»SEEING AS« AS METAPHOR
Abstract
The article considers the relation between propositional knowledge and image; at the beginning, we review three theories which deal with this subject: Pylyshyn's, Paivio's and Kosslyn's. We accept Kosslyn's theory as most suitable for our purposes and reject the other two because they are not true to the facts. Imagery is one of the essential parts of our mental life and it is not totally reducible to propositional knowledge. In the process of forming and understanding of metaphor, both imagery and propositional knowledge are present.
Our concluding argument is that we cannot use the notion of »seeing as« in an account of metaphor because it is already metaphorical. For a correct account of metaphor, we need notions which are not themselves »laden« with metaphorical components.
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References
Donald Davidson: Inquiries into Truth and interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1984, p. 263.
Paul Ricoeur: The Rule of Metaphor, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1975, p. 213.
Earl R. Mao Cormac: A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1985, p. 141.
Zenon Pylyshyn: »What the mind’s eye tells the mind’s brain: a critique of metal imagery«, Psychological Bulletin80: 5.
Allan Paivio: Imagery and Verbal processes, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York 1971, p. 8.
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