CONTROVERSIES OVER THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF AESTHETICS

Abstract

One of the cardinal sins ascribed to traditional philosophical aesthetics is its normativism which is perceived as posing a danger to artistic freedom. If normativism was to be one of the cardinal sins of traditional aesthetics, then it is no wonder that, according to some proponents of analytical aesthetics, its salvation was to be found in an escape into pure descriptivism. It was to be not only free of any normativistic tendencies but free of any element of valuation, too. As a result we obtained several classificatory, axiologically neutral, definitions of art. Attempts were made at creating some purely descriptive conceptions of art which, according to their authors, were to provide a comprehensive characteristics of the artistic praxis and which, at the same time, would be devoid of any evaluative components and free of normativism. George Dickie's institutional theory of art is a classical example of this approach. But neither the institutional theory nor any other attempts at creating purely descriptive and classificatory theories of art have fulfilled the expectations and become comprehensive and satisfying theories of art. It seems that this was not a coincidence, and it couldn't have been otherwise. It should have been expected since, as Theodor Adorno has pointed out, »The idea of value-neutral aesthetics is nonsense.« I think that the general thesis which claims that aesthetics always has some normative foundations is too radical, too strong. Personally I would prefer to speak of normative aspects of aesthetics. The degree of normativity of various theories is not, as can be seen, always the same. I however, have no doubts that aesthetics is an axiological discipline and that no purely descriptive theory of art can provide a full characterization of art.