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TWO
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MIGRATION STUDIES

D D V E
d o m o v i n i

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T E M A T S K I S K L O P

THE VULNERABILITY OF REFUGEES IN EUROPE
RANLJIVOST BEGUNKA IN BEGUNCEV V EVROPI

T H E M A T I C S E C T I O N

INTRODUCTION TO THE THEMATIC SECTION

Mojca VAH JEVŠNIK

The predominant response to recent refugee arrivals to Europe has been one of paranoia and fear of depersonalised masses of people disrupting Europe's cultural and social welfare landscape, triggering (further) political crises, violence and the rise of nationalistic movements. It therefore came as no surprise that the mainstream political focus has been on tightening external European Union borders in a desperate attempt to keep them out.

Some intriguing strategies to reach this goal have been put forth. For example, legal obligations to provide protection to *anyone* fleeing persecution and war have been rhetorically undermined by introducing the argument of 'exception' in the public debates over deservingness of protection. In a blog post on the emotions of solidarity with refugees, the sociologist Serhat Karakayali (2016) evokes Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace argument that the protection of strangers is not a question of philanthropy but of right. Yet public opinion on the recent refugee arrivals, he notes, has been less informed by reason or reference to the Geneva Convention and more by the mobilization of feelings of empathy towards refugees. Noting that these days Kantianism is not a very powerful paradigm when it comes to migration politics, he warns against deservingness becoming determined by public opinion – which can be based on flawed assumptions and can, if the representation of refugees as deserving is damaged, be reversed. Indeed, the protection of the vulnerable should not depend on the presence of raw, visible need reflected in injured, sick, starved, disabled bodies (Malkki 2015) and the ability of those seeking protection to evoke feelings of empathy and acts of solidarity. Seemingly healthy and young male refugees are in this respect most often cast aside from the humanitarian gaze, which has recently prompted calls to put the spotlight on our gender biases (Hilhorst 2016).

There is of course no denying that the language of immediate need is more eloquent, expressive and mobilizing than the legal lingo on abstract commitment to rights (cf. Englund 2006). This is not only true in the case of mainstream public opinion on deservingness, but can also be observed among humanitarian workers and volunteers working with refugees. A hungry and inadequately clothed child can evoke a surge of empathy and the need to help much more pointedly than a dispute over the legal documents of a seemingly self-confident man with a border official. And the effects of doing good in the case of the former are much more immediate and satisfying. During my fieldwork on humanitarian and development workers in Kosovo, conducted some years ago, I observed an overwhelming motivational drive and sense of accomplishment among the individuals whose tasks involved sorting out immediate problems, such as providing a missing piece of clothing, bandaging a cut, arranging a dentist appointment or comforting a crying child by providing a new toy. Bringing immediate relief to the most vulnerable refugees gave them a sense of what Stamm (2002) labels as compassion satisfaction, i.e. the pleasure derived from being able to do your work well. More frustration and feelings of helplessness and defeat were observed in the case of humanitarian and social workers assigned to individual cases, since this type of help requires continuous interaction and long-term engagement that goes beyond patching physical wounds. A UNHCR case worker whom I met in Pristina told me that her greatest work-related challenge

has been working with unaccompanied refugee children with disabilities or severe post-traumatic stress disorders, because those cases did not make her feel rewarded for doing good, but have instead increased her own anxieties and made her put up emotional walls. Building resilience is of course an essential component of every aid worker's job, but she feared that she was heading towards numbness and indifference, adopting the 'I've seen it all' attitude. Such compassion fatigue (Figley 1995) can not only affect individual aid workers working with refugees on a regular basis, but can be symptomatic of large populations exposed to aggressive media campaigning that may result in their indifference to humanitarian appeals.

The inherently volatile societies should therefore be continuously reminded of the existing normative frameworks, but they should also be encouraged to preserve and revive philanthropic endeavours – by all means within the realistic limits of ability and capacity to help. Karakayali (2016) believes, based on data from his recent survey, that face-to-face interactions in particular are one way to break out of the cycle of volatility, and calls for investing in the volunteer movement, “where citizens do not depend on mass and social media when it comes to the emotional dimension of their relation to migrants and refugees.” The most vulnerable of the vulnerable in particular should not escape the humanitarian gaze or become victims of lingering compassion fatigue. Research can be of paramount importance in this respect. It can throw light on refugees' multiple vulnerabilities and facilitate development of evidence-based strategies, mechanisms and tools for the advancement of a coherent and efficient response to help ease their struggles. It can also illuminate the wider structural frameworks and political agendas that contribute to constructing vulnerabilities in the receiving countries.

In an attempt to encourage relevant research, the purpose of this thematic section is to open the floor to explorations of various aspects of vulnerabilities lived and experienced by refugees. In the first article, Claudia Schneider uses Freeman's framework for the study of admission policy, which acknowledges the wider socio-economic and closer party political structures but also emphasises the mediating role of politicians who interpret and maintain or change these structures, to explore the developments leading to the response of the German government to refugee arrivals. She discusses the political debates on the 'deservingness' of refugees to be admitted to Germany and brings attention to the emergence of the discourse that calls for the hierarchical classification of the groups of migrants and refugees more and less needy of protection.

The article by Synnøve Bendixsen builds on the research findings gathered within the framework of an extensive research project that was initiated in order to examine how policies affect practice in welfare institutions and the everyday lives of irregular migrants in Norway. She brings attention to the increasingly restrictive asylum and immigration policies across Europe and argues that irregular migration is constructed by governments' utilization of complexly interrelated techniques. The purpose of the article is not to argue that migrants cannot be irregular or 'illegal', but rather to explore the various forms through which being irregular (and therefore subject to deportation) is produced. It also touches upon an important issue that has been relatively underexposed in academic debates, namely the use of research findings and discussions to legitimize specific political stances and decisions. Bendixsen therefore calls for caution in regard to how research questions are framed and how results are presented.

Darja Zaviršek brings attention to the processes of militarization of borders on the Balkan route and institutionalization of refugees across Europe. She is critical of the

ideologies of eurocentrism, culturalisation and cultural racism that have pervaded many debates on refugee arrivals, and of the construction of refugees as a national threat and health risk. She argues that spatial confinement and segregation are unnecessary and inappropriate in this respect. The response to the humanitarian crisis should not be a crisis of humanity reflected in the militarization of borders and pathologisation of those wanting to enter, but rather enforcement of the notion of the universal values of humanity.

The final two articles address the important issue of unaccompanied minors seeking international protection in Slovenia. The articles are complementary in that they cover the same problematic from two different viewpoints. Mateja Sedmak and Zorana Medarić build their argumentation on the empirical research of the experiences and views of unaccompanied migrant children conducted as part of the international project “In whose best interest? Exploring Unaccompanied Minors’ Rights through the Lens of Migration and Asylum Processes”. They explore migrant children’s perceptions of different life transitions experienced on their journey, including transition across geographical spaces, institutional transition, transition over time and psychological transition. The narratives reveal their multiple personal vulnerabilities, but they also expose inconsistencies in relation to the formal admission procedures that may further exacerbate their insecurities. The authors argue that durable solutions for unaccompanied minors in Slovenia do not exist and call for an efficient, child-oriented system of protection.

The article by Tjaša Žakelj and Blaž Lenarčič is also concerned with the determination of the best interest of unaccompanied minors in Slovenia, but uses a different lens. The authors explore the inclusion of the principle of the best interest of the child in Slovenian legislation and other formal regulations that determine this principle in various formal procedures, and discuss the understanding and utilization of this principle in formal procedures by a variety of experts. One of the important arguments brought forth by the article is the need to improve the system response in a manner that will support the endeavours and engagement of legal representatives.

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A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING IMMIGRATION POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMANY'S ASYLUM POLICY

Claudia SCHNEIDER¹

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ABSTRACT

A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Admission Policy: A Case Study of Recent Developments in Germany's Asylum Policy

Germany's asylum policy and the debate surrounding it underwent a significant shift in 2015 when asylum applications increased considerably over previous years. Rather than moving towards more restriction, as was the case in the past when asylum applications saw a substantial rise, the German government responded towards refugees in an open and welcoming manner. This article will analyse the developments which led to the German government's "we can manage it" response, using a conceptual framework which considers structural and agency concerns and the interconnection between the two. The framework centres on processes within the party political system and the way they were or were not influenced by developments and structures in the wider socio-political and economic environment and by politicians' perceptions, beliefs and goals. The findings show that a new alliance was formed between the conservative CDU party and the social democratic SPD party, reflecting a political debate on asylum seekers and refugees which combined an explicit humanitarianism within Germany with a hierarchical classification of migrants who were "more or less needy" of protection, limiting the explicit humanitarianism within Germany to specific groups of migrants and refugees.

KEY WORDS: asylum seekers, far right, refugees, structure-agency, political debate

IZVLEČEK

Konceptualni okvir analize politik sprejema: študija primera trenutne usmeritve nemške azilne politike

Nemška azilna politika je leta 2015, ko se je v primerjavi s prejšnjimi leti občutno povečalo število prošenj za azil, doživela presenetljiv premik. V nasprotju s pričakovanji nemška vlada ni zaostрила pogojev sprejema, kot je bilo to v navadi v preteklosti, temveč je beguncem izrazila dobrodošlico. Članek ponuja analizo dogodkov, ki so pripeljali do tovrstne vladne usmeritve, in pri tem uporabi konceptualni okvir, ki upošteva strukturo, delovanje in njun preplet. Osredotoča se na procese znotraj strankarskega političnega sistema in analizo morebitnega vpliva nanj s strani struktur v širšem družbenopolitičnem in ekonomskem okolju, ter percepcij, verovanj in ciljev politikov. Izsledki kažejo, da se je med konzervativno stranko CDU in socialnodemokratsko stranko SPD oblikovala nova zaveza. Obe sta zavzela stališče, da so nekateri migranti zaščite bolj »potrebni« kot drugi. S hierarhizacijo sta domet humanitarizma v Nemčiji omejili na specifične skupine migrantov in beguncev. KLJUČNE BESEDE: prosilci za azil, radikalna politična desnica, begunci, struktura/delovanje, politična debata

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INTRODUCTION

2015 was a turning point in Germany's asylum policy and the related political debate on asylum. There was a significant increase in first applications for asylum (441,899 compared to 173,072 in 2014) of which 158,657 were filed by Syrians fleeing the civil war.¹ To the surprise of many, Chancellor Merkel and large parts of the conservative CDU (Christian Democratic Union) responded in September 2015 with a welcoming and open border policy towards refugees, announcing a 'we can manage it' (*wir schaffen es*) attitude. They openly contradicted the Dublin Convention which demands that refugees apply for asylum in the first EU country which they enter. This welcoming position stands in contrast to the position of CDU politicians, who had warned about overloading and the risk to national stability in the context of refugees arriving from former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, and through their position triggered a constitutional change regarding political asylum in 1993 which led to a more restrictive asylum policy (see Schneider 2006).

This article aims to analyse the responses by the German government to the refugee movements in 2015. It will start with the presentation of a framework for the analysis of admission policy (see Schneider 2006), followed by an application of the framework to the development of Germany's asylum policy in 2015. Theoretical approaches in immigration policy have often focused on either structural *or* agency components. This article places emphasis on explicitly analysing both structure *and* agency and how they interconnect in a specific case study of asylum policy. The framework was informed by studies which link agency and structure in a non-deterministic manner and in particular Freeman's (1979) earlier study of the subject. At the heart of the framework is the analysis of the link between structure and agency within the political party environment, followed by an analysis of the wider environment, politicians' justification schemes and the interconnection between politicians' agency and the wider environment (see Schneider 2006).

AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, WITH A SPECIFIC FOCUS ON FREEMAN (1979)

Up to the early 1990s, studies on immigration policy typically focused on structural factors (economic and/or political) and were often embedded in a wider framework of a hypothesis-testing or deterministic approach (using downward reduction) (see, for example, Castles, Kosack 1973; Freeman 1995; Kay, Miles 1992). "Opposite" approaches, which view immigration policy as being determined by agency (upward reduction) have not been formulated explicitly. Although a number of authors, such as Layton-Henry (1992) and Rich (1986) have emphasised the role of politicians in specific case studies of immigration policy, they did not propose upward reduction. Since the mid-1990s, authors have increasingly acknowledged both structure and agency as independent items of analysis, although most have not developed an explicit discussion regarding the structure-agency link (e.g. Brochman 1999; Joly 1996; Joppke 1999). Only a few scholars, such as Richmond (1994) and

1 The top five countries of origin in 2015 were: Syria (441,899), Albania (53,805), Kosovo (33,427), Afghanistan (31,382) and Iraq (29,784).

Freeman (as early as 1979) have discussed the theoretical aspects of the structure-agency link more systematically in the context of immigration policy. The approaches can therefore be classified into three groups: firstly, those which view immigration policy as being determined by structural factors; secondly, approaches which look at actors and structures in less deterministic ways but do not explicitly discuss how they interrelate; and thirdly, those which include a more systematic discussion of the role of structures and agency in the context of immigration policy (see Schneider 2006). This article aims to present a framework which focuses more explicitly on the structure-agency link and is informed in particular by Freeman's (1979) earlier study, which considers agency and structures within a non-deterministic framework; interestingly it has not been applied by later authors analysing different scenarios of immigration policy.


In his comparative study of British and French immigration policies after the Second World War, Freeman (1979) offers a theoretical framework which explicitly acknowledges structure and agency and the link between them. At a time when approaches towards immigration policy were often based on structural explanations, he placed emphasis on politicians' justifications and beliefs. While emphasising politicians as an independent analytical category, Freeman does not ignore the structural context. He acknowledges both politicians' choices and the limiting/enhancing effect of the structural context upon these choices. Politicians' decision-making processes are analysed in the context of two layers: *external constraints on policy* (economic, demographic and historical conditions) and *proximate determinants* (party systems, political styles and belief systems of decision-makers) (Freeman 1979: 311). It is also important to note that Freeman did not start off to test a hypothesis, but began with a descriptive account and 'generated plausible hypotheses' *after* his investigation, formulating his analytical/theoretical framework of external constraints and proximate determinants during his investigation. This underscores the fact that Freeman's approach is, in methodological terms, a qualitative or theory-building approach. By arguing that structural influences on immigration policy need to be mediated via politicians' perceptions and belief systems, Freeman explicitly addresses the structure-agency link.²

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADMISSION POLICY

The framework (see Figure 1) is informed by Freeman (1979), but distinguishes more explicitly between: 1) politicians' decision making processes (their values, goals and perceptions); 2) the wider environment (e.g. social, political, historical and legal structures and actions at a national and international level); and 3) the party political system (where the core processes take place with regard to decision-making on immigration policy and legislation) (see Figure 1; see also Schneider 2006, 2009). Structure is understood here as both macro factors (such as the economy, legislation and political structure) and normative and interactive structures which govern organisations, such as political parties. Agency refers to actions and psychological dimensions such as beliefs, perceptions and goals of individuals which contribute to the development, maintenance and changing of structures.

2 Interestingly, Freeman's (1995, 2006) later studies follow theory-testing approaches and are based on a variety of hypotheses relating to the political system. They have been referred to more often in immigration literature than his earlier study which offers a more flexible analytical framework.

Fig 1: A conceptual framework for the study of immigration policy
(adapted from Schneider 2006, 2009)



The three layers in Figure 1 are interlinked: Layer 3 is linked with layer 1 and 2 by focusing on politicians' perceptions of the wider environment and the party political system. The perceptions together with individuals' goals and beliefs influence actions, which change or maintain structures relating to admission policy within the party political system. Below I will discuss the three (interrelated) layers in separate sections, before they are applied to Germany's refugee policy in 2015.

Layer 1: The wider environment

The wider environment acknowledges structural factors and processes which go beyond the party political system, such as the wider economic, political and media structures and migration itself. The structures are fluid and reflect an ongoing process of development, maintenance and change via agency. As the focus of the framework is on the party political system, the structure-agency link within the wider environment will not be analysed further, and instead the focus will be on the macro structures and processes such as migration itself, the economy and the socio-political context and politicians' perceptions of these structures. Admission policy literature acknowledges a range of wider structural factors, including economic factors (see the classic study by Castles, Kosack 1973 and more recently Cornelius, Rosenblum 2005) and political factors (e.g. Freeman 2006; Schain 2006). Since the early 1990s, factors relating to the nation state, such as conceptions of

national identity and sovereignty, have also been prominent (Joppke 1999, 2005; Sassen 1996; Thouez, Channac 2006), and are often linked to discussions relating to legal systems, laws and rights (see Gibney 2004; Joppke 1999, 2008). A number of authors have looked at the role of governmental and non-governmental organisations and interest groups which are involved in decision-making processes (see Boswell 2009; Lahav, Guiraudon 2006; Statham, Geddes 2006; Zincone 2006). Other factors, such as historical ties (Geddes 2003) and the media (Boswell 2010; Lahav, Guiraudon 2006) have also been considered although often in connection with one or several of the factors outlined above.


Although an objective analysis of these wider structures or macro factors is relevant to understanding the context of immigration policy, they should not be correlated merely with developments regarding admission policy. Such a correlation between macro factors and developments regarding admission policy would overlook agency and ignore (in the specific framework presented here) the fact that politicians are the main mediators between the macro structures and developments regarding admission policy. Instead, the perceptions and interpretations of these wider structures by politicians need to be researched – identifying how they have influenced actors' decision-making processes. Freeman's (1979) classic study of immigration policy in Britain and France highlights, for example, how politicians' different interpretations and perceptions of seemingly similar objective (economic) situations can lead to significantly different immigration policies.

Layer 2: The narrower context of the political party system

At the heart of the framework lies the party political system. The analysis here focuses on how actors within the system maintain or change (or, in Archer's 1995 words, *elaborate*) structures (e.g. interactive and normative structures). Classic studies which have looked more closely at political decision-making processes include those by Freeman (1979) and Layton-Henry (1992). More recently, Zincone (2006) compared the processes in the political party system relating to two migration laws in Italy passed in 1998 and 2002 by two different governments.

The analysis of the structure-agency link within the party political system will be informed by Archer's (1995) approach, which organises the link between agency and structure along temporal lines. Her so-called 'morphogenetic sequence' understands structure as the intended and unintended outcome of past actions that *pre-dates* and *conditions* present action. Present action is viewed as *elaborating* (i.e. either maintaining or changing) this structure (see Fig. 2).

Fig. 2: Archer's (1995: 76) morphogenetic sequence (amended)



In the next section, Archer's model will be applied to processes within the party political system, researching how structures (e.g. interactive and normative) within the party political system existing at the beginning of 2015 (T1) were elaborated (i.e. maintained or changed) by politicians throughout the first eight months of 2015 (T2), leading to an elaboration of admission policies by autumn 2015 (T3).⁵

Layer 2 also focuses on the different characteristics of actors (i.e. politicians in our case) within the context of the political party system, such as their "hierarchical" and ideological positions, which affect the way structures relating to admission policy are elaborated. Münch (1992) and Perlmutter (1996) found, for example, that politicians of local municipalities in Germany and Italy respectively initiated changes resulting in more restrictive rules on immigration; this is also confirmed in a study on constitutional change in Germany (see Schneider 2006). As the framework presented in this article follows a theory-building approach, it is not proposed *a priori* that higher or lower-ranking politicians, or specific ideological positions, are more influential than others regarding the formation of admission policy. It merely highlights the *potential* relevance of politicians' hierarchical and ideological positions in understanding decision-making processes relating to admission policy. The case study of Germany's admission policy in 2015 actually reflects a scenario which differs from the standard ideas about the link between lower-level political structures and restrictive positions on migration policy, as discussed by Münch (1992) and Perlmutter (1996).

Layer 3: The subjective level of politicians' decision-making

Layer 3 explores the more subjective dimensions of decision-making and differentiates between actors' goals, their normative principles and their perceptions of the narrower and wider environment (Simon 1982; Sen 1982). Apart from ideological analyses, authors have focused less on politicians' decision-making processes at an individual level. Kelly and

Trebilcock (1998: 448) argue that 'ideas and values have substantial independent explanatory power' to understand Canadian immigration policy.³ More recently, Boswell (2009) has also emphasised the role of expert knowledge in politicians' decision-making processes in the context of German and British immigration policy.

A STUDY OF GERMANY'S RECENT REFUGEE ADMISSION POLICY

This section will apply the above layers to the case study of German admission policy towards asylum seekers in 2015. The wider environment, the party political system and politicians' justification systems will be discussed separately, before linking them in a final discussion section.

The wider environment

The wider environment encompasses a broad range of areas, as outlined above. This article will focus in particular on the German and European situation regarding refugees and asylum seekers, public opinion, the economic situation and the socio-political climate in Germany.

Asylum applications (first applications) in Germany reached 441,899 in 2015, which was a significant increase over 2014 (173,072). In 2008 there were only 22,085 applications, which by 2012 had increased to 64,539. The top five countries of origin in 2015 were: Syria (158,657), Albania (53,805), Kosovo (33,427), Afghanistan (31,382) and Iraq (29,784) (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016). Germany has accepted larger numbers of Syrian refugees since 2013 when EU member countries agreed to take a contingent of Syrian refugees from Lebanon, which had received the largest influx of refugees; consequently, Germany accepted 15,000 Syrian refugees in 2013 under the EU agreement.⁴ By April 2014, 19,000 (non-contingent) refugees from Syria had arrived at Germany's borders and filed first applications for asylum. By the end of 2014, Syria had overtaken Afghanistan as the country of origin which produced the largest number of refugees globally. However, the large majority of the over 4 million Syrian refugees fled to Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Turkey accepted 1.59 million refugees from Syria, the highest number, although

3 The study of politicians' perceptions and justifications relates to representations of the actors' belief systems, and there may be a discrepancy between representation and the actual constituents of decision-making processes. It is neither assumed that politicians' representations can always be taken for granted, nor is it proposed that their justifications can never be taken for granted; see, for example, Edelmann (1988) and Spector and Kitsuse (1987). Instead of a priori assumptions about the truth of politicians' representations of their thoughts, an empirical analysis may discover possible discrepancies between justifications and actions which may reflect motives for political action not made explicit by the actors.

4 Contingent refugees receive automatic right of residence for two years and do not enter the asylum procedure.

Lebanon has the highest proportion (25 percent) of refugees in comparison to the overall population (UNHCR 2016).

As of May 2016, Germany is the EU country with the largest number of asylum applications (354,038) followed by Serbia (and Kosovo) (313,656) and Sweden (110,579), Hungary (72,505) and Austria (39,786) (UNHCR 2016). Germany uses a distribution system of asylum seekers across its federal states, the so-called “Königstein quota system” (Königsteiner Schlüssel) which was developed 60 years ago and takes into account population levels and tax revenues of federal states. North Rhine-Westphalia receives the highest percentage of asylum seekers, followed by Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2016).

The refugee crisis had already reached Europe before the civil war started in Syria, and since 2008 refugees have increasingly tried to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea.⁵ The German journalist Heribert Prantl, known for his humanitarian voice in the context of migration, describes the humanitarian disaster which unfolded in the Mediterranean in 2011:

The Mediterranean is a mass grave. Since the start of the year, 1,820 people have died in it. They were boat people on their way to Europe, and they died of thirst on the water, drowned in high seas or off Lampedusa, froze out in the cold of Europe’s refugee policy. The island of Lampedusa is a life raft in the Mediterranean for those fleeing their homes. Many never reach it; and for those who do, it’s not much help. They are sent packing again. Most of the refugees are shipped back immediately to where they came from. (Prantl 2011)

At the beginning of 2015 the EU member states decided to stop the rescue missions in the Mediterranean. The human death toll was seen as collateral to counter the traffickers: “Europe is using dead refugees to shield itself from the others” (Prantl 2015). After outrage from the UNHCR and other organisations, the EU member states agreed to start sending rescue missions into the Mediterranean again (Prantl 2015c). In October 2015, EU president Juncker proposed a quota system regarding the distribution of refugees across the EU member states. He did not succeed in implementing the quotas, as the majority of member states rejected the proposal. In March 2016 the European Commission agreed to a deal with Turkey to return all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey, reflecting the EU’s aim to secure and militarize its external borders. The deal has been sharply criticised by the UN, the Council of Europe and human rights organizations for violating the right of asylum (ProAsyl 2016).

Public opinion regarding the acceptance of refugees has been changing over the years. In 2013, after the death of over more than 300 refugees near the island of Lampedusa, the majority of Germans were still reluctant to accept additional refugees (43 percent for and 51 percent against additional refugees, ARD Deutschlandtrend 2013 (*Spiegel online* 2013). However, in July 2015 54 percent of participants in a public opinion poll supported the acceptance of additional refugees, which increased further to 60 percent in August 2015 (ZDF-Politbarometer 2015). However, by October 2015 the number of supporters of additional refugees had decreased to 45 percent, and only increased slightly in November (47 percent). Voters who supported the CDU/CSU and AfD rejected the acceptance

5 UNHCR, <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php>.

of additional refugees by 61 percent and 70 percent majorities, respectively. This contrasts with support for additional refugees among 72 percent of Green voters, 54 percent of SPD voters and 48 percent Left Party voters (*Spiegel online* 2015).

The economic situation in Germany looked good in 2015 and showed a growth factor of 1.7 percent compared to 1.6 percent in the preceding year.⁶ At the end of 2014 unemployment in Germany stood at 6.4 percent; which was relatively low compared to the European Union average, which was 10 percent.⁷

The fact that Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, had been influential in implementing a policy of severe austerity in Greece, and had been widely criticised for being inhumane, might have been an important factor in the developments regarding asylum policy a year later (see Feldenkirchen, Pfister 2016). It might have also influenced the media and the population to show more empathy towards the refugees arriving in Germany and an understanding that Greece could not cope with the influx of refugees.

Despite the positive response towards the refugees by the mainstream media and political parties in 2015, there was a rise in support of anti-immigration parties such as Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany; AfD) and the far right. Overall, 2015 saw an increase of crimes motivated by right-wing extremism (21,933) compared to 2014 (16,559) and 2013 (16,557). The number of violent crimes directed at foreigners was with 918, the highest number since the current definition of politically motivated crime was introduced in 2001 (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2015). The number of attacks on refugee shelters increased drastically in 2015. The far right also included an openly racist movement against Muslim residents called "Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West" (PEGIDA), which organised weekly marches in Dresden and other towns in Germany.

At least 817 attacks on refugee shelters have been carried out since the beginning of this year [2015], according to Germany's Criminal Police Office statistics, which were made public during a parliamentary session on Wednesday. In contrast, there were only 199 similar crimes recorded in 2014. [...] The number of arsons, which amounted to only six in 2014, soared to 65. More than 750 of the 817 attacks were carried out by right-wing extremists, while in 2014 they were responsible for 177 out of 199.⁸

We will see below that politicians from all parties condemned the racist attacks but did not use it to justify a restriction on accepting refugees, as was the case in 1993 when politicians agreed to a constitutional change regarding political asylum.

The party political context

Since November 2013, Germany has been governed by a coalition government made up of Christian Democrats (CDU; of which Angela Merkel is the party leader), Germany's Social Democrats (SPD) and the CDU's smaller sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), which governs in Bavaria only. Die Linke (The Left) party and Bündnis 90/Die

6 <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/germany/gdp-growth>.

7 <http://www.statista.com/statistics/227005/unemployment-rate-in-germany>.

8 <https://www.rt.com/news/326187-germany-far-right-attacks-refugees/>.

Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens) party form the opposition, while the FDP and the AfD are not represented in the Bundestag (lower house). The beginning of 2015 was marked by an increase of asylum seekers arriving at Germany's borders. Up to July 2015 Chancellor Merkel was cautious in her rhetoric on migration and showed reluctance and restriction rather than an open welcome; responding, for example, to a refugee girl from Lebanon who had arrived in Rostock and who was at risk of being deported that Germany "could not manage" if every refugee were to come, (Feldenkirchen, Pfister 2016). This represented the general position of politicians from the CDU, CSU and SPD, who followed a restrictive stance on asylum policy without creating an openly hostile debate on the refugees arriving in Germany. The focus was on developing an EU policy response to the refugee movements into Europe. However, at the annual summer press conference on 31 August, Chancellor Merkel had changed her stance and she used, for the first time, the phrase "we can manage it", which has characterised her policy from then on. She advocated an openly welcoming policy towards refugees, reflected for example in the government's decision in early September to open the border to Hungary so that refugees stranded at the main station in Budapest could travel to Germany (ibid.). The majority of politicians from the CDU and SPD supported her decision, although it involved a suspension of the Dublin Convention. However, politicians from the CSU and especially the head of the CSU, Horst Seehofer, started to openly criticise Chancellor Merkel's decision to explicitly welcome refugees in Germany. This represented a significant shift between the two sister parties; the traditional coalition between the CDU/CSU on migration issues was broken and a new and unusual co-operation between the SPD and the CDU on migration policy occurred. In that sense, the interactive structures between the main political parties have changed significantly since August 2015. There was also a shift in normative structures (reflected for example in political debates) amongst the CDU. Their members emphasised and prioritised humanitarianism and integration rather than the more usual migration rhetoric on overloading and the danger to national stability (see Schneider 2006), as will be outlined further below.

Feldenkirchen and Pfister (2016 online) argue that Merkel was in a strong and powerful position in 2015 to openly welcome refugees and dispense with regulations set out in the Dublin Convention. Merkel has been described throughout her chancellorship as building and consolidating her position of power within the political system, to a significantly greater extent than previous chancellors of Germany: "She had saved for so long and carefully protected her power – now she was intent on spending her political capital" (ibid.). Merkel was supported by a media representation which was welcoming to refugees and a population which showed open support for refugees, as reflected in the large number of volunteers and generally positive public opinion polls (see Prantl 2015b). However, this openness towards refugees was combined with a more restrictive asylum law. In October 2015 an Acceleration Asylum Law was debated and adopted, which declared Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro as safe countries of origin.⁹ It further aimed at accelerating the repatriation of rejected asylum seekers and included restrictions on financial support whereby asylum seekers waiting in reception centres receive payments in kind "as far as possible" and rejected asylum seekers are stripped of their social benefits. The law was criticised by organisations which advocate refugee rights such as ProAsyl for being inhumane and vio-

9 The existing safe countries of origin include all EU member states, Norway, Switzerland, Ghana, Senegal, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia.

lating the constitutional article on human dignity.¹⁰ Apart from restrictive measures, the law introduced German language and “living in Germany” courses in order to enhance the integration of recognized refugees. I will come back to this law when I discuss politicians’ decision-making processes below.

Applying Archer’s model of structural elaboration, the above scenario shows that the political structures at the beginning of 2015 were marked by a loose co-operation between the CDU, CSU and SPD, representing an implicit rather than explicit stance on asylum policy which reflected a mix between restriction and a reluctant welcome. Due to the fact that the normative structures within the party political system had not developed an explicitly restrictive position on asylum policy, Merkel was able to shift to an explicitly welcoming policy at the beginning of September 2016, supported by the majority of CDU and SPD politicians. However, her powerful position and the support of the media and the wider population were important factors in her shift in asylum policy. Overall, the political debate developed from one which implicitly represented a mix of restriction and reluctant welcome to one which was explicitly welcoming, although the asylum law which was agreed upon in October 2015 underscored the fact that the “welcome” and humanitarian gesture was not open to all. Countries such as Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro were declared safe countries of origin, and strict financial and welfare cuts were implemented for asylum-seekers whose applications were unsuccessful or viewed as being potentially unsuccessful.

Politicians’ justification systems

This section will look at politicians’ justification systems in more depth. It is informed, in particular, by an analysis of a political debate which took place in the Bundestag on 15 October 2015. The debate related to the intake of refugees in general and, in particular, to the new asylum law discussed above (Drucksache 18/6386). The law was adopted with 475 members of the Bundestag voting in favour, 68 voting against and 57 abstaining. The analysis applied Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) open coding strategy to identify themes and sub-themes which politicians represented in their decision to vote for or against the new asylum procedure/law. NVivo software was used to analyse the debate. 23 politicians contributed to the debate with seven contributions from the CDU, six from SPD, four contributions from Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, four from Die Linke Party and two contributions from the CSU. Below I present the themes that were used to justify the politicians’ decisions and analyse to what extent politicians from different political parties used similar/dissimilar justifications.

The *meta*-themes which were identified in the debate included politicians’ perceptions and goals with regard to domestic policy, asylum policy, foreign policy, European policy and the global situation. Another major theme related to individuals’ value systems. CSU politicians who countered a policy of welcome stressed the aspect of the burden on society, referring to themes such as overloading, risk of national instability, limits of acceptance and crime rates amongst refugees. Their other emphasis was on social and cultural integration of refugees. These themes were combined with a strong support for the new asylum law,

¹⁰ <https://www.proasyl.de>.

some references to European border controls and a distinction between needy and non-needy applicants. CDU politicians placed less emphasis on the burden on society and national stability and focused more on the social welfare of refugees (especially children and young people) and the values of the constitution and the pragmatism reflected in Merkel's phrase "we can manage it". Racism was condemned and empathy towards refugees advocated, while also acknowledging that there is anxiety among some parts of the population which had to be responded to. The distinction between needy and non-needy migrants was highlighted and, similar to the CSU, strong support for the new asylum law (and especially support for safe countries of origin and the refoulement of unsuccessful applicants) was proclaimed. The SPD emphasised that more financial support was needed for municipalities which experienced a rise in refugees. Similar to the CDU and CSU, SPD politicians focused on the social integration of refugees, European solidarity, support for the new asylum law (although the use of vouchers was criticised) and a distinction between so-called needy and non-needy migrants.¹¹ They mentioned the worries of some people in the population, criticised racism and supported help for the regions from which refugees were arriving. Die Grünen/Bündnis 90 and Die Linke covered similar topics, mainly criticising the proposal to reduce the financial support for rejected refugees or refugees arriving from safe countries of origin, the safe country of origin rule in general and the co-operation with Turkey. They highlighted constitutional values, criticised racism and said that the causes of refugee movements need to be tackled and the arms trade stopped. Overall, the majority of politicians focused on the advocating of humanitarianism within and outside Germany, although this contrasted with their support for a law which introduced restrictive measures for refugees arriving from so-called safe countries of origin, which was seen by refugee organisations as violating humanitarianism.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The following brings together the above sections, highlighting how factors at the agency level and the structural level and the connection or (lack of connection) between them influenced migration admission policy in Germany in 2015. The social, economic and political environment in 2015 was characterised by rising migration numbers, a strong economy, a very visible and audible "refugees welcome" movement but also a rise in xenophobic violence. The party political system was characterised in the first months of 2015 by the traditional co-operation between the CDU and CSU, reflecting a passive restrictive stance on asylum policy. By September 2015 this had changed into an openly welcoming position towards refugees who did not arrive from safe countries of origin by Chancellor Merkel. A new strategic alliance emerged between the CDU and SPD, and a conflict over migration arose between the CDU and CSU, suspending the traditional alliance between the CDU and CSU on the issue of migration. At the politicians' decision making level, themes of humanitarianism within Germany and refugee integration were dominant among CDU and SPD politicians, while the CSU emphasised the burden on society and the risk to national stability.

