Hegel and Freud: Between Aufhebung and Verneinung

Abstract

The paper analyses two concepts, or conceptual operations, coming from very different traditions and contexts. One is Freud’s concept of Verneinung, “negation”, developed in his short yet extraordinary piece bearing the same title, and the other is the Hegelian notion of Aufhebung, “sublation”, described by him as “one of the most important notions in philosophy.” The methodological approach consists in proposing a parallel staging of the two conceptual operations, against the background of which some of the singular, less obvious, yet absolutely crucial aspects of these two concepts, as well as of the broader theoretical settings within which they appear, come to light. The principal thesis of the article concerns the singular nature of double negation at work in both concepts: its ability to produce something new, and a singular object that does not exist outside this operation.