Cartesian dulism

Abstract

Descartes says that he, his mind, is really distinct from his body. His argument for the real distinction is based on the assumption that clear and distinct conception provides a reliable guide to possibility. And if he can clearly and distinctly conceive of himself as a thinking, non-extended thing in isolation from his body (and body at all), then he can infer that he, his mind, can exist apart from (his) body. It is argued against Arnauld's thesis that the adequate knowledge is necessary. It is accepted Cartesian idea of complete conceivability which provides a reasonable ground for thinking that in coenciving himself as a thinking thing, he is not only excluding the thoughts of body in conceiving himself, but even conceiving himself as lacking in bodily aspects. Therefore, a non-extended, thinking thing is a complete thing, which can exists apart from all other thing and at the same time it is an individual thing. A thing is an individual thing if it retains the functional organisation - the inner structure - in virtue of which we can ascribe to it the properties which determine what kinds of things it is. And it stays, what it is (self) - the same idividual thinking thing - from moment to moment of his thinking that he exists. Cartesian dualism is therfore categorial and functional dualism at same time.