11 Interestingly the term 'bogus asylum-seekers' (Scheinasyllant) which was dominant in the 1993 debate was not used by any of the politicians; instead, migrants were classified by neediness of protection.

How are these different dimensions and developments regarding the wider environment, the political party system and politicians' decision-making connected? This article has argued that immigration policy is influenced by both structural and agency factors and processes which occur between the two. Macro factors such as the economy and the socio-political environment and party political structures are therefore not sufficient to explain developments in immigration policy and need to be analysed in the context of agency. I draw attention to Freeman's (1979) earlier approach which offered a flexible framework for the study of immigration policy, which acknowledged the wider socio-economic and narrower party political structures but also emphasised the mediating role of politicians who interpret and maintain or change these structures. Figure 1 showed how politicians are interconnected with the wider environment and the party political system through their agency; on the one hand their agency elaborates structures in the party political context and the wider environment and on the other hand their agency is limited or enhanced by these structures.¹²

The article shows that the wider environment in 2015 was characterised by increasing asylum applications, an increasing support by the general public and the media regarding the acceptance of refugees, a rise in anti-immigration parties, a positive economic situation and a European policy which focused on the control of its external borders. Although migration numbers were mentioned by politicians, they were not a dominant theme in the debate relating to a new asylum law; only the CSU emphasised numbers and overloading. The positive economic situation was not highlighted in the debate explicitly although it was reflected indirectly in the phrase "we can manage it". The ascent of the far right, a major development during 2015, was highlighted in the debate and criticised; however, it was not connected to the theme of national instability or used to argue for a restrictive admission policy towards asylum-seekers, as had happened in the debate surrounding the constitutional change regarding political asylum in 1993. Instead, more focus was placed on the welcoming attitude towards refugees by the general public. Europe was reflected in the debate and many goals were directed at a European level (e.g. EU burden-sharing, solidarity, EU asylum policy). However, the major themes in the debate focused on normative principles (in particular, the perception and advocating of humanitarianism within Germany) and the goal of refugee integration rather than referring to processes in the wider environment. This contrasts clearly with 1993 when the (temporary) rise of in numbers of asylum seekers (caused by the civil war in former Yugoslavia) and the ascent of the far right (influenced by the emphasis on ethnic nationalism triggered by German reunification), were linked to the theme of national instability in order to justify the constitutional change and to implement a more restrictive asylum legislation (see Schneider 2006).

The article also notes how politicians changed the interactive and normative structures within the party political system whereby the usual alliance between the two conservative parties (CDU and CSU) weakened and instead the CDU's position on asylum policy became more aligned with that of the Social Democrats (SPD). In their discourse, CDU and SPD politicians advocated an explicit humanitarianism within Germany and emphasised the integration and welcome of refugees. However, they also supported (together with the CSU) more restrictive asylum procedures, which proposed a distinction between needy

12 Agency is here understood through its psycho-social dimension (e.g. individuals' beliefs, perceptions and goals) and action itself.

and non-needy refugees and migrants. In this way they limited their humanitarianism to specific groups of migrants. While this article is going to press, the situation described in this article is changing, and more restrictive rhetoric regarding refugees and asylum seekers is (again) dominating the political and the public debate.

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POVZETEK

KONCEPTUALNI OKVIR ANALIZE POLITIK SPREJEMA: ŠTUDIJA PRIMERA TRENUTNE USMERITVE NEMŠKE AZILNE POLITIKE

Claudia SCHNEIDER

Nemška azilna politika je leta 2015, ko se je v primerjavi s prejšnjimi leti občutno povečalo število prošenj za odobritev azila, doživela presenetljiv premik. V nasprotju s pričakovanji nemška vlada ni zaostрила pogojev sprejema, kot je bilo to v navadi v preteklosti, temveč je beguncem izrazila dobrodošlico. Članek ponuja analizo dogodkov, ki so pripeljali do tovrstne vladne usmeritve, in pri tem uporabi konceptualni okvir, ki upošteva strukturo, delovanje in njun preplet. Osredotoča se na procese znotraj strankarskega političnega sistema in analizo morebitnega vpliva nanj s strani struktur v širšem družbenopolitičnem in ekonomskem okolju, ter percepcij, verovanj in ciljev politikov. Poudarja dejstvo, da na politike sprejema vplivajo strukturni dejavniki, delovanje posameznikov in procesi, ki nastanejo ob njunem prepletu. V tem smislu članek gradi predvsem na Freemanovem pristopu (1979), ki ponuja fleksibilen okvir za preučevanje politik ob upoštevanju širših socialnoekonomskih in strankarskih struktur, ter mediacijski vlogi politikov, ki te strukture bodisi ohranjajo ali spreminjajo. Izsledki kažejo, da so se leta 2015 politiki v Nemčiji za upravičevanje svoje pozicioniranosti v odnosu do azilne politike raje sklicevali na vrednote kot na dejavnike v družbenopolitičnem okolju. Ta dinamika je v nasprotju z dinamiko spreminjanja nemške azilne politike leta 1993, ko so dogodki v širšem okolju sprožili javne debate, nastrojene proti priseljevanju in bili uporabljeni oz. zlorabljeni za doseg spremembe člena zakona o azilu (glej Schneider 2006). Članek osvetljuje tudi spreminjanje struktur znotraj strankarskega političnega sistema, ko je kanclerka Merklova naznanila zavezanost za beguncem prijazno azilno politiko. Posledično so se obstoječe navezave med dvema konzervativnima strankama (CDU in CSU) prekinile, stališča stranke CSU pa so se zblížala s socialnimi demokrati (SPD). Politiki CDU in SPD so začeli zagovarjati eksplicitni humanitarizem in poudarjati pomen integracije beguncev. Prav tako pa so (skupaj s CSU) podprli bolj restriktivne postopke podeljevanja azila, ki bi ločevali med bolj in manj zaščite potrebnimi migranti in begunci in tako omejili domet humanitarizma v Nemčiji na specifične skupine migrantov in beguncev. Restriktivna retorika o beguncih in prosilcih se tako nadaljuje in v političnih debatah (ponovno) začenja prevladovati.

THE PRODUCTION OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS: THE CASE OF NORWAY

Synnøve BENDIXSEN¹

COBISS 1.01

ABSTRACT

The Production of Irregular Migrants: The Case of Norway

Irregular migration is a growing phenomenon in Europe and elsewhere. In Norway, as in other European countries, there has been a process of heavy restrictions and limited liberalisation in asylum and immigration policies. Drawing on research on irregular migration and my own field-work with irregular migrants in Norway, this article discusses four areas of government action that explain how irregular migration is produced, namely 1) the de- and reestablishing of borders, 2) categorization as a management strategy, 3) the production of a deportable subject and, finally, 4) the criminalization of people who are in the territory “illegally”. These are complexly interrelated techniques used by governments in their efforts to exercise authority over people who are in the nation-state “illegally”. I focus on how the nation-state configures and produces irregular migrants in their own back yard. The governmentality of irregular migrants is simultaneously the production of such a category of people.

KEY WORDS: irregular migration, governmentality, social borders, deportation, criminalization

IZVLEČEK

Ustvarjanje nedokumentiranih migrantov: primer Norveške

Nedokumentirane migracije so v porastu tako v Evropi kot drugje po svetu. Na Norveškem, kot tudi v preostalih evropskih državah, zaznavajo zastoj liberalizacije azilnih in migracijskih politik in porast restriktivnih ukrepov. Članek temelji na raziskavi nedokumentiranih migracij in avtoričinem terenskem delu z nedokumentiranimi migranti na Norveškem ter ponuja analizo štirih področij vladnih ukrepov. Ti pojasnjujejo način ustvarjanja nedokumentiranosti: 1) odstranitev in ponovna vzpostavitev meja; 2) kategorizacija kot strategija upravljanja; 3) ustvarjanje kategorije subjekta za deportacijo; in 4) kriminalizacija »nezakonito« priseljenih ljudi. Namen kompleksno prepletenih vladnih tehnik je upravljati z »nezakonito« priseljenimi ljudmi. Članek se osredotoča na načine konfiguracije in ustvarjanja nedokumentiranih migrantov na ozemlju nacionalne države, saj prav vladnost nedokumentiranih migracij hkrati ustvarja tovrstno kategorizacijo ljudi.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: nedokumentirane migracije, vladnost, družbene meje, deportacija, kriminalizacija

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INTRODUCTION

Irregular migration is a growing phenomenon in Europe and elsewhere. One reason for this is that it has become difficult to migrate within the framework set by national and supranational bodies, and prior authorizations for international mobility are increasingly required. In Norway, as in other European countries, there has been a process of heavy restrictions and limited liberalisation in asylum and immigration policies. On the one hand, labour markets have been opened to EU nationals and a limited number of highly skilled migrants – moving policy in a more liberal direction (Spencer 2003). On the other hand, border controls have been intensified and technologized in order to limit unauthorised entrance, and asylum seekers' right to work has been largely withdrawn. The application of liberal principles to the migration of desired groups of migrants, and illiberal forms of governing through an increase in control measures applied to undesired groups of migrants, illustrates how states combine liberal forms of governance with disciplinary forms, or *policing* (Walters 2002).

Drawing on the increasingly expanding research on irregular migration and fieldwork with irregular migrants in Norway in the period 2011–2013, this article discusses the various ways irregular migration is governed and constructed as a particular form of problem and political concern in Norway. I here use governmentality as developed by Foucault (1991, 2002) as an analytical approach in order to “denaturalize features that have become second nature” (Walters 2012: 14). In a broad sense, governmentality means “the conduct of conducts”, and the focus is on the practices, techniques and rationalities that are intended to shape actions in order to achieve specific goals. Frequently, the aim of a governmentality analysis is to examine the way the government attempts to shape human action: “To analyse government is to analyse those practices that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups” (Dean 2010: 20). It importantly provides a framework to unpack relational politics and ethics, by drawing our gaze towards the connections between governments, politics and authority and the identity and the self (Dean 2010: 20).

In this article I will distinguish four fields of government actions that explain how irregular migration is produced, namely 1) the de- and reestablishing of borders, 2) categorization as a management strategy, 3) the production of a deportable subject and, finally, 4) the criminalization of people who are in the territory ‘illegally’. These are complexly interrelated techniques used by governments in their efforts to exercise authority over people who are in the nation-state ‘illegally’. I focus on how the nation-state configures and simultaneously produces irregular migrants in their own back yard.

While the focus in this article is on how the state constructs illegality, it still recognizes migrants as active subjects, e.g. the migrant becomes ‘illegal’ through crossing borders without the proper authorization, or has not left the nation-state after the rejection of their asylum application and the date of exit. However, in this article I will focus on how irregular migration is produced not through a migrant’s act, but rather through the various forms through which irregularity is produced. As the French philosopher Étienne Balibar (2000: 42) argues in his discussion of the political mobilization of irregular migrants in France:

The *sans-papiers* have shown that their illegality has not been reformed by the state but rather created by it. They have shown that such a production of illegality, destined for political manipulation,

could not be accomplished without constant attacks on civil rights (in particular, personal safety, which proceeds from the non-retroactivity of laws to the respect of dignity and physical integrity) nor without constant compromises with neo-fascism and the men who promote it.

Finally, the aim of the article is to also draw attention to some of the pitfalls we face as researchers in this methodologically challenging, but increasingly important, field of study. Migration in general and irregular migration in particular is a highly politicized field. Knowledge of irregular migration is sought after by governments, politicians, police and NGOs who wish to advance specific agendas relating to migration control, welfare rights, and questions of exclusion/inclusion. Research is often used to legitimize various political positions in a polarized debate. Extra caution is necessary with regard to how research questions are composed and pursued and how results are presented.

THE DESTABILIZING AND REESTABLISHING OF BORDERS

Without borders there would be no irregular migration. At the beginning of the 1990s, influential voices spoke of a “borderless world” and celebrated what seemed to be a de-bordering of the state due to globalization processes. However, while scholars tended to argue that the nation-state had lost control, of which the lack of capacity to control unwanted migration was evidence (e.g. Soysal 1996, Sassen 1996), today scholars are increasingly recognizing that governments’ migration control mechanisms have not declined, but in fact changed (Guiraudon, Lahav 2000). Few disagree that the relevance of territoriality has shifted rather than weakened (Andreas 2000). Governments have shifted the level at which policy is expanded and executed. For example, national governments have devised a number of ways to circumvent normative constraints deriving from international jurisprudence. As Guiraudon and Lahav (2000: 164) have showed, decision making has shifted “upward to intergovernmental fora, downward to elected local authorities, and outward to private actors such as airline carriers, shipping companies, employers, and private security agencies.” The consequent multifaceted and decentralization of migration policy does not mean that states have lost control over migration, but rather illustrates the capacity for adaptation and adjustments in the state apparatus and agencies in charge of migration: “By sharing competence, states may have ceded exclusive autonomy yet they have done so to meet national policy goals, regaining sovereignty in another sense: capabilities to rule” (Guiraudon, Lahav 2000: 164).

Borders are as important as ever; Balibar (2002: 84–85) refers to the continuous changing of their forms, structures and techniques as the “ubiquity of borders”. Today borders are constructed, reproduced and contested by a variety of actors, using techniques, institutions, laws, policies and social interactions at different scales (Bendixsen 2016). At the same time, the border is both a temporal and spatial experience. The effect of the border on migration, regular and irregular, is experienced differently depending on one’s legal status, country of origin, ethnicity, race, gender, age, etc. (Balibar 2002; Yuval-Davis 2004; Rumford 2006; Nyer 2010; Fassin 2011). Borders have the ability “to appear or disappear, to materialize at certain times or for certain groups of people with sudden intensity; to morph, or acquire the quality of permanent fixture” (Reeves 2014: 7). Time and temporality play important parts in border management (Nyer 2010): for some, the border can

mean impediments, delays, and increased waiting times, while for others it signifies swift movement and speedy processing as a “trusted” traveller (Nyer 2010). As Balibar puts it, “borders are polysemic” (2002: 82), in that “borders never exist in the same way for individuals belonging to different social groups” (2002: 78–79).

This multiplication of borders also produces irregular migration in its various forms. The implementation of European integration, for instance through the Schengen Agreement, has made it increasingly difficult for undocumented travellers such as asylum seekers to cross the external Schengen borders. Immigration laws formulate restrictions on the entry and stay of aliens in a nation-state, and as such define what is legal. Simultaneously, immigration laws generate an area of what are considered to be illegal practices. De Genova (2002: 430) asserts that:

Illegality” is the product of immigration laws – not merely in the abstract sense that without the law, nothing could be construed to be outside of the law; nor simply in the generic sense that immigration law constructs, differentiates, and ranks various categories of “aliens” – but in the more profound sense that the history of deliberate interventions that have revised and reformulated the law has entailed an active process of inclusion through “illegalization”.

The distinction between physical border and social boundaries is relevant here: while borders are “external territorial frontiers”, boundaries are internal social categorizations which “are tightly related in a process in which immigrants are racialized and ethnic minorities are reminded of their foreign origin” (Fassin 2011: 214). These forces work concurrently and contain processes of “migrant illegality” (de Genova 2002) and “immigrant racialization” (Silverstein 2005).

Internal borders or social boundaries within the nation-states increasingly regulate who can access certain social and health rights. In Norway, social boundaries have come to include welfare-state regulations concerning who has what rights. The Nordic welfare states are characterized by an extensive welfare-state model, where citizens’ welfare is significantly addressed through programs and institutions that are mainly publicly funded through taxation. The right to welfare services is mainly based on citizenship and residency, rather than employment, income or past contributions to the welfare system. Equality and inclusion of citizens is a major ambition. Among the Nordic countries, the welfare system has played a significant role for the inclusion of migrants and refugees across the ideological and political differences (Olwig 2010; Rugkåsa 2012). When it comes to irregular migrants, these countries are, however, on the restrictive side, in terms of both formal and informal enrolment in welfare programs.

The last decade’s increase in internal social boundaries within the nation states through welfare laws, regulations and practices facilitate, obstruct and set yardsticks for migrants’ entrance into society (Bendixsen 2016). Recent discussions have concerned the extent of healthcare to be provided to irregular migrants. Norwegian welfare law defines the scope of the law as ‘everyone residing in the realm’, without any mention of legality (Søvig 2013). Consequently, for some time there was uncertainty concerning whether irregular migrants were entitled to certain services. However, in the past decade there has been a discussion concerning who should be included in ‘everyone’. While irregular migrants are still included in a few cases (i.e. the Child Welfare Act (1992), the Education Act (1998) and the Act on Crisis Shelters (2009)), irregular migrants’ access to services has been increasingly

circumvented by various regulations and circulars issued by government departments that redefine the scope of the law to mean only “legal residents” (Søvig 2013). One outcome of a review of existing laws initiated by the Norwegian Ministry of Health due to what they called ‘continuing doubt and varying practices’, was a new healthcare regulation (which entered into force in July 2011) which restricted irregular migrants’ access to healthcare to include only emergency care and healthcare that cannot be delayed “without danger of imminent death, permanent and seriously reduced functionality, serious injury, or severe pain” (Healthcare Regulation 2011).¹

Interpretations of rights and rules are produced and acted upon when irregular migrants encounter welfare institutions and welfare workers, such as when an irregular migrant visits an Emergency Care unit. During my fieldwork I observed that on occasion an irregular migrant would borrow someone else’s identity papers and thus face no difficulties in receiving medical attention. Other times, the migrant was rejected by the receptionist because he or she was not a legal resident in Norway. Yet other times, the migrant would not even try to obtain health care because they lacked valid papers, did not have the money to pay the bill or feared that the receptionist or doctor would call the police.² While health care providers in Germany have a certain **duty** to report irregular migrants, this is not the case in Norway. Still, I met migrants who feared they would be reported, which could lead to their deportation. Face-to-face meetings between irregular migrants and welfare workers are shaped by both the various actors’ knowledge and values, and by representations of irregular migration circulating in the media and in public debate (Bendixsen 2015). Irregular migrants’ interactions with the nation-state in which they are living can consequently be characterised as being “simultaneously inside and outside”, “on the margin”, or that they are in a space where there is “no way out, no way in” (Sigona, Hughes 2012).

While the private sector (including family, friends, and NGOs) is crucial to welfare provisions in many societies, in the Nordic countries the nation-state regulates substantial parts of residents’ welfare and social life. As a consequence, relations between individuals, organizations, and the nation-state are fundamental (Esping Andersen 1990). The close relations between individuals, organizations and the nation-state – also called “strong welfare states” – in Scandinavia make it harder for those who are excluded from public arrangements to get by (Khosravi 2010). It appears as if the welfare state borders must be carefully regulated and guarded precisely because the welfare system is so generous. The Nordic welfare model is thus in many ways, both formally and informally, exclusionary towards irregular migrants, and comes to take the character of “welfare chauvinism” (Andersen, Bjørklund 1990).

In sum, accountability and control mechanisms for migration have moved *inwards* towards the societal level: nation-states have shifted their focus from territorial border marking to a politics of social boundary production and assertion *within* the nation-state, where actors such as welfare and health providers become de facto border control managers (Bendixsen 2016). Another way in which the nation-state produces irregular migration is through its effort to count and categorize, to which I now turn.

1 Children, pregnant women, prisoners and persons with communicable diseases are granted some additional rights.

2 In Oslo there is a health care unit set up by NGOs particularly for irregular migrants. Many irregular migrants make use of this health care service.

THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS AND CATEGORIZATION

In Norway the government operated until recently with a guesstimate from Statistics Norway (Zhang 2008) which estimated that the number of people without legal residence in 2006 ranged between 10,000 and 32,000. Of these, 12,325 had previously applied for asylum (Zhang 2008). This category includes people who have sought asylum but have been rejected and not left Norway; people who stayed in the country after their visa expired; and people who came into the country without legal authorization.³ In Norway, and more generally in Europe, there is a tendency that the higher estimate is referred to as the real number, which has become a myth-buster. Among these is a predominance of single men, but also women and families. The ethnic and national background are similar to those who apply for asylum, and who have relatively high rejection rates, namely people from Afghanistan, Iraq, Ethiopia, Palestine, Somalia, and Sri Lanka.

Zhang (2008) called his estimate a “guesstimate” in order to indicate the practical difficulties of establishing reliable statistics in this field. This number has become political; some emphasize the low number, partly to argue that irregular migrants is a group that does not represent a major problem and thus the government should provide them with assistance. Others, such as politicians on the right, emphasize the elevated number in order to illustrate that irregular migration is a government and police problem which needs increased focus and security endorsements, and linking the group to criminality issues. This latter approach has been defined as “crime migration” – the connection of two governmental areas (migration policies and crime) that used to be separate but which have become increasingly complexly integrated – to which I will return below.

Providing an account of irregular migrants is not only about providing an overview of the population as part of the governmental management and control of who is living on the territory (cf. Foucault 2002). The estimated numbers and construction of categories of irregular migrants simultaneously become part of the underpinning of how irregular migration is viewed as a problem, and what kind of problem irregular migration is constructed to be: for some actors it becomes an issue of humanitarian concern, for others it is presented as a “security problem”. Statistics are crucial to modern forms of government (Foucault 2002). In the case of irregular migrants, statistics serve not only to acquire knowledge about the population, but also to identify those considered as illegitimate part of the nation-state’s population and must therefore be excluded from rights that otherwise are accorded to “everyone”. In addition, there are several problematic aspects of statistics related to its individualizing and codified function: people who empirically have little in common except that they are living without legal authorization in a nation-state become part and representatives of a category, which in turn becomes the basis for political control (de Genova 2002). Such individualization and categorization obscures the heterogeneous category in terms of national origin, sex, age, ethnicity and religion.

It is primarily from a management perspective that migrants are classified into sub-categories as asylum seekers, migrant workers, refugees, family reunification or unaccompanied minors. It is part of an effort to control and normalize what empirically is a very complex migration flow (Feldman 2011). The categories and taxonomies constructed by the

3 New figures from a 2014 report estimate that there are between 18,100 and 56,000 people “without legal residence” in the country.

state and the media have a management perspective or a state-centric focus that reinforces the concept of crossing borders in a “legitimate” or illegitimate way (Soguk 2007). Such border-related categories and definitions of migrants are implemented as part of a sovereign right-claim of the nation-state to decide who its citizens are (Noiriel 2001). The effect of such categorization is that migrants are objectified (Feldman 2011). While the Norwegian authorities use the term “persons without legal residence”, the research literature and public debate make use of different categories for the same or partially overlapping categories of people, including “undocumented”, “paperless” or “sans papier”, “illegal”, “non-status migrants”, “unreturnable” or “return deniers”. The battle over the terms also indicates how migration control and inclusion in the nation-state is both a legal and moral concern. Nyers (2010: 135) argues that “[t]he charge of illegality is meant to undermine the moral character of certain types of migrants [...] The term ‘illegal’ implies a breaking of the legal order, a violation of rule-following norms of behaviours, and an intention to commit a wrong.” In the public debate the issue of irregulars’ rights to residence and welfare move from well-integrated irregular migrants who are presented as contributing to society, to dope dealers. Frequently, the media draws on emotional argumentation which centres around those who are “less fortunate” and who “deserve our sympathy” on the one hand, and those whose actions define them as “undeserving” and “illegitimate” and should thus be forcefully returned.

The main argument against using the term “illegal immigrant” is that a *person* cannot be illegal, only the *actions* of a person can contravene existing laws (Nyers 2010). In my research I have chosen to speak of “irregular migration”, because this is quite broad and can include political, social and economic mechanisms in addition to the legal dimension (see Thomson 2010). By using “irregular” or “irregularized” the starting point becomes examining how individuals and groups are “irregularized” in the interaction between specific migration flows and the legal, political, social and economic mechanisms. The term suggests how a person’s administrative status may change as a result of changes in laws and regulations. A person’s legal status depends on a number of factors related to national legislation and its interpretation, the development of the country they migrated from and its international relations with Norway, as well as individuals’ changing status (for example relating to marriage, childbirth, illness, etc.) (cf. Thomsen 2010).

Furthermore, the illegal/legal dichotomy is not as clear-cut as it might seem. In France, Chauvin and Graces-Macarena (2012) argues that “illegality” increasingly seems to operate as a continuum, where migrants may accumulate official and semi-official documents and certificates of attendance and participation in society, in hopes of making themselves less subject to deportation or to make legalization possible in the future. This is perhaps less the case in Norway compared to France, where some groups are provided access to regularization by documenting their number of years of residence in the country (ibid.). From the migrants’ perspective, in my fieldwork I realized that the border between being legal and illegal is experienced as unclear because of the complexity of the system of migration control. The experiences of being irregular, however, are not only related to the legal status as an irregular (Bendixsen 2015). The situation of a rejected asylum seeker changes radically if a return agreement with the country of his/her nationality is implemented. A return agreement facilitates the deportation and forced return of irregular migrants, turning irregular migrants into deportable subjects.

DEPORTABILITY – PRODUCING DEPORTABLE SUBJECTS

In the last decade there has been an increase in the use of deportation, detention, deterrence and return as a way of dealing with the irregular population in Europe and the United States. This intensification of control has been called “deportation regimes” (Genova, Peutz 2012), referring to how these policies and practices produce deportable human beings and describe a “deportation turn” in how Western nation-states deal with unwanted non-citizens (Anderson, Gibney, Paoletti 2011). Deportation is defined as “the compulsory removal of “aliens” from the physical, juridical, and social space of the state” (De Genova, Peutz 2010: 1).

The practice of deportation, I argue, is closely linked to programs of assisted return developed by several European countries. The Norwegian government has an explicit policy objective to encourage irregular migrants to leave “voluntarily”. This is done through introducing asylum seekers to the program of assisted return which is organised by IOM (International Organisation of Migrants) on behalf of the Norwegian authorities. As part of this objective to encourage assisted return, the Norwegian government continues to implement agreements with relevant countries facilitating the return of irregular migrants by force (Bendixsen, Lidén 2016), also called deportation. Such agreements that legalise forced return or deportation simultaneously increase deportability. It also testifies to how deportability is characterised by relatively high levels of cooperation at the international scale. Additionally, as in the EU countries, Norwegian authorities operate with “targets” for deportation. In the last couple of years these have increased: from 3,700 in the consolidated budget in 2010 to 4,600 in 2011, 5,298–7,100 in 2014 (the police (PU) transported 7,259 in 2014), and 7,800 in 2015 (7,825 were reported to have been transported in 2015).⁴ While the number of deportations has been rather stable for the last 2–3 years, in 2016 the media argued that the government “needs” to forcefully return 16,000 people, although there is a lack of capacity to pursue this. Walters (2002: 280) suggests that

When deportation rates become “targets” to be met by immigration and other departments, when national and international agencies seek to compare levels and techniques of deportation across nations and exchange information for “best practices”, then it seems we have governmentalization of government.

Targeting irregular migrants to be deported within a particular budget year is described by the authorities as a necessary means for maintaining a fair asylum process, and is also meant to discourage other (potential) migrants from coming to Norway, sending a message with the deported people that they will not receive asylum or be allowed to stay “illegally” in Norway. As the Minister of Immigration and Integration Sylvi Listhaug of the right-wing Progress Party said in the parliament on the day after her appointment: “[p]ursuing active return work will limit the arrival of more unjustified asylum seekers”.⁵ She added: “I will also make sure that those who do not have the right to stay are sent out as quickly as possible.”

4 Figures from https://www.politi.no/politiets_utlendingsenhet/statistikk/ (25. 6. 2016).

5 http://www.aftenposten.no/norge/Inntil-16000-skall-tvangsreturneres-i-ar_-men-Norge-har-bare-kapasitet-til-a-sende-ut-halvparten-16152b.html (22. 6. 2016).

“Active return work” is thus linked to deterrence policies and forced return. Part of such deterrence policies includes the emergence of specialized detention facilities that expedite deportation, and various public campaigns, such as ads on trains, subway stations and on taxis in Oslo to apply for assisted return. Such practices are central to the production of perceptions of “irregular migrants”. Public justifications of forced return include presenting these people as economic migrants without legitimate asylum claims – even if many of them claim otherwise.

The increase in deportation or immigration enforcement has by scholars been attributed to increased anxiety associated with the war on terror, the prison-industrial-detention-centre complex’s need to justify its existence, racialisation, scapegoating, and the labour needs of capitalism in the neoliberal era (de Genova 2002; de Genova, Peutz 2010; Coutin 2015). In the USA, de Genova (2002) argues that because it was nearly unfeasible, both physically and politically, to deport the around 12 million irregular immigrants living in the country, deportation policies are not about reaching this goal. Instead, he suggests, deportation produces deportability and thus increases irregular migrants’ awareness that they risk deportation, which may decrease their capacity to oppose or question exploitative labour conditions in the neo-liberal global economy. Similarly, Khosravi (2010) describes how ‘illegal’ migrants in Sweden felt constantly monitored, and how they in consequence became obedient, disciplined individuals. Fear of deportation or being produced as a deportable subject “produces and maintains migrant ‘illegality’ as not merely an anomalous juridical status but as a practical, materially consequential, and deeply interiorized mode of being – and of being put in place” (Peutz, de Genova 2010: 14). As a consequence of such socio-political exclusion, irregular migrants have become the “modern proletarians” (Balibar 2000: 42).

In Norway, research has so far not suggested that irregular migrants represent an important labour force. Deportation in Norway is currently instead linked to an effort to increase motivation among irregular migrants to sign up for assisted return (Bendixsen, Lidén 2016), and thus it is part of an effort to reduce asylum pressures. But the effects of being deportable on irregular migrants’ living conditions are similar. Living as an irregular migrant involves living with the awareness that he or she can be deported, which affects everyday life (Willen 2007; Khosravi 2010; Kjærre 2010; Bendixsen 2015). During my fieldwork, I observed that some migrants try to make themselves invisible to the authorities by trying to dress and move in ways or places that makes them unnoticeable, or by avoiding seeking health care when they felt ill because they feared that authorities would be notified (Bendixsen 2015). It also involved taking extra precautions of not committing minor acts of breaking the law, such as always paying for their bus tickets. I also interviewed several migrants who worked on the informal market for very low pay (as low as 1 Euro an hour), and other times never receiving the promised money. They had nowhere to turn to complain, and continued working informally as precarious workers, hoping not to be tricked the next time around.

One last feature of deportability needs mentioning. Deportability is consequential not only for aliens but also for people with permanent residence, and this is tied to the maximum sentence set out in the penal provision. In Norway, the expulsion rules say that “a foreign national who was granted a permanent residence permit before the criminal offence was committed can be expelled if the offence (under Norwegian law) can lead

to imprisonment for a term of two years or more”.⁶ Thus, governing through deportation means that rather than being dichotomous categories, the citizen and the alien become situated on an interconnected continuum defined by moral, economic, and cultural “border-scapes” (Mezzadra, Neilson 2013). It calls attention to the fact that making clear-cut distinctions between ‘open’ or ‘closed’ borders, and between ‘citizens’ or ‘aliens’, is misleading (Jansen 2015). It also demonstrates how criminal law and migration law have become increasingly connected, to which I now finally turn.

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS

Two previously separate spheres of state control – immigration control and crime control – have increasingly begun to overlap, seeping into each other and setting the terms for each other in a new formation that researchers call “crime migration” (Johansen, Ugelvik, Aas 2013).

In Norway, Aas (2014: 525) has asserted that “[c]riminal law is applied not only to punish, but also to deport, while deportation is used not only for immigration purposes, but also because an individual is seen as a law and order problem (without necessarily needing to prove so with criminal law procedural means).” The merging of these two spheres (crime and migration) emphasizes the centrality of citizenship or legal residency to the domestic penal order (Bosworth, Guild 2008; Aas 2014), as well as to the global mobility regime (Aas 2014). The increasingly strong connection constructed between border security, boundary management, migration and crime in post-cold war Norway can be illustrated by the exponential growth in deportations based on criminal sentencing: from 190 decisions in 1991, the number of migrants deported from Norway on the basis of having been convicted of a crime increased exponentially to nearly 2,500 decisions in 2014 (Aas, Mohn 2015).

Detention of migrants is usually considered to be different from incarceration, as it is pursued more for “administrative” purposes rather than as detention of a person who committed or allegedly committed a crime (Sampson, Mitchell 2013). Detention is viewed as an ‘effective migration management’ tool and a governmental practice used for deprivation of liberty in the absence of a criminal charge (ibid.). While in some countries, entering the country without proper authorization is an administrative offence, and not a crime, in Norway it can carry a prison sentence. A few years ago, unauthorized stay could be punished with 30 days in prison, in 2013 it was increased to 60 days, and in 2014 to one year. In 2015, politicians from the Progress Party argued that it should be illegal to provide healthcare to irregular migrants, it should be a duty of healthcare workers to report if they provide assistance to irregular migrants, and that it should be punishable to rent apartments irregular migrants. The motion was dismissed, but such public shaming of irregular migrants amplifies uncertainty around how citizens should respond to irregular migrants and adds to the discursive criminalization of migrants.

A similar intertwining of immigration issues and criminality is also found in the media. The media is important for our understanding of who is worthy of sacrificing, and who are morally legitimate suffering individuals. The questions of deportation and irregular access to welfare services have received attention in the Norwegian media, which mainly

6 <http://www.une.no/en/Cases/Expulsion-rules/> (24. 6. 2016).

constructs irregular migrants either as worthy of being included or as a threat to society. The media has focused on crime in relation to persons without legal residence, and has criticized the government for allowing “criminal asylum seekers” to be in the country and enjoy welfare benefits. On the other hand, the media has also criticized the government for carrying out inhumane asylum policies, and for deporting Norwegians and refusing people humanitarian aid. Constructing an idea of migrants as “productive” or “harmless” vs. “unproductive” or “problematic”, such policy responses have fed into the increasingly strict social environment for refugees and asylum seekers in recent years.⁷ Crimes conducted by migrants are frequently viewed as a sign of their “foreignness”, thus constructing them as “Other” and deviant (Aas 2013). These representations of irregulars are also gendered. While women and children are often portrayed as innocent victims, men are more often associated with crime and danger.

