Nietzsche’s Critique of Objectivity and Its “Tools”

Abstract

The article takes as its venture-point the thesis that – whilst speaking of Nietzsche’s critique of objectivity – it is impossible to avoid the following fundamental problem: according to Nietzsche, objectivity and criticism are two facets of the same tendency that the “philosophy of the future” will have to overcome in the higher form of the philosophical “creation of new values”. From this perspective, it also becomes possible to explain Nietzsche’s decision to focus his critique in an attempt to intervene against what he calls Rangverschiebung, the “shift in rank ordering,” of the relationship between philosophy and science. Namely, by doing so, he immediately positioned the philosophical critique on a terrain that does not allow for the critique to follow its spontaneous tendency towards the ideal of objectivity. The first part of the article addresses the epistemological aspect of Nietzsche’s critique of objectivity, i.e. it explains why (and how) Nietzsche rejected all philosophical criteria of the foundation of objective understanding. The second part, by contrast, explains how it is possible, according to Nietzsche, to intervene against the ongoing process of the “shift in rank ordering” within the relationship between philosophy and science, which ultimately leads to a harmful complete monopolisation of truth by the ideal of scientific objectivity.