Luck and human action in Aristotle's Physics

Abstract

In Physics 2.4-6, Aristotle discusses so-called lucky events (ta apotuches) and defines them as events that occur accidentally and that are such that might have occurred by virtue of rational human action. The most controversial point of the discussion is the fact that he ascribes them the property of being for the sake of something. They are certainly not for the sake of something in the same sense in which a 'normal' teleological process is for the sake of something, i.e. in the sense that the result of the process is responsible for its occurrence. Thus, if Aristotle really believes that lucky events can be characterised as being for the sake of something, then one could rightly ask how is it possible to hold such a belief and what are his reasons for holding it. In this essay, the author suggests some answers to these questions. He tries to show that such a characterisation of lucky events is a natural consequence of the consistent application of principles that Aristotle recommends as standard to natural philosophers. He also tries to demonstrate that Aristotle actually needs lucky events described in such a manner: that the existence of lucky events described as being for the sake of something confirms his belief in the superiority of the teleological explanation of human action.