CONCLUSION

The governmentality of irregular migrants is simultaneously the production of such a category of people. Irregular migrants are constructed as particular subjects not only through laws regulating entry and exit of the nation-state and the Schengen external border zone, but also through the internal national welfare-state’s laws and regulations and their interpretations as practiced by governmental agencies. The escalation of border management and border production at various scales multiply social borders, for example through welfare regulations and the enforcement thereof by welfare state gatekeepers. This means that irregular migrants are produced as a category in multiple ways and at various scales.

Facilitating deportation through third-country agreements and partly legitimizing such practices through the implementation of assisted return programmes that are presented as viable alternatives simultaneously produce deportable subjects. This governing practice calls attention to the continuum between aliens and citizens. Finally, the process of criminalizing migrants, constructing images of the dangerous or deviant migrant, is part of the symbolic control of national territory, although with real consequences for the people in question.

Research on irregular migrants and their legal, institutional and empirical exclusion from and inclusion in welfare schemes are both methodologically and ethically challenging. In light of this, as researchers it becomes imperative to reflect upon the categories we as researchers use, as well as our analytical focus and knowledge production, because it ultimately may have an impact on how people defined as irregular migrants are viewed, recognized and treated.

7 Paradoxically, “criminalized” people are not necessarily losing access to welfare rights. The status of criminal and subsequent inclusion in the judicial system and the status of prisoner may provide better protection and effective access to welfare than the status of “irregular migrant”. For instance, an irregular migrant in prison will, in theory, have the same access to health care as all other inmates. Hannah Arendt (2004) [1948] alluded to this paradox in her discussion of refugees and the stateless in Europe in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, where she argues that the best criterion by which to decide if someone has been forced outside the law is whether someone’s legal position would be improved by committing a crime.

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POVZETEK

USTVARJANJE NEDOKUMENTIRANIH MIGRANTOV: PRIMER NORVEŠKE Synnøve BENDIXSEN

Nedokumentirane migracije so v porastu tako v Evropi kot drugje po svetu. Na Norveškem, kot tudi v preostalih evropskih državah, zaznavajo zastoj liberalizacije azilnih in migracijskih politik in porast restriktivnih ukrepov. Članek temelji na raziskavi o nedokumentiranih migracijah in avtoričinem terenskem delu z nedokumentiranimi migranti na Norveškem ter podaja analizo štirih področij vladnih ukrepov, ki pojasnjujejo način ustvarjanja nedokumentiranosti. Prvič, nedokumentirani migranti so kot taki konstruirani skozi prizmo zakonov, ki regulirajo vstop in izstop iz nacionalne države in zunanjih meja šengenskega območja, in (interpretacij) v državah blaginje veljavnih zakonov. Del notranjih oz. socialnih meja na Norveškem so namreč tudi regulativni predpisi o upravičenosti do določenih pravic, dostopa do zdravstvene oskrbe, zatočišča in hrane. Eskalacija upravljanja in vzpostavljanja meja na različnih ravneh dostopa do ugodnosti, ki jih nudi država blaginje, povzroča nastanek številnih socialnih/družbenih razmejevanj.

Drugič, število in konstrukcija kategorij nedokumentiranih migrantov sta pomemben del razumevanja nedokumentiranosti: nekateri ga razumejo v kontekstu humanitarnosti, drugi v kontekstu varnosti. Za moderne oblike vladavine so statistike ključnega pomena (Foucault 2002). V primeru nedokumentiranih migracij se s statistiko identificirajo tisti, ki so v državi neupravičeno in jim je zato treba onemogočiti dostop do »univerzalnih« socialnih pravic. Umeščanje različnih ljudi, ki jim je skupno le to, da v državi prebivajo brez legalnega statusa, v eno skupino, zanemarja heterogenost narodnosti, spola, starosti, etnične pripadnosti in religije.

Tretjič, deportacije, ki so v okviru sporazumov s tretjimi državami legitimizirane v programih pomoči pri vračanju in predstavljene kot sprejemljive alternative za nedokumentirane migrante, hkrati ustvarjajo kategorijo subjektov za deportacijo. Tovrstna oblika vladanja pozornost usmerja na kontinuum med državljani in tujci. In četrtič, proces kriminalizacije migrantov je del simbolnega nadzora nad nacionalnim teritorijem in konstruira podobe nevarnih in deviantnih migrantov.

Namen kompleksno prepletenih vladnih tehnik je upravljati z ljudmi, ki so v državi »nezakonito«. Članek se osredotoča na načine konfiguracije in ustvarjanja nedokumentiranih migrantov na ozemlju nacionalne države, saj prav vladnost nedokumentiranih migracij hkrati ustvarja tovrstno kategorizacijo ljudi. Raziskovalci morajo pri ustvarjanju novega znanja kategorije premišljeno uporabljati, saj lahko te močno vplivajo na dojetje nedokumentiranih migrantov in odnos do njih.

»STULTIFERA NAVIS« NA BALKANSKI BEGUNSKI POTI

Darja ZAVIRŠEK¹

COBISS 1.01

IZVLEČEK

»Stultifera Navis« na balkanski begunski poti

Zbirni in namestitveni centri za begunce, azilni domovi in centri za tujce so sodobna oblika institucionalizacije in prostorske segregacije ljudi. Nekoč dobro znani procesi »velikega zapiranja«, biopolitike in ustvarjanja »populacij« so danes prežeti z ideologijami evrocentrizma, kulturalizacije in kulturnega rasizma, ki jih širijo mediji. Primerjava s procesi zapiranja hendikepiranih pokaže, da so se po eni strani procesi deinstitucionalizacije na Zahodu uspešno končali ali pa še potekajo (v Sloveniji, na primer), po drugi strani pa se povsod po Evropi krepi institucionalizacija beguncev in migrantov. Namesto konstruiranja beguncev kot varnostne grožnje, zdravstvenega tveganja in kulturne drug(ačn)osti so potrebni ukrepi deinstitucionalizacije in depatologizacije begunskih življenj. KLJUČNE BESEDE: begunci, evrocentrizen, biopolitika, »balkanska begunska pot«, deinstitucionalizacija

ABSTRACT

“Stultifera Navis” on the Balkan Refugees Route

Collection centres and hot spots, asylum and detention centres for refugees are forms of institutionalisation and spatial segregation of people. The well-known processes of the “big confinement”, biopolitics and the creation of “populations” are today pervaded with the ideologies of eurocentrism, culturalisation and cultural racism produced by the media. Compared with the processes of spatial segregation of the disabled in the past, one can conclude that while the deinstitutionalisation was achieved in the west and is in some countries on its way (in Slovenia for example), the institutionalisation of migrants and refugees takes place across Europe. Instead of the construction of the refugees as the national threat, health risk and the cultural Other, the measures of deinstitutionalisation and depathologisation of the refugees’ lives are needed.

KEY WORDS: refugees, eurocentrism, biopolitics, “Balkan refugee route”, deinstitutionalisation

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UVOD

Čeprav se je število migrantov, ki so v Evropo prihajali z Bližnjega vzhoda, iz Afrike in srednje Azije, povečevalo vse od leta 2000, se Slovenija, z izjemo nekaterih kritičnih raziskovalk in novinarjev (Pajnik, Lesjak Tušek, Gregorčič 2001; Kralj 2005; Zorn 2008), s to tematiko ni ukvarjala vse do leta 2015, do nastanka t. i. »balkanske begunske poti«. Ta je po tem, ko so nekatere države EU odprle meje za prihod večjega števila migrantov, delovala kot koridor množičnih prehodov.¹ Tako so sredi leta 2015 migranti in begunci v Sloveniji in še v nekaterih drugih postsocialističnih državah postali eno najaktualnejših političnih in družbenih vprašanj. Če je sprememba najprej povzročila osuplost nad množicami ljudi, ki so z vlaki, avtobusi in peš prestopali meje, pa je jeseni 2015 v teh državah naivno osuplost² zamenjala militarizacija meja in jasneje izražena ksenofobija večinske populacije. Madžarska je že spomladi 2015 na mejo s Srbijo in Hrvaško poslala vojake, policiste in zapornike, ki naj bi zadrževali begunce, kmalu za tem pa je na obeh mejah in tudi na meji s Slovenijo začela postavljati zidove in bodeče žice. »Balkanska begunska pot« se je preusmerila proti Sloveniji, pred bežečimi ljudmi pa se je pojavilo več meja (grška, makedonska, srbska, hrvaška, slovenska). Kmalu po Madžarski so začele tudi Makedonija, Hrvaška in Slovenija meje militarizirati z vojniki in s »tehničnimi ovirami«.³ Čeprav sta Nemčija in Avstrija pokazali veliko humanitarne naravnosti, saj sta sprejeli in na zgleden način poskrbeli za veliko število beguncev (s takojšnjo vključitvijo otrok v šole, mladih v oblike poklicnega vajeništva in v študijski proces, manjše število ljudi razpršili po mestih in širili strpnost in zmerno dobrodošlico), sta obenem proti koncu leta 2015 tudi ti državi iskali načine, da bi ljudi zadržali zunaj meja, in sicer tako, da sta pritiskali na schengenske države, naj meje Evrope čim bolj zaprejo. Tako je bil eden od argumentov militarizacije meja v Sloveniji, da bo država, ki jih ne bo varovala, izključena iz schengenskega režima.

Na balkanski begunski poti, pretežno ob državnih mejah, so začeli odpirati zbirne centre, eno od sodobnih oblik institucionalizacije in prostorske segregacije ljudi. Za analizo procesov »transferja« beguncev čez Slovenijo uporabljam Goffmanovo teorijo totalne ustanove ter Foucaultovo teorijo biopolitike in sortiranja populacije (Goffman 1957, 1961; Foucault 2006 [1961], 1980, 2015 [2004]). Nekdanje medicinsko-zaporniške institucije za zapiranje norcev, »posebnežev«, »moralno vprašljivih« in hendikepiranih so danes primerljive s centri za tujce, z zbirnimi centri (zidanimi stavbami in postavljenimi šotori), ki so prostorsko ločeni od večinskega prebivalstva, ljudje v njih pa segregirani, policijsko nadzorovani in pogosto razčlovečeni.⁴ Konstruiranje beguncev kot varnostne grožnje, zdravstvenega tveganja (kužnosti) in kulturne drug(ačn)osti je, kot nekoč v primeru norcev in telesno in socialno hendikepiranih, ki so prav tako funkcionirali kot »grožnja« in »nevarnost« za večinsko prebivalstvo, danes proizvedeno z načinom sprejema (policijsko

1 Dr. Jelki Zorn se zahvaljujem za dragocene sugestije med pisanjem članka.

2 Vojna v Siriji poteka že od leta 2011.

3 Septembra 2015 je Slovenija na mejo s Hrvaško namestila specialno enoto policije, oktobra 2015 je vlada potrdila novelo zakona o obrambi, s katerim je vojska dobila del policijskih pooblastil, od Madžarske pa kupila rezilno in bodečo žico. Sredi novembra 2015 je Slovenija začela postavljati žičnato ograjo na meji s Hrvaško, Makedonija pa je začela ograje postavljati na meji z Grčijo.

4 V mislih imam predvsem dolgotrajno bivanje v segregiranih namestitvah in ne neobhodno čakanje na registracijo.

spremljanje ljudi, ki bežijo; policijski sprejem in odločitve, kdo gre čez mejo in kdo ostane; policijsko določanje, kdo je na vrsti za določen postopek) in s procesom obravnave (zapiranje, discipliniranje, ustvarjanje nevidnosti ipd.).

Kritična analiza ravnanja z ljudmi, ki bežijo pred vojnami, družinskimi ozemeljskimi spori, preganjanjem zaradi osebnih okoliščin (istospolno usmerjeni; tisti, ki jim preti krvno maščevanje itd.) in ekonomsko bedo, ki jo povzročajo neoliberalizem, okoljevarstvene katastrofe, etnični konflikti, sektaški boji, paravojaške organizacije in mednarodna vojaška posredovanja, je namenjena argumentiranju tega, da na humanitarno krizo ne moremo in ne smemo odgovoriti s krizo humanosti, temveč z deinstitutionalizacijo procesov sprejemanja beguncev v evropskih državah, depatologizacijo in demilitarizacijo njihovih življenj ter z univerzalnimi humanističnimi vrednotami.

Kritična primerjalna analiza procesov upravljanja migracij danes, medijska analiza pisanja o migracijah med septembrom in decembrom 2015 in diskurzivna analiza terenskih poročil ter njihova analitična refleksija so metodologija pričujočega članka.

KULTURALIZACIJA IN EVROCENTRIZEM

Postsocialistične države, ki jih uvrščamo med t. i. balkanske (Romunija, Hrvaška, Slovenija itn.), pa tudi tiste, ki so del postsocialistične »Evrope« (Madžarska, Poljska, Slovaška, Češka), so na migrante reagirale z državnim nacionalizmom in novimi skrajno desnimi gibanji in političnimi strankami. Nekatere države, kot na primer Madžarska in Slovaška, so se uradno uprle odločitvi Evropske komisije, da sprejmejo določeno število beguncev po načelu kvot znotraj držav EU,⁵ ali pa so kvote pogojevale. Slovaška je odločila, da sprejme le družine krščanske veroizpovedi in ne posameznikov, slovenska vlada pa je izrazila interes, da med »kvotnimi begunci« sprejme družine, angleško govoreče osebe in pismene ljudi. Paradoks je, da je zavračanje beguncev najmočnejše v tistih državah, kjer jih je najmanj, kar spominja na sovraštvo do Judov v 19. in 20. stoletju, ki je bilo razširjeno tudi tam, kjer jih skorajda ni bilo in ga poznamo kot »antisemitizem brez Judov« (na Japonskem, v Sloveniji ipd.). Slovenija je imela julija 2016 zgolj 612 prošenj za mednarodno zaščito, le 58 ljudem pa je država odobrila prošnjo za azil, kar kaže na razkorak med moralno paniko in številom ljudi, ki so ostali v Sloveniji.

Večinsko zavračajoč odnos do migrantov, ki je od odprtja »balkanske begunske poti« značilen predvsem za postsocialistične države in je hkrati širši vseevropski fenomen, je posledica kulturalizacije Drugega. Samir Amin (2009) jo je povedno analiziral kot evrocentrizem, utemeljen na ideji o kontinuiranem zgodovinskem razvoju Evrope vse od grške civilizacije, njegovi glavni manifestaciji pa sta krščanstvo in kapitalizem. Medtem ko naj bi si vzhodnjaška metafizika prizadevala odkriti najvišje načelo ali »absolutno resnico«, se je evropska civilizacija usmerila v racionalnost in iskanje delnih resnic, kar naj bi spodbudilo prehod v kapitalizem in posledično demokracijo. Jedrni del evrocentrizma je islamofobija.

5 Madžarska vlada je želela z referendumom 2. oktobra 2016 zagotoviti podporo vladni politiki zavračanja prerazporeditve beguncev po državah Evropske unije, a je bil referendum neveljaven, saj se ga je udeležilo manj kot 50 odstotkov volilnih udeležencev.

Slovenska desno usmerjena tiskana medija, dnevnik *Slovenske novice* in tednik *Reporter*, kar najbolje izkazujeta Aminovo idejo evrocentrizma.⁶ Domnevne esencialne značilnosti Evropejcev, ki se kažejo v navadah, vrednotah in celo čustvovanju ljudi, naj bi bile povsem drugačne od tistih, ki jih imajo migranti: »prizori, ki jih v naši kulturi težko razumemo«; »kako pripravljene so prihajajoči muslimani na sožitje z našo evropsko kulturo«; »v tretjem svetu ni razvitega občutka hvaležnosti, nasploh so občutki zelo slabo razviti« itd. Medijsko poročanje je ustvarilo podobo kulturno povsem drugačnih ljudi, ki prihajajo v Evropo: »[...] kupi reči, ki so jih begunci odmetavali kar med potjo; še zaprte ribje konzerve, odeje in folije, vreče s hrano« (Šuljić 2015a); »v tretjem svetu ni razvitega občutka hvaležnosti, nasploh so občutki zelo slabo razviti – nadomesti jih občutek samodejnosti ali brezobčutek, dosega cilja z vsemi sredstvi, igra, izraba, zloraba. Človek tretjega sveta je izredno pragmatičen. Ne ovirajo ga čustva, ne ovirajo ga moralna vprašanja« (Preac 2015).

Amin (2009: 63) pokaže, da evropska identiteta temelji na mitih, kot je tisti o evropski kontinuiteti z grško kulturo, iz katere so izbrisani vsi »vzhodnjaški« vplivi, mit o krščanstvu kot evropski religiji⁷ ter mit o evropski zgodovini, ki naj bi nujno vodila v razcvet kapitalizma. Evropska identiteta naj bi bila v tej mitski misli povsem drugačna od »vzhodne«, od tod tudi rasistično prepričanje o tujcih kot »varnostni grožnji«. Evrocentrični diskurz Evropejce (vključno z ZDA) slika kot demokratične, migrante in begunce pa kot nedemokratične, ne ločuje med posamezniki in režimi in ne upošteva izrednega položaja ljudi, ki so izgubili dom, jim preti politično motivirano mučenje, prisilna mobilizacija, lakota in smrt zaradi pomanjkanja zdravstvene oskrbe in so na begu v negotovo prihodnost. Tako je *Reporter* zapisal:

Na nevarnost je 25. avgusta v kolumni za *Reporter* opozoril tudi nekdanji direktor Sove Damir Črnčec, ki je ob tem pozval, da se moramo tega zavedati in ukrepati, še predno bo prepozno. Posledice nezakonite migracije pretežno islamske populacije, ki zavrača evropske demokratične vrednote, je primerjal s tistimi, ki so jih v 16. stoletju povzročili turški vpadi. (Kršinar 2015)

Ker so današnje množične migracije povezane z globalnim liberalnim kapitalizmom, ki »spreminja cone osiromašenja v cone vojne in vice versa« (Balibar 2015: 211), ni zanemarljivo, da je del evrocentrističnega konstrukta tudi prepričanje, da je kapitalizem »poenotil« Evropo in »da je bil kapitalistični čudež lahko samo evropski« (Amin 2009: 58). V resnici je kapitalizem države polariziral, poglobil neenakosti, jih razdelil na center in periferijo, in sicer tako temeljito, da države periferije niso mogle nadoknaditi razlik v razvoju v primerjavi s t. i. razvitimi državami. Danes so te razlike še bolj očitne. Izginil pa ni niti konstrukt, da so vzroki za razlike in neenakosti med državami izključno »notranji«.

6 Izbrani primeri člankov so del širše analize obeh tiskanih medijev v času »balkanske begunske poti«. Članke (skupaj 93) je zbrala in sortirala Simona Šivec, študentka podiplomskega študija Socialna pravičnost in vključevanje na področju hendikepa, etničnosti in spola (2015/2016) na Fakulteti za socialno delo.

7 Ni torej čudno, da ljudje ne vedo, da sirski begunci niso zgolj muslimani, temveč tudi katoličani, ali pa da nekateri zavračajo religioznost kot singularno identiteto (Sen 2009).

Od te konstrukcije »Vzhoda« ni več daleč do današnje medijske kulturalizacije, ki v ljudeh z Bližnjega vzhoda, ene od zibelk evropske kulture, vidi krvoločneže:

Medtem so se otroci, ki so jim policisti in vojaki pustili, da skačejo naokoli po prašni cesti ali polju, igrali. Na trenutke je bila njihova igra zelo značilna za muslimane z Bližnjega vzhoda – med sabo so si metali manjše kamenje. Trenirati je treba že zelo zgodaj, kamenjanje ljudi je med muslimani izredno priljubljeno. (Biščak 2015)

Navezujoč se na Amina, Mastnak (2009) poudarja, da je evrocentizem prepleten z evropskim osvajanjem sveta, ki je bil resnični vzrok nastanka kapitalizma. Eurocentrizem, kot ga poznamo danes, se je izostril v poznem 15. stoletju, ko se je pojavilo kolektivno zavedanje nečesa, kar se je poimenovalo »Evropa« kot politična skupnost (prav tam: 181). Srednji vek torej še ni poznal »Evrope«, ideja o njej kot o fizičnem in duhovnem prostoru zahodne, latinske in krščanske kolektivne identitete pa se je razvila po turški osvojitvi Konstantinopla leta 1453. Tedaj so se pojavili klici po nujnosti ubranitve »Evrope« pred Turki, neverniki. V enem od člankov v tedniku *Reporter* je ta kolektivni spomin, ki je evropsko identiteto konstruiral v binarnem nasprotju kristjani : neverniki/muslimani in ki so ga s pomočjo pisnih virov negovale številne generacije, ponovno vzniknil v podobi spopada religij:

Kako pripravljeni so prihajajoči muslimani na sožitje z našo, evropsko kulturo pa pokaže naslednji primer: v do zadnjega koticčka napolnjenem čolnu so se vozili muslimanski in katoliški begunci iz Libije. Ko so prišli na odprto morje, pa so muslimani pometali vse katoličane v morje. (Starič 2015)

Mastnak poudarja, da je bila Evropa »iznajdena v enotnem nasprotovanju zahodnih kristjanov Turkom, ki so bili obenem realna sovražna politična sila in simbolna podoba muslimanskega sovražnika« (2009: 182). Z drugimi besedami, »muslimanski problem« je dejavno prisoten v jedru zgodovinske konstitucije evrocentrizma« (prav tam), podobo sovražnega Turka pa so v času »balkanske begunske poti« mediji ponovno oživili:

Cilj džihadistov je popolno uničenje zahodne civilizacije, kar pa jim na srečo ne bo uspelo. Že v zgodovini se je dogajalo pri nas poznano nasilje Turkov, ki so vpadali v naše kraje z znanimi ukrivljenimi sabljami, znak muslimanov za uničevanje ljudi, in pobijali, zažigali, posiljevali ter kradli otroke, ki so jih potem vzgajali v janičarje. (Štokelj 2015)

Horde nepovabljenih in nezakonitih novodobnih Turkov derejo na slovensko ozemlje, kot da gre za nekaj najbolj normalnega, in za sabo puščajo tone odpadkov (samo na Brežiškem v enem tednu več kot sto ton!). [...] Lahko od takšnih ljudi pričakujemo, da bodo kot prebivalci Evrope spoštovali njeno civilizacijo, kulturo? (Klemenčič 2015)

Mediji, ki ustvarjajo »resnico« in reproducirajo interes politike, krepijo obstoječe vzhodnoevropske nacionalizme tako, da na najrazličnejše načine kulturalizirajo begunce. Objektivizacija Drugega brez pripravljenosti razumeti, iz kakšnih okolij nasilja in trpljenja bežijo begunci, je nujna, da se sprost socialna sposobnost drugemu prizadejati bolečino. Feldman (2015) govori o kulturni anesteziji, ki je stanje, ko se družba na kolektivni ravni ni sposobna soočiti z bolečino drugega in je ne more prenesti.

Desno usmerjeni mediji so tudi osebne zgodbe ljudi, ki govorijo o skrajni stiski in obupu, prevajali v primere zgodb sumljivih tujcev. Nekateri begunci so v obupu, da jih ne bi vrnili v državo vstopa in nato nazaj domov, nasprotovali dajanju prstnih odtisov: »Migrant, ki zavrača dajanje prstnih odtisov, je oseba s slabimi nameni« (Glucks 2015). Ljudi, ki trpijo, pa naj gre za otroke ali odrasle, se spremeni ne samo v osebe, ki so sposobne nasilnih dejanj, ampak kar v ljudi, katerih obstoj sam je že orožje:

Vsak moker in premražen migrantski otrok na naši meji, katerega fotografijo objavijo mediji, je topovski izstrelek, vsaka množica iz muslimanskega sveta, ki predre policijski kordon, je zmagovita ofenziva. Orožje zoper Evropsko unijo je masa ljudi, ki jo je do zdaj uspešno ustavil samo madžarski premier Viktor Orban. (Glucks 2015)

Še več, pomanjkanje empatije in nerazumevanje zgodovine vojn na območjih, s katerih prihajajo migranti, pomeni zanikanje nesmiselnosti bojevanja za tiste, ki so z begom v Evropo zavrnili pobijanje ljudi bodisi na strani vladnih bodisi na strani lokalnih, paravojaških ali mednarodnih sil. Nesmiselne vojne rasistični diskurz spreminja v ideologijo domoljubne vojne. Tako so mediji mladim moškim, ki so pobegnili pred zapori, mučenjem in vojno, ki so jo preživljali od leta 2011, nekateri pa so se v vojnah že rodili, očitali nekakšno dezerterstvo in pomanjkanje domoljubja:

Sirci so medtem množično zapuščali svoje domove. Bežali so pred bombami Asadovega režima in pred verskimi blazneži, a nikomur od teh mladih bežečih fantov ni padlo na pamet, da bi se boril za svojo domovino. Tak odnos bodo zagotovo imeli tudi do države, ki jim bo ponudila zatočišče in jih sprejela za svoje. (Biščak 2015)

Konstruiranje ideje o domoljubni vojni je način, da se travmam, socialnemu trpljenju, razpadu skupnosti in množičnim smrtim pripiše smisel in opraviči nesmiselno vojno. Socialna amnezija ali izbris spomina, o katerih govori Feldman (2015), pa sta še bolj očitna v zahodni ideologiji opravičevanj mednarodnih intervencij, ki se imenujejo kar 'pravične vojne' (*just wars*), 'preventivne vojne' (*preventatives wars*) ali 'vojne proti terorizmu' (*war on terrorism*). Postsocialistične države, ki so bile, kot pokažem v nadaljevanju, same objekt evrocentrizma (ob vstopu v Evropsko unijo značilna formulacija, da bodo s tem »postale del Evrope«), so se na begunce odzvale prav z evrocentrizmom, s pomanjkanjem empatije, kulturno anestezijsko in z zgodovinsko amnezijo lastnih izkušenj vojn, begunstva in travm po letu 1991.

BALKANSKA BEGUNSKA POT KOT DEL REVITALIZACIJE KONSTRUKTA O BALKANU

Pred namestitvijo v namestitvene centre po različnih državah Evropske unije morajo ljudje meje šele prestopiti. Meje so prostori zavrnitev, selekcije, policijske brutalnosti, depersonalizacije (spanje na prostem, čakanje v vrsti dolge ure, čakanje v vrsti na dežju, večurna hoja, pomanjkanje sanitarij, hranjenje ljudi skozi žico ipd.) in tudi prostori pogajanj, odpora in solidarnosti (Zorn 2016). O prepletenosti navedenega priča dnevniški zapis z mejnega prehoda Obrežje/Bregana, 20. septembra 2015:

Na meji med Slovenijo in Hrvaško je okoli 100 šotorov. Ljudje so iz Hrvaške, Slovenije, Avstrije, poročevalec s Portugalske, televizijska ekipa iz Nemčije, Sirci, Afganistanci in drugi. Postavljeno je še nekaj večjih šotorov, kjer je mogoče dobiti vodo, hrano, obleke in prvo pomoč. Kar vidim, me spominja na boljši trg z gomilami oblek, kuhane hrane in ljudi. Takšne meje nisem vajena. Postala je prostor čakanja in negotovosti, pa tudi srečevanj, organiziranih dogodkov, prostor načrtov za prihodnost in predvsem izmenjevanja informacij. Ljudje ne razumejo, zakaj jih je policija zadržala v tem zaporu na prostem, še manj vedo, koliko časa bodo morali prebiti tu. Nekateri so tu že četrti dan. Kaj se bo zgodilo, ko bo prišla nova skupina in bodo imele spet prednost ženske z otroki, ki jih bodo ločili od moških in z avtobusi poslali naprej v Slovenijo? Vsak razmišlja, kdaj bo prišel na vrsto. Ljudje me sprašujejo, ali sta Slovenija in Hrvaška v vojni, ker je na meji toliko vojakov? Grozno se počutim, ko jim povem, da je to schengenska meja, in ko jim zamolčim, da je bila narejena prav za njih, da jih zaustavi. (Zorn 2016: 2)

»Ali sta Slovenija in Hrvaška v vojni, ker je na meji toliko vojakov«, se zdi kot vprašanje naivnega začudenja, ki pa je v resnici posledica travme in retravmatizacije, ki dobi obliko nevedenja. Cathy Caruth (1996) poudarja, da travma onemogoča celotno registracijo dogodka. Travmatizirana oseba ne more v celoti in naenkrat doumeti in občutiti travmatičnega dogodka, zato travmatično izkušnjo doživlja z zamikom. Travmatičnost dogodka preprečuje vedenje in povzroča ne-vedenje, ne-razumevanje. Dori Laub (1992) govori o kognitivnem zoženju, ki pri travmi omeji tisto, kar lahko oseba opazi ali čuti. Prav to pa je preventivna narava travmatičnega spomina, ki ima značilnost zanikanja ali potlačitve. Tudi v spominih ljudi, ki so preživeli različne oblike institucionalnega nasilja v psihiatričnih bolnicah ali zavodih za hendikepirane, se ponavlja vprašanje, ki hkrati to ni: »ne razumem, zakaj«; »nikoli nisem mogla razumeti, zakaj jim je bilo ponoči tako težko priti in nas obrniti okoli« (Zaviršek 2000: 143). Tudi med begunci se travmatični dogodek ponavlja v obliki vprašanja »zakaj«; »Zakaj nas ne spustijo čez mejo, saj nismo kriminalci?«; »Zakaj nas zapirajo, saj nismo nikomur nič naredili?« Vprašanja, ki ostanejo brez odgovora, kažejo na nemoč osebe, da bi, kot pokaže Dori Laub (1992), pričala sama zase, da bi bila 'priča od znotraj' (*witness from within*).

A obenem begunce in migrante razmere na meji upravičeno spominjajo na vojno. Vojna, ki je del administrativnega aparata države, kot pokaže Foucault (1997), se tako vse bolj razteza v civilno sfero, na vaške travnike, in postaja del ideologije varovanja tistega, kar se »potencialno lahko zgodi« (Feldman 2015: 72). Različne prakse vladnosti, ki se prikazujejo kot nemilitantne, pacifistične, pogodbene, pravne, so v resnici del vojnega aparata. S postavitvami ograj, zidov, rezalnih in bodečih žic pa je prostora za pogajanja vse manj. Nasprotno, oživeli so stari stereotipi, kot na primer poimenovanje »balkanska begunska pot«, sintagma, ki oživlja stereotip o Balkanu kot delu Evrope, ki je zgodovinsko »markiran« kot evropska periferija. Evrocentrizen se tu pojavi v dveh plasteh, kot kulturalizem zahodnega sveta do periferije in kot odnos periferije do nezaželenih prišlekov.

Med vojnami na ozemlju Jugoslavije v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja je Balkan postal sinonim za nacionalizem in politične ter socialne konflikte (čeprav v vojne med nekdanjimi jugoslovanskimi republikami niso bile vključene Grčija, Bolgarija, Romunija, Albanija

in Turčija, ki se jih prav tako uvršča na Balkan).⁸ Kljub temu je z besedo »balkanizacija« zahodni svet začel poimenovati razmere, za katere so bili značilni družbena fragmentacija, nesmiselni konflikti in porušena socialna kohezija.⁹ Todorova (1997/2009; 2015) je zgodovinski proces marginalizacije in stereotipizacije Balkana, ki je v stoletjih postal nasprotje Evrope, poimenovala balkanizem; ta se prenaša z novinarskimi, s političnimi in z literarnimi viri.

»Balkanska begunska pot« je danes del balkanizma, njegova revitalizacija in nova zgodovinska pojavna oblika, ki obuja stare stereotipe o »hordah barbarov«¹⁰ (Turkov, Slovanov, Vzhodnoevropejcev), ki z Vzhoda preplavljajo Evropo in s tujo religijo in tujimi navadami rušijo zahodno demokracijo, harmonijo in blaginjo.

Balkan je torej še danes zrcalni obraz Zahoda, njegova konstrukcija in projekcijsko platno, na katerega Zahod projicira vse, česar se pri sebi želi znebiti. S pojavom »balkanske begunske poti« lahko ta socialnopsihološki proces vzamemo kar dobesedno, saj Zahod na Balkan ne odlaga zgolj predstav o lenih, koruptivnih, manj sposobnih ljudeh in lastnih strahov o ekonomski krizi, ki zajema vse širše sloje svetovnega prebivalstva, temveč vanj dejansko odlaga ljudi, ki se jih hoče znebiti oziroma jih noče sprejeti.¹¹ Turčija in Grčija sta postali državi – zapora, saj so ljudje, ki nimajo denarja, da bi s pomočjo tihotapskih poti nadaljevali pot v druge evropske države, ujeti v njih. Zahod tako potrebuje Balkan zaradi dvojega, da se z njegovim obstojem sam vzpostavlja kot kriterij razvitosti in demokratičnosti¹² in da brani njegove namišljene meje. Ko je Avstrija začela načrtovati ograjo na slovensko-avstrijski meji, jo je decembra 2015 postavila na meji z Balkanom (štiri kilometre). Balkan je postal vratar Zahoda, varuh »zlate kletke«, če parafraziramo pesnico Sylvio Plath. Ne gre zgolj za simbolno funkcijo vratarja v kafkovskem pomenu, temveč dejansko

8 Zaradi vojn na Balkanu ni ostalo veliko od multietničnih teritorijev in še manj od njegove multiplicitete, saj imamo danes praviloma etnično homogene države in njihove institucije. Še več, večina držav na Balkanu je postavila zidove, ograje ali bodeče žice vsaj na eni od svojih meja. Grčija je že leta 2012 postavila 12 km dolgo ograjo s Turčijo, Madžarska je julija 2015 začela postavljati žično ograjo s Srbijo (175 km) in nekaj mesecev pozneje s Hrvaško (348 km), leta 2016 pa je pripravila vse za gradnjo meje z Romunijo. Novembra 2015 je Makedonija začela postavljati ograjo na meji z Grčijo, Slovenija je novembra 2015 postavila žično ograjo na svoji južni meji s Hrvaško. Bolgarija je leta 2014 začela graditi trimetrski zid, obdan z bodečo žico, na meji s Turčijo. Ta je bil junija 2016 dolg že 146 km, kar pomeni, da je med državama neprehodna betonska meja, ki naj bi potekala vzdolž celotne meje (166 km). Turčija pa je postavila betonski zid na meji s Sirijo, ki ga postopoma gradi vzdolž 900 km dolge meje.

