Dve
domovini

Two
homelands

DVE
domovini
RAZPRAVE O IZSELJENSTVU

TWO
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MIGRATION STUDIES

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UVODNIK

V rokah držite novo številko revije *Dve Domovini/Two Homelands*. Tokrat nekoliko drugačno, tako, kot si jo je zamislilo novo uredništvo, a z vsebinami, ki še naprej posegajo na področje migracij. Zanimajo nas slovenski izseljenci, a tudi priseljenci v Slovenijo, zgodovina in trenutni migracijski tokovi, veliki migracijski sistemi in dramatične zgodbe posameznikov.

Negujemo torej teme, do sedaj že zastopane na straneh *Dveh domovin/Two Homelands*, in odpiramo nekatere nove, ki so šele v zadnjih nekaj letih vstopile v fokus migracijskih študij.

Novo uredništvo sestavljamo dva urednika tematskih sklopov in glavni urednik. Kot lahko vidite, smo si nekaj dela uspeli razdeliti, nekaj pa ga moramo še vedno opraviti skupaj. Dr. Kristina Toplak je prevzela odgovornost za tematski sklop »The 'Western Balkans': legacies, practices, policies and identity strategies vis-à-vis the process of nation building«. Dr. Jernej Mlekuž je uredil nova navodila avtorjem ter poskrbel za novo podobo revije. Glavni urednik dr. Jure Gombač pa nosim odgovornost za kvalitetno opravljeno delo in za to, da bo poleg naših stalnih revijo v roke vzel tudi kakšen nov bralec.

Na tem mestu se je seveda treba zahvaliti dr. Marjanu Drnovšku, bivšemu uredniku, ki nam je v roke predal urejeno ter uveljavljeno revijo, dr. Marini Lukšič Hacin, ki nam še naprej nudi gostoljubje na Inštitutu za slovensko izseljenstvo ZRC SAZU ter našim glavnim podpornikom, Uradu Vlade Republike Slovenije za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu ter Javni agenciji za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

Naslednji dve leti bomo torej z revijo pluli po različnih migracijskih tokovih ter se skušali izogniti čerem, brzicam in vrtincem na naši poti. V kolikšni meri nam bo to uspevalo bo razvidno tudi iz vašega odziva, pripomb, kritik, predlogov ter prispevkov, ki nam jih boste poslali. Nova številka je torej pred vami, mi pa načrtujemo nove podvige.

<div align="right">

Jure Gombač
Jernej Mlekuž
Kristina Toplak

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TEMATSKI SKLOP

THE "WESTERN BALKANS": LEGACIES, PRACTICES, POLICIES AND IDENTITY STRATEGIES VIS-À-VIS THE PROCESS OF NATION BUILDING

ZAHODNI BALKAN: ZAPUŠČINE, PRAKSE, POLITIKE IN IDENTITETNE STRATEGIJE VIS-À-VIS PROCESU OBLIKOVANJA NACIJ

THE "WESTERN BALKANS": LEGACIES, PRACTICES, POLICIES AND IDENTITY STRATEGIES VIS-À-VIS THE PROCESS OF NATION BUILDING

Tanja PETROVIĆ[1]

The thematic section *The "Western Balkans": Legacies, Practices, Policies and Identity Strategies vis-à-vis the Process of Nation Building* resulted from a need of researchers from the Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts who are participating in the project *The Impact of Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Religious Factors on Peace and Stability in the Western Balkans* (target research programme "Science for Peace and Security 2006–2010") to articulate basic theoretical postulates that enable consistent and ideologically unburdened reflection on processes that are going on the in the "Western Balkans".[2]

The dissolution of Social Federative Yugoslavia and the emerging of new borders, new nation states and new national identities have intensified discourses of Balkanism (Todorova 1997) that maintain an image of the Balkans as a problematic, conflict-ridden, underdeveloped region populated by ethnic groups whose behaviour is motivated by mutual hatred and irrationality. The process of nation building, which lies at the root of developments in the Balkans in recent decades, is however essentially a Western European phenomenon. As Todorova (1997) argues, what happened in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s is not an expression of some violent Balkan essence, but actually the end of the Balkans (in the sense of its Ottoman legacy) and the final Europeization of this region.

The characteristics of the emerging, restructuring, and negotiation of national identities in the Balkans are to be explained with help of the historical legacies shared by

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[2] In the political discourse, especially referring to the EU enlargement processes, the Western Balkans most often includes Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia (and Kosovo), Montenegro, and Albania – i.e. the countries that are still not members of the European Union and are at different stages of accession to the EU. I accept this term only technically and thus use it within quotation marks to indicate that it is problematic from a historical and anthropological point of view, since it is characterized by an empty, or negative content: it tells what the countries included are not – namely EU members – and not what they have in common, and thus disregards categories of common historical legacy, which, following Todorova (2004, 2005) I consider crucially important in dealing with national and cultural identities in the Balkans and elsewhere.

the Balkan societies – the Ottoman legacy, the Yugoslav legacy for the former Yugoslav republics and the Socialist legacy that includes Albania as a member of this group.

The nature of the supra-national Yugoslav identity and the dynamic of the national and the supra-national in the former Yugoslavia is discussed in the article by Hannes Grandits, who chooses a historical perspective to explain the reasons for nation-building activities during socialism in Yugoslavia, and shows that despite the presence of the supra-national ideology of Yugoslavism and the rhetoric to the "class question", in which ethnic issues were supposed to become obsolete, national identities were in some cases established (Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia), and in others supported (Montenegro) and strengthened (Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia) under the "roof" of Yugoslav federation. Comparing the Yugoslav and Soviet socialist systems, Grandits shows that rather than being resolved politically, "national problems" were simply transformed into new frameworks. Surprisingly enough, Yugoslavism as an ideology does not represent a constant in Yugoslav socialism: while supported in the 1950s by the high ranking politicians, this trend was replaced by the "nationalization" of the six constituent republics in 1960s. This process of nationalization was intensified by the 1974 constitution, when competences were transferred from the federal level to the level of the republics and autonomous provinces. We may argue that this process took its final shape with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, through ethnic conflicts that led to emergence of new states, new borders, new national languages and parallel processes of ethnic homogenization and cultural heterogenization that were conducted through voluntary and forced migrations that became a "trademark" for the demographic situation in the former Yugoslav lands.[3]

Most of articles in this thematic section deal with Kosovo – a fact that comes as no surprise, not only because Kosovo is a hot issue on the political agenda right now, and an emerging state where nation-building activities and policies may be observed "in vivo", but also because of the complex and multidirectional ethnic processes that took part in this region. Although the perception of the situation in Kosovo has for a long time been reduced to a conflict between Serbs and Albanians, the region is characterized by a multitude and heterogeneity of ethnic and cultural identities. As argued by Ger Duijzings, who did extensive research in Kosovo, during the last few decades the society has experienced "long-term shifts in identification processes, from predominantly localized religious identities towards predominantly ethnic and national identities, as well as the shift from cultural complexity towards homogenization and the emerging of clear boundaries" (Dejzings 2005: 6). These shifts are intrinsically related to the nation-building process.

Mojca Vah addresses another, recently introduced model of nation-building in the Balkans – the one conducted by the international community through its institutions, and by applying models of governance and policies without paying considerable respect to local circumstances, relations and existing practices. Vah provides a broader context

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[3] The complementary processes of ethnic homogenization and cultural heterogenization related to forced migrations in the former Yugoslavia are discussed in detail in Čapo-Žmegač (2002) and Petrović (2006).

for the activities of the international community in areas with ethnic conflicts, pointing out insufficiencies of proposed measures in the most recent case – the UNMIK mission in Kosovo conducted in cooperation with the EU, OSCE and KFOR.

Since Barth's seminal work (1969), students of ethnicity and nationalism have been aware of the importance of boundaries and delimiting *us* from *others* for the formation of national and other collective identities. These boundaries and mechanisms of delimitation are, however, by no means stable and unchangeable. We may thus speak of a gradation of otherness as an important means of negotiation of one's local and/or national identity. Discourses on otherness are the focus of the articles by Tanja Petrović and Biljana Sikimić.

Petrović's article deals with those groups in Kosovo which do not fit into the two available nation-building models – the Serbian and the Albanian – and outlines the dynamics between the discourses articulated by the Serbian political and academic elites engaged in the nation-building and the identity strategies of the members of these communities. The article by Biljana Sikimić provides a complementary picture, offering an analysis of images of the other formed at the local level, by Serbs living in the Prilužje enclave. She illustrates the importance of traditional culture in understanding identity processes and shows that the gradation of otherness is present not only in the discourse that ideologically shapes national identity, but also in the domain of traditional culture, on the local and everyday level. Here, this gradation underlies the logic of the functioning of traditional culture and in social norms (such as role of the other in traditional rituals and customs, presence/absence of intermarriage etc.).

The articles by Petrović and Sikimić both underscore the importance of historical memory, on the national and local level respectively. While on the local level the historical memory of the Battle of Kosovo is used to explain relations between "the clans" and justify the cultural patterns used (restriction of intermarriage etc.), transferred to the national level, the same historical memory becomes the foundation of the Serbian national identity (cf. Bakić-Hayden 2004; Dejzings 2005) and functions as "a principal tool of explanation, legitimation and mobilisation" in the nation-building process (Todorova 2004: 3). This parallel functioning of the same historical memory by no means implies that the nation-building process does not affect local relations and realities: it will suffice to mention the demographic situation in Kosovo, which changed dramatically in 1980s and 1990s. Ethnic violence not only caused forced movements of Serbs and Albanians, but numerous ethnic groups left the region, being unable to identify with the available national identities at the moment the pressure to identify nationally was high. A curious example of this kind is the resettlement of the Circassians (*Čerkezi*) from Kosovo to the Russian republic of Adigya (Sikimić 2004). The resettlement of Croats from the town of Janjevo (*Janjevci*) and from Letnica in the early 1990s is related both to the processes of ethnic homogenization in Kosovo and to ethnic processes in the broader framework of the former Yugoslavia: the *Janjevci* were settled in Zagreb and the inhabitants of Letnica moved into houses left by Serbs in Slavonia (cf. Šiljković and Glamuzina 2004; Dejzings 2005). A significant number of Roma and the Gorani also left Kosovo during the last two decades. Such drastic reduction of ethnic diversity in Kosovo has had an important

impact on people's everyday lives and practices in the sphere of the traditional culture. The ethnic stratification of Kosovo was followed by professional stratification: members of particular ethnic groups were assigned particular trades (the *Janjevci* were craftsmen producing jewellery, the inhabitants of Sirinića Župa were builders etc.). Members of other ethnic groups were important agents in religious rituals, and the religious life in Kosovo was characterized by a high extent of mutuality and interaction: people belonging to different religions visited both Orthodox and Catholic sanctuaries and worshiped the same saints (Dejzings 2005). Significant changes on the local level also appear as a consequence of ignoring local relations and cultural patterns in the process of nation-building imposed "from above" by the institutions of the international community, as Mojca Vah points out in her article.

Nataša Gregorič-Bon also examines the dialectics between various levels of identification. In her article, the relationship between local and national is complicated by two additional levels – regional and supra-national, the latter relating to the context of the EU. The inhabitants of the village of Dhërmi/Drimades in southern Albania articulate local discourses in which they map their space in relation to regional, national and supra-national frameworks. The constant renegotiation of social and spatial boundaries is to a certain extent conditioned by the high mobility of the villagers (many of them temporarily work in Greece and elsewhere in the EU) and double – Greek and Albanian – tools of identity management which they have at their disposal (such as Special Identity Cards of Greek origin that enable them unrestricted movement in the EU countries, Greek pensions and health insurance).

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DYNAMICS OF SOCIALIST NATION-BUILDING: THE SHORT LIVED PROGRAMME OF PROMOTING A YUGOSLAV NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SOME COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

Hannes GRANDITS[1]

ABSTRACT
Dynamics of Socialist Nation-Building: The Short Lived Programme of Promoting a Yugoslav National Identity and Some Comparative Perspectives
Adopting a historical perspective, the article discusses the politics of nation building in Socialist Yugoslavia and the dialectics between Yugoslav national identity and national identities developed in the Federation's constitutive republics.
KEYWORDS: nation building, socialism, Yugoslavia

IZVLEČEK
Dinamika socialističnega oblikovanja nacij: Kratkotrajni program promocije jugoslovanske nacionalne identitete in nekateri primerjalni vidiki
Prispevek s historičnega vidika obravnava politike oblikovanja nacij v socialistični Jugoslaviji in dialektiko med jugoslovansko nacionalno identiteto in nacionalnimi identitetami, ki so bile oblikovane ali podpirane v posameznih republikah federativne države.
KLJUČNE BESEDE: oblikovanje nacij, socializem, Jugoslavija

For decades many believed that socialism – as the dominant ideology and political reality in South-eastern and Eastern Europe during the second half of the twentieth century – had resolved existing ethnic conflicts and the "national question", by concentrating on the (rhetoric of the) class struggle. However, by the beginning of the 1990s, even some experts were relatively surprised to observe the emergence of a multiplicity of national(istic) movements, which in many places led to violent conflicts: the breakdown of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took place during a dreadful war, in a more or less conflict-torn manner numerous new nation-states came into being with the collapse of the USSR, and the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation occurred during the course of an increasingly nationalistic polemic.

Contrary to what the leading Communist elite have declared for decades, Titoism in Yugoslavia or the Pax Sovietica in the Eastern Bloc have clearly not managed to overcome the "national problem". Although the histories of national or ethnic conflicts in South-

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eastern and Eastern Europe often reach back long before the period of real socialism, it appears that in the socialist decades, rather than being resolved politically, many "national problems" were simply transformed into new frameworks.

Various approaches can further our understanding of the boom in nationalistic movements after 1989. On the one hand, it makes sense to focus on the social dynamics that accompanied the breakdown of the socialist system and led to an increasingly nationalistic social reality during the course of the 1990s. Such approaches could be termed as more "contemporary" or "process oriented" and illustrate, for instance, how emerging nationalistic discourses are closely linked with new power relations and agency rationalities. No doubt, such research on political, social, and cultural dynamics promises to provide us with deeper insights into the complexities of the mentioned "nationalistic" turn after 1989.

Another way to deal with the mentioned wave of nationalism is to approach this problem through a more diachronic or "historical" analysis. Well-founded knowledge about the "national question" in different situations from the past can undoubtedly reveal important insights – including, indirectly, into the logic of the post 1989 national(istic) renaissance and nation-building dynamics.

For the purpose of this article I will adopt such a historical perspective. The paper concentrates on a historical re-consideration of the deeper reasons for nation-building activities during socialist rule, and, in principle, the following crucial question is somehow at the centre of interest: Why did the "national question" remain – despite the rhetorical turn to the "class question" – so immensely important, even in the socialist power system (so that in some situations it entered the centre of political life)?

In this article I will approach this question by discussing in particular nation-building politics in the former Yugoslavia and specifically one initiative: the attempt to create a "national Yugoslavism". This short-lived project, which was initiated in the second half of the 1950s and then suddenly stopped in the 1960s, might help to provide insights into certain decisions that were made about "nation-building" during the socialist period (and how these decisions strongly influenced further developments of the national question in the country). In the latter part of the article I will place the Yugoslav case into a wider comparative context. The hypotheses put forward at the end of the text still need to be seen as "work in progress", requiring verification in a further research process.[2]

THE IRRITATION: TITO'S REJECTION OF A "YUGOSLAV NATION" AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS IN 1964

The following excerpt from a speech by Josip Broz Tito, party leader and president of socialist Yugoslavia, can be helpful with regards to the issue of "national relations" in socialist Yugoslavia at the height of so-called "Titoism". The quoted extract is from a general statement made by Tito at the eighth Congress of the League of Communists in 1964:

> The content of our [national] relations has to be of a kind where the Brotherhood and Unity of our peoples can develop further. However, there are persons, even communists, who have already become tired of this strong slogan of our People's Liberation War and who believe that nations have already been superseded by our socialist social development and that they actually should pass away [literally should 'die off' ('odumru')]. But these people are mistaking the union of our people with the liquidation of our nations and want the formation of something new and artificial: a uniform Yugoslav nation [emphasis mine]. … I know that only some are probably concerned, but these few can cause great damage. Insofar as these few are within our League of Communists, it has to be said, that there is no place for them among us, because they are harmful.3

This drastic statement was received with surprise and generated feelings of deep insecurity – in particular within the Party, but also in the broader spheres of society. Federal, republic, and district party leadership institutions were swamped with inquiries as to how Tito's statement should be understood, and there was concern that there would be no place in the Party for people who felt that they belonged first of all to a Yugoslav nation.

In previous years people had been accustomed to Tito and most other party leaders holding a decidedly "pro-Yugoslav" position. This was also very much the case at the Congress of the League of Communists in April 1958. At this Congress the "national relations" within the country were allocated only minor importance. This was in stark contrast with the Congress of 1964, where the national question assumed a crucial position. Tito alone devoted almost one third of his principal statement to it. Seen retrospectively, the time between the two congresses in question, i.e. the late 1950s and early 1960s, undoubtedly has to be seen as a decisive turning point in the handling of the national question in socialist Yugoslavia.

IN RETROSPECTIVE: ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF NATIONAL POLICY IMMEDIATELY AFTER WWII

With the seizure of power towards and after the end of the Second World War, the victorious Communist Party began, as is generally known, to endow the six nationally

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3 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ)/507-VII-A-CKSKJ I/VIII-K.1/2, 31–32.

defined republics with all the symbolic aspects of national communities. This took place within the framework of a federatively organised Socialist People's Republic and under the slogan of Brotherhood and Unity. Particularly in the three southern republics – which were approached with a discourse of "belated development" – the new regime just proceeded to systematically build up these nations. This is especially true for the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. After 1944/45 the standard literary Macedonian language was codified, "national" historiographical, literary, and ethnographic traditions were embarked upon, and the symbols and institutions – that a republic "needs" – were created and founded. In many respects this was also the case for Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Why, after the Second World War, did the national policy develop in this manner? At this point it shall suffice to refer to the following two reasons:

a) It was an attempt to create a new "national equilibrium" in the Yugoslav state through the formation of new nations. The introduction of a federative structure and the establishment of several new "national" republics were to help ease the smouldering nationalistic antagonisms of the interwar period, which had so brutally escalated during the Second World War. To some degree this solution was also just a pragmatic consequence of the course of the so-called Yugoslav People's Liberation War.

b) Nevertheless, the described approach to the national policy also explicitly followed the ideologically defined goals of socialism. In particular, the ideology of the emancipation of the "oppressed" "small nations" as an evolutionary step for realising the communist future was a very important source of legitimisation for such a policy. The discursive and real orientation of the model of the Soviet Union and Stalin's nation-building policy (later "exported" also by the strategic policy of the Comintern) can hardly be overlooked, and thus this aspect will be taken into further consideration in the comparative perspectives below.

THE BASIC PROBLEM: "NATIONALISATION" OF THE POPULATION

While establishing institutions according to national principles was still relatively easy to accomplish in the three above-mentioned socialist republics (this was also partly furthered by a relatively developed "national orientation" within parts of the regional party elite), the objectives of the Party – to "nationalise" the respective populations as fast as possible – did not proceed without a fair share of problems. All three new republics of the Yugoslav South were, when considering their ethnic, linguistic, and confessional composition, far from homogenous. In addition to a Slav-Orthodox majority, which was the focus of socialist "Macedonisation", Macedonia also had Albanian-speaking, mainly Muslim populations, as well as Serbian, Turkish, so-called Torbesh (Slavic-speaking Muslim), Aromanian and Roma populations. In Montenegro, the Slav-Orthodox majority was more pronounced, although there were also different minority populations. And here it was unclear whether the Slav-Orthodox population of the country would be more sympathetic to a "Serbian" national self-ascription or a "Montenegrin" one.

In Bosnia the constellation seemed to be even more complicated, with a considerable part of the population regarding itself as Serbian, and others who associated themselves with the Croatian nation. These two groups constituted the majority of the republic's population. However, the largest single population group were the Slavic-speaking Muslims, whose national affiliation was still undecided. In the beginning, the Communist leadership urged their Muslim Party members to declare themselves either as belonging to the Serbian or to the Croatian nation. A considerable number of them did indeed do so during the first censuses after the Second World War in 1948 and 1953, but during the 1950s a new social dynamic gained relevance with regard to this question. Beyond affecting the national self-identification of Muslim Party members in Bosnia and the Muslim population in general, it became a major trend in larger segments of Yugoslav society. It seemed to be particularly marked in the urban populations of the rapidly growing cities throughout the country. This phenomenon can be described as the development of "national Yugoslavism".

NATIONAL YUGOSLAVISM: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND IDEOLOGICAL PROJECT

The following quotation, from one of the meetings from the "Ideological Commission" of the Central Committee of the League of Communists, is helpful in illustrating the above-mentioned dynamic. This commission, which took over the heritage of the central "Agitprop" institution during the 1950s and was to later become increasingly thematically differentiated, was responsible for finding proper ideological guidelines for the social and political problems that had been raised. At the beginning of one of the meetings in 1960, an internal speaker introduced the (national) problem and began his statement by making reference to the (Bosnian) Muslims, who were actually the topic of that meeting, but his considerations went immediately beyond them:

> The large majority of the Muslims, particularly in Bosnia, have not declared themselves nationally and the process of national assignment is not going into the direction of a self-ascription as Serbs, Croats etc. There are also cases where Muslims, usually members of the League of Communists, who previously declared themselves as Serbs, Croats, etc. and nowadays declare themselves as "Yugoslavs". Even some Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins etc. have recently started to declare themselves as "Yugoslavs". This is particularly characteristic for the youth, which can be seen very clearly by a recent opinion poll, carried out on this topic by the editorial board of [the magazine] "Mladost".
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> Since there are more and more mixed marriages – today about ten percent of all marriages in the Federative Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) are mixed marriages – for many it appears most normal that the children of these marriages declare themselves as "Yugoslavs".
>
> Furthermore, according to the opinion of some, it is seen as a sign of progressive-

ness to declare oneself as "Yugoslav" and not as a member of a nation, since the national consciousness was born on a lower level of societal development and will ultimately be overcome with the development of socialism and socialist social relations anyhow. Many who support this notion also feel that it should also be made possible for Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, etc, to declare themselves as "Yugoslavs", should they wish so.4

Later in the course of the meeting's discussion the topic was discussed in further detail with regard to the Bosnian Muslims. Already at an earlier occasion, during an inspection tour in Bosnia, the Ideological Commission gave instructions to the Bosnian Party comrades, which were written down in the commission's documentation in this way:

> We have said there that they can register as Yugoslavs. In the schools it is requested from the children that they declare themselves [nationally]. Also the statisticians complain that there is a problem about the different criteria within the population [to decide upon nationality] at the censuses, and that they would wish that this would have been already discussed thoroughly. It is a fact that nobody would be bothered by declaring himself as Yugoslav. One needs to talk with this regard with Kardelj [the chief-ideologist with regard to national questions in the Party] and we need to go at hand to them [the comrades in Bosnia] on that score. 5

As is generally known, the Bosnian Muslims were not recognised nationally as "Yugoslavs", but as a separate nation under the designation of "Musliman" (Muslim) in the 1960s (later, during the war of the 1990s "Bošnjak" (Bosniac) replaced "Musliman" as national self-ascription).

But as the above quotations illustrate, in the late 1950s there were clear tendencies for the formation of a Yugoslav nation, and respectively there were quite a few social groups that had a favourable view of this development. Apart from the here discussed Bosnian Muslims these were, for instance, children and partners in mixed marriages, obviously considerable parts of the youth, and also larger parts of the Party members seemed to have quite positive feelings vis-à-vis this "advanced development" in the national question.

But which official position did the Party assume towards this development? During the initial stages it was an explicitly positive one, although this position changed drastically at a later stage. Before we go into this more deeply, let us make mention of the constraints that the Yugoslav society, economy, and particularly the leadership of the Party saw itself confronted with at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s. At that time Yugoslavia seemed to have overcome the conflict with Soviet policy. The economic embargo implemented by the Soviet Union and the Comecon states as a consequence of the conflict with the Yugoslav Communists in the late 1940s brought the country to the verge of an economic collapse. But in the course of the 1950s the Yugoslav leadership managed to ease the conflict step

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[4] AJ/ 507-A-CK SKJ, VIII, II/2-b-142 (1–7) 1960.IX.23.
[5] AJ/ 507-A-CK SKJ, VIII, II/2-b-102 (1–2) (K-6).

by step. Moreover, this external confrontation had even managed to generate solidarity amongst the Yugoslav society with its Communist leadership. With substantial economic aid from the USA, the Yugoslav Communist leadership was able to overcome the threat of being "re-integrated" under Soviet control and gradually found a new place between the blocs of the Cold War. In the later 1950s, Yugoslavia joined the ranks of the countries with the fastest economic growth in the world (with yearly economic growth rates of between ten and fifteen percent).

As a result of such a "successful" development, which was increasingly accompanied by optimism on behalf of much of the population (cf. Grandits 2000), the Communist leadership, which was thirsty for action, turned to new challenges in its political mission: with the system of "worker self-management", an independent way for realising a socialist order was intensively discussed and also increasingly implemented (cf. for details Höpken 1984). The government, which despite being a federative state in reality functioned very centralistically and in many respects was very Stalinist up to the late 1950s, underwent a noticeable "liberalisation". As a further stage of development, the leadership of the Party supported the changes – since they seemed to be a movement "from below" – for speeding up efforts in the formation of "socialist Yugoslavism" as a "national feeling".[6]

The "nationalisation" of the six constituent republics under a federative roof and strong central control, so strongly promoted in the one-and-half decades after WWII, should now give way to the concept of socialist Yugoslavism. And the Party was instructed by its leadership to set on work this concept at first in cultural life (cf. Shoup 1968: 193f.). The institutional implementation of this new integrative concept of nation soon showed positive results. The biggest success was no doubt the agreement of the leading linguists and literature experts from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Montenegro that they spoke variants of a common Serbo-Croatian language in Novi Sad in 1954 and the publication of a common orthography of the Serbo-Croatian (or Croato-Serbian) language in 1960 (cf. Okuka 1998: 78). It seemed that – despite sometimes irritating "interjections" from artistic, and respectively intellectual, dissidents (that the regime seemed to have under good control at that time) – there were enough social groups that supported the embarked way. At that time among others they also included the majority of the historians, who following the initiative of the Party joined an inter-republican Yugoslav historian association, worked on a Yugoslav encyclopaedia and at the beginning of the 1960s began publishing a Yugoslav historical journal.[7]

But resistance to the ongoing development began to form within the Party itself. This resistance was in principle not necessarily "nationally" justified. On the one hand the loosening of the central control on the economy and the increasing experimentation with the self-management system went against the grain of the so-called "liberalisation

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[6] Also the image of the country promoted to the international world obtained such a character, which can be very illustratively seen in the self-portrayal of Yugoslavia at the first world's fair after the Second World War, which took place in Brussels in 1958. Cf. in detail AJ/56-Generalni komisarijat Jugoslovenske sekcije opšte međunarodne izložbe u Briselu 1954–1959. Fasc. 7, 21, 24.

[7] Cf. for details AJ/ 684 – Savez istoričara Jugoslavije. Kut. 2–6.

opponents". These people began to group around the long-term Minister of the Interior, chief of the secret services, and at that time potentially a secret candidate for Tito's succession, Alexander Ranković. This group was increasingly worried about its future position in the Party and wanted to hold on the "tried and true" federatively organised rule under strong centralist control. On the other hand criticism was increasingly put forward about the management of the country's economic development by factions of the party leaders at the level of the republics. This was also caused by the fact that – despite industrial mega-projects in and massive flows of resources to, for instance, Montenegro, Macedonia or Bosnia – the differences in the standards of living between the republics of the north and those from the south had not really begun to shrink – on the contrary.[8]

POLITICAL U-TURN: THE PARTY'S RENUNCIATION OF THE PROJECT OF NATIONAL YUGOSLAVISM

The complete turnaround in policy towards the "Yugoslav nation" needs to be understood against the background of such diverging opinions about the "right line" for future socialist policy within the Party. Its abandonment was to some degree accepted as a kind of "collateral damage" in the political power games. In the course of the 1960s Tito obviously felt his dominant position within the Party too much put in question by Ranković and the adherents of an anti-liberal, respectively "centralist" policy. In such a situation, presumably also in an attempt to re-strengthen his own position, Tito decided to strongly back the political course that was anticipated by his chief ideologist Edward Kardelj. Kardelj's option foresaw a far-reaching progression of the system of worker self-management under the premises of federal de-centralisation (cf. here Jović 2003: 131–154). As a consequence of this decision, Ranković was openly accused of working towards the establishment of a centralist hegemony and "Greater Serbian" unitarianism. He was relieved of his position and finally expelled from the Party. This whole internal Party conflict was increasingly accompanied by a polemic against every kind of "exaggerated centralism", which was portrayed as the reason for all (economic) troubles. Yugoslavism as a national and "centralist" concept, up to then systematically promoted by the Party, fell victim to this Party conflict and the accompanying "anti-centralist rhetoric" (although Tito in later years and up to his death spoke nostalgically on many occasions about the idea of Yugoslavism).

The later progressing policy of decentralisation has to be seen closely linked to the growing importance that the leadership was willing to give to the development of its subsequently key prestige project: worker self-management. This project had been started already in the 1950s, but was now in the course of the 1960s affirmed as the key feature in realising the Yugoslav path to a socialist society and implemented step by step regardless of the consequences. In theory the development of self-management should

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[8] Kosovo was economically lagging far behind all other Yugoslav regions even from the South. Cf. here the numbers in Singleton 1976: 241–259.

have proceeded continuously to the point at which the working population would ideally have had the power to participate in all their affairs so that the state could sooner or later "die off" (Jović 2003).

The wider population experienced all these decentralisation and self-management policies together with two other policies/developments, which from the perspective of many made an even greater impact on their daily lives: a further expansion of the state welfare system and the increasing development of a consumer culture, which reached larger parts of the population in the 1960s. Although the "Yugoslav" consumer culture – actually an anachronistic feature in a socialist state – advanced in a markedly "Western" fashion (for an illustration of this it is enough to mention here, for instance, the shopping trips of masses of Yugoslavs to the shopping centres in neighbouring Western cities like Trieste or the very much "western" designed marketing industry), it's development was systematically but quietly supported by the regime's policy (cf. Patterson 2001). All these developments seem to have been received – despite the presence of economic problems and shortages – with approval across broad parts of the population.

The various reform plans and policies "for realising a better socialist future" became omnipresent in the Party-controlled public discourse throughout much of the 1960s. But especially the political decision to change the functioning of the state machinery in the direction of decentralisation opened up topics that a majority of Yugoslavs (including within the (Party-)elites) considered as having been already closed: the inner-Yugoslav distribution of power and closely bound to it again the "national question". The more decision-making powers were delegated to lower levels of the self-management, the more the role of the party leaders at local, regional and republic level was upgraded. It was in such a situation that the almost global anti-authoritarian wave of (youth) protest against the "system" (in the West the "1968 revolutions") reached Yugoslavia. It met a regime that was not willing to make any concessions to claimed "democratic" freedoms and was far from putting into question the absolute power monopoly of the Party. But the regime began to compensate for this in promising and later on also granting increasing "national freedoms". This was the atmosphere in which the idea of a socialist Yugoslavism was finally replaced by the concept of the unity of the Yugoslav nations and nationalities. The whole process of political change finally found its conclusion in the adoption of the constitution of 1974. This constitution massively transferred decision-making powers from the central Party institutions to the Party elites of the nationally defined constituent republics. At the latest from this period on these party elites at the republic level increasingly concentrated their activities more or less only on "their republic", and more and more competed for getting as much as possible from the overall state budget for their republic. Such a logic soon led to a rhetoric that became occupied with "national arguments" claiming for "just" national symmetries and quotas.

This development not only had consequences for the political power games, but became increasingly relevant for the daily life of the people. Something similar also became (again) observable for many regions in Yugoslavia, as has been summarised by Yuri Slezkine, for the USSR of the 1970s and 1980s:

Every Soviet citizen was born into a certain nationality, took it to day care and through high school, had it officially confirmed at the age of sixteen and then carried it to the grave with thousands of application forms, certificates, questionnaires and reception desks. It made a difference in school admissions and it could be crucial in employment, promotions and draft assignments. (Slezkine 1994–450)[9]

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES: IDEOLOGICAL ENTANGLEMENT AND PRAGMATIC IMPLEMENTATION

If we try to see the outlined development in Yugoslavia in relation to other socialist states, it is obvious – and the above discussion should have made this clear – how many specific characteristics the Yugoslav case had. Nevertheless, it is also possible to note corresponding features in the national or "ethnic" policies of other multi-national socialist states. This also had to do with the entanglement of socialist policy in South-eastern and Eastern Europe, which existed over many decades throughout the twentieth century.

The entanglement of national policies under socialism: how did this work?

These entanglements must be seen on different layers: biographical and power-political, and also ideological ones. Tito, as well as other leading Yugoslav communists, spent quite some time in the USSR in the period between WWI and WWII. There they closely monitored the implementation of Stalin's national policy and personally witnessed how nation building (*natsional'oe stroitel'stvo*) was carried out on a large scale in the early USSR. While in Tsarist times the population had been classified and ruled according to the categories of religion and language, the Soviet leaders wanted to break with this tradition after they assumed power. "Nation" should be the progressive, modern and new crucial principle of categorisation. For this purpose the different nationalities of the huge former Russian Empire (at the beginning of the twentieth century about 65 of the 140 million inhabitants of the Russian Empire were not Russians) had to be identified and in some cases also invented. In preparation for the first state-wide census of the Soviet Union in 1926, in which the population was to be counted according to nationality for the first time, the Soviet leadership (in realising the new constitution of the USSR) sent out ethnographers, statisticians and linguists throughout the huge country from Minsk to Vladivostok. They were ordered to identify which clans, tribes or nationalities belonged to which nation. In doing so the experts proceeded with relative "flexibility". Following the ideological position, to give "national freedom" (which was quite widely defined) to the people, the Soviet policy under Stalin established a multiplicity of ethno-territorially classified administrative units already in the 1920s. In the 1930s, in view of the difficulty

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[9] Cf. for the working of such a policy of ethnicisation in everyday Soviet life see for instance Karklins 1986: 101–153.

of handing such an abundance of recognised nations, nationalities and national minorities – which spoke 192 recognised languages – it was decided, for pragmatic reasons, to only focus on the most important nations and nationalities. In the various republic territories, the nation-building processes of the titular nations of the respective republic were strongly pushed forward (although despite a strong reduction, a large number of autonomous regions on a national basis continued to exist) (cf. Hirsch 1997: 251–278). Towards the end of the 1930s, almost all the republics already had their own national union of writers, national theatres and scientific academies and institutions, which intensively embarked on producing the national histories, literature and languages of their republic (Slezkine 1994: 447).

Tito – like some other Yugoslav communist top cadres and so many of the communist politicians who came to power after 1945 in the different states of Eastern and South-eastern Europe – spent several years in the Soviet Union during this period of intensive nation building. It is unlikely that this was without influence on his visions about national policy, and the practical reality was that the Soviet Union served as the glorious role model that had to be followed – not to mention the directives of the Comintern which were also to be implemented (cf. here Shoup 1968: 35–59; cf. here also Sperber 1984.) Even when Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Union in 1948 and began to work on realising a "different" kind of socialism than the Soviet Union, a certain ideological orientation towards the Soviet political ideology remained even then (although presenting the Yugoslav application of socialist ideology as the much more appropriate way). For instance, Edward Kardelj, the repeatedly mentioned ideologist of national and self-management policy in socialist Yugoslavia, related his theoretical legitimisation of the appropriate principle for future national policies in Yugoslavia of the 1960s and 1970s closely to Stalin's so influential theoretical work on "Marxism and the National Question" (see Stalin 1950 [1913]: 26–93). He did this also for the purpose of appropriately "defending" the planned and later adopted course for national policies in the Yugoslav context (cf. for instance Kardelj 1958).

This strong ideological commitment to the fundaments of communist ideological development (and that meant throughout the whole socialist world also the orientation towards the Soviet example) needs no doubt to be emphasised as a very significant element of the socialist nation-building policy. Socialist nation-building policies in the countries of Eastern and South-eastern Europe were always very much ideologically driven, were legitimised with many references to socialist theoreticians on the national question – from Marx, Otto Bauer, to Lenin, Stalin … and in the Yugoslav case Kardelj – and were per se actually convinced that the national problem would become obsolete in the socialist future. On the path to such a condition – as a transient stage in the development – the importance of the national was admitted, whereas the national in a socialist society always needed to be (according to Stalin's axiom) only "national in the form, but socialist in content".

Pragmatic implementation of ideological premises

In the practical experience of daily politics, the above-mentioned ideological foundations were, however, often quite practically "adapted" to the daily political needs of the Party. National policy was namely also one of the crucial aspects of socialist maintenance of power. It was repeatedly changed in reaction to political and social developments that threatened to become "problematic" to the regime. The results of this policy didn't share much in common with the ideological outlook that anticipated the "de-nationalised" social relations in the aspired socialist future. Quite the opposite was often the case. Reference may be made again, for instance, to the above-mentioned case of the Yugoslav resp. Bosnian Muslims, who – like Muslims in many regions of the Soviet Union – originally didn't define themselves in national terms, but were urged in the socialist order to declare themselves "nationally" (cf. Kappeler et al. 1989).

In general, socialist regimes were more willing to grant "national freedom" than to accept restraints in their exertion of power. A reinforcement of national policy, which in addition to party-internal power games also met with massive criticism from the authoritarian policy system in the late 1960s and early 1970s, has been addressed with reference to the Yugoslav case. There were similar occurrences elsewhere, with the case of the ČSSR being particularly prominent. The convulsion of the system in the Prague Spring in 1968 and the following reestablishment of authoritarian control went hand in hand with a dynamic impulse for nationalisation "from above". The ČSSR was federalised and republic status was implemented in the Czech lands as well as Slovakia. Instead of tolerating a more democratic pluralism, a pluralism of nationally defined polit-bureaucratic elites was installed. The transfer of power to now also nationally defined parts of the socialist system was to have stimulated new political dynamics within the system later on (cf. Eyal 2003). This tendency of "nationalisation" instead of "democratisation" was a political manoeuvre that in different forms has been consciously applied as well by other socialist regimes (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania) under the threat of losing power, i.e. in particular during the 1980s. Although knowing that such a policy could very much strengthen disintegrative dynamics – in particular in multi-national state like Yugoslavia (SFRJ) or the ČSSR – such a consequence was still hazarded as an instrument of power-politics.

CONCLUSIONS

In an attempt to give some answers to the question posed at the beginning of this working paper as to why the "national question" has remained so immensely important in the socialist system, it might be appropriate to argue in the following three ways:

a) Nation building was a strongly ideology-driven process: In the realisation of the "grand plan" of establishing an ideal, modern and above all future socialist society, national and nation-building policies always had an important – ideologically-theoretically founded – role. National "liberation" respectively acting against national "oppression"

was part of the ideological socialist "emancipation" discourse. Of course, in the aspired future of a classless society, the importance of the nations would fall away in the end anyhow. However, until this stage of social development could be reached, it would be necessary to come to grips with the existing "national realities" – of course by following the ideologically "correct" and Party formulated aims.

b) "Nationalisation" instead of "democratisation": In the practical reality, socialist regimes – even in situations of crisis – were hardly ready to put up with claims for allowing some democratic pluralism. However, they were much more open-minded with regard to approving so-called "national rights" in such situations – which often caused dynamics of "ethnicisation" or "nationalisation" in the following political relations and also in general social life.

c) Nation building was an important instrument of power within the rivalry of elites in the one-party-system: The national policy and in particular the nation-building policy was also "internally" and on different levels of the Party, a proven means to ensure or achieve power. This aspect needs to be especially emphasised here, since it reminds us that in addition to the "official line" in political life (at the national, regional and local level), there were always spaces for manoeuvre in the pursuit of working for "personal" attitudes and strategies – also with regard to "national policy".

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POVZETEK

DINAMIKA SOCIALISTIČNEGA OBLIKOVANJA NACIJ: KRATKOTRAJNI PROGRAM PROMOCIJE JUGOSLOVANSKE NACIONALNE IDENTITETE IN NEKATERI PRIMERJALNI VIDIKI

Hannes Grandits

Prispevek s historičnega vidika obravnava politike oblikovanja nacij v socialistični Jugoslaviji in dialektiko med jugoslovansko nacionalno identiteto in nacionalnimi identitetami, ki so bile oblikovane ali podpirane v posameznih republikah federativne države. Diskusija je osredotočena na vprašanje, zakaj je »nacionalno vprašanje« v socializmu ostalo tako pomembno in je bistveno vplivalo na razdelitev moči v socialističnem sistemu ne glede na retorično poudarjanje »razrednega vprašanja«. V prispevku je podrobno obravnavana kratkotrajna pobuda za ustvarjanje »nacionalnega jugoslovanstva«, ki prispeva k boljšemu razumevanju strategij oblikovanja nacij v jugoslovanskem prostoru v obdobju socializma. V zadnjem delu prispevka je jugoslovanski primer umeščen v širšo perspektivo in avtor ga primerja s politiko oblikovanja nacij v Sovjetski zvezi.

MIGRANTS WITH A MANDATE FOR NATION-BUILDING: INTERNATIONAL AGENCY IN MULTI-ETHNIC KOSOVO

Mojca VAH[1]

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ABSTRACT

Migrants with a Mandate for Nation-Building: International Agency in Multi-Ethnic Kosovo[2]

The post-war reconstruction of Kosovo took the shape of a trusteeship-like international administration led by the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and partners. Large numbers of international staff were imported and entrusted with a mandate for nation-building according to the Western European civic-territorial model. Although this model has been perceived and promoted as an appropriate and desirable solution for multi-ethnic Kosovo, reconciliation between the ethnic communities, a prerequisite for the implementation of the proposed model, remains a serious challenge for the agents of UNMIK. A number of ambiguous and questionable solutions have been proposed, jeopardising the professional integrity of the international staff.

KEY WORDS: nation-building, migration, UNMIK, international community, Kosovo

IZVLEČEK

Migranti z mandatom za formiranje nacije. Mednarodna dejavnost na multietničnem ozemlju Kosova

Povojna rekonstrukcija Kosova se odvija pod okriljem mednarodne civilne uprave, na čelu katere je Misija Združenih narodov na Kosovu (UNMIK) s partnerji. Mednarodno osebje, ki se je v velikem številu naselilo na ozemlju Kosova, je dobilo mandat za izgradnjo nacije po vzoru zahodnoevropskega teritorialnega modela. Za implementacijo tega modela, ki je prepoznan in promoviran kot primerna in zaželena rešitev za multietnično strukturo kosovske družbe, je nujno potrebna zgladitev sporov med etničnimi skupnostmi, kar ostaja primarni izziv za akterje Misije ZN na Kosovu. Za dosego tega cilja so bile ponujene številne nejasne in vprašljive strategije, njihov neuspeh pa začenja spodkopavati profesionalno integriteto mednarodnega osebja.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: formiranje nacije, UNMIK, mednarodna skupnost, migracije, Kosovo

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INTRODUCTION

Peacekeepers, consultants and experts of all sorts are an abundant species in Kosovo. (KIPRED 2005)

Since the disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed, the area has become a magnet for international development workers, diplomats, researchers, journalists, and other privileged and high-skilled labour migrants fascinated by the character of Balkan societies. I became aware of the popularity of the area after being engaged in several conversations with international development workers in Prishtina. According to their narratives, employment in the development profession is recently most desirable in the countries of Western Balkans.[3] "Orient is passé, Western Balkans is in", I was accustomed to hearing several times during my stay in Kosovo. Indeed, the Balkans have a reputation of being chaotic, barbaric, primitive, uncivilised, cruel, untamed, even tribal on one hand (Todorova 1997; Green 2005) but also exotic, primal, unspoiled by capitalism, passionate, picturesque and romantic (Debeljak 2004) on the other. It provides a one-of-a-kind work and research opportunity for the international staff due its ambiguity, impulsive nature and stubborn posture. In addition, it is currently relatively stable and therefore provides a safe environment to conduct research, provide assistance to the locals in war-torn countries or contribute to its development and modernisation. What makes the countries of the Western Balkans even more intriguing and challenging is the undisputable fact that they are geographically a part of Europe, a supposedly exemplary model of civilisation and modernity,[4] a role model that should be followed and obeyed. And yet, as a Kosovo Albanian political analyst and journalist that I spoke with sarcastically put it, somehow the countries of the Balkans do not seem to understand and respect that, making the mission of Europeanisation of the Balkans increasingly difficult and thus endangering the peace and stability of the region.

The Balkans is creating mixed feelings of exciting uneasiness due to its illusive status as a fractal that fails to comply entirely with the modern invention of a Western European nation-state. Again, this makes it fascinating for international staff and professional public and offers a convenient case study on the implementation of nation-building according to the Western European civic model. It was Stane Južnič who said that nineteenth-century Europe was obsessed with the question of the nation-state and the obsession is still present in those parts of the world where nation-states are not firmly established (1993: 307). Similarly, Sarah Green argues that the Balkans might seem inherently chaotic and

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[3] The countries of the Western Balkans include Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania.

[4] "At its simplest, modernity is a shorthand term for modern society or industrial civilisation. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to transformation and human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and market economy; (3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy." (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 94)

challenging to European commentators because of their inability to "classify this place according to the principles of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century modernist ways of thinking about things" (2005: 132). The post-war reconstruction of some former Yugoslavian countries seems a perfect opportunity to impose the preferred values and norms through agencies of reconstruction and development, Europeanise the area and promote the civic model of nation-building.

In the Western Balkans, ethnic mobilisation with nationalistic tendencies has been present ever since the wars in the nineties and, indeed, long before that. It should be noted that differences between nations and ethnicities were not a cause of the war, which was led largely for political and economic reasons, but were used as an ideational war resource. In an excellent article on the obstacles and perspectives of post-conflict peacebuilding in multicultural societies, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara argues that "in their function as identity generating symbolic resources, ethnicity or other cultural characteristics of differentiation are very important for the maintenance of warfare" (2004: 69). One can safely agree that this was indeed the case in the wars following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, the situation needs to be grasped as it presents itself to us in this specific period of time. Even if we are aware that the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia were not fought in the name of ethnicity or nationality, the fact remains that, *post partum*, ethnic and national differences have become a driving force in claims for independence and the creation of nation-states according to ethnic genealogy. The changing minorities and majorities in the Western Balkans and their discontents, seemingly irreconcilable differences between ethnic minority communities stemming from the wars, secessionist tendencies and irredentist movements all pose contemporary threats to the stability of the region. The large-scale involvement of the international community[5] to promote reconciliation has been noted in most post-Yugoslavian-war countries, with the recent focus on Kosovo. A new generation of peacekeeping has come to life there, entailing administration and governance over the territory according to the models promoted by the international community through a specially established United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

In the article I will argue that the new generation of peacekeeping in Kosovo involves a mission of nation-building according to western preferences. I will explore the measures taken by the international community to promote and implement the civic Western European nation-building model as a preferred solution for Kosovo. To achieve this, I will examine the role and activities of UNMIK and other pillars of international administration within the process of nation-building. Finally, I will offer a sociological account of the management of ethnic communities by UNMIK and PISG[6] to show compatibility with the promoted model.

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[5] By the term international community in Kosovo I am referring to the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union Mission in Kosovo (EUMIK), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and foreign diplomatic and liaison offices.

[6] PISG stands for Provisional Institutions of Self-Government that were set up in 2001. Provisional

Mojca Vah

FIRST COMES STATE THEN COMES NATION: APPLICATION OF THE CIVIC-TERRITORIAL MODEL OF NATION-BUILDING TO POST-WAR KOSOVO

From assimilation to multiculturalism

The modern European nation-state[7] was built according to two distinctive forms, concepts and understandings of the nation: ethnic and territorial or civic. In the case of the former, the nation-state was developed by transforming the ethnic ties of a group of settlers, sharing the same culture, into national ties. This model was used in Central and Eastern Europe, whereas the latter model was predominant in Western Europe, including France, Spain, England and the Netherlands. In contrast to the ethnic model, the civic model used territory as the starting point for establishing the nation-state. Ethnic groups, settled on the area that was to become a state, were joined through the unification of the economy, education, rights and through territorial centralisation. The state's core *ethnie* led this process due to its historical predominance and cultural-political domination, and it imposed its lifestyles, myths and symbols on the state and traditions of the entire population (Smith 1989).

Indeed, the creation of a modern, bureaucratic nation-state in Western Europe went hand in hand with the processes of assimilation, one of the most important principles for achieving the civic or republican organisation of states (Šabec 2006). The 'social contract' theorists, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, claimed that individuals submitted willingly to the state in return for the (economic) protection it provided, putting the ethnic component in the background. As Ksenija Šabec argues, it was economic gains and educational opportunities offered to the citizens that made them *willing* to become a part of the nation-state (ibid.). Indeed, the promise of social mobility is a strong factor of motivation and mobilisation, but as we have been constantly reminded throughout the history of humankind, ethnicity has always kept emerging and reasserting itself. Having this in mind, it becomes questionable whether the efforts of the western nation-building model to establish a nation-state that will supersede ethnicity can be successful in the war-torn countries of the former Yugoslavia. Has it even been successful in the countries of Western Europe? The ethnic nationalisms that the implementation of the model was supposed to suppress are far from being a thing of the past, as it is evident from their emergence in some Western European countries. In all fairness, the agenda the civic model proposes is clear and the results it anticipates are optimistically promising, but is it indeed a winning formula that can work everywhere?

The mechanisms of assimilation that the western model of nation-building had been using since the eighteenth century were replaced after the Second World War by

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governmental institutions include the Assembly of Kosovo, the Government and the Office of the President of Kosovo (UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9).

[7] The adopted and widely used term *nation-state* is misleading as it suggests that state is congruent with the nation, which is rarely the case.

the concept of multiculturalism.[8] Western European countries were convinced that the process of the creation of nation-states had been completed because the rural population had already been assimilated and the Paris Peace Conferences (1919–1920) confirmed the territorial divisions as desired by the Western European states (Šabec 2006). However, the independence movements that emerged after the infamous year of 1989 and the fall of communist regimes in the eastern parts of Europe presented a new challenge for Western European nation-states. The nationalistic claims of small nations for a nation-state of their own were regarded as in opposition to the modern and rational nation-building model in accordance with the Enlightenment movement. Especially the complex ethnic situation in the Balkans and secessionist claims by a number of nations within former Yugoslavia reinforced its reputation in Western Europe of being semideveloped and semicivilised (Todorova 1997) due to its inability or unwillingness to adopt the values of the modern (western) world and implement the civic-territorial model of nation-building. True, assimilation is no longer a politically correct tool to achieve the respective objective, and it seems that multiculturalism is the new preferred concept for European countries, including those of the Western Balkans. A case study of Kosovo will show the variety of measures taken by the international community to promote the civic nation-building model, including the use of peacekeeping operations as the necessary medium through which the international governance over the territory can be put into effect.

A new generation of peacekeeping with a mandate for nation-building: UNMIK & Co.[9]

The conflict in Kosovo did not receive much international attention during the 1990s despite Serbian repressive conduct against the Kosovar-Albanian population. Conflicts in other parts of the former republic of Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, occupied international society and the less violent conflict between the ethnic groups of Kosovo was more or less ignored. However, as the other conflicts in the rest of the former Yugoslavia came to an end and the oppression in Kosovo escalated to atrocities and forced expulsion of Albanian populations, international society could no longer watch in silence. Unable to obtain a UN mandate, NATO initiated an attack against Serbia in March 1999. As the air strikes approached the closing stages, it was evident that there was a pressing need

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[8] While multiculturalism seems to be an exemplary model, it is in fact exclusive and unfavourable to individuals belonging to ethnic and national communities within nation-states. By granting them rights to preserve their ethnic and national identities, they are discouraged to assimilate or even integrate into the majority society, making their social mobility difficult. Again, the question is whether such concept of multiculturalism is a successful formula for avoiding the emergence of ethno-nationalist movements. Nevertheless, it is the model that is currently being implemented in Kosovo by the international community.

[9] The expression UNMIK & Co. (UNMIK and company) is frequently used by the international staff in Kosovo and refers to the UNMIK, OSCE, EU and UNHCR missions in Kosovo.

to reconstruct Kosovo as a democratic and multi-ethnic community in order to avoid future relapses into war and ethnic cleansing. The need to prevent future conflicts was obvious, but the question was how to ensure the democratic development envisaged and desired by international society. (Mosegaard Søbjerg 2006: 57)

After the NATO bombings in 1999, the war in Kosovo came to an end.[10] Prior to the war, Kosovo was a province of the former Yugoslavia, with its status upgraded to an autonomous federal entity in 1974. In the late eighties, Kosovo's autonomy was revoked by the Republic of Serbia and it remained under a repressive Serbian security regime until the intervention by NATO. Before and during the NATO air campaign (from 24 March to 10 June 1999) diplomatic efforts were made to create a UN-supported resolution that would allow an international presence in the province. The efforts resulted in the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which enabled the UN to take over full administration of Kosovo. In accordance with the resolution, the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established. The operation is divided into four pillars: Civil Administration (UNMIK), Institution Building (OSCE), Reconstruction and Economic Development (EU), and Police and Justice (under the direct leadership of the UN). Initially, one of the four pillars was humanitarian assistance led by UNHCR, but it was phased out in 2000 and replaced by the Police and Justice pillar.

UNMIK was established as "a peacekeeping mission to provide an interim administration for Kosovo, pending a political process and settlement in regards to the final status of Kosovo" (KIPRED 2005). The tasks that UNMIK has been entrusted with, however, are not the tasks usually covered by peacekeeping operations. First-generation peacekeeping, also referred to as traditional peacekeeping, was employed in the late 1940s and included operations such as the UN Truce Supervision Operation, the first blue helmets (the UN Emergency Force) in the Sinai in the mid 1950s and UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in the mid 1960s. The doctrinal pillars of first-generation peacekeeping included consent, neutrality and the non-use of force, except in cases of self-defence. Their major advantage was conceptual clarity, but in terms of conflict resolution the operations were static (Kühne 2005). After the cold war the mandates of UN peacekeeping forces were no longer limited to the monitoring of ceasefires.

> Emergency aid, ensuring basic public security, infrastructure and administration as well as the rule of law, repatriation of refugees, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups, preparing and conducting elections on local and national levels as well as economic reconstruction and other non-military issues were added to the list of tasks. (ibid.: 103)

This type of peacekeeping is referred to as the second generation and includes elements of peacebuilding. More UN involvement, however, meant more responsibilities

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[10] For a discussion of the legitimacy of bombing and the right to sovereignty see e.g. Mosegaard Søbjerg 2006.

and risk-taking and it unfortunately resulted in an increased number of civilian casualties involved in peace operations. As was to be expected, the Security Council allowed the limited use of force for peace operations in the 1990s, which became known as third-generation peacekeeping.[11]

Although not yet regarded as such in the relevant literature or by the UN, I agree with Kühne that the UNMIK/KFOR operation differs from all three abovementioned generations of peacekeeping in one important aspect: international involvement. While the mission holds a mandate to perform all of the tasks of third-generation peacekeeping, it also holds a mandate to govern. Making a simple comparison, one can easily recognise similarities with trusteeships, although in the case of UNMIK the international community (and not individual states) is involved in administration. Mosegaard Søbjerg explains (2006: 60):

> Both within international law and international relations theory, there is continually a significant difference between peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the one hand and trusteeships on the other in terms of the amount of responsibility and authority placed with the UN. In a peacekeeping operation, the UN works with the existing government in a territory or a state, while the role of the UN in a trusteeship is to be the government.

As UNMIK & Co. was sent to Kosovo with a mandate to administer the entire territory, Kosovo became a *de facto* trusteeship. The responsibilities and tasks of the mission included: (1) carrying out basic civilian administration; (2) organising the establishment of democratic institutions; (3) supporting the reconstruction of infrastructure; (4) supporting provision of humanitarian aid; (5) maintaining law and order; (6) protecting and promoting human rights; (7) assuring the safe return of refugees; (8) promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government (KIPRED 2005; Mosegaard Søbjerg 2006). These officially and publically declared tasks and responsibilities reveal the agenda of nation-building. Implicitly all components have been put in place to carry out the project of the resocialisation of the Kosovar nation in the direction of implementing the civic nation-building model and adopting western values.

All eight identified tasks are inextricably linked with the efforts to achieve reconciliation between different ethnic groups settled in the Kosovo territory. This is the major and

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[11] It is important to distinguish between different types of peace operations: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. "While peacekeeping aims to provide an environment of stability to facilitate the processes of both reconstruction and progress … peacemaking is a diplomatic and political endeavour applied strategically to confrontation situations, through such undertakings as mediation and negotiation, in order to arrest the conflict or at least prevent it from escalating. Peacebuilding is the peaceful political and socio-economic reconstruction of a country." (Iribarnegaray 2002: 8) In second, third and fourth-generation peacekeeping, however, the three types became largely intertwined and are now frequently joined under the term peacekeeping operations. Examples of second-generation peacekeeping include UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda). Typical examples of third-generation peacekeeping include IFOR (Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilisation Force) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

most important challenge for the international community, as the success of the mission and subsequent operations lies in its ability to provide a safe and stabile environment for the implementation of future agendas. Achieving reconciliation between the two main ethnic groups, Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, is also a necessary prerequisite to successful implementation of the civic nation-building model and therefore a top priority of UNMIK & Co. Let us take a closer look at what they are up against.

THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE: ACHIEVING POST-WAR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN ETHNIC COMMUNITIES TO ENABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIC NATION-BUILDING MODEL

According to the OSCE estimate, the population of Kosovo came close to 2.4 million in 2000. The area is the most densely populated in the region, with 220 inhabitants per km². The growth rate is a staggering 1.3 per cent and half of the population is younger than twenty years of age. The majority ethnic group are Kosovo Albanians, comprising around 90 per cent of the population. The second largest ethnic community are Serbs with 5.3 per cent, followed by four other ethnic minority communities: RAE (Roma-Ashkali-Egyptians), Turks, Bosnians and Goranis. The last reliable, but now completely outdated census, was conducted in 1981, and therefore the numbers and percentages above are only an estimate. There was another census in 1991, but it was largely boycotted by Kosovo Albanians and is therefore not credible (PISG 2004).

The major problem that Kosovo is facing is a low rate of economic development. The economy, in fact, is barely existent and as a result the poverty rate in Kosovo is the highest in the region, with unemployment rate reaching 49 per cent in 2004 (PISG 2004). Another problem is the largely rural character of Kosovo:

> The basic dilemma of rural Kosovo is not new. In 1979, the World Bank wrote that poverty in Yugoslavia is "basically rural." While it held out hopes for employment growth in most of the less developed regions, it did not see much prospect of change in Kosovo: "The exception is Kosovo, which cannot, even under optimistic assumptions and even if the plan's growth targets are achieved, be expected to absorb the increments to its labour force." Since then, Kosovo's population has continued to grow rapidly, but neither the number of jobs nor the availability of agricultural land has kept pace. (ESI 2006: 1)

The traditional strategy for survival has been emigration of family members, especially to Western Europe, who sent home remittances. Since the conflict, the assistance received from family members in the Diaspora has constituted half of Kosovo families' budgets (PISG 2004). Currently, labour migration to EU member states has been restricted and therefore social stability is further endangered.[12]

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[12] In 2006, European Stability Initiative (ESI) issued an excellent report on migration, families and the

Managing ethnic communities: some confusing propositions

The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, enacted through UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, outlines a comprehensive catalogue of human rights, prohibits discrimination and names the relevant international documents to be observed and ensured by the PISG as domestically applicable legislation[13] (KIPRED 2006). The Constitutional Framework does not refer to minorities, which is the commonly accepted terminology in international documents, but uses the term community to denote members of the same ethnic, religious or linguistic group. It is worth pointing out, however, that "the use of the term "community" instead of "minority" does not have any impact on obligations of the PISG to observe and ensure internationally recognised documents pertaining to "minorities"" (ibid.: 5). As already mentioned, no credible census has been conducted since 1981 and therefore no statistical data exists on any of the abovementioned communities living in Kosovo. There are, however, certain estimates of their numbers according to UNHCR and OSCE reports.

The Serb community is the largest ethnic minority community in Kosovo. As the Republic of Serbia does not recognise the UNMIK administration or PISG, parallel Serbian institutions operate in almost every Serbian enclave within Kosovo. "So far, parallelisms have been most salient in health and education (approved by UNMIK and paid by both UNMIK and often paid double by Belgrade structures) and courts (not approved by UNMIK but tacitly allowed to operate)." (KIPRED 2005) Other parallelisms include security structures and administrative structures related to property issues. Two reports on parallel structures have been issued so far by the OSCE mission in Kosovo, stating that in Kosovo-Serb inhabited areas parallel structures continue to answer directly to Belgrade, hence exerting its control over parts of Kosovo (2007).

Relations with other communities are significantly better than with Serbs, although Roma are also experiencing discriminatory treatment on many levels. The Roma have been joined by the Ashkali and Egyptians in a single ethnic grouping called the RAE community, due to the commonality of their problems.[14] They have been stigmatised

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future of Kosovo. *Cutting the lifeline* is available at http://www.esiweb.org.

[13] The main documents in question are: The Universal Declaration on Human Rights; The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Protocols thereto; The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; The Convention on the Rights of the Child; The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; and The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

[14] As noted by KIPRED, the use of the RAE formula denoting the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities as a single political grouping is a deviation from progressive guarantees of the Constitutional Framework (2006: 6): "In spite of probable noble motives aiming to amplify their voice by the creation of a larger grouping, the perceived attempt for the creation of a new identity has created serious identity and political troubles for these communities. As such, it goes against the basic right of members of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities to preserve and promote their individual

and kept away from well-paid jobs due to their historical discrimination resulting in low qualifications and due to prejudices. The major difference is that Ashkali and the Egyptians speak Albanian as their native language, are fairly well integrated into the Albanian community and have traditionally lived in Albanian neighbourhoods, whereas the Roma have preserved their own language and are living in separate dwellings. An additional factor for the resentment of the Albanian population towards the Roma is their alleged collaboration with the Milošević's regime during the war. Therefore, the Roma refugees that returned to Kosovo after the war were not welcome in predominantly Albanian regions, but ironically also not in Serbian enclaves.

