The Closure of Experience

Authors

  • Hanno Birken-Bertsch

Abstract

Kant ends traditional epistemology and founds the aesthetic approach. He does so by working on the distinction between representation and object. Kant denies the separatability of representation and its object. Representation and object are not separable because one cannot have an object without an representation. Kant, thus interpreted, comes very close to Goodman. Just as the object depends on the appearance, the world depends - according to Goodman — on the version. Not any version, but only true (or right) versions make worlds, is Goodman's thesis. Not imagined intuitions, but only empirical intuitions, that is, appearances, make objects, is Kant's point. Both hold that we are operating within intuitions or versions respectively. This is the closure of experience.

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Published

2016-01-21

How to Cite

Birken-Bertsch, H. (2016). The Closure of Experience. Filozofski Vestnik, 13(2). Retrieved from https://ojs.zrc-sazu.si/filozofski-vestnik/article/view/3828

Issue

Vol. 13 No. 2 (1992): The Actuality of Kant

Section

Articles

License

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