9 Ker besede »potujejo«, je deloma cinično, deloma pa šaljivo, da je bolgarska teoretičarka Milglena Nikolčina Združeno kraljestvo po brexitu označila kar z »balkanizacija Združenega kraljestva« (Krečić 2016).

10 Danes je besedo »horda« zamenjala modernejša »cunami«; tako mediji pišejo o »begunskem cunamiju«.

11 Septembra 2016 je bilo v Grčiji okoli 60.000 ljudi, ki so tam »obtičali«, Turčija ima 2,5 milijona beguncev, kar je največ v Evropi, ki so ostali ujeti v državi, ko je ta spomladi 2016 sklenila dogovor o zadrževanju beguncev znotraj svojih meja v zameno za vizumsko liberalizacijo (Žerjavič 2016; UNHCR Global Report 2015).

12 Z izvolitvijo Donalda Trumpa za predsednika ZDA novembra 2016 se je tradicionalna polarizacija med demokratičnim Zahodom vs nedemokratičnim Vzhodom radikalno zamajala.

funkcionira kot teritorij, ki naj prepreči vstop beguncem in migrantom.¹³ Takšen režim je ustvarila že uradna politika Evropske unije, ko je vzpostavila enoten nadzor na svojih zunanjih mejah (schengenski nadzor) in sprejela Dublinski sporazum, ki določa, da se migranti, ki ne dobijo političnega azila, vrne v prvo varno državo, v katero so vstopili (najpogosteje v Madžarsko, Bolgarijo, Grčijo, Turčijo, Italijo). Zgodovinska funkcija Balkana je torej trojna. Z njim Zahod ohranja svoje simbolne in ekonomske privilegije; je koristen kot grožnja, ki naj konsolidira večinsko prebivalstvo doma in argumentira povečanje policijskega in vojaškega nadzora v zahodnih državah pod geslom varovanja državljanov; in tretjič, Zahod Balkan potrebuje kot branik, ki prebežnike zadržuje na svojih mejah.

Če je »balkanska begunska pot« oblika balkanizma, torej nadaljevanje strategije ustvarjanja in ohranjanja periferije Zahoda, pa so države Jugovzhodne Evrope na begunce in migrante prav tako odgovorile s kulturalizacijo, z evrocentrizmom in islamofobijo. Njihova socialna amnezija, povezana s travmatično izkušnjo lastne viktimizacije, je preprečila, da bi v ljudeh, ki bežijo pred vojno, terorjem, mučenjem in smrtjo ter jih zaustavljajo bodeče žice, videli same sebe.¹⁴

NAMESTITVENI CENTRI KOT NADALJEVANJE

»VELIKEGA ZAPIRANJA«

Od epidemije gobavosti je postalo zapiranje ljudi v azile, zavode in bolnišnice zaporniškega tipa po Evropi ne le ponavljajoča se praksa, temveč strukturna oblika izključevanja Drugega (Foucault 2006/1961). Struktura zapiranja se je ohranila s politiko prostorov, v katere so bili naseljeni »odvečni« ljudje. Nekdanje hiralnice so postale vojašnice, vojašnice so postali zavodi za hendikepirane, nekdanje psihiatrične bolnišnice so postale namestitveni centri za migrante (Zaviršek 2015). Kot nekdanj, je treba tudi danes upravljanje ljudi poenostaviti in skriti. Sredozemski in jadranski otoki pa tudi otoki sredi Tihega oceana so postali mesta velikega zapiranja. Vladni namestitveni center za mlade brez spremstva, ki je v zadnjih letih deloval v mestu Mitilini na grškem otoku Lezbosu,¹⁵ so odprli v stavbi nekdanje psihiatrične bolnice, še prej pa je bila v njej bolnišnica za bolnike s tuberkulozo (Videmšek 2016: 76). V času Jugoslavije so na otokih gradili tako zapore (zloglasni zapor za politične zapornike na Golem otoku) kot psihiatrične bolnišnice in azile za hendikepirane (na Hrvaškem so bile psihiatrične bolnišnice na otokih Mljet, Rab in še delujoča na Ugljanu). Grške socialnovarstvene ustanove so na otok Leros pred desetletji v azil poslale na stotine hendikepiranih. Avstralska vlada je s 'pacifiško rešitvijo' (*Pacific solution*) že leta 2001 ljudi, zajete v bližini avstralske obale, začela nameščati v centre za tujce, ki so jih zgradili na majhnih otokih državne uprave Nauru in novogvinejskega otoka Manus (Briskman 2012). Na grških otokih je v 'relokacijskih centrih' (t. i. *hot spotih*), kjer ljudje čakajo na premesti-

13 V novi zgodovinski konstelaciji je izostal pomemben del balkanističnega konstrukta, to je konstrukcija Balkana kot prostora užitka, dobre hrane, glasbe in nedela. Od leta 2015 so nekatere obmorske države Balkana povsem nezaželen turistični cilj.

14 Spomnimo se trpljenja ljudi, ki so pred drugo svetovno vojno odhajali kot ekonomski, po njej pa kot politični migranti, in štirih milijonov ljudi, ki so domove zaradi vojn na območju Jugoslavije zapustili po letu 1991.

15 Na Lezbos je samo leta 2009 prišlo 13.000 ljudi (Videmšek 2016a: 73).

tev v druge države EU ali na deportacijo, in jih nekateri poimenujejo kar koncentracijska taborišča, saj v njih vladajo grozljive razmere (na otoku Hios na primer), ujetih okoli 9.420 beguncev in migrantov, z njihovim statusom pa se večinoma nihče ne ukvarja (Videmšek 2016a,b). Strukturna reprodukcija »populacij« in DrugEGA se poustvarja tako, da se nove in nove ljudi namešča v iste zavržene in stigmatizirane prostore. Foucault je pokazal, da je nova tehnologija oblasti od konca 17. stoletja postopoma iz ljudstva začela ustvarjati »populacije«, »politično telo« pa se je spremenilo v »biološko telo« (Foucault 2015/2004). Tehnologija oblasti je v obliki »biooblasti« prevzela skrb za življenje »populacij« in spremenila prejšnjo naravo skrbi, značilno za predkapitalistične oblastne strukture: »Starodavna pravica vzeti ali pustiti življenje odstopi mesto svoji na glavo obrnjeni podobi, ki označuje moderno biopolitiko in se izraža v obrazcu dati živeti in pustiti umreti« (Agamben 2005/1998: 60).

Meje so prvi prostor proizvajanja beguncev kot populacije, ki je podvržena biooblasti, saj se na mejah ljudi sortira na »upravičene« in »neupravičene« migrante, ekonomske in politične migrante, na tiste, ki dobijo status prosilca za azil, azilanta, imajo začasni status, so brez statusa, torej ilegalni itd. Proizvodnja »populacij(e)«, »drobljenje biološkega polja« (Foucault 2015/2004) zahteva nove prostore, kamor oblast namesti ljudi (v centre za tujce, azilne domove, namestitvene centre ipd.). Goffman (1957, 1961) je podobne prostore nekoč poimenoval totalne ustanove, za katere je bilo značilno nadzorovanje varovancev s strani zaposlenih in ustvarjanje institucionalne kulture, totalna ločenost zaprtih od večinskega prebivalstva, hierarhija med varovanci in socialna smrt. Proizvodnja populacij pa je hkrati tudi rez v »populacijo«, v kateri imajo nekateri državljski status in drugi ne. Ideologijo »populacije« pri vsakdanjem upravljanju migracij s pridom uporabljata kulturalizem in kulturni rasizem: »Ponudimo jim konzerve, sadje, vodo, kruh, hrano pač, ki je primerna **tej populaciji** (poudarek D. Z.). In radi jo vzamejo,« je povedala Zdenka Močnik, vodja brežiške izpostave uprave za zaščito in reševanje« (Šujić 2015b).

Vidik biopolitike »dati živeti« namesto »pustiti umreti« so pri upravljanju migracij zdravstveni pregledi. Migrante, ki pridejo iz Turčije v Grčijo, policisti aretirajo¹⁶ in jih nato odpeljejo v bolnišnico, kjer jih pregledajo, ali ne prinašajo nalezljivih boleznih. Potem jih s trajektom odpeljejo v namestitveni center na otok Hios (Videmšek 2016a: 73). Biopolitični stroj oblasti geografski prostor, to je morsko mejo med državama, spremeni v absolutni biopolitični prostor, kjer potekajo selekcija, sortiranje in zdravstveni pregled »populacije«, ki naj prepreči okužbe in bolezni domačega prebivalstva. Tako biooblast v sistem »omogočanja življenja« uvede rasizem in, kot opozori Agamben, v biološki kontinuum zariše cezuro in uvaja načelo vojne (Agamben 2005/1998: 61). Za begunce se ob prestopu nove meje začne nova vojna.

Trdim, da imamo v 21. stoletju opraviti s procesi, znanimi iz obdobja hitro razvijajočega se kapitalizma od srede 17. stoletja, ko so revne, hendikepirane, nepreskrbljene, »moralno vprašljive« ljudi zapirali v polzaporniške medicinsko-administrativne institucije in ki so z uporabo biopolitike postali »populacije«. Če je bilo »veliko zapiranje« v norišnice, polzaprtje ali zaprte zavode po večjih zahodnih mestih in pozneje po vsej Evropi in njenih kolonijah namenjeno konstrukciji in utrditvi ideje o normalnem in deviantnem, moralnem in nemoralnem, pravilnem in nepravilnem, je »veliko zapiranje« beguncev in migrantov

16 Videmšek opisuje, da je za migrante na tej poti najvarnejše, da, ko vidijo čoln policijske patrolje, poskačejo v vodo, saj jih bodo policisti iz vode rešili in potem aretirali (Videmšek 2016a: 73).

z globalnega juga in evropske periferije namenjeno konstrukciji nove »populacije«, ki naj nadomesti hendikepirane, revne in norce, in to z namenom, da se struktura izključevanja ohrani z reprodukcijo Drugega. Obenem se s tem ohranjajo ekonomski in socialni privilegiji zahodnega sveta.

Kako rigorozno je bilo »veliko zapiranje« v 19. stoletju, opiše Foucault, ko pravi, da sta se samo v Parizu vsak stoti prebivalec ali prebivalka znašla za zapahi (2006/1961: 49). Kako vseobsežno in totalno je danes »veliko zapiranje« beguncev in migrantov, pa povedo podatki, da je na primer v namestitvenem centru Pagani v mestu Mitilini na Lezbosu živelo po 2.000 oseb naenkrat. Na italijanski Lampedusa je bil namestitveni center, imenovan kar »italijanski Guantanamo«, z več sto ljudi v prostorih, namenjenih veliko manjšemu številu oseb. Na grškem Hiosu je spalo po 17 oseb v eni sobi (prim. Videmšek 2016a). Nove institucije migrante in begunce ustvarjajo kot »populacijo« in obenem kot nevidne. Gre za policijsko-humanitarne prostore z disciplinskim načinom vodenja in s hierarhičnimi odnosi moči med upravljavci in zaprtimi in med zaprtimi samimi. Ko Bradol (2004) analizira današnjo mednarodno humanitarno pomoč, govori o »oboroženem humanitarizmu«, natanko tako pa lahko po vsem svetu poimenujemo tudi delovanje različnih institucij za begunce.

Če so torej »politično kulturo nevarnosti« (Foucault 2015/2004: 67) v 19. stoletju tvorili norci in »moralno izrojenci«, ki lahko okužijo posameznike, družine in celotni narod, je današnja »politična kultura nevarnosti« osredotočena na begunce, ki ogrožajo »naše družine«, skupnosti in ves zahodni svet. Za ljudi, prestrašenimi zaradi nepredvidljive »animalne« narave norcev, so postali ti pregovorna in mitologizirana grožnja tedaj, ko so jih zaprli, institucije pa dobrodošel ukrep, ki naj varuje večinsko populacijo pred nasiljem in kriminalom. To se danes dogaja beguncem, ki so postali simbol zunanje grožnje, to je terorizma.

Tudi institucije za migrante in begunce, kot je bilo nekoč značilno za norce, so urejene zunaj urbanih centrov, na obrobjih mest in manjših krajev, kar poceni njihov nadzor, ga naredi skritega in minimalizira stik migrantov z zunanjim svetom.¹⁷ Nekaterne institucije za migrante in begunce so enoznačno represivne ustanove, kot na primer centri za tujce, ki jih je Slovenija ustanovila leta 2001 in jih poimenovala kar »centri za odstranjevanje tujcev«. Rasistično poimenovanje navaja na misel, da je tisto, kar je treba odstraniti, že samo po sebi škodljivo. Tudi poimenovanje »centri za tujce« je evfemizem, ki ga poznamo iz obdobja velikega zapiranja hendikepiranih (in pri nas ponekod še danes), ko so se institucije imenovala »sanatorij«, »dom« in »bolnišnica«. Oboji so »ne-prostori«, ker ne integrirajo drugih socialnih prostorov, pomenov, tradicij, običajev; so ne-simbolizirani in nimajo drugega namena in dejavnosti, kot sta izolacija in prepoved prostega gibanja (Kralj 2005: 180; Lipovec Čebren, Zorn 2016).

Institucionalizacija je doživela preobrat v 20. stoletju, ko je po zahodnih državah v različnih obdobjih, bodisi med obema svetovnjima vojnama bodisi po drugi svetovni vojni, zaradi spoznanja, da so mnogi ljudje v azilih doživeli najrazličnejše zlorabe in zatiranja, v večjih prišlo do deinstitutionalizacije. Stigma, mortifikacija jaza, proizvodnja volatilnih teles, profesionalni paternalizem in druge oblike institucionalnega nasilja so bili ves čas del institucionalne pedagogizacije. Proces definiramo kot ukinjanje velikih ustanov in njihovo nadomeščanje z dovolj majhnimi, ljudem dostopnimi in trajnimi socialnimi servisi,

17 Namestitveni centri so danes tudi v mestnih jedrih (v Ljubljani na Kotnikovi ulici). V Berlinu, na primer, je center za nujno namestitev nastal sredi mesta na Osloer Strasse 23, kjer živi tudi sicer največ priseljencev.

ki zadovoljujejo potrebe ljudi po pomoči, asistenci, zdravstvenih in socialnih storitvah, ne glede na obseg storitev, ki jih človek potrebuje. Ena od značilnosti deinstitutionalizacije je, da socialni in psihosocialni servisi sledijo ljudem, in ne obratno, da se ljudi namešča v ustanove glede na prazne kapacitete in njihovo razpoložljivost. V zaprti instituciji se generira hierarhična struktura ne zgolj med osebjem, ki varuje in nadzoruje zaprte, temveč tudi med zaprtimi osebami samimi. Priče v namestitvenih centrih za migrante in begunce govorijo o izkoriščanju šibkejših beguncev s strani močnejših; o povezavah med tihotapci, prodajalci belega blaga in o zlorabah in prodaji otrok. V postsocialističnih državah, kamor je modernizacija prišla z zamikom, je poznejša tudi deinstitutionalizacija, ki je v številnih državah šele v povojih (Zaviršek 2006, 2014, 2015). Hkrati z njo pa se krepi institucionalizacija migrantov in beguncev (Lipovec Čebon, Zorn 2016). Če je nekoč *stultifera navis* po rekah vozila norce v bližnja srednjeveška mesta ali na njihove robove, danes ponekod prebežnike imenujejo kar *boatpeople* ('ljudje v čolnih') (prim.: Briskman 2012) in jih izvažajo v države evropske periferije, na obrobja držav ali na odročne otoke. Trdim, da se umanjkanje demokratičnih procesov deinstitutionalizacije po državah Vzhodne in Zahodne Evrope odraža v podobnem »velikem zapiranju«: v Franciji je znana »džungla« v kraju Calaise, ZDA imajo velike centre za tujce v Texasu itd. Nasprotno pa so v Italiji, znani po zgodnjem odpiranju psihiatričnih ustanov (proces, znan pod imenom *Psichiatria Democratica*) v začetku sedemdesetih let 20. stoletja, ki je prineslo prave kulturne in socialne premike pri sprejemanju razlik, begunci in migranti navkljub desnemu populizmu Lige Nord sprejeti v skupnosti in ne živijo zaprti v begunskih centrih in drugih prostorih zajetja.

Tako kot so bili nekoč norci, katerih »naravo« so enačili z živalskostjo, v nekem smislu »varnostna grožnja«, so danes to migranti in begunci, zato humanitarni procesi delujejo predvsem kot »preventiva«. Foucault (2015/2004: 39) je pokazal, da so kazenske institucije pred obdobjem moderne prakso pravičnosti izvajale s temeljnim vprašanjem »kaj si storil?« Moderno kaznovanje pa je vprašanje spremenilo v »kdo si?« (uporabljajoč različne psihološke, socialne in pedagoške postopke). Foucault poudarja, da vprašanje »kdo si?« kaznovalno funkcijo izrekanja pravičnosti nadomesti z izrekanjem resnice (prav tam). Režimi izrekanja resnice, ki so od 19. stoletja medicinski, psihološki, pedagoški, sortirajo ljudi glede na diagnoze in moralne posebnosti. V centrih za tujce zaprti migranti pogosto sprašujejo: »Zakaj nas držijo tukaj, saj nismo kriminalci!« A gre za napačno vprašanje, saj biooblasti ne zanima več, kaj je kdo storil, temveč kdo oseba je. Policija in drugi represivni aparati države, ki proizvajajo resnico, ves čas zastavljajo vprašanje »kdo si?«, ko poskušajo ugotoviti, od kod in zakaj oseba prihaja in ali je potencialna grožnja terorizma? Gre za vprašanje, »kaj bi človek lahko naredil«, ne, kaj je naredil, to pa je, kot je pokazal Feldman (2015) v svoji politični teoriji vojn, že vpisano v današnjo politiko »pravičnih vojn«. ¹⁸ Odnos zahodnih držav do sodobnih migrantov iz držav, iz katerih bežijo zaradi vojn, ekonomskega životarjenja ali tradicionalnih oblik nasilja nad posamezniki in družinami, je torej mogoče primerjati z ljudmi, ki so jih po evropskih mestih od konca 17. stoletja zaradi revščine, ekonomske neučinkovitosti ali moralne vprašljivosti zapirali v različne ustanove.

18 Mastnak (2009:184) je nekaj let pred balkansko begunsko potjo napisal, da se je v zadnjih desetletjih evrocentrizem premestil v ZDA in da je ameriška hegemonija v resnici nadaljevanje evrocentrizma z drugimi sredstvi.

ZAKLJUČEK

Čeprav so se metafore, kot so »Evropa trdnjava« in »Evropa kot berlinski zid«, začele pojavljati že po letu 2000 (Petrović 2015: 105), je danes postalo povsem jasno, da begunci, ki pridejo na evropske meje in vstopijo v evropske države, ne vstopajo v prostore demokracije, liberalizma in svobode, temveč prestopajo prag prostora, kjer jih čakajo identiteta Drugega in ne-prostori. »Oboroženi humanitarizem« se manifestira v militarizaciji nacionalnih meja, medijski demonizaciji in prostorski segregaciji. Ti procesi spominjajo na Foucaultovo misel, da je v liberalizmu svoboda nekaj, »kar se v slehernem trenutku proizvaja« (2015/2004: 66): »Liberalizem ni nekaj, kar svobodo priznava. Liberalizem se ponuja kot nekaj, kar svobodo v slehernem trenutku izdeluje, vzbuja in proizvaja, seveda skupaj s [celo množico] prisil in problemov glede stroškov, ki jih to izdelovanje zahteva.«

Tako Evropa danes proizvaja begunce in namestitvene centre, še več, proizvaja regije in države, ki postajajo velike totalne institucije, kamor druge države s svojih ozemelj »vračajo« migrante, od tam pa ljudje, kot pravi Agamben (2005), »ki prenesejo vse, kar zmorejo prenesti« in jih to dela neljudi, ne morejo nikamor več. Zato je potrebna deinstitutionalizacija begunskih prihodov in begunskih življenj, saj se v nasprotnem primeru krepijo oblike nedovoljene trgovine z ljudmi in tihotapstva, kršene so temeljne človekove pravice, socialna distanca med ljudmi pa se vse bolj pogloblja. Za preživetje ideje človeškosti je treba svet videti kot novit prostor ljudi, naravnih virov in dobrin, ga historizirati in tudi v vsakdanjem življenju zagotoviti, da je prostor vseh, ne zgolj ekonomsko privilegiranih. Drugače bo *stultifera navis*, 'ladja norcev', še naprej plula in odlagala ljudi na neznane otoke, kjer bodo ob javnem molku tudi sami počasi utihnil in izginili.

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SUMMARY

“STULTIFERA NAVIS” ON THE BALKAN REFUGEES ROUTE

Darja ZAVIRŠEK

In 2015 1,015 million persons who fled from Syria, Afganistan and Iraq to the western and northern countries took either the Mediterranean or the Balkan refugee routes. The latter was different from all other migrant footpaths in the last decades due to the migration corridor which existed from August 2015 until early 2016 and was relatively free of surveillance for people to cross the borders and to move. With the increased number of refugees the Balkan states increased the militarization of the borders with the fences, razor wires, collection centres and hot spots. The article focuses on one dimension of the management of migration which is the institutionalisation of migrants and refugees in collection centres and hot spots, asylum and detention centres. The well-known processes of the “big confinement”, biopolitics and the creation of “populations” are today pervaded with the ideologies of eurocentrism, culturalisation and cultural racism widely used by the media. An important part of the “management of migration” is the institutionalisation of people who flee from economic devastation and wars. Compared with the processes of spatial segregation of the disabled and people with mental health problems in the past, one can conclude that while the deinstitutionalisation has become a democratic norm for some people, an increase of the institutionalisation of migrants and refugees takes place. The lack of the democratic reflection about global interconnectedness of people and causes of economic scarcity and wars, bring about the confinement of new “populations” on a large scale, caused by the biopolitics of the nation states. Instead of the construction of the refugees as the national threat, health risk and cultural othering, the measures of deinstitutionalisation and depathologisation of the refugees’ lives are needed. During the Balkan refugee route local population gradually increased their negative sentiments against refugees and media produced and reproduced very negative images of the migrant people. The old-fashion images of the “Turks” who are going to violate the Balkan population again were used by the media to support the militarization of the borders. In the western countries the image of the Balkan refugee route supported the processes of the re-emerging of balkanism and the process of turning the Balkan semi-periphery into an actual tampon-zone and the prison-like territory where the West not only projects its fantasies of the economic and moral superiority but pushes back real people whom the West doesn’t want to receive.

LIFE TRANSITIONS OF THE UNACCOMPANIED MIGRANT CHILDREN IN SLOVENIA: SUBJECTIVE VIEWS

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ABSTRACT

Life Transitions of the Unaccompanied Migrant children in Slovenia: Subjective Views

The article addresses the issue of unaccompanied migrant children seeking international protection in Slovenia and their perceptions of four different life transitions they experience through their journey: a transition across geographical spaces, institutional transition, transition over time and psychological transition. The implementation of the existing international protection system in Slovenia is seen through their narratives and perceptions of their own best interest, various gaps, constraints and weak points in the procedures. There are no durable solutions for unaccompanied minors in Slovenia who are in search of a better everyday life.

KEY WORDS: unaccompanied migrant children, life transitions, best interest of a child, subjective views

IZVLEČEK

Življenjski prehodi mladoletnih migrantov brez spremstva v Sloveniji: subjektivni pogledi

Članek obravnava mladoletne migrante brez spremstva, ki v Sloveniji iščejo mednarodno zaščito, in njihovo razumevanje štirih različnih življenjskih prehodov, ki so jih izkusili na svoji poti: prehoda v geografskem prostoru, institucionalnega prehoda, prehoda skozi čas in psihološke tranzicije. Njihove pripovedi o lastnih najboljših koristih in pogledih nanje razkrivajo vrzeli, omejitve in šibke točke obstoječih postopkov in implementacije sistema mednarodne zaščite v Sloveniji. Slovenija za mladoletne migrante brez spremstva v iskanju boljšega vsakdanjika namreč nima trajnih rešitev.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: mladoletni migranti brez spremstva, življenjski prehodi, najboljša korist otroka, subjektivni vidik

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INTRODUCTION

The idea for the paper stems from Ravi Kohli's (2014) presumptions that children seeking asylum move in three dimensions at the same time: firstly, they make a journey across *geographical spaces*, leaving their country of origin and moving to the host country; secondly, they move *over time*, during the journey and while waiting for the decision regarding their international protection application they actually get older and finally, they move *psychologically* in different directions, adjusting their experiences, "arranging their stories of who they are, what happened to them and how they came to be asking for asylum" (Kohli 2014: 84). Moreover, "[...] in becoming forced migrants and refugees, they experience the death of everyday life" (ibid.).

The transitions mentioned will be analysed through the experiences and views of unaccompanied migrant children involved in the process of seeking international protection in the Republic of Slovenia. In addition to the transitions suggested by Kohli, for the purpose of our analysis we will introduce a fourth transition: the *institutional status transition*, by which we have in mind the transition through the international protection procedures and statuses in which young people on the move are involved.

The empirical data used in the paper were collected within the international project *In Whose Best Interest? Exploring Unaccompanied Minors' Rights through the Lens of Migration and Asylum Processes (MinAs)* which lasted from 2014 to 2015. The general aim of the project which was to collect autobiographical narrations and self-perceptions of unaccompanied minors and thus address the experiences of children themselves. In addition, the two broad objectives of the project were: firstly, to deal with the conceptual aspect of *the best interest of the child*¹ which is embedded in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) including analysis of legal, non-governmental, political, social aspects and unaccompanied minors' views on the best interest of the child and secondly, to identify the practical dimensions of the best interest of the child and *best interest determination procedures* regarding reception, asylum procedures, protection measures and return of unaccompanied minor migrants. An international comparison revealed that both the best interest of the child principle and the best interest determination are undefined and often left open to different interpretation. Moreover, when a more concrete definition of the best interest principle can actually be found in theory, practical application of the principle does not always follow (Sedmak et al. 2015). The situation in Slovenia is similar in this regard.

NATIONAL CONTEXT

The Republic of Slovenia is a small country lying between Italy, Croatia, Hungary and Austria with less than two million inhabitants. Slovenia is ethnically quite homogenous (according to the last Census from 2001) as 83% of the country is made up of ethnic Slovenes.

1 The best interest of the child is one of the underlying principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, namely Article 3, Paragraph 1, which gives the child the right to have his or her best interests assessed and taken into account as a primary consideration in all actions or decisions that concern him or her, both in the public and private sphere. It is one of the fundamental values of the Convention.

In the past, mostly in the 70s and 80s the vast majority of (economic) migrants coming to Slovenia were inhabitants from other republics of former Yugoslavia. After independence in the 90s and after the war in the territory of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia) refugees began to seek protection within the Slovenian state. It is only in the last two decades that Slovenia has dealt with a more ethnically heterogeneous immigration flow with a peak in the year 2015 with the refugee corridor through Slovenia. Slovenia is mostly a transit country and most of the illegal immigrants, either adults or minors, continue their path towards the countries of Northern and Western Europe soon after crossing the border. Consequently, the number of unaccompanied minors (UAMs) in Slovenia is relatively low. On average (the year 2004 excluded) there were 38 UAMs per year who applied for asylum in the period from 2002–2016. The highest number was in 2004 when 104 UAMs came to Slovenia. Out of a total of 679 applications in this 15 year long period, subsidiary protection status was granted in only 33 cases (Ministry of the Interior 2016). According to the data obtained by Slovene Philanthropy (2009) and the Ministry of the Interior (2016) the majority of UAMs who have come to Slovenia in the last years are male and coming from areas of crisis (predominantly Afghanistan and Somalia). Some of them remain in Slovenia for longer periods of time, where they are granted international protection status, while many of them continue their journey toward other destinations. In addition, there was an increasing number of unaccompanied minors who were returned to Slovenia from other EU countries on the basis of the Dublin II Regulation (Slovene Philanthropy and PIC 2009) before the Dublin III regulation came into force.

Most UAMs found by the authorities in Slovenia apply for international protection. If they apply for status there are three possible outcomes: 1) They receive subsidiary protection status which is usually temporary; 2) They are assigned a more permanent status of refugee; 3) They are rejected and therefore have to leave the country. Those who do not apply for international protection status upon their arrival are usually placed in the Aliens Centre until they return to their home countries.

Legally, the situation of unaccompanied minors in Slovenia (their rights, obligations, status etc.) is regulated through two main legal acts: the Aliens Act² (AA) and the International Protection Act³ (IPA). The first regulates the entry, departure and residence of aliens and the second regulates the transfer of the international protection system in Slovenia. After signing the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1991, a number of measures aiming to implement children's rights on various levels were adopted, however, there is still no comprehensive and systematic approach to the protection of UAMs in Slovenia. Namely, the issue of UAMs has become a relatively relevant theme for Slovenian policy makers and scholars only in the last decade. The first study to report on unaccompanied minors in Slovenia (Peace Institute 2003; Zavrtnik, Gornik 2007) noted that some special provisions for unaccompanied minors have been acknowledged through legislation, but are often not implemented in practice; there is no suitable accommodation nor is there personnel who deal exclusively with them. According to documents, reports and guidelines published regularly by the most active NGO in this field in Slovenia, Slovene Philanthropy (2009, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2011, 2011a, 2011b, 2013), there have been certain improvements over time, however the basic problems remain largely unchanged.

2 ZTuj-2, Official Gazette of the RS 50/11.

3 ZMZ-UPB2; Official Gazette of the RS 11/11.

An overview of the situation of UAMs in Slovenia highlights the importance of the best interest of the child principle to be identified in each specific case for every UAM, so as to respond to the particular needs of each child. From this perspective, it is of particular importance to analyse the views and experiences of those most involved in the process, the UAMs themselves. This is particularly the case as there is an omnipresent lack of research on UAMs focusing on exploring their own perspectives (Wernesjö 2011).

METHODOLOGY

The presented narratives of unaccompanied minors were obtained during empirical field research carried out in the period between January and April 2015 with the generous assistance of Slovene Philanthropy.⁴ During this period, extensive interviews were conducted with 18 unaccompanied minors,⁵ all boys, who were living in the territory of Slovenia at that time (13 from Afghanistan, 2 Somalians, 1 from Ghana, 1 from Sierra Leone and 1 from Ukraine). When the interview was conducted 2 interviewees were 17 years old, 2 were 18 years old, 4 were 19 years old, 3 were 20 years old, 4 were 21 years old, 2 were 22 and one was 23 years old.⁶ Interviewees had been living in Slovenia from 5 months to 7 years, while upon their arrival in Slovenia they were all minors. All of them had legal status and were not illegal immigrants living on the streets, nor were they waiting for refugee or international protection status.⁷ Some had already been granted subsidiary protection status or refugee status (4) or were waiting for an extension. The interviews were conducted in English, Slovenian and also in Russian. They generally lasted from one hour and half up to two and half hours and were recorded and transcribed. Research topics addressed in the interviews were: *perceptions of daily life* (living conditions, fulfilment of basic needs, access to basic social rights, education/work etc.); *perceptions of well-being as a young persons* (subjective well-being, friends, family, social links, leisure activities, identity, convictions and values); *living conditions and treatment of unaccompanied migrants/asylum seekers* (procedures and status seeking); *the future* (desires, expectations and aspirations).

SUBJECTIVE TRANSITION PERCEPTIONS

What follows are the subjective experiences and presentations of the stories unaccompanied minors with regard to their transitions (1) across geographical spaces, (2) through the international protection procedures, (3) across time and (4) the deeply personal, psychological

4 Slovenian Philanthropy, Association for the Promotion of Volunteering is the NGO and humanitarian organization operating in the public interest since 1992. The staff of Slovenian Philanthropy is often involved with the work with UAMs as their guardians. The interviews were conducted by Marina Uzelac from Slovenian Philanthropy.

5 All interviewed boys were UAMs upon their arrival in Slovenia, and some of them are currently already of age.

6 Upon arrival in Slovenia, they were 14 (2), 15 (3), 16 (8) and 17 (5) years old.

7 The term “asylum seekers” is commonly used in most EU members and in the international context. In Slovenian legislation terminology from 2008 the term “international protection” is used instead. The latest includes refugee status and status of subsidiarity protection.

transition. All these are interrelated and they are a part of building a meaningful world and reconstructing the lives of unaccompanied children on the move.

Journey across geographical spaces

In their geographical transitions children move through different countries – from the country of origin to various transition countries towards the one that will be their country of settlement (see also Kohli 2014; Mougne 2010; Bhabha 2006, Ayotte 2000).

After leaving their country of origin, the unaccompanied minors start a long, exhausting, uncertain and often dangerous journey. According to UAMs staying in Slovenia they had diverse reasons for leaving the countries of origin, such as war and fear of political prosecution, religious prosecution, fear for their lives, forced inclusion in army/war etc. Due to traumatic experiences some of them did not want to talk about the past at all. One boy who left his home country when he was 16 gave the following reason for leaving:

I left my country because of religion. That was the real problem. [...] before it was ok, but when some people, because of religion and changes, they didn't accept the president, when it came to that, everyone moved. They invited me to be with them and that was the reason that my mother sent me away. If I would go with them, I would die [...] they wanted me to work for them or to do whatever they like [...] You will have to kill some or they will kill you.

The act of departure is the attempt to resolve the (critical) situation they are in with one decisive action. From this perspective the departure needs to be seen as the desperate act of (self) protection (Kirkpatrick 1992).

Often the family saved money for the journey. In one case a mother sold their house to pay for her son's journey to Turkey. Only one informant mentioned the concrete expense for illegal border crossing: his uncle paid 16,000 EU. To find a person who helps organise the journey and traveling by various means of transport is usually not problematic, the only thing that matters is money. Most of them passed several borders with the aim to arrive to one of the European countries (e.g. Ghana–Libya–Macedonia–Slovenia; Afghanistan–Pakistan–Iran–Turkey–Greece–Slovenia; Sierra Leone–Greece–Macedonia–Serbia–Hungary–Serbia/deportation–Macedonia/deportation–Greece–Italy–Slovenia). Some of them they actually did not have clear idea about the final destination they just went “towards Europe”. Some of them were traveling and living in different countries illegally for years (Greece, Iran, Pakistan etc.).

Some authors (Kirkpatrick 1992) point to a feeling of guilt on the part of children on the move because in leaving a dangerous situation and being privileged to, they left their families behind.