The Turkish community is, on the contrary, very well-integrated, and their economic situation is good even compared to the Kosovo Albanians. They speak the Albanian language, have the same religious affiliation and have traditionally had good relations with the Kosovo Albanians. The Bosnians also have good relations with the majority community, mainly due to the common sense of victimhood as a result of the war and a shared religion. Divisions remain, however, and indirect discrimination has been reported several times, together with fear of using the Bosnian language in public. Another minority community are Goranis, who live almost exclusively in the hills of the most southern and one of the least developed municipalities. They are of Slavic origin, practice Muslim religion and are reportedly politically siding with the Serbs. Due to their geographic isolation, however, they are currently not facing any security threats (KIPRED 2005).

The first step towards the implementation of the civic nation-building model in Kosovo was and still is the promotion of the right to return "through a return planning strategy which emphasises a return to multiple geographic areas in an incremental, low-profile and orderly fashion" (KIPRED 2005: 24). Other tasks of UNMIK & Co. include addressing and managing problematic of ethnic diversity in fields that became UNHCR and OSCE focal points in preparing assessments of the situation of ethnic minorities: security and freedom of movement for minorities, access to justice, discrimination and access to essential services (education, employment, social services, health care), housing and property rights, and access to public, civil and political structures (UNHCR and OSCE 2003). Needless to say, the rules that were set and the measures demanded to be taken regarding each of those issues by far exceed the standards that most European countries have adopted (and implemented) for the protection of ethnic or national minorities. Due to limited space, I will not offer a detailed analysis of all the measures taken for establishing a peaceful multiethnic society in Kosovo. I will, however, offer a few examples to show that the international community has been trying to achieve reconciliation between ethnic communities with demanding and often confusing measures, in order to enforce its preferred nation-building model.

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identity and to declare themselves as members of the same. Hence, the use of RAE formula may be seen as being in collision with the institutional right of every person to declare himself a member of any community."

Promoting ethnic minority overrepresentation in governmental institutions is one important example (KIPRED 2005, 2006):

> In elected bodies representation of minority communities is guaranteed by the Constitutional Framework. Apart from the seats that political entities of each community win in the proportional system, out of 120 seats, the Kosovo assembly allocates 20 additional seats for members of minority communities, according to the following distribution: 10 Serbs, 4 RAE, 3 Bosnians, 2 Turks, 1 Gorani. (…) We could think of no minorities in Europe that are overrepresented to this degree. (…) Minority communities enjoy guaranteed representation in the government too. According to the formula established by the Constitutional Framework, the Kosovo Government should have at least one minister representing the Serb community and one representing other communities.

There are two official languages in Kosovo: Albanian and Serbian. Other ethnic minority communities that constitute a substantial part of the population in a municipality, however, are enjoying special rights regarding language use too. According to the UNMIK Regulation,[15] meetings of the Municipal Assembly and its committees and public meetings are to be conducted in both the Albanian and Serbian languages. In municipalities where a community lives whose language is neither Albanian nor Serbian they are also to be translated, when necessary, into the language of that community. The same goes for official documents and official signs indicating or including the names of cities, towns, villages, roads, streets and other public places. Upon analysing the existing data, OSCE researchers realised, however, that there have been very few instances of RAE, Turkish or Bosnian communities putting forth specific requests for additional language usage in any form (OSCE 2006). All ethnic communities in Kosovo also have the right to education in their own language and pupils and students of most communities tend to exercise that right. In addition, they have the right to study the history and culture of their ethnic community with different curricula designed in Prishtina, Belgrade, Sarajevo or Ankara (KIPRED 2006)[16]. Another example is establishment of the Human Rights Cells in every ministry of PISG, with protection of ethnic minority rights being one of the priority tasks.[17]

While integration and multiculturalism are both simultaneously trying to be implemented in Kosovo, there is another concept that the international community has been

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[15] UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 on Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo.

[16] In this regard, the situation of the RAE community is least favourable, as they have no mother country that can assist them in carrying out education. The available curriculum contains almost nothing about their history and culture (KIPRED 2006). Needless to say, there are significant problems in implementing the right to education in different languages across Kosovo. This, however, is not a subject of discussion in this paper. The objective is to provide examples of demands set by the international community that PISG needs to meet. For a more detailed discussion on minority language use in municipalities see OSCE 2006.

[17] See, for example, the PISG Report on Activities in the areas of anti-discrimination, anti-corruption, anti-trafficking in human beings and human rights (2007).

trying out: the process of decentralisation. Through the decentralisation process "the international community is trying to ensure that the rights of the Serb community will be constitutionally guaranteed and their competences will be significantly empowered in the municipalities where they constitute the majority" (KIPRED 2007). The process of decentralisation is primarily aimed at pacifying the Serbian community, and to a lesser degree other non-Albanian communities, and is perceived as such also by the Albanian public.[18]

> A substantial number of Kosovars consider the process of decentralisation as controversial and ethnically motivated. As an earlier study indicated 50-60 per cent of Kosovo Albanians find the following issues as "unacceptable": (a) increasing the powers of Serb-majority municipalities more than in other regions, and (b) allowing these municipalities to receive direct financial and other support from the government of Serbia. (KIPRED 2007: 7)

Fears have been expressed by some interest groups that the decentralisation process will endanger the territorial integrity of Kosovo and widen Belgrade's power over the Kosovo enclaves, "which will vanish because they will be unified" (Kurti in KIPRED 2007: 10). And although the international community has been promoting decentralisation as a process to bring Kosovo closer to becoming a multiethnic society, it is frequently argued that new municipalities are being formed along ethnic lines. Therefore, the ethnic component is actually being strengthened. There is another unwelcome consequence stemming from the decentralisation plan. As KIPRED argues (2007: 15):

> Once these municipalities are up and running, their sustainability will be put to the test. Henceforth we can safely predict that once the immediate threat that Serbs currently perceive is gone, hardship realities will kick in, and some Serbs will seek to be incorporated back into bigger municipalities. In the future, more and more services will depend on "own revenues", and those municipalities that do not have a solid tax-base will be unable to raise funds and will offer less services to their citizens.

CONCLUSION: SIMCITY KOSOVO EDITION

Let me conclude in the same manner than I started, by turning to the agents of nation-building in Kosovo. While conducting my research in Prishtina, I was strongly aware of the international presence, especially when walking up the main street in the centre of the town and meeting development workers and other international staff from various ethnic backgrounds. The service sector started developing according to their needs and some excellent restaurants and coffee shops have been blooming by a popular demand. In

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[18] The Kosovo decentralisation plan was adopted by the Kosovo Government in March 2005.

downtown Prishtina, where most of the international organisations seek and buy premises, the prices of real estate have skyrocketed. The same is true for certain prestigious neighbourhood areas that are occupied almost exclusively by UN staff. UN jeeps can be seen everywhere around the town and the rest of the country, especially in the divided town of Mitrovica. The international community is setting the norms, imposing values, writing laws on every imaginable matter, Europeanising the rural areas and providing security through its imported military and civilian staff. It is moulding the vulnerable post-war territory of Kosovo according to the principles promoted by a supposedly successful civic nation-building model.

The similarity to the city-building computer simulation game SimCity is obvious. The players of the computer game can establish, shape, build and manage the territory while not being personally affected by the choices they make, which bears a strong resemblance to the UNMIK and KFOR staff, who are only temporarily residing in Kosovo. Moreover, their associated property, funds and assets are immune to any legal proceedings, and UNMIK has also been reluctant to accept the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsperson. KFOR, on the other hand, falls entirely beyond its jurisdiction. As argued by KIPRED: "Considerable progress has been made in clarifying applicable international standards, however, protection from legal proceedings of KFOR and UNMIK officials sets a bad example in the eyes of Kosovo authorities and citizens at large." (2006: 5)

Nevertheless, regardless of sharp criticisms of UNMIK administration, especially its confusion about the role it should play in Kosovo, I am reluctant to stigmatise the mission merely as a failing, illegal, neo-colonial intervention of the international community. It is a popular opinion in Kosovo that peace and progress could not be imagined without an international presence and therefore a welcome is still extended to UNMIK & Co. by the locals. The initial euphoric reaction that accompanied their arrival, however, has after a few years been replaced by a growing indifference and a few isolated oppositions.[19] The promoted transition of Kosovo to a market economy might not be a preferred solution for many anti-globalists but the fact remains that a successful transition is Kosovo's way out of the deadlock situation. Being an isolated island in the middle of global capital(ist) flows cannot be considered a preferred solution.

In the article I argued that the post-war territory of Kosovo has been the site of fourth-generation peacekeeping that includes a mandate to govern and conduct nation-building. UNMIK was established as an administrative body and was joined by other UN agencies, the EU, OSCE and KFOR to promote reconciliation between several ethnic communities settled in the territory, especially Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, in order to provide a safe ground for the further reconstruction of Kosovo. To achieve these goals, international staff was imported to the territory of Kosovo, where they play the role of nation-building agents in trusteeship-like governance. The model of nation-building chosen by the international

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[19] The most influential is a pro-independence movement led by Albin Kurti. Kurti is an activist and founder of the Kosovo Albanian organisation called Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination), whose slogan *No negotiation* can be seen written on the walls throughout Kosovo. Kurti is a strong critic of UNMIK administration. He is currently in home arrest, facing charges for a call to resistance.

community has been the Western European civic type, perceived and promoted as successful and appropriate. However, due to irreconcilable differences stemming from the war, UNMIK has encountered a number of problems on the way to achieving its goals, which it tried to resolve through the employment of more or less successful measures. It is argued that the measures PISG was required to implement far exceed the measures being taken by the existing EU member states to ensure the protection and equality of ethnic minority communities within their borders. Some examples are provided to prove this point. Finally, it is argued that the problems encountered by the international community in implementing preferred models in Kosovo often reflect an inability to provide clear and unambiguous solutions. While the task of promoting the integration of ethnic minority communities into the majority society has been in full course, a new proposition was simultaneously being developed that promotes the implementation of processes of decentralisation and the creation of new municipalities, mostly along ethnic lines. Unfortunately, due to weak stability of the region caused by the recent independence of Kosovo, such confusing solutions are a luxury that the international community can no longer afford.

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POVZETEK

MIGRANTI Z MANDATOM ZA FORMIRANJE NACIJE. MEDNARODNA DEJAVNOST NA MULTIETNIČNEM OZEMLJU KOSOVA

Mojca Vah

Avtorica v članku zagovarja tezo, da je povojno ozemlje Kosova prizorišče implementacije dejavnosti nove generacije operacij za ohranjanje miru, ki vključuje (civilno) upravljanje teritorija in mandat za formiranje nacije. Administrativno telo, ki ga je ustanovila mednarodna skupnost in kateremu je bila ta naloga zaupana, je Misija Združenih narodov na Kosovu (UNMIK), ki nalogo opravlja skupaj z EU, OVSE in misijo KFOR. Ena izmed primarnih agend omenjenih organizacij ostaja pomiritev etničnih skupnosti, predvsem kosovskih Albancev in Srbov, za zagotovitev varnosti in nadaljnjo rekonstrukcijo Kosova. V ta namen se je na Kosovo priselilo veliko število mednarodnega osebja, ki sodeluje pri formiranju nacije po vzoru zahodnoevropskega teritorialnega modela, promoviranega kot uspešnega in primernega. Zaradi konfliktnih odnosov med etničnima skupnostima, ki so posledica vojne v devetdesetih letih, se mednarodno osebje spopada s številnimi težavami pri implementaciji želenega modela formiranja nacije. Posledično so zato predlagane nejasne, slabo učinkovite, celo nasprotujoče si strategije in ukrepi za dosego zastavljenega cilja. Avtorica ugotavlja, da je bila integracija etničnih manjšinskih skupnosti v večinsko kosovsko albansko družbo sprejeta kot primarna strategija, hkrati pa poteka implementacija decentralizacije in oblikovanje novih občin, večinoma po etničnem ključu.

THE PRILUŽJE ENCLAVE:
A CONSTRUCTION OF LOCAL IDENTITY

Biljana SIKIMIĆ[1]

ABSTRACT

The Prilužje Enclave: A Construction of Local Identity

The present study examines a view of the "Other" in the enclave of Prilužje (Kosovo). The image of the "Other" was obtained by qualitative analysis of interviews made with Serbs in this enclave.

KEYWORDS: Serbs, Kosovo, Other, enclave

IZVLEČEK

Enklava Prilužje: Oblikovanje lokalne identitete

Prispevek s pomočjo kvalitativne analize obravnava poglede na »druge«, izoblikovane v diskurzu Srbov v enklavi Prilužje na Kosovu.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Srbi, Kosovo, »drugi«, enklava

INTRODUCTION: SITUATING THE FIELDWORK

In the summer of 2003 when the fieldwork in the Prilužje enclave was done, the station in Prilužje could be reached twice a day by train from Zvečane.[2] The train also stopped in Plemetina. However, Prilužje was additionally connected to other villages in the enclave (Grace, Babin Most, Janina Voda and Crkvena Vodica) by a school bus. Most of the interviews took place in Prilužje, while due to the difficulties with transport connections, research in Grace, Babin Most and Plemetina was reduced to only half a day and a handful of interviewees.

Babin Most is a Serbian-Albanian village in the foothills of Mt. Kopaonik, 18 km northwest of Priština. It is mentioned in the Turkish census of the Province of the Serbian Despot Đurađ Branković from 1455 as *Babinos*, with 33 Serbian houses and the priest Radivoje heading the list. On January 13, 1530, the Austrian travel writer Benedict Kuripešić spent a night in the village of "Babinos in Kosovo Polje" upon his return from

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Constantinople. The village was later deserted, probably by the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century. It was reconstructed around 1800 as the chiflik (Ottoman-Turkish economic system characterized by a money-goods relationship) or feudal estate of the Džinić family from Priština. Serbian clans listed in the first half of the twentieth century (1935) had originally come from various areas, while the Albanians came from Golak around Priština and belonged to the Berisha *fis*, or clan. There were also a few houses of Ashkalia (Albanian-speaking Roma). The village is divided into the Gornja Mahala or upper quarter, the Donja or lower Mahala and *Kod bunara* – By the Well (Urošević 1965: 141–142). At the beginning of the twentieth century all Serbs were in the chiflik system and had to forfeit one-fourth of their wheat and hay (Mikić 1988: 179).

The village of **Grace** is divided into Gornja Mahala, Donja Mahala and *Otud potoka* [From the Stream], which emerged later. It was a feudal estate whose population changed over time, but nevertheless, "two indigenous or very old settler clans of Christian Orthodox Gypsies remained" (Urošević 1965: 187–188). According to anthropologist-geographer Atanasije Urošević, in the mid-twentieth century the clans of Christian Orthodox Gypsies in Grace were: the Živići (2 houses, whose *slava* [family patron saint's day] was St. Basil) and who were indigenous, the Vučovići (20 houses, St. Basil), indigenous, the Nastovići, old settlers from Gusinja (7 houses, St. Nicholas), the Đorđevići, moved from Samodreža around 1820 (14 houses, St. Basil), and the Staniškovci or Skovrani who settled from Letanac in Lab, originally from the Leskovac area (3 houses, St. Basil). Archives dating from 1912 list 18 Serbian and 15 Albanian settler families in the village of Grace at the beginning of the twentieth century (Mikić 1988: 181).

Plemetina is a mixed Serbian-Albanian village in the valley between the Lab and Sitnica rivers, 12 km northwest of Priština. It is mentioned in the charter granted by King Milutin to Banjska in 1315. In the 1455 Turkish census of the Branković Province it is called Plametino with 22 Serbian houses and a priest, Nikola. It is mentioned several times between 1765 and 1780 in the Memorial Book of Devič Monastery. In the village are the ruins of an old church with old graves; the new village church was built in 1971 (Ivanović 1987: 501). The village is divided into a Gornja and Donja Mahala and the Mahala Bragačije, settled by *Muhadžiri* (Muslim colonists). The mahala was founded in 1878. There are no indigenous clans since it was in the chiflik system and the feudal lords of the estate were the Šeremetovići family from Peć and later an Albanian family, the Šiškovići from Vučitrn. The Serbian clans came from various areas. There are also some colonists from the period between the two world wars, as well as Christian Orthodox and Muslim Gypsies. The Albanian settlers originate mainly from the Toplica region in Serbia (Urošević 1965: 267; Mikić 1988: 180).

Prilužje is a Serbian village at the confluence of the Lab and Sitnica rivers, 12 km southeast of Vučitrn. In the Turkish census of the Branković Province from 1455, it is mentioned as the large village of Priluža with 53 Serbian houses, and it is also mentioned in the Memorial Book of Devič Monastery in Drenica in 1761 and 1775. On the site of the old place of worship, *Sveta Nedelja* [Holy Sunday], a new church of the same name was inaugurated in 1969. There are traces of two more old churches (Ivanović 1987: 512). The

village is divided into a Gornja and Donja Mahala, and the indigenous clan is the Mašić family (3 houses celebrating their *slava* or patron saint's day on the feast of St. John the Baptist). It was the chiflik of the Mehmudbegović family from Peć. Apart from a few houses of Muslim Roma, Serbs were mainly settled here from different areas (Urošević 1965: 273). In the early twentieth century Prilužje was inhabited only by Serbs and the agas [minor Turkish feudal lords] of the village were Aslan and Liman-beg Mehmudbegović from Peć (Mikić 1988: 180).

Cr(k)vena Vodica is a Serbian-Albanian village in the foothills of Mt. Čičavica, 8 km west of Priština. An earlier name for the village was Crvena Vodica. Serbs from "Crvena" or "Careva Vodica" were registered as donors in the Memorial Book of Devič monastery several times from 1763 to 1780. The remains of the old church and graveyard with stone crosses are in the village (Ivanović 1987: 541). The village was probably deserted for a certain time and was reconstructed at the beginning of nineteenth century. The Menići clan is regarded as an indigenous family that was displaced and then brought back, while the Albanians belong to the Berisha *fis*. The Serbian clans are settlers and there are also some Gypsies (Urošević 1965: 312–313). At the beginning of the twentieth century all Serbian households were in the chiflik system (Mikić 1988: 138). *Janina Voda* is a small village dating from 1860 when the Kovačani clan from Kopaonička Šalja bought the land. It is regarded as a hamlet of Crvena Vodica (Urošević 1965: 216), and at the beginning of the twentieth century it numbered 3 Serbian households with their land (Mikić 1988: 181).

In the research in the Prilužje enclave and the surrounding villages the focus of scholarly curiosity was the complexity of ethnic relations prior to 1999. The present study examines a one-sided view of the "Other", as only Serbs were interviewed in this enclave, which is still mixed today. The image of the "Other" that was obtained through analysis of the interviews does not aspire to universality, unless the well-preserved traditional culture in the Prilužje enclave and surrounding villages is taken as a safe indicator that the individual opinions of elderly, less educated people may reflect the attitude of the whole community.[3]

THE OTHER IN TRADITIONAL CULTURE
AND IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT

The traditional semiotic binary opposition *own : alien* is today analyzed as if it were on a sliding scale, and the alien/stranger/other may be less or more formally alien depending on the point s/he occupies in time and/or space.

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[3] In this kind of field studies, a problem-centred approach to interviewing is intended to neutralise the contradiction between steering the conversation by theory and a completely open approach. Communication strategies were aimed at a subjective approach to the problem. The narratives thus stimulated were enriched through dialogue and the use of imaginary and semi-structured prompts. Theoretical knowledge is developed by using elastic concepts, further developed through empirical analysis (cf. Wietzel 2000).

Slavic ethnolinguistic research has shown that in a traditional folk culture the image of someone ethnically or confessionally alien can be described with the help of a standard pattern. This can be selected from a series of main positions by which a community "recognizes" the alien. These are: outward appearance, smell, absence of soul, supernatural attributes, language, and inappropriate behaviour from the point of view of local tradition. However, Slavic material shows that there is a specific hierarchy in attitudes towards the alien; it is divided into an attitude towards the "other" and towards the "alien". The positive meaning of the foreigner's folkloric image (as the bringer of abundance, health, fertility etc.) is based on his "alien-ness". Hence, foreigners are effective in various rituals and works of magic (Belova 2002: 71, 81). Tradition attracts and uses "aliens", while behaving indifferently to "Others", and so the attribute "Other" becomes almost neutral. However, "alien" is a marked element, in many cases effective and important within the system that the bearer of tradition experiences as his or her "own". There is reference also to a specific "bilingualism of characteristics/attributes" – the ascribing of additional characteristics across cultural spheres. While in the area of "learnt culture", the perception of Jews as "alien, damned and the like" survives, in the area of everyday culture there is a complex idea of "our own aliens" who are always to hand and can cooperate in everyday life, above all in magic, more so than "Others". There is reason to presume the existence of great differences in the traditional culture of local communities in the Slavic world, conditioned both by the concrete reasons of history and the mechanisms of a general mythologisation of foreigners or people of different religions (Belova 2002: 83; 1997). Among the Slavs, however, it seems impossible to reconstruct the figure of a person of specifically different ethnic background in a particular local community using standard methodological procedures, except as the figure of a faceless foreigner, without his ethnic, religious or regional traits. Each local community has its own complex system for marking others, and this system proves to be changeable in the diachronic perspective.

In this article, the "foreigner/alien" is not viewed in his traditional role of guest or in any other role that is characteristic for traditional culture. The image of the other was constructed spontaneously in conversation or, more rarely, in answer to a direct question. To analyze the image of the "other" from the material recorded among Serbs in the Prilužje enclave, we took only statements about "others", "aliens" who speak the same (Serbian) language, i.e., who have the same language identity.

Conversation about "others", about neighbours with whom one does not marry or did not marry "before", reflects the traditional concept of the relation between "us" and "others". In contemporary linguistic-anthropological writing the researcher is also the subject of attention as the third party, thus further impairing the binary opposition. The limitations on the researcher-outsider are due not only to lack of knowledge of the language or the local vernacular; they often result from mutual misunderstanding between the representatives of the local culture (about the purpose of the research itself) and the researcher (about the scholarly presentation of "private" conversations with the informant). Older local ethnographic and historiographic sources were used to complement transcripts of the constructed subjective image of Prilužje, whereas the applied linguistic

methodology and lexicographic sources are seen as being more objective, or at any rate less subjective.

We will try here to take into consideration local knowledge and the social or psychological distance of the interviewee from the problem. Oral histories provide a sort of barometer of history, proof that members of the local community have noticed that things have changed, that certain historical changes have taken place. Oral history cannot explain how these changes came about, but it can indicate how the local community dealt with them. Transcripts of oral history are constructed stories with a co-narrator, not the pure narrative of an experienced story-teller. The researcher wishes to build his or her own coherent picture. We are faced with the peculiar "hegemony of the researcher" which limits the informant (Agar 2005: 15). The limitations thus imposed affect the very topic of the conversation, depending on what the researcher wants the narrative to become. A closer reading of transcripts reveals elements of co-construction of the local discourse and the researcher's contribution to its success or failure. Deixis (understood as socio-psychological distance) is another reason for limitation of local discourse. It is affected by the closeness of the narrator – physical, social or psychological – to the events of which s/he speaks, since the location in time and space, the psycho-social location, the coordinates of the events observed and of oral histories all differ.

In their approach to researching ethnic conflict in Kosovo, anthropologists indicate the need to include the urban/rural dichotomy, but also to take into consideration the traditional context: religion, family, kinship, tribalism, gender etc. (Duijzings 2000: 20–21).

The Prilužje enclave has preserved several interesting and distinctive characteristics that deserve the researcher's serious attention: a characteristic cult of the dead which drapes tombstones in items of clothing, complex systems of customs in the circle of life (postmortem and for weddings), an archaic manner of inviting people to their *slava*, the cult of St. Ionnachius and the Devič monastery in the Drenica hinterland, or the well preserved epic saga of the Battle of Kosovo. Nevertheless, the ethnic diversity and ethnic mingling that still take place around Prilužje today seem particularly relevant for an approach to the problem of "enclaveness".

THE CONCEPT OF HONOUR AND DISGRACE IN CONSTRUCTING THE IMAGE OF THE OTHER

Local concepts of honour and disgrace in Prilužje emerged in conversations without any authorial intervention by the researcher. Here, the interviewee is probing the researcher's knowledge of local circumstances, and getting negative answers, constructs an image on his own:

[1] The Kovačani are people whose surname is Kovačević, but they were in Kovačica village up beyond, you don't know where that is? (No.) Through Zvečane, Kovačica. They fell out with the Šiptari there and left, and now they are called Kovačani, some

were in the village of Sibovac, some in the village of Plemetina, some were in the village of Bivoljak, here and there. And the Drobnjaks, the Drobnjaks are the ones who celebrate their slava on St. George's Day and the Prophet Elijah's day. And who the Drobnjaks are, you don't know? (No, I haven't heard that at all). The Drobnjaks are, it's the tribe and the seed of Vuk Branković. Remember that. The seed of Vuk Branković is cursed because it was cursed by the mothers, wives, sisters, all who lost sons, sisters who lost brothers, wives who lost husbands at the Battle of Kosovo, they cursed him: For your treachery at Kosovo, may God grant, Vuk Branković, that your seed, breed and generation be cursed while the world turns and the ages pass. And cursed it was, see, six hundred years have passed and three hundred more must pass, since it goes to the ninth generation. And that's the seed of the Drobnjaks, it's what they were called, but the seed is of Vuk Branković. Well, even now his family hasn't had one member that wasn't born blind, crippled, deaf, or dumb, handicapped, and that's the tribe of Vuk Branković. A man from Slakovac village came here to us in Prilužje thirty years ago, twenty years they kept their handicapped son, he couldn't get up, or stand up, or talk, the seed of Vuk Branković. Well, well, well, later one son died, left two children and a wife, the second son died, a son and two daughters and that daughter of the second son was supposed to marry our cousin. The girl was normal and all, and she married here with us and had a handicapped child with us, from her tribe. No matter it wasn't in their house, but it's their seed and she came to my cousin and had a handicapped child, there has to be some consequence. A girl from Kuzmin married during the occupation in Prilužje, had a handicapped daughter and be that as it may, she found a man, and he's no good, she married him. Handicapped, see. And she's from Vuk Branković's tribe too, that seed is cursed. See what it did, Vuk Branković and his tribe and seed, they celebrate St. George's Day, and I told my nephew, ask which [family] celebrates St. George's Day or *Ilijindan* [Elijah's Day] in August, don't take her, it's Vuk Branković's tribe. It'll have to come out, either in their house or in another house where she goes, it'll have to come out that she's not right. (136-Prilužje-14-BS)

Many folklorists and historians have researched the tailoring of historic facts and the creation of the myth of betrayal by Vuk Branković at the Battle of Kosovo, as well as his primal sin and that of his descendants.[4] There are many local legends about the fate of certain places and their inhabitants in relation to Lazar's curse (see Đurić 1989: 72–75).

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[4] Cf. for example Ljubinković 1989: 136–152. For the curse of the Brankovićs see: Pešikan-Ljuštanović 2002: 64–66. For Lazar's curse see especially Loma 2002: 166–172, on the far-reaching consequences of the curse and its extension to the traitor's descendants see Loma 2002: 167, illustrated by Đurđe Branković's daughter who languished a long time because Lazar's curse had fallen upon her grandfather, Vuk Branković, until she was healed by Ionnachius of Devič. For the historical facts on the anti-hero of Kosovo, Vuk Branković, and the legend see: Mihaljčić 1989: 109–124, which includes further literature on the origin of the myth of Vuk Branković's perfidy. For the motive of betrayal at the Battle of Kosovo, 1389, see Mihaljčić 1989: 127–147. The problem of Vuk Branković's treachery was the subject of a series of studies by historian Momčilo Spremić (e.g. Spremić 1991, 1992, 1996, 1998).

Many of these legends are etiological and paraetiological, reflecting the identification of the "heroic age" with that of the earliest mythical beginnings (Loma 2002: 153).

The legend from Prilužje has parallels in Metohija. In the oral tradition of the Dabižljević clan from the old village of Drsnik in northern Metohija, two main figures appear: the founder of the dynasty, *Vojvoda* [Duke]] Daba, killed at Kosovo, and in another, later generation another "crippled" Daba, since whom there is "always someone crippled in the tribe" (Loma 2002: 156). In the village of Prilep near Dečani, the Dabići, "Albanians living in Dabaj Mahala, are descendents of the Serbian Duke Daba who was at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. They also recount that they are kin to the Dabići from the village of Drsnik near Klina, who are Serbs and who claim to be Daba's descendents. They say that in those days there were two brothers: Daba and Kraso, and so the Dabići are descended from Daba and the Krasnići from Krasa. They further say that there were always two or three lame people in the Dabići tribe" (Džogović 1985: 489).

The interviews conducted in Prilužje locate the Kosovo Drobnjak family in the villages of Slakovce and Kuzmin, or links the Drobnjak clan to the *slavas* of St. George's Day and the Prophet Elijah.[5] In his "Dictionary of Dialects of Kosovo-Metohija" (Elezović 1932, s. v. Drobnjak), Gliša Elezović confirms that the Drobnjaks are "all who celebrate St. George's Day." Anthropologist-geographer Atanasije Urošević confirms the existence of the Drobnjak clan in Kosovo. There were 5 houses in Kuzmin that celebrated St. George's Day and the Prophet Elijah. Due to oppression, they moved from Drobnjak (near Nerodimlje) to Mala Slatina, and then to Kuzmin in the mid-nineteenth century. The founding clan of the village of Slakovce were the Drobnjaks. There were 18 houses celebrating St. George's Day. Originally from Drobnjak, they later lived in Preseke (Stari Kolašin), from where they moved to Slakovce in the eighteenth century (Urošević 1965: 209, 226, 292).[6]

Anthropo-geographical material contains much data on the Kovačani clan in Kosovo.[7]

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[5] The sound archives of the Serbian Language Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) contains recordings of conversations with people born in the villages of Vrnica and Bukoš (301-K-Mitrovica-1-ML, 303-K-Vrnica-1-ML) by Miloš Luković. Both interviewees are originally from the village of Drobnjak, celebrate St. George's Day and their "little *slava*" is Elijah's Day. Recent fieldwork in Ibarski Kolašin shows that in this area it is the Bosnians who are regarded as descendants of Vuk Branković.

[6] From other data provided by this anthropologist-geographer, it could be reconstructed that there were also Drobnjaks in Kosovo in the following villages: Babin Most – 3 houses, Vrnica – 11 houses, Gojbulja – 12 houses, Nevoljane – 1 house, Novo Selo Begovo – 6 houses, Novo Selo Mađunsko – 4 houses, Ugljare – 5 houses (Urošević 1965: 142, 171, 177, 252, 255, 256, 310–311). According to summary in the same study, there were 12 clans and 70 houses of immigrants from Drobnjak (Urošević 1965: 72). There are also twentieth-century colonists in Kosovo from Drobnjak, but it is not likely that they are linked to the legend of Vuk Branković. They are probably regarded as "Montenegrins". According to the tradition of the Serbs from the Drim river valley, the Staletović clan from the village of Zojić – one house celebrating *Djurdjic* (Renovation of the Church of St. George) and St. George's day – are descendants of Vuk Branković "who sold the Serbs to the Turks and took the money" (Vukanović 1986: 430).

[7] Urošević mentions the Kovačani clan in Babin Most, Bivoljak, Vrnica, Glavotina, Janina Voda,

Urošević (1965: 118) notices that "Serbs do not have endogamy in their clans […] This is so in the Kovačani clan, which is divided into the Pantići, Mićolci and Lazići, but there is still no intermarriage." The village of Bivoljak is mentioned in an account from Prilužje, and anthropo-geographic research in 1934 registered the Kovačani clan with four houses and celebrating Sts. Cosmas and Damian. They were moved from Kovačica (Kopaonička Šalja) on to chiflik land around 1830 and their earlier origins were in Montenegro. At that time there were also four houses of Kovačani in Premetina celebrating Sts. Cosmas and Damian and who moved from the village of Kovačica around 1840. There were nine houses of Kovačani in Sibovac, celebrating Sts. Cosmas and Damian, who moved from Kovačica around 1860. Their earlier origin was in Montenegro (Urošević 1965: 153, 267, 289).[8]

THE CONCEPT OF CLAN: SEED, TRIBE, GENERATION

The construction of the local identity in Prilužje is still based on traditional moral categories – on the concept of clan and on the concept of honour[9] – which are here directly related to undesirable human characteristics. In local discourse, these are not stratified according to linguistic criteria.[10] Negative physical and character traits are conceived of

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Plemetina and Sibovac. The Kovačani, therefore, also lived in places not mentioned in conversations in Prilužje: there were two houses of Kovačani in Babin Most, one in Vrnica, 11 in Glavotina, and only the Kovačani clan lived in Janina Voda – six houses. They were all moved from Kovačica to Kopaonička Šalja at the beginning of the nineteenth century; they were originally from Montenegro and celebrated the feast of Sts. Cosmas and Damian (Urošević 1965: 142, 171–172, 175, 216).

[8] A particular type of clan stratification by *slava* existed among the Metohija Serbs. The following example comes from the town of Peć: "Serbs are here divided into tribes according to their *slava*, and the most numerous are: Nikolčani (celebrating St. Nicholas), Jovančani (celebrating St. John), Arhanđelovčani (celebrating the Archangel Michael), Đorđevčani (celebrating St. George), Petkovčani, (celebrating St. Petka), Aleksandrovčani (celebrating St. Alexandar), Lučevčani (St. Luke), Vračevčani (Cosmas and Damian) etc." (The Constantinople Herald, III/29, Constantinople, 21 August 1897).

[9] Lexicologist Stana Ristić points out that the battlefield unites the concepts of honour and disgrace (personal responsibility to ethical principles). In literary Serbian and the language of folklore, they appear in examples such as: an *honourable hero, to die honourably, the field of honour, it is disgraceful to flee from battle*, which gives these concepts a universal value handed down from ancient times. In this case, the parallel ideas of "honour" and "disgrace" are founded in "inner shame", which gives a positive connotation to words of this meaning. The feeling of shame as a conscious regulator of one's behaviour is the same as the moral norm that guides a person to conduct him or herself honourably. This awareness of personal responsibility to the community appears among speakers of the Serbian language as a moral norm peculiar not only to soldiers, but to the best kind of people (Ristić 2003: 249–250).

[10] Contemporary Serbian lexicology takes into consideration the situation-dependence of undesirable human characteristics, but separates the physical from the spiritual, cf. Dragičević 2001: 170–180. This lexicological study (Dragičević 2001: 193–216) also introduces a hierarchical structure of adjectives describing human characteristics in literary Serbian, primarily determined by urban culture, which can be used for comparison with dialectal speech, still determined today by the traditional culture.

as a unique complex of the consequences of an ancestor's mythical sin and its secondary collectivisation (cf. discourse excerpt quoted above).

The Prilužje affirmation of the *seme i pleme* (seed and breed [tribe]) formula is probably of South-Slav origin since it is not assonant in Proto-Slavonic.[11] In construction or reconstruction, oral discourse relies on folklore tradition, and hence the folklore appellation of the anti-hero with the inevitable curse:[12]

> For your treachery at Kosovo, may God grant, Vuk Branković, that your seed, breed and future generations be cursed while the world turns and the ages pass.

The duration of such a curse has a specific time limit (while the world turns and the ages pass). As a generation is considered to cover a period of a hundred years, the duration of this curse has been calculated in folklore terms to nine hundred years (six hundred and three hundred); the number nine is used in South-Slav tradition to signify "a very great number."

The curse and its consequences are expounded in the discourse, showing how the collective sin is transferred to the individual, from the general to the specific. In Prilužje, "one's own" is also defined as a complex of desirable moral and physical traits: from a healthy family, an honest one, a hardworking child.

OTHERS IN KOSOVO: SRBIJANCI

The image of Srbijanci (Serbs from Serbia proper) as "others" was constructed spontaneously in conversation, as a digression when talking of Serbian Gypsies, since the local ban on marriages does not apply to them. The local ban on Kosovar marriages used to refer to all Serbian newcomers, Serbs who were not native Kosovars, i.e. Srbijanci, Montenegrins, colonists, Šopovi (inhabitants of the Šop region on the borders of Serbia, Bulgaria and Macedonia). By including the Moravci in this list, a local Prilužje identity is easily constructed, narrower than the regional:

> [2] They are Christian Orthodox, but we called them Serbian Gypsies. Serbian Gypsies. And then, bit by bit – they never married our girls – they brought in Srbijanke [Serbian women from Serbia Proper] from over there. They brought them from Serbia, all Srbijanke. (White, so they're not Gypsies?) No, Srbijanke, white, if you only knew, oof! These women didn't pay attention to that, that they were Serbian Gypsies, but we Kosovars did. Their men didn't marry into us, and we didn't marry our women into them, no. They didn't give us [their women] and our men didn't take them either. A Serbian Gypsy, how could you take her? Having Gypsies coming to

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[11] For more details on the semantic development of South Slavic *seed* ("seme") that acquired meaning *clan* and the semantic relationship of *seed and tribe*, see: Bjeletić 1999: 55–56; for *generation* [koleno] see Bjeletić 1999: 56–60.

[12] Contemporary use of curses in Serbian language is treated by Petrović 1997.

visit you? That's it. But with these Srbijanke from Serbia, they did. And now they have a mixture, such Srbijanke, such beautiful women! (It's a mixture now?) A mixture, all white women, look, we have them from Stari Obilić too, they are here in a refugee camp, what a woman, blond, can't take your eyes off of her, and he's a Gypsy, a Gypsy. But there it is. (139-K-Premetina-5-BS)

[3] (Whom else couldn't women marry?) We wouldn't let them marry Srbijanci, for example from Župa. Some people from Župa moved to our village and our people wouldn't let you marry a Srbijanac. Kosovars marry through friendships, like, you recommend me to someone and so on. Here and there, there was a good girl, a good family, good parents, the girl would be good, hardworking, healthy, it wasn't good to be thin back then, but healthy, fat, strong, to work, to hoe. Here and there, there was a good girl, hardworking, and so on through friendship, and you wouldn't get to see the boy at all, your folks married you off and off you went. (127-K-Prilužje-4-BS)

[4] Both the Ashkalia and the pure Roma people, they didn't use to marry into one another before, the Ashkalia and the Roma, and now they do, like we marry Montenegrins or Srbijanci. (139-K-Plemetina-5-BS)

[5] Yes, for the Moravci to see them, oh, what an idea, no! Then we [women] didn't marry Montenegrins either, it was not our faith, our folks, oh no! How could you marry one, a Montenegrin's not of our faith. (And where are there Montenegrins in the vicinity?) Well, they used to be everywhere, everywhere. Mainly in Priština, the town was there, people went to school and… And they would be looking at each other. And the village girls would go to the market, there were pretty village girls, you'd go to the market, but on foot. (127-K-Prilužje-4-BS)

The expected social distance between indigenous inhabitants and newcomers in Kosovo has already been the subject of scientific research (cf. Zlatanović 2004). Relations and clashes between the native population and the colonists have been described by an anthropologist-geographer:

Between the two World Wars intermarriage (among colonists and Kosovar Serbs) were such that usually Kosovar Serb men married into the colonists, since they could take girls from them without money, while the reverse was rare because the custom among Kosovar Serbs was to ask for money in compensation for the girl. Buying a girl was abolished after the national war of liberation, but even before World War II, Kosovar Serbs had begun to depart from this custom as one having outlived its usefulness. Nevertheless, there are no strong relationships between the colonists and Kosovar Serbs even today. Differences in how households are run, differences in dress (national costume) and a certain mutual disparagement stand in the way of stronger relationships. The colonists view Kosovar Serbs as backward, while Kosovar Serbs view colonists as newcomers who have not adjusted to the rules and circumstances of their new home. Costume is an obstacle to these marriages since the bride must give up her national costume. And so almost all Montenegrin

women, women from Lika and other women from colonists' homes who married Kosovars had to start wearing Kosovo-Serbian costume almost immediately after the wedding. (Urošević 1965: 110–111; see also Petrović 1990).[13]

A cultural distance also exists in relation to the latest wave of migrations, cf. the linguistic marking: "*our / people/*", compared with: *these ones who escaped from Croatia*:

[6] Here in the village are Shiptars, up there Shiptars, and here too, we are sur-rounded, but nobody's ever said anything bad to us. (And were there any cases of marriage?) With a Shiptar girl? (Or the other way around?) No, our people here, no, but these ones who escaped from Croatia, yes, they took a Shiptar girl here. (You still have those refugees here?) Yes, here in the camp, there are, they took a Shiptar girl. (You still have the refugee camp?) Yes, over there. Kosovo B. (Kosovo B has refugees from Croatia?) Yes, it has. It has, trust me. He has a Shiptar wife, he has. (139-K-Plemetina-5-BS)

OTHERS IN KOSOVO: SERBIAN GYPSIES

The image of the inhabitants of the village of Grace also emerged as the result of co-construction by the researcher and interviewees from Plemetina and Prilužje. While researching the Prilužje enclave in Grace, the topic of identity was never explicitly imposed in conversations. The researcher discovered the existence of the problem of negative mark-ing in this village while working with displaced persons in the *Radinac* refugee centre in Smederevo. Personal contact with people from Grace who had been placed in this centre helped greatly with making contact and establishing trust in later work in the enclave. In order to receive an answer to the sensitive question of the identity of the inhabitants of Grace, the researcher asked guiding questions of interviewees from other villages in the enclave. The deixis was marked (*the ones from Grace, these people from Grace*), but the questions were not explicit.

[7] (What was your relationship with these people from Grace?) From Grace? Ah, well, those are these people, a bit like Gypsies. But they speak Serbian, our lan-guage, celebrate slava and we got on well. We didn't have anything. – We didn't marry each other. – We didn't marry into them or give in marriage, yes, as if it was another religion, but they are really Serbs, just the colour was different, black. (132-K-Prilužje-10-BS)

[8] (Tell me, can they take women from Grace?) From Grace? They can. (Did they ever take one?) Well, some did, those are these people in Grace, they are good Serbs,

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they are good people, good Serbs, honest. Workers and all, in my opinion. It's close, not far, they go around Serbia, take wives. They take them from Kragujevac, Niš, Prokuplje, Kuršumlija, the women. (I was there the day before yesterday, I saw that all the women are from different parts.) From different parts, yes, yes. They are black men and the women are white. It's a crossbred race. Did you see it? (136-K-Prilužje-14-BS)

These segments of transcript open up the comparatively unresearched question of the ethnic origin of Grace's inhabitants.[14] At the turn of the twentieth century, Jovan Cvijić (1996: 432) having no information of his own on the villages around Prilužje, gave the number of Serbian houses based on the lists of the Metropolitan, or Orthodox Archbishopric: *Prilužje 27 Serbian houses, Plemetina 12 Serbian houses, Grace 17 Serbian houses*, in which the figure for Grace certainly refers to those of Christian Orthodox denomination.

A history of political correctness runs parallel to the history of scientific interest in the identity of Serbian Gypsies. *Đorgovci* or *Jorgovci* (in Preševo – *Karađorđevci*) are viewed in ethnographic literature as "Gypsies", whose native language is mainly Serbian, but until the nineteenth century there were some whose native language was Roma. According to oral report, they come from a nomadic herdsman's *ćaja* the Jorgo. In the twentieth century they lived in southern Serbia, in Kosovo and Metohija, and in Macedonia, and it is assumed that they once lived in Montenegro as well. They are indigenous inhabitants and work in farming and as blacksmiths. In addition, they work in agriculture as wage labourers (Vukanović 1983: 140). In Izmornik in Kosovo they are called *Kiseli* ("Sour") (Vukanović 1983: 141).

Ethnologist and romanologist Tatomir Vukanović has dealt in detail with the question of "converting Gypsies into Serbs." He mentions examples from Kosovska Mitrovica where Serbianisation took place in the nineteenth century through assimilation by marriage; in Metohijski Podgor "there are occasional Serbianised Gypsies, mainly Đorgovci"; in Prizrenski Podgor, and especially in Suva Reka, the Đorgovci "vigorously declare themselves as Serbs, and are in fact assimilated with the Serbs." In Orahovac in Metohija at the end of the nineteenth century, "there were about forty houses of Christian Orthodox Gypsies who became Serbs."[15] In the Vokš area (the village of Loćani), near Dečani monastery, the Antići clan are "Serbianised Gypsies", who in addition to farming engaged in carpentry and wood engraving; in Gnjilane the Đorđević clan are "Serbianised Gypsies" (Vukanović 1983: 96–97).

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Đorgovci in the south of Serbia were in the chiflik system. The village houses of the Đorgovci and Mađupi stood in groups, the

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[14] For the full complexity of the ethnic background in the village of Grace, contained *passim* in an analysis of attitudes towards Circassians in the Prilužje enclave, see Sikimić 2004: 277.

[15] At this point Vukanović uses information from Branislav Nušić who mentions on his journey to Orahovac (Raovac) in 1894 "30 to 40 houses of Christian Orthodox Gypsies, who have been completely absorbed into the Serbs" (Nušić 1988: 204).

plots around them surrounded by a fence, thorns and outbuildings. Following the First Balkan War, many Đorgovci and Mađupi were freed of the chiflik regime, and only sporadic chiflik estates remained on the lands of the Devič Monastery. In urban settlements of Kosovo and Metohija the housing conditions of the Đorgovci and Mađupi did not differ from those of other people (Vukanović 1983: 107, 113).[16]

Atanasije Urošević (1965: 104) mentions intermarriage between Serbs and Christian Orthodox Gypsies and states "three new cases of Serbs marrying Gypsy girls", all three from Gračanica. Urošević also cites examples "where Christian Orthodox Gypsies took Serbian women", interpreting this as being due either to ignorance or economic reasons.[17] From the sociolinguistic standpoint, his remarks on the linguistic identity of the Đorgovci are also indicative since at one stage (until the beginning of the twentieth century) it was entirely Albanian.[18]

Ethnologist Tatomir Vukanović confirms that terms *Ardanovci* and Đorgovci mark the same ethnic group – "Serbianised Gypsies", "Gypsies in Kosovo whose native language is Serbian" (Vukanović 1983: 95, 138). Obviously, neither of these two terms is sufficiently well known in Prilužje. In response to a direct question by the researcher we get a very unexpected description of the Muslim Slav population:

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[16] Available ethnological data on the Đorgovci refers to wedding customs which coincide with those of the Serbs in the surrounding area. The Đorgovci are endogamous, but the Roma custom of buying the bride is noted, or where payment was exacted for the girl's dowry and for the costs of the wedding at the girl's home. This payment was made in instalments – three from the time of asking for her hand in marriage to the wedding, usually in six to twelve months. Weddings took place in churches, and the age of the spouses was the same as that in the surrounding areas (Vukanović 1983: 248).

[17] "The Gypsy Iva Milić from Badovac married a Serb woman from a house in his village where he worked as a servant. In Obilić, a girl of the Subotić colonists (from Boka) married a Gypsy of the Đokić clan in the same village just after the colonisation, 'while they still did not know that the Christian Orthodox villagers were Gypsies.' A poor girl from Lika, from among the Krivošija colonists, married a Christian Orthodox Gypsy in Skulanovo. In Dobri Dub, a Gypsy, Kosta Ilić, married a poor Montenegrin girl who was a servant in Priština (Urošević 1965: 104).

[18] Urošević in fact believes that "in some mixed Arbanasi- [Albanian-] Gypsy villages, even Christian Orthodox Gypsies adopted the Arbanasi language, that during the Turkish rule and even long after it, it was the only language they knew well or even the only language they knew at all […] At that time (around 1935) Christian Orthodox Gypsies in Obilić spoke Serbian very badly, since they still used Arbanasi among themselves. Young people in Grace tried to replace the constant use of Arbanasi by constant use of Serbian, but because of the elderly and women who did not know Serbian well, very often they too switched to Arbanasi at home […] It is probable that Christian Orthodox Gypsies in these villages switched to Arbanasi from the Serbian spoken by other Christian Orthodox Gypsies in Kosovo, such as those in Gračanica, Badovac, Priština and Kosovska Mitrovica. They probably did not know the Gypsy language when they switched to Arbanasi, just as other Christian Orthodox Gypsies in Kosovo who did not fall under the influence of the Arbanasi language do not know it, and hence their native language is Serbian. Therefore, all Christian Orthodox Gypsies in Kosovo must have abandoned the Gypsy language long before and that those speaking Arbanasi today must have first switched from Gypsy to Serbian. Christian Orthodox Gypsies in Kosovo, one and the other, including therefore those speaking Arbanasi, claim to be Serbs, and for all Kosovo Christian Orthodox Gypsies it is an insult to refer to them as Gypsies in their presence" (Urošević 1965: 108–109).

[9] (Who are the Radanovci?) Well they are, those Radanovci are half Serb, half Muslim, you see. Half Serb, half Muslim. (And where were they?) They are around Prizren there, that's where they were. I was in hospital with one patient, she was a Serb and the Shiptars made her a Muslim [lit. "a Turk"]. Her family was made Muslim. And now she still speaks Serbian, but she's Muslim, and her family and all. That's the tribe. She says to me – We're Serbs, my folks, my family is Serbian, but they made us Muslims, that's how it is. (That's around Prizren?) Towards Macedonia. There, that area over there, she says, they made us Muslims. And in Priština, for example, until recently those women from over there, from Peć and Prizren, even though they were Serbs, they wore, the older women wore dimije [Turkish trousers]. (139-K-Plemetina-5-BS)

OTHERS IN KOSOVO: *JANJEVCI*

The image of the *Janjevci* (people from the town of Janjevo) obtained through research in Priluže was supported by a number of secondary questions by the researcher aimed at clarifying the degree of local synonymity between the terms *Latins, Catholics,* and *Janjevci*. In Priluže, the *Janjevci* are defined by their traditional occupation, and their religious persuasion by opposition to Serbs and "Shiptars": *they are of different faith, they're not Shiptars or Serbs either,* [they're] *Catholics; because they're not Christian Orthodox,* [they're] *Catholics.*[19] Belonging to Christian affiliation is marked by eating habits: *They eat pork, but they're Catholics.*

[10] Ah, while Catholic girls, they're different. They eat pork, but they're Catholics. (These are people from Janjevo?) Yes. Janjevo. The Janjevci. They're of a different religion, they're not Shiptars, they're not Serbs either, [they're] Catholics. (You called them Catholics or Latins?) No, they call them Latins over there, and we call them Catholics. They are Croats. For example, my daughter-in-law from Čaglavica, she says Latins, and we here, we say Janjevci. They knew how to make all sorts of gadgets, trinkets, bracelets, chains, you know, then in the city, in Priština, they used to sell all that, those Janjevci. Where did you buy that – from the Janjevci, for example. They were experts at making that. (They didn't work on the land?) No, they were only in trade. Traders. They had a lot of gold. (They made jewellery?) Jewellery, oh yes! You buy from them when you get engaged, where do you go to buy something for your daughter-in-law – you go to the Janjevci to buy gold. That's how it is. (139-K-Plemetina-5-BS)

Ethnographic writing confirms that women from Janjevo were skilled weavers who also wove to order:

The women of Janjevo produced household cloth not only for home use but sometimes

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[19] The concept of "faith" in the Priluže enclave is analyzed in Sikimić 2004: 277–278.

for others too. Between the two world wars, some textile merchants from Priština used to order certain products from Janjevo women to be made for their customers (Barjaktarović 1971: 45).

Nevertheless, the literature shows that the *Janjevci* were much better known in the area as craftsmen who made jewellery and the like. (Barjaktarović 1972: 155–158, on *Janjevci* as "metal casters" (*livci*) and "ring-men" (*prstendžije*), see also Barjaktarović 1971: 43–45).

It is right to say that Janjevo is in the main one big ring-factory [*prstendžinica*], since about 300 Catholics make rings, there are 30 wheelwrights, 4 butchers, 10 innkeepers, 10 grocers and 2 bakers. (…) However, the main occupation of Janjevo Catholics, for which they are well known not only in their area, but also in parts much further away, is ring-making [*prstendžiluk*]. Janjevci call their craft ring-making and themselves – ringmakers. (…) Janjevci mainly make things of brass [*pirindž*], as they say, and they do not know the word bronze. (…) Only since the '40s did they begin to make things of pakon [an alloy], especially bangles, earrings and rings. They do not make anything out of silver, iron, copper or any other metal or compound. When using brass, they mainly cast it into rings, holders for icon lamps, bangles, earrings, buckles, necklaces, and girdles with metal clasps [*pafte*]. (Trojanović 1906: 106–107)

Still,

The Janjevci are, indeed, no artists in their work, on the contrary: their work is primitive, but they produce it in vast quantities, they know the roads well, the countries and languages, they go into towns, where the poor especially await them eagerly, and then buy what they need for an entire year. The Janjevci specialize in only a few items, among them the stolovat – a number of wedding rings joined together with a thick band, adorned with 5 to 10 large silver coins. (Trojanović 1906: 109)

It is not easy to reconstruct today the distant mirror,[20] but, in his description of Janjevo in 1910, Jovan Cvijić mentions that the Janjevci Catholics used to call the Christian Orthodox *Vlasi* (Vlachs).[21] Hesitation in naming the inhabitants of Janjevo is at least a

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[20] For the economic situation in Janjevo at the beginning of the twentieth century see Mikić 1988: 307–308. For statistical data on Janjevo inhabitants in Kosovo, their emigration to Croatia and life in the new area see: Šiljković/Glamuzina 2004.

[21] "In 1910 (…) there were 515 houses in Janjevo, of which 400 belonged to Catholic Serbs or "Latins" (as the Christian Orthodox call them), 75 houses of Arnauts (Albanians) and *Arnautaši (Albanianised Serbs still speaking Serbian)*, 20 of *Muhadžiri* from Serbia, 2 belonging to Turks from *Šam* (Asia Minor), and about 18 houses of Mohammedan Gypsies. The houses are usually free-standing, separate from the community and 2–3 of the most crowded contained 15 people. Among the "Latins" (the latter call the Christian Orthodox "Vlachs") two families are indigenous, moved from Staro Janjevo and account for 110 houses. These two families are the Glasinovići and the Palići. The others are old settlers, more than 200 years in the area (…) The business of Janjevo is rudimentary since the last

century old: "The Serbs speak pure Serbian, and by law they are all Catholics to the last man […] The Franciscan fathers Jukić and Slišković and many German writers call these Catholics *Croats*, which in any event comes to the same thing" (Trojanović 1906: 105). In the collection of documents (issued by the Ottoman authorities), in a receipt from the Sandžak of Novi Pazar: a Latin (sic.) called Mihoč, is one of the Dubrovnik unbelievers, living in Novi Pazar.

> This is good example showing that during this period the people from Dubrovnik were Latins as far as the Turks were concerned, just as our people from Vučitrn and throughout Kosovo and Metohija used the term Latin for every foreigner of Christian faith and Roman-Catholic by law, and in general, any man from the Christian West who was not of their religion and law. (Elezović 1940: 814–815)

At the end of the nineteenth century, Serbs from Peć used to call Albanians of Catholic denomination *Latins*.[22]

FEMALE OCCUPATION OR THE ETHNONYM *ČERČIKE*

The researcher prompts the topic of anticipated ethnic marking by the clothes worn by women by using the term *costume*, inadequate for the local vernacular (and further inadequately marked as *specific*). The female interviewee specifies a "foreign" item of clothing: the *dimije*, which does not fit the traditional marker of Orthodoxy*: And Christian Orthodox too, were baptised, ate pork and all*. This introductory question steered the conversation to the naming of a series of local women's ethnonyms: *Pećanke* (women from Peć), *Srpkinje* (Serbian women), *Čerčike*, *Katolinke* (Catholic women).

> [11] (Were there any women who wore black šalvare [Turkish trousers], who had a specific costume?) Yes, yes, a costume. Well also, for example, in Priština until

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vestiges of the metal works at Novo Brdo have been preserved in this town. From bronze they make icon lamps, candlesticks, bracelets, rings, and in particular many crosses, and sell them throughout Kosovo, Metohija and the Prizren area, but also in Serbia, Bulgaria and Wallachia. Before, they used to travel and sell their crafts throughout Macedonia, as far as Thessaloniki. Furthermore, they go from house to house making women's costumes and various kinds of napkins and towels in great quantities but very bad taste, which they sell in Kosovo, crowding out the graceful but costly Kosovo costumes. Nonetheless, wealthy Janjevci are rare." (Cvijić 1996: 525–526) For dialectological and sociolinguistic descriptions of the Janjevo vernacular see: Pavlović 1970; for craftsmen's terminology: Rodić 1974. For more recent ethnographic work on archive material from Janjevo cf. Petrović 2004.

[22] "What is more, the Catholics themselves that we call "Latins", whether in towns or *nahije* [administrative districts], although they have betrayed their old faith and set it aside, would not abandon their Serbian national *slava*, the sign of their blood and nationality. Most celebrate St. Nicholas, St. Dimitrije, the Feast of the Transfiguration etc. The greatest oath you will hear them utter is: "*Pasha qirim e Shënikolit*!" which in the language of the Arnauts (Albanians) means: "By the candle of St. Nicholas!" (Constantinople Herald, III/34, Constantinople, 25 September 1897, Dim. P-dj).

recently those women from over there, from Peć and Prizren, they wore them, although they were Serbs, the older women wore the dimije. (Even though they were Serbs?) Even though they were Serbs, they wore dimije, and then that gajtan. (The Christian Orthodox women too?) The Christian Orthodox too, they were baptised, ate pork and all, but they wore only dimije, we called them Čerčike. (Those women who wore it?) Who wore the dimije, but are Serbs, for example. They're Serbs. (139-K-Plemetina-5-BS)

The term *Čerčika* has been noted in a dictionary of the Kosovo-Metohija vernacular as an appellative: *čerčika*, f. "a woman who sells various home-made types of cloth, old suits etc., in public: *Every Saturday the čerčike go to the bazaar in Mitrovica*" (confirmation from Gornja Sudimlja, Turcism, Elezović 1935 s.v.).[23] The example from Prilužje shows the onymisation of this appellative (meaning the doer, practitioner of the occupation), but it is also possible that the interviewee is not sure of the real meaning of the term *čerčika*. In both cases the term refers only to women, whether they sell their cloth at the market or wear some elements of Muslim costume. The possible connection to the selling of goods indicates the further course of the interviewee's associations as she continues to speak of the *Janjevke* (women from Janjevo): *they are Catholics, that sell, Janjevci*. On the other hand, it is clear that in Kosovo at the turn of the twentieth century, to which period this data refers, travelling peddlers of small goods belonged to another social and ethnic class, and this would apply all the more to women who did so.[24]

An outsider's view of women's costumes in Kosovo at the beginning of the twentieth century can be observed in a description by Branislav Nušić (1902: 138–150), who neutrally notes that in contrast to women in villages, "town women wear *dimije* which are made a little shorter than for Turkish women and are girdled with a silken sash. *Dimije* are usually made of *basma* [type of thin cotton fabric] or *jum-basma* [woolen fabric]. Over a linen or silk shirt, they wear a *jelek* made of homespun or velvet or even of silk" (Nušić 1902: 148). Around the same time, Petar Kostić sees women's clothing in Kosovo in the nineteenth century as an ethnic marker:

Our women had to dress and cover themselves as the Muslim women do, in a

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[23] An Etymological Dictionary of the Croatian or Serbian Language marks the lexeme *čerčija* as masculine, even though the source from which it was taken (Skok 1971–1974, s.v. *čerčija*), with examples from Banja Luka and Sarajevo, marks it only as feminine, with the synonyms: *woman trader, pazar-bula* (market woman in Oriental costume), *carrier*. By comparing this with confirmation from Prilužje and surroundings, apart from what is certainly a specific social status, a certain ethnic marking of women traders at town markets in the central Balkans of the twentieth century may also be suggested. The lexicographical and ethnolinguistic confirmation cited hitherto indicate that these women traders certainly existed in Bosnia and Kosovo. For traditional attitudes towards market-women (in South Slav folklore material) cf. Sikimić 1999.

[24] In the period following the Second World War, *the Gypsy Redžo from Mitrovica* used to peddle a variety of goods in the villages around Leposavić (Lešak, Krnjin, Tvrđen). He used to go to Leposavić twice a month by train, to more far-flung villages on foot. He carried his goods in a sack, gave goods on credit or exchanged them for food: flour, beans, meat (oral confirmation by Grozdana Mladenović, born in 1931 in Krnjin, near Leposavić).

feredža with an avlija [havlija: a large, white kerchief that went over the feredža], and in some places in džarove [fabric used by Muslim women to cover their heads] too, and they also had to wear yellow slippers. On one occasion, a Mohammedan assaulted a Muslim girl thinking she was Serb. Thereupon came the order for the giaours to wear red slippers, in contrast to Mohammedan women who wore yellow ones. What had to be done out of fear, gradually turned into a custom which was not easily abolished. It was only on Good Friday 1913 that the feredža was abolished for Serbian women, and the avlija set aside. Prizren Latins (Catholic women) still retain this costume, but gradually, especially after the second liberation, they too are beginning to abandon it. (Kostić 1988: 300).[25]

LOCAL – GLOBAL

How are historical changes to the ethnic image reflected in local memory? The enclave still remembers the arrival of the colonists in Kosovo between the two world wars, the gradual changes to folk costume, the arrival of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. In informal communication, no politically correct terminology in speaking of the "other" has yet emerged. In Prilužje (as in all other enclaves) the older ethnonym, *Šiptari* (Shiptars) is consistently used: *They fell out with the Shiptars there*; *Here in the village are Shiptars, up there Shiptars*; *and the Shiptars made her a Muslim*; cf. examples quoted from other enclaves: *for the Shiptars, for example, they sewed breeches* (Sirinić), and *Shiptars always guarded the terzija* (Zubin Potok). It is the same when naming the Albanian language: *No, they don't know the Roma language, but they know the Shiptar language*, where the politically correct term "Roma language" was introduced by researcher's question. The case is the same with the use of the ethnonym "Roma" since it is only a repetition of the researcher's question. Nevertheless, the marking of the Roma ethnic group whose native language is Albanian as *Ashkalia* is very common:[26]

[12] (They speak only Serbian? They don't know the Roma language?) No, they don't know the Roma language, but they know the Shiptar language. The Shiptar language they know. (And you have pure Roma people too?) We have pure Roma people too. There are pure Roma people in our village. (Who speak the Roma language?) Only the Roma language, we don't have Ashkalia, Ashkalia we don't have. [139-K-Plemetina-5-BS]

In Prilužje today, as in other Serbian enclaves in Kosovo, only *Shiptars* and *occupiers*

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[25] For an ethnographic view of Kosovo town costumes, especially female, see for example in Vukanović 2001: 281–286; Vukanović 1986: 110–111.

