POPPER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Abstract

Paper tries to analyse Popper's attempt for demarcation between science and metaphysics (pseudo-science). It is shown that proposed principle of demarcation - falsification - is not enough for the justification of Popper's purpose. The application of proposed criterion leads to a paradoxical result — in the same boat there are mathematics and logic, theory of induction, different metaphysical theories and philosophy. Falsification as the principle of demarcation is successful only in the horizon of distinction between sentences of empirical and non-empirical sciences. In the second part Tarski's theory of truth is compared with Popper's interpretation of it. Popper expects too much from Tarski and somehow misinterprets his theory. The basic problem is Popper's assumption that in science the truth is pursued and that there exist objective criteria for it. However, Popper thinks also that the theory of verisimilitude can solve all the problems with correspondence and objectivity. At the end the alternative as a blend mixture between Popper's and Feyerabend's positions about the question of progress in science is defended.