In fact, none of the interviewees chose Slovenia as a final destination. Some of them had never heard of Slovenia before. They found themselves in Slovenia under different circumstances (usually they were returned to Slovenia while trying to enter other countries or they were left in Slovenia or on the Slovenian border by traffickers who claimed that they were in some other country such as Italy or Germany).

I had information that there are a lot of countries that are part of Europe but are not part of Schengen that you can ask for Asylum home. I thought to go to some country that is European Union of Schengen. Then they brought me here. Police caught me here. (17 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

The journey was difficult, long and exhausting; they travelled by boat, truck, car and on foot. By the time they arrived in Slovenia, many unaccompanied minors had been traveling for at least 6 months and sometimes more, especially if they were moving on foot or had problems crossing borders. In such cases they had previously stayed in other countries for several months or years. As explained by one unaccompanied minor:

We walked for weeks. Like I never did before. It was difficult to sleep in the forest without bed, cold. I also met people going like that also had problems. We talked and we followed the same footsteps. We go, we walked, sometimes there where speedboats. Some could not make it, some died. We walked for weeks, we were tired. (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

[...] then they were left in a truck, or on the border believing they were in Italy or Austria, betrayed.

No, I wanted to go cross Slovenia, to go in Italy, in Austria, in Germany [...] but driver let me here in Slovenia. I did not understand the language and I did not know where I am. [...] I wanted to ask taxi driver to take me in Italy or in Austria. He said to wait for a moment. I was waiting for 15 minutes and then after 15 minutes police came and they took me in Postojna. That it is. (14 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

Traveling through geographical spaces also means changing culture, language of communication, habits, the whole natural and social context. One of the first problems unaccompanied minors have to address is the language obstacle.

After being apprehended by the police and before being taken to Aliens Centre in Postojna, one boy was taken to the police station and was subjected to an interview; in accordance with the standard procedures he was granted an interpreter. His perception of the whole situation is presented below:

Yes, the translator was. [...] You know what, translator was Iranian, look, I am from Afghanistan. The language is similar but there is a big difference. [...] you understand Croatian, but they do not understand you. I also did not understand everything. (14 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

Language and translation problems are also present in further procedures in the process of applying for international protection status. The unaccompanied minors interviewed stated that they could not fully express themselves nor were they always properly understood during the interviews. One significant reason were translators who were poorly prepared, did not speak the language well enough or who did not translate everything that was said.

It was not hard, but it was difficult for me with the interpreter, he did not actually say what I said. He only said the way he understood. That is not the way; you are dealing with a human, what you say is what they take into consideration, so you have to interpret fact by fact, word by word. And

get into the mind of the person whom you talk. And he didn't do that. (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

With issues like this, there is no doubt that the interpreter could not present the voice of a child which is of extreme importance in the procedure. According to the interviewees, there were also intercultural differences (or a lack of competences in this field) which contributed to misunderstandings during the interviews:

I do not know. Living in Slovenia or in Afghanistan is quite different. When we answer a question, they did not believe the response. They did not survive and they have not seen. For them, it was quite hard to understand us. (14 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

At this point, the importance of the formal interview in the final decision regarding international protection must be stressed. Their future depends on a successful interview. Due to poor or shoddy translation and interpretation, intercultural differences and a lack of empathy, unaccompanied children often feel confused, scared and left without enough information.

Transition through the international protection procedures and statuses

Transition through the international protection procedures involves the time UAMs take part in the system. It involves all procedures at the border (and possible return procedures) and the act/process of application for international protection (including the time spent waiting for the application to be either accepted or rejected). Finally, it presents the transition through different statuses – from being statusless and without any legal rights, to receiving temporary status with some of the associated rights, to (ideally) a durable solution with permanent status and all associated rights.

The transition through the international protection procedures clearly shows the absence of a child-friendly approach as well as a lack of respect for the implementation of the best interest of the child principle. There is a lack of information regarding the border and possible return procedures. In Slovenia, this part of the institutionalised procedure has not yet been observed nor systematically researched. There is evidence to suggest that the primary goal of the border police is to return unaccompanied minors either to a neighbouring country or to their country of origin and only if this is not possible does the minor obtain authorisation to stay in Slovenia and apply for status (Sedmak et al. 2015: 53–56). From the point of view of the best interest of the child, it is questionable if an approach which takes this principle into consideration is always taken into account.

The transition through the international protection procedures starts when an unaccompanied minor applies for international protection (at the border, through the border police, social worker or at the Aliens Centre). The application for international protection needs to be submitted within a very short time after being placed in Asylum Home; the submission procedure happens in the presence of at least four people who the unaccompanied minor does not know (legal representative, legal adviser, interpreter, an official). Due to time pressure, unaccompanied minors find the whole process of application for international protection confusing; they do not receive enough information about the entire

procedure nor their rights and options. Moreover, there is most certainly not enough time to properly prepare for the first interview, upon which so much depends. Unaccompanied minors highlight how confused and scared they were during the first interview, as seen by the following statements:

Before the interview nobody explained anything to me, then I gave the interview and they said, ok, now you have finished. (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

[...] You know, you are nervous, you are meeting them for the first time; you don't know what to say. It's hard. [...] And again, you don't know who to trust. You don't know who is a police officer, or who is an immigration officer. (15 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

While the time prior to the first interview and application for international protection status is obviously too short, the time before receiving the decision regarding status is too long. According to the IPA, the whole procedure of status application should be finished within 6 months, giving clear priority to the applications of minors. In reality, unaccompanied minors wait for the final decision for as long as a year or a year and half. Some NGO experts stress that this process is prolonged due to age assessment procedures, the result being that some unaccompanied minors reach the age of 18 before they receive a decision regarding their application, and thus they lose the benefits and rights stemming from their minority status. In the worst cases, they can even be deported from the state.

One must keep in mind the long term uncertainty with which unaccompanied minors live while waiting for the final response. In this intermediary period (which can last as long as a year and half) they cannot properly plan for their future. They theoretically obtain the rights, but in practice they have limited possibilities and rights in the areas of accommodation, schooling, work, health care etc.

While waiting for status, they are usually accommodated in Asylum Home which is primarily intended for adults and therefore not a suitable accommodation for minors. There they have limited autonomy, are often socially isolated and wait for the decision regarding their status. They also have limited information about the process, but also limited possibilities to actively spend their time and essentially find themselves in a state of idleness.

Sometimes I went out with friends, at that time there was nothing to do in Asylum Home. This was very hard. (17 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

The transition through the institutional procedures is apparently only finished by obtaining the "final" decision – subsidiary/refugee status and all the rights associated with this status. At this stage a special guardian is appointed to unaccompanied minors to protect their rights and work in their best interest. However, the status is often limited to a very short period (usually a few years, until they are of age). This means that by obtaining status unaccompanied minors actually do not finish the transition through the system but are subjected to a temporary solution and after turning 18, their insecurities and battle for status continues. After they lose their status, they usually appeal and in the meantime they receive temporary leave to remain, which allows them to live in Slovenia, but basically without other rights.

I did not have the permission to work, to go to school [...] and it says basic healthcare, but this is not true. I went to the doctor, because my teeth hurt, but they said: you don't have the insurance. And you go. And that's it. (14 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

As expressed by many authors, in Slovenia (as in other European countries) there is no durable solution for unaccompanied minors seeking “shelter under the European umbrella”. There is no durable solution which, in accordance with Kanics (2015), is sustainable and which ensures that the child will be able to reach adulthood in an environment which will meet his or her needs. The reality of the situation, as seen by the (former) unaccompanied minors involved in our study unfortunately demonstrates a completely different experience. A 17 year old boy who has been living in Slovenia for 6 years, fears that he will get a negative answer to his request for prolonged subsidiary protection status:

If I get negative answer I don't know what I will do. Maybe I will leave Slovenia. Sometimes one boy says he will kill himself. These are the only two solutions. I don't know what I will do. (14 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

Instead of a durable solution they are subjected to the feeling of having no future.

Before, when I was in Asylum Home, I waited and I thought I would get a status in Slovenia and settle down and everything will be the best [...], that I will get a future. But I only got the status for 1 year. When it ends, there will be a lot of changes for me. I did not have much hope. (15 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

Unaccompanied minors find themselves in a highly insecure position with limited prospects for the future. When the same minor was asked: “At the moment, what do you miss the most?” he answered: “The future and my mother.” Hope for the future is lost, while their past lives are far away, too.

Transition across time

Unaccompanied minors also experience a transition across time. These transitions occur during their journey toward Europe, while waiting for international protection status and hoping for a durable solution which would enable them to have a “simple and ordinary” life. During this period, they become older and turn from children to young adults.

Their chronological age is an important determinant of their rights and it defines the way they are treated as migrants. It is a decisive factor for the outcome of asylum application and therefore their access to certain rights. Since they are usually granted status on the basis of their minority, a range of medical, physical, and psychological assessments may be used to determine their age. Age assessment is used in cases when there is doubt as to whether they are truly underage, however the methods are not prescribed and some which are health-wise or ethically disputable can still be used. While most unaccompanied minors in Slovenia did not experience age assessment procedures as their age was not questioned, one boy had to undergo an x-ray examination:

[How was it at the doctor, how did they check you?] They performed an x-ray on both my hands and my knees. [...] I didn't mind, they told me that I must go to the doctor and I went.

According to the Asylum Procedures Directive (2005/85/EC), medical examination may be used to determine age within the asylum application procedure, however many European paediatricians oppose this procedure on ethical, medical and legal grounds (Sauer et al. 2015).

When discussing the time transition, the sequence of events also plays an important role. Unaccompanied minors have to explain their situation, their reasons for leaving, when they left, how and where they travelled, what the sequence of events was. In order to be credible and convincing, their story needs to be linear, clear and coherent (UNHCR 2013; Kohli 2014). They often have to tell and re-tell their stories over and over again:

All together I had two interviews. First interview was basic questions; you are just telling them every story. In second interview they are taking your answers from the first one, questions from your stories, and asking you again. Those things that they don't believe that they don't trust or didn't understand pretty well. They are taking those sentences and making questions from those words or those things. And she is asking you again. (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

Once they obtain temporary status, or while waiting for status to be renewed, they structure their time and create daily routines, live “normal”, “ordinary lives”, to create a routine and find “normality” in the wider context of insecurity and uncertainty regarding their future.

In the morning I wake up at 7, then I go to school, I have school until 12 or 3. Then I go back home, eat, then I train, I go to the gym. One hour, two hours. Then I go out, in the city centre, I go back, sometimes I go to visit someone, come back. Every day is like this. (17 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

In their transition across time, coming of age is an important milestone for unaccompanied minors as access to formal rights to support are usually reduced or cease once they turn 18, since obtaining subsidiary protection was based on the fact that they were minors.

Then I felt really bad, it was my worst day. The worst day. When I got the negative answer. /.../ Then I asked Aida from Slovenian Philanthropy why did they give me a negative answer. And she said: before you were a minor and now you are of age [...] (17 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

They lose certain benefits, such as for example the right to have a guardian or their access to health care is reduced – they are entitled only to emergency healthcare procedures. They also lose the right to family reunification. Young people are left without support, but above all, they are left without a perspective on what their future lives will look like. Suddenly, they are left on their own.

Yes, in Asylum home they said we will get a guardian. They said they will take care for you until you 18, then you are free. But I don't want to get free! (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

As we will see, the transition is not only chronological but psychological as well – due to the circumstances they were forced to cope with (being without adult supervision, traveling etc.) unaccompanied minors mature earlier than their counterparts. While waiting for international protection status or with status while working occasionally or receiving some support money they often need to care for their family who remain back in their country of origin – sending them (an already scarce amount of) money.

[When you say your family needs help, are you talking about the money your family needs?]

Yes, I am the oldest of the family, I have four brothers and mother. They need money; they are coming from Somalia to Yemen. There are also refugees in Yemen. It is bad. Sometimes they have to pay rent, health, everything. And I am the one to whom they say: "Give us, give us for that!"

[So they expect you to send them money?]

Yes. (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

In the case of unaccompanied minors, the movement across time is inevitably linked to a psychological transition and maturation.

Psychological changes and adjustments

In these 5 years we changed a lot. In home country we were still kids. There was one tension that you would die. But here you need to turn into a man, to think about everything. (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

The first years in a host country are without doubt difficult. Unaccompanied minors miss their families and siblings. They often say they regret leaving their homes and only after being separated from their family of origin do they realise how difficult it is to be alone, without family protection and support. The absurdity of the situation is seen in the paradox articulated by Christiansen and Foighel (1990, Kohli 2014): parents send their children away into the unknown because they love them and may permanently lose contact with them as a result.

According to Kohli (2014) unaccompanied children constantly move between the past and hope for the future. Life circumstances and specific life trajectories force them to mature earlier than they ought to. They must adapt to their new situations alone, often without support.

I lost my hair [...] because of the stress. It is stressful when you are here and your family is in another country. Of course stress will be with you. (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

The constant struggle to establish an ordinary everyday life is difficult and contributes to their being thrust into adulthood.

Actually I want to know more people, to have more contacts, to be social. To be more in touch with people. To have more friends from different cultures, from different societies, to have fun, to have a hobby, to travel with them, to know the world, to know the people. But that is not possible. We don't have documents and we are living in a society where we face so much tensions, stress. Other persons don't even want to be friends with us because they see some much pain and stress in us and could say why should they make themselves sad. We were not born with this stress and painful, hard, sadness faces. We were not born like this but time and situation made us like that. We are also humans, we also have feelings. (17 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

Some unaccompanied minors stay in Slovenia for a significant period of time, but at the end they are left without a solution that would enable them to plan a future.

In two years they should give me the papers or reject me, clean my fingerprints so I can have a better life somewhere else. It's like in a football ground. Everybody is kicking us and we don't know where our goal is. (17 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

The (psychological) situation of unaccompanied minors staying in Slovenia is additionally absurd due to the fact that they are actually trapped in a country they do not see as a future home country. All the interviewees related that they did not plan to come and stay in Slovenia, they were apprehended at the border or within Slovenian territory, or they were returned to Slovenia from some other country in accordance with the Dublin Act. They do not have the possibility to move further, toward their goal of a "dream" country. They are stuck in the moment, stuck physically and psychologically. They have no future, no dream to dream, only unending insecurity which usually ends with the legal decision that they will be returned to their country of origin.

[Your family helped you to get the money to come to Slovenia?]

Not to Slovenia, to another country. I never dreamed of Slovenia. My plan was going to Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Norway, other places. I never heard of Slovenia. (15 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

Significant others, peers and a support network play an important role in the process of psychological adaptation and as a part of survival strategies for the unaccompanied minor. The general disadvantaged position they hold is further worsened by a lack of (psychological) support and friends. They do not have many opportunities to make friends among Slovenians (because of language problems, a lack of money, psychological constraints such as insecurity etc.) and they mostly associate with other unaccompanied minors.

I have. I have friends from Asylum Home, which also come from Ukraine, Muhamed from Syria, we talk and socialise. (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

According to Mai (2010: 78) once they arrive in Europe, unaccompanied minors "[...] fall into places marked by a specific set of opportunities and possibilities, which are al-

ready established places of marginality and irregular/illegal livelihoods in the country of destination”.

Psychological and other kinds of support which are appreciated without exception and there is constant support and help from the representative from Slovene Philanthropy.

She is the best I have ever had because she helps me. If it is good or bad. [...] She is like a mother to me; you know because she is doing everything like a mother, she is really a guardian. (16 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

One of the survival strategies and a source of psychological reassurance is the attempt to obtain a proper education and through this, escape insecurity. One of the boys tried to obtain status by being a top athlete, competing and winning events for Slovenia. However even this was not sufficient:

In one year I brought five medals for this country. That was identified for the country with the club, representing Slovenia. So why they don't give me documents? (17 years old upon arrival in Slovenia)

Unfortunately many unaccompanied minors do not have enough strength to continue the fight and they surrender psychologically – they abandon previous ambitious goals regarding education or job aspirations, lose self-esteem, become apathetic regarding their future etc.

CONCLUSION

In the present article we have attempted to highlight the various life transitions young people on the move go through using the narratives of (former) unaccompanied minors living in Slovenia. These transitions are across geographical spaces, through international protection procedures, across time as well as deeply personal psychological transitions. Some of the transitions are common to all young people, some are specific to unaccompanied minors; however all of them are deeply interrelated and help to reconstruct not only a meaningful world but also the lives of unaccompanied minors (Kholi 2014). Ideally all the transitions should end in a situation where minors could develop into adulthood in an environment which will meet his or her needs, free from persecution or fear of serious harm – in a safe and better life. This is a durable solution for unaccompanied minors as proposed by various authors such as Kanics (2015).

The presented narratives of unaccompanied minors and the analysis of their life transitions, and consequently the Slovenian system of international protection, demonstrate that the best interest of the child principle and durable solution principle as interpreted in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) are subject to severe violation at several stages.

The violation of both the best interest and the durable solution principles can be seen at several stages. From the very beginning of the formal procedures applied by the Slovene border police, the emphasis is on returning the unaccompanied children to wherever they came from. Such an approach is manifestly contrary to the directives of the Convention,

wherein the procedures regarding best interest assessment state that the best interest of unaccompanied minors would be a decision to allow access to the territory in order to carry out a more thorough assessment of the child's situation. Finally, international protection status is per se guaranteed only on the basis of being underage and therefore cannot be prolonged when the age of majority is reached, thus eliminating any possibility of extension and finding a durable solution.

It appears that the aim of the Slovenian state policy regarding unaccompanied minors is unclear: is it the aim to give minors permanent shelter or only to allow them to stay in Slovenia until they turn 18? This is a political question lying somewhere between migration control policy and child welfare. Only after explicitly defining goals related to unaccompanied minors can a durable solution be successfully applied and the best interest of the child truly met.

We wish to conclude using the words of unaccompanied minors regarding their future aspirations: their wishes for the future are very modest and simple. When we ask them what their greatest wish for the future is, the usual answer we get is: "A normal life. To live normally. To live here and be with others" (17 years old upon arrival in Slovenia).

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POVZETEK**ŽIVLJENJSKI PREHODI MLADOLETNIH MIGRANTOV BREZ SPREMSTVA
V SLOVENIJI: SUBJEKTIVNI POGLEDI****Mateja SEDMAK, Zorana MEDARIĆ**

Namen članka je položaj mladoletnih migrantov brez spremstva v Sloveniji predstaviti na temelju štirih življenjskih prehodov, skozi katere gredo na svoji poti: prehoda v geografskem prostoru, institucionalnega prehoda, prehoda skozi čas in psihološke tranzicije. Članek temelji na pripovedih in razmišljanjih mladoletnih migrantov brez spremstva, ki živijo v Sloveniji. S pomočjo njihovih zgodb, ki običajno niso predmet raziskovanja, avtorici analizirata obstoječe postopke in način implementacije mednarodne zaščite za mladoletne migrante brez spremstva v Sloveniji. Pri tem ugotavljata, v kolikšni meri dokumenti in postopki upoštevajo načelo najboljše koristi otroka kot eno ključnih načel Konvencije Združenih Narodov o otrokovih pravicah. Kljub zelo majhnemu številu mladoletnih migrantov brez spremstva, ki v Sloveniji zaprosijo za mednarodno zaščito, sistem zanje ni prijazen in ni usklajen z načelom najboljše koristi otroka. Njihove pripovedi razkrivajo številne vrzeli, omejitve in šibke točke obstoječega slovenskega sistema mednarodne zaščite, predvsem pa Slovenija za mladoletne migrante brez spremstva nima dolgoročnih in trajnih rešitev.

DETERMINATION OF THE BEST INTEREST OF UNACCOMPANIED MINORS IN SLOVENIA¹

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ABSTRACT

Determination of the Best Interest of Unaccompanied Minors in Slovenia

The paper deals with underage “third-country” nationals or stateless persons without parents or a legal representative, referred to as unaccompanied minors (UAMs). In Slovenia UAMs may hold varied types of status, and each of these implies different legal provisions and practical determination of the best interest of the child. According to the UNHCR Convention on the Rights of the Child, the best interest of the child should be the primary consideration in all actions concerning children. This paper focuses on how the principle of the best interest of the child is included in the sectoral national legislation and in other formal regulations which determine procedures regarding and treatment of UAMs. In addition, the article examines how experts understand this principle and put it into practice in various formal procedures. To that end, the views of experts who adopt or implement legal provisions, as well as the views of the experts who support UAMs during the international protection application process and in their everyday lives will be examined.

KEY WORDS: unaccompanied minors, best interest of the child, migrations, children

IZVLEČEK

Določanje najboljših koristi mladoletnih migrantov brez spremstva v Sloveniji

Članek se ukvarja z mladoletniki brez spremstva, to je z mladoletniki, ki so v pravni terminologiji opredeljeni kot mladoletni državljani tretjih držav in so na območju Slovenije sami, brez staršev ali zakonitega zastopnika. V Sloveniji imajo mladoletni migranti brez spremstva različne statuse, med katerimi vsak vsebuje različne zakonske določbe ter praktične določitve otrokovih najboljših koristi, ki naj bi bile usklajene s Konvencijo OZN o otrokovih pravicah. Članek ponuja tudi pregled vključevanja načela otrokovih najboljših koristi v nacionalno zakonodajo in druge formalne predpise, ki določajo postopke in obravnave omenjenih skupin otrok. Obenem obravnava način sprejemanja zakonskih ukrepov, njihovega izvajanja ali nadzorovanja ter kako strokovnjaki v različnih formalnih postopkih razumejo in določajo načelo najboljše koristi otroka.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: mladoletni migranti brez spremstva, otrokova najboljša korist, migracije, otroci

1 The study referred to in the paper is a part of the international project “In Whose Best Interests? Exploring Unaccompanied Minors’ Rights through the Lens of Migration and Asylum Processes”, carried out in 2014–2015 and financed by the EU. The project addressed the inclusion of the best interest of the child concept in legislation and best interest determination in the reception, protection and status procedures concerning UAMs in Austria (Universität Wien, Institut für Politikwissenschaft), France (Centre national de la recherche scientifique), the UK (University of Brighton) and Slovenia (University of Primorska, Science and Research Centre, IRSSV, Slovene Philanthropy).

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INTRODUCTION

At a time when the European Union is facing the consequences of extensive migration flows, questions arise regarding the wellbeing of migrants and the support mechanisms of various states. In this paper we do not question the inclusion of human rights principles in international conventions (such as the European Convention on Human Rights or the Convention on the Rights of the Child) within the national legal provisions; our main focus is the implementation of these rights and the crucial principles of these conventions in practice. The paper deals with the general level of the implementation of the best interest of the child principle (BIC) as the key principle of official actions and decisions affecting children's lives, which is derived from the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) adopted in 1989. Based on the CRC principles, EU migration and asylum policy also sets out special provisions for unaccompanied minors (UAMs) as a vulnerable group of migrants and integrates BIC into numerous directives,² which also focus on procedures concerning UAMs. While the abovementioned directives are legally binding for all member states, there is a certain leeway as to how the rules are adopted.

From the point of view of most migrants, Slovenia is a transition state. This means that most UAMs leave the country relatively quickly and follow their path to the countries of Western and Northern Europe (Slovene Philanthropy, PIC 2009). Data obtained by the Ministry of the Interior show that in the period from 2002 to the middle of 2016, 679 UAMs applied for international protection status. Seventy-three per cent of them (495) left Slovenia on their own, which means the international protection procedures initiated in all those cases were suspended. In a 15-year period, subsidiary protection status or refugee status was granted to 33 UAMs who applied for international protection. Meanwhile, data on whether the UAM was granted subsidiary protection status or refugee status is not available. Among UAMs who applied for international protection over the last five years, the majority are boys from Afghanistan and Syria.

Taking into consideration the situation in Slovenia, the paper addresses two perspectives of the inclusion of the BIC principle in procedures concerning UAMs. The first is the inclusion of the BIC principle in Slovenian legislation which determines the reception, protection and status procedures regarding UAMs; the second is an analysis of the inclusion of the BIC principle and its determination in procedures based on the opinions of experts who deal with UAMs, or in other words, the implementation of the BIC principle in practice.³

2 The directives are discussed in the next chapter.

3 The most significant gaps in the Slovenian mechanism which fail to provide proper care and support to UAMs are described in the paper "The implementation of unaccompanied minors' rights in Slovenia: An analysis based on the best interest of the child principle" (Žakelj et al. 2015). If we speak in terms of Boylan's concept of basic human rights (2012) of UAMs, many are being continuously violated in Slovenia (Žakelj et al. 2015).

BIC AS THE KEY PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING OFFICIAL ACTIONS AND DECISIONS AFFECTING CHILDREN'S LIVES

The BIC is one of the core principles of the CRC.⁴ Slovenia became a signatory to the CRC in 1991, and numerous measures to protect children's rights were subsequently adopted, e.g. the Resolution on the Foundations of the Formulation of Family Policy in the Republic of Slovenia, new legislation which regulated the entire education system, new health and social legislation and several other measures related to the implementation of the civil, political, social and economic rights of children.

The right of the child to have his/her best interests assessed and taken into account as a primary consideration in all actions or decisions that concern him/her, in both the public and private sphere, is set out in Article 3 of the CRC. Since the ratification of the Convention, its basic BIC principle has been expounded and elaborated upon in several UN documents and has also been included in relevant EU action plans and directives which focus on procedures regarding UAMs. Crucial documents will be mentioned which stress the use of the BIC principle in actions concerning UAMs or which address guidelines on how to determine BIC in practice. These documents are:

UNICEF's *Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child* (published in 1998 and amended several times up to 2007). The last edition of the Handbook provides a detailed reference for the implementation of law, policy and practice to promote and protect the rights of children.

Comments of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: especially General Comment No. 6 (2005: 38) on how to determine BIC; on allowing the child access to territory, how to carry out assessment processes and regarding the appointment of a competent guardian and General Comment No. 14 (2013: 4) which defines the BIC as a three-fold concept; namely a substantive right, a legal principle and rules of procedure.

UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child (2008) identify the underlying principles that can be used to construct a framework for ensuring compliance with the CRC in a formal best interest determination (BID). This document sets out legal and other principles that guide decision-makers in (1) making formal BIDs; (2) deciding who should act and what procedural safeguards BIDs should follow and (3) how criteria should be applied in order to take the best decision in a particular case.

UNHCR Field Handbook for the Implementation of UNHCR BID Guidelines (2011) offers additional advice on how to carry out the BID process in practice.

4 The principle of the best interest of the child as the crucial general principle along with the three main principles of the UNCRC emphasising children's rights to protection, provision and participation cause an ambiguity which complicates the implementation of the Convention through regulations and legislation (Kallio 2012: 82). On the other hand, the rights emphasised by the UN follow Western conceptions of a proper childhood (op. cit. 89), thus the UNCRC is often criticised as following a hegemonic understanding of childhood. Most in academia stress the need for a culturally sensitive approach to the understanding of childhood and would argue that UAMs are a typical example of such need. The question arises of whether a "culturally sensitive approach" would indeed enable a better response to the needs of UAMs or whether it would broaden the gap in standards of protection for native and other children, which is the current practice in Slovenia (Sedmak et al. 2017).

UNHCR's and UNICEF's joint publication *Safe and Sound: what States can do to ensure respect for the best interests of unaccompanied and separated children in Europe* (2014), which aims to support states in the EU and EFTA in applying the BIC principle as a primary consideration when dealing with unaccompanied and separated children within their territory.

Specific provisions on UAMs and the inclusion of the BIC principle in procedures concerning UAMs are also guided by relevant EU documents such as:

Council Directive on the Right to Family Reunification (2003/86/EC), which aims to establish common rules of law relating to the right to family reunification.

Return Directive (2008/115/EU), which sets common standards and defines procedures for returning third-country nationals staying illegally in a Member State territory, determines exceptions, and includes provisions for children.

EU Action plan on unaccompanied minors 2010–2014 (COM (2010) 213 final), which identifies the need for comprehensive child protection systems as one of the elements of preventive action and elaborates upon the main course of action: prevention, regional protection programmes, reception and identification of durable solutions.

Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU), which sets standards for conditions of the detention of (unaccompanied) children and access to education; provides rules on the protection of physical and mental health; requires Member States to take into account age-specific concerns and to ensure adequate living standards, and provides rules for the placement and tracking down the families of UAMs. The directive addresses some guidelines for assessing the BIC as well.

Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU), which establishes common standards of the asylum procedure with the aim to foster efficient and fair asylum decisions and sets common quality standards that also include special provisions for children.

Regulation (EU) 604/2013, which determines the EU Member State responsible for reviewing applications from asylum seekers in search of international protection, calls for close cooperation of Member States and for taking appropriate action to identify the family members, siblings or relatives of the UAM in the territory of Member States, whilst safe-guarding the BIC.

The above-listed UN and EU documents do not really establish specific care procedures for UAMs within national contexts, nor do they establish their rights. Instead, they include some specific provisions for UAMs, usually taking into account their vulnerability.

THE BEST INTEREST OF UAMs IN SLOVENIA: LEGAL PROVISIONS AND THEIR PRACTICAL DETERMINATION

A qualitative analysis was implemented in order to examine the inclusion of the BIC concept in national legislation and BID in practice. A careful examination of the main national acts and regulations⁵ was conducted in order to determine the inclusion of the BIC in

5 Act Amending the International Protection Act (ZMZ-D) (2013); Aliens Act (ZTuj-2) (2011); International Protection Act (ZMZ-UPB2) (2011); Marriage and Family Relations Act (ZZZDR-UPB1) (2004, 2007).

legal provisions concerning UAMs. The analysis of the determination of the best interest of the UAM in practice is based on semi-structured interviews with experts working in the field of protection of UAMs. The following subchapters will firstly provide data obtained from the analysis, highlighting the level of inclusion of the BIC principle in legal provisions concerning UAMs, and secondly will provide answers regarding how BIC is determined in practice, who the key players are in its determination and what obstacles are met in its practical implementation.

UAMs and BIC in Slovenian legislation

The most significant legal acts in Slovenia, which deals with the rights, statuses and obligations of UAMs are the Aliens Act (AA) and the International Protection Act (IPA). The first version of the AA was adopted in 2011 and amended several times (most recently in April 2014). It sets out the conditions for and methods of aliens' entry into, departure from and residence in Slovenia. UAMs who have not yet applied for refugee or subsidiary protection status or those who decide not to apply are dealt with under the AA and placed in the Aliens Centre near the town of Postojna, where they live in "a restricted movement area" which in practice means they are detained.⁶ Taking into consideration the BIC principle, an analysis of the AA demonstrates that this principle is not fully integrated within the AA. For instance, Article 82 of the AA stipulates that the police shall issue the UAM with a return decision if his/her special case guardian establishes that this is in his/her best interests, having carefully considered all the circumstances. This is the only mention of the BIC principle in the AA.

In the event that a UAM decides to apply for international protection (this possibility is presented to them by the special case guardian appointed by a local Centre for Social Work) he is transferred to the Asylum Home in Ljubljana and dealt with under the IPA.⁷ The IPA came into force at the beginning of 2008 in order to regulate the international protection system in Slovenia on the basis of the Common European Asylum System. The IPA sets out the basic principles, the procedures for the granting and removal of international protection, the duration and the extent of international protection, the rights and obligations of applicants for international protection and those who have obtained international protection status, i.e. refugee status or subsidiary protection status. The IPA defines both refugee status and subsidiary protection status. According to Article 2, refugee status is granted to third country nationals who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, national affiliation, membership of a particular social group or

6 The detention of children at the Aliens Centre is rarely disputed, while this issue is regarded as extremely relevant worldwide (see Global Campaign to End Immigration Detention of Children 2012; Gross, Song 2016). Slovenia is one of the EU countries that unfortunately does not provide an alternative to detention (Bloomfield 2015). Despite being generally overlooked, during periods with a more significant number of UAMs and other immigrants, NGOs and the Ombudsman's office stress the unacceptably long periods which children (with or without families) spend detained at the Aliens Centre. Such criticisms are ignored on the basis of the argument that there are no other available options.

7 The new IPA was adopted in 2016. In addition to other changes, it now stipulates that the duration of the procedure can be prolonged for an additional 9 months.

political opinion, are outside their country of origin and are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country, or stateless persons who are outside the country of their former habitual residence as a result of such events and are unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it. At the same time, the IPA (Article 2) allows for the granting of the status of a subsidiary form of protection to third country nationals or stateless persons who do not qualify for refugee status in the case that there are substantive grounds for suspecting that upon their return to the country of origin (or in case of stateless persons, the country of last residence) the person would face a real risk of being subject to serious harm (such as the death penalty or execution, torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, serious and individual threats to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict). The IPA stipulates that the BIC principle must be taken into consideration in proceedings in which the applicant is a UAM.

Even if BIC is a legal standard derived from general national legislation on child protection, there is a lack of guidelines on how it should be determined. BIC must be established in each particular case, taking into account specific circumstances. It is important to stress that the Slovenian legal provisions which serve as the legal underpinning for certain procedures regarding UAMs (the appointment of a legal representative or guardian) use the phrase/term *interest of the child* and not *best interest of the child*. The *interest of the child* is explicitly mentioned in several national laws, e.g. the Marriage and Family Relations Act and the Civil Procedure Act. As previously noted, there is no explanation as to what the phrase/term *interest of the child* actually means. For example, Article 4 of the Marriage and Family Relations Act, which is used for guardianship, implies that the interest of the child should be obtained by assuring conditions for healthy growth, coherent personal development and competences for the autonomous life and work of the child; Article 5 of the same act stipulates that in all activities and procedures affecting a child, parents, other persons, state authorities and bearers of public authority must act in the child's interest, and Article 6 stipulates that it is in the interest of the child to develop in a healthy manner. Similarly, the Civil Procedure Act (Article 408) explicitly requires the court to protect the interest of the child in legal and parental lawsuits *ex officio*.

Based on the findings presented here, it can be concluded that BIC cannot be pre-determined through the application of general regulations. Instead it must be specifically identified in each case when deciding on the children's rights and/or obligations. Any detailed regulation or definition of the child's best interest would therefore be turned into its opposite – narrowing it down to its understanding in the search for signs of pre-set definitions.

Best interest determination in practice

This subchapter is dedicated to the analysis of interviews conducted with the experts working in the field.⁸⁷ The selection of experts was made on the basis of several criteria: scope of duties; involvement in different procedures; involvement in formal or informal support to UAMs; experience in providing legal advice to UAMs; authorisation for the supervision of the implementation of human/children's rights; involvement in the daily lives of UAMs accommodated at official facilities. The main topics that will be further examined are: who the key players are in determining BIC in the context of UAMs; how the BIC is determined in procedures regarding UAMs; how the BIC can be realised in practice; the identification of crucial obstacles for individual BID; implementation of UAMs' right to actively participate in the procedure and identification of particularities in the system in response to the rights and needs of UAMs.