[26] Cf. an example from a transcript by Miloš Luković (Luković 2005): *There were, there were, they are different Gypsies, who spoke only the Shiptar language. They are Ashkalia* (the English version of the article Luković 2007).

are clearly negatively marked on the hierarchical scale of otherness.[27] The image of the other in Prilužje retains traces of a pre-modern time, a time which in the diachronic sense preceded ethnic partition and was based on language differences, religious division and a territorial framework that was dynastic.[28] The "insiders" on this scale are today neutrally marked, and connected only to the local community of Prilužje.

The global/local opposition is equally tenable as an adequate methodological choice in researching the enclave. This opposition reflects the same relationship as that existing between methodology in researching the standard and literary language and in researching dialect and idiolect. To inventory all the meanings of a lexeme in the standard language cannot explain the use of the same lexeme in the local vernacular or by an individual. The "anthropological twist" (which places the individual and the local in the foreground) brings us only a step away from relativising many universally acknowledged sociolinguistic and dialectological conclusions.

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[27] For a sociolinguistic analysis of the language of hatred during the wars of the 1990s in South Slav areas, especially the language of the media during the war of 1999, see: Okuka 2002.

[28] For more detail on nations as "imagined communities" see Anderson 1991: 12–22; for historical changes of the *us : them* opposition regarding the relationship between Turks and Albanians in Kosovo see Bakić-Hayden 2004.

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POVZETEK

ENKLAVA PRILUŽJE: OBLIKOVANJE LOKALNE IDENTITETE

Biljana Sikimić

Prispevek s pomočjo kvalitativne analize obravnava poglede na »druge«, izoblikovane v diskurzu Srbov v enklavi Prilužje na Kosovu. Intervjuji, ki so bili izvedeni leta 2003 v vaseh Prilužje, Babin Most, Plemetina in Grace, pokažejo, da se v diskurzu lokalnih prebivalcev oblikuje več koncentričnih krogov *drugosti*. Omenjena stratifikacija zajema osebne percepcije tako imenovanih *Kovačanov, Moravcev, Latinov, Črnogorcev, Srbijancev, Čerčik, Radanovcev* in lokalnih potujočih trgovcev, ki vsi govorijo srbski jezik. Stopnjevanje *drugosti* se udejanja na lokalni ravni in ima značilnosti »predmodernega«, to je časa pred etničnimi delitvami. Tako je podoba »drugega« v enklavi Prilužje utemeljena na podlagi jezikovnih in verskih razlik, medtem ko etnične razlike ne igrajo pomembne vloge. Vpliv procesa oblikovanja nacij pa se vendar kaže v dejstvu, da so med različnimi *drugimi* samo Albanci (*Šiptari*) negativno označeni. Tako prebivalci enklave Prilužje oblikujejo lastno identiteto z uporabo konceptov, ki sodijo v področje tradicionalne kulture.

SERBS, ALBANIANS, AND THOSE IN BETWEEN: THE GRADATION OF OTHERNESS AND IDENTITY MANAGEMENT IN THE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS

Tanja PETROVIĆ[1]

ABSTRACT

Serbs, Albanians, and Those In Between: The Gradation of Otherness and Identity Management in the Nation-Building Process

The article outlines the attitude of the Serbian nation, whose identity is to a great extent built on the belonging to Orthodox Christendom, towards Muslims – both towards Albanians, who are perceived as "undeniably other," as well as those who are perceived as "less other," such as the Gorani in Kosovo and the Bosniaks in the region of Sandžak and Kosovo. While this gradation is based on two relatively stable (at least at the synchronic level) categories – language and religion, the ethnic/national category often reveals itself as subject to negotiation, change, convergence and divergence. These processes engage both majority communities – i.e. those engaged in the nation-building process, and minority communities, i.e. those who negotiate their own status and position in this process driven by others.

KEYWORDS: Serbs, Albanians, Muslims, Other, identity, nation-building

IZVLEČEK

Srbi, Albanci in tisti vmes: Stopnjevanje drugosti in identitetne strategije v kontekstu procesa oblikovanja nacij

Prispevek opisuje odnos Srbov, katerih nacionalna identiteta v veliki meri temelji na pripadnosti pravoslavnem krščanstvu, do muslimanov – tako Albancev, ki se v srbskem nacionalnem imaginariju doživljajo kot »nedvomni drugi«, kot do Gorancev in Bošnjakov – skupin, katerih »drugost« je manjše stopnje. Stopnjevanje »drugosti« temelji na dveh (vsaj na sinhroni ravni) stabilnih kategorijah, jeziku in veri, medtem ko je kategorija etničnega/ nacionalnega pogosto podvržena procesom zagovarjanja, spreminjanja, konvergence/divergence. Omenjenih procesov so deležne tako večinske skupnosti, ki so nosilke procesa oblikovanja nacij, kot manjšinske skupnosti, ki so v procesu oblikovanja nacij prisiljene zagovarjati lastne interese.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Srbi, Albanci, muslimani, »drugi«, identiteta, oblikovanje nacij

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INTRODUCTION: THE GRADATION OF *OTHERNESS* AND THE NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY IN THE BALKANS

The concepts of the *Other* and *otherness* have become a constant in anthropological discourse during recent decades. They help to understand processes of negotiation of collective identities and roles and statuses ascribed to or taken by various social groups in the contemporary world. Extensive research conducted on discourses through which the other is imagined and perceived in Western European societies[2] teaches us that imagining the other tells much more about the one who imagines than about the imagined. This research has shaped two related and to a great extent complementary paradigms: *orientalism* and *balkanism*. The former was developed by Edward Said (1996) and refers to "pervasive patterns of representation of cultures and societies that privilege a self-confidently 'progressive,' 'modern' and 'rational' Europe over 'the putatively 'stagnant,' 'backward,' 'traditional' and 'mystical' societies of the Orient (Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992: 1; Said 1996). Said stresses that "for Europe, the Orient is one of deepest and most present images of the Other," which "helped defining Europe (i.e. the West) as an image, an idea, a person, or an experience, which is clearly different from it" (Said 1996: 12). According to Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert Hayden (1992: 2), "in the post-colonial world, the language of orientalism still maintains its rhetorical force as a powerful set of categories with which to stigmatize societies that are not 'western-style' democracies." *Balkanism*, on the other hand, is a concept developed by Maria Todorova, which differs from orientalism principally in the fact that the Orient is the indisputable Other, while "the Balkans are Europe, are part of Europe, although, admittedly, for the past several centuries its provincial part or periphery (…) Unlike orientalism, which is a discourse about an imputed opposition, balkanism is a discourse about imputed ambiguity" (Todorova 1997: 17).

Discourses on the other and images of the other are universal mechanisms for negotiation of collective identities. We also find these mechanisms within the European periphery, where every society construes its "other," and this reproduction of otherness is, as a rule, shifted towards the east. This reproduction and gradation of "Orients" was labelled *nesting orientalisms* by Milica Bakić-Hayden in her seminal article (Bakić-Hayden 1995). It is a pattern in which "Asia is more 'East' or 'other' than eastern Europe; within eastern Europe itself this gradation is reproduced with the Balkans perceived as most 'eastern'; within the Balkans there are similarly constructed hierarchies" (ibid.: 918).

In this article I will try to show the gradation of *otherness* which is present within a single Balkan society, namely in the Republic of Serbia, and describe the dynamics of the identity politics that is influenced by this gradation. The conditions for such internal gradation are not so much geographical (based on an east – west dichotomy), but have to do with the Ottoman historical legacy which is shared by Balkan societies. Bakić-Hayden points out the fact that "many Balkan self-identities have been constructed in direct op-

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2 Larry Wolff 1992, 1994, Maria Todorova 1997, Vesna Goldsworthy 1998, Ania Loomba 1998.

position to an actual oriental other, i.e. Ottoman Turks who conquered the region from the east." These self-identities however had to deal with another *other* or *half-other*, who resulted from the long lasting presence of Ottomans in the area, that is, the parts of Balkan population that have been subject to Islamization. I will outline the attitude of the Serbian nation, whose identity is to a great extent built on belonging to Orthodox Christendom, towards Muslims in Serbia – both those perceived as "undeniably other" as well as those who are perceived as "less other," such as the Gorani in Kosovo and Bosniaks in the Sandžak region and Kosovo. While this gradation is based on two relatively stable (at least at the synchronic level) categories – language and religion, the ethnic/national category often reveals itself as a subject to negotiation, change, convergence and divergence. These processes engage both majority communities – i.e. those engaged in the nation-building process, and minority communities, i.e. those who negotiate their own status and position in this process driven by others. The actions of both are deeply related and may be understood only if observed in a broader context.

THE MUSLIM *OTHER* AND COLLECTIVE IMAGERY IN EUROPE AND IN THE BALKANS

It is well known that the construction of European identity is to a great extent based on the opposition between Christendom and Islam. As Tomaž Mastnak (1997) argues, a strong common consciousness of "Europeanism" did not exist before the 15th century, when "'Europe' started to gain more articulated emotional connotations and mobilization power, and became a notion that started functioning as a holder of common political consciousness of the West" (Mastnak 1997: 16). Europe was essentially construed as an "active community of Christians," and such perception of Europe was most clearly shaped after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 (ibid: 17). "Europe as a political community was shaped in a holy war against 'Turks,' who became a symbolic representation of hostile Muslims during the Renaissance" (ibid.: 24). Defending Europe from Muslims is *locus communis* in European historiographical and political discourses. *Antemurale Christianitatis* is also a metaphor that serves as a discursive means for proving the Europeanness of numerous nations on the continent. It is particularly pervasive in the Balkans, which are traditionally perceived as the European periphery, European non-Europe, the European internal Other (Todorova 1997; Hammond 2004, 2006; Mastnak 1997). This metaphor was extensively employed in the process of redefinition of national identities in the former Yugoslav lands in the late 1980s and 1990s: as Slavoj Žižek (1993: 21) points out, in the former Yugoslavia "every participant … tries to legitimize their place 'inside' by presenting themselves as the last bastion of European civilization … in the face of Oriental barbarism." At his Gazimestan speech on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo on June 28, 1989, the then president of Serbia Slobodan Milošević stressed that

Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself on the Kosovo Plain, but it also

defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended European culture, religion, and European society in general.

The same metaphor was repeated several years later, in the 1990s, but then it referred to the contemporary situation in Europe and to a need to protect the continent from an "Islamic onslaught". Dragoš Kalajić, a Serbian journalist and painter stated that

The fact of Islamic onslaught on Western Europe by peaceful means, by means of mass immigrations, threatening to turn European nations into national minorities within their own states, only accentuates the importance of the Serbian struggle for the overall defense of Europe, European culture and civilization (Kalajić 1994, as cited in Bakić-Hayden 1995: 925).

Although this statement strongly resembles the discourse of western European extreme nationalist parties' representatives, it actually refers to a different context, since in Serbia and elsewhere in the Balkans, the Muslim presence is of a different nature. Reference to the western European situation is an attempt to justify ethnic violence towards Muslims that hides behind the formulation "the Serbian struggle". A similar borrowing of "more universal" discursive patterns is observable in the discourse of terrorism with reference to Muslims in Serbia, particularly Albanians in Kosovo and Bosniaks in Sandžak. In the last few years, the Serbian media have applied such discourse when writing about the Vehabi in Sandžak. This discourse shares many similarities with Western media reporting and political discourse on Islamist fanaticism and threats of Muslim terrorism. (cf. Karanović 2007)

In line with Münkler (1991), Mastnak (1997: 15) points out that "Europe is an exclusivist notion that includes only by excluding". Due to the long-lasting Ottoman presence in the Balkans, the inclusion/exclusion pattern based on the Christian/Muslim opposition was not unambiguous as it was for a large part of the rest of Europe. The Ottoman legacy caused non-correspondence of ethnic, linguistic and confessional categories, to which Western European travellers, journalists and administrators reacted with confusion and disturbance. Irvine and Gal (1999) give several illustrations of such attitudes: German geographer Karl von Östreich wrote about the Balkans in the beginning of the 20th century:

Instead of racially pure Turks and Albanians we find people who are racially mixed ... and whose multilingualism misleads us about their origins, so that they can be counted sometimes as Greeks, sometimes as Bulgarians, sometimes as Wallachians. (Von Östreich 1905: 270)

Another traveller from the same period, Lucy Garnett, describes the Balkan "confusion" in the following way: in Macedonia, she notes,

a Greek-speaking community may prove to be Wallachian, Albanian or even Bul-

garian, and the inhabitants of a Slav-speaking village may claim to be of Greek origin... All these various ethnical elements are, in many country districts of Macedonia, as well as in the towns, so helplessly fused and intermingled. (Garnett 1904: 234–235)

Ehrenpreis (1928: 12) describes "the Levantine type in the areas between the Balkans and Mediterranean" as "psychologically and socially, truly a 'wavering form,' a composite of Easterner and Westerner, multilingual ... superficial and unreliable." Such a medley of people, religions, and languages became a "trademark" of the Balkans, and was at the same time seen as the most salient difference between this region and rest of Europe, ethically relatively homogenous, where "the ideal political order of one nation, speaking one language, ruled by one state, within one bounded territory" was the prerequisite for achieving the highest European values of technological progress, economic development, and civilization (Irvine and Gal 1999: 63).

The process of Islamization was the most intensive in those parts of the Balkans that were peripheral and in contact zones between the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches, i.e. in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, parts of Macedonia and Albania. While in areas with weak church structures such as Bosnia conversion to Islam was an easier and to a relatively high degree voluntary process, in Kosovo the urban population was first subject to conversion, while the rural population was subject to Islamization as late as the 17th century, and this wave of Islamization was forced.[3] This simultaneously caused the emergence of religious syncretism and heterodoxy to a much greater extent than in Bosnia. It took several generations for families to fully adopt Islam in Kosovo and Albania, while in certain areas there are still ambiguous religious identities (Dejzings 2005: 29–31; cf. Kressing 2007). As Zirojević (2003: 91) points out, "the Islamization process of the Balkan domicile population as well as the domicile population of other parts of the Ottoman Empire figured to be neither prompt nor plain." As a consequence, a plethora of 'intermediary' and unstable religious identities emerged, known in literature as Cryptochristianity, bireligiousness, and "unfinished Islamization". While Zirojević (2003) provides an overview of socio-cultural processes that indicate religious syncretism in the South Slavic lands, Dejzings (2005) points to a particular Albanian case of crypto-Catholicism in the village of Stubla in Kosovo. In the winter of 1845-1846, the local Ottoman pasha initiated the deportation of 25 Albanian families from this village to Anatolia because they publicly denied Islam and (re)converted to their "original" and "authentic" religion, Catholicism (Dejzings 2005: 122).[4]

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[3] Todorova (2004: 141–142) stresses that while "it is widely accepted nowadays that the vast majority of the Balkan conversions were individual ones, (…) this particular point, whether the conversions were the result of a centrally planned and systematically implemented policy of assimilations or, on the other hand, whether they were an individually initiated policy of social, political and religious adaptation, was itself the object of internal debates within Bulgarian historiography".

[4] For more about Islamization in the Balkans cf. also Vryonis 1972; Barjaktarović 1950; Zirojević 2001; Lopasic 1994; Todorova 2004.

While individual conversions to Islam were made with the intention of full "integration into the new religious and social milieu" and thus were accompanied with a subsequent loss of the native language,

> the exceptions were the cases where these conversions occurred en masse in larger or smaller groups, irrespective of whether they were voluntary or enforced: Bosnia, Albania, the Rhodopes (the Pomaks), Macedonia (the Torbesh), Serbia (the Gorani) (Todorova 2004: 142).

The Ottoman legacy reflected in the non-correspondence of ethnic, religious and linguistic categories caused the emergence of a number of small ethnic groups that do not fit into the model composed of nations and national minorities, which is a result of the modern nation-building process. These "hidden" minorities (cf. Sikimić 2004) are institutionally unrecognized, publicly invisible and absent from policy-making institutions. Their members share an idea of common origin and of importance of that origin for their identity. Within the framework of such development and from the historical viewpoint, minority communities may be observed as groups which failed to complete the shaping of a distinctive ethnic identity in the nation-building process (Promitzer 2004: 13–14). The relationship between these minority groups and the state in which they live is ambiguous and subject to change and negotiation: state policy may vary from recognition and support to assimilation, while minorities may adopt some of the existing national identities, develop their own national identity, or remain invisible. One also must not overlook the importance of the relationship between the majority and minority population: the minority is perceived as different by the majority and in certain cases the identification of the minority with the majority ("voluntary" assimilation) is not possible because of this perceived difference. For example, there is a common tendency of the Roma population to "hide" their ethnic origin by adopting a more prestigious identity that gives them better chances for survival and prosperity – a strategy that was labelled *ethnic mimicry* by some Yugoslav ethnologists. It seems, however, that this mimicry is almost never complete and successful, since those whose identity is Roma try to adopt and maintain a distance towards them (Dejzings 2005: 200, f. 22). So the Orthodox, Serbian-speaking Roma in Kosovo consider themselves Serbs, but the social distance between the two communities reveals itself in the absence of intermarriages and the fact that the Serbs call them *Serbian Gypsies* (*srpski Cigani*) (Mladenović 2004). Similarly, Albanian-speaking Roma who try to adopt Albanian identity are called *Albanian Gypsies* by Albanians (Dejzings 2005: 192).

The redefinition of collective identities in the Balkans from local to ethnic and national is closely related to the nation-building process in this part of Europe: to quote Maria Todorova (1997),

> the Balkans were becoming European by shedding the last residue of an imperial legacy, widely considered as anomaly at the time, and by assuming and emulating

the homogeneous European nation-state as the normative form of social organiza-
tion. It may well be that what we are witnessing today, wrongly attributed to some
Balkan essence, is the ultimate Europeization of the Balkans. If the Balkans are,
as I think they are, tantamount to their Ottoman legacy, this is an advanced stage
of the end of the Balkans.

The nation-building process of the western European type that took part in the Balkan
states after their liberation from Ottoman rule led to increasing ethnic homogenization. As
a consequence, the identity strategies chosen by members of minority groups were either
convergent or divergent towards the dominant (national) identity. The direction of strategy
towards convergence or divergence depends as a rule on current political circumstances
and the distribution of power.

ALBANIANS: THE SERBIAN INDISPUTABLE *OTHER*

The presence of Islam in the Balkan Peninsula combined with various linguistic
identities made possible the development of the whole plethora of identity strategies. For
the identity of the Serbian majority, Orthodox Christianity is the essential ingredient,
which became particularly obvious in the last few decades with the escalation of Serbian
nationalism and the strengthening of the political role of the Serbian Orthodox Church
and its affirmation as "the national church." The Battle of Kosovo and the sacredness
of the Kosovo land, where numerous Orthodox sanctuaries are situated, are central ele-
ments that constitute the Serbian national myth. While all other (non-Orthodox) religious
communities became stigmatized (and also frequently subject to violence) as Serbian
nationalism increased, Muslims continued to play the role of the radical, indisputable
Other in the Serbian collective imagery. This Otherness is most radically ascribed to
the Kosovo Albanians, the community which also represents the linguistic Other. In the
1980s, the conflict between Serbs and Albanians was presented in Serbian political and
public discourse as a "clash of civilizations," a new battle between Christianity and Islam
(Dejzings 2005: 139). The perception of Albanians as Others was strengthened through
the production and maintenance of stereotypes of Albanians as savages that need to be
civilized, barbarians and intruders characterized by violent and deviant sexual behaviour,
as people who "reproduce like animals" and who "destroy Orthodox churches and other
sanctuaries" (Marković 2003). Since the imagining of the Other is always characterized
by ambiguity, these stereotypes are complemented with the positive stereotyping of Al-
banians as people with high moral codes, who preserve the social solidarity, biological
vitality, patriarchal warrior ethos, a natural wisdom – i.e. all that the Serbs lost in the
process of Westernization and modernization.[5]
The linguistic and cultural isolation of Albanians from the other peoples in the former

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[5] Marković (2003) provides a historical overview of stereotypes that Serbs use regarding Albanians.

Yugoslavia resulted in their self-perception as "a non-Slavic people trapped in a South Slav state" (Berg 1983: 56, as cited in Bakić-Hayden 1995: 926). Despite the high degree of Islamization of the Albanian population in Kosovo, they retained a strong sense of the Albanian identity and there was not a significant convergence between them and Slavophone Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. This was so partly because of the fact that Albanians are divided into three religious groups: Muslims, Catholics and a significantly numerous community of the Shiite dervish Sufi order of Bektashis (Dejzings 2005: 24). In addition,

> the common Islamic heritage is not so homogenous as it may appear (…) Albanian Islamic religious activity has long been influenced by the numerous Sufi orders and intertwined with practices derived from Albanian national custom and, as such, is quite different from the more orthodox, 'pure' Islamic tradition of Slavic Muslims (Berg 1983, as cited in Bakić-Hayden 1995: 925–926, f. 38).

For these reasons, Albanian nationalism was secular to a great extent and not closely connected to religion, in opposition to Serbian nationalism, which is characterized by the intermingling of ethnic and religious identities (Dejzings 2005: 212). Despite the secular character of Albanian national ideology, it was often presented in religious terms by the Serbian side: As Milica Bakić Hayden (1995: 926) points out, "from Serbian perspectives of the 1970s and 1980s, the Albanians from Kosovo were experiencing an Islamic revival." She provides an example of media discourse from *Duga* magazine reflecting such attitude:

> The truth about Kosovo and Metohia has not changed much over time, so that even today Muslim fundamentalism, persistently knocking at the door of Kosovo and Metohia, is trying to approach Europe. It is hard to believe that Europe is not aware of this. Even those in Europe who do not hold Serbia close to their hearts know very well that this old Balkan state represents the last barrier to the ongoing onslaught and aggression of Islam (Saric 1990).

Although Albanians and Serbs were "indisputable" others for each other, this does not mean that there have not been attempts to question the "authenticity" of the identity of the other ethnic group. From the Serbian side, such attempts were articulated in academic discourse, as the so-called *Arnautaši* thesis. Serbian historians, ethnographers and geographers claimed that numerous Serbs in Kosovo converted to Islam but managed to keep their Serbian language and customs for a long time, but eventually adopted Albanian identity within several generations (Bataković 1997, 2007). Such a thesis implies that many Albanians are in fact not 'real' Albanians, but converted Serbs. Albanians, on the other hand, claimed that numerous Serbs are actually Albanians who converted to Orthodox Christianity in the Serbian medieval kingdom and consequently adopted Serbian identity.[6]

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6 Both of these claims are not without historical truth, as pointed out by Dejzings (2005: 33–34).

BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS: NON-ALBANIAN MUSLIMS IN SERBIA AND THE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS

State-driven assimilation policies

To understand the identity-related processes that are currently taking place in the societies of Serbia and Kosovo, apart from the Ottoman legacy, one must consider another legacy that is shared by ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia, namely the legacy of Yugoslav socialism. The nationally pluralistic "Bratstvo i jedinstvo" ("Brotherhood and Unity") in Tito's Yugoslavia, attempting to create a new supraethnic identity, in reality forced the ethnification of the six Yugoslav nations ("narodi") when it ascribed a fixed linguistic and territorial identity to them as well as to the smaller ethnic groups (the so-called nationalities, "narodnosti") (cf. Grandits this volume).

Yugoslav quota system, which was set to guarantee equal representation of all nations and nationalities in governing institutions and equal access to the labour market, prompted members of small ethnic groups to assimilate into the ethnic groups with whom they shared most of their identity features (language and/or religion). This tendency was clearly shown in the census data, where the figures were much lower than the actual number of Roma, Jews, and other small ethnic groups (cf. Dejzings 2005: 204). The "simplification" of complex ethnic relations in some areas was even directly carried out by the state institutions, as in the case of the Muslim Slavophone population of Gora and Sredačka Župa and other Muslim and non-Albanian speaking groups. After the Second World War, in 1945, they were ascribed Albanian ethnic identity and Albanian names by state decree (Mladenović 2004: 253). Comparable with such a policy of the Yugoslav socialist authorities is the practice of classification of ethnic groups in present-day Kosovo by UNMIK authorities, who lump Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians into a single group designated by the abbreviation RAE, ignoring the self-perceptions of these groups and the identity strategies chosen by them (see Vah, this volume).

From Invisibility to Visibility

Ethnic groups which do not fit into the dominant nation-state model "can easily be attacked on the basis of the primary nation-state categories and semiotic codes that express ethnic identities. These essentially relate to languages, names, religion and traditions." (Konstantinov 1997: 34). While such groups most often evolve "an identity-sustaining strategy which relies on less visible categories that are connected with demographic behaviour: residential patterns, family and kinship structure, and employment patterns," as Konstantinov (ibid.) argues in case of the Pomaks in Bulgaria, they may also opt for visibility within the national state context, adopting some existing national identity or reinterpreting their local identity as a national one.

The process of the national identity formation among Bosnian Muslims, which was

another result of the Yugoslav legacy and which took its final shape during the violent ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, significantly affected the identity strategies of non-Albanian Muslims in the Serbia, particularly in the Sandžak region, which borders Bosnia. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Muslim leadership in Sandžak

> hopes that ultimately their region will be reunited with the 'motherland' which, it claims, is Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sandžak and Muslim leaders also maintain that there are strong linguistic and cultural links between their communities. The Sandžak Muslims, according to their intellectuals, are neither Turks nor Serbs who have converted to Islam, but Muslims who speak neither Albanian nor a pure Ekavian (the dialect spoken by the majority of Serbia's citizens). (Andrejevich 1997: 174–175)[7]

Such discourse is an illustrative example of what Konstantinov (1997: 36) labels the 'vernacular academy.' It is an "important minority-centred layer of reaction against the nation-state monopoly over identity affairs." As the author further points out, "the vernacular academy borrows exclusively from the official nation-state academic discourse in terms of general categories and analytical tools, reinterpreting these for its own needs." Both the vernacular and the nation-state academic discourses share "the premise that the ethnic identity is a matter of unbroken genetic lineage rather that cultural event or choice" (ibid.).

An Albanian speaking Muslim community claimed to have Egyptian identity and established their organizations in Kosovo and Macedonia in 1990 (Dejzings 2005: 190). Although often identified with Roma, the members of this community deny that they are of Roma origin and emphasize their social status, which is much higher than that of the Roma in Kosovo. At the same time, such strategy aimed at distancing from Albanians at a moment when identification with them was not perceived as strategically good policy. Both Macedonians and Serbs supported this identity change and saw it as a way to lessen Albanian political influence. In this process, the discourse of the "vernacular academy," which offered proofs for the community's relations with Egypt, was re-employed by the representatives of Serbian national academia: Serbian scholars went a step further, claiming that Macedonian and Kosovo Egyptians are in fact Christian Copts, and their Muslim

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[7]   Although the argument of differentiation on the basis of language is frequent in this kind of discourse, it most frequently does not correspond to the facts, at least when areas where Serbo-Croatian used to be spoken are concerned: as the American linguist Victor Friedman (Friedman 1997: 5; cf. also. Greenberg 1995, 2004: 34–35) points out, "in an ethnically mixed village or region, all the inhabitants will speak the same dialect, i.e. ethnically based dialects do not really exist." Ranko Bugarski (2002–2003: 72) writes similarly about linguistic situation in pre-war multiethnic Sarajevo: "Naturally, there were individual differences in vocabulary range. Style of expression and level of language culture related to education, social status, profession, etc. But the point is that there existed no recognizable "ethnolects" to cut across such difference: the belief that local urban Serbs, Croats, and Moslems spoke and wrote differently depending on ethnonational affiliation is a myth" (for more on these issues see Petrović 2008).

identity is thus inauthentic and secondary. According to the German journal Der Spiegel, Slobodan Milošević supported the Kosovo Egyptians' demands, and maintained that half of the Albanian population there are Egyptians who were forced to give up their identity (Dejzings 2005: 192). Milošević's inclusion of a Roma and an Egyptian in the Serbian delegation to the Rambouillet negotiations over Kosovo's autonomy in 1999, as well as his concern for the status of the Gorani in Kosovo and his insistence that any representative of minority groups in the Kosovo parliament is allowed to block any decision that is contrary to the group interests, should be understood in the same light, as a result of "a concern with the potential costs to the state of the political mobilization by the republic's largest ethnic minority" (Friedman 2007: 682).

The relatively isolated community of Gorani in Kosovo's south-west today numbers around 10,000 people. The nation-building processes that took part in the former Yugoslavia from the 1990s on resulted in intense frictions within this community, whose members chose various strategies attempting to survive in circumstances that were unfavourable in many ways. In 1999 the Gorani expressed loyalty to the Serbian state authorities in the Kosovo conflict, which led them to bad relations with the Albanians. While part of the community still insists on loyalty to the Serbs and on a separate Gorani identity, the other part maintains that the best option for the community is to take Bosniak national identity, to integrate into Bosniak organizations in Kosovo and take an active part in political life and Kosovo institutions (Stojanović 2006: 35). Most community members share the feeling that this is the worst time that the Gorani have ever experienced: "Whenever other bigger nations were in conflict, we had to bear severe consequences. Neutrality was never among the available options, we always had to choose sides," says one of them (ibid.: 34).

The Gorani are traditionally an emigrant population (Hasani 2007), a significant number of whom live in Serbia proper, where they usually own sweetshops. Because of their Albanian-sounding names, many of them were targets of violence after the Kosovo Albanians proclaimed independence in February 2008 (Zejneli 2008).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this article I have tried to outline the dynamics of the discourses and strategies that are being used for identity negotiation in a period of intensified nation-building processes in Serbian society, particularly in relation to ethnic processes in Kosovo, the area which has a central place in the Serbian national imagery. While Albanians are perceived and discursively construed as a Serbian indisputable Other, the attitude of the Serbian majority and its political elites towards other Muslim groups such as the Gorani, Egyptians, Turks, and Bosniaks, is ambiguous and depends on current political circumstances and distribution of power. While the Serbian politicians and academics engaged in the "national project" support the efforts of these groups to resist Albanian assimilation, these groups, being Muslim, are not separated from Albanians in the dominant nationalist discourse in Serbia, which is characterized by the opposition between Orthodox Christianity and

Islam. Ambiguity of similar kind is observable in the attitude towards Islam as a specifically Balkan (Ottoman) legacy: In the internal Balkan context the attitude towards the Slavophone Muslims is characterized by ambiguity due to what Milica Bakić-Hayden calls a "betrayal syndrome" (Bakić-Hayden 1995: 927). However, the other two discourses that function in a broader European and international context are also used with reference to the Balkan Muslims, namely, *Antemurale Christianitatis* discourse and discourse of Islamist extremism and terrorism.[8] All these discourses are intended to negotiate the interests of the dominant group in the nation-building process and to justify the means through which these interests are achieved.

The process of nation building in the former Yugoslavia presented the members of small ethnic groups with a quite difficult choice: they had to manage to maintain good relations with both larger ethnic groups on the local level and the ruling elites on the national level, and simultaneously to protect their own interests. Striking a successful balance between the three is proving to be a nearly impossible task.

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[8] Erjavec and Volčič (2007) show how young intellectuals in Serbia appropriate 'war on terrorism' disourse in order to legitimize violence against Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo.

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POVZETEK

SRBI, ALBANCI IN TISTI VMES: STOPNJEVANJE DRUGOSTI IN IDENTITETNE STRATEGIJE V KONTEKSTU PROCESA OBLIKOVANJA NACIJ

Tanja Petrović

V prispevku poskušam očrtati dinamiko med diskurzi in strategijami, ki se uporabljajo za zagovarjanje identitet v stopnjevanju procesa oblikovanja nacij v srbski družbi s posebnim poudarkom na etničnih procesih na Kosovu, ki mu pripada centralno mesto v nacionalnem imaginariju Srbov. V prevladajočih diskurzih se kot glavni element srbske nacionalne identitete izpostavlja pravoslavna veroizpoved. Ta identiteta se oblikuje predvsem v nasprotju do islama. Medtem ko se v tem procesu Albanci doživljajo kot nedvomni drugi, je odnos srbske večine do ostalih muslimanskih skupnosti na Kosovu, kot so Gorani, Turki, Egipčani, Bošnjaki, dvoumen in odvisen od trenutnih političnih okoliščin in odnosov moči. Srbska politična elita in pripadniki akademske sfere, ki so angažirani na "nacionalnem projektu", podpirajo prizadevanja omenjenih skupin, da bi oblikovale posebno etnično identiteto in se s tem zoperstavile albanizaciji. Po drugi strani pa se v prevladujočem nacionalističnem diskursu, ki ga označuje nasprotje med pravoslavljem in islamom, omenjene skupine zaradi verske pripadnosti islamu ne ločijo od Albancev. Podobno dvoumnost najdemo v odnosu do islama kot dela specifično balkanske (otomanske) dediščine: v notranjem, balkanskem kontekstu se odnos do muslimanov, ki so govorci slovanskih jezikov, lahko označi kot »sindrom izdajstva«, vendar pa se ta odnos oblikuje še skozi diskurza, ki funkcionirata tudi v širšem evropskem in svetovnem kontekstu: to sta diskurz *Antemurale Christianitatis* in diskurz o muslimanih kot teroristih in grožnji za svetovno varnost. Ne glede na ta širši kontekst sta omenjena diskurza v bistvu nacionalna in služita zagovarjanju interesov in pozicij posameznih nacionalnih skupnosti; srbska nacionalna skupnost pri tem ni izjema.

Pripadniki manjšinskih skupnosti na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, kot so slovansko govoreči muslimani, so v procesu oblikovanja nacij soočeni s težko izbiro: morajo vzdrževati dobre odnose tako na lokalni ravni z večjimi skupnostmi, ki so nosilke procesa oblikovanja nacij, kot na nacionalni ravni s predstavniki vladajočih elit, hkrati pa morajo zaščititi interese lastne skupine. To se največkrat pokaže kot nemogoča naloga.

"WHERE ARE WE? EUROPE OR ALBANIA?"
REGIONALISM AS SEEN BY THE LOCAL PEOPLE OF DHËRMI/ DRIMADES IN SOUTHERN ALBANIA

Nataša GREGORIČ BON[1]

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ABSTRACT

"Where are we? Europe or Albania?" Regionalism as Seen by the Local People of Dhërmi/Drimades in Southern Albania[2]

This paper illustrates and explains how the villagers of Dhërmi/Drimades in Southern Albania envision and shape "their" place as a distinct region in relation to the European Union's regional policies. Special attention is given to the local discourses about the inclusion and/or exclusion of the village space into and from the European Union, which is often referred to by the notion of Europe or *Europi/Europa*. The paper aims to explore the ways in which local people construct their regional identity and how they discuss it in their everyday lives. It questions the influences of historical, social, cultural, political and economic changes in postcommunist Albania on people's perceptions of modernity, which they axiomatically link with "Europe" or the "West". The paper argues that the local people of Dhërmi/Drimades negotiate their social and spatial boundaries and thus reconstruct their regional identity and belonging through debates about modernity and modernisation.

KEY WORDS: regionalism, modernity and modernisation, social and spatial boundaries, Southern Albania

IZVLEČEK

»Kje smo!? V Evropi ali v Albaniji?« Regionalizem v Dhërmiju/Drimadesu v južni Albaniji

Prispevek predstavi in analizira načine, skozi katere vaščani Dhërmija/Drimadesa v južni Albaniji vzpostavljajo »svoj« kraj kot distinktivno regijo in jo definirajo v soodvisnosti z regionalno politiko Evropske unije. Vsebina članka se osredotoči na lokalne diskurze o vključenosti in/ali izključenosti vaškega prostora v Evropsko unijo ali iz nje, oz. *Europi/Europa* kot jo naslavljajo številni vaščani. Pod drobnogled so postavljeni debate in pogajanja, skozi katere domačini vzpostavljajo regionalno identiteto. Kako zgodovinske, kulturne, politične in ekonomske spremembe v postkomunistični Albaniji vplivajo na lokalne predstave o modernosti, ki jo domačini aksiomatično povezujejo z »Evropo« ali »Zahodom«, predstavlja eno izmed osrednjih vprašanj. Avtorica trdi, da debate o modernosti, modern-

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izaciji in potovanjih vzporedno z družbenimi in prostorskimi razmejevanji predstavljajo pomemben del identitetnih procesov, skozi katere domačini Dhërmija/Drimadesa pogajajo in poustvarjajo regionalnost in pripadnost vasi ali regiji.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: regionalizem, modernost in modernizacija, družbena in prostorska razmejevanja, južna Albanija

"*Ti einai afto, Natasa? Europi i Alvania?*"[3] ("Where are we, Natasa? Europe or Albania?"), Ariadne asked me irritably on a winter evening in 2005, while we were experiencing an unexpected electricity blackout and were left in complete darkness in front of a blank TV screen in her living room. Her question left me perplexed, as I knew that whatever my answer would be, she would continue by furiously describing the problems she was experiencing in her everyday life in the village of Dhërmi (official Albanian name) or Drimades (local Greek name) in Southern Albania. Although electricity blackouts were a constant part of everyday life in this as well as in other villages and towns throughout Albania, they were often accompanied with anger and disapprobation, especially when they came at times outside of the expected daily schedule.[4] My answer "*Europi*?", which sounded more like a question, evoked another flow of angry words from Ariadne. She explained that this magnitude of disorder, unreliability, bad living conditions, daily electricity blackouts and water cuts and finally the level of corruption do not belong in Europe but are typical for Albania. "*Edo einai Alvania. Monoha pseumata. Simera lene etsi kai avrio anapoda*" ("This is Albania. Only lies. Today they say this and tomorrow the contrary"), she furiously continued.

What did Ariadne actually want to express with her question? How is this question related to her perception of place and spatial belonging? In what ways are spatial perceptions and notions of belonging imbued with national issues on the one hand and the European Union's regionalism on the other? How is she, born in 1943 in Dhërmi/Drimades after some years of living as emigrants in Greece, mapping her village within the wider spatial map of the world? In what sense do her spatial perceptions correspond to a wider geopolitical division of Europe and the world?

I try to address these, as well as many other related questions in this paper, to show how the villagers of Dhërmi/Drimades envision and shape "their" place as a distinct region in relation to the European Union's regional policies. Special attention is given to local discourses about the inclusion and/or exclusion of the village space into and from the European Union, which is often referred to by the notion of Europe or *Europi/Europa*[5]. The paper aims to explore the ways in which local people construct their regional identity and how they discuss it in their everyday lives. It questions the influences of

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[3] Throughout this paper, words in the local Greek dialect are written in *italic*.

[4] Due to the general energy crisis throughout Albania and because a lot of the users do not pay their electricity bills there are daily electricity blackouts lasting for at least four to six hours. From 2004 to 2005 electricity blackouts were planned daily from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. From December 2007 until the present day in March 2008 there were no power shortages.

[5] Throughout the paper the dual names of places and things are stated in both languages.

historical, social, cultural, political and economic changes in postcommunist Albania on people's perceptions about modernity, which they axiomatically link with "Europe" or the "West". The paper argues that the local people of Dhërmi/Drimades negotiate their social and spatial boundaries and thus reconstruct their regional identity and belonging through debates about modernity and modernisation.

The narratives presented are told in the people's own words. They were collected during thirteen months of anthropological field research in the coastal village of Dhërmi/Drimades in Southern Albania which took place between 2004 and 2005 and in 2008. To maintain the anonymity of my interlocutors I have changed their names as well as some of the information of their life stories that are not important to the following discussion.

AMBIGUITIES AND NESTED HIERARCHIES

The dual name of the village Dhërmi/Drimades already discloses the first ambiguities that constitute the "whereness" of the village. On the one hand, from the perspective of the legal policies and the mainstream public opinion in Greece, Dhërmi/Drimades and Himarë/Himara area are located in the historical and political region of Northern Epirus; on the other hand, however, from the perspective of the legal policies and the public opinion in Albania they are located in Southern Albania. These ambiguous locations lead further to the ambiguities in people's identification, where the Northern Epirot can mean the Albanian and/or the Greek or European; and where the Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox can be identified as an Albanian citizen of Greek nationality and/or an Albanian citizen and/or a member of the Greek national minority.

According to Sarah Green (2005: 12) ambiguity "can be as hegemonic and subject to disciplinary regimes as clarity; confusion, lack of means to pin things down". Upon her fieldwork in Pogoni in Epirus in northern Greece, she maintains that these ambiguities are generated "as positive assertions and constructions of truth: 'This is the Balkans Sarah; what did you expect'" (ibid.). Contrary to the people of Pogoni the people of Dhërmi/Drimades do not explain the ambiguities, lack of clarity and confusions with a shared place such as the Balkans, but ascribe them to Albania. The fluidity and indeterminacy of Albanian places can be read already in Ariadne's words: "This is Albania. Only lies. Today they say this and tomorrow the contrary".

In everyday conversations of many local people in Dhërmi/Drimades, Albania is defined in opposition to the European Union. The latter is thought of as a cluster of countries of Western Europe, where the people of Dhërmi/Drimades locate Greece, Italy, Germany and Austria. In contrast to the European Union, which is seen as economically and politically ordered, fixed and stable, Albania is defined as disordered, mixed and unstable. The term "the Balkans"[6] is used more in political and media discourse than in the everyday

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[6] For more on the notion of the Balkans and its discursive meanings see Norris (1999); Bjelić and Savić (2002); Todorova (1997, 2004); and for the Balkans as hegemonic concept see Green (2005).

talk in the village. Compared to the "ordered" Western Europe, the Balkans carries rather a pejorative meaning (e.g. the "turbulent Balkans" - cf. Todorova 1997: 45)

Today, following their emigration to Greece and regular returns to their natal village during the summer, the people of Dhërmi/Drimades redefine their place and map it onto a geopolitical map as the predominant way of organizing the space. They see the village side by side with Greece and the European Union. For many of them the Albanian border is situated north of the Himarë/Himara area. This kind of mapping continually produces a hierarchy of places where power and place dynamically constitute each other, depending on a historically contingent and politically shaped social context. I explore this kind of hierarchy in this paper. Here I refer to the notion of "nested hierarchies" as defined by Green (2005: 230). Nested hierarchies pertain to people's awareness that modernisation comes in many forms. It relates to their habit of measuring this diversity "against a single scale value ('better' or 'worse', 'authentic' or 'fake' forms of modernity)" and leads to the idea that "one particular form of modernity (the 'Western' form)" is the "'best' sort, the standard, or benchmark, against all others were to be measured" (ibid.).

The notions of place and space[7] to which I refer in this paper are defined in terms of processes. Following several scholars (Lefebvre 1991; Foucault 1975, 1980; de Certeau 1984; Ingold 2000, et.al.) who have studied spatial notions, the meanings of space and place are not fixed and static entities but are continuously reproduced and recreated through the processes of social relations. In contrast to the above mentioned authors, Gupta and Ferguson (2001 [1997]) situate their studies of spatial construction within the contemporary context of migrations and transnational culture flows of the late capitalist world. They focus on the "ways in which dominant cultural forms may be picked up and used – and significantly transformed – in the midst of the fields of power relations that link localities to a wider world" (2001: 5). In their edited collection *Culture, Power and Place* (2001) Gupta and Ferguson critically rethink the relations between place and power, which are intimately intertwined. People and places are not enclosed homogeneities and their locality does not necessarily relate to the sense of being rooted to a particular place. Locality "is not simply that one is located in a certain place but that particular place is set apart and opposed to other places" (2001: 13). There is a mutual relation between the process of place making and the process of construction of locality and identity. In parallel to the processes of place making, which are always contested, Gupta (2001: 17) points out the relations between places that continuously shift as a result of political and economic reorganisation of space in the world system. Moreover he argues that the "dominant cultural forms" (2001: 5) that are being imposed are never simply enacted by social agents but are always reappropriated and reinterpreted by those agents. As such the notions of place and identity are socially constructed, and always in the process of becoming.

Building on Gupta and Ferguson's concept of dominant cultural forms, my article

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[7]   I consider place and space as different but also related. I generally use notion of place (*topos/vëndi*) in terms of social interactions, experiences and practices, and the notion of space (*horos/hapsirë*) in terms of abstractions and wider social and political conceptualisations of people's life-worlds.

questions how the people of Dhërmi/Drimades continuously reconstruct their place and how they shape it according to the dominant cultural forms such as the European Union and its regional policies (see Harvie 1994). By putting local people's discourses in the context of geographically, politically and historically shifting frontiers, the paper seeks to explore how these tendencies are related to the negotiations of regional identities and how they influence the visions of the future.

DHËRMI/DRIMADES

The municipality of Himarë/Himara, which stretches about 25 kilometres along the Southern Albanian coast, is also known as *Bregu i Detit*, meaning the coastal area. The municipality lies 42 kilometres from the northern city of Vlorë and about the same from the southern city of Sarandë. The Albanian-Greek border is 60 kilometres to the south. The local people of Dhërmi/Drimades, its neighbouring village Palasa and the municipal town of Himarë/Himara mainly use the local Greek dialect and partly the Southern Albanian (Tosk) dialect in their day-to-day conversations.[8] The people inhabiting the other five villages of the Himarë/Himara area (Ilias, Vuno, Qeparo, Pilur and Kudhes) mainly speak the Southern Albanian dialect.

The official, Albanian name Dhërmi is mainly used by those inhabitants and seasonal workers who moved to the village from other parts of Albania either during the period of communism or after it. In contrast to Dhërmi, the local, Greek name Drimades is mainly used by the inhabitants who are believed to "come" from the village and thus declare themselves as *horiani* ("locals") or *Drimadiotes* or *Himariotes*. When asked about the meaning of the term *horianos*, many people of Dhërmi/Drimades explained that *horianos* means *apo ton topo*, "of the place". The indicative "of the place" is related to the referent's origin, which has to be either from Dhërmi/Drimades or the Himarë/Himara area. Their declarations as *horianos* are formed in contrast to that of *ksenos*, meaning newcomers, foreigners and outsiders. Sometimes they also use pejorative names for them, such as *Turkos* or *Alvanos*.[9] Newcomers, who moved to Dhërmi/Drimades, often declare themselves according to the name of the place from where they have moved to Dhërmi/Drimades. During my stay in the village I never heard anyone declare himself/herself as either *vëndore* or local in Albanian language or as *fshatarë* or villager in Albanian language. In contrast to *horianos*, who are predominantly Orthodox Christians, the majority of the newcomers are Muslims.[10]

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[8] For detailed information about the language use see Gregorič Bon 2008: 63–71.

[9] According to the *horianos* these pejorative terms of address point to the differences in place of origin, language skill, religion, financial position, social status and the possibility of unrestricted crossing of the Albanian – Greek border.

[10] After 45 years of atheism in communist Albania, contemporary religious proclamations play a more important role in questions about ethnicity than in questions regarding ideological beliefs. Thus, many scholars of Albanian Studies when identifying religious ratios prefer to refer to the survey done

According to the official population census from 2005, the village of Dhërmi/Drimades is inhabited by approximately 1,800 residents, half of whom live as emigrants in Greece or elsewhere (mainly the United States and Italy). Because of the massive emigration of youth, mainly the elderly population (born between 1926 and 1945) and only a couple of young families live in the village of Dhërmi/Drimades. Besides them, the village is nowadays also inhabited by a growing number of families and seasonal workers from other parts of Albania. Many of them moved to Dhërmi/Drimades after 1990. While most of the year the place is rather desolate, in the summer months it bustles with tourists, among whom prevail the emigrants originating from Dhërmi/Drimades and other places throughout Albania. Tourists arriving from Vlorë and the capital Tirana, from Kosovo and sometimes from other parts of Europe, however, can also be seen.

BRIEF HISTORY

Throughout the centuries people living in today's Himarë/Himara area and its neighbourhood have been travelling to and from the area mainly because of trading, seasonal work, shepherding or due to their service in different armies (Winnifrith 2002; see also Vullnetari 2007). In the early 19th century most of the area of today's Southern Albania and Epirus in Greece was part of the *vilayet*[11] with its centre in Ioannina. For the purposes of the tax collecting system the Ottoman administration divided all non-Muslim people into special administrative and organizational units, *millets*,[12] which incorporated people according to their religious affiliation, regardless of where they lived, what language(s) they spoke, or what the colour of their skin was (Glenny 2000: 71, 91–93, 112, 115; Mazower 2000: 59–60; Duijzings 2002: 60; Green 2005: 147). Although the area of today's Himarë/Himara was a part of the *millet* system (meaning that people had to pay taxes collectively), the people were granted a special status and kept their own local government[13] until the foundation of the Albanian Republic in 1913. After that the Ottoman principle of organizing people and places was replaced with the nationalistic principle, which categorized people and places according to their language and territory. Discordances between the Ottoman and nationalistic ways of dividing people and places led to tensions

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in 1939 (before communism) when about 70% of the population were perceived as Muslim (among whom 20% were followers of the Bektashi order), 20% belonging to the Albanian Orthodox Church and 10% to the Catholic Church.

[11] *Vilayet* is a Turkish term used by the Ottoman administration to define the administrative division or province.

[12] *Millet* is a Turkish term used by the Ottoman administration to define the administrative and organisational units that divided people according to their religious belonging.

[13] Because of their fierce resistance to the Ottoman army (Papadakis 1985) the people of today's Himarë/Himara area were granted a special status upon which they were allowed to keep their own, autonomous government. A similar status was held by the isolated villages of Mirdita in northern Albania, where many kept their own tribal laws which were based on the Lek Dukagjin canon (de Waal 1996: 177).

and territorial disputes, which have continuously appeared, disappeared, reappeared and blurred since then (de Rapper and Sintès 2006; Green 2005: 148–149).

Heightened political tensions, which were mainly provoked by the pro-Greek party, began in different places where both Greek and Albanian speakers lived. In accordance with the claims of the Greek-speaking people, the autonomous government of Northern Epirus with its centre in Gjirokastër was declared in 1914 by the pro-Greek party, which was in power in the south of Albania at that time (see Papadakis 1985; see also Clayer 2004). After the beginning of World War I (1914–1918) the government soon collapsed. When the war ended the tendencies to re-establish the autonomy of the territory known as Northern Epirus continued. In February 1922 the Albanian Parliament ratified the Declaration of Minority Rights proposed by Fan Noli. The Declaration recognised the rights of Greek-speaking people living in three villages in the Himarë/Himara area (Palasa, Dhërmi/Drimades, and Himarë/Himara) and in the villages of Gjirokastër and Delvinë (Kondis and Manda 1994: 16; Clayer 2004; de Rapper and Sintès 2006: 22).

"Exactly where Northern Epirus begins and ends is another one of those contested issues involving drawing lines on the map" (Green 2005: 15). While for some the Northern Epirus straddles the Greek-Albanian border, for others it also includes a part of Southern Albania, which is inhabited predominantly by a Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox population; and there are also others, especially the Albanian people, for whom Northern Epirus does not exist at all. The widest geographical and historical region of Northern Epirus is considered to consist of Southern Albania and Epirus in Greece, regardless of the Greek-Albanian border (ibid.). After the foundation of the independent Republic of Albania in 1913, Epirus was divided between Southern Albania and Epirus in Greece. According to the mainstream public opinion in Greece, the Greek-speaking people of Orthodox religion living in Southern Albania are called Northern Epirots (*Vorioepirotes*) (see Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002: 191). According to the public opinion in Albania they are often referred to as *Greku* (Greeks in Albanian language) or pejoratively *Kaure* (non-believers in Albanian language[14]) or *Kaur i derit* (non-believer-pigs, i.e. Greek pigs in Albanian language).

During the communist dictatorship (1945–1990), the road, *to dromo*, which leads through the state border and which was used by the people living in Southern Albania for travel and trade, was closed following Hoxha's policy of suppression of free movement across the state borders. In the period of Hoxha's autarky the minority status acknowledged to the people living in Palasa, Dhërmi/Drimades and Himarë/Himara in 1922 was revoked with the explanation that there were not enough Greek-speakers living in the Himarë/Himara area (Kondis and Manda 1994: 21). The districts of Gjirokastër, Sarandë and Delvinë were confirmed as "minority zones" (Kondis and Manda 1994: 21; de Rapper and Sintès 2006: 12).

Despite the restriction and control of even the in-country movements, Hoxha's policy of unification and homogenisation of Albanian citizens forced many Greek-speaking

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[14] Originally *kaure* is Turkish word that means non-believer.

people to move to places in the northern or central part of Albania (Kondis and Manda 1994: 21; see also Green 2005: 227). In addition, many of Greek names for people and places were replaced by Albanian ones and the use of the Greek language was forbidden outside the minority zones (Kondis and Manda 1994: 21).

During the period of communism the minority issues and irredentist claims raised by the Southern Albanian pro-Greek party almost disappeared. They resurfaced again in 1990 after the declaration of democracy, the opening of the borders and the massive migrations that followed (Hatziprokopiou 2003: 1033–1059; Mai and Schwandner-Sievers 2003: 939–949; Papailias 2003: 1059–1079). Nowadays, because of economic (capitalism), political (democracy, the rise of new nation-states and the European Union), social and cultural changes (individuality), these issues are reflected upon in a somehow different way than they were before. In Dhërmi/Drimades and Himarë/Himara the main differentiation is advanced by the people who claim to be from the village or the area identifying themselves by the term locals (*horiani*). Except for some elderly inhabitants of Dhërmi/Drimades the declaration of being a Northern Epirot is nowadays rarely used in daily conversation. Following the massive migrations to Greece and the stereotypes created and spread through the national Greek media (Vullnetari 2007: 51; Green 2005: 229), which depict Albania as a backward place filled with backward people, *Vorioepirotes* are often perceived by people in Greece as being no different from Albanians.

According to the State Council[15] the *Vorioepirotes* and Pontic Greeks[16] are considered to be of Greek ethnic origin. Upon demonstrating their "cultural ancestry" (sharing "common historical memories" and/or links with "historic homelands and culture"), Greek descent (Greek Albanians have to prove that the birthplace of their parents or grandparents is in Northern Epirus), language, and religion they can be granted a Special Identity Card of *omoghenis* (co-ethnicity in Greek language) – *Eidiko Deltio Tautotitas Omoghenis* (Tsitselikis 2003: 7; Kondis and Manda 1994: 20–21). This provides them with Greek nationality and Albanian citizenship. Besides the legal status this special card gives them the right to reside in Greece, permits them to work there, grants them special benefits (i.e. social security, health care, and education), and allows them "free" crossing of the Albanian-Greek border.

While the Greek migration policy defines Greek origins on the basis of language, religion, birth and predecessors from so called "Northern Epirus", the Albanian minority policy defines Greek origins according to the language, religion, birth and predecessors originating from the areas once called "minority zones" (i.e. the districts of Gjirokastër, Sarandë and Delvinë). As people who claim to originate from the Himarë/Himara area

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[15] The State Council (no. 2756/1983) is the Supreme Administrative Court of Justice in Greece (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002: 204).

[16] In referring to Glytsos (1995), Triandafyllidou and Veikou define Pontic Greeks as "ethnic Greeks who either emigrated from areas of the Ottoman empire (the southern coast of the Black Sea in particular) to the former Soviet Union at the beginning of the 20th century or left Greece in the 1930s and 1940s for political reasons" (2002: 191).

do not live within the "minority zones" they are not considered to be part of the Greek minority by the Albanian state.

ENVISIONING PLACE AND SPACE

Especially in the first months of my fieldwork many villagers were asking me where I came from. My answer that I came from Slovenia was often followed by another question: *"Slovenia einai stis Europi?"* ("Is Slovenia in Europe?"). With this term "Europe" most of the villagers had its economic, political and socio-cultural meanings in mind rather than the geographical ones. Following their interpretations "Europe" is analogous to the European Union (EU), which according to their definitions conjoins the countries of the so-called "Western" Europe. The latter is often axiomatically related with "modernity", "civilization" and economic development. Their questions about Slovenia's inclusion into the EU were often followed with another question about the state's currency: "Do you use Euros?" Because at that time (2004 and 2005) Slovenia has not yet been included in the Euro area, my answer was negative. While some of the villagers curiously continued to question me about the planned year of Slovenia's inclusion in the Euro area, others were interested in its economic development, comparing it to Greece, while a third group only shrugged their shoulders and commented patronisingly that Slovenia was one of the most developed countries in ex-Yugoslavia already in the communist period. It seems likely that with these questions and comments the villagers wanted to check how well the country that I came from is doing according to "European" standards of modernisation, which were then compared to the economic wellbeing many of them have experienced while living as emigrants in Greece. As mentioned in the previous section (*Brief History*), the people of Dhërmi/Drimades as well as the municipality of Himarë/Himara continuously move and travel back and forth from the areas of present Albania, Greece and other places in Europe. Based on these movements and contacts with various people and places, they encounter different forms of modernisations which they value in accordance with the scales of nested hierarchies. "Europe" and/or the "West" are thus considered as the golden standard or the benchmark according to which other modernities are measured. Since both Albania and Slovenia were communist countries in the past and Greece was not, Greece was axiomatically seen as being more "Western" than Albania and Slovenia.

The idea of modern Greece appeared after the reopening of the Albanian-Greek border in 1990, which was followed by massive migrations of the Albanian population to Greece. Thus for example Janis, born in 1938 in Dhërmi/Drimades, who emigrated to Greece in 1990 and returned to his natal village twelve years later noted in one of our conversations:

> In those times when my parents were young and my grandfather traded with Greeks
> the people living there were very poor. Many of them moved here as the Spanish

flu[17] was spreading in Ioannina and many people died. The Greeks were very poor at that time and they were buying wheat here [in Southern Albania]. But now it is just the opposite: we are poor and they are rich.

Besides Janis many other local people remember too that in the times before communism the people living on the Albanian side of the border were far richer and better off than the people on the Greek side. Sarah Green (2005: 231) notes similar accounts on the Greek side of the border. But in contrast to the people from Albanian side of the border, they forgot that their northern neighbours were once better off than they are today. When the communist dictator Enver Hoxha closed the state borders the situation was reversed. Although Hoxha's policy aimed to develop agricultural and industrial economy in the country and promote the idea of "modern" industrial practices and the modernisation of agricultural production (Pollo and Puto 1981: 26; Biberaj 1990: 68 and also Green 2005: 228), the limited market economy and other economic and political restrictions left people in poverty compared to other countries in Europe. These differences became evident after the collapse of communism and reopening of the borders, when people living on the both sides of the border, Albanian and Greek, could compare their living conditions (Green 2005: 228).

MOVEMENTS

Throughout the year Dhërmi/Drimades is mainly inhabited by the elderly population (born between 1926 and 1945) among whom the returnees, who emigrated to Greece after 1990 and returned to their natal village in the past few years, are predominant. Many of them posses Special Identity Cards of *omoghenis*, which allow them unrestricted border crossings (into those EU countries which are part of the Schengen Agreement), in addition to Greek pensions (provided by the Agricultural Insurance Organisation OGA) and health and social security benefits. In spite of the fact that in practice most of the villagers do not travel beyond Greece, they often emphasize their ability to travel "freely" to the countries of "Western" Europe. They often use this privilege to differentiate themselves from other citizens of Albania, whose travels are restricted by visas, which must be acquired through long bureaucratic procedures.

Green (2005: 223) asserts that documents such as visas and passports are policing separations and that they are means by which "the state continues to assert the power to name people and control movement in this transnational world" (see also Navaro-Yashin

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[17] The Spanish flu or influenza pandemic was caused by an unusually severe and deadly Influenza A virus strain between 1918 and 1920. By far the most destructive pandemic in history, it killed between 50 and 100 million people worldwide in just 18 months, dwarfing the bloodshed due to World War I. Many of its victims were healthy young adults, in contrast to most influenza outbreaks which predominantly affect juvenile, elderly, or otherwise weakened patients (http://www.who.int/media-centre/factsheets/fs211/en/).

2003; Goldsworthy 1999: 10). Following this presumption, it could be said that the Special Identity Cards of *omoghenis* in Dhërmi/Drimades also act as the means of politicizing the differences between local people (the Albanian citizens of Greek nationality) and the newcomers or "Albanians". Moreover, it could also be said that the political elite in Greece asserts its power through the Special Identity Cards to name people and control their movements across the Greek-Albanian border, which experienced massive emigrations of Albanians after 1990. As asserted by Gupta and Ferguson (2001), such state powers of control, organisation and definition of people and places are never simply enacted by the people, because they always reappropriate and reinterpret them. These kinds of state powers in Dhërmi/Drimades, mediated through Special Identity Cards, are thus reinterpreted and recreated through the everyday practices and movements of the local people. These movements include either actual (emigrations to Greece) or possible (the ability of unrestricted crossings of the EU borders) movements to and through the EU countries and present the basis for the local people's construction of social and spatial boundaries.

In numerous discussions, the local people put forth their right to cross the "European" borders. One of them was Janis, who told me the following:

> *I* can travel freely throughout the European countries. I do not have to apply for visa like Albanians as I have the Greek card [Special Identity Cards of omoghenis]. I lived in Athens for many years and I never had problems understanding their language. Not like Albanians who learned Greek while living there. Many locals in this village speak Greek. My grandmother, for example, could not understand Albanian. People feel Greek here like the people from Kosova feel Albanian. It is the same. But nowadays many Albanians have moved to the village and so it got depraved. Albanians are breaking into the houses that have been left empty as the locals moved to Athens and they are stealing things. They don't know how to behave. They are not civilized.

