The Other in the Soul

Povzetek

Most of Freud’s readers take it for granted that the question of the relation to others is completely neglected by Freudian psychology. Whereas his clinical accounts of pathological cases thoroughly relate the complex bonds that the patient weaves with others, Freud, through his metapsychological views, seems to propound an ego-focused conception: whatever the subject experiences, it stands for an inner event in a lonely self-regulated system. Taking issue with this conception, I point out that Freud has always thought the mind as an open entity which is essentially involved in exchanges with others. Based on the poorly-known developments of the posthumous publication Entwurf einer Psychologie (1895), the article begins to consider drives not as organic functions, but as claims addressed to somebody. It then refutes two common objections against the supposed Freudian solipsism, excerpted from Laplanche’s works. In its conclusion, the article outlines the philosophical stakes of Freudian thought understood as a relational