Key procedures and actors determining the best interest of UAMs

Documented UAMs in Slovenia have two possibilities, namely (1) to remain in the country as illegal migrants without status, accommodated at the Aliens Centre until they are returned to their country of origin, or (2) to apply for international protection and wait for a decision which has three possible outcomes: refugee status, which is more permanent in nature; subsidiary protection, which is extremely temporary in nature, or having their application refused on grounds of failure to meet the conditions for international protection. At the beginning of the international protection procedure, UAMs are accommodated at the Asylum Home. One special case guardian, who is in contact with all the UAMs staying at the Aliens Centre, noted that majority of minors choose the second option and consequently face complex and often long procedures to potentially obtain international protection status.

When they arrive in Slovenia, most UAMs come in contact with the border police, which searches for illegal migrants. Here it is important to stress that Slovenia has signed

87 In the period from 21 January to 14 April 2015, 13 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 experts: three representatives of NGOs (two from Slovene Philanthropy, the only organisation in Slovenia that systematically deals with assistance, advocacy and protection of UAMs, and one representative from the Legal Information Centre for NGOs, which offers legal counselling and information regarding laws on foreigners and international protection); one representative from the Aliens Centre; one representative of Ministry of the Interior (working in the field of integration), a special case guardian responsible for protection of UAMs accommodated in the Aliens Centre, one representative from the Asylum Home, one representative from the Border Police Division, one Deputy Ombudsman and a Senior Adviser, one representative of Ministry of Work, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, two representatives from Centres for Social Work (one who works in an intervention service which offers exceptional support to foreign minors detected in Croatian border areas; the other who takes decisions on legal representatives for UAMs when applying for international protection status) and one legal representative of UAMs. All of the excerpts from interviews used in this paper were translated from Slovenian into English by the authors.

several bilateral agreements⁹ which outline the return of persons who do not comply with conditions for entry to the state or stay in its territory. When the conditions for return are met, UAMs are sent back to the state they left before arriving in Slovenia. A representative from the Border Police Division had this to say when asked how it is possible to return UAMs to a state they had passed through considering their rights and the BIC principle:

In fact, it does not enter into our minds that Croatia could return them somewhere where their rights could be violated. Why? Because the principle of non-refoulement applies to us and so it applies to the Croats. And this is about the principle of trust in the legal order and the standards of an EU state. (Border Police Division Representative)

According to the interviews with experts who provide various means of support to UAMs, we have less information regarding procedures which take place at the borders.

[...] Border procedures are also very problematic, how they are treated at the border, what is happening there [...]. (NGO Representative 1)

Border procedures are more problematic in my opinion. They can be degrading, invade privacy, fail to respect their rights. [...] Such culture still prevails at the borders – that the one who is in control feels strong, and how they act towards foreigners, especially third country foreigners and not only UAMs, stems from their feelings of strength. (Deputy Ombudsman)

One interesting fact which speaks for itself is that border procedures regarding UAMs have not yet been observed or systematically researched. As our literature and data review revealed, similar to the other EU member states, in Slovenia there are no complete statistical records of the number of UAMs who have been permitted or refused entry into the country in recent years.

If not returned to the state they crossed on the basis of bilateral agreements, or in the event that the UAM has not (yet) asked for international protection by the police, he¹⁰ is taken to the Aliens Centre. On the basis of the AA, a special case guardian¹¹ is appointed to him by the regional Centre for Social Work. The special case guardian conducts a conversation with the UAM in an attempt to identify what is in his best interest. The special

9 At the core of the Common European Asylum System established by the European Union (EU) is the right to asylum and the prohibition of refoulement, as guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Both instruments are binding on EU Member States, which must also comply with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

10 Since more than 90% of UAMs in Slovenia are boys, we will henceforth refer to UAMs using masculine pronouns.

11 Various terms are used to describe guardians in Slovenia. The terms differ depending on the procedure that applies to the UAM. In the case of the removal of an UAM who is, according to the law, unlawfully residing in the Republic of Slovenia, the Police must inform the Centre for Social Work, which has to immediately appoint a special case guardian for the child. UAMs who apply for international protection status are appointed a legal representative while a guardian in the usual sense of the word is appointed to children whose asylum procedure has been completed and who have been granted international protection (Slovene Philanthropy 2013: 17).

case guardian interviewed here believes that in most cases in this first step it is of great importance that UAMs apply for international protection status.

My suggestion to them is based on the fact they are underage. I defend the view they should decide to apply for asylum. If they are granted asylum the list of their rights is much more extensive. (Special Case Guardian)

Upon the submission of the application for international protection and while waiting for the “final decision”, UAMs obtain the rights of applicants (Articles 78 and 79 of the IPA). These rights include residence in the Republic of Slovenia, supply of materials in the event of accommodation at the Asylum Home or its branches (housing, food, clothing and toiletries), financial assistance in the event that private accommodation is found, education, access to the labour market and pocket money. These rights are well embedded in the national legislation, but as research by Žakelj et al. (2015) has revealed, they are often not adequately implemented in practice.

UAMs who decide to apply for international protection status are transferred to the Asylum Home, and a legal representative is appointed to them within 24 hours. According to the opinions of the majority of the experts interviewed, the role of legal representative is the most important in determining the best interest of each UAM.¹²

I would say the best interest of the child determination depends on the engagement of the legal representative. The legal representative is the one who is closest to the UAM. It depends how he/she is appointed to the case. And how the best interest of the child and his will is recognised and taken into consideration in the procedure also depends on this. (NGO Representative 3)

The legal representative essentially protects the UAM’s right to be heard in matters relating to him. In their duties toward the UAM, the legal representative protects his or her interests by taking into account the ethnic, linguistic, religious and educational background of the child. At the same time, when making decisions, the representative considers the minor’s opinions and desires as far as possible in order to meet the child’s best interest. As our expert interviews revealed, however, UAMs do not have the opportunity to actively participate in the process, as they are not asked for their opinions nor are their wishes listened to, particularly not at the beginning of the procedures.

Later, yes [...] He is the person who says what he wants, where to integrate him, which school he would like to attend, which sports he would like to participate in, or if he wants to become a get a library card [...] (Asylum Home Representative)

The role of the legal representative is limited to the support of UAMs during the procedure of obtaining status. If either refugee or subsidiary status is granted to the UAM, he is appointed a guardian. The fact that interviewees in our research stressed the role of the legal representative (and not the role of guardian) shows two relevant facts – first is the

12 Slovenia recently started training legal representatives for UAMs. The first generation of legal representatives started their work in June 2014, and the list currently includes two years (approx. 40) of trained legal representatives with various professional backgrounds. The legal representative is appointed to the UAM by the regional Centre for Social Work.

temporary nature of the solutions and provisions for BIC, and the second is correlated to the fact that most UAMs in Slovenia receive support from a legal representative and only a few receive support from a guardian. This is because the procedure ends sooner if the UAM continues their journey to other EU countries or if no status is granted to them. Here we can see that the role of the legal representative is stressed, even if guardians who take care of UAMs with status have at least an equally important role to play.

Determination of BIC and its realisation

According to the UNHCR and UNICEF, the BIC principle should be embedded in the national structures and procedures by ensuring a holistic approach in order to establish a child's best interests. This means that the processes are above all child-friendly. "But implementation of the best interests of the child is subject to contradictory pressures such as migration control versus human rights for all irrespective of their nationality" (Lundberg 2011: 50). Our research among experts identified another important issue in the process of determination of the BIC principle in Slovenia, namely that it is in the hands of various individuals who are each responsible for one part of the procedure. "Each time it (BIC) is determined by the person who is in charge, individually for each part of the procedure" (Deputy Ombudsman).

From this quotation it is evident that in Slovenia, BIC depends mainly on the actors involved in the prescribed procedures. Furthermore, its implementation depends to a large extent on the personal endeavours of those involved in the process. To make things even more complex, the powers of those involved are greatly dispersed.

As I said, in relation to UAMs our tasks are very clear and narrow. This is a fact-finding procedure and appointment of a legal representative from the list of legal representatives. It is not a very wide range of tasks. (Centre for Social Work Representative)

An analysis of the national legislation (Žakelj et al. 2015) revealed that the dispersion of power relates to all actors involved in various procedures concerning UAMs. This can be seen by listing their roles. For example, a special case guardian is limited to one conversation at the Aliens Centre and advising on potential applications for international protection status or on the decision to be returned, while the legal representative's role is to take care of a list of tasks such as application for international protection, health issues, social issues, education, etc.

Our interviewees also revealed negative practises that are based on the prescribed characteristics of the process. One such example is the procedure surrounding the application for international protection status. This must be conducted within 24 hours of arriving at the Asylum Home and also includes an interview in the presence of four people unknown to the UAM.

We found this [procedure] very problematic because it happens right away, that is a few hours after the arrival at the Asylum Home. It is not necessary that UAMs are previously accommodated at the Aliens Centre, as in some cases they are sent directly to the Asylum Home [...] and the submission of the application is of vital importance because it is the basis for decision making

regarding the protection status [...]. Imagine a child who might have travelled for months, who is hungry, not to mention his psychical condition and traumas, and he is sent into a room with people who he is seeing for the first time. The first person is the legal representative, who tries to explain to him that he/she is on his side, then there is a legal adviser, an interpreter and an official. And they try to convince him to tell his story of why he applied for international protection status. And I find this system totally inadequate; there is no time and place to prepare a child for such an important thing as the submission of the application. (NGO Representative 1)

Another example of the issues within the process stems from a characteristic of the legislation according to which UAMs are not treated as a party to the proceedings.

In all cases of appointing legal representatives we need to act according to the General Administrative Procedure Act. [...] And here there is a huge gap, because all the provisions for child protection are implemented in litigation procedures and actions, but it is not included in the general administrative procedure, which means that the child is not regarded as a party to the proceedings and he does not have these rights, neither procedural rights nor material rights. (Centre for Social Work Representative)

Additionally, the experts interviewed recognised the process of BID as an extremely complex process that depends on each individual case and must take into consideration several factors related to the child's circumstances (e.g. health condition, safety, past experiences, desires, expectations, aspirations, etc.).

It is not possible to speak about it [what is in the best interest of an individual UAM] in general terms. Each case is different. The best interest of the child can only be defined on the basis of all the information. It is of vital importance to acquire as much information as possible – why this child left his country, what is the main reason he left, where are his parents, where is he headed, was he travelling with someone, was he at risk when travelling, what are his plans and wishes and what were his parents' wishes, did his parents send him away or did he decide to go on his own? And this absolutely is not a matter of one meeting. [...] (NGO Representative 1)

I just know that we're working hard to find some sort of individual solutions even in some cases where it may be said that they are "tailor-made". Of course, I'm now talking about these minors who have been in our country for a long time, who stay in Slovenia and do not go further with their cousin to Sweden from the moment they are released from the Aliens Centre. (Border Police Division Representative)

Consequently the determination of the best interest of the child and its practical implementation in Slovenia is very difficult. This is also evident from the opinions of the experts, who appear quite critical in their comments on the possibilities of applying the BIC principle in practice.

Even when you find out what would be in the best interest of a child you can't implement it, because the system does not allow it. I mean, there is no system. A child-friendly system that would enable child-friendly involvement in social welfare, health care, schooling, etc. does not exist in Slovenia. [...]. (NGO Representative 1)

It's difficult. Not only in this field but in general. The best interest of the child is an excellent rule which can be interpreted in one way or another, but it is hard to achieve. [...] (Deputy Ombudsman)

At this point it should be noted that BID cannot be fully implemented for at least two significant reasons: (1) there are several authorised individuals in charge of the various decisions in a large number of procedural steps, and (2) too many people are involved in the whole procedure. In the majority of cases, BID is often only partial and recognised as such only by the specific authority responsible for one single step in the procedure.

Treated as (indigenous) children?

In our interviews we also asked experts about the suitability of these procedures with regard to adjustments which take into consideration the child as a special participant in the procedure. Their answers revealed not only that the procedures are not suitable for this particular vulnerable group of children, but also that authorities would not allow Slovenian children to go through the procedural problems that UAMs routinely experience.

[...] these individuals are principally considered as foreigners and not as children, which is evident from the understanding of these issues by the Ministry for Work, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities [with regard to] how much it is ready to help in practice. But the protection of this group of children is not recognised as their primary role. (Deputy Ombudsman)

[...] It was interesting to me that the list of trained legal representatives includes a lawyer who has worked at one of the centres for social work for years. And I remember sitting next to her at a training course. She said that the state would not allow a Slovenian child to go through what UAMs have to go through (from procedures and unclear responsibilities to being at risk, and the state does not do anything). (NGO Representative 1)

The rights of minor citizens and unaccompanied minors should be equal in theory and practice. Unfortunately the division between “us” and “them” is (still) omnipresent and results in the perception that “they are children, but not our children”. This is clearly evident from the aforementioned expert statements which highlight that although the national legislation recognises UAMs as children with special protection and rights, in practice they are treated as aliens and not first as children. To make things even more difficult, in the majority of cases UAMs are subjected to procedures which would be never acceptable for indigenous children. It is important to note the attitude that should be the main criteria of the treatment UAMs, as presented in the interview with the representative from the Ministry of the Interior: “I think that if everyone gave a little thought, ‘if that was my child’ they would probably take a different approach” (Ministry of the Interior Representative).

Individual endeavours and the lack of a systemic response

As Slovenia houses only a small number of UAMs who do not leave the state, we cannot claim that those who do stay are left without substantial support. This support, however, is mostly based on the informal endeavours of NGOs engaged in caring for UAMs. One of these is Slovene Philanthropy, which provides substantial support to new legal representatives who want to do what they believe is the best for the minors they represent. The main problem is that Slovenia has no systematic approach to the support of UAMs.

I believe the Slovenian reality is that every step is a part of an individual approach; there is no systematic approach. The problem with the Slovenian system is that there are some individuals (one person in particular) – from Ministry of the Interior, Slovene Philanthropy representatives, representatives of NGOs, volunteers – who do their best for the well-being of this group of children. The problem is that there is no system. [...] and when these individuals are no longer there, it will be much worse. [...] (NGO Representative 1)

It can be said that there is a lack of clarity in the tasks of those involved, and a lack of options for solutions (especially regarding accommodation, etc.). As is evident from the interview with the legal representative, legislation should not be an obstacle regarding representation of UAMs:

They (authorised bodies) all think they are limited by the legal regulations. I do not say we should act outside the law, but inside the law there are possibilities to do a lot. If there is the will. But everyone says: “This is not within our powers, we can’t do it!” Come on, read it again, with all the commas and without the full stop at the end of the sentence. That’s how I see it. (Legal Representative)

In addition, the procedure from the application submission onwards depends a great deal on the level of engagement of the legal representative:

I know a couple of legal representatives who give their best and do everything they can, sometimes they beat their heads against the wall so that minors get, I cannot say more than they are entitled to – this does not sound good, but they do get everything they need. (NGO Representative 2)

From the interviews conducted with the experts, it is evident that the individual engagement of the personnel involved (especially legal representatives with their knowledge and expertise, in combination with their commitment¹³ to their work) plays a crucial role in procedures involving UAMs. Since they carry out demanding tasks in support of UAMs, they must be supported with training and advice in order to do their work properly.

I am afraid my work is becoming routine for me. I think I could stand up for each individual more, go more often for a visit ... From one case to another. You might have some negative experiences, you become reluctant and you may be afraid (of not being successful). To overcome it, we need systematic supervision [...]. (Legal Representative)

13 Similarly, Jones (2001: 254) argues for the role of social workers in the UK system of support for unaccompanied minors.

Such doubts present serious evidence of the fear of not being able to cope with the tasks necessary to determine BIC in each individual case. The numerous procedures some legal representatives are involved in, combined with the gaps in the system, lead them to become sceptical, which is based on not being supported by governmental authorities. Instead, the minimum level of care is encouraged, as all other options can only be realised on the basis of an intensive search for options which are not automatically available. The experience of not being supported discourages new endeavours for the full realisation of BIC.

DISCUSSION

Understanding the BIC principle through the lens of those procedures affecting UAMs confirmed the ambiguousness and subjectivity of the BID. As some authors (Aspinall, Watters 2010) argue, the legal recognition of the rights of UAMs does not guarantee their protection: the situation UAMs encounter in countries where they seek international protection embodies fundamental tensions between immigration policy and child welfare. The situation in Slovenia is specific in this regard. We can say that child welfare is at odds with immigration policy due to the fact that UAMs are recognised and treated as foreigners first. That they are under age and highly vulnerable is of secondary importance.

An analysis of the asylum procedures of Western countries (Cemlyn, Nye 2012) showed that the rights of UAMs can be undermined by reception arrangements and asylum processes which are not child-oriented, deficiencies in the availability and provision of services, and the likelihood of detention and removal. Based on the study at hand we can claim that the list of issues in Slovenia is quite similar. The first issue is the absence of systemic responses to the problem, which brings a significant burden to those who are willing to take on the role of active support for UAMs. In this regard, legal representatives (and later guardians when status is approved) can be looked upon as key workers who should strive to identify and realise the best interest of the UAMs who stay in Slovenia. Even though the system of trained legal representatives is in its infancy, some serious problems are already evident. For instance, only the most limited tasks of representation within procedures are paid, which may cause legal representatives to do only the minimum with regard to BIC. Although legal representatives receive significant informal support from Slovene Philanthropy, there is doubt that they will be willing to do this work long-term, as with no systemic changes, legal representatives and their informal supporters will face the same obstacles over and over again. We must stress that exercising the rights of UAMs cannot depend on the individual endeavours of the actors involved, as this places minors in an extremely unequal situation in comparison with other children.

Our analysis also showed that procedures involving UAMs are highly fragmented, so the BID depends on various individuals (border control, special case guardian, legal representative, decision maker, staff involved in potential age disputes, those deciding on request for transfer out of the Asylum Home, etc.). Such a fragmentation of the key actors involved in this principle offers too many options for treating an individual as just one among many applicants, with no emphasis on an integrated individual approach. The current situation calls for the joint training of all individual actors.

Finally, we should mention that the issues facing UAMs receive very little attention in Slovenia. There is not a great deal of discussion about this matter at scientific, political

nor general levels. It can be concluded that their presence is seen and felt mostly by those who are involved with UAMs and meet them on a daily basis. Other issues which remain largely unaddressed are what happens at the border, how many UAMs are returned to other countries on the basis of bilateral agreements, and on what terms is it recognised that return is in their best interest. Unfortunately these questions cannot yet be answered due to a lack of comprehensive official national statistics. The same can be argued for the question regarding to what extent the principle of a durable solution is considered when authorities make decisions on the status of UAMs. There is much evidence which shows that durable solutions are not taken into consideration.

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POVZETEK**DOLOČANJE NAJBOLJŠIH KORISTI MLADOLETNIH MIGRANTOV
BREZ SPREMSTVA V SLOVENIJI****Tjaša ŽAKELJ, Blaž LENARČIČ**

V prvem delu članka avtorja predstavi koncept otrokovih najboljših koristi ter ključne evropske in preostale mednarodne dokumente, ki so podlaga za opredelitve omenjenega načela v primerih obravnave mladoletnih migrantov brez spremstva. Sledi analiza slovenske zakonodaje, ki določa postopke v zvezi z mladoletnimi migranti brez spremstva. Cilj analize je ugotoviti, na kakšen način je načelo najboljših koristi otroka umeščeno v pravni okvir. Avtorja ugotavljata, da je v področni zakonodaji to načelo integrirano le do določene mere, nekoliko bolje v primerih postopkov prosilcev za mednarodno zaščito ali mladoletnikov, ki imajo enega od statusov mednarodne zaščite, in mnogo manj, ko govorimo o mladoletnikih, ki (še) niso obravnavani kot prosilci za mednarodno zaščito. V obeh primerih manjka celovitejša in natančnejša opredelitev, kako naj se načelo upošteva v praksi. V drugem delu so predstavljeni rezultati intervjujev s strokovnjaki, ki so udeleženi v obravnavo ali vsakdanje življenje mladoletnih migrantov brez spremstva. Rezultati so pokazali več relevantnih težav glede določanja najboljših koristi mladoletnih migrantov brez spremstva. Prvič, da je upoštevanje načela otrokove najboljših koristi običajno odvisno od osebe, ki otroka trenutno obravnava (npr. policist, odločevalec v postopku pridobivanja mednarodne zaščite, socialni delavec, zakoniti zastopnik ipd.); drugič, da je treba poudariti pomanjkljivosti trenutnega sistema delovanja zakonitih zastopnikov (npr. plačilo je omejeno zgolj na najosnovnejše naloge v postopku, kar posledično pomeni, da sistem spodbuja, da bi zakoniti zastopniki zagotavljali le najnujnejšo skrb za uresničevanje otrokovih pravic), navsezadnje pa, da so mladoletni migranti v postopkih obravnavani najprej kot tujci in šele potem kot otroci. Avtorja poudarjata tudi marginalnost obravnavane teme v slovenskem znanstvenem prostoru.

TEMATSKI SKLOP

SLOVENIAN MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND THEIR COVERAGE
OF THE MIGRANT SITUATION

MIGRANTSKA SITUACIJA V SLOVENSKIH MAINSTREAM MEDIJAH

THEMATIC SECTION

INTRODUCTION TO THE THEMATIC SECTION

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Around 15 years have passed since the early 2000s when the first groups of migrants that did not come exclusively from the area of ex-Yugoslavia began to cross Slovenia's borders. At that time the Slovenian media responded xenophobically, appealing for protection against these "invasive aliens" that appeared to be so different from "us" (see Pajnik 2008). However, this was not a break from their established patterns. Throughout the past 25 years, scholars have demonstrated how the Slovenian mainstream media have not succeeded in transcending the dominant modes of depicting "the other". Whether "the other" stands for migrants, Roma people, Bosnian migrant workers, refugees, Muslims, the Erased etc., the dominant discourses and rhetoric seem to stay the same. Several scholars have shown that the "other" is represented as threatening, barbaric, culturally and even physically different and therefore perceived as an invasive threat to Slovenian cultural, national, ethnic and racial homogeneity (see Doupona, Verschuere, Žagar 2001; Žagar 2004, 2009; Pajnik 2003, 2007, 2008; Vidmar Horvat 2007; Vezovnik 2013, 2015a, 2015b, 2017; Bobnič, Vezovnik 2013; Kralj 2008; Mlekuž 2008; Bajt 2016; Jalušič 2001; Kuzmanič 1999; Pušnik 1999, 2003, 2008). In rarer cases the "other" has also been depicted as a submissive, desubjectivised suffering victim calling for the reader's compassion (Vezovnik 2013, 2015a, 2015b).

During the so-called "migrant crisis" which occurred in autumn 2015, the dominant Slovenian political and media discourses once again did not change much. As soon as the first migrants entered Slovenia, the media started to re-construct the xenophobic discourses, calling for even more "efficient" security measures against what they termed "the migration flood".

It all began as the consequence of the closure of the Hungarian border. On 15 September 2015, a humanitarian corridor through Croatia and Slovenia was established in order to allow migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan etc. to transit the "Balkan migratory route" and reach target destinations in western and northern European countries that were previously accessed through Hungary. Migrants were suddenly forced to change their route, which initially led across Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Hungary (Lunaček, Brumen, Meh 2016). The first group of approximately 200 migrants arrived in Slovenia by train from Croatia on 17 September 2015. The migrants were mainly aiming to transit Slovenia and continue their journey to Austria. However, from the first days when refugees started to enter Slovenian territory it became clear that the Slovenian government was unprepared to handle the logistics of registering and properly caring for the migrants by providing them with medical support, food, shelter, psychological support and transportation to Austria. According to Kogovšek and Bajt (2016: 8), the capacities of the Slovenian reception centres were far too low. The lack of organization and adequate decision making led to the additional dehumanization of the migrants, who had to wait long hours for registration, transport and reception of humanitarian aid. Throughout the autumn of 2015, the arrivals of refugees were not constant but depended on the opening

and closure of the Hungarian border, which affected the so-called “western Balkans migratory route”. According to government data, the number of migrants crossing Slovenia was 422,724 in the period from 17 October 2015 to 25 January 2016, with a peak in October and November. 48.7% of them were men, and 51.3% were women and children. 45% came from Syria, 30% from Afghanistan, 17% Iraq, 7% from other countries and 1% from Pakistan. Amongst them, 158 refugees applied for international protection, 69 applications were evaluated but only 5 persons were granted refugee status.

Things became even more problematic when the government realized that most of the refugees would not be applying for asylum in Slovenia, and that the Croatian authorities would not be willing to accept them when returned (Kogovšek, Bajt 2016: 8). The situation became especially complicated when the Slovenian government tried to meet the Schengen and EU requirements for the further securitization of the Schengen Area and the establishment of the humanitarian corridor at the same time. Finally, amongst other things, the Schengen requirements led to the decision of the Slovenian government to erect a razor-wire fence on the Slovenian-Croatian border in November 2015. The razor wire was a part of a broader European securitization plan which also foresaw the deployment of police forces in full riot gear, including weapons, changing the law in order to give more power to the military, detaining migrants at Refugee Centres or in monitored fenced areas at the Slovenian-Croatian border crossings etc. (Ladić, Vučko 2016: 25). Although the humanitarian corridor was established precisely because of the abrupt closure of the Hungarian border with a razor-wire fence that prevented the migrants from trespassing across Hungarian territory, the Slovenian securitization measures led to the adoption of the same “security” measures. Orban’s much-criticized policies became the Slovenian reality (or better, normality) a couple of months later.

Throughout the whole period of Slovenia’s involvement in the “Balkan migratory route”, the media and political discourses played a crucial role in shaping and constructing images of migrants and migration in the Slovenian public imagination. However, the dominant political and media discourses did not establish the imagery of migration in isolation, but worked together. The Slovenian political strategy, which mainly focused on the implementation of successful securitization measures, was entirely in line with the Slovenian mainstream media constructions of refugees as a security, economic and cultural threat that needs to be controlled (see Vezovnik 2017). The media discourses also went hand in hand with even more explicit practices and rhetoric of exclusion, such as racism and hate speech, which were mainly associated with right-wing political discourses and which were perpetuated in conservative right-wing media and online (see Bajt 2016), especially on popular social-media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.

This section therefore provides insight to a very problematic juncture of media and political discourses on migration. The empirical material that the authors of this section critically engaged with was obtained from the Government Communication Office in the form of hard-copy press clippings that included all printed and transcribed TV texts published and aired between 20 August 2015, when the “Balkan migratory route” came into existence, and 31 December 2015, when the humanitarian corridor began to close down. The media that the authors of this section addressed included the following print media: *Slovenske novice*, *Delo*, *Dnevnik*, *Večer*, *Reporter*, and *Demokracija*, and the TV show *Odmevi*, which is aired by the national public broadcaster RTV Slovenija. The articles that comprise the section make an empirical analysis of the selected material using various

methodological and analytical approaches, from critical discourse analysis and framing to more theory-based interpretative approaches.

The section starts with an article by Ksenija Vidmar Horvat that provides a broader picture of the migration situation in Slovenia and Europe by analysing public reactions to the migrant situation. Vidmar Horvat claims that during the migration situation, Slovenia assumed the role of the border guard of Europe, structured on the basis of memories of its socialist past. She explores Slovenian “post-Schengen” imaginaries of the border and finds that the historical legacies of the divided Europe of the 20th century still played a part in negotiating the identity of the region. The article emphasizes that the securitization of migration emerged as one of the dominant modes in the analysed public responses. The depiction of migrants as a threat to Slovenians that needs to be securitized is also demonstrated by the second article, written by Andreja Vezovnik. In her analysis of the Slovenian tabloid daily *Slovenske novice*, Vezovnik finds that Slovenians are constructed as the victims of the migrant’s alleged cultural differentness, barbarity, and criminality. In explaining the phenomenon of self-victimization, Vezovnik explores the self-identification of Slovenians as victims. In her view, such self-identification, which mainly appeared in canonical literature and emerged since the spring of nations in the mid-19th century, lays the groundwork for the understanding of self-victimization in the present day. The rhetoric of threat, fear and hate is further explored by Maruša Pušnik in her article, in which she analyses populism and extremism in moralistic stories in *Reporter* and *Demokracija* – Slovenia’s two leading right-wing weeklies. Pušnik’s findings in her exploration of the Slovenian right-wing press are similar to Vezovnik’s findings relating to Slovenia’s main tabloid. Pušnik claims that the discussions on migrants and Islam in such media are extremely xenophobic, nationalist, racist and chauvinist. If such problematic rhetoric can somehow be expected to be found in tabloid and right-wing journalism, it surely appears as an even bigger problem when found in the so-called “quality” press and on public TV. The articles by Breda Luthar, Mojca Pajnik and Dejan Jontes deconstruct journalistic mechanisms in order to show how the media followed the mainstream political agenda in preserving the idea of “Fortress Europe”. Luthar explores how naturalized and conventionalized rules of positing a lack of bias as a constitutive element of journalists’ professional self-representation influenced the covering of migration topics. In her analysis of RTV Slovenija’s show *Odmevi*, Luthar finds out the selection and “discursive treatment” of the interviewed guests led to a “opinion corridor” – i.e. a narrowing of the debate on migration, which led to the exclusion of any voices but those coming from the political mainstream. Similarly, Pajnik discovers a very problematic fusion of the media with the political agenda, which she outlines in her analysis of op-ed articles in *Delo*. She demonstrates how the articles adopt a “realist” political stance in the absence of a more informed analysis that would increase the reader’s understanding of European migration policies. The section concludes with an analysis of *Delo*, *Dnevnik*, and *Večer* conducted by Jontes. He focuses on journalistic conventions, the formal aspects of the news stories, and the performance of objectivity. By analysing “factism” and episodic framing, Jontes reflects on the paradox in reporting migration issues where the problem is primarily framed in terms of humanitarian crisis on the explicit level, and rarely as a security issue, while on the connotative level, factism and episodic framing suggest another reading of the problem that reinforces fear of immigrants.

We believe that this section mainly shows three things. First, it shows how the mainstream media completely gave up the floor to dominant political voices and worked as channels through which these voices became hegemonic. However, the media not only provided a space for such articulations, but actively contributed to shaping them, primarily by cutting out the voices of migrants and critical sub-political figures. Second, it shows how the mainstream media failed to critically address and question dominant political structures, ideologies, policies and ideas. Third, it shows the problematic continuation of xenophobic, racist, stereotypical, chauvinist, nationalist and similar rhetoric that still persists as the dominant framework through which Slovenian mainstream media depict and represent “the other”.

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THE BALKAN ROAD AND THE GUARDING OF EUROPE: THE REFUGEE CRISIS ON THE BORDERS OF SLOVENIA

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ABSTRACT

The Balkan Road and the Guarding of Europe: The Refugee Crisis on the Borders of Slovenia

The article investigates public reactions to the refugee crisis in the autumn of 2015. The focus is on the emerging “post-Schengen” imaginaries of the border which are formed in reaction to the actions by the member states at the periphery (Hungary, Croatia) and in the centre’s alleged expectations that the external borders of the EU will be protected. In this constellation, Slovenia assumes the role of the border guard of Europe, which is based on the memories of the 20th century, in particular of the ascribed traumatic legacy of being part of the socialist bloc. The theoretical argument derived from the study emphasises the importance of historical treatments of public perceptions about political community, borders and solidarity, as well as the need for localized analyses of popular beliefs of belonging which stem from the regional histories.

KEY WORDS: refugees, the Balkan road, borders, strangers, Slovenia, precariousness

IZVLEČEK

Balkanska pot in varuhi Evrope: begunska kriza na mejah Slovenije

Članek obravnava javne odzive na begunsko krizo jeseni 2015. Temeljno izhodišče analize so vznikajoči »post-schengenski«¹ imaginariji meje, ki se oblikujejo v odzivih na ukrepe držav članic EU v periferni soseščini in glede na pričakovanja centra o varovanju zunanjih meja. Slovenija v tej konstelaciji, ki se opira na spomine na 20. stoletje, predvsem na pripisano dediščino travmatičnega pripadanja socialističnemu bloku, zavzema mesto varuha meje. Iz te analize izpeljani teoretski argument poudari pomen zgodovinske obravnave javnih predstav o politični skupnosti, mejah in solidarnosti ter lokaliziranih študij popularnih predstav o pripadnosti, ki izhajajo iz regijskih zgodovin.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: begunci, balkanska pot, meje, tujci, Slovenija, prekarnost

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INTRODUCTION: THE TIME OF BORDERS

Today's world is a world of borders. As many scholars have argued (Andersson 2014; Balibar 2003; Carr 2015; Walters 2006), the perception that our time is defined by the freedom of movement and that globalization has induced the collapse of the borders is a highly overrated myth. In fact, we are faced with a new border situation, based on the multiplication of borders as well as technological advancement and sophistication beyond imagination (Carr 2015). These include satellite monitoring, remote control and mobile borders as concerns technology, proliferation of professional profiles as concerns border agents, and a plethora of formal, informal and private institutions of control (Bučar Ručman 2016) in between. In Europe alone, the monitoring of borders involves national governments, police forces and immigration offices as well as FRONTEX, RABIT (The Rapid Border Intervention Team), PJC (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters), Europol and Eurojust (Carr 2015: 23), to name but a few. By means of ghettoization and the concept of gated communities, borders are expanding within the cities (Balibar 2003; Bauman 2011), through zip files and other security passwords crossing the walls of buildings, communication networks and personal data (*dataveillance*, Bučar Ručman 2016). In geopolitical terms, the extra-territorialization of juridical powers on the borders has already been established, in places like the Spanish autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. While they are imposing new barriers to movement, borders have also turned into a profitable business.¹ Trading in “illegalities” (Carr 2015) and “clandestine migration” (Andersson 2014) includes private companies but also governments, research institutes and aid organizations (Andersson 2014: 14). In brief, in the de-territorialized globe of the 21st century, borders present a vast and expanding terrain of control, centring around the uneven distribution of mobility (Andersson 2014: 7) on the one hand and the classification of privileges and crimes of movement (Melossi 2003) on the other.