Janis's narrative shows how the Special Identity Cards of *omoghenis* and free border passing as well as knowledge of the Greek code construct the social boundaries which Janis generates and manages within the framework of the state ideology. According to Green (2005: 124) the state ideology which is "definitional" and "legalistic" is insinuated through the political, bureaucratic and economic "teeth". In spite of Gupta and Ferguson's (2001) assertion that people never fully enact the mechanism of state power, the case of Janis shows how these state mechanisms (such as Special Identity Card *omoghenis* and visas) are being reinterpreted and reappropriated within the grip of the "teeth" of the state ideologies. In this manner Janis reconstructs the locality or "Greekness" in contrast to "Albanianness" as a synonym for uncivilized and unmodern.

The uncivilized "other" in contrast to the "civilized" us is also constructed through the oral stories recounted by the elderly villagers. In these stories they remember their ancestors' movements to places over the sea and the mountains (see Gregorič Bon 2007a; 2008a: 169–190). The stories about these movements date back to the period of communism. While the stories about the movements overseas relate Dhërmi/Drimades and

its people to Greece and Italy, civilisation, economic development and general wellbeing, the stories of the movements over the mountains relate the village and its people to Albania, poverty and lack of civilization. In order to illustrate these relations let me give an example of two stories, with the first describing movements overseas and the other movements over the mountains.

I met Pavlos, born in 1938 in Dhërmi/Drimades, in the summer when I was working in one of the cafeterias situated on the coast. Pavlos is a widower who nowadays lives in Tirana. In 1958 he moved to Tirana to study geodesy and he lived there with his family until 1990, when they all emigrated to Greece. In 2001 he and his wife returned to Tirana where they bought a house and Pavlos started a business. Two years later Pavlos's wife died. Every summer – in July and August – Pavlos moves to Dhërmi/Drimades where he owns a part of his father's house which he shares together with his brother. Occasionally he goes to Greece in order to visit his children, who were all married in the village of Dhërmi/Drimades. As he lived for some years in Athens he told his story of the sea and trading:

> […] Muço, Papajani, Duni, and Zhupa were some of the prosperous families who used to own large boats. In Drimades boats were rare. There were approximately three or four of them. They were wooden and imported from Greece or Italy. Because of the Jaliskari port, there were also some warehouses built on the coast. People used to keep valanidi, kitro and olive oil over there. […] We have always had contacts with the outside world. Therefore we are more civilizuar [civilized in Albanian language] than the people living in other parts of Albania. Our forefathers have seen a lot of other places in Greece and Italy. Compared to the rest of the places to the north and to the east, we were wealthy. However, later during the times of the system, when the state closed the road [otan o kratos eklise to dromo], we were forbidden to move around.

In the late afternoon in August, Aspasia and I sat on a grass hill, a couple of metres away from my home, where she usually pastured her goat every day. Aspasia, who was born in 1933 in Dhërmi/Drimades, recalled the mountains with the following words:

> […], our mothers used to walk to the places behind the mountains […] They walked up there burdened with goods that they wanted to exchange. They carried olives, olive oil, oranges, clothes and sometimes some pieces of furniture or souvenirs which our fathers or uncles brought from outside. They used ropes to tie these goods and carried them on their backs; in rain, cold or snow […] It did not matter as there was great famine. Especially in areas that are not fertile enough to grow wheat. In those times we only ate corn bread; without yeast. It was hard to eat. Therefore we often wanted to eat the normal bread from wheat which we could only get by exchange in the places behind the mountains. […] Sometimes they came back empty-handed because they were robbed on their way back. There was poverty everywhere and the people living behind the mountains stole food in those days … They were bad people*!*

Aspasia lived in the village for her entire lifetime. She married relatively late to a widower ten years older, who came from the same village. He already had four children with his first wife and later Aspasia bore two sons. During communism both she and her husband worked in the agricultural cooperative. Today she is a widow and lives on her own, as her sons live as emigrants in Greece.

In the stories presented the storytellers reconstruct the village as a place that stretches between the sea and the mountains or better, between Albania, Greece and Italy (see Gregorič Bon 2007a; 2008a). It seems that Dhërmi/Drimades is at the same time a place of wealth and poverty, civilizedness and uncivilizedness, modernity and non-modernity. The stories illustrate how the political and economical divisions and the social production of differences contribute to placing the village on the geopolitical map of Europe and the world. As the stories and the historical background (see the section *Brief History*) show, the people of today's Southern Albania, Epirus and Corfu in Greece traded among themselves in the times before communism and so created a common space between them. The closing of the borders in 1945 stopped these travels and changed the perception of the space, which began to be redefined also by planned relocations across Albania and emigrations of people to Greece, Italy and elsewhere. The villagers experienced the state border between Albania and Greece (or the "road closure" in Pavlos' words) as a delineating mark, which defined who and what belongs to the Albanian nation-state or to the Greek nation-state. After the end of communism, when the "road" was opened again, at least for Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians, massive migrations shattered again the perception of borders and the differences reappeared again. They were no longer defined on the basis of the nation-states, but also on the basis of global economy and politics, which are today the major forces that define the power and hierarchy of places. In the scope of this kind of hierarchy, some places and states are considered as "Western", meaning "civilized" and "modern" countries, while others get labelled as "Eastern", meaning "uncivilized" or "not modern" countries.

The stories also describe how the story-tellers use the hegemonic geopolitical and economical hierarchy of places and states to construct and redefine their own private hierarchies, which influence their sense of the "whereness" of Dhërmi/Drimades. The mountains define the boundary between the places behind them and the village in front of them. The sea strait is seen as another boundary, which is in contrast to the mountains perceived in a positive way. The village thus stands in between. The stories try to resolve this ambiguity by relating the village to its connecting places. In general, the story-tellers use the remembrances of their ancestors' paths to reconstruct the past and recreate the present, which serves to define their belonging to the place – the village.

MODERNITY AND MODERNISATION

While in the previous section I showed how the village's in-betweenness is constructed through the local people's narratives, in this section I explore how this in-betweenness is created through their debates about modernity and modernization. The terms of modernity and modernization are defined according to Green (2005: 230), who relates modernity to economic wealth and general development and defines modernization as the yet absent modernity accompanied with discussions about the need to modernise.

Ariadne's question about the "whereness" of the village and her furious criticism of the electricity blackouts already tells us something about her conceptualisation of modernity and modernisation. She relates them to the unreliable living conditions and non-modern life in Albania, which is defined in contrast to reliable and modern life in Europe or the EU. The latter she equates with Greece, to where she emigrated together with her family shortly after the end of communism. She constructs her image of modernity based on past experiences of her life in Greece. When complaining about the uncertain life in Albania, she forms a difference between the way things are and the way things ought to be. On the one hand Ariadne sees the village as not sufficiently modernised, while on the other she asserts some parallels with modernisation. Moreover, her question, "Where are we? Europe or Albania?" could also be understood in terms of nested hierarchies, where she discerns various modernities by positing "Europe" or Greece as the standard for other modernities to be measured.

After some years of living in Greece, Ariadne and her husband Kosta returned to their natal village of Dhërmi/Drimades. With savings from Greece and remittances sent by their children still living there, they built a new house in the village and a restaurant on the coast. Nowadays, besides olive oil production and Greek pensions, tourism represents one of the most important sources of income to many villagers of Dhërmi/Drimades and the Himarë/Himara area. Because of this, many owners of tourist facilities are trying to improve the village infrastructure, and trying to enable the rebuilding of the road, the water supply, the organisation of municipal services, etc. In achieving this, people's aims are based more on individual than common actions (see Gregorič Bon 2007b, forthcoming 2008b). Thus Ariadne, for example, often emphasized her individual efforts to remove the rubbish from the area close to her restaurant by criticizing the insufficient organisation of the municipal rubbish disposal service. Here she complained about the unreliable local as well as state authorities, who only promise to solve these problems and do not actually do anything. In one of the late mornings of early June in 2005, when she was showing me her garden behind the restaurant, Ariadne complained:

When Kosta [her husband] and I began to build this restaurant this place was full of rubbish and broken glass. We put a lot of effort into removing bottles. As there is no municipal rubbish disposal service we had to take care of it on our own. The local officials promised to solve this problem and organise regular rubbish disposal for the summer months when the coast is full of tourists who leave a large amount

of rubbish behind them. But they only promise while often they do not do anything […]. But what would you expect? This is Albania. Only lies. Today they say this and tomorrow the contrary.

According to Ariadne the village has not been sufficiently modernised. For this she blames the local and state authorities, who are careless and irresponsible. In contrast to them she constructs an image of herself as responsible and modern, aiming to improve and modernise the village.

Similar views about modernisation are described by Anastas, born in 1970 in Korçe. His parents came from Dhërmi/Drimades, from where they moved to Korçe during the communist period. Anastas owns a small hotel on the coast. In December 1990 he emigrated to Greece together with his parents and two sisters. In 1994 Anastas moved to Athens where he studied tourism and management. After completing his studies he worked as an agent at a tourist agency in Patras. In 2000 he moved to Dhërmi/Drimades. He expressed his aims to modernise the village as follows:

> Because Himara is a politically problematic municipality, the state policy is not to invest into its infrastructure. This is the reason why the roads are full of holes and rocks. It is a similar case when it comes to electricity blackouts and rubbish disposal. We also lack proper medical service in this area, thus we can not guarantee safety to our tourists. Another problem is the unreliability of the public transport system. Traffic safety is also an issue. These are all important reasons why we cannot offer our place and services to foreign tourists. Basically, the municipality of Himara never gets sufficient funds from the state budget, thus we cannot afford to develop proper tourist facilities and services. The money we get is not sufficient to deal with all of the problems at the same time. The development initiative is left to us, i horiani, it depends on our work and cooperation. I prefer to cooperate with my troublesome neighbour than let the state take my land away from me. I hope that better times will come soon, as we are promised help from certain international institutions. For example, in 2007 the World Bank plans to implement a pilot project of renovating old houses in Drimades. We cannot expect this kind of help from the state, as they don't like us because we are Greeks. This is something they cannot tolerate.

Anastas, who holds a degree in tourism and management, lists infrastructural inadequacies that impede the development of tourism on the coast of Dhërmi/Drimades, based on his past experiences of working in tourism in Greece. Similar to Ariadne he blames the political elite to be responsible for the insufficient development of the area. Here he exposes the ethnicity issues of the area which he sees as the main reason for the government's lack of investments in the infrastructure of this area. This he expresses already in first lines of his narrative, when he names Himarë/Himara along with Dhërmi/Drimades as a "problematic municipality". Here he refers to the continuity of the minority issues that have appeared, disappeared and reappeared again over the past centuries. In his views about the development of tourism Anastas forms differences between the Albanian politi-

cal elite or the "state" (in his words) on the one hand and the local community (*i horiani*) on the other. Like Ariadne, Anastas also puts forth his own, individual responsibility for cleaning the coast. He does not expect or hope to receive financial help from the "state" and rather sees a solution in "local" responsibility as well as in international funding sources such as the World Bank.

In general, both Ariadne and Anastas speak about modernisation rather than modernity. When they complain about the irresponsibility of the government they construct themselves as being modern but living in a place that has not been sufficiently modernised. In their critical views of the Albanian government they construct the locality in contrast to the "state", both defined as fixed and closed entities *per se*. In their views and representations of the development of coastal tourism they generate and mediate ideas about the homogeneity of the local people or *horiani*, which they define similarly to the ideas about the nation-state.

The debates about modernity and modernisation show similarly to the stories about their ancestors' travels over the mountains and the sea how the "whereness" of the village is constituted according to the nested hierarchy and vice versa. As I have mentioned earlier (in *Brief History*), different administrative, political and economical delineations of people and places have influenced their lives over centuries and the people have also continued to reproduce them themselves. With the opening of the Albanian-Greek state border and the ensuing massive migrations, these delineations were exposed not only in terms of national differences but also in terms of economic and infrastructural differences between both countries. This lead to the widespread assertion on the both sides of the border, the Greek and the Albanian, that Greece is more modernised than Albania.

EUROPEANISATION AND REGIONALISM

When differentiating between themselves and the "Albanians" or themselves and the "state" local people continuously form their identity. They declare themselves to be locals, *i horiani*, a concept which some of them see akin to "Greekness" or "Europeanness" and in opposition to "Albanianness". Others conceptualise the "local" and locality as a distinct identity, often calling the local people Himariotes – using the name of the municipality. Thus for example, Anastas noted the following about the Greek perception of his identity in one of our discussions:

> I was simply tired of being seen as a poor and miserable Greek from the Albanian side in the eyes of the Greeks. Therefore whenever they asked me where I am from I told them that I am Himariot as I come from Himara. And most of them did not pose any further questions.

Anastas' statement tells us that after being upset by Greeks' reaction to him, he began to tell them something different – that he is Himariot, coming from Himarë/Himara. As a

result, Anastas reports, people presumably altered their reaction to him. It could be said that with this statement he was ensuring that I do not see him as a "poor and miserable Greek from the Albanian side" as well as demonstrating that he has agency and that the people who do think that way about him are "ignorant" people.

Along with the fall of communism and massive migrations from Albania, stereotypes appeared in the Greek media which depicted Albanians as dishevelled, "uncivilized" and not "modern" people. Following these stereotypes, the people who declared themselves to be Northern Epirots were seen by many people in Greece as no different from Albanians (see Green 2005: 228). As a result of such stereotyping the local people who once declared themselves to be Northern Epirots took things into their own hands by creating their own distinct identity. Simultaneously with the process of identity formation they redefine their place as being neither Greek nor Albanian, but the "autonomous" region of Himara.

In the last couple of years many books and articles appeared which try to reconstruct the past of Himarë/Himara (see Gregorič Bon 2008a: 115–165). Many of them were written in response to the contemporary work of historiographers (Memushaj 2003, Nasi, Prifti, et.al. 2004, Frashëri 2005), which follows the pro-Albanian view of Himarë/Himara and its people as being a part of the Albanian nation and nation state historically. Local intellectuals and historiographers (Rusha 2001; Jorgji 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, Koçi 2006; Gjikopulli 2006) have responded with a number of works trying to prove the pro-Greek or pro-local view. They try to define the origin and belonging of the people of Himarë/Himara on the basis of their historical, political, social, cultural and territorial distinctiveness.[18] They emphasize the autonomy of their government and trading relations with people and places overseas, which the local people managed to maintain until the communist period. Based on this the historiographers locate and redefine the local people and the area of Himarë/Himara as an autonomous locality which is, according to written as well as oral history, related to Greece and/or the European Union.

Around 2006, some intellectuals (members of the Himarë/Himara community) defending the local interests set up an Internet website (www.himara.eu). The website provides general information about the villages of Himarë/Himara and their history, offers a tourist guide and a possibility for discussion and gives basic information about visa applications for moving to the United States. The information is given in three languages: Albanian, Greek and English. The tourist guide states the following:

> The region [periohi/krahina] of Himara, named after the country town [kompoli/ qënder] Himara (Heimarra) on the shores of the Ionian Sea, historically commences at the village of Nivitsa to the south and the Logaras mountain ridge on the north. On the one hand lies the deep blue of the Ionian Sea and a continuous series of penunsulars […]; and on the other side lies the mass of the Akrokeraunia mountain range […] This strip of land between the mountain peaks and the sea is the beautiful and historic land of Himara, with its villages and their old, stonebuild houses the Byzantine churches and monasteries, the castles and other monuments, as well as the

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[18] For a detailed information on this see Gregorič Bon 2008a: 104–168.

people of Himara, hospitable and proud, who have remained unbounded throughout the history [sic.] (the Municipality of Himara 2006).

The tourist guide then presents the history and tourist attractions of the Himarë/Himara area, which has changed constantly in size and number of existing villages. In the 18th century there were 16 villages in the area, spread from the Lloghara mountain pass on the north to the village of Nivitsa in the south of Albania (Gregorič Bon 2008a: 44). Although there are only 7 villages officially included in the area now, many local historians, intellectuals and politicians combine it with the municipality of Lukova in the south and declare them an administratively independent region (www.himara.eu and Gjikopulli 2006: 195). They ground these claims in the history of the area, emphasizing its autonomy and special status in the period of Ottoman domination. They also see the Christian religion and historical legacy in general as important for the establishment of the distinctiveness of the region.

Local tendencies for the establishment of an autonomous region transcend the actual state borders on the one side, but generate and redefine the meaning of the locality on the other (e.g. defining locality on the cornerstone of national ideology). They are striving to find their place in the Europe of regions (Harvie 1994). The project for united European regional communities appeared in 1980 in "Western" Europe and ten years later in its "Eastern" part, also known as the Balkans (Parkin 1999). Therefore many local intellectuals and members of the local community in general see the virtual space of their region as being in the EU – as in "www.himara.eu", which is an opportunity for them to enforce their locality and preserve their "authentic" tradition of Himarë/Himara. This shows how regionalisation as a basically bureaucratic reform (Parkin 1999) in Himarë/Himara gradually became reinterpreted in socio-cultural terms.

CONCLUSION

Many people of Dhërmi/Drimades travel back and forth not only between and within rural and urban places in Albania but also in Greece and elsewhere in Europe. When moving through and within places the people of Dhërmi/Drimades reconfigure and redefine their own localities and the meaning of their village. In this process of ongoing reconfiguration the localities and the meanings of both the village and people are often ambiguous and lead to negotiations and conflicts over their belonging and locatedness. When faced with social, political and economic changes, people of Dhërmi/Drimades situate their village on the geopolitical map, which includes Greece or European Union on one side and Albania on the other. People's movements are not something new, although they have been facilitated by a new road system, modern transportation and changes in the availability of passports and visas. Migrations took place in Dhërmi/Drimades for many centuries due to considerable erosion of the terrain, lack of land suitable for cultivation, and different economical, social, and political changes (see Gregorič Bon 2008a). While

on the one hand these movements brought about a multiplicity of connections between people and places, on the other hand the administrative (Ottoman period) and political divisions (formation of nation-states) caused divisions of people and places according to the nested hierarchies principle.

Nested hierarchies indicate how the local people of Dhërmi/Drimades subvert negative stereotypes which are present in public and media discourse in Greece (labelling them as "poor and miserable Greeks from the Albanian side") on the one hand and in Albania on the other (as being *Kaur* or *Greku*) and reinterpret them by ranking each other according to hierarchies. Along with the formation of social hierarchies and differentiations, which are formed by people's movements, debates about modernity and modernisation and claims over the regional identity, the local people continuously reconstruct their village and locate it on the geopolitical map of EU. According to their negotiations and perceptions, Dhërmi/Drimades as well as Himarë/Himara lie in between the EU and Albania, or between modernity and non-modernity. As I argued earlier in this paper, the local people negotiate their social and spatial boundaries and reconstruct their belonging to a distinct region through continuous differentiations between "us" and "them".

The paper shows how the people of Dhërmi/Drimades rhetorically construct "themselves" as locals. Moreover it showed how they position and contrast themselves against two groups of "others". One group of "others" is defined in terms of power, as being "above" them, including EU authorities and states like Greece and other Western European countries. The other group of "others" is perceived as being "below" them and includes newcomers, seasonal workers and Albanians. The conceptualisations of all three groups are interrelated and they depend on the social and cultural background of the speakers.

The main focus of this article was given to local perceptions and discourses about the notions of modernity, modernisation, regionalism and "Europe". Their discourses illustrate the ways in which local people reappropriate and redefine these notions within the grip of the "teeth" of the state as well as supra-state ideologies. When setting their discourses in relation to the politically and historically shifting frontiers, one can find shifting labels, such as "EU" and "Albania", which reflect the economic and political development or non-development of the area, region or state. The differences between "Europeanness" and "Albanianness" are porous and blurred as they continually shift according to social, cultural, political, economic and historical contingencies. Continuously shifting meanings constitute the space as being fractal, not corresponding to the borders of the Euclidian space. This fractality often gives an image of complexity and fragmentation rather than relation (Green 2005: 136). Based on this, the social and spatial differences that the local people rhetorically constitute are relational rather than complex, as they are grounded in social connections rather than differences. In general the paper tries to illustrate how the local people's discourses about modernity and the EU tend to rally for the official recognition of their specific interpretations of the past and present and different identity narratives deriving from them.

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POVZETEK

»KJE SMO!? V EVROPI ALI V ALBANIJI?« REGIONALIZEM V DHËRMIJU/DRIMADESU V JUŽNI ALBANIJI

Nataša Gregorič Bon

Prispevek analizira načine, skozi katere vaščani Dhërmija/Drimadesa v južni Albaniji vzpostavljajo »svoj« kraj kot distinktivno regijo, ki jo vzporejajo z regionalno politiko Evropske unije. Vsebina članka predstavi debate o vključenosti in/ali izključenosti vaškega prostora v Evropsko unijo ali iz nje ali »Evrope«, kot se nanjo pogosto naslavljajo vaščani. Kako zgodovinske, kulturne, politične in ekonomske spremembe v postkomunistični Albaniji vplivajo na lokalne predstave o modernosti, ki jih domačini aksiomatično povezujejo z »Evropo« ali »Zahodom«, predstavlja eno izmed osrednjih vprašanj članka. Vsebina temelji na izsledkih daljšega antropološkega terenskega dela, ki ga je avtorica opravila v obdobju med letoma 2004 in 2005 ter leta 2008.

Številni vaščani Dhërmija/Drimadesa potujejo med in skozi posamezne vasi in mesta tako v Albaniji in Grčiji kakor tudi širše po Evropi. Ko potujejo skozi posamezne kraje in med njimi, vaščani rekonfigurirajo in vedno znova opredeljujejo svojo umeščenost v vas Dhërmi/Drimades pa tudi pozicijo in pomen vasi. Na osnovi tovrstnih procesov se pogosto ustvarjajo dvoumja, ki vodijo v pogajanja in spore glede pripadnosti in umeščenosti vaščanov in vasi same. Zaradi družbenih, političnih in ekonomskih sprememb posamezniki, ki izhajajo iz Dhërmija/Drimadesa, umeščajo svojo vas na geopolitični zemljevid, ki vključuje Grčijo oz. Evropsko unijo na eni strani ter Albanijo na drugi. Tako danes kot tudi v preteklih tisočletjih je bilo na območju današnje občine Himarë/Himara veliko selitev in potovanj. Precejšnja erozivnost terena, pomanjkanje rodovitne zemlje, ekonomske, družbene in politične spremembe so bile v preteklosti in tudi danes ostajajo temeljni vzrok selitev. Ena izmed redkih razlik, ki se vzpostavlja med preteklim in današnjim načinom potovanj je, da se današnja poslužujejo modernih prevoznih sredstev, so pretežno uravnavana s pomočjo potnih listov in viz ter potekajo preko geopolitičnih meja. Na eni strani potovanja in selitve prinašajo številne povezave med ljudmi in kraji, na drugi pa preko administrativnih in političnih delitev ljudi in krajev prinašajo tudi številne razlike.

Debate in pogajanja lokalnih prebivalcev razkrivajo načine, skozi katere poustvarjajo pomene modernosti, modernizacije in lokalnosti ter jih opredeljujejo v okviru ideologije nacionalne in supra-države. V njihovih opredelitvah sta pomena EU in Albanije nenehno premakljiva in prestavljiva. Razlike med »evropskostjo« in »albanskostjo« so porozne in zameglene, saj se neprestano spreminjajo glede na družbena, politična in zgodovinska naključja. Pogovori domačinov o modernosti, modernizaciji in potovanjih so vzporedno z družbenimi in prostorskimi razmejevanji ključni del identitetnih procesov, skozi katere domačini Dhërmija/Drimadesa pogajajo in poustvarjajo regionalnost in pripadnost vasi

oz. regiji. Avtorica ugotavlja, da nenehna pogajanja domačinov in njihova opredeljevanja modernosti, lokalnosti in evropskosti odražajo težnje po uradnemu priznanju regionalnosti področja in nenazadnje identitetnih opredeljevanj domačinov, ki izhajajo iz omenjenih teženj.

TRAJNOST POVRATKA KAO FIZIČKI I SINTETIČKI INDIKATOR ODRŽIVOSTI. PRIMJER SRPSKIH POVRATNIKA U HRVATSKU[1]

Milan MESIĆ[2] i Dragan BAGIĆ[3]

SAŽETAK

Trajnost povratka kao fizički i sintetički indikator održivosti. primjer Srpskih povratnika u Hrvatsku.

Tradicionalno shvaćanje povratka izbjeglica kao jednokratnog i konačnog čina u novije je vrijeme izloženo oštrim kritikama teoretičara i istraživača migracija i izbjeglištva. Čini se da je u kratko vrijeme prevladalo shvaćanje da je povratak složen, dugotrajan, pa i višesmjeran proces, koji u svakoj fazi može postati reverzibilan. Praćenja povratnika ubrzo su 'otkrila' da mnogi od njih, prije ili kasnije odlaze u nove migracije. Zaključeno je da nije dovoljno da povratnici jednom pređu granicu svoje domovine u povratnom smjeru, nego da povratak treba biti uspješan odnosno održiv. Pokazalo se, međutim, da održivost povratka nije lako odrediti, a osobito 'mjeriti'. Najjednostavnije 'održivost' se određuje *izostankom ponovne migracije* nakon povratka. U svom empirijskom istraživanju održivosti povratka srpskih izbjeglica u Hrvatsku autori su konceptualizirali i operacionalizirali čak sedam aspekata održivosti povratka: trajnost, sigurnost, socio-demografska struktura povratnika, društveno-ekonomski uvjeti, izbjegličko iskustvo, povratnička (manjinska)prava, te subjektivne ocjene uvjeta. Ovdje skraćeno iznose rezultate vezane uz prvu dimenziju povratka. Oni potvrđuju dosadašnje spoznaje i očekivanja da veliki dio registriranih povratnika zapravo na adresama koje su prijavili. Na kraju ističe se potreba diferenciranog shvaćanja izbjeglica i povratnika, da bi se bolje mogli razumjeti povratnički procesi. Stoga je predložena tipologija povratnika: A) *bezuvjetni trajni*; B) *uvjetni trajni*; C) *polupovratnici* ili *transgranični* (*transnacionalni*); D) *neformalni povratnici*; E) *formalni* ili *kvazi-povratnici*.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: izbjeglice, povratnici, Srbi, Hrvatska, održivost povratka; tipovi povratnika

ABSTRACT

Return Durability as a Physical and Synthetical Indicator of Sustainability. Example of the Serb Returnees in Croatia

Traditional understanding of refugee return as one-time and a definite act has recently been vigorously criticized by the theoreticians and researchers in refugee studies. It seems that

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in a short period of time opinion prevailed that return is always a complex long-term and diversified process, which in each of its phases can become reversible. Filed researches already 'revealed' that many returnees do not stay actually in their places and homeland of origin but re-emigrate. This finding has lead to conclusion that simple crossing of boarder in opposite direction is not the real indicator of return. Instead, it should be successful i.e. sustainable. The most common 'measure' of sustainability is absence of repeated migration. The authors have conceptualized and operacionalized

seven aspects of return sustainability: I. the extent of return durability; II. feeling of safety; III. socio-demographic characteristics of returnees; IV. socio-economic conditions; V. refugee experience and orientation towards return; VI. citizenship and minority rights; VII. subjective perception of living conditions. Here are only findings relating to the first dimension presented and discussed, accompanied by the returnee typology proposed by the authors, in order to better understand complexity of return movements. They differentiate the following types of returnees: A) unconditional permanent; B) conditional permanent; C) semi-returnees or transnational; D) non-formal; E) formal or quasi-returnees.

KEY WORDS: refugees, returnees, Croatia, Serbs, sustainability of return, types of returnees

KONCEPTUALIZACIJA ODRŽIVOSTI POVRATKA

Na povratak se tradicionalno gledalo kao na jednokratan i konačan čin. Stoga je svrstan na prvo mjesto '*trajnih* rješenja'. On podrazumijeva sretan završetak izbjegličkog ciklusa, a time i prestanak brige za odgovorne međunarodne organizacije. Dok se izbjeglištvo (osim u slučaju 'azilanata' iz komunističkog bloka) povezivalo s negativnim konotacijama patnje, 'iskorjenjivanja', gubitka 'doma', ukratko socijalne patologije, povratak se uzimao kao njegova suprotnost: nešto što je po sebi dobro, 'prirodno'. Njime izbjeglice gube svoju etiketu i postaju ponovno 'normalni' ljudi, koji, kao i svi drugi opet pripadaju svome 'domu' i svojoj 'domovini' (Hammond, 1999:227). Time se ponovno ustanovljuje 'prirodni' i 'nacionalni' poredak, za koji se pretpostavljao da je postojao prije raseljenja (Black and Gent, 2006:19). Napokon, smatra se da je 'normalno' da se izbjeglice žele vratiti 'kući'. Iskustva operacija povratka, na žalost, govore da su povratak i reintegracija daleko od 'prirodnog' i neproblematičnog kontinuiteta, osobito u post-konfliktnim situacijama (Eastmond, 2006:142-3).

To tradicionalno poimanje povratka u novije je vrijeme izloženo oštrim kritikama teoretičara i istraživača migracija i izbjeglištva. Čini se da je u kratko vrijeme prevladalo shvaćanje da je povratak složen, dugotrajan, pa i višesmjeran proces, pa se i briga odgovornih međunarodnih i drugih organizacija ne može svoditi na logistiku povratnicima u ponovnom prelasku granice domovine, pa ni ponovnom useljenju u njihove kuće. Kritika je olakšana i općom akademskom atmosferom obilježenom jačanjem postmodernoga mišljenja koje decentrira i pluralizira perspektive, dekonstruirajući sve fiksne koncepte identitete, pripadanja, teritorijalizacije. Tako je iz socio konstruktivističke (ili dekonostruktivističke) pozicije 'napadnut' i pojam 'doma' i 'domovine' u vezi s izbjeglicama, kao i nediferencirani pojam 'povratnika' (Allen and Morsnik, 1994:7; Black, 2002), i napokon sama pretpostavka neproblematičnosti povratka 'domu', opterećenom politikom i raznim

interesima (Black and Gent, 2004:4). H. Malkki (1992:37), ne prihvaća označavanje izbjeglica 'iskorijenjenima' u smislu nemogućnosti 'ukorjenjivanja' negdje drugdje.

Praćenja povratnika ubrzo su 'otkrila' zabrinjavajuće tendencije, da mnogi od njih, naime, prije ili kasnije, i zbog različitih razloga, odlaze u nove migracije. Zaključak je bio jednostavan ali dramatičan – povratak nije dovoljan, treba biti učinkovit ili uspješan. Kako je diskurs 'održivosti', koji je došao iz ekologije, već ušao u širu upotrebu i bio pri ruci, primijenjen je i na povratak izbjeglica i tako smo dobili zahtjev za 'održivim povratkom'. On je, kao i svi pomodni pojmovi, 'preko noći' postao nova ortodoksija u izbjegličkim (i migracijskim) studijama, ali i u izbjegličkoj politici UNHCR-a i drugih međunarodnih organizacija i civilnih udruga. No, time, naravno povratak nije postao manje prijeporan koncept i politika. Pitanje 'održivosti' otvorilo je nova pitanja i kontroverzije.

Lako se složiti oko načelnog stava da povratak treba biti 'održiv' da bi imao smisla, ali kako 'održivost' odrediti i onda 'mjeriti' pokazuje se daleko težim pitanjem. Najjednostavnije 'održivost' se određuje *izostankom ponovne migracije* (neko vrijeme) nakon povratka (Migration DRC, 2005:2). Međutim, kako u svim povratnim tokovima, čini se, dolazi do veće ili manje ponovne migracije, ovaj koncept ne odgovara na mnogo složenija pitanja zašto se to događa, odnosno koje su pretpostavke da do toga ne dođe.

Drugi je pristup održivosti složeniji i bavi se *društveno ekonomskim problemima* s kojima se susreću povratnici, odnosno njihovim *životnim uvjetima*. U to ulazi: sigurnost, smještaj, zaposlenost, infrastruktura, te dostupnost državnih institucija i socijalnih službi (školstvo, zdravstvo) (UNMIK and UNHCR, 2003:3). U Sussex pilot studiji za Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Velike Britanije o dobrovoljnom povratku izbjeglica u Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Kosovo, Black i suradnici (2004:39)[4] definirali su individualnu održivost na slijedeći način. „Povratna migracija je održiva za pojedince ako njihov društveno ekonomski status i strah od nasilja ili progona nije pogoršan, u odnosu na stanovništvo u mjestu porijekla, godinu dana nakon povratka".

Raniji i jednostavniji pristupi 'mjerenju' povratka konceptualizirani su na individualnoj razini brojanja onih koji su (trajno) ostali, odnosno nisu ponovno emigrirali. Pa i socio-ekonomski indikatori statusa stanovništva su općenito jasni i uglavnom se lako operacionaliziraju. No, kad je u pitanju održivost povratka izbjeglica za svaki od njih postavlja se pitanje s čime se uspoređuju, odnosno kako se *mjere*. Primjerice, je li na (ne)zaposlenost povratnika treba gledati prema nekom apsolutnom ili relativnom standardu? Vjerojatno ćemo se lako složiti s drugim prijedlogom, ali se onda otvara novo pitanje. Je li razinu (ne)zaposlenosti povratnika treba uspoređivati sa stanjem u izbjeglištvu ili u 'domovini' u koju su se vratili.

Pitanje 'mjerenja' 'održivosti povratka' ili njegovih indikatora ima i drugi problem (s kojim se nastoje suočiti noviji pristupi, o kojima dalje govorimo). Treba li, naime, 'mjeriti' uspješnost povratka pojedinačnih izbjeglica (metodološki individualizam) ili povratničkih zajednica? Kako, u drugom slučaju, odrediti povratničku (manjinsku) zajednicu – na razini naselja, regije ili cjeline etničkog korpusa? Ne ovisi li (trajna) održivost povratka

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[4] Radi se, međutim, o vrlo malom uzorku ispitanika – samo 30 za svaku zemlju.

izbjeglica upravo o odnosu s drugom (drugima) etničkom (većinskom) zajednicom (na lokalnoj i nacionalnoj razini)? Ako da (jer to je samo retoričko pitanje), onda moramo 'mjeriti' društvenu rekonstrukciju lokalnih i širih zajednica na područjima povratka? Kako, međutim, 'mjeriti' suživot (i u odnosu na što – na stanje prije rata, na stanje u vrijeme rata ili prema nekom arbitrarnom 'standardu'?

Jedna varijanta ovog društveno ekonomskog pristupa održivosti povratka poseban naglasak stavlja na 'životna sredstva' (*livelihoods*). Međunarodne organizacije i sponzori 'održivost životnih sredstava' definiraju iz svoje perspektive prvenstveno kao sposobnost povratnika da osiguraju dovoljno 'žilava' (*robust*) sredstva da mogu preživljavati bez vanjske pomoći i da mogu podnijeti vanjske šokove. Ovdje se postavlja pitanje, da li u 'vanjsku' pomoć treba uključiti doznake izbjeglica i migranata (članova obitelji ili rođaka povratnika) iz zemlje izbjeglištva ili migracije, ili se one bolje mogu shvatiti kao stvar diverzifikacije (i transnacionalizacije) u osiguravanju održivih 'životnih sredstava'?

Međunarodne organizacije su u slučaju Bosne i Hercegovine i Hrvatske (u okviru ovog modela) inzistirale na povratku imovine povratnicima (kuća, stanova i zemlje), kao temeljne pretpostavke (održivog) povratka. Nekoliko je istraživača upozorilo (Eastmond, 2006:143)[5] da je (rana) obnova predratnih izbjegličkih kuća važan, ali po sebi nedovoljan poticaj da bi se izbjeglice trajno vratile, osobito ako se radi o pripadnicima etničkih manjina u područjima gdje ekonomska kriza i nacionalistička politika radi protiv normalizacije života. „Doista, čak i u Bosni, gdje su promovirani kako restitucija vlasništva tako i povratak, mnoge izbjeglice i raseljene osobe odlučili su se vratiti nakon što su ponovno dobili svoje vlasništvo; umjesto toga, oni su ga prodali, iznajmili, ili ga koriste kao ljetne vikendice" (Black, Eastmond & Gent, 2006:10) Prodajom ili zamjenom svojih kuća, povratnici samo dovršavaju i osnažuju ratne ciljeve etničkog čišćenja i etničke homogenizacije. „Za one koji se doista vrate, čak i tamo gdje etnički odnosi i fizička sigurnost nisu prepreke integraciji, mogućnosti ponovnog ustanovljenja 'doma' čini se da ovisi uvelike o životnim mogućnostima" (Eastmond, 2006:143). Ispitivanje povratnika u jednoj ruralnoj povratničkoj zajednici u Bosni i Hercegovini, osam godina nakon povratka, je pokazalo da oni i dalje žive u velikoj ekonomskoj bijedi, bez izgleda na zaposlenje. Mada su sami svoje stambene uvjete i sigurnost ocijenili zadovoljavajućim, zadržava ih uglavnom to što nisu našli priliku otići negdje drugdje gdje bi bolje živjeli (Čukur, 2005).

Na održivost povratka može se gledati i sa stajališta *osiguranja* za povratnike bitnih *prava*. Svi ljudi, pa tako i migranti i izbjeglice imaju *pravo* na povratak u zemlju porijekla (uz istodobno pravo njezina napuštanja), što je utvrđeno još u Općoj deklaraciji o ljudskim pravima (članak 13). Međutim, to je 'mekano' (*soft*) pravo koje se ne može nametnuti državama bez njihove privole. Nakon iskustva s etničkim čišćenjima u Bosni i Hercegovini, međunarodne organizacije su kroz Daytonski sporazum osnažile to pravo, eksplicirajući ga ka 'pravo na povratak svojim *domovima*' (kurziv naš). Nešto kasnije na Kosovu je UNMIK napokon formulirao 'pravo na održivi povratak'. *Manual on Sustainable Return* razrađuje ga u četiri područja: a) sigurnost i slobodu kretanja, b)

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[5] Vidi tematski broj časopisa *International Migrations*, 44 (3).

pristup javnim službama (državnim uredima, obrazovanju, zdravstvenoj zaštiti), c) pristup skloništu (putem učinkovitog vraćanja vlasništva ili pomoći u rekonstrukciji kuća), i d) ekonomske opcije, putem poštenog i jednakog pristupa mogućnostima zapošljavanja (Black and Gent, 2006: 22-24).

U okviru ovog modela, čak se i integracija povratnika shvaća ponajprije kao *njihovo pravo*. Barem se tako može razumjeti tvrdnja da „ne može biti nade u normalnost sve dok se većina raseljenih nije u stanju reintegrirati u svoja društva" (UNHCR, 1997:162). Prvo, integracija je barem dvostrani (a prije višestrani) proces i ne može se nametnuti drugoj (većinskoj) etničkoj zajednici, i štoviše ako se 'izvana' nameće kao jednostrano pravo, ne samo što će ostati formalno, nego će prije izazvati otpore nego pomirenje. Drugo, ovaj zahtjev „nove ortodoksije odgovornih tijela međunarodne zajednice", mada u dobroj namjeri, može nesvjesno izbjeglicama-povratnicima nanijeti drugu vrstu nepravde – poricanje njihovog prava na trajno iseljenje (ili na razne oblike transnacionalnog polu-povratka) (Black and Gent, 2006:20). Štoviše, njihova vlastita opcija ne-vraćanja, posebno u situaciji mogućeg i poželjnog povratka, nadaje se u tom svijetlu kao 'nenormalna', a njihov status 'ne-povratnika' patološkim (Malkki, 1992:31). U mnogim slučajevima, pokazalo se, da se s povratkom, međutim, nije poboljšao život dotadašnjih izbjeglica, i da se povratnici, zbog različitih razloga, moraju ponovno seliti.

Svi do sada navedeni pristupi održivom povratku usmjereni su na pojedince ili njihove obitelji. Sve više se shvaća da se održivost povratka ne može svesti na individualnu razinu i na same povratnike, nego da se mora konceptualizirati *agregatno*, uzimajući u obzir dinamičke posljedice povratka na ekonomska i društvena kretanja u područjima povratka i društvu u cjelini. „Ne samo da je teško za izbjeglice i druge migrante kao pojedince da jednostavno odu 'kući', nego povratak u zemlje porijekla može doprinijeti spirali propadanja, bilo kroz ponovno raspirivanje sukoba, kroz perpetuiranje nejednakosti ili zloupotrebu prava, ili kroz ekonomske poteškoće, što bi moglo potaknuti veću razinu nasilnog raseljenja u budućnosti. U tom smislu, ne radi se samo o pitanju kako učiniti povratak održivim, nego kako ga učiniti održivim u razmjerima zajednice, a ne samo za pojedince" (Black and Gent, 2006:32).

U slučaju Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine, i zapravo više ili manje u svim post-konfliktnim društvima, povratak i reintegracija se događa u uvjetima dubokih promjena, koje uključuju tranziciju u nove ekonomske i političke sustave. Radi se o dinamičnim i osporavanim procesima koji nameću potrebitost pregovaranja oko društvenog položaja povratnika u novim odnosima moći i nejednakosti. „Društvena rekonstrukcija' … odnosi se na procese (ponovnog) stvaranja, u novim okolnostima, društvenih odnosa, identiteta i kulturnih značenja – koji ljude u poslijeratnom okviru (ponovno) povezuju s posebnim mjestom i zajednicom kao 'domom" (Eastmond, 2006:143). Spomenuta Sussex studija ustanovljuje da je povratna migracija „održiva je za *zemlju porijekla ili regiju*, ako se socio-ekonomski uvjeti i razina naselja i progona znatno ne pogoršaju jednu godinu nakon što je povratni proces završen" Black et al., 2004:39).

Držimo da je to preoptimistično, nerealno gledište, primjereno više potrebi 'mjerenja' 'održivosti' i namijenjeno međunarodnim organizacijama i vladama (Zapadnim)

zainteresiranim za što brže 'rješenje' izbjegličkog problema. Spomenuta analiza slučaja male povratničke zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini (Čukur, 2005), i naše reprezentativno istraživanje, potvrđuju da se radi o dugoročnom procesu, koji u raznim fazama može postati reverzibilan. Napokon, dobro je poznato da se i manje osjetljiva društvena integracija (recimo imigranata u zapadna društva) razvija godinama, ako ne i desetljećima.

Black, Eastmond i Gent (2006:4) predlažu razlikovanje 'užih' i 'širih' indikatora održivosti. Prvi odgovaraju na jednostavno pitanje – jesu li povratnici nakon povratka ponovno emigrirali. Drugi uključuju "kako razmjere u kojima su se pojedinačni povratnici u stanju integrirati u svoja domovinska društva, tako i širi utjecaj povratka na makro-ekonomske i političke indikatore". Danas se ističu dva temeljna uvjeta održivog povratka. Prvo, to je njegova *dobrovoljnost.* Ona nije, međutim, teko neproblematična kako na prvi pogled izgleda (Black and Gent, 2006:19). Može li se, primjerice, doista govoriti o dobrovoljnosti, kada se izbjeglice moraju odlučiti između povratka - na koji ih potiču zemlje primitka ili međunarodne organizacije, nudeći im i pomoć u tome - i neizvjesnoga opstanka u atmosferi neželjenog gosta (posebno kad se radi o faktičkim izbjeglicama bez formalnog konvencijskog statusa). I drugo, to je okruženje povratka – u sigurnosnom, ekonomskom i političkom smislu.

Rjeđe se govori o uvjetima izbjeglištva, kao razlozima za i protiv povratka, pri čemu su se istraživanja u tom pogledu uglavnom odnosila na Zapadne zemlje primitka izbjeglica. Kad je riječ o srpskim izbjeglicama iz Hrvatske, oni su najvećim dijelom izbjegli u Srbiju i u Bosnu i Hercegovinu na područje Republike Srpske, i tamo ostali živjeti. Barem su dva osnovna razloga za takvu njihovu izbjegličku orijentaciju. To je prvo direktna upletenost Miloševićevog režima u 'srpsku pobunu u Hrvatskoj', a potom u iseljavanje Srba iz 'Srpske Krajine', nakon njezinog vojnog poraza. Bilo bi potpuno nelogično očekivati, da njihov ekonomski položaj, i možda još više politička situacija u kojoj su živjeli, nisu utjecali na njihovu volju i spremnost na povratak. U oba slučaja oni su se našli pod snažnom političkom kontrolom Miloševićeva režima. „Politička retorika vladajuće Srpske demokratske stranke u republici Srpskoj oko procesa povratka u Bosni centriran je oko tvrdnje da se Srbi ne žele vratiti u bošnjačko-hrvatsku federaciju, te implikacije da svi Srbi trebaju živjeti u jednoj državi". Na sličan pritisak naišli su i srpske izbjeglice iz Hrvatske. Prvo su poticani na naseljavanje Istočne Slavonije, koja je tada bila pod srpskom kontrolom, da ojačaju srpsko stanovništvo tamo, a neki su naseljeni i na Kosovo, sukladno strategiji legitimizacije kontrole teritorija pomoću etničke dominacije (Harvey, 2006:96).

Napokon, u najnovije vrijeme javlja se i jedan novi, postmoderan pristup održivosti povratka (već prilično raširen u migracijskim studijama), koji dovodi u pitanje ili barem revidira sve dosadašnje konvencionalne modele – *transnacionalizam.* Marita Eastmond ispituje strategije povratka, kojima pribjegavaju bosansko-hercegovačke izbjeglice, zbog neizvjesnosti s kojima su suočene, te ukazuje na transnacionalni prostor u kojima se one događaju. „Opisane strategije različitog su trajanja, često se zbivaju izvan ustanovljenih politika i programa, i temelje se na potrebi držanja otvorenih opcija na različitim mjestima. Dok politike teže definirati izbjeglički povratak kao jednokratno i konačno seljenje u zemlju ili mjesto porijekla, transnacionalna perspektiva sugerira da bi se povratak bolje konceptualizirao kao dinamičan i nedovršen proces, koji se može rastegnuti na

dulje vrijeme, uključivanjem kretanja između mjesta i aktivne veze s ljudima i resursima u zemlji azila. Transnacionalne strategije također uključuju mnoge izbjeglice vani, koji zadržavaju i posjećuju redovito svoje vraćene kuće u Bosni, neki od njih i dulje vrijeme, pripremajući se za trajan povratak u nekom kasnijem trenutku. U takvoj transnacionalnoj dinamici, izbjeglice i povratnici nisu uvijek jasno razdvojene kategorije, budući se jedni i drugi mogu kretati u oba smjera i kombinirati resurse. Transnacionalna perspektiva također dovodi u pitanje pojmove 'doma', kao nečega vezanog uz jedan poseban lokalitet ili nacionalnu zajednicu. Ako dom nije tek mjesto ili fizička struktura, nego također i pozornica (*site*) društvenih odnosa i kulturalnih značenja, onda se može uvelike rastegnuti na nekoliko mjesta, od kojih svaki može zadržati osobit set odnosa i značenja za one kojih se tiče. Ova transnacionalna dimenzija doma tako je izazov pojmovima 'repatrijacije' ili 'povratka' u pojednostavljenom vidu. Umjesto toga, … rekonstituirani dom može biti translokalan, pri čemu svaki lokalitet postaje dio novoga doma. Ponovno promišljanje povratka izbjeglica u smislu transnacionalne mobilnosti i pripadanja također sugerira nove načine konceptualiziranja potencijala rekonstrukcije velikih izbjegličkih populacija izvan zemlje" (Eastmond (2006:141-2).

Ekstenzivno smo citirali autoricu jer je doista pregnantno i sustavno izložila transnacionalni pristup održivosti povratka, i k tome se s njom gotovo u svemu slažemo, osim moguće implikacije njezinih zaključaka. Na kritiku konvencionalnih pristupa, u smislu njihove ograničenosti i nedostatnosti, nemamo nikakvih primjedbi. U konvencionalnim pristupima povratak je *isključivo* shvaćen kao definitivni čin ponovnog naseljenja u 'izvornu' socio-prostornu lokaciju. Ovaj, pak, pristup naglašava dinamičnost, nedovršenost, transteritorijalnost, odnosno transnacionalnost povratničkih mreža. Ne slažemo se, međutim s Eastmond i sličnim mišljenjima, ukoliko odbacuju svaku primjenljivost konvencionalnih pristupa uopće, ako negiraju (ili barem zanemaruju) simboličko značenje 'doma' kao jedinstvenog mjesta za mnoge izbjeglice-povratnike, a onda i važnost repatrijacije ili povratka. Ne radi se o tome da se transnacionalizam kao okvir za razumijevanje (dijela) povratničkih procesa može prihvatiti samo na štetu konvencionalnih pristupa, nego o međusobnom nadopunjavaju, što pokazujemo u analizi rezultata našega istraživanja. Mi nismo ispitivali transnacionalne veze i strategije srpskih povratnika u Hrvatsku, ali neki nalazi sugeriraju njihovo postojanje. Nepobitno je potvrđeno da je na povratak u tradicionalnom smislu orijentiran određeni tip izbjeglica-povratnika (stariji, neobrazovani, ruralni ljudi), te da znatno manji udio, posebno u trajnom (službenom) povratku, mladih, obrazovanih, agilnih ljudi, upućuje na njihove drugačije strategije rješavanja svoga izbjegličkog statusa.

Na kraju želimo naglasiti ono što se uporno izostavlja u analizi izbjeglištva i povratka. Izbjeglice i povratnici ni ukoliko nisu 'siva masa', nediferencirani korpus, koji se, isključivo ponukan vanjskim poticajima (pritiscima, manipulacijama, progonom, pomoći) kreće, gotovo bez ikakve volje pojedinca - bilo u smjeru izbjeglištva bilo povratka. Kao i prije izbjeglištva, tako i u izbjeglištvu[6] i napokon povratku, izbjeglice-povratnici razlikuju se

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6 Još u prvom sociološkom istraživanju izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba u Hrvatskoj, Mesić (1992) je pred-

ne samo po svojim urođenim obilježjima, nego i po svom društveno ekonomskom statusu, snalaženju, uspjehu u životu, političkim orijentacijama itd. K tome se izbjeglička populacija s vremenom uvelike mijenja po svojim socio-demografskim obilježjima - zbog ratnih stradanja i prirodnih umiranja članova obitelji, rađanja novih članova, ženidbi, rastava (osobito etnički mješovitih brakova), spajanja i razdvajanja obitelji. Stoga, barem mi, uvjetno govorimo o izbjeglicama ili povratnicima kao cjelini, stalno imajući na umu njihovu stvarnu diferencijaciju.

Napokon, u analizi održivosti povratka, i osobito u poticajnim mjerama, važno je razlikovati čimbenike na koje se ne može utjecati kao što su prirođena obilježja povratnika (poput dobi i spola), od onih na koje se (politikom) može utjecati (obrazovanje, kvalificiranost, zapošljavanje, razni oblici pomoći).

U našem istraživanju mi smo pokušali konceptualizirati i operacionalizirati čak sedam aspekata održivosti povratka:

1. razina trajnosti povratka – izostanak ponovne migracije
2. osjećaj sigurnosti
3. socio-demografska struktura (trajnih) povratnika
4. društveno-ekonomski uvjeti održivosti povratka;
5. izbjegličko iskustvo i orijentacija na povratak;
6. građansko-državljanska i manjinska prava kao uvjet održivosti povratka;
7. subjektivni uvjeti održivosti (ocijene, mišljenja i osjećaji povratnika).

Prva dimenzija se poklapa sa pojmom 'užih' indikatora povratka, a sve ostale se odnose na 'šire'. Pri tome, mi, na žalost, nismo mogli istraživati širi utjecaj povratka na makro-ekonomska kretanja i političke odnose u društvu, nego smo se morali ograničiti na životne uvjete samih povratnika. Ovdje skraćeno prenosimo samo rezultate vezane uz prvu dimenziju povratka.

METODOLOGIJA ISTRAŽIVANJA

Cilj našega empirijskog istraživanja, koje je naručio UNHCR (ured u Zagrebu) bio je prvo, utvrditi stvarnu prisutnost registriranih srpskih povratnika u Hrvatskoj (razinu trajnosti povratka), i drugo, utvrditi utjecaj različitih aspekata povratka na njegovu održivost. Istraživanje je trebalo biti statistički reprezentativno za poznatu populaciju od 120.000 registriranih povratnika. Proces prikupljanja podataka podijeljen je u dvije faze. Prvo smo za svakog povratnika odabranog u uzorka utvrdili mjesto ili barem državu stalnog boravka, a potom je provedeno opsežno strukturirano ispitivanje s povratnicima koji su ostali živjeti u mjestu povratka. Konstruirali smo odgovarajuće istraživačke instrumente, sastavljene od tri osnovna dokumenta:

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ložio razlikovanje 6 tipova izbjeglica odnosno raseljenih osoba, polazeći samo aspekta izbjeglištva, a to su razlozi i načini zbog kojih i na koji su ljudi dospjeli u izbjeglištvo. zatim je na nekim drugim dimenzijama konstruirao jeo nekoliko drugih tipologija, prvenstveno da bi ukazao na njihovu diferenciranost, i utjecaj te diferencijacije na njihov život u izbjeglištvu i (ne)povratničku orijentaciju.

- *dnevnika anketiranja*, u kojem su anketari bilježili sve tražene informacije u kontaktima sa ispitanicima u nastojanju da se utvrdi stvarno prebivalište svakog pojedinog registriranog povratnika;
- *obrasca za odsutne povratnike*, u kojem su anketari bilježili informacije o mjestu boravka povratnika, prikupljene od informatora u mjestima gdje su registrirani a nisu pronađeni pojedini povratnici;
- *glavni upitnik*, s pitanjima o uvjetima života i zadovoljstvom ispitanika nakon povratka.

Strukturirani intervju s ispitanicima povratnicama trajao je prosječno oko 40 minuta.

Uzorak je odabran metodom slučajnog izbora ispitanika iz baze Ministarstva mora, turizma, prometa i razvitka (dalje: Ministarstva). Uz ukupan broj, bilo nam je poznato samo jedno obilježje ispitanika, a to je mjesto prijavljenog povratka. Iz toga smo podatka izveli dvije vrste stratifikacije: a) prema regiji i b) prema veličini naselja.

Za našu stratifikaciju uzorka prema veličini naselje koristili smo službenu klasifikaciju naselja prema popisu stanovništva Hrvatske iz 2001. Tako možemo pratiti povratnike u slijedećim vrstama naselja prema njihovoj veličini: a) do 500 stanovnika; b) od 501 do 2000; c) od 2001 do 10.000 stanovnika; te d) više od 10.000 stanovnika. Daljnja podjela urbanih naselja sa više od 10.000 stanovnika za nas nije imala smisla, budući je udio povratnika u takva naselja relativno mali (oko 5%).

Tako smo dobili sve zajedno 32 stratuma. Svaki je u planiranom uzorku od 1500 povratnika predstavljen proporcionalno svome udjelu u populaciji registriranih srpskih (manjinskih) povratnika. Na terenu nismo uspjeli prikupiti tražene podatke za 50 osoba. Na glavni upitnik odgovarale su 403 osobe iz uzorka. Smatramo da uzorak i po veličini i stratifikaciji dobro reprezentira istraživanu populaciju. Njime, dakle, nisu obuhvaćeni eventualni povratnici (a držimo da ih ima), koji zbog raznih razloga nisu popisani u navedenoj bazi podataka nadležnog Ministarstva. Njihovo neevidentiranje s jedne strane može proizlaziti iz propusta u radu službenih tijela koja su vodila ovu registraciju, ili (što vjerujemo da je vjerojatno češći slučaj) iz svjesnih ili nesvjesnih zaobilaženja službenih kanala povratka pojedinih izbjeglica. K tome, možemo pretpostaviti da se takvi povratnici po nekim obilježjima razlikuju od naše poznate populacije. Stoga smo dužni upozoriti da se naši empirijski nalazi ne mogu metodološki korektno poopćavati na sve moguće manjinske povratnike, nego ponajprije na popisanu populaciju. Marginalna teorijska pogreška ukupno ostvarenog uzorka od 1450 respondenata je +/-2,5 posto, a za glavni upitnik (403) +/-4 posto.[7]

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[7] K tome treba upozoriti na nekoliko mogućih pristranosti ukupnog uzorka koje bi mogle utjecati na povećanje empirijske pogreške preko teorijskog maksimuma. Mi ne možemo biti sigurni da se 50 osoba, za koje nismo uspjeli prikupiti tražene podatke, više ili manje ne razlikuju po nekim važnim obilježjima od cjeline uzorka. Ukoliko su nam te osobe ostale nedostupne zbog nekih razloga koji su na osobit način povezane s predmetom našega istraživanja, onda to može povećati pogrešku uzorka za dodatnih oko 3%. Dalje, treba imati u vidu da nekih 15% ispitanika nisu pronađeni na traženoj adresi, niti je na terenu dobivena informacija o njihovom stvarnom prebivalištu (što se uglavnom

U dogovoru s naručiteljem istraživanja, njegovo provođenje na terenu preuzele su dvije civilne udruge, za koje smo vjerovali da će relativno lakše uspostaviti kontakte s našim ispitanicima. Jedna je etničko politička – Srpski demokratski forum (SDF), a druga humanitarna – Hrvatski crveni križ (HCK). Iz redova njihovih aktivista regrutirana su 43 anketara. Budući se radilo o osobama s malim ili nikakvim iskustvom u takvoj vrsti anketiranja, svi su pozvani na pripremu, tijekom koje su upoznati s ciljevima istraživanja, pravilima sociološkog anketiranja i njihovim zadacima. Osim usmenih, svaki je anketar dobio i detaljne pismene upute za svoj terenski rad. Na žalost, to nije bilo dovoljno da osigura podjednaku kvalitetu anketiranja. Štoviše, zbog pogrešaka pojedinih anketara neka pitanja u znatnom broju upitnika ostala su bez (upisanih) odgovora. Zbog toga nam broj ispitanika po pojedinim pitanjima varira, a neka su pitanja čak morala biti isključena iz analize. Unatoč tome, istraživanje je, po našem sudu, polučilo relevantne i validne rezultate, jer su ključna pitanja relativno dobro pokrivena.

Unos podataka provela je agencija Puls, a u skladu sa ISO standardima prema kojima je organiziran rad ove agencije. Provedena je kontrola točnosti unosa podataka, koja je pokazala da je udio pogrešaka unosa manji od 0,5%. Istraživanje je koncipirano sukladno temeljnim etničkim načelima, što je potvrdilo Etičko povjerenstvo Odsjeka za sociologiju.

RAZINA TRAJNOSTI POVRATKA – IZOSTANAK PONOVNE MIGRACIJE

U konceptualnom okviru smo istaknuli, da je prvi i najjednostavniji indikator održivosti povratka relativna trajnost ostanka povratnika u mjestima povratka. Neki istraživači predlažu godinu dana, kao najkraće razdoblje ili najmanju 'mjeru' relativne trajnosti. Ukoliko, dakle, ne dođe do ponovne migracije barem godinu dana nakon povratka, on se po tom kriteriju može smatrati održivim (što se čini zadovoljavajuće ponajprije sa stajališta odgovornih međunarodnih organizacija i zainteresiranih vlada). Mi smo u konceptualnoj raspravi izrazili našu duboku sumnju u realnost ovakvog pristupa održivosti povratka, jer on ignorira ili previđa zbiljsku složenost i dugotrajnost toga procesa, koji u raznim fazama može postati reverzibilan. Stoga smo izostavili bilo koju vremensku odrednicu, jer mislimo da za neke povratnike ni desetljeće provedeno u mjestu porijekla i svome domu nije garancija da je povratak konačno dovršen. Pri tome je, naravno, nakon nekog vremena teško povući granicu između odustajanja od povratka i radnih migracija do kojih bi u sličnim ekonomskim okolnostima moglo doći i bez prethodnog izbjeglištva. U

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događalo u gradovima). Ova činjenica može značajno utjecati na točnost podataka o broju prisutnih povratnika u mjestu povratka, što je i uzeto u obzir pri davanju tih procjena. U manjoj mjeri ona može zakriviti rezultate iz glavnog upitnika o stavovima i uvjetima života povratnika. S obzirom da su odbijanja razgovora bila vrlo rijetka, izvjesno je da to nije moglo znatno utjecati na rezultate istraživanja.

tome razgraničenju važno je uzeti subjektivan osjećaj samih ljudi – smatraju li se oni još uvijek povratnicima ili ne.

Ogromna većina povratnika vratila se iz Srbije, gdje je izbjegla većina srpskih izbjeglica (77%), a samo 8 posto iz Bosne i Hercegovine, te daljnjih 9 posto iz drugog dijela Hrvatske. Prosječno su trajni povratnici iz našeg uzorka u izbjeglištvu proveli oko 4,5 godina. Masovniji povratak srpskih izbjeglica počeo je 1997. godine. Oni čine 8 posto od svih registriranih povratnika do svibnja 2006. godine, odnosno nešto manje od 15 tisuća ljudi. Godinu dana prije upisano je dvostruko manje povratnika. Najveći broj dokumentiran je 1998. - oko 20 tisuća, nakon čega godišnji povratni kontingenti padaju na 14 i 15 tisuća tijekom 1999. i 2000., te iduće tri godine na 10 tisuća. Zadnjih godina broj povratnika dalje se naglo smanjuje, tako da je u 2005. godini registrirano oko 5 tisuća.

Utvrditi, dakle, fizičku prisutnost odnosno ostanak registriranih povratnika na prijavljenim adresama u RH, bio je prvi osnovni zadatak ovog terenskog istraživanja. Nakon svega, koji god bili razlozi odustajanja od povratka, udio onih koji ostaju najvažniji je, upravo sintetički, podatak o (relativnoj) uspješnosti povratka. Tek potom, možemo analizirati čimbenike koji su na to, više ili manje utjecali.

