Ratio Cognoscendi and Ratio Essendi

Some Remarks on Descartes’ Notions of Analysis and Synthesis

Abstract

Descartes’ conception of the distinction between the analytic and synthetic method is one of the more enigmatic themes of his oeuvre. The problem in the secondary literature usually boils down to two questions: First, what exactly does Descartes mean by analysis and synthesis, or, to what extent does he owe his conception of analysis to the Greek geometers? And second, in which writings does he use one or the other? Descartes' own writings raise more questions than they answer. The paper first analyses some classic passages that address the question of method, problematising Gueroult’s symmetrical scheme in which analysis is supposed to belong to the order of knowledge and synthesis to the order of things. Although Descartes considered analysis to be the more appropriate method of metaphysics, he did not completely renounce synthetic explanations. In the paper we suggest that, in addition to the brief summary, more geometrico, of some proofs in the Second Replies, synthesis is to be sought in Descartes’ physics, although Descartes himself nowhere reflects on this methodologically.