In which sense is intellective knowledge said to be “more true” than scientific knowledge? A problematic comparison in Aristotle, An. Post. II 19

Abstract

At the very end of Posterior Analytics, Aristotle writes that “nothing apart from intellective knowledge (noûs) can be truer than scientific knowledge (epistēmē)”. This claim may sound problematic in consideration of the Aristotelian Principle of Exluded-Middle, which states that there are no intermediate degrees between truth and falsity. In fact, Aristotle's logic leaves no room for incremental truths, so that a more circumstantial understanding of such alleged superior truth is needed. After a critical discussion of some literature on the topic, the meaning of Aristotle’s alēthésteron (‘more true’) shall be understood here as meaning: (1) more exact because of its unitary object, (2) more certain and convincing, (3) more orientative and guiding, (4) conceptually antecedent, and, finally, (5) more causative of truth. Intellective knowledge will emerge as a non-inferential way of understanding, whose positive truth-value will always be the same as the one guaranteed by scientific knowledge.