Novija istraživanja povratničkih tokova ukazala su na veće ili manje netočnosti službenih podataka o brojnom stanju stvarnih povratnika, bilo da je riječ o tijelima 'domovinskih' vlada bilo međunarodnih organizacija. Ovdje ne mislimo na namjerno uvećavanje brojeva, nego na problem da se stanoviti dio registrirah povratnika zadržava na mjestu povratka samo kraće vrijeme ili boravi povremeno, a ne trajno, za što postoje razni razlozi.

Prema našim nalazima, od 35 do najviše 45 posto registriranih povratnika stalno prebiva u svojim mjestima, a dodatnih 3,5 posto preseljeno je negdje drugdje u Hrvatskoj. Istodobno, između 35 i 42 posto njih nije stalno naseljeno u Hrvatskoj. Kada rezultate istraživanja poopćimo na cijelu populaciju od 120.000 registriranih srpskih (manjinskih) povratnika, dolazimo do zasnovane procjene da u zemlji trajno prebiva između 46.000 i 54.000, od čega 42.000 do 49.000 u mjestima svoga porijekla. Njima treba dodati stanoviti broj neregistriranih povratnika koji su trajno ostali (možda nekoliko tisuća). Neki nedostajući podaci u našem uzorku sugeriraju da manji dio, prvenstveno mlađih članova povratničkih domaćinstava, možda nisu registrirani, da ne govorimo o onima koji su mogli u potpunosti, iz nekih razloga zaobići registraciju svoga povratka. Kada odbijemo 14.500 preminulih nakon povratka, ostaje između 66.000 i 74.000 registriranih povratnika koji (i dalje) stalno prebivaju izvan Hrvatske, uglavnom u Srbiji.

Činjenica da neki 'povratnici' ne borave stalno u mjestu porijekla (ili drugom mjestu povratka), ne znači nužno (barem za dio njih) da ne održavaju nikakve veze s njim. Po iskazima naših informatora nekih 6 posto povratnika povremeno borave u Hrvatskoj, a povremeno izvan nje, uglavnom u zemlji izbjeglištva. Svaki drugi povratnik (ili svaki peti ukupno), koji redovito ne boravi neko vrijeme u Hrvatskoj, povremeno navraća u svoje kuće ovdje. To se događa barem jednom, a u prosjeku dva ili tri puta godišnje. Naši nalazi dalje ukazuju, da je sklonost ostanku znatno veća u najmanjim, ruralnim naseljima, pogotovo u odnosu na gradove sa preko 10.000 stanovnika.

Na kraju ukazujemo na uočljivu tendenciju da povratnici relativno češće trajno

ostaju u onim dijelovima Hrvatske koji su tijekom rata bili pod kontrolom srpskih snaga. Kako su to istodobno područja gdje su etnički Srbi činili apsolutnu ili relativnu većinu stanovništva prije rata, možemo zaključiti da je etnička koncentracija jedan od čimbenika trajnoga manjinskog povratka.

Opći je zaključak, da su ovi rezultati istraživanja nesumnjivo potvrdili dosadašnje spoznaje o tome da se stanoviti dio povratnika (shvaćeno naprosto u smislu izbjeglica koji u suprotnom mjeru prijeđu ponovno granicu zemlje porijekla) ne zadržava trajno u mjestima porijekla, da zapravo žive u zemlji izbjeglištva ili odlaze u migraciju negdje drugdje, ili samo povremeno borave na prijavljenim adresama. Je li manje od polovine trajnih povratnika, u registriranom povratničkom korpusu, indikator uspješnosti odnosno održivosti povratka čini se nemoguće odgovoriti na isključivi binaran način – sa da li ne. Ne možemo, naime, znati što bi trebao biti neki apsolutni standard, pa čak bi i usporedba s nekim drugim povratnim procesom bila problematična, jer bi morala vrednovati vrlo različite društveno političke kontekste u kojima se oni odvijaju. 'Mjerimo' li udio trajnih povratnika u odnosu na registrirane ili u odnosu na cijelo izbjegličko tijelo? Računaju li se u to i one izbjeglice koje se, zbog raznih razloga, nikako ne žele vratiti, mada za to ne postoje formalne i sigurnosne prepreke? Je li važan broj povratnika (apsolutan ili relativan) ili njihova stvarna uspješnost u smislu zadovoljavajuće kvalitete života i integracije u lokalnu i širu sredinu? Je li važna njihova socio-ekonomska struktura kao pretpostavka održivosti povratka, ili njihovo subjektivno zadovoljstvo? Iz čije perspektive se 'mjeri' uspješnost povratka? Ako polazimo od samih povratnika – je li za njih bolje da ostanu, pa makar žive loše i sa slabim perspektivama za ekonomsku i socijalnu promociju, odnosno integraciju? Što bismo mi činili i što bismo htjeli u takvoj situaciji? O nekim od tih pitanja raspravljat ćemo dalje u analizi pojedinih čimbenika (ne)uspješnosti povratka.

Uvjetan opći odgovor na temeljno pitanje o održivosti povratka temeljem ovog nalaza mogao bi glasiti: povratak srpskih izbjeglica u Hrvatsku teče, što znači da su za to osigurane barem osnovne pretpostavke. Štoviše, znatan dio izbjeglica ostao je u svojim mjestima i domovima i više godina (neki i desetljeće) nakon povratka, i time je potvrđena djelomična fizička održivost. Očito je, međutim, da postoje važni razlozi zbog čega se znatan dio izbjeglica nije ni pokušao vratiti, a gotovo polovina nije ostala nakon povratka.

Naši nalazi sugeriraju, što smo istaknuli i u raspravi o konceptualnom okviru, potrebu diferenciranog shvaćanja izbjeglica i povratnika, da bi se bolje mogli razumjeti složeni povratnički procesi. Predlažemo, da u izbjegličkom korpusu prvo pokušamo različiti *potencijalne povratnike* od *potencijalnih ne-povratnika*. Uvjereni smo da se u srpskoj izbjegličkoj populaciji (i vjerojatno i u drugima) znatan dio ljudi ne želi i ne namjerava vratiti u zemlju svoga porijekla (da li im i onda ona ostaje domovina – pitat će se socijalni konstrukcionisti), čak i ako se ispune osnovni sigurnosni uvjeti i povratak imovine. Među njima treba dalje razlikovati *političke ne-povratnike* (ili *tvrde*) od *ekonomskih* (ili *mekih*). Naime, za prve, bez obzira jesu li bili prisiljeni na izbjeglištvo ili su imali (više ili manje riskantnu) opciju opstanka, primarni razlozi izbjeglištva jesu političke promjene u domovini, odnosno međuetničke promjene moći. Ako je 70 posto trajnih povratnika (mahom starijih ruralnih ljudi) otvoreno nezadovoljno statusom nacionalne manjine, koliko to tek

znači izbjeglicama (mahom mlađima, obrazovanima, urbanima) koji se nisu ni pokušali vratiti ili su se vratili tek formalno zbog vlasništva, putovnice ili drugih sličnih razloga?! Zato ih označavamo *tvrdim ne-povratnicima.*

Meki ne-nepovratnici dijele slična socio-demografska obilježja s prethodnima, ali im je motivacija ne vraćanja ekonomske naravi odnosno tipično migrantska. Radi se prvenstveno o tome, da se s vremenom provedenim u izbjeglištvu, oni integriraju u novu sredinu, srede svoj obiteljski život, zaposlenje, školovanje djece, i otvore nove perspektive za svoje profesionalno i društveno napredovanje. Kad bi imali stvarnu opciju povratka pod sličnim uvjetima, dobar dio njih bi se na to odlučio, ali za takav povratak još nismo čuli. Zato ih označavamo *mekim*, jer oni ne ostaju u drugoj zemlji (pa makar to bila matična zemlja njihovog etničkog korpusa) zato što to žele, nego zato jer je to racionalno ponašanje, koje bismo vjerojatno i sami slijedili. Ovakva tipologija je važna i zbog referentnog okvira za 'mjerenje' uspješnosti povratka. Ako je ona (više ili manje) opravdana, onda se ni 'idealno-tipski' povratak ne može zamisliti u smislu cjelokupnog obuhvata izbjegličkog korpusa.

Kad je riječ o povratnicima, u širem smislu koji uključuje formalne i stvarne povratnike, predlažemo slijedeću tipologiju povratnika : A) *bezuvjetni trajni*; B) *uvjetni trajni*; C) *polu-povratnici* ili *transgranični* (*transnacionalni*); D) *neformalni povratnici;* E) *formalni* ili *kvazi- povratnici*. Kada govorimo o *bezuvjetnim* povratnicima ne mislimo baš doslovno da će se oni vratiti čak i kada postoji neposredna opasnost za život ili ih zemlja porijekla ne želi pustiti preko granice. Hoćemo reći, da su se ti ljudi spremni vratiti i ostati trajno u svojim domovima, čak i kada se moraju suočiti s teškim životnim uvjetima, čim se otvore mogućnosti za povratak i osiguraju elementarni sigurnosni i egzistencijalni uvjeti (sklonište). Oni će nastojati ostati dok god mogu preživljavati. Tipično to su stariji, neobrazovani i nekvalificirani, ruralni ljudi, koji su loše živjeli (i) u izbjeglištvu, tamo se nisu snašli niti su se mogli osjećati 'kod kuće'. Neki među njima vraćaju se već zato da bi umrli na 'svom kućnom pragu'. Za njih 'dom' u mjestu porijekla ima stvarno i simboličko značenje, i stoga se na njih nikako ne može odnositi postmoderna dekonstrukcija poimanja teritorijalne vezanosti i pripadanja (domu, domovini, etniji, naciji, vjeri). Uostalom, blizu 90 posto naših ispitanika, kao jedan od (najvažnijih) razloga za povratak, navodi osjećaj pripadnosti mjestu i kraju iz kojeg su izbjegli.

Pod *uvjetno trajnim* povratnicima mislimo na ljude koji su se stvarno namjeravali vratiti i nastoje ostati, ali ako ne uspiju riješiti svoja i obiteljska egzistencijalna pitanja na zadovoljavajući način, te ako im se otvori neka bolja migracijska opcija, oni će ju prihvatiti. Njihov ostanak posebno je važan za održivost povratka.

Treću kategoriju povratnika koncipirali smo temeljem novijih transnacionalnih pristupa migracijama i izbjegličko povratničkim kretanjima. Po iskazima naših informatora nekih 6 posto povratnika povremeno borave u Hrvatskoj, a povremeno izvan nje, uglavnom u zemlji izbjeglištva. Njih je najbolje opisati s jedne strane kao *polu-povratnike*, a s druge kao *transgranične* ili *transnacionalne* povratnike, koji dakle, direktno ili osobno povezuju svoja dva 'doma', a moguće je da se neki članovi njihovih obitelji nalaze i na nekom trećem mjestu i da također održavaju vezu s 'prvim'. Njima treba posredno dodati

i sve one, iz prvih dviju kategorija, čiji su članovi (užih) obitelji u izbjeglištvu ili migracijama, i ekonomski pomažu održivost povratka onih koji su se vratili, osiguravajući i sebi takvu opciju u povoljnom trenutku. Njihovu demografsku strukturu nismo uspjeli snimiti, jer su nam bili nedostupni, ali pretpostavljamo da je po tome bliža našoj drugoj (B) kategoriji nego prvoj (A), ali šira.

Četvrti tip su stvarni povratnici koji zbog nekih razloga nisu formalno registrirani. Mi, primjerice, nismo uspjeli dobiti podatke o svim članovima nekih kućanstava iz našeg uzorka. Pretpostavljamo da među njima, barem dio, posebno mlađih članova, nije registriran jer su se vratili kasnije a nisu nositelji nikakvih vlasničkih prava, pa im registracija nije bila potrebna. Osim toga, nepoznati broj povratnika mogao se je vratiti svjesno izbjegavajući službenu povratničku registraciju. Među njima bi se mogli naći članovi etnički miješanih porodica ali i drugih, koje (dijelom) nisu bile u izbjeglištvu. Neki možda ne žele javno biti 'obilježeni' kao povratnici. Takav tip vjerojatno se diferencira na uvjetno trajne i transgranične povratnike. Daljnja je pretpostavka da se neki nisu prijavili kao povratnici jer nisu znali da mogu i kako to trebaju učiniti, ili im prijava nije trebala (povratnički status, naime, traje 6 mjeseci i donosi pravo na primarnu zdravstvenu zaštitu i povratničku naknadu od 250 do 500 HRK).

Napokon, kao što smo pretpostavljali, znatan dio registriranih povratnika, zapravo su *formalni* ili *kvazi* povratnici. Oni se, naime, vraćaju ne da bi ostali, nego da bi povratili imovinu i potom ju prodali ili iznajmili, te dobili potrebne dokumente za ostvarivanje povratničkih i drugih prava. Za pretpostaviti je da se ti 'povratnici' regrutiraju dijelom iz *političkih*, a dijelom iz *ekonomskih* ne-povratnika. Ipak, dio njih, koji zadržavaju imovinu ovdje, ostavlja opciju mogućega povratka otvorenom, i ovisno o okolnostima mogli bi ju i ostvariti. Njima bi se, po našem sudu, pridružio veliki dio i onih koji bi ostvarili povratak stanarskih prava.

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SUMMARY

RETURN DURABILITY AS A PHYSICAL AND SYNTHETICAL INDICATOR OF SUSTAINABILITY. EXAPLE OF THE SERB RETURNEES IN CROATIA

Milan Mesić i Dragan Bagić

Traditional understanding of refugee return as one-time and a definite act has recently been vigorously criticized by the theoreticians and researchers in refugee studies. It seems that in a short period of time opinion prevailed that return is always a complex long-term and diversified process, which in each of its phases can become reversible. Filed researches already 'revealed' that many returnees do not stay actually in their places and homeland of origin but re-emigrate. This finding has lead to conclusion that simple crossing of boarder in opposite direction is not the real indicator of return. Instead, it should be successful

i.e. sustainable. The most common 'measure' of sustainability is absence of repeated migration. The authors have conceptualized and operacionalized seven aspects of return sustainability: I. the extent of return durability; II. feeling of safety; III. socio-demographic characteristics of returnees; IV. socio-economic conditions; V. refugee experience and orientation towards return; VI. citizenship and minority rights; VII. subjective perception of living conditions. Here are only findings relating to the first dimension presented and discussed, accompanied by the returnee typology proposed by the authors, in order to better understand complexity of return movements. They differentiate the following types of returnees: A) unconditional permanent; B) conditional permanent; C) semi-returnees or transnational; D) non-formal; E) formal or quasi-returnees.

»RUTO SI VSAK RAZLAGA PO SVOJE«: POKRIVANJE MED SLOVENSKIMI BOŠNJAKINJAMI

Špela KALČIĆ[1]

IZVLEČEK

»Ruto si vsak razlaga po svoje«: pokrivanje med slovenskimi Bošnjakinjami

Članek temelji na podrobnih terenskih raziskavah, ki sem jih opravila med letoma 2003 in 2006 na Jesenicah. Obravnava prakse pokrivanja med slovenskimi muslimankami, bolj natančno med Bošnjakinjami. Opisuje konkretne prakse pokrivanja, analizira koranske ajete in hadise, ki služijo kot verska osnova pokrivanja, predstavi njihove najbolj razširjene interpretacije med islamskimi intelektualci in raziskovalci, nazadnje pa se posveti še bošnjaškim interpretacijam primarnih islamskih virov in njihovim konkretnim udejanjanjem v praksi. Interpretacije koranskih ajetov in hadisov, na katerih se utemeljuje pokrivanje, so precej raznolike in se v različnih okoljih manifestirajo skozi zelo različne materialne oblike in prakse. Za prakse pokrivanja je bolj kot so sami islamski viri, torej tekst, pomembno njihovo razumevanje, na slednjega pa vplivajo različni dejavniki: kako vsak posameznik razume islam, njegova izobrazba, osebnost ter okolje, v katerem se te interpretacije odvijajo. Enako velja tudi za slovenske muslimanke, Bošnjakinje.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: pokrivanje, islam, Bošnjakinje, hidžab, Koran,

ABSTRACT

»Each Person Explains Veil in His Own Way«: Veiling among Slovenian Bosniaks

The article is based on the detailed fieldwork that I conducted between 2003 and 2006 in Jesenice. It is exploring the practices of covering among Slovenian Muslim women, specifically Bosniaks. It describes concrete practices of covering, analyses Koran ayat and hadith, religious foundations for covering, presents the most widespread interpretations by Islamic intellectuals and researchers, and lastly turns attention to Bosniak interpretations of primary Islamic sources and their concrete implementation in practice. Interpretations of Koran ayat and hadith in which the covering is justified, are various and are in different environments manifested through very different material shapes and practices. Different understandings of the practice of covering are influenced by factors such as individual's interpretations of Islam, education, personality and environment in which those interpretations take place, and is more important than Islamic sources, i.e. the text. The same is relevant for Slovenian Muslim women, the Bosniaks.

KEY WORDS: veiling, Islam, women Bosniaks, hijab, Koran

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Špela Kalčić

PRAKSE POKRIVANJA

V Sloveniji predstavlja pokrivanje[2] med Bošnjakinjami nov in razmeroma redek pojav. V primerjavi z drugimi evropskimi državami, kjer je praksa pokrivanja bolj razširjena in tako tudi bolj očitna, pokrite muslimanke na ulicah slovenskih mest ostajajo skorajda neopazne. Število pokritih muslimank se giblje v desetinah. Ahmed Pašić je ocenil, da naj bi bilo v Sloveniji približno 30 pokritih muslimank. Po mojih ocenah med Bošnjakinjami, ki so pokrite, živi danes v Ljubljani okoli 20 žensk, na Jesenicah pa se je po navedbah informatork od leta 1995, ko naj bi se pokrila prva Bošnjakinja, pokrilo 17 žensk. V času mojega bivanja na Jesenicah jih je bilo prisotnih šest, medtem ko so bile ostale zaradi različnih razlogov (sprememba kraja bivanja zaradi poroke, trajne ali začasne selitve drugam, študij ipd.) odsotne. Poleg tega sem se srečevala tudi s pokritimi ženskami, ki so prihajale na obiske v *džemat* (arabsko: *ğamā'a*, skupnost vernikov)[3] ob različnih verskih prireditvah. Te so bile iz Ljubljane, Kočevja, Tržiča, Trbovelj pa tudi iz Bosne in Avstrije. Bošnjakinje izraz pokrita uporabljajo, kadar želijo povedati, da so pokrite vedno, kot to po njihovih interpretacijah nalaga vera. To pomeni, da z oblačili pokrijejo glavo z izjemo obraza, vrat in celotno telo razen dlani.

Velika večina Bošnjakinj, ki islam sicer praticira, pa je pokritih le občasno in islamskim zapovedim o oblačenju ne sledi dosledno, torej v vseh situacijah, ko naj bi bile pokrite. Pokrijejo se le v času molitve, ki jo opravljajo doma ali v *mesdžidu* (arabsko: *masğid*, muslimansko svetišče).[4] Ruto si nadenejo že pred odhodom od doma ali šele pred vstopom v *mesdžid*. Islamski predpisi namreč zahtevajo od žensk, da so pokrite v času molitve in ko se nahajajo v *džamiji* ali kakem drugem svetem prostoru, kot sta na primer *mesdžid* ali *džamija*. Tako so na primer tudi deklice med veroukom, ki se odvija v *mesdžidu*, pokrite, čeprav ni nujno, da se takrat učijo moliti.

Poleg pokrivanja v času molitve se nekatere Bošnjakinje, ki sicer niso pokrite, pokrivajo tudi ob različnih verskih priložnostih. V času mojega druženja z njimi so bile mnoge pokrite med 4. tradicionalnim druženjem muslimanov Slovenije,[5] pokrivale so se

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[2] V pričujočem tekstu ločujem med »pokrivali« in »zakrivali« oziroma med praksami »pokrivanja« in »zakrivanja«. Izraz »zakrivanje« oziroma »zakrivalo« se v slovenskem jeziku uporablja predvsem v zvezi s praksami zakrivanja obraza (gl. npr. geslo »zakriti« ali »zakrivanje« v SSKJ 1994). Ker v tekstu razpravljam o različnih vrstah oblačil in načinih oblačenja, pri katerih ne gre vedno za zakrivanje obraza, raje uporabljam bolj generičen in vrednostno nevtralen izraz »pokrivanje«, oziroma »pokrivalo«. Izraz »zakrivalo« oziroma »zakrivanje« uporabljam le, kadar želim eksplicitno povedati, da gre za zakrivanje obraza.

[3] V Sloveniji tudi poimenovanje za lokalno podružnico Islamske skupnosti.

[4] Etimološka različica besede *masgveda* v natabejščini in sirščini pomeni kraj prosternacije, kjer človek v znak pozdrava poklekne in se s čelom dotakne tal (prim. Delcambre 1994[1987]: 66). V Bosni se beseda *mesdžid* uporablja za vsako manjšo islamsko molilnico. V srbohrvaščini se je preko turščine uveljavil etimološki derivat te arabske besede v jezikovni podobi *džamija* (prim. Smailagić 1990: 137), medtem ko je v slovenščini bolj uveljavljen izraz *mošeja*.

[5] Program srečanja je vključeval piknik na Poljanah v okolici Jesenic in različna predavanja v jeseniškem *mesdžidu* ter v prostorih Kulturnega društva Biser med 25. in 27. 6. 2004.

ob porokah, kjer se je obred pred matičarjem nadaljeval še s *šeriatsko* poroko pred *hodžo* (turško: *hoca*, islamski »duhovnik«)[6]v *mesdžidu*, pokrite so bile, kadar so nastopale ali prisostvovale nastopom pevskih zborov *ilahij* (bosansko: pesem z nabožno vsebino) in *kasid* (arabsko: *qasida*, arabska oda) v *mesdžidu*, v prostorih Kulturnega društva Biser na Jesenicah ali v Kulturnem domu Španski borci v Ljubljani.[7] Ravno tako so se pokrivale, kadar so predavale o islamu in muslimanih ali pa takim predavanjem prisostvovale. V času *ramadana* (arabsko: *ramadān*, 9. mesec islamskega koledarja)[8] imajo Bošnjaki navado, da na *iftarje*[9] povabijo prijatelje in tudi ob teh priložnostih so bile tako gostiteljice kot tudi gostje pogosto pokrite. Pokrite so bile še ob izvajanju *mevluda* (arabsko: *mawlūd*),[10] ali *tevhida* (arabsko: *tawhīd*, monoteizem)[11] na domu. Sama sicer nisem prisostvovala nobenemu obredu obrezovanja moških potomcev (bosansko: *sunečenje*), vendar sem izvedela, da se ženske pokrijejo tudi ob tej priložnosti.

Bošnjakinje takšne občasne prakse pokrivanja utemeljujejo z dejstvom, da se ob takih priložnostih opravlja tudi molitev, med katero morajo biti muslimanke tudi sicer pokrite. To vsekakor drži v primeru srečanja muslimanov, ki je potekalo cel dan, v katerega sta sovpadli dnevni molitvi *podne* in *ikindija* ter večerna molitev, *akšam*.[12] Ravno tako se moli v primeru *šeriatske* poroke, ki praviloma poteka v *mesdžidu*, lahko pa tudi na nevestinem domu. V primeru *šeriatskih* porok, ki se nadaljujejo s svatbo, potek slednje tudi sicer sovpada s časom nekaterih dnevnih molitev. Pred *iftarjem*, ki se prične po sončnem zahodu, se ravno tako opravlja večerna molitev, *akšam*, prav tako pa se moli tudi med obredom *sunečenja, tevhida* in *mevluda*. V primeru predavanj z versko vsebino ter poslušanja *ilahij* in *kasid,* ki so pesmi z nabožno vsebino, so ženske svoje pokrivanje utemeljevale

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[6] Beseda nima jasne etimologije. V osmanski turščini pomeni pisar, tajnik, uradnik, učenjak, profesor ali zasebni učitelj. Bošnjaki oznako uporabljajo za naslavljanje svojih »duhovnikov«.

[7] Ob teh priložnostih so bile pokrite tudi same nastopajoče.

[8] Muslimanski sveti mesec posta.

[9] *Iftar* predstavlja skupni obed, ki ob koncu dneva prekine post v času svetega meseca *ramadana*.

[10] Kolektivni obredi, ki so običajno organizirani v čast preroku in njegovemu rojstvu, ali dogodki, povezani z religioznim ali družinskim življenjem (inavguracija *mošeje*, vselitev v novo hišo oz. stanovanje, *šeriatska* poroka, obrezovanje moških potomcev, *sunečenje* ipd.).

[11] *Tevhid* se je kot ritual v Bosni pojavil v sedemdesetih letih. Razvil se je v specifično bosanski ritual, obred skupne molitve, ki se ga navadno organizira v počastitev umrlega. Nekateri avtorji omenjajo tudi vrsto *tevhida,* ki ga ljudje organizirajo v znak slavljenja življenja (npr. ob priliki poroke ali obrezovanja dečkov, *sunečenja* ipd.), vendar iz mojih opazovanj na Jesenicah ljudje taka praznovanja običajno imenujejo *mevlud*. *Tevhid* najverjetneje izvira iz prakse in obredov derviševm, v katerih se ljudje zberejo v krog in izgovarjajo religiozne reke ali 99 božjih imen. Kot navajajo različni avtorji, se je v Bosni *tevhid* običajno odvijal po domovih, toda na Jesenicah, kjer večina muslimanov živi v majhnih stanovanjih, ta največkrat poteka v *mesdžidu* (prim. Bringa 1997: 198–206, prim. tudi Škaljić 1985 in Softić 1984).

[12] Islamski nauk predpisuje pet dnevnih molitev (arabsko: *salāt*, iz turščine: *namaz*), *sabah-namaz* (tik pred jutranjo zoro), *podne-namaz* (ko je sonce v zenitu), *ikindija-namaz* (ko sonce opravi tri četrtine svoje dnevne poti na zahod), *akšam-namaz* (tik preden sončnim zahodom) in *jacija-namaz* (ko se znoči). Bošnjaki so poimenovanja za posamezne molitve prevzeli od Osmanov. Poimenovanja imajo torej svoj etimološki izvor v turščini. Arabska poimenovanja za molitve (arabsko: *salatu-l-fadjr, salatu-l-zuhr, salatu-l-asr, salatu-l-magrib, salatu-l-isha*) niso v rabi.

s prisotnostjo Korana, verskih tekstov oziroma verskih vsebin, zaradi česar naj bi se pokrivale iz spoštovanja do boga. Vendar, kot sem opazila, so predvsem mlajše ženske, ki sicer niso pokrite, pogosto ostale pokrite tudi potem, ko so bile verske ceremonije ali rituali že končani. Dobila sem občutek, da so različni dogodki, ki povežejo muslimane med seboj, na sploh priložnost, ko se lahko ženske, ki se sicer ne pokrivajo, pokrijejo. Tako mi je Elmedina,[13] študentka kemije, ki sem jo spoznala na *iftarju*, na katerega sem bila povabljena, povedala, da se trudi biti pokrita, kadar se le da in ne le v času molitve. Ob tisti priložnosti se je na Jesenice iz Škofje Loke pripeljala že pokrita in ruto obdržala vse do vrnitve domov.

Za nekatere ženske občasno pokrivanje predstavlja obdobje pred dokončnim pokritjem in ga tako prakticirajo, kadar menijo, da imajo za to priložnost. Tako se na primer Šejla, ki je študentka ekonomije v Ljubljani, pokriva vedno, kadar je na Jesenicah, medtem ko v Ljubljani, kjer študira, ni pokrita zaradi prepričanja, da bi takšno oblačenje zaradi razširjenih predsodkov do pokritih muslimank zanjo v vsakdanjem življenju predstavljalo prevelike težave. Kljub temu pa je prav v vseh situacijah vedno oblečena v dolga, ohlapna in neprosojna oblačila, ki pokrivajo telo v skladu z islamskimi predpisi. Zejna je prišla v Slovenijo kot begunka med vojno v Bosni, se tu poročila in ostala ter ima danes slovensko državljanstvo. Pokrita je bila na pikniku in na vseh muslimanskih porokah, na katerih sva se srečali. Tudi ona pazi, da je v javnosti vedno oblečena v oblačila, ki zakrivajo njeno telo, in si nasploh želi, da bi nekoč imela možnost in se pokrila. Takšno odločitev ji zaenkrat preprečuje strah pred izgubo službe v vrtnariji, kjer je zaposlena, saj bi slednje lahko ogrozilo eksistenco njene družine.

Sicer pa je potrebno povedati tudi, da stalno pokrite ženske niso venomer tako oblečene, temveč le, ko je to obvezno. Pokrivajo se v javnosti, medtem ko so doma pokrite le pred tujci in moškimi, ki jim niso v sorodu. V ožjem družinskem krogu, pred prijateljicami in nasploh ženskami so sicer odkrite in pogosto nosijo povsem običajna oblačila, kot so npr. kavbojke, majice s kratkimi ali dolgimi rokavi, krila, mini krila, hlače, kratke hlače, trenirke ipd.

MATERIALNA PODOBA

Ženske, ki so pokrite ali se pokrivajo občasno in ne samo med molitvijo, so praviloma stare od dvajset do štirideset let, med njimi pa sem spoznala tudi nekaj srednješolk in dve starejši gospe, eno v zgodnjih petdesetih, drugo pa staro okoli šestdeset let. Večinoma so potomke priseljencev iz Bosne in Hercegovine, v manjši meri tudi iz Črne gore, nekatere pa so prišle v Slovenijo kot begunke ali v času jugoslovanskih ekonomskih migracij. Med njimi sem spoznala tudi Slovenko, ki je prestopila v islam potem, ko se je začel zanj aktivno zanimati njen sedanji partner, ki je sicer Bošnjak. Moje sogovornice so imele osnovnošolsko, srednješolsko, poklicno ali univerzitetno izobrazbo.

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[13] Imena vseh informatork/jev so spremenjena.

Med ženskami, ki so stalno pokrite, prevladujejo tiste, ki so stare od dvajset do štiri-
deset let. Večina stalno pokritih pa se je pokrila v zadnjih petih letih. Ženske, s katerimi
sem se družila, so bile pokrite od nekaj mesecev do petih let. Odločitev za pokrivanje je bila
pri vseh individualna in večina jih je bila iz družin, kjer razen njih ni bila pokrita nobena
druga ženska. Prav tako večina njihovih mater, pogosto pa tudi babic v Bosni, nikoli ni bila
pokrita. Pokrivanje je med Bošnjakinjami precej raznoliko. Lahko se odločijo za ruto, ki ji
rečejo ruta, marama ali mahrama. Prepognjeno na polovico jo na glavo namestijo tako, da jo
potisnejo nekoliko naprej na čelo, da pokrije vse lase. Ponavadi jo znajo umetelno zavezati
okoli glave in vratu, pri tem pa si lahko pomagajo tudi z bucikami ali različnimi okrasnimi
broškami. Pod ruto lahko nosijo manjšo ruto ali tanko, na čelu pogosto dekorirano kapico.
Ta pokriva čelni del in gleda izpod večje rute, s katero je ponavadi tudi barvno in vzorčno
usklajena. Namesto rute se lahko odločijo tudi za šal, ki ga na različne načine zavijejo okoli
glave, pri čemer ponavadi poleg las in vratu pokrijejo tudi oprsje in ramena. V kombinaciji z
ruto ali šalom se oblačijo v dolga, ohlapna in neprosojna oblačila, kot so hlače, krila, daljše
bluze, tunike, puloverji, jope, majice ipd. in se jih dobi v slovenskih trgovinah. Mnoge si
obleke šivajo same ali pa jih dajo sešiti. Tako se ob priložnostih, kot je na primer poroka,
s tem namenom obdarijo z različnim blagom. Veliko oblačil kupujejo v tujini, predvsem
v trgovinah z oblačili za pokrite ženske v bližnji Bosni in Hercegovini, kamor tudi sicer
pogosto potujejo na obisk k sorodnikom ali prijateljem. Oblačila kupujejo tudi v Avstriji,
Turčiji in v arabskih državah, kot so Jordanija, Katar, Arabski emirati, Savdska Arabija
ipd. Veliko oblačil, ki so na voljo v bosanskih specializiranih butikih, naj bi bilo uvoženih
ravno iz teh držav. Ženskam oblačila prinašajo tudi prijatelji in sorodniki, ki v teh državah
živijo ali jih obiščejo, v dar pa jim jih prinesejo tudi *hadžije*,[14] ko se vrnejo z romanja v
Meko. Rabljene obleke se pogosto podarjajo naprej, ob različnih srečanjih muslimanov pa
jih nekatere ženske z zvezami v teh državah tudi prodajajo.

Razloge za nakupovanje oblačil predvsem v tujini predstavlja dejstvo, da na slo-
venskem tržišču kljub vsemu ni dovolj velike izbire, ki bi zadovoljila osebni okus po-
kritih muslimank. Poleg tega so oblačila iz Bosne in z Bližnjega vzhoda pogosto tudi
cenejša. Posledica nabavljanja oblačil v tujini se kaže predvsem v tem, da slednje vpliva
na materialno podobo oblačenja stalno ali občasno pokritih, ki se od tradicionalnega
pokrivanja pri Bošnjakinjah precej razlikuje. Takšno odstopanje je še najbolj očitno v
primerih, ko ženske nosijo oblačila, ki jih imenujejo *džilbab* (arabsko: *al-jilbab*).[15] To
so dolge ohlapne obleke, značilne predvsem za nošnjo žensk v arabskih državah. Barve
in vzorci, ki jih izbirajo za svoja oblačila, so odraz njihovega osebnega okusa, pogosto
pa so manj živahne ali pisane, kot so jih navajeni bosanski muslimani, kjer so temne

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[14] *Hadžija* je naziv, ki ga dobi moški potem, ko opravi *hadž*, romanje v Meko. Žensko, ki je opravila
hadž, imenujejo *hadžinica*.

[15] Fatima Mernissi ob brskanju po slovarjih z namenom, da bi ugotovila pravi pomen besede *džilbab*,
pove, da slovar Lisan al-'Arab *džilbab* opredeli kot generično poimenovanje za različne vrste obla-
čil: srajce, plašče ipd. V omenjenem slovarju je *džilbab* med drugim definiran kot velik kos tkanine,
ki ga nosi ženska, ali pa kot kos tkanine, s katero si ženska pokrije glavo in oprsje (prim. Mernissi
1991: 180–181).

barve, kot npr. črna, siva, temno modra, tradicionalno omejene na krščansko populacijo. Starejše ženske, ki se skoraj praviloma pokrijejo le ob času molitve, ob obisku *mesdži-da* ali ob verskih ceremonijah po domovih, kot so *iftar*, *sunečenje*, *mevlud* in *tevhid*, se namreč držijo tradicionalno svetlih, živopisanih tkanin, značilnih za nošnjo bosanskih muslimank, in se temnim barvam izogibajo. Te ženske ponavadi nosijo dolga pisana ali svetla enobarvna krila, *dimije* (turško: *dimi*, široke, nabrane, krilu podobne hlače), blu-ze, jopice in telovnike. Pokrivajo se z rutami, ki veljajo za tradicionalno bosanske, kot so *šamija*, tanka bombažna ruta s cvetličnim vzorcem, *kerana šamija*, bombažna ruta s cvetlično poslikavo, obrobljena s kvačkano čipko, ali velika enobarvna štirioglata ruta, ki jo imenujejo *namazbez ma(h)rama*. *Dimije* med Bošnjakinjami danes veljajo za tipično oblačilo bosanskih muslimank. To ne drži povsem, saj etnografska evidenca za Bosno 19. in prve polovice 20. stoletja kaže, da so *dimije* nosile tudi katoličanke, pravoslavke in Judinje (gl. Beljkašić-Hadžidedić 1987, 1999). Res pa je, da so se *dimije* na bosanskem podeželju vse do danes ohranile le med muslimankami, medtem ko jih pravoslavke in katoličanke ne nosijo več (prim. Bringa 1997: 65; Sorabji 1989: 36, 46). Na Jesenicah jih nosijo izključno starejše ženske, pa še te zelo redko. Mnoge med njimi navajajo, da je to oblačilo, ki ga v Bosni nosijo starejše ženske po vaseh, medtem ko jih mladi in v mestih že dolgo ne sprejemajo več za svoje. Mlajša dekleta na Jesenicah tako *dimij* praviloma ne nosijo, saj jih imajo za nekaj kmečkega in zaostalega.

Bošnjakinje, ki so se pokrile ali se pokrivajo občasno, se torej pokrivajo drugače od večine, predvsem starejših žensk, ki to počnejo samo, kadar se pokrijejo za obred molitve ali kakšno drugo ceremonijo, ker tako nalaga vera. Ženske, ki so vedno pokrite, in tudi mnoge, ki se pokrivajo občasno, svoj način oblačenja imenujejo *hidžab*.[16] Ta izraz razumejo kot način oblačenja, pri katerem so v skladu z islamskimi predpisi pokriti vsi deli telesa razen dlani in obraza. Izraz izvira iz Korana in danes predstavlja temeljni koncept oblače-nja muslimank po svetu. Izraza ni mogoče zaslediti v etnografski evidenci oblačil Bosne v 19. in prvi polovici 20. stoletja, kjer je sicer mogoče zaslediti številne izraze arabskega izvora, ki so se preko turščine uveljavili tudi v bosanskem jeziku (prim. Beljkašić-Ha-džidedić 1987, 1990, 1999). Ravno tako izraza ne pozna večina starejših Bošnjakinj, ki sem jih srečevala ob različnih verskih dogodkih, kot tudi ne večina ostalih Bošnjakov in Bošnjakinj, ki so predvsem nominalni muslimani in verske obrede izvajajo le občasno.

VERSKO ZNANJE

Bošnjakinje so kot najpomembnejši razlog za pokrivanje navajale dejstvo, da slednje predstavlja versko dolžnost oz. *farz* (arabsko: *fard*).[17] Še preden so se pokrile, so pogosto

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[16] *Hidžab* izhaja iz istega korena (*h-j-b*) kot glagol *hajaba*, kar pomeni zastreti, prikriti, zakriti, ločiti, osamiti, oblikovati ločnico. Beseda med drugim označuje tudi način sodobnega pokrivanja musli-mank, ogrinjalo, zaveso, zastor, zagrinjalo in pregrado (El Guindi 1999: 157).

[17] V hanafitski islamski pravni šoli je sedem kategorij, ki početje ljudi opredeljuje glede na to, kaj mo-rajo, kaj smejo in česa ne smejo početi. *Farz* predstavlja dejanja, ki so obvezna, *haram* pa tista, ki

razmišljale o tem, predvsem pa so se aktivno seznanjale z islamom, da so brale versko literaturo v bosanskem jeziku, katere je, kot so mi povedali različni informatorji, po vojni kar naenkrat v izobilju. Svoje začetke zanimanja za islam so povezovale s prihodom beguncev na Jesenice na začetku vojne v Bosni. Med begunci naj bi bili namreč tudi versko izobraženi posamezniki, ki so takrat *v mesdžidu* pričeli voditi verske dejavnosti, poleg tega pa so takrat pričele prihajati iz Bosne na Jesenice tudi različne knjige, iz katerih so se mnogi Bošnjaki, predvsem mlajše generacije, začeli aktiveje informirati o islamu. Same tako pokrivanje pojasnjujejo z verskim znanjem, kakršnega naj večina njihovih staršev, ki se je versko izobrazila na bosanskem podeželju, od koder jih največ prihaja, ne bi imela. Ti naj bi znanje o islamu pridobili predvsem od sorodnikov, staršev in starih staršev ter v lokalnih podeželskih *mektebih* (arabsko: *maktab*, koranska šola, islamski verouk), kjer naj bi se predvsem osnovnih islamskih praks, izvajanja ritualov, naučili z ustnim izročilom in ne s samostojnim študijem primarnih islamskih virov. Tako pa naj ne bi pridobili poglobljenega razumevanja teh praks in islama nasploh. Ravno zaradi tega izobraževanja naj bi bilo med pokritimi ženskami več mlajših, saj se predvsem slednje izobražujejo na tem področju.

Nadina in Selma sta mi, obe pokriti in v zgodnjih tridesetih, ob druženju na srečanju muslimanov pojasnili, da sta se za to, da se pokrijeta, odločili zaradi prebiranja verske literature:

Tako Nadina kot Selma se strinjata, da je stopnja verovanja odvisna od strahu, ki ga nosiš v sebi. Pred vojno naj ne bi bilo prevodov Korana. Vsaj oni naj ga doma ne bi imeli. Selmin oče je npr. znal veliko sur, vendar ni vedel, kaj pomenijo, in se zaradi tega tudi ni bal. Selma je povedala, da jo je potem, ko je prebrala knjižico o hidžabu, postalo strah, kako zelo greši, enako pa naj bi bilo tudi z drugimi stvarmi v islamu. Bolj ko se bojiš, bolj naj bi se pokoraval Bogu. Rekla je, da so imeli včasih le Koran in Takvim, sedaj, ko so na razpolago knjige, pa šele skozi branje slednjih spoznaš in sprejmeš islam in se bojiš. Bolj ko bereš, bolj se bojiš. Nadina je v našem pogovoru tako dodala: »Pokrivene smo, jer slušamo Alahovu naredbu.« (Terenski zapiski, Jesenice, 26. 4. 2004)

Selma je pripovedovala o tanki žepni knjižici z naslovom Pismo sestri i majci (gl. Kudić 1993), ki jo je med vojno sponzorirala Savdska organizacija Al Haramain Islamic Foundation in jo kot brezplačni primerek delila med Bošnjake v Bosni, ta pa je, kot se zdi, dosegla tudi Jesenice, saj jo imajo shranjeno v knjižnici lokalnega *mesdžida*. V njej je seveda interpretacijski vložek avtorice Mirsade-Merjeme Kudić, ki te verske odlomke razlaga na precej strog način, skratka, nespoštovanje te odredbe označuje za grešno. Med islamsko *ulemo* (arabsko: *ulamā*, islamski intelektualci) po svetu in tudi med raziskovalci, ki se ukvarjajo z islamom, pa obstajajo zelo različne interpretacije teh zapovedi in številnih drugih vprašanj, ki zadevajo udejanjenje islama v praksi.

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so prepovedana. Med obema skrajnima določiloma so dejanja razvrščena glede na vmesne stopnje zaželenega in dovoljenega. (Bringa 1997: 160).

Špela Kalčić

KORAN IN HADISI O POKRIVANJU

Pokrivanje muslimank temelji na primarnih islamskih virih, na Koranu (arabsko: *al-Qur'ān*)[18] in *hadisih* (arabsko: *hadīt*, prenos, tradicija).[19] Načeloma velja, da predstavlja *farz* oziroma neizpodbitno versko obvezo.[20] Med različnimi interpretacijami pokrivanja je najbolj razširjena tista, ki pod pokrivanjem razume pokrivanje las in vratu, ne pa tudi obraza. Pri tem naj bi bile muslimanke pokrite z ohlapno in neprosojno tkanino, ki pokrije vse dele telesa razen obraza in dlani. Nekateri interpretatorji Korana in *hadisov* so mnenja, da naj bi bilo obvezno tudi zakrivanje obraza, spet druge, sicer redkejše interpretacije, pa zatrjujejo celo, da pokrivanje sploh ne predstavlja verske obveze. Ključni pojmi, ki se pojavijo v Koranu v zvezi z oblačenjem muslimank, so *hidžab, džilbab* in *himar*[21]. Osrednji vir predstavlja Koran, iz katerega se kot temelj pokrivanja najpogosteje navajajo 31. *ajet* 24. *sure* ter 53. in 59. *ajet* 33. *sure*. Koranski *ajeti* (ed. *ajet*; arabsko: *āya*, dokaz, koranski verz) so v različnih družbah po svetu deležni različnih interpretacij, prav tako pa so jih v različnih obdobjih različno interpretirale različne verske avtoritete.

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[18] Slovesno ustno razglašanje pred publiko (Delcambre 1994[1987]: 42). »Beseda Koran izvira iz besed, ki pomenijo hkrati 'recitirati' in 'brati'.« (El Guindi 1999: 198) Prva Alahova objava (l.610) božjemu poslancu Mohamedu je bila *iqre*, kar pomeni recitiraj (Mernissi 1991: 28). Koran je torej sveta knjiga muslimanov, ki temelji na božjih razodetjih božjemu poslancu Mohamedu. Ta jih je z memoriziranjem na pamet ponavljal svojim sodobnikom. Koran je sestavljen iz *sur*, ki se naprej delijo na različno dolge *ajete* oziroma odlomke. Mohamed je objave dobival v obliki *ajetev*, ki so mu bili preko angela Gabriela posredovani ob različnih priložnostih. Ob eni priložnosti je bilo lahko razodetih tudi po več *ajetov* hkrati. Ker je bil Mohamed nepismen, so ta razodetja zabeležili njegovi sodobniki. Zapisovali so jih na različne podlage, odvisno pač od okoliščin in razpoložljivega materiala, največkrat pa je bilo to usnje, kost ali kamen. Zapisi so bili šele kasneje zbrani in sestavljeni v tisto, čemur danes rečemo Koran (El Guindi 1999: 198). Sure se delijo na tiste, ki so bile razodete v Meki (l.610–l.622), in tiste, ki so bile razodete v Medini (l.622–l.632), vendar pa v Koranu niso zbrane po kronološkem zaporedju, po katerem so bile razodete. Sure, ki so bile razodete v Meki, govorijo predvsem o osnovnih islamskih načelih in dolžnostih, ki naj bi se jim podrejali muslimani, medtem ko tiste iz Medine obravnavajo predvsem tematiko, povezano s konkretnimi težavami in dilemami, s katerimi se je soočala zgodnja muslimanska skupnost ob svojem formiranju (Mernissi 1991: 29).

[19] *Hadisi* so zbirke izrekov in dejanj iz življenja preroka Mohameda in njegovih slednikov, ki predstavljajo temelj *sune*. Med *ulemo* (islamski intelektualci) se je razvila bogata in elaborirana znanost o *hadisih* z namenom preverjanja njihove verodostojnosti. Pri vsakem *hadisu* se preverja, kdo izmed Mohamedovih sodobnikov, ki je bil priča določenemu izreku ali dejanju, ga je izrekel ter v kakšnih okoliščinah. Poleg tega se z namenom preverjanja njihove zanesljivosti in avtentičnosti preverja tudi niz ljudi, ki so ga prenašali dalje, saj so bili *hadisi* zbrani šele po smrti preroka Mohameda. Med prenašalci *hadisov* je mnogo žensk, zbirali in razlagali pa so jih izključno moški. Zbrani so v istoimenskih knjigah (*Hadisi*), ki so naslovljene z imeni njihovih zbiralcev in razlagalcev. Priznanih je devet zbirk, ki tematsko obravnavajo različne vidike življenja muslimanov po Mohamedovem zgledu, med njimi pa kot najbolj zanesljivi veljata *Sahih Muslim* in *Sahih al-Buhari* (arabsko: *sahih*, avtentično, verodostojno; Al Bukhari in Muslim: imena avtorjev zbirk; prim. El Guindi 1999: 198 in Mernissi 1991: 3).

[20] Med različnimi sunitskimi pravnimi šolami obstaja konsenz o pokrivanju (glave) kot obvezen.

[21] Oblačilo, ki služi za pokrivanje glave, vratu in ramen ter pri tem pušča obraz odkrit.

Najbolj pogosto navajan *ajet*, ki obravnava pokrivanje ženskega telesa, je 31. *ajet* 24. *sure,*[22] imenovane *An-Nur* oz. Svetloba:[23]

> In reci vernicam, naj svoje poglede spustijo,
> in naj svoja sramna mesta[24] čuvajo
> in naj svojih okrasov ne kažejo, razen kar je zunanjega
> in naj svoja zagrinjala[25] spustijo niz prsi[26] svojih
> in naj svojih okrasov drugim ne kažejo,
> razen možem svojim
> ali očetom svojim ali očetom možev svojih ali sinovom svojim
> ali sinovom možev svojih ali bratom svojim
> ali sinovom bratov svojih
> ali sinovom sester svojih ali prijateljicam svojim
> ali onim, ki jih njih desnica poseduje,
> ali moškim, ki jim ženske niso potrebne,
> ali otrokom, ki še ženske golote ne vidijo!
> In naj ne udarjajo z nogami svojimi,
> da bi se za nakit, ki ga pokrivajo, vedelo!
> In Alahu se vsi pokesajte, verniki, da bi uspeh imeli.

Predhodni, 30. *ajet*, ki nagovarja tudi moške (El Guindi 1999: 154), pa se glasi:

> Ti reci vernikom, naj svoje poglede spustijo
> in naj svoja sramna mesta [genitalije – op. Š.K.] čuvajo, kar je za njih bolj čednostno!
> Alah res vse ve, kar oni počnejo!

El Guindijeva izpostavi, da ta ne govori zgolj o pokrivanju telesa, temveč tudi o primernem vedenju, pri čemer zadržanost nalaga tako ženskam kot moškim. V 31. *ajetu* ni

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[22] *Sura*, poglavje v Koranu.

[23] V Sloveniji zaenkrat še nimamo uradnega prevoda Korana v slovenski jezik. Jelinčičev prevod (2003) namreč ni nastal na osnovi arabskega izvirnika in zaradi tega ga Islamska skupnost ne prizna. Pri odlomkih, ki jih navajam, se tako naslanjam na slovenski prevod, ki pa ga, kjer je to potrebno, poskušam pojasniti s pomočjo bosanskega prevoda (gl. Prevod značenja Kur'ana 1984 Besima Korkuta) ali angleških prevodov Fadwe El Guindi (1999) in Fatime Mernissi (1991), na čigar dela se v glavnem opiram pri interpretacijaj koranskih *sur*. Predvsem Fadwa El Guindi namreč opozarja na nedosledno prevajanje izvirnega Korana iz arabščine v druge jezike, kar naj bi ključno vplivalo na različnost koranskih interpretacij in raznolika razumevanja Korana, torej tudi na razumevanje pravil, ki jih slednji zapoveduje glede oblačenja.

[24] V izvirniku *furož* (arabsko; Murad 2002: 38–39). Tako Murad kot Fadwa El Guindi (1999: 155) *furož* prevajata kot »genitalije« in ne kot »sramna mesta«, vendar pa se je v bosanskem in slovenskem prevodu uveljavil prav slednji izraz (bosansko: *stidna mjesta*).

[25] Izvirnik ne govori o zagrinjalu v dobesednem pomenu besede, temveč navede *humur* (arabsko; množinska oblika besede *himar*), torej oblačilo, ki pokrije lase, vrat, ramena in oprsje, ne pa tudi obraza (Roald 2002: 259).

[26] V izvirniku *džujob* (arabsko; množinska obliko besede *džaib*: prsi in vrat; Murad 2002: 41).

zaslediti izraza *hidžab*, ki v sodobnem svetu predstavlja enega izmed temeljnih konceptov pokrivanja, se pa zato pojavi izraz *himar.* Ta označuje oblačilo, s katerim si ženska pokrije lase in vrat, ne pa tudi obraza. *Sura* tako ne predpisuje zakrivanja obraza in ravno tako v njej ni zaslediti izrazov kot sta *nikab* in *litma,*[27] ki se v arabskem jeziku jasno nanašata na vrsto oblačil, s katerimi se zakrije obraz. (prim. El Guindi 1999: 155).

Z *ajetom* so opredeljeni tudi ljudje, pred katerimi je ženska lahko odkrita (pred katerimi sme »kazati svoje okrase«). To so osebe, za katere velja tabu incesta, torej moški sorodniki, ki se jim reče *mahrem*: mož, oče, oče moža, brat, sinovi, sinovi moža, očetov brat, materin brat, sinovi bratov in sester ter »brate po dojenju« (prim. El Guindi 1999: 98). Ženska pa je lahko poleg tega odkrita tudi pred moškimi, ki jih diskvalificira njihov status (sužnji), aseksualno stanje (evnuhi) ali seksualna nezrelost (mladoletni dečki) ter seveda tudi pred drugimi ženskami (prim. El Guindi 1999: 85–86). Zanimivo je, da naj bi bila ta določila po mnenju nekaterih strožje naložena mlajšim kot starejšim ženskam, pri katerih naj bi bila dopustna manjša doslednost v pokrivanju. 60. *ajet* 24. *sure* namreč pravi, da starejše ženske brez upanja na poroko lahko odložijo svoja oblačila, vendar pa kljub vsemu to ni ravno zaželeno (prim. Roald 2002: 255).

O obleki govori tudi 59. *ajet sure Al-Ahzab* oz. Zavezniki. Tudi ta poudarja pomembnost zadržanega vedenja, poleg tega pa je v njem uporabljen izraz *džilbab*, ki v arabščini označuje ogrinjalo ali kakšno drugo večje ohlapnejše oblačilo, s katerim si ženska pokrije telo (prim. El Guindi 1999: 155):

Vere znanilec, reci ženam svojim in hčeram svojim
in vernikov ženam, naj svoje obleke spustijo![28]
Tako bodo najlaže prepoznane in nadlegovane ne bodo.

Omenjeni *ajet sure Al-Ahzab* po mnenju nekaterih avtorjev pokrivanje opredeljuje kot javni znak islamske identitete in preventivni ukrep pred nadlegovanjem. Helen Watson tako opozarja, da sta bili obe *suri*, tako 24., *An-Nur* kot 33., *Al-Ahzab*, razodeti pet oziroma šest let po *hidžri* (arabsko: *hiğra*, preselitev),[29] zaradi česar bi lahko njuna navodila o oblačenju razlagali tudi kot manifestacijo procesov uvajanja osebnih in družbenih vedenjskih kodeksov v novonastajajoči muslimanski skupnosti (prim. Watson 1994: 145).[30]

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[27] Turbanu podobno pokrivalo za glavo, s katerim si moški ali ženske zakrijejo tudi obraz pod očmi. Nekoliko spominja na tuareški *tegelmust* (gl. npr. slikovni material v El Guindi 1999).

[28] V izvirniku »naj se pokrijejo z *džilbabom*« (El Guindi 1999: 155).

[29] Preselitev iz Meke v Medino, ki zaznamuje začetek islamskega obdobja. Bolj kot geografski premik *hidžra* označuje razdor z družino, klanom in povezavo z drugimi klani. V zgodovini islama je ključnega pomena, saj razdeli čas na dve obdobji; na obdobje pred *hidžro* (obdobje plemenske ureditve) in obdobje nove dobe, utemeljene na islamu, ki obenem predstavlja versko sporočilo in organizacijo nove verske skupnosti (prim. Delcambre 1994[1987]: 65).

[30] Mnogi *ajeti*, tudi navedeni, naj bi nastali kot odgovori na konkretne težave, s katerimi so se muslimani in Mohamed soočali ob začetkih formiranja muslimanske skupnosti. V Medini naj bi predvsem v času od poraza v bitki pri Uhudu leta tri po *hidžri* (l.625) do zmage nad Meko leta osem po *hidžri* (l.630), poleg vojaških neuspehov proti Meki in njenim zaveznikom, prihajalo do številnih nesoglasij in sporov med Mohamedom in njegovimi nasprotniki. Po obleganju Medine, leta pet po *hidžri* (l.627), naj

HIDŽAB

Nekateri interpretatorji Korana v zvezi s pokrivanjem navajajo tudi 53. *ajet sure Al-Ahzab*. Ta ne govori niti o pokrivanju niti o oblačenju nasploh:

> Verniki! Ne vstopajte v sobe Vere znanilca,
> razen, če se vam zaradi hrane dovoli,
> ne čakajoč, da se ono pripravi!
> Vendar, če boste pozvani, vi vstopite, pa ko jeste, se razidite,
> pogovoru se ne predajajoč!
> To res Vere znanilca vznemirja in pred vami ga je sram,
> A Alah se resnice ne sramuje!
> A ko od njih [Mohamedovih žena – op. Š.K.] nekaj zahtevate, izza zastora [hidžab
> – op. Š.K.] to od njih zahtevate!
> To vam je za srca vaša in za srca njihova čistejše!

Ajet naj bi govoril o zasebnosti Mohamedovega doma in o njegovem družinskem življenju ter položaju njegovih žena. Objavljen naj bi bil, ko se je pojavila potreba po varovanju njihove zasebnosti, ko je bilo potrebno omejiti vstop tujih moških v zasebne prostore Mohamedovih žena, in tako nakazati tudi zaželjeno vedenje obiskovalcev do njih. Govoril naj bi o fizični ločnici, ki naj bi ločevala prostor, kjer so se zadrževale Mohamedove žene od tistega, kamor so vstopali moški, ki so obiskovali Mohameda.[31] *Ajet* ne govori o ženski obleki (El Guindi 1999: 154), saj koranski izraz *hidžab* v prvotnem pomenu ne označuje obleke. Šele kasneje se je njegova raba s fizične, prostorske ločnice, prenesla na mobilno ločnico v podobi obleke. Danes se *hidžab* najpogosteje povezuje ravno z oblačenjem, ki zadeva pokrivanje telesa in glave.

O oblačenju govorijo tudi nekateri *hadisi,* pri čemer večina govori o moških in le nekateri omenjajo žensko obleko. Bolj kot na oblačenje pa dajejo poudarek skromnemu in zadržanemu vedenju. Dva *hadisa* opisujeta, kako so bile pokrite medinske ženske po razodetju koranskih *ajetov* o oblačenju: oblečene naj bi bile v črno, da bi se ločevale od drugih nemuslimank. Spet drug *hadis* pripoveduje o tem, da je Mohamed neki ženski, ki je vprašala, kaj naj stori, če nima *džilbaba*, odgovoril, da naj jo njena sestra pokrije s

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bi naraslo število nasprotnikov, ki so bili nezadovoljni z Mohamedovimi vojaškimi neuspehi. Ozračje v Medini naj bi postalo napeto, varnost prebivalcev pa naj bi se zmanjšala. Ženske na ulicah naj bi ne glede na njihov status nadlegovali moški. Svoje nesramno vedenje naj bi pri Mohamedu opravičevali s trditvijo, da se tako vedejo le do žensk, za katere mislijo, da so sužnje. Navedeni *ajet* naj bi bil tako objavljen kot posledica takšnega vedenja: muslimanke naj se na viden način ločijo od drugih žensk in tako že v naprej preprečijo izgovore nadlegovalcev (prim. Mernissi 1991: 108, 178–180).

[31] *Ajet* naj bi bil izrečen ob praznovanju Mohamedove poroke z Zajnab Bint Jahš, ko naj bi se trije izmed gostov zadržali pri pogovoru v Zajnabini sobi dlje časa, kot je bilo za situacijo primerno. Ko so gostje odšli, naj bi se Mohamed vrnil v Zajnabino sobo in medtem ko je zagrinjal zaveso med njim in Anasom, ki je še stal pred vrati, izrekel 53. *ajet* 33. *sure* (Mernissi 1991: 86–87). Božje razodetje o *hidžabu* naj bi torej sovpadalo z zastiranjem fizične zavese, ki jo je Mohamed zagrnil med sabo in človekom, ki je stal pred vhodom njegove poročne spalnice.

svojim. *Hadis*, ki se pripisuje Mohamedovi najmlajši ženi Aiši, pa opisuje, kako je njena sestra Asma v Mohamedovo hišo vstopila v prosojnih oblačilih. Ob tej priložnosti naj bi jo Mohamed opozoril, da lahko polnoletna ženska (tista, ki je dočakala menstruacijo), pokaže »le to«, pri čemer naj bi pokazal na svoj obraz in dlani (prim. Roald 2002: 265–266). Ženska obleka naj bi po *hadisih*, ki bolj eksplicitno kot Koran predpisujejo pokrivanje žensk (ob tem je potrebno poudariti, da gre pri tem tudi že za inerpretacijo Korana s strani Mohamedovih sodobnikov), pokrila celotno telo razen obraza, dlani in stopal (po nekaterih interpretacijah morajo biti tudi ta pokrita), pri tem pa naj bi bila obleka dolga in neprosojna. Ženska naj bi se tako oblačila od nastopa polnoletnosti naprej. *Hadisi* sicer ne predvidevajo jasno določene oblike oblačenja, iz njihovih opisov obleke pa je mogoče razbrati, da so ljudje verske norme oblačenja v Mohamedovem času izpolnjevali na različne načine in z različnimi vrstami oblačil (prim. Roald 2002: 267).

Interpretacije koranskih *ajetov* in tudi *hadisov* na katerih se utemeljuje pokrivanje, so precej raznolike (prim. Roald 2002: 260) in se v različnih okoljih manifestirajo skozi zelo različne materialne oblike in prakse. Anne Sofie Roald tako pojasnjuje, da je za prakse pokrivanja bolj kot so sami islamski viri, torej tekst, pomembno njihovo razumevanje, na slednjega pa vplivajo dejavniki, kot so splošno razumevanje islama s strani posameznika, njegova izobrazba, osebnost ter okolje, v katerem se te interpretacije odvijajo (Roald 2002: viii, xii 68, 91).

ISLAM IN TRADICIJA

Različne interpretacije pokrivanja je opaziti tudi med Bošnjakinjami. Razlage se razhajajo tako glede na njihovo versko izobrazbo in okolje, v katerem so se seznanile z islamom, kot tudi glede na to, h katerim interpretacijam in *mezhebom* oz. islamskim pravnim šolam se nagibajo.

