Kant and the Second Copernican Turn

Abstract

This article sets out from the thesis according to which the crucial issue in Kant’s “Copernican turn” in philosophy is thought’s affection by a “thing” that, while belonging to thought evades its grasp. This thesis is supported by two central issues of Kant’s philosophy. The first issue is ontological, i.e. Kant’s “transcendental difference” between phenomenon and noumenon. The second is logico-epistemological, at it core is the selfcritique of reason or the critique of the transcendental appearance, such as it is developed in the transcendental dialectics of the first Critique. Although these two issues converge in terms of problems and concepts, it is only in his Critique of Judgement that Kant succeeded to properly articulate their connection. It is this effect of connection that is grounded in the completion of the transcendental aesthetic through the sensibility of feeling and as well as logical operations of the reflective judgement that we call the additional, second “Copernican turn” of Kant’s philosophy that concludes Kant’s revolution in thinking and solves at the same time the problem of thought’s affection by its “thing”.