Heidegger, Adorno, and Mimesis

Abstract

I discuss the relations between Heidegger and Adorno's Philosophies of Art by situating them against two shared backgrounds: the first is Kant's analysis of aesthetic judgment, the second is the pervasive appearance of mimesis in each of their aesthetic theories. The term mimesis will be employed in regard to Heidegger's treatment - in his »Origin of the Work of Art« - of the origin and the means by which truth »happens,« specifically when mimesis turns against itself as mere imitation. The movement of the artwork is then considered as follows: the concept of mimesis is examined in light of Heidegger's »Origin« essay to illuminate the concept and essay by placing both in relation to Adorno's Aesthetic Theory (especially the way mimesis figures there) as well as Kant's doctrine of the sublime. The movement of the artwork toward truth is presented as the movement of mimesis, in particular, as akin to the sublime's negation of what has already appeared. For Heidegger and Adorno's accounts, the mimetic movement of the artwork parallels the movement of aesthetic judgement.