Tako mlajše generacije Bošnjakinj, ki svoje znanje o islamu črpajo iz verske literature, prebiranja Korana in *hadisov*, pogosto navajajo, da starejše generacije niso na pravilen način seznanjene z islamom in da zaradi tega tudi njihove verske prakse niso dosledne. Na to so me že takoj ob mojem prihodu na Jesenice opozorile tudi pokrite Bošnjakinje, ki sebe kot muslimanke niso doživljale kot reprezentativne za Slovenijo, in poudarile, da bom pravo predstavo o pokrivanju dobila šele potem, ko jih bom primerjala z ostalimi muslimankami na Jesenicah, ki se ne pokrivajo:

Belma: Veš, res je, da nosimo ruto, ampak drgač nismo nič posebnega. Jaz tudi ne vem, kaj bi me tebi lahko na primer ponudile. Profil navadne muslimanke v Sloveniji je takšen, da ko jo vprašaš, kaj je po veri, bi rekla muslimanka, kaj je po nacionalnosti, tud muslimanka, mol ne, posti, ko pa jo vprašaš, zakaj posti, pa ne bi vedla. To je delavka za nekim strojem, s končano osnovno šolo. Ki ni pokrita … In po možnosti kadi. Za muslimane tu je tradicija in islam eno in isto. (Terenski zapiski, Jesenice, 15. 5. 2004)

Tako so izpostavile, da ženske, ki zamenjujejo islam s tradicijo, tudi kadar se pokrijejo, tega pogosto ne naredijo v skladu z verskimi predpisi. Navajale so, da si nekatere ženske ob molitvi ne pokrijejo las v celoti, da jim izpod rute pogosto uhajajo prameni ali pa da si ruto zavežejo na tilniku, tako da vrat ostaja odkrit, vse to pa ni v skladu z islamskimi predpisi. Njihova razlaga takih odstopanj je bila, da te ženske v resnici ne razumejo pravega pomena pokrivanja in da tako v kombinaciji z ruto nosijo celo kratke rokave ali oprijeta oblačila. Tako sem tudi sama imela priložnost pred nekim blokom na Jesenicah videti starejšo muslimanko v kratkih rokavih, ki je nosila ruto.

Ženske so pogosto izpostavljale razliko med pokrivanjem, ki temelji na verskem znanju, in tistim, ki temelji na tradicionalnem razumevanju islama. Nekega dne sem obiskala Aišo. Njena mama Adila se je ravnokar vrnila s potovanja v Tunizijo in navdušeno pripovedovala o svoji izkušnji. Sama se ne pokriva, v Tuniziji pa je stalno nosila tudi kratke rokave. Rekla je, da so jo Tunizijci, potem ko so slišali, kako ji je ime, zgroženo vprašali:

> Kakšna si ti muslimanka v kratkih rokavih? Mi nismo nobeni muslimani proti njim. Tam ni ustavljanja na ulici in pogovarjanja med moškimi in ženskami. Tam si rečejo sam Eselamu alejkum! In grejo naprej. Nema! (Terenski zapiski, Jesenice, 24. 6. 2004)

Nato je nadaljevala, kako se oblačijo Tunizijke. Barve in vzorci rut, ki jih nosijo, naj bi imele svoj pomen in moški naj bi po barvi rut vedeli, kakšen status ima ženska. Adila je namreč opazila, da ženske za pokrivanje izbirajo različne barve rut, in je vprašala vodiča, kaj katera pomeni:

> Črna pomeni, da je vdova in se noče spet poročit. Črna s plavim trakom, da je vdova in išče moža. Roza, da je zaročena in ima fanta. Moški vejo, da je zasedena. Bela, je ženska, ki je ločena, pa nima otrok. Rjava, je ločena po svoji krivdi, ker ni mogla imeti otrok. Barva starega zlata, una med bledo oranžno in rjavo, je ločena, ampak ne po svoji krivdi. (Terenski zapiski, Jesenice, 24. 6. 2004)

Aiša, ki je pokrita in intenzivno prebira versko literaturo in različne islamske *alime* (arabsko: *ālim*, mn. *ulamā*, učenjak), je to opisovanje hitro pokomentirala, rekoč:

> … barva v islamu nima nobenega pomena. To je stvar tradicije. Barva obleke, ki jo nosi muslimanka, ne sporoča ničesar. Sporoča pa zato njena obleka. Ruta je karakter, odraz ženske. Govori o njeni morali. Nosi vrline pravoverne muslimanke. Pomeni, da je poštena, delavna, zvesta, spoštljiva, pomeni, da ta ženska ne more početi vsega, kar počno nemuslimanke. Npr. ne more hoditi v diskoteke. Ruta ni samo način oblačenja, temveč je veliko več. Ruto si vsak razlaga po svoje. Zato pa dekleta hodijo naokoli v kavbojkah in oprijetih majicah, gor pa zavite. (Terenski zapiski, Jesenice, 24. 6. 2004)

Njena interpretacija je temeljila na poznavanju *hadisov* in Korana, kjer, kot smo videli, dejansko ni eksplicitno navedeno, v kakšna oblačila naj bi se muslimanke oblačile, temveč predvsem, kako naj bi se ženska pokrila. Pokrila naj bi torej lase, vrat, telo do dlani in stopal. Navedeno je tudi pred kom naj bi bila pokrita. Tako mi Adila, ki je sicer prihajala iz zelo verne muslimanske družine, pravzaprav ni znala povedati, pred kom naj bi muslimanka sploh morala biti pokrita. Aišin brat Hamdija in Adilin sin je bil tako kot Aiša globoko veren moški, ki je pred časom opravil tudi *hadž* (arabsko: *hağğ*, romanje v Meko)[32] in nasploh dal veliko na spoštovanje verskih pravil. Veliko se je posvečal preučevanju islama in si v tistem času tudi iskal ženo, ki bi bila v skladu z islamskimi pravili pokrita. Ko me je skrbelo, če sem dovolj spoštljiva, sem Adilo vprašala, če Hamdijo moti, da sem na obisku v kratkih rokavih. Rekla mi je:

> … če jaz nimam dolgih rokavov, zakaj bi jih imela ti. Tud jaz bi se morala pokrit pred sinom, ne pa da sem tkole u kratkih rokavih. Pred sinom hadžijem bi se morala oblečt v dolge rokave, to da sem pred njim u kratkih rokavih sploh ni lepo.
> Š.K.: Ampak vi ste njegova mama, jaz pa sem na obisku in z njim nisem v sorodu. (Terenski zapiski, Jesenice, 24. 6. 2004)

Adila je po ljudskih teorijah razumela, da se človek, ki opravi *hadž,* očisti vseh grehov, in da se mora, ko se vrne s *hadža*, truditi, da »*hadž* zadrži«, torej, da ostane čist. Ker ni vedela, da se materi pred sinom ni treba pokrivati, je mislila, da je to greh. V tem kontekstu je pojasnjevala tudi razloge, zakaj se na *hadž* odpravljajo predvsem starejši ljudje in zakaj nekatere ženske po *hadžu*, med katerim morajo biti pokrite, ostanejo pokrite tudi, ko se vrnejo. Tako je na moje vprašanje, zakaj se pokrivajo predvsem mlade ženske, medtem ko njihove mame sploh niso pokrite, odgovorila:

> Adila: To so punce, ki so začele s temelja. To, da si pokrita, je pa temelj. Sajma se je pokrila na hadžu.
> Š.K.: A ko gre ženska na hadž, se mora pokrit za vedno?
> Adila: A seveda. Lih zato gredo pa ponavadi na hadž starejši, ker je to tko težko zadržat. Žene se pokriju preden grejo na hadž, če se pa potem odviješ, vse zgubiš. In kaj ti bo pol ves denar in vse kar si dal, da si ke sploh šou. (Terenski zapiski, 24. 6. 2004)

Na tak način se je pokrila tudi šestdesetletna Esma, ki mi je v pogovoru povedala, da dolgo ni živela v skladu z islamom, vendar pa, da za kesanje nikoli ni prepozno. Ko se je pokesala, je začela živeti z islamom in tako opravila tudi *hadž* ter se od takrat naprej nikoli več ni odkrila. Rekla je, da je žalostno, da so nekatere starejše ženske, ki so bile z njo na *hadžu*, po vrnitvi odložile ruto, saj so tako ponovno postale grešnice. Čeprav je pokrivanje razumela kot versko dolžnost muslimanke in svoje dolgoletno nespoštovanje islama poskušala popraviti in se tako odkupiti Alahu tudi s tem, ko se je pokrila, je tudi

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[32] Zadnji od petih islamskih stebrov.

v njenih interpretacijah pokrivanja opaziti, da njeno znanje o islamu bolj kot na islamskih virih temelji na ustnem izročilu in zgledovanju po bosanski tradiciji, kjer so starejše ženske pokrite tudi v pozni starosti. Kot smo prebrali, naj bi po nekaterih interpretacijah starejše ženske bile pokrivanja oproščene. Pri opisanih interpretacijah pokrivanja se izrisujejo predvsem razlike v razumevanju islama med tistimi, ki so znanje o njem pridobili na bosanskem podeželju od sorodnikov v obliki ustnega izročila, in tistimi, ki so se do njega prebili skozi študij različnih islamskih tekstov.

Takšne različne stile islamskih praks bi lahko pojasnili z Gellnerjevim modelom razlikovanja med visokim in nizkim ali ljudskim islamom. Sam razlikuje med tako imenovanim urbanim – visokim islamom, katerega nosilci naj bi bili predvsem različni islamski učenjaki in urbani srednji razred, ki naj bi se pri svojih praksah opiral predvsem na pisne vire, in podeželjskim - ljudskim islamom, ki naj bi bil prej kot v preučevanje »črke« usmerjen v ustno izročilo in pisano besedo pogosto izrablja v magične namene, kot so izdelovanje amuletov, pisanje urokov ipd. Vrednote, ki naj bi jih po njegovem zastopali slednji visokega islama, so red, izpolnjevanje predpisov, resnost in študij, medtem ko naj bi bili slednji nizkega islama bolj usmerjeni v verske izkušnje, povezane z ekstazo in mistiko. Ljudje, ki naj bi bili pristaši visokega stila, naj bi zavračali histerijo, pretirano izkazovanje emocij in poudarjali monoteistično in nomokratsko naravo islama ter bili zelo previdni glede praks, povezanih s *širkom* (arabsko; pripisovanje Bogu enakega in zaradi tega politeizem), torej s praksami, v katerih se ljudem pripisuje lastnosti, ki naj bi bile edinstvene Bogu. To pa so na primer sposobnost videnja v prihodnost in druge vrste mediacije med Bogom in človekom, v katere se ljudski islam, ravno nasprotno, koncentrira. Medtem ko naj bi bil visoki islam precej usmerjen k puritanizmu in skripturalizmu, torej k doslednemu spoštovanju pisane verske besede, naj bi bil nizki usmerjen predvsem v različne kulte svetnikov in magične obrede ter bi bil potemtakem sinkretičen, vključeval naj bi tudi elemente lokalnih tradicij, ki naj islamu ne bi bili lastni (Gellner 2003[1992]: 9–21).

Čeprav takšna delitev ni vedno povsem jasna in marsikdaj ta dva stila prehajata eden v drugega, bi lahko rekli, da se takšne vzporednice izrisujejo tudi med Bošnjaki in Bošnjakinjami pri razumevanju pokrivanja in tudi drugih verskih pravil. V ljudsko razumevanje pokrivanja so usmerjene predvsem starejše Bošnjakinje, ki praviloma prakticirajo zgoraj opisano »tradicionalno« pokrivanje, te pa so v slovenska mesta migrirale predvsem z bosanskega podeželja in se o islamu niso posebej »dodatno izobraževale«. Isto velja za tiste njihove potomce, ki se niso poglobljeno ukvarjali z islamom. Tako sem jih pogosto slišala komentirati, da svoj islam izvajajo tako, kot so jih naučile njihove matere, očetje, stari starši ali *hodže* na bosanskem podeželju. Ravno slednje pa so mi, potem ko smo se bolj zbližale, pripovedovale tudi o izdelovanju *hamajlij* (arabsko: *hamā'il*, talisman)[33] in *hodžah*, ki so jih z njimi pozdravili, ker jih je nekdo uročil. Tako mi je Suada povedala, da jo je njen sin Mensur, ko je bil operiran, prosil, naj mu prinese za srečo *hamajlijo*, obesek, ki se ga lahko kupi ali ga *hodža* izdela v prav določen namen. Gre za obesek v

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[33] Gre za koranske *ajete*, ki se hranijo v majhnih torbicah ali medaljonih, ter jih nosijo okoli vratu ipd.

obliki etuija, v katerem so spravljene »besede iz Korana«. Ko je pred leti imela zdravstvene težave, naj bi se s tem namenom na *hodžo* v Bosni obrnila tudi sama.

POKRITA TAKO, DA LASJE OSTANEJO ODKRITI

Tisti, ki so se držali pisane islamske besede, so praviloma zavračali takšne prakse, ki jih Gellner opiše kot nizki oz. ljudski islam. Vendar pa so tudi med »skripturalisti« interpretacije Korana in *hadisov* različne. Tudi med njimi ni enotnih predstav o tem, kako naj bi zgledalo pokrivanje muslimank. Pri navajanju opisov pokrivanja se tako sklicujejo na različne *hadise* prav tako pa različno interpretirajo tudi koranske *ajete*. Največje razhajanje je ravno glede barv oblačil, o kateri koranski *ajeti* ne govorijo, pa tudi glede tega, ali je potrebno zakriti tudi obraz ali ne. Med nekaterimi ženskami, ki se pokrivajo le občasno, obstaja tudi prepričanje, da pokrivanje glave za žensko niti ne predstavlja stroge verske obveze.

Dejansko večina Bošnjakov, med katerimi je veliko takih, ki so se posvetili tudi študiju islama, ne samo da islamskih oblačilnih praks ne prakticira, temveč ob moji omembi zanimanja za oblačilni kod muslimanov, predstav o njem sploh niso povezovali z islamom. Maida in Enes sta nekega večera, ko smo se vračali s predavanja o bosanskih heraldičnih simbolih na Filozofski fakulteti v Ljubljani, razpravljala o temi moje raziskave »oblačilne prakse in muslimani«, kakor sem jima jo predstavila:

> Oba oblečena v črne usnjene plašče in obuta v črne usnjene čevlje sta se premerila od nog do glave. Maida je povzela tisto, kar je videla: »Oblačilne prakse ... Aha! Črno usnje ... črno usnje ...« Enes pa jo je opozoril »Pazi, zdej bodo pa mislil, da sva skina, ne muslimana«. (Terenski zapiski, Ljubljana, 15. 5. 2005)

Enes je prišel v Ljubljano po vojni v Bosni kot študent arhitekture, Maida pa je bila študentka zgodovine in se je z družino iz Sarajeva preselila v Ljubljano na začetku vojne. Oba sta o islamu očitno vedela in prebrala veliko ter trdila, da so vero doma vedno spoštovali in da jo spoštujeta tudi sama. Ko sem Maido vprašala o pokrivanju, je vneto zatrjevala, da nikjer v Koranu ne piše, da bi morala imeti pokrito glavo. Sklicevala se je na 31. *ajet sure An –Nur* (31:24), ki govori o »sramnih mestih« (»… in naj svoja sramna mesta čuvajo, in naj svojih okrasov ne kažejo, razen kar je zunanjega, in naj svoja zagrinjala spustijo niz prsi svojih …«).[34] Dejala je, da tako kot je oblečena, ostajajo njeni »sramni

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[34] V islamu pokrivanja ni mogoče interpretirati skozi prizmo sramu, povezanega s spolnostjo in telesnostjo. Izvorni islam namreč ne pozna enakega koncepta sramu, kot ga poznata krščanstvo ali judovstvo (El Guindi 1999: 140–143). Po drugi strani pa je res tudi to, da so se interpretacije primarnih islamskih virov oblikovale pod vplivom različnih tradicij, s katerimi se je islam srečeval, ko se je širil v različne predele sveta. Judovstvo in krščanstvo (npr. biblijske zgodbe) sta tako pogosto vplivala na interpretacije Korana in posredno tudi na razumevanje muslimank v družbi (Kassam 2000: 226–227). Koncept *aurat*-a (arabsko) oz. *avret* (bosansko), ki je povezan tudi s koranskimi interpretacijami pokrivanja, naj bi bil tako, kot opozarja Fadwa El Guindi (1999: 140–143), pogosto

deli« vedno pokriti, da svojih okrasov (prsi) ne razkazuje in da so »zunanji okrasi«, nakit, na primer uhani, verižica ipd., tisti, ki jih sme »razkazovati«. In da ravno tako sme kazati na primer svoje komolce, ki zanjo ne predstavljajo »sramnih delov«. Nato je omenila, da tako piše v Koranu in da sama upošteva le, kar piše v Koranu, medtem ko *hadisi* predstavljajo korpus verskih spisov o življenju preroka Mohameda in njegovih sodobnikov, ki so nastali po prerokovi smrti in potemtakem ne predstavljajo božje besede, temveč svojevrstno folkloro, na katero pa se sama požvižga.

Po nekaterih interpretacijah Korana pokrivanje las dejansko ni pojmovano kot obvezno. Mnenja različnih interpretatorjev se namreč glede vprašanja pokrivanja kot neomajne in nesporne verske dolžnosti pogosto razhajajo, saj v Koranu dejansko nikjer ni eksplicitno zapisano, kako in s čim naj bi se ženska pokrila, zaradi česar je koranska osnova za to prakso dejansko vprašljiva (prim. Watson 1994: 146). Med tistimi, ki so proti tej praksi, je tudi *mufti*[35] Soheiba Ben Šejh iz Marseillesa, ki meni, da je bilo pokrivanje zapovedano z namenom, da bi se obvarovalo žensko dostojanstvo na način, primeren času objave Korana. V sodobnosti naj bi žensko dostojanstvo bolj kot pokrivanje, zagotavljala ravno izobrazba (Brown 2001: 111–112). Tudi Maida je svojo interpretacijo pokrivanja gradila na podobnem razumevanju in menila, da je kljub temu, da ni pokrita, oblečena skladno z islamskimi predpisi.

ZAKRIVANJE OBRAZA?

Pokrivanje je nasploh razumljeno na najrazličnejše načine. Tudi med muslimankami, ki pokrivanje razumejo kot obvezo. Aiša me je ob neki priložnosti opozorila, da se sama pokriva drugače kot nekatere druge ženske na Jesenicah. Tistega dne je bila oblečena v roza obleko in roza šal. Obleka ni bila ozka, pa tudi ne pretirano široka. Tudi šal, s katerim si je ovila glavo, ni bil pretirano velik. Z njim si je ovila le glavo in vrat, medtem ko je ramena pustila odkrita. Lahko bi rekli, da je delovala nadvse elegantno. Zase je sicer pogosto dejala, da sama prakticira turški stil, ki je drugačen od jordanskega in nasploh arabskega. Pogosto je nosila hlače z različnimi tunikami, ki so segale nad kolena in skoraj nikoli je nisem videla v *džilbabu*. Pri svojih razlagah pokrivanja se je naslanjala na pisanje islamskih učenjakov, ki zastopajo bolj liberalna tolmačenja Korana, predvsem na dela islamskega *alima* Jusufa El Kardavija. Ta naj bi za muslimanke, ki živijo v Evropi in so zaradi svojega oblačenja v nemuslimanskem okolju izpostavljene, imel za sprejemljivo

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napačno interpretiran. Ta navaja, da se ga v angleških tekstih pogosto napačno povezuje s tistimi deli ženskega telesa, ki naj bi v islamu predstavljali »moralne madeže«, zaradi česar naj bi morali biti pokriti. Kot arabsko govoreča razlagalka Korana in *hadisov* navaja, da dejanski pomen izraza v Koranu označuje ranljivost, ki jo je potrebno obvarovati (El Guindi 1999: 140–143). Vendar so se interpretacije Korana in njegovih konceptov v novih okoljih in skozi čas pogosto tudi spreminjale, tako da tudi Bošnjakom *avret* danes predstavlja »sramne dele na človeškem telesu, ki jih je treba pokriti« (Škaljić 1989: 106).

[35] Najvišji predstavnik v rajonu.

nošenje klobuka ali kape namesto rute. Pogovarjali sva se o tem, kako se oblačijo musli-
manke in muslimani na Jesenicah:

> Aiša: Saj tudi tko kot sem jaz zdajle oblečena, je po njihovem mnenju nesprejem-
> ljivo.
> Š.K.: Zakaj?
> Aiša: Prvič roza barva, že s tem menda zavajam. Potem je pa obleka čisto preozka,
> da bi bila v skladu z njihovimi prepričanji. Ti ne boš Dino nikoli videla, da bi dala kaj
> takega nase. Ona je vedno v temnih oblekah in rutah in v širokih oblekah. Opazuj,
> pa boš videla. In tudi rute so vedno velike. Jaz vedno pravim 2 krat 2. To mora biti
> vse čez ramena. (Terenski zapiski, Ljubljana, 25. 5. 2004)

Aiša je pripovedovala o načinu oblačenja, pri katerem se nekateri Bošnjaki in Bo-
šnjakinje pogosto razen na koranske *ajete* sklicujejo tudi na različne *hadise*, ki opisujejo
oblačila žensk pa tudi moških. Ti ljudje so pogosto govorili, da sledijo *suno* preroka
Mohameda. Tako mi je Dina ob najinem prvem srečanju pojasnjevala, kako naj bi se
muslimanke oblačile. Poudarila je, da je oblačenje potrebno interpretirati tudi s *hadisi,*
ne samo s Koranom.

> Dina: To je veš kako, če boš šla do neke ženske, ki ima drugačno prepričanje, ti bo
> ona rekla, ja pač po Koranu piše, »i neka spuste vela preko prsa svoja«, se prau da
> piše nej spustijo obleke svoje čez prsa. In ona bo rekla, da to ne pomeni, da moraš
> pokrivati, da moraš nositi hidžab. Do nekoga boš šla in bo rekel »ja, neka spuste vela
> preko prsa svoja piše v Koranu«, to se prau, od tukaj se spusti velo dol, od tukaj se
> spusti pregrinjalo dol [kaže na vrh glave – op. Š.K.] in ti bo rekel, da moraš še tole
> pokrit [obraz – op. Š. K.] Razumeš. Lahko ti je drugačna interpretacija vsega tega.
> Če pa pogledaš še hadise zraven, oziroma, če pa povežeš še s suno, potem pa dobiš
> nekaj drugega. Božji poslanec je rekel, »žena, ko postane polnoletna, pokrije vse
> razen rok od tukaj do tukaj [dlani – op. Š.K.] in pa obraza.
> Š.K.: In to je prav eksplicitno. In v kermu hadisu je že to?
> Dina: To mislm da je El Buhari. (Intervju, 17. 3. 2004)

Sama je bila resnično pogosto oblečena v oblačila temnejših barv, nosila je *džilbabe*
in velike rute, ki so ji skoraj vedno pokrivale tudi ramena. Vendar se takrat, ko sem jo
spoznala, tega nisem zavedala. Šele Aišino opozorilo na razlike med pokritimi me je
opomnilo na to, da sem Dino dejansko videvala povečini oblečeno ravno tako. Kot mi
je ob neki priložnosti dejala, se je namreč pri izbiri barve za svoja oblačila ravnala tudi
po nekem *hadisu*, v katerem piše, da naj bi bile Mohamedove žene videti kot vrane, ker
so bile v črnem, in so se ji zaradi tega temnejše barve zdele primernejše od svetlih ali
kričečih. Vendar sama ni bila oblečena izključno v črno, ravno tako pa se ni sklicevala
na pokrivanje obraza tako kot nekatere druge Bošnjakinje, ki se vedno oblačijo le v črno.
Na srečanju muslimanov na Poljanah sem se o tem pogovarjala z Nadino, ki se je sicer
tja pripeljala iz Trbovelj. S seboj je pripeljala tudi trinajstletno hčerko, ki je bila za tisto

priložnost ravno tako oblečena v črno obleko in imela glavo pokrito s črno ruto. Rekla je, da je pokrita tri leta in da si želi, da bi se tudi njena hči, ko bo dobila menstruacijo, torej ko bo v skladu z islamskimi načeli polnoletna, pokrila. Opazila sem, da ima precej radikaliziran odnos do islama. Ko sem jo vprašala, kaj meni o *nikabu,* tj. kosu oblačila, ki pokriva obraz in ga danes nosijo nekatere Bošnjakinje v Bosni, predvsem pa v arabskih deželah, je brez obotavljanja odvrnila, da je to obveza, ker naj bi v Koranu pisalo,

… neka se vidi samo ono, što je spoljašnje, a to je odječa. (Terenski zapiski, Jesenice, 26. 4. 2004)

Belma in Dina na primer *nikaba* tako nista razumeli kot *farz*, temveč kot nekaj, kar naj bi bilo pohvalno, *vadžib*. Ker sta se pri interpretaciji Korana navezovali tudi na *hadis*, v katerem je opisano, da naj bi bil obraz ženske odkrit. Nadina pa, ki se je ravno tako navezovala na Koran kot tudi na *hadise*, tega *hadisa* pri svojih interpretacijah pokrivanja ni upoštevala. »Izbrala« je le tiste odlomke iz verskih spisov, ki so ustrezali njenim, radikaliziranim predstavam islamskih praks.

Zakrivanje obraza je po mnenju nekaterih interpretatorjev primarnih islamskih virov dejansko obvezno. Tako Senaid Zajimović, ko navaja 31. *ajet* 24. *sure* (»... in naj svojih okrasov ne kažejo, razen kar je zunanjega«), pravi, da je zunanje »vse, kar se pokaže samo od sebe,« zunanji okras pa naj bi bila kar vrhnja oblačila sama. Po njegovem mnenju je tako dovoljeno kazati le vrhnja oblačila in pa oblačila, ki se izpod vrhnjih pokažejo med hojo ali zaradi pihanja vetra. *Himar*, ki se pojavi v *ajetu* iste *sure* (»in naj svoja zagrinjala [*himar*] spustijo niz prsi svojih«), Zaimović pri tem interpretira kot oblačilo, ki se spusti z glave na prsi, tako da se pri tem zakrije tudi obraz (Zajimović 2004). Že predhodno pa sem navedla, da arabski avtorji *himar* opisujejo kot oblačilo, ki pokrije lase, vrat in oprsje, ne pa tudi obraza (prim. El Guindi 1999: 155). Za spodbijanje takih interpretacij, po katerih je zakrivanje obraza obvezno, bolj liberalni avtorji navajajo oblačilne norme, ki zadevajo dva izmed petih islamskih stebrov: ženska namreč ne sme imeti zakritega obraza med opravljanjem molitve in na *hadžu* (prim. Sofie Roald 2002: 271, 277). Po drugi strani med zagovorniki zakrivanja obraza potekajo debate o tem, ali je bilo slednje naloženo le Mohamedovim ženam ali pa se nanaša na vse muslimanke. O tem sem se pogovarjala tudi z jeseniškim *hodžo*, ki je rekel, da naj bi se ta *ajet* nanašal le na Mohamedove žene in ne na ostale ženske. Za ostale naj bi to pomenilo le prostovoljno pokrivanje »z *nikabom*«.

ISLAMSKI UČENJAKI

V Sloveniji ni žensk, ki bi si zakrivale tudi obraz. *Hidžab* večina pokritih muslimank razume kot *farz*, strogo versko dolžnost, mnenja o *nikabu*, zakrivanju obraza pa so zelo različna. Medtem ko so nekatere ženske izrecno proti temu in pravijo, da nikjer v Koranu ne piše, da bi si ženska morala zakrivati obraz, druge menijo, da je to sredstvo, ki služi za izražanje večje bogaboječnosti, nekatere, zelo redke pa, da naj bi bilo tudi zakrivanje

obraza obveza, izpolnjevanje, katero pa je v slovenskem okolju skorajda neizvedljivo. Posameznice so celo razmišljale, da bi, če bi živele v sredini, kjer bi bila ta praksa bolj razširjena, verjetno tudi same nadele *nikab*. Nekatere izmed njih so ga nosile, ko so bile na potovanjih v arabskih deželah. Kot razloge, zakaj tega ne storijo v Sloveniji, so navajale, da bi v slovenskem okolju to predstavljalo številne ovire in da so že s samim *hidžabom* dovolj izpostavljene. Zaradi istega razloga so se nekatere izogibale tudi drugim vrstam oblačil, značilnim za arabski svet, saj bi bile v njih preveč vpadljive. Dina mi je tako ob obisku na svojem domu razkazovala obleke, ki jih je dobila ali kupila na potovanjih po arabskem svetu. Med njimi je bilo tudi oblačilo, ki ga je imenovala *himar*, pokrivalo, ki se ga natakne na glavo kot kapuco in pokrije lase in ramena vse do pasu:

> Š.K.: Ti, kaj pa je himar?
> Dina: Veš, različno ga interpretirajo, ta himar. Nekateri pravijo, da je to hidžab na splošno, drugi pravijo da je himar to pokrivalo, a veš, Čist odvisn … recimo eni a veš kaj je himar? Himar je to [iz omare vzame zeleno pokrivalo – op. Š.K.] Evo, to je himar. Jest to ne nosm, veš. Jest sem to dobila v darilo od ene iz Iraka … Kot neka kapuca. Pol uspodi pride ena ruta, in potem čez maš [nejasno] in one nosijo. In pol recimo, vse je pokrito, a veš.
> Š.K.: To ti ne nosiš?
> Dina: O ne. A si predstavljaš ti mene, da tole oblečem, pa da grem taka po Jesenicah? Tole je še nekak sprejemljivo [pokaže na črn džilbab, v katerega je oblečena, in sivo ruto – op. Š.K.] To pa …
> Š.K.: A zarad tega, ker bi bilo preveč?
> Dina: Mhm. (Intervju, Jesenice, 17. 3. 2004)

Na prakse pokrivanja muslimank vplivajo številni dejavniki, v ospredju pa sta predvsem dva: vpliv okolja, v katerem se posameznica odloči za pokrivanje, in njeno razumevanje verskih spisov, torej tako Korana kot *sune*, ki predstavlja jedro družbenih in pravnih islamskih tradicij, temelječih na *hadisih*, torej izrekih in dejanjih, ki jih pripisujejo preroku Mohamedu. Med *ulemo* (islamski intelektualci) se je razvila razvejana znanost o *hadisih* z namenom preverjanja njihove verodostojnosti, vendar je njihova interpretacija za običajne vernike skoraj praviloma prezapletena, da bi se je lotevali samostojno. Tako se pri svojih interpretacijah opisov pokrivanja in drugih islamskih praks sklicujejo na interpretacije različnih *alimov* (islamski intelektualci), med katerimi pa ravno tako obstajajo različne interpretacije. Te se razlikujejo glede na islamske pravne šole, *mezheb,* in obsegajo celo paleto interpretacij, od zelo liberalnih do skrajno konzervativnih. Tako so se tudi moje sogovornice pri interpretacijah pokrivanja s sklicevanjem na *hadise* o pokrivanju navezovale predvsem na interpretacije različnih *alimov* in ne na svoja lastna, samostojna dognanja. Ravno zaradi tega sta Dina in Belma zakrivanje obraza razumeli drugače kot Nadina, saj so se ženske glede te prakse sklicevale na različne *alime* in njihove različne interpretacije. Ko sem Dino vprašala, katerim *alimom* sledi, mi je povedala:

> Dina: Ne. Ne ne ne. Zarad vojne se je začel nazaj vračat v islam. A veš. Poglabljat

v islam v bistvu. Ker islam je bil nekak v našem življenju, sam ni bil nekak na prav način dan. Ni bil v celoti dan. Pa če ti en del islama odvzameš, recimo sprejmeš en del, drugo pa odvzameš, ne more, v bistvu islam ni tak, nekako ne šteka, ne gre. To je v celoti islam, a veš. Če ne vzameš v celoti, ne gre. Enostavno ne gre, recimo, ne vem, maš hadis, ki pravi, pokorna žena, ne vem »če bi komu naredil, da naj dela sedždo, Alah bi naredil, da to žena dela možu. Sedžda je tist, da gre na kolena. Če bi komu naredu, bi naredu da žena to dela možu. Lahko si predstavljaš, koliko velika bi morala biti ženina pokornost možu. In če vzameš ta del hadisa, oziroma ta hadis, morš reč, o zdej sem pa jest pokorna možu. Oziroma, zdej sem pa jest manj vredna kot moj mož, a veš. Ampak, maš pa drug hadis, ki pravi, »ni boljši tisti musliman, ki« oziroma, »najboljši med vami so tisti, ki delajo lepo s svojimi ženami«. A veš in to je drugo, takoj. In moraš celoto gledat. Ne morš kr en del vzet, drugega pa pustit. [Nerazločno] Ne, moraš celoto vzet, oziroma tisto, kar islamski učenjaki pravijo. Na osnovi enega hadisa ne moreš reč, to je pa zdej vera. To je tko. Ne ti tko, maš ljudi, ki so to preučeval in ki so na koncu nek konsenz dosegl. Mislm dosegl, niso čist dosegl …

Š.K.: A pa so kakšni učenjaki, ki jih še posebej spoštuješ, al pa jim slediš, bereš njihove knjige?

Dina: Kardavi. Jusufa Kardavi. Ne vem, koga še. Gazali, Mohamed El Gazali, čeprav on je že umrl. Potem, recimo, všeč so mi kar se tiče verovanja, recimo Šejh[36] ibn Baz, [nerazločno], recimo, kar se tiče verovanja, ampak oni so že umrli. Ampak to samo kar se tiče verovanja, ne vsega, glede prakticiranja mi nekako niso všeč. Oni so bl v tej smeri a veš, ženska mora biti zakrita do totala, ne jemljem tega od njih, recimo Kardavi mi je glede tega, Kardavi mi je nasploh, kar se tiče tega, tud zdej, ko sem bila v Katarju, sem klanjala v njegovi mošeji. UAAAUU! (Intervju, Jesenice, 17. 3. 2004)

Nadine sicer nisem vprašala, katere islamske učenjake bere, vendar predvidevam, da so ji blizu avtorji, kot sta Šejh ibn Baz in Senaid Zajimović, ki zakrivanje obraza interpretirata kot obvezno. V nekem drugem pogovoru z Aišo je ta navajala avtorje, po katerih se zgleduje sama, ker so glede na njeno presojo dovolj liberalni, njihove interpretacije pa prilagojene na razmere, v katerih živi. Omenila je Jusufa Kardavija (ki muslimankam dovoljuje nošenje čepic in klobukov namesto rut), Šuki Ramića in Halil Mehtića. Kot skrajno konzervativne avtorje, ki jih ni odobravala, pa je omenila Zaimovića, Mohamed Porčo, Abdusamed Bušatlića in Šejh ibn Baza. Za slednjega je celo podala primer, s katerim je hotela ponazoriti njegovo skrajno konzervativnost in neprilagojenost sodobnim razmeram:

Otkrivanje lica žene je isto ko i otkrivanje njezinog polnog organa.
Ne treba se ustavljati kod semafora, jer se treba pokoravati Bogu a ne predmetu.
(Terenski zapiski, Jesenice, 23. 6. 2004)

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[36] *Šejh* pri Arabcih označuje osebo z ugledom, v novejšem času pa tako imenujejo tudi verske učenjake. Torej gre za neke vrste titulo, katero se nadene osebi, ki uživa ugled zaradi svojega verskega znanja.

Dina pa je svoje interpretacije povzemala nekje vmes, med tistimi bolj liberalnimi in tistimi bolj konzervativnimi. Tako sama nikoli ne bi nosila roza oblačil kot Aiša, hkrati pa bi si, kot se je v nekem drugem pogovoru izrazila, prav gotovo zakrila obraz, če bi živela kje drugje in ne v Sloveniji, kjer je okolje za kaj takega preveč utesnjujoče.

ZAKLJUČEK

Na Zahodu so uveljavljene predstave o tem, da so muslimanke, ki se pokrivajo, zatirane. Prepričanje o opresivni naravi pokrival in zakrival se je uveljavilo z orientalističnimi diskurzi, ki so v preteklosti spremljali kolonializem v prekomorskih angleških in francoskih kolonijah z muslimanskim prebivalstvom. Da bi se opravičilo prisotnost v kolonijah, je bilo potrebno dokazati, da so islamski običaji zaostali in šovinistični. Tako so bile muslimanke v angleških in francoskih orientalističnih delih pogosto prikazovane kot zakrite, zaprte in zatorej zatirane.

Na Zahodu še danes pogled na pokrito muslimanko pri marsikom vzbuja dvom o njeni dejanski svobodi. Izmuzljivost interpretacije pokrival in zakrival tiči v njihovi dejanski večpomenskosti. Pokrivala in zakrivala so lahko tako znak svobode kot tudi nesvobode, do resnice pa se lahko dokopljemo le, če prakse njihove rabe kontekstualiziramo. Kdo se pokriva, zakaj, v katerem okolju, kako razume primarne islamske vire in komu razlaga svoje oblačilne prakse? Ruta je kot izpraznjena metafora, v katero se vpisujejo številni pomeni. Vse je odvisno od tega, kdo jo razlaga, zakaj, v kakšnem kontekstu in s kakšnim namenom.

Prakse pokrivanja med slovenskimi Bošnjakinjami so se pojavile z vojno v Bosni in Hercegovini. Redke posameznice, ki se pokrivajo, se ne pokrivajo zavoljo tradicije svojih mož ali staršev, temveč zaradi tega, ker so se tako same odločile. S prebiranjem verske literature, ki se je med vojno razmnožila tudi s pomočjo sponzorjev iz islamskega sveta, so prišle do sklepa, da je pokrivanje dolžnost vsake polnoletne muslimanke. Pri tem se sklicujejo na interpretacije islama različnih islamskih intelektualcev, zaradi česar njihove oblačilne prakse privzemajo različne materialne podobe. Prav gotovo pri vsem skupaj ni zanemarljivo dejstvo, da se materialna podoba njihovih oblačil prilagaja tudi okolju, v katerem živijo, saj zaradi predsodkov večinskega prebivalstva do islama poskušajo kljub svoji očitni oblačilni drugačnosti čim manj izstopati. Ker gre pri pokrivanju med Bošnjakinjami za svobodne odločitve, ki temeljijo na osebnem verskem prepričanju, bi lahko povsem mirno in brez dvoma dejali, da so njihova pokrivala izraz svobode veroizpovedi in osebnega izraza: biti to, kar so – muslimanke.

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SUMMARY

»EACH PERSON EXPLAINS VEIL IN HIS OWN WAY«: VEILING AMONG SLOVENIAN BOSNIAKS

Špela Kalčič

Perception that Muslim women who cover themselves are oppressed, is widespread in the West. Conviction that covering is oppressive was first introduced by the orientalist discourse that accompanied colonialism in overseas English and French colonies, populated with Muslims. To justify the presence in colonies, it was necessary to prove that Islamic customs are backward and chauvinistic. Thus, in English and French orientalist works, Muslim women were often presented as covered and therefore oppressed.

 In the West, even today the sight of a covered Muslim woman raises doubts about her actual freedom. Elusiveness of interpretation of covering is due to its actual multiple meanings, as covering can be a sign of either freedom or oppression. The truth can be discovered only when the practices of its use are contextualised. Head scarf is like a blank metaphor to which numerous meanings are ascribed. It all depends on who, why, in what context and with what purpose is interpreting it.

The article is based on the detailed fieldwork that was conducted between 2003 and 2006 in Jesenice. It is exploring the practices of covering among Slovenian Muslim women, specifically Bosniaks. It describes concrete practices of covering, analyses Koran ayat and hadith, religious foundations for covering, presents the most widespread interpretations by Islamic intellectuals and researchers, and lastly turns attention to Bosniak interpretations of primary Islamic sources and their concrete implementation in practice. Interpretations of Koran ayat and hadith in which the covering is justified, are various and are in different environments manifested through very different material shapes and practices. Different understandings of the practice of covering are influenced by factors such as individual's interpretations of Islam, education, personality and environment in which those interpretations take place, and is more important than Islamic sources, i.e. the text. The same is relevant for Slovenian Muslim women, the Bosniaks.

The practice of covering among Slovenian Muslim women surfaced during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Few individuals who cover themselves are not covering because of tradition, their husbands or parents, but because they themselves decided to do so. Reading religious literature that was spread out during the war, also with the help of

sponsors from the Islamic world, they came to a conclusion that covering is an obligation of every grown-up Muslim woman. They are referring to interpretations of Islam by different Islamic intellectuals and therefore, their dressing practices take different material forms. Not to be disregarded is the fact that material image of their clothing tends to be adjusted to their living environment, as despite their different clothing they try not to stand out due to prejudice towards Islam of the majority society. Because covering of Bosniak Muslim women in Slovenia is their free choice, based on individual religious convictions, we can without a doubt argue that their covering is an expression of freedom and personality: to be what they are – Muslim women.

COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF CHANGING IDENTITES: AN EXPLORATION OF MEMORIES AND IDENTITIES RELATED TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

Marja KUZMANIĆ[1]

ABSTRACT

Collective Memory of Changing Identities: An Exploration of Memories and Identities Related to the Disintegration of Yugoslavia
Through the analysis of memories of major events related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia the differences in collective memories and social representations of various generations of Slovenians and other former Yugoslav peoples resident in Slovenia are explored. Qualitative analysis of eighteen semi-structured interviews illustrates contested interpretations or narratives of the break up, memories and representations of Tito's Yugoslavia, and the changes in social (ethnic) identification.
KEYWORDS: social/collective memory, identity, social representations, narratives, disintegration of former Yugoslavia

IZVLEČEK

Kolektivni spomin spreminjajočih se identitet: Študija z razpadom Jugoslavije povezanih spominov in identitet
Prispevek skozi analizo spominov na pomembnejše dogodke razpada Jugoslavije obravnava razlike v kolektivnih spominih ter socialnih predstavah različnih generacij Slovencev ter drugih pripadnikov nekdanjih jugoslovanskih narodnosti, ki danes živijo v Sloveniji. Rezultati kvalitativne analize osemnajstih pol-strukturiranih intervjujev prikazujejo nasprotujoče si intepretacije razpada, spomine in predstave o Titovi Jugoslaviji ter spremembe na področju socialne (predvsem etnične) identifikacije.
KLJUČNE BESEDE: socialni/kolektivni spomin, identiteta, naracija, socialne predstave, razpad nekdanje Jugoslavije

SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Yugoslavia, a liberal communist country, famous for its forty years of relatively successful and peaceful federalism, represented an example of unorthodox socialism and was a country of numerous ethnic communities. Of particular concern for this research[2] is the

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[2] This article is based upon the author's Master's course project, conducted during her postgraduate studies MPhil in Social and Developmental Psychology at the University of Cambridge.

period of the post-WWII or 'Second' Yugoslavia, under Tito's leadership, and especially its break-up in early 1990s. After Tito's death in 1980, the state started to unravel as the governments of the republics began to exercise the powers that were due to them under the constitution of 1974 (Judah 1988). Initial problems ultimately resulted in the break up of the federation in 1991, which began with the secession of Slovenia on June 25th, 1991, and was followed by the 'Ten-days-war' for independence. Shortly after, wars broke out in Croatia and Bosnia, whereas Slovenia emerged practically unharmed as the first independent state.

After June 1991, the Slovenian state began reorganizing its national symbols, renaming its public spaces and changing the way history was taught in schools (Bajt 2003). Mainstream political, historical and media discourse changed considerably and new interpretations of the past and the present emerged. For example, the teaching of official history in schools changed in 1991 when the school textbooks were altered. The media played an important role in the processes of (re)organization of collective memory and the construction of a non-Yugoslavian, Slovenian national identity in opposition to everything related to former Yugoslavia (Pušnik 2003).

The period of the breakdown of the Yugoslav federation raises complex questions concerning contested and changing identities, collective memories, and representations of reality. Periods of social transformation, like that which took place all over former Yugoslavia, are of much interest to those who study the modification of memories and identities, even if not through migration per se. During the times of the Second Yugoslavia, cultural and ethnic distinction was only somewhat acknowledged. A complex set of contested collective memories co-existed in this multiethnic and multinational state (Bajt 2003), but a common supra-national identity, based on Yugoslav brotherhood and unity as well as on the workers movement, was promoted. This Yugoslav identity was primarily formulated as an ideological narrative by the communist political elite and supported by mass rituals and commemorations (Jović 2004). The collapse of the authoritarian regime in Yugoslavia involved a change in the sphere of 'official memories' (Jović 2004) and a rupture in people's private memories, representations, traditions, as well as their social and personal identities. Questions of what it means to be Slovenian or Non-Slovenian became prominent. The complexities of contemporary Slovenian society, marked by the co-existence of various ethnic communities, who used to belong to the same supra-national entity, represent a prolific research context for the exploration of potentially existing contested collective interpretations of history and their relation to social representation and identification.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Memory, the main focus of this study, is seen as inherently social from a social constructivist perspective. Moreover, *collective or social memory* is understood as a process of remembering and forgetting (Wertsch 2002; Middleton & Edwards 1990; Schwartz 1982) through which we "give shape to our experience, thought and imagination in terms of past, present and future" (Brockmeier 2002: 21). Contradictorily, it is concerned with

content and process, change and stability at the same time as it refers to continuity and preservation of the past but also pertains to altering the past in order 'to fit' the present (Middleton & Edwards 1990). In this way it is considered to play a role in rhetorical and political processes related to identification, and serves as a usable past for justification and legitimisation of beliefs, attitudes, and needs of the present (Paez, Basabe & Gonzales 1997; Wertsch 2002). Although drawing on Maurice Halbwachs' (1992 [1952]) notion of the *frameworks of collective memory,* the clear-cut distinction between historical, collective (social) and autobiographical (internal, personal) memory is questioned since memory cannot exist without individuals 'carrying out' the act of remembering, consequently undermining the possibility of existence of collective memory simply 'out there'. Collective memory is hence understood as a social or collective process influenced by various factors of the social sphere, but carried out by individuals, who belong to certain social groups, which in turn circularly influence people's 'ways of remembering'. This proximity between individual and collective memory, as well as the emphasis on the process of remembering as such, can be better understood by taking into account the notions of *identification* and *narrative.*

Narrative organization proves to be particularly important due to its capacity to give shape to temporal dimension of human experience (Brockmeier 2002). The complexities of the world cannot be dealt with 'event-by–event', they are rather framed into larger structures, frames or schemata, providing the interpretative context for the various components they encompass (Bruner 1990). Narrative is the most pervasive and important form of discourse in human communication (Bruner 1990) that provides 'conceptual' or 'mental' tools for people to engage in the processes of remembering, forgetting, representing, and identifying.

Identification and remembering (forgetting) are well conceptualized through the *Social Representations Theory* (SRT) (Moscovici 1973; 2000; Duveen 2000; 2001), a prominent socio-psychological theory. Social representations are systems of values, ideas and practices – collective elaborations of social objects – which help people to orient themselves in the material and social world. SRT is hence explicitly concerned with different kinds of social knowledge, communication and types of representations. It supplies a framework for exploring contested interpretations of history, studying intergroup relations between 'us' and 'other', and understanding identity (re-)construction in the contexts where potentially distinct representations of reality exist. This approach has also extended our understanding of *social identity* as part of one's self-concept, based on membership of a social group, since it emphasizes that identity is not only about identifying but is also about 'being identified' by the 'other' (Duveen 2001).

In research concerned with the narration of memories about a particular historical transition or rupture, such as the transition from socialist Yugoslavia to capitalist Slovenia, the consideration of all these concepts is essential.

RESEARCH FORMULATION

Accounts of existing research on collective memory, Slovenian national identity formation, and the transition from Yugoslavia to independent Slovenia draw mainly on the media, historical and political discourses, history textbooks, and so on (Bajt 2003; Pušnik 1999; 2003; 2004; Bašić-Hrvatin 1997). How well these sources reflect the (collective) memories and representations of the larger public is difficult to tell. For such a purpose, sample interview data are essential to account for the personal or individual dimensions of the 'social sphere' (Jovchelovitch 2002). Accordingly, individuals as active interpreters of cultural material or the 'memory consumers' (Kansteiner 2002) are the focal point of this study, which is concerned with the differing collective memories and representations between Slovenians and other former Yugoslav peoples (Bosniacs and Serbs) now resident in Slovenia in relation to some of the major recent historical and political events. The focus on samples of individuals, who perform the 'act of remembering', allows for the exploration of ways in which memory relates to the processes of identification and social representation, prominent issues also in migration research.

With the aim of exploring the differences that membership of an ethnic group might exert upon people's interpretation of the past, this report focuses on memories and representations of some major events related to the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. These are Tito's death, the wars in Slovenia, Bosnia and Croatia, the beginning of the war(s), the disintegration of the federation and the attainment of Slovenian independence. Through the analysis of memories of these events, the main objective is to elaborate on the studies that explore whether, and in what ways, group membership influences memories and interpretations of people's experience. It is predicted that people would remember the break up of Yugoslavia according to the collective framework of the group they belong to. Given that the interviewees live in the same environment, and were more or less exposed to the same events, both directly and via the media, it is expected that they will all remember such major events. The significance and the influence of these events, as well as the emotions attached to them, are expected to vary. Special focus is paid to the role that identification plays in people's memories and, vice versa, how narratively structured memories relate to people's constructions of who they are.

RESEARCH METHODS

> Those of us analyzing collective remembering and other forms of human action are just as socioculturally situated as the individuals and groups we examine. (Wertsch 2002: 18)

For the purpose of data collection, selective or theoretical sampling (Strauss 1987) was employed – deliberate selection, not aiming for representativeness but covering a good cross-section of people of different ethnicity, age, gender, educational background,

social class and so on. Eighteen (N=18) participants were recruited through various organisations, cultural societies, and acquaintances[3], six from each of the three most dissimilar ethnic communities in Slovenia[4] – the Bosniac[5] and Serbian minorities and the Slovenian majority. According to the 2002 Census, Slovenia is considered a rather homogeneous state, with 83.1% of its population declaring themselves as Slovenian. However, the people from former Yugoslavia represent about 7% of the population. It is important to emphasize that they do not have a constitutionally defined minority status in the Republic of Slovenia at the moment. Many of them have lived in Slovenia for a few decades but are not considered to be autochthonous population; however, neither are they complete foreigners. Since the break up their 'place' is somewhere in between (Bajt 2003). The majority arrived in Slovenia as economic immigrants after World War II, or following the break up of Yugoslavia. The term 'Non-Slovenians' has been used to denote them. Owing to this 'special' status, the discrepancies between their memories of Yugoslavia and its disintegration, compared to the memories and representations of the majority population, might illuminate the fluid relationship between collective memory and social identity.

Interviewing, coding and analysing

Multiple conflicting and changeable realities are assumed to exist 'out there' from the social constructivist standpoint taken in this research. Such a perspective is indispensable in research concerning contested interpretations of history. Individuals are considered as active interpreters of events and the researcher is perceived as participating in the processes of 'meaning-making'. Accordingly, the semi-structured questionnaire, which consisted of 20 open-ended questions pertaining to people's memories of specific events and their feelings of belonging to any particular group, did not aim at standardisation. Instead,

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[3] The Peace Institute (Institute for Contemporary Social and Political Studies), Society Serbian Community, and other sources.

[4] Due to the limits of this research, it was impossible to include other ethnic communities.

[5] As with other groups, it is also difficult to speak of a homogenous group of inhabitants originating from the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since May 2006, there are officially two registered Muslim religious communities in Slovenia – the Islamic community and the Slovenian Muslim Community. This speaks of the heterogeneity amongst Non-Slovenian ethnic groups in Slovenia. 'Bosnian', as an identity, still describes the inhabitants of Bosnia, mainly of Muslim cultural background. However, before, both Serbs and Croats from Bosnia would consider themselves Bosnian. The term 'Muslim' (Musliman) was introduced in the post WWII Yugoslav censuses as distinct from 'Serb' and 'Croat' as a culturally and religiously different majority group living in Bosnia and Hercegovina. 'Muslims' were thus constructed primarily as a cultural-ethnic group. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia the term 'Muslim' became more religiously determined, and the term 'Bosniac' (Bošnjaci) was introduced to replace it as a national identity attribution. The declaration of 'Bosniac' as a national category was enforced by the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994, and is thus a new category alongside the categories of 'Muslim' and 'Bosnian'. In accordance with this declaration the term 'Bosniac' is used in this report.

each interview took a slightly different direction and the same topics were discussed in varying order depending on the interviewee.[6]

Interviews took place in April 2006, lasted between 30 and 45 minutes and were mostly conducted in Slovenian; however, some were in Bosnian, some in Serbian. They were tape-recorded, transcribed and translated into English. Using a blend of thematic and narrative qualitative analysis (Flick 1998; 2002; Mishler 1986), I systematically examined the obvious and implicit (or latent) meanings and content of the data.[7] Not to hamper the analysis by solely inductive formation of categories, the use of more open coding and categorising procedures was appropriate, such as those found in Grounded Theory (Strauss & Corbin 1994; Mayring 2004). Hence, a partially deductive and partially inductive procedure was employed, combining the strengths of data-driven with more deductive approaches. To increase consistency, coding took place twice with the aid of the *Atlas-ti* computer program. The program, used solely for indexing and organisation, allowed a systematic comparison of identified themes across groups and generations. Analysis was a circular process: it was essential to return to the already analyzed fragments to ensure the consistent usage of the codes.

INTERPRETATION OF THE ANALYSIS

Above described analysis revealed four directions of interpretation. The first, with a focus on the form or structure, considers the emplotment of memories into higher level frameworks or narratives. The second concerns representations of Tito's Yugoslavia and is followed by the most interesting section on group-contested interpretations of the disintegration. The last part observes the complex changes in identification that occurred during the period of transition. All major unquestionably interrelated directions of interpretation are presented in a slightly shortened version due to the limits of this paper.

Emplotment

The process of how elements acquire meaning through their integration into a narrative plot is described as 'emplotment' by Paul Ricoeur (1985). This represents a prolific characterisation of the processes underway in the analyzed data as specific memories are

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[6] In this way, the interview was an open discourse between the speakers (Mishler 1986), the atmosphere was more comfortable and the interviewees less concerned with what they could or could not say in what would ordinarily be a hierarchical encounter. I allowed the respondents to continue, even if they had digressed from the point of the question – in this way one is more likely to find stories or narratives.

[7] Codes were formulated, reformulated and discarded as the grasp of the data deepened. Some focused more on the content (e.g. *'Tito's death',* or *'life events'*), whereas others denoted more subtle structures and patterns that emerged from the data (e.g. *'interrelatedness', 'taken-for-granted'* etc.).

placed into broader frameworks, related to other events, and to people's mental states so as to begin to make sense and acquire meaning as well as explanatory and interpretative power for the narrator. This is congruent with the view that narrative organisation of experience is important for making sense of the past as well as for establishing the interpretative context for present and future experience (Brockmeier 2002; Bruner 1990; Mishler 1986; Jovchelovitch & Bauer 2000). On the basis of the transcripts, it is possible to distinguish between grand narratives and shorter personal stories or memories of events. The two are in some ways indiscernible, since the personal and the social are entirely interrelated. Personal narratives only acquire meaning once they are situated within some grand narrative by means of sequencing into complex nets of events. The constant interplay of personal or family memories with more social or collective level narratives or frameworks seems to be a significant indicator of emplotment. In the following sections I present what appear to be other indicators of inherent narrative emplotment of memories.

Sequential narratives

The proposed grand narratives, within which personal memories acquire meaning, correspond to the narratives of the war and/or disintegration of Yugoslavia, or to the narrative of Slovenian independence – all importantly intertwined. Although there appear to be several levels, all narratives share a common characteristic – their plot is essentially sequential. This can be observed from Janez's[8] description of how he remembers the day when Tito died. He was only 12 years old at the time.

> M.K .[9]: Could you tell me how you remember it [the day when Tito died]?
> Janez (38): It was like this…I don't know what day and all that was, but it was during the week. I was at home. I came from school and I was doing my homework. My dad and my mom were watching TV or they were somewhere close and they called us [the children] to come and see when they saw the special news: 'Comrade Tito died'. Then we all cried.
> M.K.: Really? All of you?
> Janez: Yes we all cried. I don't know. Then after a couple of days, when there was the funeral, we had something organised in school so that we watched the direct transmission on TV. There were no classes and we were watching the transmission of the funeral. I remember this well. I know that there was Tomaž Terček[10] on TV and that there was a black band or stripe or how it was … 'Comrade Tito died' and everyone started crying. I don't know…

Apart from the unique temporal sequence of the events, which are incorporated into

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8 The names of the respondents have been changed to protect their privacy, but a group specific marker was retained.
9 M.K. (Marja Kuzmanić), the author's initials.
10 A former well known journalist of Ljubljana Radio Television.

the plot ('emplotted'), other characteristic aspects of narrative are noticeable from this extract, such as a clear dramatic note, organisation and familiarisation of newly encountered experience and the presence of various actors as well as the mental state of the narrator. As pointed out by the theorists of narrative organisation of human experience, the sequencing of events represents a crucial step towards their emplotment and memorization.

Inseparability

Inseparability, in other words interconnectedness or interrelatedness, signifies another key aspect of emplotment and narrative organization of memory. It refers to the notion that remembered events, which are incorporated into a narrative, often become highly intertwined and sometimes indiscernible. For instance, when asked about Tito's death, people began talking about their life in Yugoslavia in general. Emira (54) answered the question about Tito's death by saying that, "the only difference is that you were safer and more secure in those times. The authorities had a bigger power…how can I say this…the police or whoever […]". Instead of focusing on Tito's death, she referred to the change or transition which it signifies, describing the period when he was the president. Similarly, when asked about how he remembers the day of Slovenian independence a student switched the conversation to say how both of us were the first generation of pupils who were not Tito's pioneers.[11] These two examples are just some of many, which point to the existence of broader frameworks or narratives that incorporate all these events and render them inseparable. Focusing on particular events seems to activate a broader framework in which other related memories are also organized.

Dialogicality: Thinking in oppositions

Finally, to invoke a picture or a memory of the past, the interviewees relied on the opposition between 'before' and 'after'. This indicates a formation of a narrative which encompasses the notion of time and what happened during that time. To make sense of the past, memories have to be compared to some other period which leads to the sequencing of events and to formation of grand narratives from personal accounts and stories. Not only are memories remembered through the 'before-after' opposition, at the same time, the image of the past is appropriated through the eyes of the present. My discussion of Tito's death with Breda, a 55 year old teacher, might further illustrate this point.

M.K.: So this seems to be an important event for you [Tito's death]…why so?
Breda (55): I mean everything changed and it became worse because before it wasn't so bad. The majority, everyone…whoever wanted to work could work,

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[11] At around the age of seven all Yugoslav children were accepted among Tito's pioneers and later they became members of the Socialist Youth Association.

we had jobs, we had enough money. In those times I didn't have to check what I will and won't buy in the supermarket. I went to the supermarket, threw everything into the trolley, bought it and went home. And I even had money left at the end. Even at the end of the month I had money in my account.
M.K.: So there is a big economic or material difference…
Breda: Yes, very much so.
M.K.: Aha.
Breda: I also didn't check the electricity…how much it was. I never looked at the bills. How much is this, how much is that. I always had some money left. And I had a teacher's salary and a bit of supplement for the difficulty of my work.

In many ways this is a very telling extract[12]epitomizing several themes taken up in the analysis and interpretation. The interviewee makes a distinction between 'before' and 'after', concerning Tito's death – an event she mentioned as the most important national or political event, signifying the time when things began to change radically. No matter which event is perceived as a turning point, no matter how much of a rupture it represents for the interviewee, everyone employs the 'before-after' distinction to frame their experience and talk about how they remember it.

Returning to the above example, Tito's death is not important in itself, but because it reminds the interviewee of the past times which seem to be better in comparison with today. This is not an unusual point of view in former Yugoslav countries, nor in other post-communist countries. In this example, the content that is taken for granted is of particular interest. By saying how 'before' Tito died she did not have to worry about how much money she was spending, she is invoking the 'before-after' distinction and inferring that today she is probably hardly able to make ends meet. It is taken as common knowledge (i.e. representation) that being a teacher was not a particularly lucrative profession at the time, yet she was living well. However, if her status had changed in a positive manner, her representations and memories of those times would surely be different – according to the present. Thus, the memories are always seen from today's perspective in accordance with unique social, cultural, and political circumstances or, as emphasized by Halbwachs (1992 [1952]) and others, re-constructed in order to fit the present situation.

Memories and representations of Tito's Yugoslavia

This section is explicitly concerned with the 'before' and as such represents the point of departure for the discussion of the 'after', which refers to the memories of the break up and will be discussed shortly. Although there were no specific questions in the questionnaires aiming at people's representations of Yugoslavia as such, this emerged as one of the most salient themes. The former Yugoslavia is conceptualized in relation to the representations of the communist or socialist ideology. These are sometimes given

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[12] As valuable as many of those that regrettably could not be included in this report.

directly, people describe them openly, but they are also expressed indirectly in their narratives of specific events corresponding to Serge Moscovici's (2000) notion of social representations as most commonly taken for granted or implicit.

By means of talking about 'before' and 'after' or 'now' this representation of Yugoslavia is contrasted with today's situation. Contested or polemical representations of Yugoslavia are present, which do not vary much between interviewees but within their accounts. There are common threads or themes around which representations and memories evolve; however, there is no common pattern in which members of different ethnic groups would differ in their representations of Yugoslavia – signifying that there are perhaps collectively shared representations among most members of Slovenian society.

Representations of former Yugoslavia cluster mainly around two poles, negative and positive. Among the later are especially those, to which the interviewees referred when talking about how life was better 'before', such as social security, safety, equality, prosperity, indiscrimination, and freedom. These are all conceptualized in comparison to the situation in Slovenia today.

> Jožica (74): The feeling of safety for people was much higher…Today someone can be lying behind the road and no one will look at him, whereas they used to take care of every person. That was really a social state and today we have the market economy and everyone is just trying to get more money.

> Samo (33): When we lived in Yugoslavia, everyone was equally poor.

> Suzana (38): You could stop wherever you wanted, you slept wherever you wanted. No one asked you what are you or where are you or why are you here. It was more free.

These examples convey positive representations of the former state and explicitly or implicitly talk about the present. The past and the present are importantly contrasted and intertwined - one contributes to the definition the other and vice versa.

The above views are often, but not always, accompanied with a representation of the system as totalitarian, a form of dictatorship. Socialist ideas and the system are considered to be 'implanted' or 'imposed' into people's minds, forced upon them mainly through education. Again these views are contrasted with today, implying that now one is able to take a more objective viewpoint and look at the past. However, our opinions, memories and representations of the past are framed through today's collective frameworks. Even as a researcher, who exercises maximum reflexivity, one remains within the same cultural or social frameworks.