In critical accounts, borders appear to be part of a large geo-technological apparatus existing in a semi-secretive sphere of agencies, units, centres and investigation rooms, governed by self-serving protocols and rules, and bound into a system which to a large extent is undetectable to the general public on whose behalf it allegedly operates. With the exception of anthropological investigations of the people turned migrants (cf. Andersson 2014), and ethnographic accounts of life in border regions (Wastl Walter et al. 2004), in social writing, the current high-tech border regimes seem to have acquired a quality of existing outside (human) time and space. However, the current refugee crisis in the EU has uncovered a new border reality, one which has collapsed “back” into the past. In addition to re-instituting some of the types of border controls removed in 2007 by the Schengen Agreement, we are witnessing the emergence of a post-Schengen European map, one heavily sequestered across the lines of modern nationalism and at the same time clustered around new, and until recently, unlikely border allies, such as Orban's Hungary, Merkel's Germany and Erdogan's Turkey. The cartography of European borders since the onset of

1 In addition to private enterprises paid to develop operations such as Mariss, Limes, and Dolphin, all targeting illegal immigration, firms profiting from investments in “migration management” with public money also include Airbus, the arms manufacturer Finmeccanica and the security company Thales. Since 2000, 226 million euros have been spent on border control equipment such as boats, drones, Dorados, and night glasses; an additional 16 million euros was paid to programs searching for methods to replace sniffer dogs, *Delo* (9. 11. 2015: 25).

the crisis has furthermore collapsed into new historical divisions, defined by the roads to Europe taken by migrants from the global South. In the Mediterranean area, the main path of entry, known to the European public since at least 2000, revolves around the so-called “Mediterranean road”.² Taken mainly by refugees from Africa, it bears the imprint of European (post)colonial violence. In the South-East, the “Balkan road” momentarily appeared in 2015–2016. Cutting across the territories of the post-socialist states, it is overwritten with the script of the (post)Cold War narrative.

The theoretical concern of this article is how to (re)locate history in the field of border studies. The argument develops in three stages. First, the postnational state as the new historical reality of border control is explicated: this is done through a brief analysis of the historical contradictions emerging from the evolution of the modern state from the national to the postnational rule of governmentality and the arrival of the “neoliberal subject”. The thesis is that the neoliberal “precariousness” demands that borders are treated theoretically as both sites of the fear of migration in space (kinophobia) and the fear of passing of social time (chronophobia). The central part of the analysis connects public perceptions of time and history in relation to borders on the case of Slovenia. Using the method of discourse reading of a case sample of media reports about the refugee crisis in the autumn of 2015, I show how history and memory of the “Wall” are facilitated by local media and politicians to legitimize the nation’s role as the border guard of Europe. In conclusion, I summarize the findings by underlining the need to theoretically link studies of global migration with regional histories, using public memory as an important mediator in the settling of issues of postnational community, solidarity and action.

THE CENTURY OF MIGRATION

Migration is a key feature of contemporary societies. Whereas movement is a transhistorical fact of human history, we are currently witnessing a drastic shift in scaling. “The past two decades have seen a sharp growth in the number of people, enterprises, and places expelled from the core social and economic orders of our time” (Sassen 2014: 1). At the present over 1 billion people globally are displaced (Nail 2016). In the EU, a total of 3.8 million people immigrated to one of the EU 28 Member States during 2014, while at least 2.8 million emigrants were reported to have left an EU Member State; 12.4 thousand people are “stateless”.³ Climate change, land grabbing (coupled with the ‘foreignization’ of farmlands and the ‘financialization’ of food commodities, Baird and le Billon 2012) and wars are the contributing factors to the expulsion of people in the global South. The 2008 financial crisis has underwritten the displacement of millions of people worldwide, including in the global North (9 million in the US). Globally, the predictions are that migration rates will continue to grow over the next twenty-five years. “The twenty-first century will be the

2 According to Frontex, the primary migratory routes to Europe are: the Western African route, Western Mediterranean route, Central Mediterranean route, Apulia and Calabria route, Circular route from Albania to Greece, Western Balkan route, Eastern Mediterranean route, and Eastern Borders route; frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map, accessed (21. 9. 2016).

3 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics (15. 9. 2016).

century of the migrant,” Thomas Nail writes (2016), while people who migrate, either by choice or by force, will constitute the dominant figure of the changing, postnational world.

The management of migration is becoming a leading challenge for the social (re)organization of the postnational state as a whole. The epochal transformation we call globalization, Sassen writes, “is taking place inside the national to a far larger extent than is usually recognized” (Sassen 2014: 1). Migration stands at the core of this transformation. (This, as will be explained further down, should by no means be confused with migration hysteria based on amplification of numbers and the scope of the alleged “threats” to the host societies.) So far, not much political concern (beyond the usual rhetoric of “migration as an opportunity”)⁴ has been displayed. Moreover, despite the fact that the late twentieth-century policies of integration, assimilation or multicultural cohabitation have in many ways already proven to be inadequate in addressing issues of belonging and membership, have been politically discredited and will continue to wither in both their public appeal and actual efficiency (Kymlicka 2015), no serious attempts to develop new agendas of social and political organization of life can be detected. To the contrary, the withering of state powers to manage their populations has turned backwards to modern tools of control through bordering (Brown 2010) on the geo-graphic side, and to the furthering of the modern individualization process in its neoliberal edition on the body-graphic side. The combined effect is that rather than creating conditions for minimizing the impacts of globalization, the postnational state has added to the confusion, anxiety and conflict.

Two related issues can be listed among the many causes of this historical impasse. First, there is a growing confusion of clear boundaries between citizens and immigrants, outsiders and insiders (Calavita 2005: 13–14). A process which Newman describes as “societal compartmentalization” (Newman 2006: 175) contributes to the blurring of the boundaries between the “domestic” and the foreign populace at the multiple levels of neighbourhoods, cities, regions, states and continents. Considering the scope of the transnationalization of societies, it may even be unproductive to use the term “integration”, as it is no longer clear what (or which group) constitutes the measure (of integration) and who is to be integrated into where and what. The massive spread of human movement has reshaped social territories and cultural identities of local and transnational communities to the degree where the modern politics of citizenship is increasingly losing ground as the dominant principle of governmentality. This includes the shaking of the social and cultural embeddedness of identity (Squires 2002: 229), as well as firm classifications of national belonging (Soysal 2002).

Second, both the sovereignty and the legitimacy of the modern state are at stake. Notwithstanding that, as Sassen writes, “[t]erritory, law, economy, security, authority, and membership all have largely been constructed as national in most of the world, albeit rarely with the degree of autonomy posited in national law and international treaties” (Sassen 2014: 49), the waning power of the state is perceived as a major historical crisis. As Sassen also argues, the sovereignty of the state has always been a fiction to a certain degree (ibid.), but this should not prevent us from taking seriously various recent developments in search of the re-institution of that fiction, most significantly through the inventions of new, post-Westphalian types and technologies of state bordering and surveillance. The

4 Cf. also UN, 2015 European Agenda on Migration, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/index_en.htm.

global neoliberal economy has corroded the elegance of the modern divide between the inside and the outside of the nation (Brown 2010: 25): forces of globalization nowadays materialize *inside* the countries (Sassen 2014: 5) as much as they operate transnationally. Deregulation of national borders, a prime concern of the previous decade, should therefore be studied in pair with international *and* internal, intra-national compartmentalization across socio-economic and juridical spaces.

NEOLIBERAL BORDER POLITICS

In contrast to the modern perception according to which borders were there to protect and unify territorial integrity and the communal sense of the cultural self, today, borders are moving inwards, where they participate in the management of the post-national biopolitics of belonging and membership. Most evident is the shift in the relationship between state and society (Rumford 2006: 159). In modern history, the key assumptions of governing by borders were the stasis of the (social and territorial) space (Newman 2006: 175), and that borders were an outcome of a political (either violent or peaceful) decision-making process (ibid.). As concerns the management of population, modern rationality differentiated between ‘bare life’ (zoe) and political life (bios), or rather, as Agamben (2004) argues, the whole point of citizenship discourse (the contract) was to obliterate the fact of its embeddedness in bare, biological life. The contract was extended into the post-WWII world order through the human rights/citizenship rights divide, which transposed the national principle onto the management of human life and global humanity (ibid.). In the 21st century, the structure of the contract is transforming towards the precarization of life (Butler 2004).

As Bauman (2016) argues, this is a new stage of individualization. Neoliberal rationality encourages individuals to transform their selves into projects to be managed by the rule of commercial entrepreneurship, wherein there is not much room for interpersonal solidarity and empathy (McCormack, Salmenniemi 2016). The precarity of the existential condition (Bauman 2016) should not be confused with the decline of the social *tout court*, however. In the post-welfare societies, bonds of belonging are still very much patterned by the historical experience of solidarities based on ethno-cultural belongings. Regardless of the fact that it is the state which has been seen responsible for the “destabilization of the conduct of life” (Bauman 2016: 59), state thinking is still determining the perception of safety. Although “no longer promising protection and security” (ibid.), the state is invoked when defending social rights and political entitlements. No matter how vague the sense of belonging to the nation-state, the rights of citizenship, as defined by modern rationality, still governs people’s expectations and claims (to privilege).

In other words, whereas the state has lost much of its power over the borders, and has, in its subsidiary role, paired with agents of global neoliberalism in order to multiply, fortify and expand internal borders among groups of state-affiliated as well as state-less people (in a way thus itself becoming an agent of the liquefying of the social), national borders of citizenship still play a vital role in public definitions of rights and solidarity. While in the 1990s some could still argue that national citizenship was losing ground to a more universal model of membership, anchored in deterritorialized notions of “persons’ rights” (Soysal 1994: 3), the present-day reality is closer to the new “walling” of citizens against “strangers”. The current condition of the post-welfare state thus has underlined, instead of

undermined, claims to citizenship. The neoliberal release of the modern grip of the borders has intensified the fear of others while further relieving the state, and agents who profit from migrant labour, of their implication in the “crime” of the borders (Melossi 2003).

THE PRECARIOUS BODY

Borders are spectacular sites on which the global(ized) precariousness of human existential conditions is transferred onto the back of the other. Ideological nuances inscribed in either the “polite” or the far-right extremist articulations notwithstanding, at the crossing stations of the impoverished Western social economies, the migrant becomes the source of our own insecurity and is deemed an agent of inequality (Nicholson et al. 2016: 337).

As seen above, the modern state border operated primarily reactively. Drawing an administrative, political and military defence line, its main “task” was to keep the human enclaves within as intact as possible. Stability was further provided by manufacturing bonds of solidarity based on ethno-cultural or civic principles, whereas deviations from conditions of belonging enforced by nationalist patriotism were deemed treason. Individual critical patriots could find themselves in exile, but, through acts of denaturalization, large groups of people could also be expelled. Thus, the modern border operated primarily within, acting as a tool of surveillance and control for the maintenance of the civic loyalties of citizens living inside its operative circle (Balibar 2003).

The postnational border operates primarily pro-actively, or as Andersson (2014: 7) argues, productively: sorting out among humans in line to pass, legally or illegally, the crossing points, it is the site of the production of subjects qua nationals and others. The border filters people on the move, in effect turning some of them into a legal category of immigrants while letting others pass by unnoticed. In light of the dramatic decomposing of state institutions of civic certainty and nationhood stability, borders are among the last resorts of the validation of national belonging for people with national passports. For those without papers, the “sans papiers”, they are the entry point of becoming – as a migrant, a refugee, an asylum seeker – the other.

The migrant’s precariousness is caught in the circularity between eternal waste (Pajnik 2016) and recruitment of labour. In contrast to the precariousness of sedentary labour, however, the migrant’s condition of circularity (i.e. precariousness) entails both economic and juridical status. Economically, precariousness in the case of migrant workers depends on the kind of jobs they are deemed suitable for, the three Ds (dirty, dangerous, demanding, Pajnik 2016). These are mainly short-term, insecure, irregular jobs, based on temporary permits, dependent on the duration of the projects, subcontracting, seasonal work in agriculture, etc. (ibid.); in the case of feminized migrant labour, tending to the needs of the host country’s households, temporality is defined by the life cycles of death (of the elderly in care) and growing up (children going to school) (Mezzadra, Neilson 2013). Juridically, immigration laws ensure the durability of precariousness through criminalization and (racial) difference (Calavita 2005). This implies the containment in non-citizenship and/or illegality: “The very qualities that make a group suitable for recruitment as ‘labour’ demonstrate its lack of qualities for membership” (Solberg, in Calavita 2005: 12). The latter can be illustrated by the recruitment of Mexican migrants at the US/Mexico border, where forces of neoliberalism “work together to create a criminal population without

labour rights (expulsion) in order to redistribute them as surplus labour power according to the needs of US valorization (expansion) (Nail 2016: 222).

The border, operating as the factory of migrant precariousness, is, to the people living within the borders as “natives”, mainly invisible in this capacity; yet – through the media and public performances of national populists – they can sense its presence, casting the end-product, the border subject, as a potential threat to the tranquillity of the lives within.

KINO- AND CHRONOPHOBIA

The diagnosis of why this politics of fear works so effectively within populations that are free of concerns of legal status has become almost unanimous in its judgment in recent years. Whereas the usual line of explanation follows the historical progression of fear of strangers from the outskirts of the constitution of the modern community, as explained in sociology by Simmel and Schutz (Marrota 2010), the present-day verdict seems to be that it is the common fate of precariousness of life of both the natives and the immigrants which has led to the latter being deemed the culprit in the destruction of the existential order. In this context, Bauman, by reiterating Aesop’s fable of the hares and the frogs, calls the migrants bearers of bad news: “Those nomads – not by choice but by the verdict of a heartless fate – remind us, irritatingly, infuriatingly and horrifyingly, of the incurable vulnerability of our own position and of the endemic fragility of our hard won well-being” (Bauman 2016: 16).

Kinophobia (Nail 2016),⁵ the fear of people dislocated in space (territorial, social, or economic), works in pair with fears in time, or better yet, *of* time. Following Nail (ibid.), this type of fear could be described as chronophobia. This includes the migrant’s own change of time perspective concerning their personal biography and expressed in different forms and states of social vulnerability, as well as the time consciousness of the host community. As indicated by the rising nationalism in Eastern Europe (Forrester et al 2004), the time perspective, borne on the invocation of historical entitlements and the ‘anterior presence’ discourse,⁶ is an important aspect of argumentation for the anti-immigration stance. Since the 2008 economic crisis, the relationship between migration and time management has gained additional curves across Europe. In the Mediterranean, for instance, a new “regional time” is emerging (Knight, Stewart 2016). As reported by ethnographers of austerity, it oscillates between memories of past securities and the “eternal” present, threatening to irrevocably destroy the planning of future (Bryant 2016). As already argued above in the case of postnational claim to the privileges of national citizenship, confusion

5 Nail speaks of kinopolitics to define the motion of migrant labour. At the border this politics operates in three cycles, or circuits: the border circuit which works by deportation; the detention circuit which extracts mobility by incarceration or settlement in camps; and the labour circuit which can lead to either labour recruitment or deportation (Nail 2016: 31–32)

6 The ‘we were here first’ discourse, as Eugen Roosens warns, is a dangerous weapon because it appears as ‘common sense’. ‘This type of argumentation’, Roosens contends, ‘has become in political power relations and also in the media a tacit compromise much more “acceptable” [or “politically correct”] than blunt xenophobia or aggressive racism’ (Roosens, quoted in Shippers 2007: 105).

of the time perspective, encompassing “simultaneous pasts and presents” (Knight, Stewart 2016: 5) plays a role in the structuring of social experience and expectations of the service of the (postnational) state. It is not hard to see fertile soil for welfare chauvinism piling up on the abandoned fields of the social state, which may be soon assisting the extreme right in directing the public fears of migrants. Precarity has already proven to be effective in providing the conditions for confusing economic vulnerability with the migrant “threat”. Or, as Robinson puts it, “(e)conomic globalization denationalizes national economies and in contrast immigration renationalizes politics” (2009: 23; for the Slovenian case, see Bučar Ručman, Kanduč 2016). In the post-crisis reconstitution, as will become evident below, memories of national borders become vital agents in the negotiation of the safeguarding of the national welfare.

THE BALKAN ROAD

What follows is a discourse summary of newspaper coverage of the “Balkan road” in the leading national daily *Delo*. The analysis focuses on three topics: the Balkan refugee road itself, the “security theme”; and the image of the “razor-wire fence”.

The Balkan road

Across Central and Eastern Europe, the experience of the Berlin Wall, regardless of its actual geographic and political presence, has constituted a key emotion of post-socialist integration into the EU. After the revolutions of 1989, the region as a whole was marked by discourses of “catching up”, “defrosting”, “return to history” (Forrester et al. 2004); in this teleological narrative, (Western) Europe appeared as a final destination in both political and cultural development. In Slovenia, however, a special effort was invested to be disassociated with the region, claiming a Central European heritage as the historical proof of the commensurability of Slovene identity with European history. When accepted into the Schengen space, newspaper headlines such as “Border renaissance of Central Europe”, “Triumph of freedom” and “Confirmation of Europeanness” (Vidmar Horvat 2009) continued the process of “ethnic engineering” (Štiks 2010). The so-called debalkanization process of the 1990s (Petrović 2009; Velikonja 2005) coupled with the self-ascribed *cordon sanitaire* role during the violent break-up of Yugoslavia (Mihelj 2004) patterned the master narrative of accession to the EU in 2004 and of inclusion among the Schengen states in 2007.

The opening of the “Balkan refugee road” invoked Orientalist cultural images of the region. However, two discursive strategies appear in the reports, neither directly associated with the customary notion of the Balkans as the European “other”. Rather, the image of the oriental Balkan was mobilized to point to Brussels on the one side and to Turkey on the other side of the European management of the refugee crisis. Headlines and sub-headlines such as “Eastern bazaar at the Brussels table” (28. 11. 2015), “Brussels Bazaar” (17. 10. 2015), “Turkey is becoming the master of the Balkan road” (ibid.), and “More Order at the Balkan Corridor of Chaos” (26. 10. 2015) indicated a novel imagery of Europe in which Turkey appeared as both a (political) partner and a (cultural) colonizer. “Brussels”, on the

other hand, entered the “dark continent” (Todorova 2001), demonstrating a similarity to its handling of the Balkan crisis in its incapacity to mitigate humanitarian solutions to the political conflict (a suppressed memory of the war in Bosnia), and in a subservient role to the Oriental “empire”. The confusion of history, culture and geography provided a map of the region in which Slovenia moved from the place of a peripheral Member State to the role of a Schengen centre. Above all, a critical distance from the centre, paradoxically, fuelled a potent fantasy by which the regional map would, yet once more in history, show Slovenia as a non-Balkan destination.

Security

The image of Slovenia as the border guard emerged in late October and intensified in November 2015. If in August of the same year, EU Member States, including Slovenia, expressed both objection and abjection in response to Orbán’s announcement of his plan to fence in the country, in a matter of a few weeks, news about the Slovene government’s purchase of the razor-wire fence was starting to appear. At first, the prime minister and the government (centre-left) coalition remained secretive about the plan, but already by the end of October, ideas about setting up “technical barriers” (4. 11. 2015) were communicated to the public. In September, Orbán was called “the executor of European dirty business” (24. 9. 2015); by mid-October, the prime minister confirmed that getting closer to Hungary’s way of dealing with the issue could be an option (24. 10. 2015).

Security was a key legitimation topic. The discourse on security was given a featured role on the occasion of the implementation of the Schengen border in former Eastern Europe in 2007; back then, its main discursive companion was “our” freedom (Vidmar Horvat 2009). Since then, securitization has become a partner product of the debordering of Europe as a whole. Anxious reactions to the reports about a club of selected countries debating the introduction of a mini-Schengen after the Paris terrorist attacks triggered an especially strong flow of “worthy border guard” claims. Slovenia has justified the trust, has proven an effective and reliable “guard of the Schengen border”, were some of the statements from the Minister of the Interior. The same minister also pointed to what was in her view the real problem, namely that an “unsorted” flow of refugees comes to Slovenia, where economic migrants mix with the refugees (10. 11. 2015).

The time-operation of the border is an integral aspect in the management of fear. Already in 2007, when Slovenia was to become the guard of the external Schengen border, in Croatia, newspapers wrote of the return of the “iron curtain” to the region. On the other side, fears erupted of the pre-Schengen border returning to their lives (which in fact happened twice, in the northern region during the European Cup in Austria and the G8 meeting in Trieste, Italy in 2009). In addition, media reports were filled with evidence of humiliation, travelling as cultural judgments across the lifted administrative borders in the North and West. In defence, the acceptance into the Schengen area was presented as a token of cultural worthiness and, relatedly, that this worthiness implied taking on the role of the border guard (Vidmar Horvat 2009).

In the new, 2015 constellation of rebordering of Europe, fears of being caught within the iron curtains of the new epoch were being mediated through the combined invocation of the security measures and the racialization of the border. As concerns the former, assuming

the role of the guardian of both its own national territory and the European empire as a whole created an image of centrality in terms of management of the crisis. With its own push to administer the “Balkan road”, this peripheral state could not be ignored. As concerns the latter, claiming the power to differentiate among categories of humans contested the privilege to “sort” people, a customary property of the centre. Either way, posing as a Schengen sovereign constituted a spatial and temporal advance, a moment of historical and geographic progress.

THE SCHENGEN (E)MOTIONS AND THE WALL

As Bauman notes, “securitization” is an empty discourse which, as a neologism, empowers political elites to legitimize their actions of control and frees ordinary people of the moral burden of “the fate of the wretched” (Bauman 2016: 35). In Slovenia, a Schengen border state, however, memories of past borders played a role in public attitudes and in articulating border discourse when encountering the refugees.

The razor-wire fence

While the military units were erecting the fences at a speed of 150 metres per hour (12. 11. 2015), manipulation of the numbers of refugees approaching Slovenia⁷ as well as fears of “backflows” from Austria and Germany (12. 11. 2015) turned public attention into migration hysteria. Already an available tool within the Schengen border industry, hysteric anticipation of flows and floods of people invading the lands and homes of the peaceful Western world was used to expedite the legitimation process at home and in the region, while attaching itself to the image of the nation victimized by hordes of migrants.⁸ However, in *Delo*, the memory of the wire interfered with the legitimation processes. In a letter entitled “Concentration camp Slovenia”, a reader wrote: “It is sad to see that we are using the same methods as were used during the war by the aggressor.” In December, public protests against the army and fences at the borders were launched in different parts of Slovenia (11. 12. 2015); in a report from the border region of Istria, the daily used a quote from the protest as the front-page headline: “This is incomparable even to the war times” (12. 12. 2015), and reiterated peoples’ protests about the “sad, terrifying scene” reminiscent of the last war (15. 12. 2015). Istrian mayors from the Slovene and Croatian sides issued a joint statement demanding the removal of the fence (17. 12. 2015), while references to the fenced-in areas of Slovenia during WWII illustrated commentaries such as “A fenced-in mind” (7. 12.: 27), “Primorje region also fenced” (11. 12.: 11), “Closing of the borders at the Balkans will revive painful memories” (26. 9.: 3), “Again Europe with iron curtain” (22. 9., 2), “refugee holocaust” (7. 9.: 5), “I hope that they do not erect a concrete Berlin Wall again (31. 12.: 4).

7 Journalists following the refugees on the Balkan road reported 10–12 thousand people on the move; the number was inflated to 30,000 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (*Delo*, 11. 11. 2016).

8 As Carr (2016: 23) has argued, the “invasion” anticipated by playing with numbers has never occurred in real life; as concerns migrants from Africa, the main burden of the expulsions is split among the neighbouring countries, while only a minor portion arrives at the frontiers of the EU.

Although small in size, the selection of reactions in *Delo* to the razor-wire fencing of Slovenia's eastern and southern borders nonetheless confirms that the border exists in territorial as well as time-historical social registers. Despite being recognized as "one gigantic apparatus of control", the Schengen border operates in local variations, imbued with border and other memories of the past. The traumatic experiences of WWII and Slovenia's assignment to the Eastern bloc during the Cold War created a memorial basis in the post-socialist regions on which present-day encounters with traumas and crises are lodged. Memories of past terrors of different types of fencing-in of people and states also direct the perception of the Schengen border and its exclusionary role in defining the non-Schengen people.

CONCLUSION

The passing through the turbulent present is turning borders into much more visible markers of historical place as well as time. Crises, Knight and Stewart write in relation to the 2008 global fiscal crisis, defeat routine and structure and, in their capacity to disrupt the flow of history, function as events. In terms of phenomenological description, events are cuts into the flow of time. By disrupting the routines of time passing, they acquire a "semantic density" by which they help in the historicization of the present (which, under ordinary circumstances, remains unrepresentable in its historicity (ibid.)). Historicization occurs in relation to the past, painted through either nostalgic or traumatized memories of "how things once were". As mentioned above, for the people in Southern Europe, the crisis was such an event which evoked the memory of the social state and the moral contract of the pre-crisis debt economy. Across Europe, the 2015 refugee crisis triggered a different, border history, split along the memory lines of the debordering of the inner space and the "securitization" of the borders along the outside edge.

What, then, is a theoretical relevance of studying the Balkan road? Our research shows that the local fate of global migrants depends on regional histories, whereby public memory is an important mediator in the settling of issues of postnational community, solidarity and action. Moreover, global issues such as border control, securitization, legal and illegal migrants acquire local meanings which stem from national histories and narratives of the past, and participate in the negotiation of the identities of host communities. Whereas a country's geopolitical power is a factor in the scope of its contribution to the international "management of migration" (Čebren, Zorn 2016), the reverse is also true: peripherally enforced rules of migration control can intervene into a larger geopolitical context of transnational alignments, unsettling the hegemonic order of the centres. The EU humanitarian crisis, as regards the refugees on the Balkan road, and in front of the razor wire erected by peripheral Member States, is a good case at hand.

In his call to revive the value of human life, and acknowledge dignity as a basic humanist legacy in the European thought, Habermas notes the following:

In contrast to the territorial form of the nation-state, "globalization" conjures up images of overflowing rivers, washing away all the frontier checkpoints and controls, and ultimately the bulwark of the nation itself. The new relevance of "flow volumes" also signals how the locus of control has shifted from space to time: as "masters of speed" come to replace "rulers of territory", the nation-state appears to steadily lose its power. (Habermas 2012: 67)

Public depictions of the “Balkan road” suggest that the time component concerns not only the technologies of control, but also invokes mental cartographies that allow for the management of the “flows” of strangers. In other words, borders and the strangers who cross them to “come to us” evolve in territories that are populated with time maps and landscapes of public memories, running in accord but also in tension with the governance of the present. Castells argues that “building blocks from history, geography, biology, productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory and personal phantasies, power apparatus and religious convictions” can be employed when new social territories are being drafted (Castells 1997, quoted in Jensen, Richardson 2004: 46). The enlargement of the Schengen territories contributed a historically monumental event which in the minor territories of central Europe, such as Slovenia, triggered the evolution of mental geographies in which the “borderless” EU was very much defined by the remembering of the Europe of past borders.

While the “renaissance” of Central Europe was the officially sponsored attitude, in 2007 only a few voices warned of the implied post-imperial thinking, both emptied of memories of multicultural and multi-ethnic cohabitation and amplified in the nationalist projection of future history. This legacy today is entwined in the fences on the southern and northern borders of the Slovenian state, and defines the public response, either in its political or humanitarian version, to the suffering image of the “stranger at our door”.

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POVZETEK

BALKANSKA POT IN VARUHI EVROPE: BEGUNSKA KRIZA NA MEJAH SLOVENIJE Ksenija VIDMAR HORVAT

Članek obravnava javne odzive na begunsko krizo jeseni 2015. Analiza je vstavljena v kontekst teorij o globalizaciji in mejah. Glavnina sodobnih kritičnih razprav poudarja vlogo visoko tehnološko razvitih režimov meja. Pogosto se zdi, da tehnološki napredek meje potiska v vlogo avtonomnega akterja, ki deluje onkraj časa in prostora konkretnih ljudi. Nasprotno pa je begunska kriza poudarila drugačno resničnost meje in jo pahnila »nazaj« v zgodovino. Ta povratak je najočitnejši v izrazu geografija »migracijskih poti« v Evropo. Na Mediteranu t. i. »Mediterska pot« oživlja zgodovino (post)kolonialnega nasilja; na jugovzhodu »Balkanska pot« s presečiščem na ozemljih postsocialističnih držav obnavlja pripoved o hladni vojni.

Članek vznik teh zgodovin obravnava v luči »post-schengenskega« imaginarija, ki določa predstave o »Balkanski poti« v Sloveniji. Jeseni 2015 je Slovenija samoiniciativno prevzela vlogo varuha Evrope. Kot pokaže analiza, je bila ta vloga prefiltrirana skozi spomine na 20. stoletje, še zlasti domnevno travmatično povezanost s socialističnim vzhodnim blokom. Ta samopodoba se vpenja v trenutno neoliberalno stanje prekarnosti eksistencialnih pogojev, ki v podobi migranta najde posebej priročno tarčo za izražanje frustracij in strahov o usodi v postsocialni državi. Temeljna teza je, da je kriza socialne države povzročila kontradiktorno uveljavljanje privilegija državljanstva: sprostitev primeža meje kot dela globalne neoliberalne politike je odprla pot za strah pred drugim, hkrati pa povsem zakrila lastno udeležbo v »zločinih« meje in profitabilnosti migracij.

Prispevek s konkretno analizo medijskega diskurza poudarja pomen zgodovinske obravnave javnih predstav o politični skupnosti, mejah in solidarnosti ter lokaliziranih analiz javnih idej o pripadanju, ki jih oblikujejo regionalne zgodovine.

OTHERNESS AND VICTIMHOOD IN THE TABLOID PRESS: THE CASE OF THE “REFUGEE CRISIS” IN “SLOVENSKE NOVICE”

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ABSTRACT

Otherness and Victimhood in the Tabloid Press: The Case of the “Refugee Crisis” in “Slovenske Novice”

By using critical discourse analysis, the article focuses mainly on ways in which migrants are constructed through language in the most widely-read Slovenian tabloid newspaper, *Slovenske novice* (Slovenian News). The article begins with a definition of tabloid discourse and continues with an empirical exploration of how migrants are constructed as “the other” and Slovenians as victims. The empirical material covers the period from 20 August 2015 to 31 December 2015. The author establishes that tabloid discourse mainly employs binary dichotomies between “us”, who are represented as victims, heroes, and heroic victims, and “them”, who embody a threat to the culture and security of the majority population.

KEY WORDS: migration, tabloid, *Slovenske novice*, othering, victim

IZVLEČEK

Drugost in žrtvenost v tabloidnem tisku: primer »begunske krize« v »Slovenskih novicah«

Članek s pomočjo kritične analize diskurza obravnava predvsem jezikovne načine, s pomočjo katerih so migranti konstruirani v osrednjem in najbolj branem slovenskem dnevniku – *Slovenskih novicah*. Ker se *Slovenske novice* žanrsko umeščajo med tabloide, članek najprej opredeli elemente tabloidov, nato pa s pomočjo empirične študije pokaže, kako so bili v obdobju med 20. 8. 2015 in 31. 12. 2015 migranti konstruirani kot »drugi«, Slovenci pa kot žrtve. S pomočjo analize avtorica ugotavlja, da tabloidni diskurz preigrava predvsem binarne dihotomije med »nami kot tistimi, ki poosebljamo žrtve, heroje in heroizirane žrtve, in »njimi«, ki za večinsko populacijo poosebljajo kulturno in varnostno grožnjo.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: migracije, tabloid, *Slovenske novice*, drugačenje, žrtev

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INTRODUCTION: FRAMING TABLOID DISCOURSE¹

Along with the paradigmatic division between serious journalism and the tabloid press that mainly relies on the distinction between the supposed “objectivity” of hard news vs. the “non-objectivity” of tabloid news (see Jontes 2009), Luthar (1998a: 7–8), in a study of the Slovenian media, identifies some other prevalent features of tabloid discourse that are in line with other referential authors’ analyses of mostly US, Australian and English tabloids (see Langer 1998; Glynn 2000; Debrix 2008; van Dijk 1992; Sparks 2000). First, Luthar finds that in tabloid discourse, providing information is a secondary matter, as tabloid news is more focused on constructing human dramas. This means that the whole iconographical look of the tabloids, the visual style, and the para-social relationship with the imaginary audience, construct a space between the tabloid producers and the audience as a social occasion whose primary function is to generate exciting gossipy small talk over human dramas. Although the tabloids still convey information, the audience views the tabloids similarly to other popular genres, whose main intention is not the provision of information, but rather of moral judgement of the world based on “common sense”, sociability and routine confrontation with uncertainty (Luthar 1998a: 39).

Second, in the tabloid news a problem or event is narrated in the manner of a moral dilemma. The main task of the tabloid news is to offer a moral judgement of the world or the event described in the story. This results in constructing the story around Manichean binary oppositions between “us” as “good” and “them” as “bad”. Events are presented through narrations concerning two-dimensional conflicts. They are transformed into dramatic stories, into polarized melodramas (Luthar 1998a: 10). An investigative reporter plays the central mediatory role between safety and danger, honesty and crime, individual and institution, justice and injustice. This communication satisfies the viewer’s need for truth, honesty, intrigue, and secrecy (Luthar 1998a: 37).

Third, events are reported within a referential field of personal experience and common sense, with common sense being the tabloid ideology *par excellence*, instituted as natural and founded on the presumption of fundamental, undeniable, universal truths (Luthar 1998a: 7–8). Another important feature of tabloid news is the personification or subjectivisation of journalistic language, which has several aspects: the narration of events as “human interest stories”, the use of individual experiences as a referential framework for the understanding of structural phenomena, focusing on individual experience and the emotional states of the victims and witnesses of an event etc. (Luthar 1998a: 10; Langer 1998).

Although the focus of tabloid news might seem of no political significance, the tabloid press is deeply political and has to be analysed as such. It is also important to point out that the use of common sense as a potential ground for legitimating power is at work in the tabloid genre, and as such is worth studying precisely because it sustains and perpetuates what is considered “normal” or “common” in a society. Furthermore, tabloid news is political because it constructs certain cultural constellations as natural while placing others outside the realm of common sense (Luthar 1998a: 10). Ideology in the tabloid news is thus not

1 This article was partially written during the author’s research stay at the University of Oslo, Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages. Part of the research results presented here were related to the project Discourses of the Nation and the National.

overt – the tabloid news does not lie to and manipulate us, it does not speak untruths, but rather it colonizes our common sense. As such, tabloid news serves generally as a conduit for the circulation of popular ways of knowing (Glynn 2000: 7).

