The Innateness of Clear and Distinct Ideas

Abstract

The thesis of the innateness of ideas is one of the fundamental characteristics of Descartes’ epistemology. Because he does not provide us with its explicit definition, we are posed with the following question: Is the innateness of ideas a unitary concept, or rather a word designating elements derived from different theoretical models? In focusing on clear and distinct ideas, the aim of this article is to show that Descartes consistently uses only one theory of innate ideas. In the first part, I form a list of innate ideas and pose a series of problems, which a consistent theory of innate ideas should solve. In the second part, I show one response to these questions that can be found in Descartes’ response to a pamphlet written by his former ally, Henricus Regius. I show that Descartes derives the innate character of ideas from their potential existence in the faculty of thought. In the third part, I take into consideration an account of innateness from the Meditations and show two possible models of innateness. I conclude by noting that the model that Descartes actually follows is the one also found in his response to Regius.