> M.K.: So did Tito mean anything to you…since you cried when he died?
> Janez (38): I don't know. At the time it was…, it was implanted so that he was supposed to mean something. I don't know… If I think about it today, I don't think he meant much to us.

There are numerous other examples where interviewees refer to the ways in which the socialist ideology was promulgated and express a less favourable view of former country.

CONTESTED NARRATIVES OF THE BREAK UP OF YUGOSLAVIA

Three kinds of grand narratives according to which people talk about the events related to the break up of Yugoslavia were identified: (a) narrative of transition or change, (b) narrative of disintegration, and (c) narrative of war.

Transition or change

The theme of transition or change is the narrative which encompasses a rupture of a least disruptive character. It comes as no surprise that those who understand the break up mainly in terms of transition are mostly members of the Slovenian majority. Others give some attention to the transition, but these are mainly those who did not experience highly disturbing events, especially the younger individuals. Transition or change encompasses several different themes, but pertains especially to the transformation from the former to the current political system and is recognized by the accentuation of the primarily positive alterations brought by the era of independent Slovenia.

> Gaja (22): I think that after the attainment of independence Slovenia came into a sort of a transition period, when it had to prove to itself and to others that this is a country capable of being independent and that it can be economically successful, etc. […] I think that this influenced our life very much. How I see this today, it seems to me that it had a positive impact, right. This is probably also important. If I think about myself and my family, I think that I have better opportunities now than I would have had before. What do I know… I still feel today that it had an important influence.

> Sanel (25): It is actually a start of a completely new… a change … a process of change begun in that way. Since then so many things changed that remained the same before. Many many things…

These two extracts communicate the manner in which Slovenian independence, as a part of the break up of Yugoslavia, is often viewed. For Slovenian interviewees especially, this is a period of change marked less by an identity crisis and described as something exciting – a period of new opportunities.

Disintegration

Present explicitly or implicitly among the interviewees of the newly formed minorities in Slovenia is the sense of having lost a homeland, of becoming a foreigner in their own country. There appear to be different ways in which these people experienced the period of late 1980s and early 1990s, depending on how much the war and related events influenced their lives. The interviewees of Serbian ancestry focus more on the fact that the country disintegrated – what represents the moment of rupture for them.

> Slavica (55): For me a very horrible and sad event - so to speak - was when Yugoslavia disintegrated. That was also shocking for me because I was brought up in such a way that there is only one homeland and I thought I was in my homeland and that I won't need two citizenships…and I don't have one.

> Nikola (60): The third [important event] and what hurt me the most is the break up of ex-Yugoslavia. We lived in some ideals, in brotherhood and unity, we lived this and we believed in it and then it all disintegrated overnight. So…I'm speaking emotionally, I feel this very deeply.

These people found themselves in a peculiar situation. For them, the most salient aspect was the fact that the common homeland, where they used to be the majority population, suddenly disappeared. In this sense, the disintegration is often related to the establishment of borders between countries, and in many cases interviewees talked about how new borders impeded them from travelling to visit their families in Serbia and/or Bosnia.

War(s)

The analysis shows that there exists a common pattern in which people mention the war as the most important event in their life. They often refer to the 'War in Yugoslavia' as a single entity, but also to the 'War in Bosnia' in particular.[13] Sanel, a 22 year old student, answered my introductory question about the most important events in his life:

> I mostly remember a part of my childhood that I spent in Bosnia, then my 6th birthday because I got a horse from my grandfather. Then the most important event is the war in Bosnia.

Overall, there were five interviewees who mentioned the war straight away, all of

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[13] There is no one 'war in Yugoslavia' in the memories of the interviewees, although sometimes the interviewees and the interviewer referred to the whole period in this way. Instead, there is 'war in Slovenia', 'war in Bosnia', and 'war in Croatia'. There are also different views as to when the war began, although most of the interviewees speak about the events after June 25th, 1991, as the beginning of 'everything'.

them Bosniacs. This is not to say that the others find the war irrelevant, but points to the importance this experience played in people's lives and the role it still plays in their memories, identity and thought. For this group, the importance of the war is more personal and intimate; it represents a greater rupture in their lives, selves and identities. Although almost all of the interviewees lived in Slovenia during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia[14], they experienced and memorized those years differently depending on their distinct situation or social location. Not only did these people mention the war straight away, but often interviews as a whole evolved in the same tone – within the same grand narrative or framework of collective memory.

CHANGING IDENTITIES

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Slovenian attainment of independence, the social environment in which people understood 'who they are' transformed considerably. Depending on their unique circumstances, people experienced a certain rupture in their identities, followed by coping, construction and re-construction of social representations, redefinition of certain group identities and re-establishment of what is acceptable and what is not. Such complex shifts are related to how and what people remember, as well as how this becomes structured narratively. A prominent theme that surfaced during the analysis is this emergence of new and reformulation of old identities.

Interviewees engage in remembering the period of the break up and the attainment of Slovenian independence in terms of what could be characterized as a rupture in people's sense of self, a transition from 'no differentiation to differentiation'. Many of the interviewees talked about how 'before' people were not aware of where others come from; ethnic identity or ethnicity was not of any particular importance in that society. This changed with the disintegration and independence. Slovenians, and especially 'Non-Slovenians' remember this as a period when Slovenian national identity was emerging. Some of them describe how suddenly they felt differently, perhaps as foreigners, in what used to be 'their own' country.

> Jasmin (28): Of this 'consciousness raising' I remember that as a member of a minority in Slovenia you could feel some pressure especially during the time when this Slovenian national consciousness was on the rise. We, as a minority in Slovenia, were at the time perhaps in an awkward position. Probably the same would happen if the roles were reversed.

Regardless of the ethnic group to which the interviewees belong, all attested the transition from 'no differentiation to differentiation', but Slovenians experienced it in the least disruptive fashion. This can partly be explained by noting that one could no longer

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[14] There are two exceptions; one moved from Slovenia to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, whereas one moved to Ljubljana, Slovenia from Sarajevo in the same year.

be a Yugoslav in an ethnic, legal or political sense. According to Sekulić, Massey and Hodson (1994), persons from minority nationalities in their republic, urban residents, youths, and those from mixed-nationality parentage were among those who were most likely to identify themselves as Yugoslavs. Moreover, it can be related to the socio-political processes occurring across Yugoslavia throughout the 1980s and 1990s – some form of ethno-national mobilization and/or rising of national consciousness. The theme of changing identities is salient across interviewees' accounts, but the memories carry significantly different meanings depending on how people were socially located 'before' and 'after' the disintegration. This is not solely related to how they identify themselves, but, perhaps even more importantly, how they are seen in the eyes of others.

> Jožica (74): Sometimes there used to be many Southerners around here, but they were all 'Bosnians' for us. Understand? We never knew anything…Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and those…we always had good relations with all of them.

Whilst it may be true that prior to disintegration it was less important where one is from, in the eyes of some Slovenians people from 'the South' were (and still are) often considered as one entity (the 'Southerners'), as in the abstract above. This intensified after the disintegration and through the 'building' of Slovenian national consciousness or identity. During this process, promulgated mainly by the political and media discourse campaign, people from other republics of the former Yugoslavia began to signify 'the other' – that which is not Slovenian (Pušnik 2003). Since a social group appears only to acquire significance if juxtaposed to another group or 'the other' (Deschamps 1982), for the Slovenians the people from the other republics became this 'other'. The tendency to define everyone as 'Bosnian' or 'Southerner' is congruent with Deschamps' (1982) characterization of dominant and dominated groups, where the dominant members of a society perceive other 'entities' as being composed of undifferentiated elements, who are not unique. It is argued that both dominant and dominated define themselves in relation to the same norm. The dominated are assigned a particular position or location and as such their identity entails both – processes of identification and of being identified (Duveen 2000).

In the following, some important points of discussion are considered before turning to the conclusion.

DISCUSSION

What is said during an interview is always communicated to a particular 'other', and it might take different directions depending on how the listener is perceived and represented. High levels of reflexivity and transparency of the analytical procedures were sought. However, although attempts at awareness and reflection were constantly made, one should not think that, simply by virtue of reflexivity, the researcher "can ever completely

control the multiple and complex effects of the interview relationship" (Bourdieu 1999: 615). Rather than eliminating the effects of the interviewer, I tried to control them and also to reduce the 'symbolic violence' as well as to enhance the conditions of 'non-violent communication' by allowing each interview to take its own direction and by establishing rapport (Bourdieu 1999).

Not only because of the small size of the sample, but also because the interviewees come from very different parts of the former state[15], ethnic groups, whose accounts this study compared, were not homogenous as expected at first. In fact, they were quite heterogeneous, but still some group differences appear to be present. The data revealed clearly that perceived ethnic or national identities are thoroughly intertwined with who and what people are as workers, students, or family members. This is related to the fact that age, sex, ethnicity and social position assign people a specific location within a society (Deschamps 1982), which, in turn, influences their social identity. Everyone possesses a unique blend of identities and memories, rendering it difficult to identify memories that vary according to one's affiliation with a certain social group.

CONCLUSION

By initiating research in collective memory this study represents a snapshot of 21st century Slovenian realities. The main questions pertained to how the processes of remembering and identification are shaped or organized and what is the nature of the relationship between the two. The article observed whether there are systematic ways in which certain people in contemporary Slovenian context remember the period of disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The war (or disintegration) represents an event which radically interrupted people's everyday life, and is viewed as a rupture. There appear to be systematic ways in how this rupture is remembered and interpreted. Although the ethnic groups of the participants were not homogeneous, the analysis indicated that there exist varying interpretations of reality, frameworks of collective memory or grand narratives: the narratives of 'transition', 'disintegration' and 'war'. The extent to which the interviewees focused on a particular aspect of the experience relating to the break up of Yugoslavia speaks of the differential influence and significance that these events exerted upon various communities in Slovenia. This is related to the notion that one's memories are influenced by the social location one occupies, or by the social representations and identities one assumes within a particular social order. However, representations and identities only come into existence through the human capacity to remember, which is, in turn, contingent on people's ability to structure their experience narratively.

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[15] Some of the ethnic Serbs are originally Bosnian Serbs, whereas others (or their parents) come from Serbia (and Montenegro). Likewise, the samples of Slovenians, as well as Bosniacs, were very heterogeneous.

By examining one dimension of the social sphere through the medium of people's memories of specific events, this study has shown how the period is also conceptualized through the changes that occurred in terms of identity (re)construction. The theme of changing identities signifies a period of instability, when people's basic sense of 'who they are' was under attack and when they had to re-situate themselves in the newly emerging social order. This reformulation of different social identities seems to have penetrated various segments of Slovenian society. As a consequence, some people experienced it in rather disturbing ways. Taken together, social representations do not only enable communication and understanding, but also serve as a guide for people's behaviour. What occurred on the abstract representational level of identification seems to have been transposed to a more concrete interpersonal level. Not only did people, who moved to Slovenia before the war or who were born to 'Non-Slovenian' parents, suddenly become foreigners in their own country, they became disliked and often discriminated against.

Above all, this report reflects two important things. It is a fact that the processes of 'construction' of collective memory are constantly underway and that contemporary political, historical and media discourses shape which events are being remembered and commemorated, and select which ones are to fall into historic oblivion. Yet, individuals are active interpreters of the information that is presented to them, and, hence, collective memories always embody unique blends of various influences and interpretations. When the respondents were critical about the present situation, the representations of the past served the purpose of denoting better times. However, negative views of the past, made sense of or justified the present system or situation. In the end, although it appears that group membership might afford people access to different narrative or collective frameworks and that the complex phenomena of collective memory, identity and representation are dialogically related, these all represent processes which involve active individuals performing the act of remembering, rather than simply having memories 'imprinted' onto their minds.

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POVZETEK

KOLEKTIVNI SPOMIN SPREMINJAJOČIH SE IDENTITET: ŠTUDIJA Z RAZPADOM JUGOSLAVIJE POVEZANIH SPOMINOV IN IDENTITET

Marja Kuzmanić

Prispevek predstavlja začetni korak v raziskovanju organizacije ter medsebojne povezanosti kolektivnega spomina, socialnih predstav ter identifikacije v sodobnem slovenskem postsocialističnem prostoru. Skozi analizo spominov na pomembnejše dogodke razpada Jugoslavije, kot so denimo Titova smrt, začetek vojn(e), vojne na nekaterih področjih nekdanje Jugoslavije ter osamosvojitev Republike Slovenije, obravnava razlike v kolektivnih spominih ter socialnih predstavah različnih generacij Slovencev ter drugih pripadnikov nekdanjih jugoslovanskih narodnosti, ki danes živijo v Sloveniji.

S pripadniki treh etničnih skupin (Slovenci, Bošnjaki in Srbi) je bilo izvedenih osemnajst pol-strukturiranih intervjujev. Rezultati kvalitativne analize, utemeljene na socialno-konstruktivistični raziskovalni paradigmi, so obravnavani preko t.i. 'vzgodbljanja' [v izvirniku emplotment] spominov na posamezne dogodke v zaporedne narativne strukture – procesov pozabljanja ter spominjanja. Prispevek prikazuje nasprotujoče si intepretacije razpada nekdanje Jugoslavije (narativne 'tranzicije', 'razpada' in 'vojne'), spomine in predstave o Titovi Jugoslaviji ter zapletene spremembe, do katerih je v Sloveniji prišlo v času tranzicije na področju socialne (predvsem etnične) identifikacije. Te spremembe so pomembno povezane z vprašanjem, kako postanejo dostopni različni narativni oziroma kolektivni okvirji na podlagi posameznikove identifikacije s socialnimi ali kulturnimi skupinami.

NEZAŽELENI? MEDIJSKE IN POLITIČNE KONSTRUKCIJE TUJCEV V SLOVENIJI

Ana KRALJ[1]

IZVLEČEK

Nezaželeni? Medijske in politične konstrukcije tujcev v Sloveniji

Avtorica s pomočjo diskurzivne analize raziskuje, kako so se tiskani množični mediji in politični predstavniki v slovenskem parlamentu odzvali na prihod tujcev (»ilegalnih« imigrantov) v obdobju t.i. prebežniške krize v Sloveniji v letih 2000 in 2001. Ugotovila je, da sta medijski in politični govor vzpostavila serijo diskriminatornih diskurzivnih praks s prevladujočo tezo o ogroženosti slovenstva, kar je vplivalo na institucionalno politično delovanje z legitimacijo sprememb zakonodaje v smeri zniževanja že doseženih standardov obravnave imigrantov, še posebej prosilcev za azil.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: tujci, nacionalizem, odnos do imigrantov v Sloveniji

ABSTRACT

Unwanted? Media and Political Constructions of Foreigners in Slovenia

Through a discursive analysis approach the author researches how the press and the political representatives in the Slovenian parliament reacted to the arrival of foreigners ("illegal" immigrants) in the period of the so called immigration crisis in 2000 to 2001. The author comes to the conclusion that the media discourse and the political discourse of the time established a series of discriminatory discursive practices, where the dominant thesis was one in which slovenianhood was threatened, and this in turn led to an institutional political action, with a legitimation of changes in legislation towards lowering the standards of the treatment of immigrants, especially asylum seekers.

KEY WORDS: foreigners, nationalism, attitudes towards immigrants in Slovenia

UVOD

Upravni aparat nacionalne države zaznava dve vrsti tujcev; bodisi tiste, ki so ravnokar prečkali državno mejo bodisi tiste skupine, ki znotraj nacionalnega teritorija bivajo že dolgo časa. Slednjim nacionalna država lahko priznava poseben (kolektiven) status in jih uvršča v pravno kategorijo nacionalnih manjšin, vendar priznavanje manjšinskega statusa

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ne pomeni nujno tudi priznavanja posebnih pravic ali zaščite[2]. Tujci, četudi jim je priznan status manjšine, so skupina ljudi, ki je neprestano pod drobnogledom. Izpostavljeni so vsakovrstnim sumničenjem predvsem pod pretvezo, da so »drugačni«, drugačnost pa se (samoumevno) interpretira kot škodljiva odklonskost. Tujci postanejo »osumljenci«, ne da bi karkoli storili; senca suma, če že ne krivda, je stalno prisotna ne glede na samo obnašanje ali dejanja. V zgodovini krščanske Evrope so bili Judje kot posamezniki in kot skupnost prototip sumljivih tujcev, ki jim ne gre zaupati, četudi so (bili) asimilirani, pravi Ulrich Bielefeld (1998)[3]. Podobno še vedno velja za Rome (tudi, če so stalno naseljeni na določenem ozemlju), ki ne glede na pravice, izhajajoče iz državljanstva, ostajajo permanentni tujci, podvrženi vztrajni socialni in prostorski segregaciji, zavračanju, kulpabilizaciji in kriminalizaciji.

»Drugačnost« v nacionalističnem diskurzu postane totalizirajoč, prvinski označevalec, ki služi kot argument za zavračanje soobstoja oziroma mešanja različnih rasnih ali etničnih skupin oziroma posameznikov. Pierre-André Taguieff (1988) in Zygmunt Bauman (2003) tako denimo govorita o »miksofobiji«, to je strahu pred mešanjem s tujci. Ravno njihova »drugačnost«, podkrepljena s tezo o »različnosti kultur in njihovem medsebojnem neskladju«, je eden poglavitnih argumentov zoper priseljevanje in integracijo tujcev v nove družbe. Prizadevanja, da bi ohranili »tuje«, »drugo« in »drugačno« na ustrezni varnostni razdalji, hodijo z roko v roki z odločitvijo, da se onemogoči potreba po komuniciranju, sodelovanju in medsebojnem usklajevanju, in so posledica ontološke ne-varnosti, ki temelji na novi krhkosti družbenih vezi. »Take želje se stekajo, združujejo in zgoščajo v politiko etničnega ločevanja, še zlasti obrambe pred dotokom 'tujcev'«, pravi Bauman (2000: 138-139).

Ob izteku dvajsetega stoletja je za razprave o »tujcih« postalo značilno, da se od-

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[2] V Sloveniji sta z ustavo priznani dve manjšinski skupnosti: avtohtona italijanska in madžarska manjšinska skupnost. V 65. členu Ustave Republike Slovenije je določeno, da položaj in posebne pravice romske skupnosti, ki živi v Sloveniji, ureja zakon, ki je bil po dolgih polemikah v parlamentu sprejet leta 2007. Pripadniki v Sloveniji živečih narodov in narodnosti bivše Jugoslavije navkljub številčnosti, ki presega število pripadnikov italijanske ali madžarske manjšine, nimajo priznanega legalnega skupinskega družbenega statusa, zato ustavno-pravno ne obstajajo posebne določbe v prid varovanja njihovih pravic. Več o tem glej v: Klopčič, V., Komac, M., Kržišnik-Bukić, V. (2003): *Položaj in status narodov nekdanje Jugoslavije v Republiki Sloveniji*. Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja ter v Komac, M., Medvešek, M. (ur.) (2005): *Percepcije slovenske integracijske politike*. Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja.

[3] V zadnjih letih na mesto Juda kot »trajno osumničenega tujca, ki kuje zaroto« stopajo predvsem muslimani, kar je postalo še posebej očitno v času po 11. septembru 2001 oziroma po napadu na stolpnici World Trade Centra v New Yorku. Osebe islamske veroizpovedi, četudi z državljanstvom (ZDA ali katere od evropskih držav) in »asimilirane v Zahodno družbo«, so v imaginariju vladajočih elit in prestrašenih »domačinov« postale kolektivni osumljenec. Strah, sumničenje in sovraštvo do muslimanov na področju Evrope in tako imenovanega Zahodnega sveta seveda ni zgodovinski novum. Tomaž Mastnak, denimo, v knjigi »*Evropa: med evolucijo in evtanazijo*« (1998) razvija tezo, da je za konstitucijo Evrope - in še posebej za artikuliranje evropskega diskurza - ključnega pomena ravno sovraštvo do muslimanov.

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vijajo v okviru diskurza biopolitike[4], ki si prizadeva ustvariti poenoteno, pacifizirano, obvladljivo in »normalno« družbeno telo. Po eni strani morajo državne meje za določene skupine ljudi ostajati relativno odprte ali vsaj porozne, da bi omogočile pritok kapitala, delovne sile, komunikacij in (določenih) kulturnih praks, po drugi strani se meje dnevno dograjujejo in utrjujejo. Čeprav se definiranje meja ne odvija zgolj na etnično/rasno/kulturnih merilih, se »tujost« uporablja kot družbeni označevalec in mehanizem diferenciacije, v biopolitičnem diskurzu pa »tujci« kot individuumi postanejo poenoteni v maso in kategorizirani v kolektivnih označevalcih, kot so »(ilegalni) imigranti«, »azilanti«, »prebežniki« in podobno.

ODNOS DO IMIGRANTOV V SLOVENIJI

Politike izključevanja in zavračanja, ki se na (nad)nacionalnih ravneh institucionalizirajo v obliki restriktivnih imigracijskih politik, odzvanjajo tudi na lokalnih ravneh, kjer se vse pogosteje oblikujejo različne »civilnodružbene« iniciative in gibanja, ki v imenu »lastne avtohtonosti« nasprotujejo priseljevanju »tujcev«. V Sloveniji smo bili takim reakcijam priča že v sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja, ko so v iskanju zaposlitve prihajale delavke in delavci iz drugih jugoslovanskih republik, po osamosvojitvi pa predvsem v začetku devetdesetih let v obdobju t.i. »begunske krize«, ko so v Sloveniji iskali zatočišče begunci iz Bosne in Hercegovine. Nato je v letih 2000-2001 kulminirala še t.i. »prebežniška kriza«, ki jo je zaznamovala problematika »ilegalnih imigrantov« in prosilcev za azil. Nenazadnje je treba omeniti še nedavne krčevite odpore številnih lokalnih skupnosti v Sloveniji, ki so po načelu formiranja vaških straž nasprotovale naselitvi romske družine v »njihova lokalna okolja«[5].

Sodeč po rezultatih raziskav, ki obravnavajo odnos večinskega prebivalstva do priseljevanja tujcev v Slovenijo, je ta odklonilen, še posebno pa je to očitno v primerih, ko gre za priseljevanje oseb iz bivših jugoslovanskih republik, ki obenem predstavljajo večinski delež imigrantske populacije v Sloveniji, ter ko gre za priseljevanje iz neevropskih držav, vendar s pomembno razliko – priseljenci z globalnega juga (Afrika) in vzhoda (Azija, Rusija in nekdanje države Sovjetske zveze) so pomembno bolj nezaželeni kot priseljenci iz »panevropskega sveta« (obe Ameriki in Avstralija).

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[4] Biopolitika je proces, s katerim se uveljavlja biooblast, življenje pa je uravnavano na način, s katerim bi se doseglo »ravnotežje«, »regularnost« (Foucault, 2003) in »normalnost« s pomočjo mehanizmov nadzora in intervencije, ki so »imanentni« (Negri, Hardt, 2003) vsem področjem življenja in vsebujejo nešteto subtilnih praks, ki delujejo na nivoju odnosov med ljudmi.

[5] O strahu pred abstraktnimi »tujci«, ki niso nujno tuji državljani - članice in člani romske družine imajo nenazadnje slovensko državljanstvo, vendar njihovo »tujost« dokončno zapečati etnična pripadnost - pričajo tudi tako banalni primeri, kot je denimo prodaja stanovanj Stanovanjskega sklada Republike Slovenije v Cerkljah na Gorenjskem. Lokalna skupnost »avtohtonih domačinov« je namreč izrazila pomisleke zaradi priselitve »tujcev« v Cerklje (Vir: Dnevnik, »Cena odtehta tudi pogled na pokopališče«, 16. 1. 2007).

Tabela 1: Ali bi bilo treba v prihodnosti na splošno omejevati ali spodbujati priseljevanje drugih ljudi v Slovenijo?

	Zelo omejevati	Omejevati	Spodbujati	Zelo spodbujati
Iz Hrvaške	16,8 %	69,0 %	13,2 %	1,0 %
Iz ostalih držav nekdanje Jugoslavije	21,8 %	67,0 %	10,6 %	0,6 %
Iz Madžarske	15,4 %	70,8 %	13,2 %	0,6 %
Iz Avstrije	12,1 %	67,3 %	20,0 %	0,7 %
Iz Italije	13,0 %	68,9 %	17,0 %	1,0 %
Iz drugih držav EU	12,3 %	64,4 %	21,7 %	1,6 %
Iz Rusije in držav, nastalih iz bivše SZ	19,8 %	68,6 %	11,0 %	0,6 %
Iz S. Amerike in Avstralije	13,8 %	65,4 %	18,8 %	2,0 %
Iz J. Amerike	15,7 %	67,8 %	14,5 %	2,0 %
Iz Afrike	19,1 %	67,5 %	12,4 %	1,0 %
Iz Azije	20,1 %	67,2 %	11,8 %	0,9 %

Vir: Hočevar, M. et al. (2004): *Vrednote prostora in okolja: 3. fazno in končno poročilo.* Sumarnik javnomnenjske raziskave – ankete in interpretacija rezultatov. FDV, Ljubljana.

Raziskava Slovensko javno mnenje, opravljena leta 2005, ki je obravnavala področja nacionalne in mednarodne varnosti,[6] je v vprašanju o dejavnikih, ki ogrožajo varnost Slovenije, navajala tudi begunce in ilegalne priseljence. Iz spodnje tabele je razvidno, da več kot 80 odstotkov anketiranih meni, da begunci in ilegalni imigranti malo, srednje ali zelo močno ogrožajo varnost Slovenije.

Tabela 2: Varnost Slovenije ogrožajo:

begunci in ilegalni imigranti	v %
Sploh ne	14,0
Malo	34,4
Srednje	34,1
Zelo močno	13,2
Brez odgovora	4,3

Vir: SJM 2005/2 (*cf* opomba 5)

Strokovnjaki opozarjajo, da je v sodobnih družbah prišlo do kvalitativnih sprememb v izražanju predsodkov. Medtem ko so ljudje predsodke nekoč izražali v neposrednih

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[6] Vir: Toš, Niko in skupina. *Slovensko javno mnenje 2005/2.* Nacionalna in mednarodna varnost (CRP Znanje za varnost in mir) in Mednarodna povolilna raziskava [datoteka podatkov]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij [izdelava]. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov [distribucija], november 2005.

stikih s člani drugih (stigmatiziranih) družbenih skupin, se danes kažejo predvsem skozi izogibanje stikov z njimi (Ule 1999). V tem smislu lahko interpretiramo rezultate razi- skave Slovensko javno mnenje, ki od leta 1992 med drugim meri tudi socialno distanco. Pri vprašanju »Katere od navedenih skupin ljudi ne bi želeli imeti za sosede?«, ena od navedenih skupin zajema priseljence oziroma tuje delavce. Delež odgovorov, po katerih priseljenci oziroma tuji delavci niso zaželeni sosedje, je z leti sicer precej nihal (največji je v letih takoj po osamosvojitvi, kar obenem sovpada tudi z vojnami na področju Hrvaške ter Bosne in Hercegovine, ko je v Slovenijo prispelo večje število beguncev; podoben trend je zaznati v letu 2000, v obdobju t. i. »prebežniške krize«), vendar sodeč po zadnjih razpoložljivih podatkih več kot petina sodelujočih v raziskavi priseljencev ne želi imeti za sosede.

Tabela 3: Etnična distanca

Ne bi želel/a imeti priseljencev za sosede	SJM 92/1	SJM 93/1	SJM 94/1	SJM 95/1	SJM 98/1	SJM 99/1	SJM 00/1	SJM 01/1	SJM 02/2
v %	39,6	55,6	40,5	18,1	28,3	16,0	28,5	20,6	22,6

Vir: Toš, Niko et al. *Slovensko javno mnenje. Sumarnik raziskav*. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Fa- kulteta za družbene vede. Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov, 2002.

Prva ovira ob prihodu imigrantov v ciljno državo so možnosti (legalnega) vstopa vanjo, kar določajo pravno-administrativni akti te države. Vključevanje imigrantov v družbo na ravni vsakdanjega življenja pa je močno odvisno od odnosa večinskega oziroma »avtohtonega« prebivalstva. Poglejmo, katera merila za sprejem imigrantov so sodeč po rezultatih prej omenjene raziskave odločujoča za to, ali se lahko v Slovenijo priseli oseba, ki je bila rojena drugje in je tam tudi odraščala. V tabeli 4 so poleg rezultatov, dobljenih v Sloveniji, prikazani tudi odgovori anketiranih iz dvanajstih evropskih držav, vključenih v raziskavo, kar omogoča primerjalno analizo rezultatov:

Iz rezultatov je razvidno, da so v vseh trinajstih državah najpomembnejša tri merila: sprejemanje načina življenja v državi, znanje uradnega jezika države in posedovanje spo- sobnosti, ki jih država potrebuje; v tesni navezavi s slednjim pa je tudi četrta pomembna lastnost, namreč (dobra) izobrazba oziroma kvalifikacije. Povzamemo torej lahko, da so najpomembnejše lastnosti pripravljenost za akulturacijo (prva dva indikatorja), obenem pa je (visoko) zaželena tudi ekonomska koristnost za ciljno državo (druga dva indikatorja). Slednje velja predvsem za države srednje in vzhodne Evrope (Madžarska, Poljska, Slovenija in Češka), bistveno manj pa za zahodno oziroma severnoevropske države (Nizozemska, Norveška, Švedska). Prav tako je med tema dvema skupinama držav mogoče opaziti večja razhajanja v ocenjevanju pomembnosti ekonomsko-socialne neodvisnosti potencialnih imigrantov. Ravno strah pred tem, da bi bili imigranti v breme socialnim transferjem ciljne države je v javnosti pogosto predstavljen kot eden temeljnih razlogov proti priseljevanju tujcev, vendar bi vpetost v podporne ekonomsko-socialne družinske in prijateljske mreže

Tabela 4: Merilo za sprejem priseljencev – delež anketiranih, ki menijo, da so navedena merila zelo pomembna (v %, ESS 2002/2003)

	Sprejema način življenja v državi	Zna govoriti uradni jezik države	Ima sposobnosti, ki jih država potrebuje	Ima dobro izobrazbo in kvalifika-cije	Bližnji sorodniki živijo v državi	Prihaja iz krščanskega okolja	Je premožen	Je belec
Madžarska	86,0	63,9	71,3	48,7	35,4	26,1	13,2	22,9
Poljska	44,3	48,8	48,7	39,5	42,8	29,0	17,0	12,3
Slovenija	**70,1**	**58,2**	**58,2**	**41,6**	**28,5**	**25,6**	**13,4**	**14,9**
Češka	74,4	60,6	60,6	40,5	41,7	13,4	12,7	14,7
Italija	52,0	28,6	38,5	26,8	18,3	19,8	44,5	6,7
V. Britanija	57,4	56,4	45,5	36,3	28,5	10,6	7,8	6,3
Španija	53,8	34,1	44,0	35,6	25,9	14,0	9,0	7,9
Avstrija	52,9	61,5	47,8	43,2	22,1	14,0	6,5	6,4
Irska	45,5	43,3	47,7	34,7	25,7	13,2	6,6	7,8
Nemčija	66,3	65,1	51,5	44,5	25,1	7,8	5,5	4,0
Nizozemska	66,2	64,6	33,3	25,6	17,2	5,1	2,5	3,1
Norveška	46,5	49,3	31,8	16,6	17,6	9,3	2,7	4,6
Švedska	65,4	28,8	28,5	19,8	16,7	6,5	4,0	2,8

Vir: Hafner-Fink, M. (2004): Državljanstvo, (nacionalna) identiteta in odnos do tujcev. V: Malnar, B., Bernik, I. (ur.): S Slovenkami in Slovenci na štiri oči. Fakulteta za družbene vede, IDV-CJMMK.

ter finančna neodvisnost ta strah lahko zmanjševali. Premožnost imigrantov in povezanost z drugimi družinskimi člani, ki že živijo v ciljni državi, sta bistveno bolj pomembna dejavnika za države iz prve skupine. Tudi pri indikatorjih, ki nam prikazujejo stopnjo diskriminacije na verski in rasni osnovi, se ponovi razkorak med državami srednje in vzhodne Evrope ter zahodnoevropskimi oziroma severnoevropskimi državami, pri čemer je v prvi skupini držav ponovno bolj razvidna prisotnost diskriminacije na rasni in verski osnovi.

Iz rezultatov primerjalne tabele trinajstih evropskih držav je mogoče zaključiti, da prebivalke in prebivalci srednje- in vzhodnoevropskih držav oziroma t.i. tranzicijskih držav (Madžarska, Poljska, Češka in Slovenija) navedenim merilom za sprejem imigrantov v njihove države pripisujejo večji pomen. Morda bi še posebej izpostavili pomen rasnega kriterija, kjer je merilo, da je imigrant belec, dvakrat pomembnejše kot v ostalih državah, vključenih v raziskavo. Hafner-Fink (2004) izpostavlja tudi, da je v t.i. tranzicijskih državah bolj razvidna etnična distanca, kar povezuje s tem, da je v teh državah prehod iz socializma prinesel močnejši razmah nacionalne zavesti, obenem pa je obdobje tranzicije povečalo občutek tveganja in negotovosti, kar se kaže v odklonilnem odnosu do priseljevanja tujcev oziroma v povečani ksenofobiji. Sodeč po rezultatih različnih javnomnenjskih raziskav bi torej lahko rekli, da nenaklonjenost priseljevanju tujcev v Slovenijo predstavlja splošen kontekst, ki lahko v obdobju intenzivnejših politizacij »imigrantskega vprašanja« (v smislu protipriseljenske mobilizacije s strani političnih akterjev ali medijev) privede

do ekstremnejših stališč, kot se je to zgodilo v primerih gradnje džamije, »izbrisanih«, prosilcev za azil in Romov.

ODNOS DO IMIGRANTOV V MEDIJSKEM DISKURZU

Naj že takoj na začetku izpostavimo, da se tako v zdravorazumskem dojemanju kot v medijskih diskurzih termin imigranti običajno uporablja za opis specifične skupine ljudi. Skoraj praviloma so iz te skupine izvzeti tisti, ki prihajajo iz panevropskega sveta oziroma tisti, ki se v državi nahajajo kot tuji poslovneži, predstavniki mednarodnih organizacij, diplomatsko osebje ali drugi nosilci ekspertnih znanj. Te osebe običajno tudi nimajo težav pri prehajanju državnih meja; njihove destinacije so globalizirane, število tako privilegiranih pa se ne zvišuje. Ta privilegij ostaja majhnemu številu bogatih držav oziroma majhnemu številu bogatih elit v velikemu številu držav (Bauböck 1998; Bauman 1998, 2004). Te osebe prav tako praviloma niso podvržene mehanizmom socialnega izključevanja. Termin imigrant tako večinoma ostaja namenjen tistim osebam, ki so v Slovenijo prišle iz »napačnih krajev«, iz »napačnih vzrokov« ali na »napačen način«; to so begunci, prosilci za azil in t. i. ilegalni imigranti.

V Sloveniji se je živahna javna razprava o »imigrantski problematiki« razvnela jeseni leta 2000, ko se je število t. i. ilegalnih imigrantov in prosilcev za azil povzpelo na najvišjo raven do tedaj. V sredstvih množičnega obveščanja se je, razen redkih izjem, izoblikoval izrazito stigmatizacijski in diskriminacijski diskurz, ki je slovenski javnosti predstavil novo dimenzijo imigrantske problematike - »prebežniško krizo«. Medijski diskurz pa je bil zgolj povzetek drugih diskurzov, tako institucionalnega, ki se je kazal v izjavah za javnost nekaterih državnih uradnikov, kot tako imenovanega »glasu ljudstva«, ki so ga predstavljale iniciative nekaterih prebivalcev proti naseljevanju prebežnikov. Rezultat tega so bile številne javne ksenofobne izjave in zapisi sovražnega govora. V nadaljevanju bomo s pomočjo kratke diskurzivne analize pisanja nekaterih slovenskih časnikov poskušali definirati temeljne linije diskurza o (»ilegalnih«) imigrantih.

V diskurzivno analizo smo vključili 197 člankov, objavljenih v štirih slovenskih dnevnih tiskanih medijih (Delo, Dnevnik, Slovenske novice in Večer), ki so izšli med 1. decembrom 2000 in 28. februarjem 2001, torej v tistem obdobju, ko je protiimigrantsko razpoloženje v slovenski javnosti doseglo vrhunec.

Tabela 5: Seznam časopisov, v katerih so bili objavljeni analizirani članki o imigrantih

Časopis	Frekvence	Odstotki
Delo	57	28,9
Dnevnik	40	20,3
Slovenske novice	48	24,3
Večer	52	26,4
Skupaj	197	100

Iz zgornje tabele je razvidno, da so štirje slovenski dnevni časopisi o »imigrantski problematiki« poročali v približno enakem obsegu; z nekaj več objavami izstopa Delo, sledijo Večer, Slovenske novice in Dnevnik. Število objavljenih člankov je s časom naraščalo, izjema so le Slovenske novice, ki so največ člankov o omenjeni tematiki objavile v decembru 2000, ko so prevladovale kratke notice o številu prijetih ali izgnanih »ilegalcev«, objavljene v rubriki črne kronike. V obdobju analiziranih treh mesecev je bilo objavljenih povprečno 2, 2 članka na dan, največji delež pa je bil objavljen v februarju 2001 (povprečno 3 članki na dan).

Umeščanje člankov v posamezen tematski sklop tiskane edicije je bistvenega pomena, saj vpliva na bralkino/bralčevo zaznavo in vrednotenje obravnavane tematike kot bolj ali manj (ne)problematične ali (ne)vredne pozornosti, s tem pa se dosega medijska konstrukcija realnosti *par excellence*. Članki, ki so uvrščeni na naslovnice, osrednje strani (»v žarišču«, »v središču pozornosti«) ali v sklop črne kronike, so bistveno bolj opazni in brani, obenem pa sugerirajo širši kontekst razumevanja tematike (v tem smislu so imigranti predstavljeni kot grožnja širši nacionalni varnosti, kot moteči faktor v »avtohtonih« lokalnih skupnostih ali kot neposredna grožnja zoper telo in premoženje avtohtonih prebivalcev).

Tabela 6: Objavljeni članki glede na tematski sklop

	Delo	Dnevnik	Slovenske novice	Večer
Naslovnica	10	2	2	4
»V žarišču«*	12	14	/	24
Politika	5	1	/	/
Slovenija	2	9	/	13
Dnevne novice	18	/	13	/
Kronika	6	13	33	7
Drugo**	4	1	/	4

*Sem uvrščam rubrike »V žarišču« (Večer), »V središču pozornosti« (Dnevnik), »Tretja stran« (Delo)

** »Sobotna priloga« (Delo), »Nedeljski dnevnik« in »Zelena pika« (Dnevnik), »Dosje« (Večer)

V prvem mesecu (december 2000) analiziranega časovnega obdobja je bila večina člankov v vseh štirih dnevnikih objavljena na straneh črne kronike (v primeru Slovenskih novic in Dnevnika vsi članki); prevladovale so kratke notice o »policijskih akcijah«, »lovu«, »ulovu«, »pregonu« ali »izgonu« »ilegalcev« in številu »ujetih« ali »zajetih« »prebežnikov«, nekaj notic pa se je nanašalo tudi na kazniva dejanja (vlome in kraje), ki naj bi jih zagrešili »prebežniki«. Delo in Večer sta obenem objavila tudi nekaj prispevkov o pripravah na sprejem nove azilne zakonodaje, v katerih je bila izpostavljena potreba in visoka podpora uvedbi restriktivnejših ukrepov na področju dodeljevanja azila. V drugi polovici januarja 2001 in v začetku februarja se začnejo pojavljati daljši novinarski prispevki, ki večinoma povsem nekritično povzemajo izjave anonimnih prebivalcev lokalnih skupnosti in njihovih županov; vloga novinark in novinarjev je večinoma zreducirana zgolj na po-

vezovalni tekst med nizanjem nestrpnih ali celo odkrito sovražnih izjav. V drugi polovici februarja emocionalna intenzivnost poročanja o »imigrantski grožnji« polagoma upada, novinarski prispevki ponovno večinoma navajajo kratke vesti o številu zajetih »ilegalnih imigrantov«, pojavijo se tudi objave pozivov različnih nevladnih organizacij, združenj in nekaterih predstavnikov političnega vrha k strpnosti pri obravnavi »prebežnikov« ter posamezni novinarski prispevki, ki obsojajo kriminalizacijo »prebežnikov« in poskušajo »imigrantsko problematiko« obravnavati bolj refleksivno. Obrat v medijskem poročanju je najbolj opazen v Večeru, kjer je taka ena četrtina vseh objavljenih prispevkov, medtem ko so Slovenske novice objavljale zgolj senzacionalistične članke o »imigrantski grožnji« in kratke notice o »ulovu ilegalcev«. V naslednjih mesecih je sledilo medijsko zatišje, ko se je skorajda zdelo, da se »prebežniška kriza« nikoli ni zgodila. Zaradi sprejetih dopolnil k Zakonu o azilu, ki so dodatno zaostrila postopek za pridobivanje azila, ter poostrene mejne kontrole je število prosilcev za azil in »ilegalnih imigrantov« začasno pričelo upadati, hkrati pa se je pozornost medijev preusmerila k drugim temam, kot je bil na primer napovedani referendum o umetni oploditvi z biomedicinsko pomočjo. Toda vrnimo se k poskusu kratke diskurzivne analize pisanja obravnavanih tiskanih medijev, pri čemer se bomo osredotočili na nestrpnost v medijskem prostoru.

Ena temeljnih značilnosti pisanja medijev je, kot opaža tudi Roman Kuhar (2001), da so v člankih o »imigrantskem vprašanju« pogosto navajali ali se zgolj sklicevali na izjave »avtohtonega« prebivalstva, živečega v okolici Azilnega doma oziroma domov za tujce, bodisi v Ljubljani bodisi v drugih krajih Slovenije (Črnomelj, Vidonci, Prosenjakovci, Bloke, Veliki Otok pri Postojni). Breda Luthar (1998: 235) o uporabi t.i. zunanjih glasov pravi, da *predstavljajo domnevni avtentični empirični dokaz, ki potrjuje verodostojnost institucionalne interpretacije. Uporaba 'glasu z ulice' kot zunanjega glasu (t.i. intervjuji vox pop) je najbolj ideološka uporaba zunanjega glasu kot citata, ker je najbolj naključna, arbitrarna in odpira novinarju najširši prostor manipulacije.*

Poglejmo si nekaj primerov:

*Prebežniki so doslej že **osemdesetkrat vlomili** v stanovanjske in počitniške hišice, **izginilo** je tudi nekaj avtomobilov. **Domačini pravijo**, da zaradi **naraščajoče nasilnosti** prebežnikov **živijo v strahu**. Že ob zgodnjih popoldnevih **se zapirajo v hiše**, opustili so zimsko čiščenje gozdov. V zgodnjih jutranjih urah zaposlene **ženske na delo** v prosenja-kovsko tekstilno tovarno **spremljajo njihovi možje**. **Pravijo**, da so začeli prebežniki celo **izsiljevati denar od šolskih in predšolskih otrok** (okrepila A. K.). (»Prosenjakovčani rekli ne«, Delo, 30. 1. 2001).*

*Gotovo je, da so Prekmurci **upravičeno zaskrbljeni**. Čutijo se **zelo ogrožene**, še zlasti se **bojijo** za svoje premoženje. Čedalje več je **vlomov** in **tatvin**, katerih **storilci so ilegalci in azilanti**. In mnogi se upravičeno sprašujejo, kako dolgo bo treba čakati, da bodo postali **nasilni do domačinov** (»Ilegalci kradejo«, Slovenske novice, 26. 1. 2001).*

*Včeraj je bilo **spet nevarno**. **Postopali** so pod našimi okni, se **trumoma** prevažali s taksiji, **policije** pa ni bilo **nikjer**, je povedal Oblak (»Spet skrivnostna selitev«, Slovenske novice, 5. 2. 2001).*

Iz zgornjih navedkov je moč razbrati tendenco po kriminalizaciji imigrantov, pred-

vsem v smislu tatinskosti (vlamljajo v hiše, kradejo denar, kradejo avtomobile in – nenazadnje - »kradejo« ženske) in izsiljevanja, obe »lastnosti« pa sta posplošeni in pripisani kar vsem imigrantom kot skupini. Prepričanje o kriminogenosti imigrantov nadalje vodi v prepričanje o neposredni ogroženosti »avtohtonega« prebivalstva. Prav tako ne gre spregledati poudarjanja tega, da se »azilanti« lahko prosto gibljejo, postopajo naokoli, čeprav imajo po slovenski zakonodaji pravico do svobodnega gibanja[7].

Zanimivo je, da so novinarji (in uredniki) izpostavljali »problematičnost« prebežnikov, čeprav je celo v istem novinarskem tekstu »objektivni« podatki niso potrjevali. V članku »Azilante vtihotapili v Črnomelj« (Delo, 31. 1. 2001), ki je sicer posvečen problematiki nastanitve prosilcev za azil, tako novinar navaja izjavo vodje črnomaljskega begunskega centra, ki pravi: »Nam se ni nihče pritožil niti ni bil tukaj še nihče. V centru je vse normalno«. Obenem je vodja centra zavrnil možnost, da bi prosilcem za azil onemogočili izhode, saj »imajo azilanti po naših zakonih pravico svobodnega gibanja kjer koli in kadar koli ter jim ga zato oni ne bodo omejevali«.

Zanimivo novinarsko »spregledovanje« dejstev najdemo tudi na področju, kjer ga nemara ne bi pričakovali. V članku »Vlada nad težave bolj sistematično« (Delo, 7. 2. 2001) so delavci MNZ novinarju potožili, da se sami zaman borijo proti predsodkom. Izjave prizadetih državljanov, da se v okolici namestitve ilegalnih prebežnikov in prosilcev za azil povečuje kriminaliteta, da so ogroženi otroci, starejši in dekleta, so po podatkih policije zavajajoči.

 Policija sicer ne vodi posebnih evidenc o kaznivih dejanjih, ki so jih zagrešili prosilci za azil oziroma prebežniki. Po oceni uprave kriminalistične policije je odstotek njihovih kaznivih dejanj zanemarljiv. Po njihovem mnenju neraziskanih kaznivih dejanj, kot so vlomi, predvsem na območjih, kjer se gibljejo prebežniki oziroma prosilci za azil, ne moremo avtomatično pripisovati tema kategorijama tujcev. Ta **dejstva** naj bi po podatkih MNZ v svojih izjavah za medije predstavili tudi predstavniki policije, '**žal pa niso bila objavljena**'.

Opozarjanje na ogrožanje »avtohtonega« prebivalstva Slovenije, najsi gre varnostno, socialno, kulturno, ekonomsko ali zdravstveno ogroženost, je naslednja temeljna značilnost medijskega poročanja. Pri opisovanju imigrantov se razvije bogata metaforika; uporabljajo se predvsem naslednji glagoli: se gnetejo, begajo, navaljujejo, pritiskajo, oblegajo, preplavljajo... nasploh je zelo modna metaforika naravnih katastrof[8]:

*...**begunski veletok se** iz medžimurske ravnice **vali**...skoraj zagotovo pa zdaj **derejo***

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[7] Ravno dejstvo, da v nastanitvenih centrih za prosilce za azil ni veljala prepoved izhodov in prostega gibanja, je bilo za večino slovenske javnosti zelo problematično. DELO je 3. 2. 2001 v članku z naslovom »Večina Slovencev se počuti ogrožena« objavilo rezultate javnomnenjske raziskave, opravljene na vzorcu 740 oseb, po katerih 45,7 % vprašanih meni, da bi v nastanitvenih domovih moral veljati 'zaprt sistem, po katerem migrantom ne bi smeli dopustiti izhoda', 35,8 % vprašanih se je izreklo za 'pol zaprt sistem, po katerem bi imeli migranti izhod le v izjemnih primerih', 8,9 % anketiranih je podprlo 'odprt sistem z možnostjo prostega izhoda', 9,6 % vprašanih pa je bilo neopredeljenih.

[8] O značilni metaforiki naravnih katastrof, ki ob obravnavi »imigrantske problematike« preveva govore britanskih desničarskih oziroma konservativnih strank, piše tudi Charteris-Black (2006). »Temeljne funkcije metafore v javnih diskurzih so, da poenostavljajo obravnavane teme oziroma jih delajo razumljive tako, da v naslovnikih prikličejo implicitne simbolne reprezentacije, ki vznemirijo čustva in zapolnijo vrzel med logičnim in čustvenim.« (Mio v Charteris-Black, 2006: 565).

*proti zahodu večje **horde** kot med preseljevanjem narodov z našimi slovanskimi predniki vred* (»Vodnik zbežal, begunec obležal«, Slovenske novice, 20. 12. 2000).

»Krizološki« govor vzbuja občutek obsednega stanja, neobvladljivih razmer in celo moralne panike:

***Domačinke** so se **bale za svojo čast, strah** jim **ni dal spati**. ...Drugi so poleti iz bližnje okolice opazovali domačinke po vrtovih, da se niti po solato niso upale pripogniti, kaj šele, da bi se na dvorišču malce sončile. ...'Begunci so, da oprostite, **radi nadlegovali ženske in take stvari'**, neradi konkretno navajajo primere iz **svojih bridkih ponižanj**.* (»Bodo Bloke spet ječale v grozi?«, Slovenske novice, 23. 1. 2001).

*Tudi za nas veljajo človekove pravice, vendar jih nihče ne ščiti. Živimo kot v nekakšnem **getu**, iz hiš gremo, kadar je nujno, **ne upamo** si v lastne gozdove, na vsakem koraku **nas nadzoruje** policija, **ogrožajo nas** begunci in njihovi vodniki* (»Nekaj vodnikov ilegalcev končno za zapahe?«, Večer, 18. 12. 2000).

*Goričani se **bojijo nalezljivih bolezni**, pa tudi, da jim bodo prebežniki s **pobegi** iz centra in **sprehajanjem** po njihovih dvoriščih **povzročali veliko težav**, kot so jim jih **begunci*** (»Stenice 'preselile' prebežnike na Goričko«, Delo, 22. 1. 2001).

*Zdaj prebiva na Celovški do 600 ljudi pisane etnične kulturne, izobraževalne, starostne, zdravstvene slike. ...**Seveda** se predvsem **zdravstveno šibkejši občani bojijo izbruha ebole** ali kakšne druge epidemije. ...Če si namenjen v dežele, iz katerih prihajajo begunci, te brez cepljenja ne spustijo tja. **Kdo** pa **preverja begunce**, ali so cepljeni?* (»Epidemije ebole ni, jebola pa kar vsak dan«, Slovenske novice, 9. 1. 2001).

Ksenofobični iracionalni strah je v zgornjih navedkih zgoščen na zelo poveden način: bližina »ilegalcev« škoduje poslom, kvari majhne otroke, ki pridejo v stik s tujci in lahko zbolijo, tujci ogrožajo »naša dekleta«. Sklicevanje na »zdravstveno oporečnost« imigrantov namiguje ne zgolj na očitke o njihovi pomanjkljivi osebni higieni, temveč tudi na potrebo po »higienični« odstranitvi imigrantov iz bližine »zdravega domačega družbenega telesa«. Jasno je razvidna viktimizacija »avtohtonega« slovenskega prebivalstva, predvsem pa najšibkejših in najranljivejših delov populacije (»nemočnih« žensk, deklet, otrok, starejših občanov). V vlogo žrtve pa medijski diskurz ne potiska zgolj tistih »domačinov«, ki naj bi osebno imeli »neprijetne izkušnje« s tujci, temveč se kot žrtev predstavlja celoten slovenski narod, natančneje, davkoplačevalci. V teh primerih medijski diskurz sledi poenostavljajoči kavzalni logiki. Če so »ilegalci« zapustili svoje izvorne dežele, so morali imeti denar za pot in za plačilo »ilegalnega« prestopa meje. Če potemtakem imajo svoj lasten denar, čemu bi za njihovo nastanitev in oskrbo pri nas plačevali slovenski davkoplačevalci? Pogoste so tudi navedbe o »ubožnosti« slovenskih delavcev, ki že sami komaj živijo, zdaj pa jih ekonomsko obremenjuje še skrb za vzdrževanje imigrantov:

*Veliko je **Slovencev z nerešenim eksistenčnim vprašanjem**, vključno z nerešenim vprašanjem nastanitve, plačevanja stanarin in drugih težav* (»Prebežnike razselili po državi«, Delo, 6. 2. 2001)

*Vsi tujci postajajo za našo **državo preveliko breme**...vse **stroške** moramo **plačevati obubožani državljani**, ki že sami živimo na **robu revščine**...vsak deseti **Slovenec** je **lačen*** (pismo bralca, Nedeljski dnevnik, 14. 1. 2001)

Vendar država, ki jo v nekaterih primerih poosebljajo davkoplačevalci, ni zgolj žrtev imigrantov, temveč je država (v tem primeru zgolj kot upravno-administrativni aparat, ločen od svojih davkoplačevalskih državljanov) pogosto predstavljena tudi kot krivec za nastalo situacijo. Država je tista, ki bi morala v prvi vrsti poskrbeti za dobrobit in (socialno) varnost »svojih« ljudi, vendar tega ne počne. Še več; država pravzaprav deluje proti svojim državljanom ali vsaj mimo njih, ko imigrante naseljuje v lokalna okolja, brez vednosti ali celo privoljenja »domačinov«:

Črnomaljci so zelo **razburjeni***, ker je urad za priseljevanje in begunce* **vtihotapil** *v njihov begunski center okoli 70 azilantov, od katerih so trije že ušli* (»Azilante vtihotapili v Črnomelj, Delo, 31. 1. 2001).

Oblak, ki je skupaj s svojimi somišljeniki zbral že tisoč podpisov za izselitev večjega dela stanovalcev doma in peticijo minuli teden vročil ministrstvu za notranje zadeve, je **ogorčen** *nad* **zvijačnim** *in* **ignorantskim vedenjem državnih** *in* **mestnih oblasti***, ki se* **nenehno sprenevedajo***. ...Zdaj, ko je* **država zlorabila naše zaupanje***, pa ne pristajamo na nikakršen kompromis več.* (»Ilegalce vrnili naskrivaj«, Delo, 2. 2. 2001).

Ker imajo Goričanci **zelo slabe izkušnje z begunci***, ki so v vidonskem centru živeli polnih osem let, in* **tudi z državo***...* **Domačini** *so se v soboto zvečer* **nejevoljni***, ker jih župan ni obvestil o namestitvi prebežnikov, zbrali na dvorišču centra. Izrekli so tudi* **veliko pikrih na račun občine** *in tudi* **države***, ki po njihovem mnenju* **vse, kar je slabo in kar ljudem povzroča težave, želi iz prestolnice preseliti v obrobne kraje** (»Stenice 'preselile' prebežnike na Goričko, Delo, 22. 1. 2001).

Kljub »prevarantskemu delovanju države«, ki je ponekod vodilo v samoorganizacijo lokalne obrambe po načelu formiranja »vaških straž«, pa predstavnikov nekaterih lokalnih skupnosti »slabe izkušnje z državo« niso odvrnile od pogajanj in trgovanj, v katerih so videli priložnost za doseganje lastnih lokalnih in političnih interesov:

Če bom dobil zeleno luč za **pogajanja** *z državo, bom ministru Bohincu* **predlagal***, da* **država sodeluje** *pri reševanju vodooskrbe centra in celotnega kraja, gradnji kanalizacije in čistilne naprave. ...Do dokončnega zaprtja centra bi ta zaradi zagotavljanja varnosti domačinov moral delovati kot ustanova zaprtega tipa. Še pred morebitno postavitvijo dvanajstih bivalnikov pa bi* **morala država** *celotni prostor okoli centra zavarovati s primerno ograjo* (»Župan ponuja roko državi«, Delo, 31. 1. 2001).

Toda domačini so bili odločno proti in so županu povedali, da jim vodovod, kanalizacija in čistilna naprava, za kar naj bi država prispevala sto milijonov proračunskih tolarjev, tako ali tako pripadajo, kajti, kot so **potožili***,* **od tega, da morajo** *že osem let* **živeti z ilegalci***,* **niso dobili ničesar** (»Goričko naj ne bo 'odlagališče' ilegalcev!«, Večer, 3. 2. 2001).

Župan Kalamar ni želel razkriti dogovorjene **cene za usluge***, ki jih bo* **občina naredila državi***.* (»Stenice 'preselile prebežnike' na Goričko«, Delo, 22. 1. 2001).

Ksenofobičnemu diskurzu, ki je preveval »glas ljudstva«, se v tem času niso izognili niti nekateri predstavniki različnih strok. Zanimive so bile izjave priznanega demografa, dr. Malačiča z Ekonomske fakultete v Ljubljani, ki je v intervjuju z naslovom »Število Slovencev se skokovito zmanjšuje« (Delo, 21. 11. 2001) na vprašanje*: »Naravni prirastek lahko v skupnem številu prebivalstva nadomestijo priseljenci. Sredi 70. let smo doživeli*

okrepitev iz drugih jugoslovanskih republik. Od kod bi se lahko priseljevali manjkajoči prebivalci?« odgovoril: *»Da bi migracije lahko kompenzirale preveliko znižanje rodnosti, bi število selitev, ki bi jih potrebovali za ohranjanje števila prebivalstva v Sloveniji, moralo že danes naraščati. Ne pogovarjava se o nekaj sto ljudeh, pač pa o nekaj tisoč, čez deset let se bova pogovarjala o 10 tisoč in več priseljencih na leto. **Predstavljajte si**, da se bo vsako leto priseljevalo v Slovenijo več kot 10 tisoč ljudi! **Kako** bo **to vplivalo** na **življenje v Sloveniji**? **Vedeti moramo**, da se **ne bi priseljevali iz sosednjih držav**, pač pa lahko **pričakujemo**, podobno kot vsa Evropa, da se bodo **priseljevali iz nerazvitih držav**. Če bi odprli meje, bi jih **prišlo zelo, zelo veliko**.«*

V zadnjem primeru je razviden predvsem strah pred neomejevanim prihodom tujcev iz daljnih, »nerazvitih krajev«, ki bi lahko usodno vplivali na način življenja v Sloveniji in bistveno posegali v slovenski (kulturni) prostor. Aleš Drolc (2003: 162) pravi, da sta

heterogenost in individualnost migrantov zreducirani na homogeno, kulturno nesprejemljivo gmoto, ki, to je zdaj že samoumevno, ne sodi v slovenski prostor. Z dominantno kulturo v slovenskem prostoru je nezdružljiva, vsaka možnost sobivanja pa je prav zaradi tega izključena vnaprej. 'Slovenska kultura' naj bi tako pomenila oziroma predstavljala neko stalnost, uravnoteženost, 'kultura' imigrantov pa neko spremembo, nekaj, kar lahko sedanje stanje spravi iz ravnotežja in ga nujno poslabša.

V tem primeru lahko govorimo o kulturnem rasizmu, ko v ospredje rasističnega razlikovanja ni postavljena barva kože ali oblika telesa, temveč v tej funkciji nastopajo kulturni vzorci, kot so na primer običaji, navade, jezik, glasba in podobno. Kuzmanić v intervjuju za Dnevnik (14. 3. 2006) pravi, da se kulturni rasizem »omejuje na kulture, ki niso del Zahoda. Vsi Nezahodnjaki oziroma Neslovenci, pri čemer med Neslovence ne sodijo Švedi, Avstrijci, Avstralci, Brazilci in tako dalje, so potencialni objekti tega kulturnega rasizma«. Za konec si poglejmo še del članka, objavljenega v Večeru:

*Zdaj **nas oblegajo ilegalci** in mislim, da Prekmurci nismo dolžni, da bi vse to tiho in mirno prenašali....**bojim se**, da bomo kljub **adutom**, ki jih imamo v **naši naravni in kulturni dediščini**, postali nekakšno **smetišče** ali Balkan v malem* (»Bojazen krajanov pred 'Balkanom v malem', Večer, 31. 1. 2001).

Značilnosti medijskega diskurza o imigrantih povzemamo v naslednjih točkah:
- homogenizacija (ustvarjanje vtisa o obstoju domnevno homogenega »avtohtonega« prebivalstva in domnevno homogenih imigrantov; bipolarnost diskurza na »Mi« in »Oni«);
- emocionalizacija (ustvarjanje vtisa o kriznih razmerah, obsednem stanju);
- viktimizacija »avtohtonega« prebivalstva in države;
- kulpabilizacija imigrantov in države;
- higienizacija v dvojnem pomenu;
- kriminalizacija imigrantov[9].

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9   Podobne značilnosti medijskega diskurza o imigrantih je ugotavljala Vlasta Jalušič, ki piše o emocionalizaciji, kulpabilizaciji imigrantov in države, viktimizaciji avtohtonega prebivalstva, poudarjenem sovraštvu do države, legitimizaciji morebitnega obrambnega delovanja ter normalizaciji in socializaciji ksenofobije in rasizma (Jalušič 2001: 40).

Vlasta Jalušič (2001: 13) opozarja, da »medijska konstrukcija realnosti, ki pomeni aktivno ustvarjanje javne, politične agende tu ne oblikuje samo dominantnega javnega mnenja in navideznega konsenza o temi, temveč - v medsebojnem dopolnjevanju medijskega in drugih diskurzov - tudi aktivno pripravlja podlage, glavna izhodišča in legitimacijo za izvajanje državnih in lokalnih politik«.

ODNOS DO IMIGRANTOV V POLITIČNEM DISKURZU

V obdobju t.i. »prebežniške krize« od decembra 2000 do februarja 2001 je v slovenskem parlamentu potekala razprava o Zakonu o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o azilu, sprejetega leta 1999[10]. V tem času so se dopolnili in dodatno legitimirali izrazito restriktivni ukrepi slovenske (i)migracijske politike, ki so svojo legitimnost črpali tako iz navideznega konsenza javnosti o »ogroženosti Slovenije oziroma njenih državljank in državljanov zaradi imigrantov« kot tudi iz interpretacij zahtev Evropske unije v zvezi z oblikovanjem in izvajanjem (i)migracijskih politik. V nadaljevanju bomo poskušali identificirati značilne elemente političnega diskurza, ki je potekal ob pripravah na sprejem Zakona o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o azilu[11] v slovenskem parlamentu, ter jih primerjati z značilnostmi medijskega diskurza o imigrantih. Izhajali bomo iz magnetogramov oz. dobesednih zapisov dveh sej delovnih teles Državnega zbora (Odbor za notranjo politiko) in zasedanja Državnega zbora ob obravnavanju omenjene zakonodaje[12].

