THE LOGIC OF ILLUSION

Abstract

The paper deals with the Kantian theory of transcendental ideas, developed in the Critique of Pure reason. In the first part, it elaborates the notion of »illusion« (das Scheiri), pointing out that the »illusion« (or the »apparition«) does not refer to (false) representation of a given object. The fundamental point of the transcendental illusion is that there is no object to be (falsely or correctly) represented, we are deceived by the sheer existence of this »illusion« and not by its »content«, e.i. by what it »represents«. The second part of the paper discusses the four »figures of nothing« that Kant elaborates in the last part of the Analytic and shows the relevance of this topic for the developments in the Dialectic. The third part focuses on the »Paralogism of personality« and tries to discern in it the basic structural function of the transcendental ideas in general. The Paralogism in question is also discussed in relation to Lacanian theory of »ego-ideal«.