Takratni minister za notranje zadeve je predlog Zakona o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o azilu predstavil takole:

*Kar zadeva zakona samega. Njegova **osnovna ideja** je, kot veste, **dodati tretji dodatni razlog za pridržanje prosilcev za azil**. Poleg postopka ugotavljanja identitete za azil in pa poleg preprečevanja širjenja nalezljivih bolezni naj bi se kot dodaten razlog uzakonilo še **sum zavajanja** ali **zlorabo postopka azila**. Da gre v našem primeru za **velikansko število**

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[10] Besedilo Zakona o azilu (ZAzil) je dostopno na internetni strani: http://www.amnesty.si/datoteka. php?md5ime=213707034c68166d974418c0951d0b38 (7. 3. 2008)

[11] Osnovni namen dopolnil zakona je bil uvedba restriktivnejših pogojev za pridobitev azila: zakon o azilu iz leta 1999 je namreč med razlogi za pridržanje oz. omejitev gibanja prosilcev za azil navajal ugotavljanje istovetnosti prosilca za azil in preprečevanje širjenja nalezljivih bolezni. V predlaganih (in kasneje sprejetih) dopolnilih zakona je bil dodan še en razlog, namreč sum zavajanja oziroma zloraba postopka azila, ki je obenem postal zadosten in utemeljen razlog za to, da pristojni organ takoj odloči o stvari in prošnjo za azil zavrne kot očitno neutemeljeno.

[12] Magnetogram seje Odbora za notranjo politiko z dne 15. 12. 2000 je dostopen na internetni strani: http://www.dz-rs.si/index.php?id=97&cs=4&st=m&committee=30&vt=15&fts=zakon+o+azilu&m andate=3&o=10&showdoc=1&unid=MDT3|702BE6135A0A1A75C12569B6003F74F1 (7. 3. 2008). Magnetogram seje Odbora za notranjo politiko z dne 16. 2. 2001 je dostopen na internetni strani: http://www.dz-rs.si/index.php?id=97&cs=4&st=m&committee=30&vt=15&fts=zakon+o+azilu& mandate=3&o=0&showdoc=1&unid=MDT3|C94C5904101E1F1BC12569F5004935B6 (7. 3. 2008). Magnetogram zasedanja Državnega zbora z dne 20. 12. 2000 je dostopen na internetni strani: http://www.dz-rs.si/index.php?id=97&cs=1&st=m&committee=30&vt=15&fts=zakon+o+azilu&mandat e=3&showdoc=1&unid=SZA3|68C836293392DA98C12569BD0047F8AF (7. 3. 2008).

zlorabe tega postopka kaže uvodoma navedeni podatek*, da zaprosi več kot 10 tisoč in da le 11 je takšnih, za katere je v postopku ugotovljeno, da so do pridobitve statusa begunca upravičeni* (minister za notranje zadeve, Odbor za notranjo politiko, 15. 12. 2000).

*V današnjem primeru gre zgolj za **interventni poseg**, ki se odziva na razmere, v katerih se Slovenija nahaja po **velikanskem pritisku** ilegalnih migrantov v našo državo. Da je ta **pritisk res velik**, vam lahko potrdi podatek, da je povečanje glede na lansko leto 79% in da je letošnja številka prek 31.000 ilegalnih migrantov, ki so bili zaloteni pri nezakonitem prehodu državne meje - povečanje torej od nekaj čez 20.000 kar na 31.000. Več kot tretjina teh migrantov zaprosi za azil, približno 11.000 prosilcev za azil beležimo v letošnjem letu; od tega je bilo doslej podeljeno vsega skupaj 11 azilov. Iz tega se vidi - iz obeh podatkov - : prvič, da tolikšno število zaprosi za azil, in iz podatka, da je tako majhno število podeljenih azilov, je **več kot očitno**, da **se institut azila močno in množično zlorablja**. To **zlorabo želimo preprečiti** z novelo zakona, ki je pravzaprav, kot ste videli, v tem, da se dodaja še en razlog za začasno zadržanje, pridržanje nezakonitega prehoda čez mejo in prosilca azila, in to je **zavajanje** oziroma **zloraba** instituta azila. To je torej dodano kot razlog za pridržanje oziroma za omejitev svobode* (minister za notranje zadeve, zasedanje Državnega zbora, 20. 12. 2000).

Ponovno je mogoče opaziti tendenco po »kriminalizaciji« imigrantov; argumenti, ki jih minister za notranje zadeve navaja v dokaz o zavajanju in zlorabah azilnega postopka so namreč poenostavljajoči in zavajajoči. Dejstvo, da je Republika Slovenija v letu 2000 odobrila 11 prošenj za azil od skupno vloženih 9240 prošenj (z drugimi besedami, azil je bil odobren 0,1 odstotku prosilcev) ne pomeni, da so vsi prosilci za azil, ki jim prošnja ni bila odobrena, zlorabljali postopek ali zavajali pristojne organe. Kljub temu je bil tako predstavljeni argument o zavajanju in zlorabi postopka ključen za legitimiziranje in uvedbo restriktivnejše imigracijske oz. azilne politike. V ministrovi razpravi teza o kriminogenosti imigrantov ni povsem eksplicitna, saj trdi, da imigranti (vsi imigranti – homogenizacija imigrantov) skušajo zlorabljati azilni postopek, v nadaljevanju razprave pa so sodelujoči z ministrom vred že povsem neposredni:

*Druga skupina ukrepov se nanaša na preprečevanje tovrstne **kriminalitete**. Zelo resno bi rad opozoril, da **tovrstna kriminaliteta** v Sloveniji **narašča**. Gre za dve vrsti, dve skupini tovrstne **kriminalitete**. Eno so **kazniva dejanja**, ki jih **povzročajo tujci** - mi imamo posebno statistiko o tem - in je **velik porast kaznivih dejanj**, ki jih **povzročajo tujci**. To so v bistvu **kazniva dejanja**, kot so **tatvine, vlomi, kršitev nedotakljivosti stanovanja** in podobno* (minister za notranje zadeve, 16. 2. 2001).

Zanimivo je, da je le teden dni pred navedeno ministrovo izjavo predstavnik slovenske policije na novinarski konferenci sporočil dve informaciji, ki neposredno zanikata ministrove navedbe: prvič, da policija ne vodi posebne evidence o kaznivih dejanjih tujcev, in drugič, da uprava kriminalistične policije ocenjuje, da je odstotek kaznivih dejanj, ki jih zagrešijo tujci, zanemarljiv (vir: »Vlada nad težave bolj sistematično«, Delo, 7. 2. 2001). V tem kontekstu je ministrovo izjavo mogoče razumeti kot politično in ne kot strokovno izjavo, saj ignorira sporočila lastnih strokovnih služb.

Tudi, če so člani Odbora za notranjo politiko neskladje izjav opazili, tega v razpravi ni bilo videti; nasprotno, kljub statističnim podatkom poudarjajo ogrožanje varnosti:

*...nihče se ne ukvarja z **varnostjo državljanov**. **Državljani** so **dvakratno ogroženi**. Najprej direktno **od teh pribežnikov**, drugič **od kriminala**, ki je povezan s tem...* (poslanec LDS, Odbor za notranjo politiko, 15. 12. 2000)

*...kajti z **begunci** nastajajo **problemi** predvsem na območjih, ki so mejna, in **naši državljani** imajo že **kup problemov** s temi prebežniki, in **naša vlada** je dolžna zagotoviti tudi **našim državljanom varnost**, ki jim jo mora zagotoviti* (poslanec SDS, zasedanje Državnega zbora, 20. 12. 2000).

V političnem govoru o imigrantih v kontekstu obravnave sprememb in dopolnil Zakona o azilu je emocionalizacija druga pogosta dimenzija tovrstnega diskurza. Emocionalizacijo razumemo kot uporabo pojmov, ki prikličejo močne čustvene odzive, saj gradijo na dramatičnih opisih razmer ter ustvarjajo vtis o izjemnih razmerah in visoki stopnji ogroženosti lokalnega (predvsem obmejnega) prebivalstva:

*Ampak poglejte, če gledamo sedaj te posledice, ko ti ljudje pridejo čez mejo, se pojavlja en **kup problemov**. Mislim da, ali je bilo premalo predstavljeno, vsekakor, kakšne **težave** imajo ti prebivalci na teh mejnih področjih, mislim, da ni bil samo en primer **nasilja** teh ljudi nad tem mejnih prebivalstvom. ... da se ne bo v enem dnevu ali v eni noči **privalilo več sto teh ljudi v Slovenijo, pa potem govorimo o ne o tisočih, ampak o deset tisočih na leto, v državi, ki ima dva milijona prebivalcev**... Saj, navsezadnje, **država** je **dolžna** za to, da **poskrbi najprej za svoje državljane** in da **zaščiti svoje državljane**, ker ti ljudje, ti **pribežniki** so tudi **nasilni*** (poslanec SDS, Odbor za notranjo politiko, 15. 12. 2000).

Elemente javnega govora o imigrantih, ki smo jih izpostavili že v medijskem diskurzu in ki se ponavljajo tudi v političnem diskurzu (kriminalizacija imigrantov, homogenizacija imigrantov, emocionalizacija, kulpabilizacija države), se uporablja kot argument za uvedbo restriktivnejših politik na področju imigracijske (azilne) zakonodaje. V političnem diskurzu nastopa nov element, to je sklicevanje na evropske prakse in direktive, ki po mnenju poslancev dopuščajo sprejem restriktivnejših ukrepov:

*Poglejte, **Evropska unija**, kakorkoli se je **zakonsko hermetično zaprla**, če še kdo pač pride skoz, je potem njihova notranja zakonodaja takšna, da kot smo lepo slišali izraz, enostavno šibnejo preko svojih meja. Kje to zdaj ostane, a je to **Slovenija kot nek sanitarni koridor** ali kjerkoli drugje, to je nepomembno. Dejstvo je, da vsi ti, jaz bom rekel, ker je več kategorij, ljudje, ki so nezakonito na našem ozemlju, to je posledica neučinkovitosti na naši meji. In mislim, da bi morali pri pripravi tudi te, tega zakona, razmišljati o tem, da bi bili bolj učinkoviti pri vzrokih. To se pravi, na meji....**Evropska unija**, gre na to, da **se mi želimo priključiti Evropski uniji in sprejemamo, harmoniziramo z njimi zakonodajo**, nam **ne bi mogla prav nič očitati**, če bi **naši organi na meji bili bistveno bolj učinkoviti in restriktivni**, zato ker **oni so to naredili**. To se pravi **tisto**, kar **sami naredijo**, **nam ne morejo očitati**. In v tej luči bi morali seveda tudi ta zakon tako naravnati, vse pa bi moralo biti usmerjeno v preventivo. Pozdravljam in se strinjam s tem, kar je naredila Evropska unija, ker samo na ta način se da delati, nekako **super liberalna zakonodaja** ali pa super liberalna možnost vstopa v državo pa verjetno **ni smiselna**, pa, ne vem, takšni*

ali drugačni principi gor ali dol. To, kar se na naši meji dogaja, to je nevzdržno. **Čim bolj bo ta zakon o azilu restriktiven, tem raje ga bom podprl, če bo restriktiven, tudi z dvema rokama, če je treba**. In v tej luči bi morali gledati - zaščite naših lastnih interesov (poslanec SDS, Odbor za notranjo politiko, 15. 12. 2000).

Ko smo bili v, ne vem, mislim da celo v letošnjem letu, na obisku na Nizozemskem, so povedali, da jih je prav njihova **preveč liberalna zakonodaja zatolkla**, da tako rečem, do te mere, da večina ljudi, ki na nezakoniti način pride v državo, ob uspešnih pravnikih oziroma odvetnikih, ki seveda si temu primerno služijo, uspe dobiti po njihovem zakonu, najprej ta pogoj stalnega bivališča in seveda ker sodni mlini tudi tam meljejo ne dovolj hitro, da ne bom rekel počasi, se potem to dogaja, da **ti ljudje dobijo pravico državljanstva**. In kar je pri njih še **bolj grozno**, je to, da **to pravico dobi potem cela družina**, pri malo bolj številnih družinah kot so slovenske, si lahko predstavljate, kakšna populacija jih v kratkem čaka. Tudi zato recimo teče pri njih nek, neka politična debata najprej zdaj, v katero smer iti (poslanec LDS, Odbor za notranjo politiko, 15. 12. 2000).

Zgornje navedbe iz parlamentarnih razprav so potekale v času t. i. »prebežniške krize«. V tem času je za parlamentarno razpravo domala pri vseh govorcih - ne glede na strankarsko provenienco - značilen zelo podoben tip diskurza, kar nas lahko napeljuje na sklepanje, da je konsenzualni govor rezultat posebnih razmer tistega časa. Pregled parlamentarnih razprav v letu 2006, ko je Državni zbor ponovno obravnaval Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o azilu, odkriva, da se je parlamentarni govor politično profiliral glede na strankarsko pripadnost. Poslanci in poslanke vladajoče koalicije ter poslanska skupina Slovenske nacionalne stranke so politični govor o imigrantih v primerjavi z letoma 2000 in 2001 še zaostrili, medtem ko so poslanci in poslanke Socialnih demokratov in Liberalnih demokratov Slovenije spremembam Zakona o azilu nasprotovali z argumenti, da znižuje že dosežene standarde človekovih pravic. V nadaljevanju bomo predstavili nekaj značilnih primerov zaostritve političnega govora[13]:

Če gre res za zniževanje standardov, da je to tako kritično, verjetno ne bo tu nihče upal trditi, da to ni harmonizacija z evropskim pravnim redom; tega verjetno ni, tu smo si verjetno enotni. Če pa gre za tako hudo zniževanje standardov, se pa lahko vprašamo, na kakšnem nivoju pa potem so standardi Evropske unije. Ali so države članice Evropske unije, ki se zavzemajo za enotnost - in to bi naj bila neka enotna metodologija - na azilnem področju v kameni dobi? Ljudje božji! Jaz si tega enostavno ne znam predstavljati, kakšen vik in krik. Sem vabite tudi neke predstavnike iz **ne vem kakšnih humanitarnih organizacij, ki nam tu v državnem zboru solijo pamet** pa nam razlagajo, kako si znižujemo standarde... Interes Evropske unije prav gotovo ni, da bo postala, ne vem, neko interesno področje, **kjer bodo iz vseh področij sveta drli sem in bo mimo tistega, kar lahko absorbira ta Evropska unija**, govorim o mimo tega, kar lahko absorbira. Seveda ti tokovi bodo vedno in obstaja neka kritična masa, ko se še stvari lahko urejajo. Če to prekorači

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[13] Magnetogram zasedanja Državnega zbora z dne 6. 2. 2006 je dostopen na internetni strani: http://www.dz-rs.si/index.php?id=97&cs=1&st=m&fts=zakon+o+azilu&o=10&showdoc=1&unid=SZA|344E33594B9AD0F9C125711100500AA1 (9. 3. 2008).

*vse razumne meje, je to težko. Primer bom dal samo Slovenijo v času te morije na Balkanu, ko smo imeli preko 20 tisoč različnih tujcev. Ne bom jih v kategorije postavljal, to je bilo **že mimo meje sprejemljivega**. Mislim, da smo v tistem trenutku bili v Sloveniji država, ki ima na prebivalca največ tujcev, beguncev ali kakorkoli jih že imenujemo. Naš interes ni, da bi zadeve prerasle preko vseh mogočih mej. ...In tu moramo tudi mi **zasledovati svoj nacionalen interes**. In naš **nacionalen interes verjetno ni, da bi imeli toliko teh ljudi**, kot smo imeli leta 1994, 1995; takrat je bilo res kritično. Poleg tega pa mislim, da tudi ni naš interes, da bi imeli takšno stanje na naših mejah, kot je bilo leta 2000, ko je dnevno približno 100 ljudi prestopilo našo mejo* (poslanec SDS, zasedanje Državnega zbora, 6. 2. 2006).

Pomembna značilnost javnega govora in politične retorike v Sloveniji je nizka raven refleksivnosti in analitičnega mišljenja. Slednje velja za večino novinarskih tekstov in za javna stališča poklicnih politikov. Ti so najpogosteje zatrjevali - kot je razvidno iz zgornjega citata - da sta slovenska zakonodaja in praksa na tem področju povsem usklajeni z evropskimi standardi in zahtevami, ne da bi se vprašali, ali so evropski standardi in osnove migracijske politike ustrezni. »Evropa« je tudi v tem primeru delovala kot zarotitveni obrazec, ob katerem se kritično mišljenje konča.

Sklicevanje na presežno materialno oskrbljenost imigrantov in prosilcev za azil ima pomembno razsežnost: na tej točki postanejo vpleteni tudi tiste prebivalke in prebivalci Slovenije, ki z imigranti nimajo neposrednega stika. Imigranti naj bi namreč ogrožali kakovost življenja domačink in domačinov (ter negativno vplivali na trg dela in zaposlovanja) ter socialno varnost davkoplačevalk in davkoplačevalcev:

*»V Slovenski nacionalni stranki mislimo, da je ta zakon, o katerem sedaj razpravljamo, o azilantih, precej nežna zadeva. V bistvu bi **bilo potrebno zadeve dosti bolj zategniti in jih dati na kratko,** kot je to sedaj. Mislim, da nikakor ne smemo pristajati na to, da bodo **neki tujci,** ne vem od kod, prišli v Slovenijo in **imeli večje pravice od naših državljank in državljanov.** To je nedopustno in to je bedasto, kaj tako neumnega še nisem slišal. ...In kako je mogoče, da je nekdo prosilec za azil z veljavnim potnim listom, lepo vas prosim! To je farsa! **In ljudje se delajo norca iz slovenske države.** Pride z veljavnim potnim listom, dostikrat celo s slovenskim, pa reče, da je azilant. Konec koncev, naša poslanska skupina je bila edina od vseh tukaj na obisku v azilnem domu. In kaj smo ugotovili: da **je azilni dom do polovice napolnjen s cigani iz Maribora!** Iz Maribora! Kako so to azilanti, prosilci za azil in ne vem kaj še vse? Mislim, da je **to grozljiva zadeva**. In nikakor ne pristajamo že na ta člen, ta 46.a člen, ki govori o pravici do dela, da lahko z delom prične nekdo eno leto po vložitvi prošnje za azil. Pa lepo vas prosim! **Kaj pa naši ljudje? A naši ljudje pa naj "crknejo" na cesti?**! Kakšna država smo, da so nekateri bolj pomembni od nas samih! Kaj podobnega naredi totalen idiot ali pa nekdo, ki hoče **sabotirati lastno državo**. Ampak tisti človek nima lastne države, to potem ni njegova domovina, ker je internacionalec, ker razmišlja o **multikulturalnosti** in ne vem o čem še vse. Mislim, da je **to grozljivo.** Vprašajte! Naj gredo nekateri, ki so bili do zdaj v steklenem zvonu in so ležali v vati, naj gredo malo med ljudi! Naj malo povprašajo, kako dihajo Slovenke in Slovenci! Pa bodo videli, da ti v azilnem domu imajo hrano, imajo stanovanje, dobijo obleko, preskrbljeni so z vsem in še žepnino dobijo; in žepnine dobijo več kot nek*

slovenski delavec, ki dela in ima doma dva otroka nezaposlena in mladoletna ter ženo in dobi 70.000 tolarjev na mesec. A to vas pa ne briga? To je pa vse ena figa, kaj je s temi ljudmi?! **Sramota! Sramota***! Ne vem, kako si lahko sploh drznete kaj takega govoriti in razlagati tukaj ... Izvolite, pojdite v azilni dom, pa* **vzemite te ljudi domov***, če jih imate tako radi in če ste tako širokosrčni, da jim želite pomagati na vsakršen način*« (poslanec SNS, zasedanje Državnega zbora, 6. 2. 2006)

Ob obravnavanju zakona so se javno oglašali številni strokovnjaki, nevladne organizacije, aktivistične skupine, del političnih strank, varuh človekovih pravic, mednarodne organizacije, kot je UNHCR, ter celo predsednik države in opozarjali na sporne uredbe, ki kršijo mednarodno zakonodajo in nižajo že uveljavljene standarde na področju azilne politike. Kljub temu je slovenski parlament predlog zakona o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o azilu sprejel 6. februarja 2006; navzočih je bilo 70 poslank in poslancev, od tega je bilo 45 glasov za sprejem zakona, 24 pa proti. Nobeden od amandmajev, ki so jih predlagale opozicijske stranke, v katerih so skušale vključevati nekatere predloge nevladnih organizacij, ni bil sprejet.

Podobno kot v medijskem diskurzu tudi v političnem diskurzu v obdobju 2000-2001 in 2006 lahko identificiramo naslednje značilnosti:

- homogenizacija in bipolarnost objektov diskurza (nediferencirani »Mi« in nediferencirani »Oni«);
- emocionalizacija (uporaba pojmov, primerjav in metafor, ki evocirajo ogroženost Slovenije in njenih državljank ter državljanov);
- viktimizacija »avtohtonega« prebivalstva in države (predvsem poudarjanje ekonomske in varnostne ogroženosti zaradi priseljevanja);
- kulpabilizacija imigrantov in države (država ne poskrbi za lastno prebivalstvo in je pretirano velikodušna do tujcev; imigranti množično zlorabljajo gostoljubje države);
- kriminalizacija imigrantov (imigranti so povzročitelji kaznivih dejanj, kriminaliteta zaradi njih narašča, posebej je ogroženo obmejno prebivalstvo);
- elementov higienizacije, prisotnih v medijskem diskurzu, v političnem diskurzu v tem obdobju nismo našli.

V političnem diskurzu v obdobju 2000-2001 nismo našli pomembnih diskurzivnih razlik med pripadniki posameznih parlamentarnih strank, kar pojasnjujemo s tezo o hegemonizaciji nacionalističnega diskurza, ki mu uspeva podrejati in zabrisati vse druge - v tem primeru politične - razlike. Po našem mnenju ima namreč diskurzivni material o imigrantih, tako medijski kot politični, značilnosti nacionalističnega diskurza: svet deli na »Nas« in »Njih«, vzpostavlja se kot nadrejeni, hegemonizirajoči diskurz, ki samega sebe naturalizira, ter deluje preko institucij, ki pomembno oblikujejo politike na področju odnosa do imigrantov (parlament kot zakonodajno telo, tiskani mediji kot oblikovalci javnega mnenja). Odklonilen odnos do imigrantov in ksenofobični politični diskurz zagotovo lahko pripomoreta k banalizaciji nestrpnega izražanja in vedenja v širši javnosti.

SKLEP

Javno razpoloženje, ki se je v letih 2000 in 2001 označevalo kot »prebežniška kriza«, je spominjalo na razmere v Sloveniji v zgodnjih devetdesetih letih, ko je bilo govora o »begunski krizi« (1992-1993). Nekatere študije, ki so obravnavale obe situaciji,[14] so že opozarjale na serijo elementov v procesih vzpostavljanja diskriminatornih diskurzivnih praks na področju medijskega in institucionalno-političnega delovanja. Pokazalo se je predvsem naslednje: različni elementi nacionalističnega diskurza se v nekem trenutku homogenizirajo ter proizvedejo problem ali »krizo«, ki nato s podporo javnega medijskega delovanja zlahka legitimira odmike od nekaterih temeljnih načel, ki so se zdela že samoumevna (npr. temeljne človekove pravice in svoboščine). Taki odmiki potem obveljajo za popolnoma sprejemljive izjemne ukrepe. Praviloma se dosegajo z uporabo emocionalizacije javnega govora. V primerjavi z begunsko krizo iz let 1992-1993 so se v »prebežniški krizi« zaostrili in dodatno legitimirali izrazito restriktivni ukrepi slovenske imigracijske politike z začetka devetdesetih let; hkrati se je v obdobju 2000-2001 nacionalna identiteta navzoten še bolj radikalno ločila od »drugih« in nadaljevala logiko identitetne žrtve, kar je odprlo možnosti legitimizacije politik in sprememb zakonodaje, ki utrjujejo tezo o ogroženosti slovenstva. V vsakdanjem javnem govoru in v medijih se je razširil predsodkovni in sovražni govor o drugih, ki ni imel le značilnosti ksenofobije z elementi rasizma, temveč je tudi pozival k skupinskemu delovanju proti naseljevanju in integraciji imigrantov. Pripeljal je do eksplicitnih groženj in poskusov nekaterih akterjev, da bi zares delovali sami, na lastno pest in zunaj legalnih in institucionalnih okvirov države (Jalušič 2001: 15). Nedavna dogajanja v zvezi s preseljevanjem Romov iz Ambrusa se umeščajo v enako matriko: kar je videti ekscesno ravnanje z lastnimi državljani, je zgolj dosledna izpeljava dogajanj iz obdobja begunske in prebežniške »krize«.

Lokalizirana zavračanja nastajajo iz fantazmatskih podob, ki prikazujejo imigrante kot sovražnike, kot tiste, ki ogrožajo naturalizirano samobitnost večinskega naroda; naturalizirano zato, ker ni nikoli do konca tematizirana ali pojasnjena. V primeru preselitve Romov iz Ambrusa namreč niso mogle delovati običajne metafore in sintagme, kot je na primer govor o »na svoji zemlji«. V tem primeru se je bil diskriminatorni diskurz prisiljen soočiti z lastnim jedrom brez ovinkov sklicevanja na »avtohtonost«, »lastno zemljo« ali »domačo grudo«: prisiljen je bil izgovarjati kulturni rasizem v čisti obliki. Zlorabljanje kulture pa se ne konča pri identifikaciji razlike med nami in njimi. Dejanska raznolikost imigrantov, njihovih posamičnih življenjskih usod in imigrantskih itinerarijev, se zvaja na fantazmatsko homogenost z imaginarnim skupnim imenovalcem kulturne drugačnosti. Ta drugačnost ogroža, zato se zavračanje posameznikov in posameznic dogaja v imenu kulture. Kultura postaja legitimacija verbalnega in včasih tudi fizičnega nasilja ter hkrati orodje za njegovo izvajanje.

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[14] Doupona-Horvat, M., Veschueren, J., Žagar, I. (1998): *Retorika begunske politike v Sloveniji*. OSI Ljubljana. Poročilo skupine za spremljanje nestrpnosti 01, (2001), Mirovni inštitut, Ljubljana.

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SUMMARY

UNWANTED? MEDIA AND POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIONS
OF FOREIGNERS IN SLOVENIA

Ana Kralj

The article discusses the attitude of the population of Slovenia toward immigration, in particular toward "illegal immigrants". Results of public opinion polls that seek to understand the attitude of the majority population toward immigration to Slovenia have revealed a negative majority stance toward defined groups of foreigners, most evidently so in relation to immigration from the republics of former Yugoslavia (representing the majority share of the immigrant population in Slovenia), and immigration from non-European countries, yet with a significant difference: the immigrants from the global south (Africa) and east (Asia, Russia, and states of the former Soviet Union) are significantly more unwanted than immigrants from the "pan-European world" (both Americas and Australia). Based on discourse analysis, the author has examined the reactions of printed mass media and political representatives in the national assembly to the arrival of foreigners during the "immigrant crisis" of 2000 and 2001. Research findings have revealed significant similarities between media and political discourse, both establishing a series of discriminatory discursive practices with common characteristics: homogenization of foreigners, emotionalization of discourse, criminalization of foreigners, victimization of the local population, culpabilization of the state for its inadequate reactions, and hygenization. The analysis of parliamentary discussions in the time of the "immigrant crisis" has not revealed any significant differences in the discourse used by representatives of various political parties. Considerable bias, prejudice, and nationalistic orientation that permeated the public discourse in relation to foreigners have exerted an influence on the legitimization of institutional political operations and legislative changes that lower the already existing standards of treatment of immigrants, in particular asylum seekers.

Stanislav Kobler (ur.), Četrta stran trikotnika, Znameniti Slovenci in slovenska društva v Bosni in Hercegovini 1878–2000, Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana 2008, 465 str.

Monografijo z originalnim naslovom Četrta stran trikotnika, ki jo je uredil Stanislav Koblar, je izdala založba Mladinska knjiga iz Ljubljane. Knjiga obsega kar 465 strani in je opremljena s številnimi izvirnimi fotografijami, prinaša pa enkraten pregled življenja in delovanja slovenske skupnosti v Bosni in Hercegovini. Lahko rečemo, da je vzorčen primer, kako pisati zgodovino zdomstva in tako zagotoviti, da ta delček zgodovine Slovencev ostane v trajnem spominu.

Delo je izšlo ob 110-letnici združevanja Slovencev v Bosni in Hercegovini v okviru raziskovalnega projekta Znameniti Slovenci v Bosni in Hercegovini, 1878-2000.

V zadnjem letu je to že druga publikacija (Vera Kržišnik-Bukić, Slovenci v Bosni in Hercegovini skozi pričevanja, spomine in literarne podobe 1831-2007), ki iz različnih zornih kotov opisuje življenje in delovanje Slovencev v drugačnem okolju, na stičišču različnih kultur.

Burna zgodovina, ki je značilna za celoten balkanski prostor, je močno zaznamovala tudi zadnji dve stoletji v bosansko-hercegovskem prostoru, kar je vplivalo tudi na strukturo prebivalstva. O tem govorita prva dva prispevka, ki sta ju napisala Amra Čusto in Mesud Hero.

Ko je avstro-ogrska monarhija po letu 1878 prišla v Bosno in Hercegovino, so z njo prišli številni slovenski vojaki in tako vzpostavili stik s to deželo. V naslednjih letih so pomagali oblikovati državno upravo številni Slovenci, ki so s seboj prinašali svojo kulturo in način življenja. Popis prebivalstva iz leta 1910 govori o tem, da je v Bosni in Hercegovini živelo 3108 Slovencev. Število je po tem letu še raslo. Že ob koncu 19. stoletja je bilo ustanovljeno prvo slovensko društvo, za katerega je bilo značilno, da je bila večina članov zaposlena v upravi.

Drugo prelomnico je predstavljal konec prve svetovne vojne in ustanovite Kraljevine Srbov Hrvatov in Slovencev, ko je bilo v Bosno in Hercegovino po uradni dolžnosti poslanih, mnogo Slovencev.

Dogodke, ki so se pričeli z drugo svetovno vojno in se v glavnem zaključili s sklenitvijo Daytonskega sporazuma, naniza Mesud Hero. Številne Slovence predvsem iz Štajerske in Gorenjske, so med drugo svetovno vojno Nemci izselili v Bosno in Hercegovino in mnogi med njimi so se vključili v bosansko narodnoosvobodilno gibanje. V letih po drugi svetovni vojni so bili tja poslani številni strokovnjaki iz Slovenije, da so pomagali predvsem pri obnovi precej porušene dežele. Po osamosvojitvi Slovenije in Hrvaške so se za referendum odločili tudi v Bosni in Hercegovini, vojna, ki je sledila, pa predstavlja eno največjih tragedij ob koncu 20. stoletja. V enotah armade Bosne in Hercegovine so sodelovali tudi Slovenci.

Gospodarske spremembe in razvoj je opisala Elma Hašimbegovič. Če je za obdobje avstro-ogrske nadvlade značilen razvoj na področju rudarstva, promet in industrializa-

cija, pa se v času Kraljevine preseli v Bosno in Hercegovino tudi večje število kmečkega prebivalstva iz Slovenije. Med njimi številni primorski Slovenci, ki so se umaknili iz Kraljevine Italije zaradi fašizma. Avtorica je popisala tudi delež Slovencev pri obnovitvi po drugi svetovni vojni.

Sledi zanimiv prispevek Alme Leka o delavskih organizacijah in deležu Slovencev v delavskem gibanju vse od konca 19. stoletja.

Tatjana Hojan iz Slovenskega šolskega muzeja je napisala obširno razpravo o šolstvu. Slovenski učitelji v Bosni in Hercegovini niso bili pomembni le kot pedagoški delavci, ampak tudi kot pisci učbenikov, razprav, priročnikov, organizatorji kulturno-prosvetnih prireditev, direktorji šol, šolski nadzorniki in podobno. Med drugo svetovno vojno so mnogi sodelovali pri izobraževanju nepismenega prebivalstva. Na univerzah, ki so se ustanavljale po mestih v Bosni in Hercegovini, so predavali mnogi slovenski univerzitetni profesorji.

Področje športa kot ene od dejavnosti, v katerem so Slovenci zapustili močne sledi, so popisali Stanislav Koblar, Zoran Doršner in Josip Osti, v prispevku z nazornim naslovom Šport – od gombanja do olimpijade. Slovenci so odločilno vplivali na razvoj smučanja vse od konca 19. stoletja dalje.

Vlogo Slovencev na področju medicine sta raziskala Mario Kocijančič in Amra Čusto. S pomočjo podajanja kratkih življenjepisov zdravnikov, ki so v Bosni in Hercegovini delovali ali pa bili tam rojeni, pa jih je šolanje in službovanje odpeljalo drugam, sta nanizala zanimiv in pomemben del k zgodovini Slovencev v BiH.

Osnovne podatke o sodelovanju na področju veterine je zbral Stanislav Kobler.

Usode duhovnikov, redovnic in redovnikov ter njihov delež pri vzpostavljanju katoliške cerkve v Bosni in Hercegovini so zajete v prispevku Matjaža Ambrožiča, dragocene utrinke iz povojnega Sarajeva pa je dodal Marijan Šef.

Področje kulture in umetnosti je gotovo tisto, ki je v vseh krajih in časih najbolj odprto tkanju stikov z drugimi kulturami in umetniškimi dejavnostmi. V monografiji je prav to področje književnosti (Juraj Martinović), gledališča (Ivo Svetina), opere, baleta in koncertov (Stanislav Koblar), filma in radiotelevizije (Vefik Hadžismailović), likovne umetnosti (Ivana Jevđević), arhitekture (Bogo Zupančič), arheologije in muzejev (Aiša Softić) široko in dobro analizirano. Različni avtorji, tako slovenski kot bosanski, so iz različnih zornih kotov posegli v izredno bogato sodelovanje na naštetih področjih in tako pokazali, da je kljub različnim vladam in ideologijam kulturi in umetnostni uspelo na nek način hoditi svoja pota in prav stiki med Slovenci in Bosanci, ki so bili tako bogati, so k temu bistveno pripomogli.

Zadnji prispevek Stanislava Koblarja podrobno predstavi druženje Slovencev in njihove organizacije v Bosni in Hercegovini. Začetki druženja segajo v leto 1897, ko se je pojavilo »Slovensko omizje« v Sarajevu, ki ga lahko označimo kot skupino meščansko usmerjenih somišljenikov. Leta 1910 se je skupina preimenovala v društvo Slovenski klub. Leta 1934, je bilo ustanovljeno še Delavsko kulturno društvo Cankar. Po drugi ukinitvi društva Cankar (prva leta 1940) leta 1951, so pretekla kar štiri desetletja, da so se Slovenci, proti koncu leta 1992, v vojnih razmerah zopet organizirali v Zvezo Slovencev v Bosni in

temu je 1993 sledila ustanovitev Slovenskega kulturnega društva Cankar. Delovanju tega društva in drugih slovenskih združenj, ki so zaživela po vojni v Bosni in Hercegovini sledimo vse do leta 2000.

Obsežna monografija nam prinaša vpogled v izredno razgibano obdobje zgodovine Bosne in Hercegovine s posebnega zornega kota, skozi kontinuirano prisotnost Slovencev, ki so jo soustvarjali od konca fevdalne turške uprave, do vstopa v kapitalizem, dveh svetovnih vojn, socializma in do razpada skupne države ter nekaj povojnih let. Vsebinsko se dotika vseh področij življenja. Ko je govora o Slovencih v Bosni in Hercegovini moramo izpostaviti posebno okoliščino, in sicer to, da je bila ta dežela nekoč del skupne države in odhod Slovencev v te kraje ni bil enak klasičnemu izseljevanju.

V monografiji sodelujejo avtorji slovenske in bosanske narodnosti, večina je svoje prispevke podprla z arhivskimi viri in zbranimi pričevanji in tako predstavljajo dobro osnovo za nadaljnja proučevanja, kar je tudi eden od namenov te knjige. Opozoriti je treba še na bogato fotografsko opremo, ki dajo monografiji posebno vrednost.

mag. Metka Gombač

Aviva Chomsky, »They take our jobs!« And 20 Other Myths About Immigration, Beacon Press (United States), Paperback, 2007, 192 str.

Najstarejša hčerka slovitega Noama Chomskega je profesorica zgodovine Latinske Amerike in področja Karibov ter koordinatorka za latinsko-ameriške študije na Salem State College v ameriški zvezni državi Massachusetts. Aviva Chomsky, podobno kot njen oče, svoja akademska spoznanja pripenja na vlogo aktivne levičarke in družbene kritičarke. Četudi njena razprava zadeva predvsem področje zahodne hemisfere, je njeno glavno sporočilo povezano z ultimativno težnjo po večji humanosti v celem svetu. Ob razkrivanju prepletajočih se vezi med preteklostjo in sedanjimi razmerami se skozi posrečen prikaz trka med različnimi interesnimi sloji ameriške družbe jasno izreka *za* solidarnost z Latinoameričani in *za* polne pravice imigrantov. Njeno analizo podpira temeljni argument, da družbena merila in predpostavke bistveno vplivajo na razmišljanje o fenomenu imigracij; za ponazoritev le-tega se že v izhodišču na kratko poigra z obče sprejetimi terminološkimi skovankami, ki hkrati zrcalijo in obnavljajo razumevanja določenih izrazov, kot izraz »prvi svet« v odnosu do »tretjega sveta«, »razviti« v odnosu do »nerazvitih« ipd.

V seriji krajših poglavij Aviva Chomsky razkriva najbolj razširjene mite, povezane z imigracijo ter zlasti revnejšimi latinskimi in karibskimi priseljenci v ZDA. Ti miti obtožujejo priseljence za primanjkljaj služb, nižanje plač, neplačevanje davkov, povečanje kriminala, odtok denarja iz države, jih obravnavajo kot grožnjo ameriški kulturi in standardu, na drugi strani pa prikazujejo ZDA kot velikodušno zatočišče enakih možnosti. Enega ključnih generatorjev za ohranjanje takšnih mitov vidi v preozkem spektru javnega obravnavanja kompleksne izseljenske problematike. Ta zlasti ne upošteva obeh plati globalizacijske medalje in daljnosežnosti posledic, ki jih ima kopičenje bogastva v rokah maloštevilnih, obenem pa v kolektivnem zgodovinskem spominu dovoljuje številne luknje, ki prezrejo večstoletno diskriminiranje določenih etničnih oziroma rasnih skupin; na tem mestu navede konkretne primere vključno z deportacijami, linčanji, izgoni, konfiskacijami premoženj, množičnimi sterilizacijami in drugimi oblikami evgenike ter kampanjami za rasno čistost. Aviva Chomsky pokaže, da je v deželi, ki je znano frazo »*vsi ljudje so ustvarjeni enaki*« leta 1776 vključila v Listino o neodvisnosti, ustavno zagotovljena enakost pred zakonom pravzaprav že od začetka ameriške državnosti izključevalna.

Ključni problem negativnega gledanja na imigrante vidi v sistemu vertikalne klasifikacije rasnih oziroma etničnih skupnosti (z anglosaksonsko »raso« na samem vrhu), ki je v mehanizmu ameriške države kot tudi pri velikem delu ameriške družbe tradicionalno povezana z razumevanjem fenomenov imigracije in državljanstva. Selektivno dodeljevanje državljanstva, v katerem ima država monopol nad zakonodajo in izvršilnim birokratskim aparatom, je po njenem v dobi množičnih imigracij polpretekle dobe postal eden od pomembnejših dejavnikov izključevanja iz »družbe enakih možnosti«. Da pa državljanstvo še ne zagotavlja enakih pravic, so občutili zlasti »Afroameričani« in »Latinoameričani«, katerim pripisuje status drugorazrednih državljanov. Kljub ustavnim zagotovilom o

enakosti pred zakonom v ozadju podeljevanja državljanstva še vedno delujejo vzvodi rasnega, etničnega in spolnega razlikovanja. Največje stopnje diskriminacije so bili vseskozi deležni »nebelci« oziroma tisti, ki so bili *označeni* za »nebele«. Vsebina te kategorije se je skozi čas spreminjala ter je priložnostno menjala barvo in obliko; tako so na primer med »nebelce« določeno dobo sodili tudi Armenci in Sirijci, zmedo v rasni klasifikaciji pa je ustvarjala celo zagorela polt priseljencev iz južne Evrope. Ost rasističnega kopja je bila približno do 1930 kot ljudstvom aziatskega porekla obrnjena proti »Hunom« in Slovanom, potem pa so te skupine »kar naenkrat« postale belske.

Domača v sferah ameriške oziroma globalne ekonomije, ameriškega prava in zlasti zgodovine ZDA Aviva Chomsky obelodani predsodke ameriških elit do »nebelih ras« in etničnih skupnosti, ki se v ameriški družbi najdejo pri dnu hierarhične lestvice. Vzporedno s tem razkriva vzvode podjetniških apetitov in političnega koristoljubja, ki jim gredo predsodki do priseljencev kot ranljive in slabo plačane delovne sile zaradi težnje po čim večjem dobičku kot voda na mlin. Trdi, da sta rasistično in ekonomsko mišljenje pogosto dve plati istega kovanca. Za imperialistično ameriško politično elito, ki širi strah, manipulira javno mnenje s famo o imigracijski *krizi* in prilagaja politiko zaposlovanja tujih delavcev predvsem sebi v prid, so priseljenci odlično žrtveno jagnje. Imigracijo razume kot del prepletenega globalnega sistema, ki so ga sooblikovali zgodovinski dejavniki (zlasti kolonializem) in ekonomija.

> »Imigracija je res problem, a ne v smislu, kot je ponavadi definiran. Imigracija je predvsem humanitarni problem. Ljudje zapuščajo svojo domovino, svoje družine, svoje načine bivanja in tvegajo svoja življenja. Kar je potrebno, je humanitarna rešitev.«

Izredno berljiv in lahkoten slog je bržkone izbrala zavedno, z namenom, da nagovori čim širše kroge ljudi in jih pozove k ponovnemu razmisleku o migracijah. Njena knjiga predstavlja svojevrsten izziv za razumevanje ameriške družbe skozi čas, saj z globalne prostorske in časovne perspektive prikazuje večplastnost pogosto protislovnega odnosa do priseljencev in priseljevanja nasploh. Aviva Chomsky nadene priseljencem nalepko *človek* in poudarja potrebo, da se jih obravnava kot posameznike. Zaradi aktualnosti diskusije o migracijah in njenih posledicah je možno njene argumente uporabiti tudi na slovenskem ali širše evropskem območju.

Urška Strle

NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA PRIPRAVO PRISPEVKOV
ZA *DVE DOMOVINI / TWO HOMELANDS*

1. Usmeritev revije

Revija *Dve domovini / Two Homelands* je namenjena objavi znanstvenih in strokovnih člankov, poročil, razmišljanj in knjižnih ocen s področja migracij. Revija, ki izhaja od leta 1990, je večdisciplinarna in večjezična. Letno izideta dve številki v tiskani in elektronski obliki na svetovnem spletu (http://isi.zrc-sazu.si/?q=node/436). Članki so objavljeni v slovenščini in angleščini, po odločitvi uredniškega odbora tudi v drugih jezikih, in so recenzirani.

Prispevke, ki morajo biti urejeni po spodnjih navodilih, pošljite na naslov uredništva:
Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo ZRC SAZU,
P.P. 306, SI Ljubljana;
telefon: (+386 1) 4706 485, faks: (+386 1) 4257 802;
elektronski naslov: jure.gombac@zrc-sazu.si, ali spelam@zrc-sazu.si
Prispevke oddajte uredništvu **v dveh tiskanih izvodih** in **v elektronski obliki**.

Rokopisov, ki jih uredništvo revije *Dve domovini* sprejme v objavo, avtorji ne smejo hkrati poslati kaki drugi reviji. Avtorji naj poskrbijo za primerno jezikovno raven in slogovno dovršenost.

2. Sestavine prispevkov

Članki morajo imeti sestavine, ki si sledijo po naslednjem vrstnem redu:
- **glavni naslov** članka (z velikimi tiskanimi črkami, velikost 16, okrepljeno, središčna poravnava);
- **ime in priimek avtorja** (okrepljeno in središčna poravnava, velikost črk 12, priimku naj sledi opomba pod črto, označena z *, v kateri so navedeni: 1. avtorjeva izobrazba in naziv (na primer: dr., mag. zgodovine, znanstveni sodelavec); 2. avtorjev poštni naslov (na primer Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo ZRC SAZU, Novi trg 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana); 3. avtorjevi elektronski naslov, telefon in faks);
- **predlog vrste prispevka** (izvirni, pregledni ali kratki znanstveni prispevek, strokovni članek);
- **izvleček** (slovenski naslov članka in slovenski izvleček, skupaj s presledki do 600 znakov, velikost črk 10);
- **ključne besede** (do 5 besed, velikost črk 10);
- **abstract** (angleški prevod naslova članka in slovenskega izvlečka, velikost črk 10);
- **key words** (angleški prevod ključnih besed, velikost črk 10);
- **članek** (1. skupaj s presledki naj ne presega 45.000 znakov oz. 25 tipkanih strani; 2. celotno besedilo naj bo označeno z »Normal« – torej brez oblikovanja, določanja slogov in drugega; 3. pisava Times New Roman, velikost črk 12, brez poravnave desnega roba; 4. odstavki naj bodo brez vmesnih vrstic, prazna vrstica naj bo pred in za vsakim naslovom in predvidenim mestom za tabelo ali sliko; 5. vsi zamiki odstavkov morajo biti narejeni ročno (s tabulatorjem), pri tem so odstavki za naslovi brez zamikov, ročno mora biti narejeno tudi morebitno označevanje in oštevilčevanje vrstic in odstavkov; 6. naslove označite ročno, podnaslove prvega reda z velikimi tiskanimi črkami in okrepljeno, podnaslove drugega reda z malimi tiskanimi črkami in okrepljeno, velikost črk je pri obeh vrstah naslovov 12; 7. naslovi naj bodo središčno poravnani;

- **summary** (angleški naslov članka z velikimi tiskanimi črkami, ime in priimek avtorja, sledi angleški povzetek članka, skupaj s presledki do 5000 znakov, dodajte tudi ime prevajalca).
- **Poročila in ocene** morajo imeti sestavine, ki si sledijo po naslednjem vrstnem redu:
- **poročila s konferenc in drugih dogodkov, razmišljanja**: naslov dogodka (velike tiskane črke, okrepljeno), datum poteka, ime in priimek avtorja (male črke, odebeljeno, vse središčno poravnano, celotno besedilo naj bo označeno z »Normal« - torej brez oblikovanja, določanja slogov in drugega; vsi zamiki odstavkov morajo biti narejeni ročno (s tabulatorjem, pri tem so odstavki za naslovi brez zamikov, ročno mora biti narejeno tudi morebitno označevanje in oštevilčevanje vrstic in odstavkov), besedilo naj obsega med 5000 in 15000 znaki skupaj s presledki;
- **knjižne ocene**: ime in priimek avtorja ali urednika knjige, ki je predmet ocene, naslov knjige, založba, kraj, leto izida, število strani (male tiskane črke, velikost 12, avtor in naslov naj bosta okrepljena), besedilo naj obsega med 5000 in 15000 znaki skupaj s presledki, na koncu v desnem kotu sledi ime in priimek avtorja ocene.

V besedilih **se izogibajte** podčrtavanju besed in okrepljenemu tisku. Želeni poudarki na bodo označeni s poševnim tiskom. S poševnim tiskom označite tudi navedene naslove knjig in časopisov.

3. Citiranje v člankih

V reviji *Dve domovini* je **citiranje** možno **med besedilom** in v obliki **opomb pod črto**, vendar naj avtorji uporabijo le enega od načinov.

Avtorji naj pri **citiranju med besedilom** upoštevajo naslednja navodila:
- **Citati,** dolgi tri ali več vrstic, morajo biti ročno oblikovani v ločenih enotah, poševni pisavi, zamaknjeni s tipko »tab«, brez narekovajev, za in pred vsakim citatom je prazna vrstica, pri odstavku za citatom ni zamika v prvi vrstici; citati, krajši od treh vrstic, naj bodo med drugim besedilom v narekovajih in pokončno (ne poševno).
- Če citirate cel stavek nekega avtorja, postavite na konec stavka ločilo, narekovaj in vir v oklepaju (V zvezi s tem Anderson pravi: »Dejstva so morda jasna, njihova razlaga pa ostaja predmet daljnosežnih razprav.« (Anderson 2003: 11)). Če citirate le del stavka ali besedno zvezo postavite na konec stavka, ga zaključite z narekovajem, virom v oklepaju in ločilom (Če tudi so dejstva znana, njihova razlaga, kot pravi Anderson, ostaja »predmet daljnosežnih razprav« (Anderson 2003: 11).).
- Pri **navajanju avtorjev** med besedilom (ne v oklepaju) prvič navedite ime in priimek avtorja v celoti, sicer navajajte samo priimek avtorja.
- Navajanje avtorja v oklepaju naj sledi temu vzorcu: oklepaj, priimek, leto, dvopičje in strani, ki so ločene s stičnim pomišljajem, zaklepaj, pika (Anderson 2003: 91–99); več navedb naj bo ločenih s podpičjem in razvrščenih po letnicah (Hobsbawm 2007: 23–45; Anderson 2003: 91–99).
- **Seznam literature in virov** je v tem primeru na koncu besedila, enote naj bodo razvrščene po abecednem redu priimkov avtorjev, enote istega avtorja pa razvrščene po letnicah; če imamo več del istega avtorja, ki so izšla istega leta, jih ločimo z malimi črkami (Anderson 2003a; 2003b). Seznam literature in virov je brez zamikov. Upoštevajte naslednji vrstni red in načine zapisov pri različnih navedenih enotah:
  a   navajanje pri knjigah: priimek in ime avtorja, (leto izida), *naslov knjige*, kraj, založba (primer: Anderson, Benedict (2003). *Zamišljene skupnosti: o izvoru in širjenju nacionalizma*. Ljubljana: Studia Humanitatis.);
  b   pri člankih v zborniku: priimek in ime avtorja, (leto izida), naslov članka, *naslov zbornika*

(ime urednika), kraj, založba, strani (primer: Drnovšek, Marjan (2004). Izseljenke v očeh javnosti. *Zbornik referatov 32. zborovanja slovenskih zgodovinarjev* (ur. Aleksander Žižek). Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, 383–393.);

c   pri člankih v revijah: priimek in ime avtorja, (leto izida), naslov članka, *naslov revije*, letnik, številka, strani (primer: Brightman, Robert (1995). Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification. *Cultural Anthropology*, 10 (4): 509–546.);

d   seznam literature in virov naj vsebuje vse v članku citirane vire in literaturo in naj ne vsebuje enot, ki v članku niso citirane.

Avtorji naj pri **citiranju v opombah pod črto** upoštevajo naslednja navodila:

• Pri citiranem delu naj navedejo: ime in priimek, *naslov,* kraj, založba, leto izida (primer: Zvone Žigon, *Izzivi drugačnosti: Slovenci v Afriki in na Arabskem polotoku*, Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, 2003.).

• Upoštevajo pa naj tudi naslednje: **citati,** dolgi tri ali več vrstic, morajo biti ročno oblikovani v ločenih enotah, poševni pisavi, zamaknjeni s tipko »tab«, brez narekovajev; citati, krajši od treh vrstic, naj bodo med drugim besedilom v narekovajih in pokončno (ne poševno); pri navajanju avtorjev med besedilom (ne v oklepaju) prvič navedite ime in priimek avtorja v celoti, sicer navajajte samo priimek avtorja.

Pri citiranju **arhivskega gradiva** morajo biti navedeni naslednji podatki:

• ime arhiva, signatura fonda ali zbirke, ime fonda ali zbirke, ime dokumenta in njegov datum, oznaka arhivske enote, oznaka tehnične enote (primer: Arhiv Republike Slovenije, AS 33, Deželna vlada v Ljubljani, Zapisnik 3. redne seje z dne 14. 2. 1907, a.e.1567, škatla 15.).

Pri citiranju **virov z medmrežja** pa morajo biti navedeni naslednji podatki:

• če sta avtor in naslov enote znana: priimek in ime avtorja, (leto izida), naslov članka, naslov strani in datum ogleda (primer: Becker, Howard (2003). New directions in the Sociology of Art, http://home.earthlink.net/~hsbecker/newdirections.htm (1. 2. 2008));

• če avtor ni znan, navedite le naslov članka, naslov strani in datum ogleda (primer: Interaction: Some ideas, http://home.earthlink.net/interaction.htm (1. 2. 2008));

• med besedilom prispevka v prvem primeru navedite avtorja, na primer (Becker 2003), v drugem primeru pa le prvo besedo iz naslova članka oziroma vira, na primer (Interaction).

4. Grafične in slikovne priloge

• **Fotografije, slike, zemljevidi** idr. – z izjemo tabel, narejenih v urejevalniku Word, ki pa morajo biti oblikovane za stran velikosti 16,5 x 23,5 cm – naj ne bodo vključeni v Wordov dokument. Vse slikovno gradivo oddajte oštevilčeno **v posebni mapi** z vašim priimkom in imenom.

• **Lokacijo slikovnega gradiva v tekstu** označite na naslednji način:

• Fotografija 1: Kuharica Liza v New Yorku leta 1905 (avtor: Janez Novak, vir: Arhiv Slovenije, 1415, 313/14) ali Preglednica 1: Število prebivalcev Ljubljane po popisu leta 2002 (vir: Statistični urad RS, Statistične informacije, str. 14)).

• Za grafične in slikovne priloge, za katere nimate avtorskih pravic, morate dobiti **dovoljenje za objavo**.

INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS FOR THE PREPARATION OF ARTICLES FOR
DVE DOMOVINI/TWO HOMELANDS

1. **Orientation of the Journal**

The Journal *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* welcomes the submission of scientific and professional articles, reports, debates and book reviews from the fields of humanities and social sciences, focusing on migration and related phenomena. The Journal, published since 1990, is multidisciplinary and multilingual. Two volumes are published per year in printed and electronic version on the internet (http://isi.zrc-sazu.si/?q=node/436). Articles are published in Slovenian and English. Publishing in other languages is subject to discussion of the editorial board. All articles undergo a review procedure.

Articles should be prepared according to the instructions stated below and sent to the editorial board at the following address:
Institute for Slovenian Emigration Studies SRC SASA
P.P. 306, SI Ljubljana;
Telephone: +386 1 4706 485, Fax: +386 1 4257 802;
E-mail: jure.gombac@zrc-sazu.si, or spelam@zrc-sazu.si
Articles should be submitted in **two printed versions** and an **electronic version**.

Manuscripts that are accepted for publishing by the editorial board of *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* are not to be sent for consideration and publishing to any other journal. Authors are responsible for language and style proficiency.

2. **Elements of Contributions**

Articles should contain the following elements in the stated order:
- **Title** (in capital letters, font size 16, bold, alignment center)
- **Name and surname of the author** (bold, alignment center, font size 12, after the surname a footnote should be inserted, marked with *****, stating: 1. author's education and title (e.g. PhD, MA in History, Research Fellow); 2. author's full postal address (e.g. Institute for Slovenian Emigration Studies, Novi trg 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana); 3. author's e-mail address, phone and fax number);
- **Type of the contribution** (original, review or short scientific article; professional article)
- **Abstract** (title of the article and abstract, up to 600 characters together with spaces, font size 10);
- **Key words** (up to 5 words, font size 10);
- **Article** (1. together with spaces it should not exceed 45.000 characters or 25 typed pages; 2. style of the entire text should be "Normal"; 3. font Times New Roman, size 12, alignment left; 4. paragraphs should not be separated by an empty line, empty line should be used before and after every title and intended space for a chart or picture; 5. paragraphs should be indented manually (with the tabulator), paragraphs following the titles should not be indented, bullets and numbering of lines and paragraphs should be done manually; 6. titles should be marked manually, headings 1 with bold capital letters, headings 2 with bold small letters; 7. titles should be aligned center;
- **Summary** (title of the article with capital bold letters, name and surname of the author, summary of the article, together with spaces up to 5000 characters).

Reports and reviews should contain the following elements in the stated order:
- **Reports from conferences and other events, debates**: title of the event (in bold capital letters), date of the event, name and surname of the author (bold small letters, alignment center, style of the entire text "Normal"; paragraphs should be indented manually (with the tabulator; paragraphs following the titles should not be indented, bullets and numbering of lines or paragraphs should be done manually), between 5000 and 15000 characters including spaces;
- **Book reviews**: name and surname of the author or editor of the book, title of the book, name of publisher, place of publication, date of publication, number of pages (small letters, font size 12, author and title in bold), between 5000 and 15000 characters including spaces, on the top right hand corner include the name and surname of the reviewer.

In all texts **avoid** underlining and writing in bold. Italic should be used when emphasising a word or a phrase. Italic should also be used for citing titles of books and newspapers.

3. **Citation in Articles**

Citations in the journal *Dve domovini / Two Homelands* are possible either within the text or in footnotes.

When **citing within the text** authors should follow the instructions below:
- **Long citations** (three lines or more) should be typed as an indented paragraph (with the use of "tab"), in italic, without quotation marks, the first line of the paragraph after the citation should not be indented; citation shorter than three lines should be included in the main text and separated with quotation marks, in normal font (not in italic).
- When citing an entire sentence, place the punctuation mark, quotation mark and reference in the brackets at the end of the sentence (e.g. Regarding this issue Anderson believes argues: "Facts might be clear but their interpretation is a subject of far-reaching debates." (Anderson 2003: 11)). When citing a part of the sentence or when placing a phrase at the end of the sentence, finish the sentence with quotation marks, reference in brackets and punctuation mark (e.g. Even if the facts are known, their interpretation, as argued by Anderson, "remains the subject of far-reaching debates" (Anderson 2003: 11).).
- When **naming the author** within the text (not in brackets) for the first time, include both full name and surname of the author, then continue using only last name.
- When naming the author in brackets use the following form: bracket, surname, year, colon, pages separated by hyphen, full-stop (Barthes 1999: 91–99); when naming more authors separate their names with semicolon and name them according to the year of publishing in ascending order (Said 1999: 98–99; Ford 2006: 14–45).
- **List of references** should be placed at the end of the written text and arranged in the alphabetical order according to author's surname. Multiple references by one author should be arranged according to the year of publishing. Multiple references by one author published in the same year should be separated with small letters (*e.g.* Ford 1999a; 1999b). Use the following style:
  a. books: surname and name of the author, (year of publishing), *title*, place of publishing, publisher (*e.g.* Žitnik Janja (1995). *Orel in korenine med* "*brušenjem*" *in cenzuro.* Ljubljana: Znanstvenoraziskovalni center SAZU);
  b. articles in series: surname and name of the author, (year of publishing), title, *title of the volume* (name of the editor), place of publishing, publisher, pages (*e.g.* Drnovšek,

Marjan (2004). Izseljenske v očeh javnosti. *Zbornik referatov 32. zborovanja slovenskih zgodovinarjev* (ed. Aleksander Žižek). Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, 383–393.);

- articles in journals: name and surname of the author, (year of publishing), title, *title of the journal,* year, number, pages (*e.g.* Brightman, Robert (1995). Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification. *Cultural Anthropology*, 10 (4): 509–546.);

- list of references should include all cited sources and literature.

When **citing in footnotes** authors should follow the instructions below:

- When citing works state: name and surname, *title*, place of publishing, publisher, year of publishing (*e.g.* Žitnik, Janja, *Orel in korenine med "brušenjem" in cenzuro*, Ljubljana: Znanstvenoraziskovalni center SAZU, 1995);

- Long **citations** (three lines or more) should be typed as an indented paragraph (with the use of "tab"), in italic, without quotation marks, the first line of the paragraph after the citation should not be indented; citation shorter than three lines should be included in the main text and separated with quotation marks, in normal font (not in italic); when naming the author within the text (not in brackets) for the first time, include both full name and surname of the author, then continue using only last name.

Citation of archive material should include:

- The name of the archive, book or fond number, name of series or fond, name of document and its date, archive unit, technical unit (e.g. Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, AS 33, Deželna vlada v Ljubljani, Zapisnik redne seje z dne 14.2.1907, a.e.1567, škatla 15.)

Citation of internet sources should include:

- when the author and title of the unit are known: name and surname of the author, (year of publishing), title, web page address and date of viewing (*e.g.*: Becker, Howard (2003). New directions in the Sociology of Art, http://home.earthlink.net/hsbecker/newdirections.htm (1.2.2008));

- when the author is unknown, cite only the title of the article, web page address and date of viewing (*e.g.* Interaction: Some ideas, http://home.earthlink.net/interaction.htm (1.2.2008));

- in the first case state the author within the text, e.g. (Becker 2003), in the second case use the first word from the title of the article or source e.g. (Interaction).

4. Graphics and illustrations

- **Photographs, pictures, maps** etc. – with an exception of charts originating from Word programme, which have to be adjusted to the page size 16,5 x 23,5cm – should not be included into the Word document. All illustrative material needs to be numbered and submitted separately in another folder with author's name and surname.

- **Location of illustrative material in the text** should be marked as follows: Photograph 1: Cook Lisa in New York in 1905 (author: Janez Novak, source: Archives of Slovenia, 1415, 313/14) or Chart 1: Population of Ljubljana after the 2002 census (source: Office for Statistics RS, Statistics, p. 14)).

- For graphic and illustrative material without copyrights, **permission for publishing** needs to be obtained.