The aim of this paper is to explore Slovenian tabloid discourse during the 2015 “refugee crisis”.² By taking into consideration *Slovenske novice* – Slovenia’s first tabloid daily, in print since 1992 – the article seeks to explore the status of Slovenians as victims, as this has proved to be an important instance of the more general process of constructing migrants as “others”. *Slovenske novice* is the newspaper with the largest circulation in Slovenia, and as such has to be taken into consideration as an important creator of discourses affecting the current state of mind of the Slovenian population. For this reason, in the analysis that follows the tabloid press will be understood as a discursive formation in which relations of power are inscribed in the imagery constructed by the tabloid, affirming and reflecting the common sense of its readers. *Slovenske novice* will also be considered not only as a specific tabloid genre with a single format (see Glynn 2000) but as a part of a broader landscape of tabloid culture³ that has become the dominant mode of communication, representation and expression as well as entertainment since the 1990s (Debrix 2008; Luthar 1998b; Glynn 2000).

In order to analyse the discursive formations, the analysis adopts an approach in line with critical discourse analysis. It mostly focuses on the level of textual analysis (see Fairclough 1992), as the aim is to explore features of tabloid discourse and show how tabloid discourses construct migrants and migration in the specific context of the refugee situation in the selected period. The analysis presented below was conducted on a sample of articles from the print edition of *Slovenske novice*, the Slovenian daily tabloid (circulation 336,000) with the highest readership amongst all Slovenian print media. 146 articles published between 20 August 2015 and 31 December 2015 were sampled by searching for the keywords migration, immigration, refugee and their derivatives.⁴ Therefore, I turn to critical discourse analysis to show how discourse has to be interpreted not as mere representations but as reproducing, constructing, legitimizing and sustaining relations of power between “us” and “them” (Fairclough 1992; Machin, Myer 2012).

I empirically explore three main modes of victimization and othering. First, I explore how Slovenians were constructed as victims of migrants who represented a cultural threat. Second, I explore how Slovenians were constructed as victims of migrants who represented a security threat. Third, I explore how “genuine” refugees were constructed as victims of “fake”/economic refugees. I conclude the article with a broader contextualization of the status of victim and self-victimization in Slovenian imagery and in tabloid culture as a popular phenomenon of Western origin.

2 For the description of the socio-political context of the “refugee crisis” in Slovenia please see the introduction to this section.

3 Many authors claim that we now live in a tabloid culture that is well palpable in both serious and tabloid media (Luthar 1998a, 1998b; Glynn 2000; Debrix 2008; Jontes 2009).

4 The press clipping was obtained from the Republic of Slovenia Government Communication Office.

“OTHERS” AND VICTIMS IN DISCOURSE

“Us” victims of a cultural threat

Constructing migrants as culturally different is the cornerstone of the process of “othering” that will be explored in this analysis. Cultural difference was the precondition for constructing migrants as a threat to the Slovenian community, which consequently was presented as threatened and victimized. In the analysed material, cultural differences were expressed mainly through descriptions of migrants’ character. Food and waste were the main categories through which a clear division between the “western” and “eastern” cultural and civilizational ethos was made. Below we present two excerpts from different articles which show how cultural difference was constructed. The paragraphs describe the migrants’ attitude towards the food that was given to them by humanitarian workers and towards the waste that was left behind once migrants left the places they stayed in (such as fields and stadiums) while they were waiting for transportation to registration centres. The first example describes the fields that migrants stayed in during their journey, while the second describes the reaction to migrants by the Mayor of Zavrč, a village where migrants were temporarily sheltered in a stadium.

(1) In the memory of Slovenians remained scenes which in our culture are difficult to understand: piles of things thrown away by refugees while they travelled: fish cans still unopened, blankets and rolls of plastic, bags of food. Even in their camp in the middle of the fields and temporary accommodations, things were left behind and the volunteers cleaned them up. (Šuljić 2015b: 3)

(2) [...] when the buses finally drove away, it was clear what a mess they had left behind [...] “You cannot imagine, where they were standing, they pissed, where they lay, they shat. For us that were building the Zavrč stadium, this stadium is for us like a Mosque for them, where they for sure do not go number two,” said the mayor of Zavrč, Miran Vuk, while watching the football team during their daily practice. “The situation at this stadium is a great tragedy. There are 300 children training there and now we have to clean and disinfect everything. They went number two on the two auxiliary fields, the main field and the whole grandstand. Two of them even indulged themselves and pooped in the guest lodge. In the morning the janitor had to throw up seven times before he managed to clean the filth, even though he claims he has a strong stomach. Yesterday we prepared 1,200 meals, but only two were eaten. In our schools we have a lot of children who are hungry and the municipality has to pay for hot meals for them. These refugees have plenty of money, modern telephones and navigation devices, so that they know exactly where to go and what rights they have. In the morning there were two refugees that came for coffee in a café and they wanted to pay with banknotes of hundreds of euros and dollars,” says Vuk. (Andlović 2015: 3)

In the first example the distinction between “our” culture and the migrants’ culture is delimited explicitly when the journalist writes about “scenes which in our culture are difficult to understand”, implying firstly that the two cultures are different and secondly that there is a gap between them. By making a reference to “Slovenian memory”, the journalist is constructing what Wodak et al. (1999) define as the “collective we” – a discursive mechanism that introduces the Slovenians as a togetherness, an abstract national

and cultural community within which all the potential differences (ethnic, religious, class, lifestyle etc.) are blurred with the intent to preserve the imaginary cohesion among Slovenians. Furtherly, the reference to a common memory facilitates the reader's identification with what signifies "Slovenian" in order to delimit it from what signifies the "other"/alien. Therefore, if "Slovenian" signifies cleanness and order as well as taking care of waste left behind, "migrant" signifies irrational polluting and food wasting.

It is clear that in the first example cultural distinction is organized along the binary opposed characteristics that distinguish "us" (Slovenians) and "them" (migrants). This continues in the second example where personal pronouns "us" and "they" were used consistently throughout the example. This linguistic binarity, whose function is to align readers alongside or against certain groups or ideas (Machin, Myer 2012: 84) was narrated within the referential field of the mayor's personal experience and through a mechanism of structural contradictions that van Dijk (1998) calls "ideological squaring" – i.e., positive self-representation and negative representation of "other". Ideological squaring becomes visible when texts: (1) emphasize or express positive information/characteristics of "us"; (2) emphasize or express negative information or characteristics of "others"; (3) de-emphasise the positive characteristics of "others"; and (4) de-emphasise the negative characteristics of "us". In the two examples above, Slovenians are positively represented as clean and self-sacrificing (things were left behind and volunteers cleaned them up; In the morning the janitor had to throw up seven times), poor and victimized (in our schools we have a lot of children who are hungry and the municipality has to pay for their hot meals) while migrants were portrayed as filthy (where they were standing they pissed, where they lay they shat), ungrateful (yesterday we prepared 1,200 meals, but only two were eaten), conniving and wealthy (these refugees have money, modern telephones and navigation devices, so that they know exactly where to go and what rights they have). Especially in the second example, events were dramatized through the use of explicit words (piss, shit, throw up) and words such as "tragedy" etc.

Douglas (1984: 37) shows that objects or ideas that confuse or contradict cherished classifications provoke hostile behaviour that condemns "them". She calls these confusing or contradictory elements ambiguous, anomalous, and indefinable, "uncomfortable facts, which refuse to be fitted in," which, she claims, "we find ourselves ignoring or distorting so that they do not disturb these established assumptions". The migrants' practices are indeed constructed as such contradictory elements. Waste and excrement are described as being out of place (food strewn about the field, excrement outside the toilet). This makes the migrants symbolic of disturbing, polluting, and dirty elements unwanted in an ethnically clean environment – i.e. "our" stadium, where 300 Slovenian children train, and which has a sacral symbolic meaning to locals. The stadium is rhetorically similed – explicitly compared (Reisigl, Wodak 2001: 54) to a sacral place (a mosque), and as such presented as very important for the community. This distinction, along with the reports about cleaning up after the migrants, creates two symbolically and culturally different "spaces", clearly placing a negative value (dirt, pollution, ingratitude, conniving) on the "migrant's space" in contrast to the "Slovenian space" (clean, modest, welcoming and self-sacrificing). As Douglas would put it, migrants appear to be culturally different precisely because their culture and practices are constructed in a way that morally contradicts Slovenian codes, habits, and character. The migrant "other" with his habits and practices becomes a cultural

threat to the majority population, as it threatens Slovenian purity and homogeneity by barbarically invading their symbolic space.

“Us” victims of a security threat

However, the “othering” which took hold of the portrayal of migrants can be achieved by highlighting another aspect of migrants’ cultural difference – i.e., their alleged criminality (Ibrahim 2005: 175). This aspect was especially evident in reports on migrants’ connections to possible terrorist activities. An analysis of how action is represented (see Machin, Myer 2012: 104) showed that migrants were only sporadically represented as active agents, and those cases were limited to events when migrants were described as performing criminal, deviant or aggressive activity. The transitivity of sentences – i.e. studying what people are depicted as doing and referring to who does what to whom (agency), and how as well as what gets done (action) – discloses positions of power and powerlessness (Machin, Myer 2012: 104–113) and demonstrates what kind of agency is ascribed to migrants. In example 3 below, we can see that the migrants are represented as agents (pushing, setting things on fire) against the police, who are represented as passive actors. Further on we encounter reports about aggressive migrants and victimized Slovenian policemen.

(3) Yesterday the situation at the Brežice accommodation centre was chaotic: illegal refugees were pushing against the fence that was being guarded by the special police forces [...] smoke was rising in the fenced area as migrants were clearly still setting things on fire as a sign of protest [...] (Šuljić 2015a: 3)

The construction of migrants as dishonest, conniving, ungrateful and criminal was in some cases radicalized by representing migrants as a terrorist threat, as demonstrated by the following two examples:

(4) Islamic militants in Rigonce! [...] we obtained the memory card from a camera which was apparently forgotten by refugees. Photos and a video show many young men, including Osama bin Laden. One of them (volunteers) found a forgotten camera and two memory cards [...] One of the memory cards was useless, the other had 29 photos and a video. [...] Doubts are cast by a photo of Osama bin Laden. [...] So what are sympathizers of bin Laden’s work doing in the river of refugees and migrants? Where are they going and what are their intentions? [...] “In the context of the treatment of the refugee wave we are constantly aware of the risk that such persons can be mixed with refugees,” says Drago Menegalija of the General Police Directorate. Osama bin Laden is dead, but apparently he lives in the hearts of Muslim extremists. [...] The tattoo on the left arm could facilitate the search for this guy. Where in Europe is he now? (Šuljić 2015b: 3)

(5) Migrants a potential threat even to the nuclear power plant? No wonder some Slovenian citizens and the readers of *Slovenske novice* are increasingly starting to worry whether safety is sufficiently (reliably) taken care of [...] for the security of the Nuclear power plant, which, as we know, is located not very far from the Slovenian – Croatian border and not far from the opaque river of different kinds of migrants that enter the territory of our country. [...] “There are almost certainly fighters from the Islamic State among the refugees, and they can have the exact location

of our nuclear power plant on their smart mobile phones,” said an outspoken reader from Ptuj. (Vatovec 2015a: 4)

The article from which the fourth example is taken starts with the headline “Islamic militants in Rigonce!” This claim, emphasized with an exclamation point, is supported in the story by “evidence” collected by the journalist who at the same time adopts the role of guardian of moral order, that of a detective or investigative journalist. The reader is presented with evidence the journalist found on the camera. The story shows several photos from the camera – amongst them a photo of Osama bin Laden and a portrait of a man with a criminalizing black strip over his eyes, implicitly suggesting that the migrant who forgot the camera has connections to terrorists. The potential threat to Slovenians is emphasized through explicit intertextuality, i.e. a direct quotation from Drago Menegalija, the police’s public relations officer for crime. Explicit intertextuality is commonly used in journalism when the quoted source is an important authority and when the information given by the source is dramatic and important (Fairclough 1992: 55). Although Mr. Menegalija was not explicitly referring to the story covered by the newspaper, his quote was recontextualized and presented in the story in order to ascribe it a new meaning. By putting together fragments such as the quotation from Menegalija, a photo of a man with a black strip over his eyes, and a photo of Osama bin Laden, the journalist creates a sequence that narrows down possible interpretations when the reader combines these elements (Barthes 1966: 203–204). The connotation of such syntax is quite unambiguous – the migrants in the pictures from the forgotten camera had links to terrorism. In order to further frame the reader’s interpretation, the text poses rhetorical questions that appeared under the photos: “What are sympathizers of Bin Laden doing amongst the refugees?”; “Where are they going and what are their intentions?”; “Where in Europe are they now?” presupposing (see van Dijk 1993: 276) that the man who lost the camera was a sympathizer of Bin Laden, that he was with the refugees who crossed Slovenia, and that he has potentially dangerous plans which could possibly be implemented somewhere in Europe. Posing such rhetorical questions with these implicit presuppositions allows the journalist to direct the readers towards preferred meanings without explicitly claiming that migrants are terrorists, but at the same time allowing the readers to think of possible scenarios within the provided syntax.

A similar rhetorical question is evident also in the title of the fifth example presented above – “Migrants a potential threat even to the nuclear power plant?” The word “even” discloses the implicit meaning hiding behind the supposedly explicit sentence (Richardson 2007: 63), suggesting that migrants are firstly constructed as a generally supposed potential threat and secondly a threat to the nuclear plant located near the migration route. The construction of migrants as a general threat is also evident in the naturalization of worries where the journalist is referring to worried Slovenian citizens and readers. Although the quotation expressing concern was expressed by only one reader, the journalist generalizes the act of worrying to all readers by metonymically replacing “a reader” with “the readers”, thereby constructing the idea that migrants are a general concern to the Slovenian population. This operation of genericization is used to create a specific type – the reader of *Slovenske novice* – that other readers of the newspaper can easily relate to, and to create specific imagery related to the type as well as to ascribe the type specific characteristics (Machin, Myer 2012: 80–88). Furthermore, the opinion of the reader from Ptuj may also

function to create a space for the facilitation of the audience's identification with the reader's position, and therefore further legitimize his fears and views.

“Genuine” refugees as victims of “fake” refugees

Apart from the majority population, to whom migrants represent a security and cultural threat, migrants too can sporadically be constructed as victims, however, only if they fit into a clearly defined category. Example six clearly shows how Syrian families are constructed as “genuine” victims, while other categories such as single men (sometimes referred to as economic migrants) are supposed to be “fake” victims and victimizers.

(6) It is now clear that only one third of all refugees are coming and fleeing from an unhappy Syria, this Middle East hub, where the war took everything they had, a roof over their head, and the future. In fact, as we learn from our official institutions, only this third of refugees run openly, with their name and surname, with their own identity. It was possible to find out about the unequal situation of these needy Syrian families in contrast to economic migrants (stowaways) from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere, who have taken advantage of the distress of others and jumped on the first train that goes through Slovenia to northern Europe. Without documents, these mostly young men pretending to be Syrians are ignoring Syrian families who should have priority. They are taking their seats on the way to a brighter future. (Kastelic 2015: 6)

The example begins with the construction of genuine victims by dramatically describing the situation in their country of provenience and clearly positioning this group of migrants as victimized subjects that readers are allowed to pity. They are described as honest, as they travel with documents and do not hide their identity. They are also described as consisting of normal families, which along with their honesty provides a mechanism to reference one of the most universal western qualities readers can identify with – motherhood and family life (Chouliaraki 2006: 124). Their victimhood gives them the legitimacy to become a refugee whom we should help and protect. Syrian families are therefore symbolically positioned “on our side” of the binary dichotomy that delimit “us” from “them”. This also becomes explicit in example 7.

(7) Sad stories take place among immigrants, including the story of a father of a two-month old baby, who had to take his child to the hospital at three in the morning. His other four children were left behind at the collection centre in Pomurje, luckily with their mother. (O. B.; S. I., STA 2015: 6)

Stories of “genuine” refugees are described with adjectives such as “sad”, and with occurrences a normal Slovenian family could easily encounter in their daily life – a father taking a baby to the emergency room in the middle of the night – call for the reader's compassion. Therefore, “genuine” refugees wanting to be categorized as victims would have to adopt specific features and proper behaviour in order to become objects of compassion and pity. They have to be a family (or a woman with children), travel with documents, be a Syrian citizen etc. According to the story, only a “genuine” refugee can be a legitimate victim. As implicitly stated in examples six, seven, and two, a victim's attitude towards help should

only be to humbly accept anything given, be grateful for it, and behave well. The “genuine” refugee, being a victim, is not allowed to have any active agency that would make her a political subject demanding her rights. As shown in example 3, such agency would immediately turn the migrant into a de-victimized, “fake”, deviant. Therefore, the legitimacy of a “genuine” refugee does not stand alone, as it is constructed in opposition to “fake” refugees – i.e., single non-Syrian men who migrate incognito for economic benefits. Along these lines the “fake” refugees are constructed as victimizers who take away from “genuine” refugees and benefit from their tragedy.

“Us” victims of unfortunate circumstances

If in the previous sections the ideological squaring consisted mainly of a negative representation of the “other” and it was till now explored by showing how migrants’ negativity was emphasized, in the following section I present a simultaneously occurring contraposition of the effect of ideological squaring on reporting: the positive representation of “us” and “our” social actions (Richardson 2004: 95). Example 8 shows how migrants are placed in opposition to a positively represented Slovenian victim. This opposition is presented through a story about a poor Slovenian soldier who was stealing bread which was meant to feed migrants, in order to bring it to his family.

(8) A soldier was stealing bread intended for refugees. Unfortunately, soldiers do not get paid fairly for working with migrants. Some commissioned officer – this allegedly happened in Maribor, where many Slovenian citizens, including family members of employees of the Slovenian Armed Forces, live in considerable social distress – was “stealing” bread intended for migrants and refugees before the soldiers could deliver it to the refugee centres. He allegedly secretly took it to his car, with the intent to later take it home to his family. [...] Migrants who, as we all know, are complaining about the situation in the refugee camps as being inadequate and unsustainable [...] have often rejected the food offered to them or they took the food but later on dumped or discarded it without even tasting it. Bread among other things. (Vatovec 2015b: 4)

Example 8 presents a moral dilemma in which readers may decide whether the act of the soldier should be condemned or justified. However, this dilemma opens up a further dilemma in which the readers are supposed to decide who is more entitled to get the bread – the soldier’s family or migrants. In other words, as the soldier and the migrants are both victims, it should be determined who is more deserving of the status of victim. However, this dilemma is only apparent, as a deconstruction of the example shows that the journalist has already positioned himself on the soldier’s side.

First, the soldier’s actions are contextualized by explaining he comes from a poor region, which may logically imply he is poor too. The journalist also mentions he is underpaid, a claim deduced from his act of stealing, as the journalist’s supposedly low salary is the reason that forced him to steal. Through such contextualization, the soldier’s character is brought to the level of the reader’s experience. Second, the journalist hedges when speaking about the soldier’s actions. Journalists employ hedging when they want to avoid directness and accountability for what they write (Machin, Myer 2012: 192). In example 8 this is done in several instances. For example, he suggests the soldier is not a real thief, as

the word “stealing” is written in inverted commas which are used to distance the journalist from the denominator “thief”. As soon as the word “thief” is put in inverted commas, it acquires a new connotation that nullifies the negative connotation of the denominator “thief”. The journalist also uses the word “allegedly” twice with the same intent – in the second case to distance himself from the morally questionable actions of the soldiers while in the first case to give the impression that the story might not even be a true one. Thirdly, in order to morally justify the soldier’s action, the journalist adds the information that the bread was then brought to the poor soldier’s family, which again creates a common space of identification for the Slovenian readers. Finally, in order to fully legitimize the soldier’s action, the journalist points out that migrants are not grateful for the bread they receive – i.e. they are not truly victims, as a proper victim would gratefully accept the bread and be thankful for it. This creates the idea the bread would be thrown away by the migrants anyways and therefore stealing bread for poor Slovenian families would make it a legitimate act. This last point is also supported by the photos in the article. A photo of a loaf of bread on the railway tracks appears at the end of the article with the caption: “If soldiers pick up bread that migrants will undoubtedly throw away, would this still be stealing?”

While the article initially poses the action of stealing as a moral dilemma, it then immediately presents a solution to the moral dilemma. The soldier and soldiers (as genericization is present in the photo caption) are represented as pure souls, as innocent victims whose personal life is subordinated to the cruelty of the financial distress of the region. The soldier then becomes at the same time a victim of the situation as well as a hero who dares to steal in order to take care of his family, while migrants become de-victimized.

CONCLUSION: VICTIMIZATION AS A MEANS OF OTHERING

“Othering” in Slovenia occurs on two levels. On the explicit level of hate speech and xenophobia directed towards minority groups (Roma, Serbs, Bosnians, Kosovars, migrants from the Middle East and African countries, etc.) and on the implicit level of self-victimization. The first level, concerning Slovenian rhetoric and practices of exclusion, did not develop during the 2015 “refugee crisis” but has much older origins and a wider context. Many studies have noted an intensification of stereotyping, xenophobia, and discriminatory speech directed against anything or anybody foreign emerging in Slovenian public discourse since the country seceded from Yugoslavia (see Vezovnik 2015; Doupona Horvat et al. 1998; Jalušič 2000; Pajnik et al. 2001; Zavratnik Zimic 2006; Kralj 2008; Bobnič, Vezovnik 2013; Bajt 2016; Pušnik 2011) and even earlier (Mežnarič 1986). This and many other studies show there was a climate of xenophobia in public discourse and practices against groups of ethnic non-Slovenians, especially asylum seekers and undocumented migrants during the early 2000s, ex-Yugoslavian refugees during the early 1990s, low-skilled migrant workers from ex-Yugoslavian regions in the late 2000s, the Islamic community since the 1970s, Roma people and the Erased throughout the transitional period, and lately also refugees. This climate is in line with other European trends of the rhetoric of exclusion that aims at delimiting a European “us” from the non-European “other” (Wodak, Boukala 2015). In Slovenia and elsewhere the abovementioned binarity was produced and reproduced by hegemonic media and political discourse, but also translated into the migration laws, politics, and policies which began to develop since Slovenia became an independent state in 1991.

The analysis presented here does not offer much new material with respect to these general exclusionist trends. The analysis showed explicit "othering" by depicting migrants as culturally different from Slovenians. This difference was then marked with a negative connotation, which was most often evident in a negative moral judgement of the acts and characters of migrants. Such "othering" highlighted and reinforced similarities amongst "us" by emphasizing the "other's" distinctiveness (Benhabib 1996). The migrant "other" has functioned as the point against which the Slovenian positive self-image and self-representation is established. This discursive system that establishes and reaffirms the dichotomist polarization of cultural difference between "us" and "them" is akin to Said's (1995) notion of orientalism – a system of discourses and knowledge organized around distinctions of rational vs. irrational, centre vs. periphery and civilization vs. barbarism (Vežovnik, Šarić 2015). The division between "us" and "them" involved a three-part process. First, the analysed tabloid news identified the Slovenian culture and territory as a "space"; second, it separated "Slovenian space" from the "migrants" space; third, it constructed the "migrants" space as barbaric and different and put a negative social value on their "space" (Richardson 2004: 69). This was most evident in constructing migrants as a cultural and security threat and Slovenians as victims of the migrants' cultural barbarism, obscenity, violence, criminality etc.

The idea of a threatened and oppressed community brings us to the second level of "othering" – a much subtler and implicit one occurring through self-victimization. Threatened/oppressed people are seen to have a specific subjectivity, that of the victim. We usually find a victimizer or oppressor set in opposition to the victim. For the analysed tabloid content, the notion of victim and the opposition between victim and victimizer seems to be an important sustainer of a broader discursive and power operation of "othering". If contextualizing the "othering" of migrants seemed like a pretty straightforward job that was already done by the abovementioned studies, making sense of the apparently new phenomenon of (self-) victimization might be more challenging, as we have to think within the broader frame of Slovenian national and identity building and dig deeper into Slovenian history in order to understand when this pattern of self-victimization "originated". I would contend here that Slovenia has never really liberated itself from the "prison of nations". It was first a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, then of Yugoslavia, and since 2004 of the European Union. Due to its smallness and marginal status in all of these supra-national formations, its "national character" has mostly been reduced to self-victimization based of feelings of being exploited by stronger nations. The perpetuation of self-victimization as an important feature was evident mostly in canonical literature published since the middle of the 19th century that provided a *locus communis* for the construction of the Slovenian "national character". However, an important feature of the construction of the "national character" can also be attributed to the Catholic values that were strongly promoted in the late 19th century by the Christian-Socialist movement called *Krekism*. *Krekism* aimed at solving the social situation of the impoverished Slovenian peasantry by at the same time depicting the Slovenian peasants as humble, servile, hard-working, and diligent, erecting these characteristics as an important signifier of Sloveneness. Since that period Slovenia, its culture, language and population have been perceived as being dominated by these supra-national "big Others" and at the same time endangered by the barbaric Islamic and Balkan "others" that have been represented as a threat to Sloveneness since the Ottoman period. This self-victimization therefore reflects a small nation's fear of being taken over,

dying out, losing its autochthony, population, culture and language. In order to prevent such an imaginary scenario, the Slovenian national consciousness was built on the ideology of ethnic uniformity, exclusivism, language purism, the idea of blood and soil and similar (see Vezovnik 2010, 2015; Šumi 2012; Šumi, Janko Spreizer 2011; Jalušič 2001).

However, the “trend” of constructing victims and self-victimization is not only specific to the Slovenian case but is a prominent “trend” in tabloid journalism per se. As Best (1997) and Glynn (2000) point out, the victimization of a majority population as the victims of a minority has its roots in the right-wing rhetoric that for instance in the USA emerged in the 1970s but especially during the Reagan era. Since then, victimization has become a fashionable mass media topic, to the point where Best (1997) labelled the trend the “victim industry”. Television shows in particular enabled the construction of white people’s identity which was understood as victimized, and therefore deserving of more rights in relation to the supposedly violent and criminal black urban Americans. The mass media therefore played an important role in establishing and reproducing racist ideology through heroifying and idealizing white victims of black crime. As Laruelle (2015: 1) notes, “/.../ media corruption has made the victim a new ethical value, a point of condensation and effervescence, of the exacerbation of ideological conflicts” (ibid.: 2). *Slovenske novice* demonstrated a very similar process. On one hand migrants were deprived of the status of the victim, while the majority population obtained it, and even more, became the victim of migrants. This is not so much a moral dilemma present in the self-posed question: who should I as a reader feel sorry for? Rather it is a matter of the construction of a social hierarchy in which the majority population becomes a victim and their rights become more important than migrants’ human rights.

However, I do not see the solution in restoring the migrant as the victim *par excellence*. In the section about “genuine” vs. “fake” refugees I showed that the representation of the “genuine” victims is equally dangerous as the operation of victimizing the majority population. Although it might be true that the only positive representations of migrants occurred in the case when texts were writing about “genuine” refugees, we have to be careful when thinking what kind of representation of migrants is actually fair. The political implications of constructing migrants only as victims reproduces systemic inequalities between the majority population, sometimes represented as active, mostly through the characters of heroic helpers of victims and migrants represented as passive, stripped of agency and de-subjectivised.

Therefore, what one encounters here is the paradox of victimization. The victimized “other” can be protected and pitied as long as he remains a genuine victim, a victim without agency and political charge. In this case the pitying of such “genuine” victims could be explained by re-addressing the Slovenian self-victimization that allows potential identification with the migrant “genuine” victims who appear similar to the victimized Slovenian “pure souls” (Vezovnik 2015: 262). As soon as the migrant tries to avoid the status of victim by performing acts of resistance, claiming rights etc., his political struggle is reduced to deviant vandalism.

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POVZETEK

DRUGOST IN ŽRTVENOST V TABLOIDNEM TISKU: PRIMER »BEGUNSKE KRIZE« V »SLOVENSKIH NOVICAH«

Andreja VEZOVIK

Prispevek se osredotoča na analizo reprezentacij begunske krize in migrantov v Sloveniji leta 2015. S pomočjo kritične analize diskurza prispevek obravnava predvsem jezikovne načine, s pomočjo katerih so migranti konstruirani v osrednjem in najbolj branem slovenskem dnevniku *Slovenske novice*. Ker se *Slovenske novice* žanrsko umeščajo med tabloide, članek najprej opredeli elemente tabloidov, predvsem pa tabloidnega diskurza, nato pa s pomočjo empirične študije pokaže, kako so bili s pomočjo tabloidnosti v izbranem obdobju med 20. 8. 2015 in 31. 12. 2015 migranti konstruirani kot »drugi«. Izbrano obdobje časovno sovпада s t. i. »begunsko krizo« v Sloveniji leta 2015. S pomočjo analize avtorica ugotavlja, da tabloidni diskurz preigrava predvsem binarne dihotomije med »nami« kot tistimi, ki posebejamo žrtve, heroje in heroizirane žrtve, in »njimi«, ki za večinsko populacijo posebejajo kulturno in varnostno grožnjo. V analitičnem delu skozi reprezentacije migrantov identificira migrante kot tiste, ki za večinsko populacijo predstavljajo kulturno grožnjo. To se kaže v konstruiranju kulturne drugačnosti migrantov, pri čemer so migranti reprezentirani kot umazani in pretkani. Nadalje analiza ugotavlja, da so migranti reprezentirani tudi kot varnostna grožnja, pri čemer je poudarjen predvsem strah pred migranti, povezanimi s terorizmom. Navsezadnje so migranti reprezentirani tudi kot žrtve, pri čemer novinarski teksti vzpostavljajo razliko med »pravimi« migranti – sirskimi družinami, ki so upravičeni do statusa žrtve, in ekonomskimi migranti – mladimi moškimi iz Afganistana, Iraka in Irana, ki jih prikazujejo kot oportuniste in »neprave« žrtve. Članek sklene z razpravo o pomenu statusa žrtve, saj se žrtev kaže kot osrednja kategorija novinarskih prispevkov. Kot žrtve namreč nastopajo tako begunci kot tudi večinska populacija. Pri konstruiranju žrtve se kot osrednje sestavine tabloidnega diskurza kažejo predvsem moraliziranje, upovedovanje skozi osebne zgodbe, senzacionalizem, pretirana čustvenost ipd.

DINAMIKA NOVIČARSKEGA DISKURZA POPULIZMA IN EKSTREMIZMA: MORALNE ZGODBE O BEGUNCIH

Maruša PUŠNIK¹

COBISS 1.01

IZVLEČEK

Dinamika novičarskega diskurza populizma in ekstremizma: moralne zgodbe o beguncih

Članek proučuje značilnosti ekstremnih populističnih novičarskih diskurzov in njihovih desnih politik na primeru ksenofobnega tona razprav o beguncih in islamu. Da bi demitologiziral populistične diskurze, ki jih reproducirata, in razkril način razširjanja ekstremističnih pogledov, analizira prispevke o beguncih iz dveh tednikov, *Reporterja* in *Demokracije*, ki se samoopredelujeta kot desno usmerjena politična tednika. Njun politični diskurz temelji na avtoritarizmu, militarizmu, nativizmu in etničnem nacionalizmu, kulturalizaciji ekonomske politike in tehniki vzbujanja gnusa in sovraštva namesto sočutja, reartikulira pa se v odnosu do beguncev – migrantov muslimanov, ki ju predstavljata kot nevarnost »našim« svoboščinam. Članek ugotavlja, da islamofobija in ekstremni populistični diskurzi, ki se širijo prek novičarskega diskurza, kulturno zamenjajo z biološkim; nova oblika kulturnega rasizma tudi begunca zamenja z migrantom muslimanom.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: begunci, populistični novičarski diskurz, ekstremizem, nacionalizem, kulturni rasizem

ABSTRACT

The Dynamics of Journalistic Discourse on Populism and Extremism: Moralistic Stories about Refugees

The article examines the characteristics of extreme populist news discourses and their right-wing policies in the case of xenophobic discussions of refugees and Islam. It analyzes news articles about refugees from two weeklies, *Reporter* and *Demokracija*, which are self-described as right-wing-oriented political weeklies, in order to reveal the implementation of their populist policy. This policy is based on authoritarianism, militarism, nativism and ethnic nationalism, the culturalisation of economic policy and on the techniques of arousing disgust and hatred instead of compassion, and it is rearticulated in relation to refugees – Muslim immigrants – who are presented as a threat to “our” freedoms. The article notes that Islamophobia and extreme populist discourses, which are spreading via the news discourse, replace the biological with the cultural, but also refugees with Muslim immigrants, which gives us a new form of cultural racism.

KEY WORDS: refugees, populist news discourse, extremism, nationalism, cultural racism

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Če kmalu ne uspemo izgnati Judov, bodo v zelo kratkem času judaizirali naše ljudi. (Adolf Hitler, govor v Nürnbergu, 13. januar 1923, v Yilmaz 2016: 1)

O muslimanski invaziji na Evropo [...] Do sklepa, da so begunci namerno poslani v Evropo, ni daleč. Zato lepega dne, ko se bomo zbudili, v naši soseski namesto cerkvene zvonika ne bo samo minaret, ampak bo tudi na naši priljubljeni kavarni pisalo čajnica pri 72 devicah ali pri mučeniku Abdulahu. Takrat bo že zdavnaj prepozno. (Biščak 2015a: 26)

UVOD: MIGRACIJE, NACIONALIZEM IN DESNIČARSKI FENOMEN

V začetku 21. stoletja se soočamo z množičnim priseljevanjem iz islamskega sveta, kar je posledica konfliktov v deželah, kot so Afganistan, Irak, Somalija, Sirija.¹ Migracije spremlja porast ekstremnih populističnih diskurzov in politik širom po Evropi in drugod, kar je tesno povezano z vzponom in s krepitvijo politične desnice in desničarskih, pogosto skrajno ekstremnih diskurzov (Wodak, KhosraviNik 2013; Mammone, Godin, Jenkins 2012; Wilson, Hainsworth 2012; Rydgren 2005; Paxton 2004). Chantal Mouffe (1995; 2005) govori celo o vzponu skrajne desnice in koncu politike, češ da je hegemonsko strategijo namesto socialističnih gibanj prevzela skrajna desnica. Še več, opazni so pereči premiki v oblikah in stilih politične retorike desno usmerjenih strank pa tudi celotnega političnega polja, zato mnogi avtorji opozarjajo, da prihaja do »haiderizacije« in »berlusconizacije« politike in Evrope (Wodak, KhosraviNik 2013: xvii–xviii), kar se odraža v mešanici konzumeristične ideologije, etno-nacionalističnih sentimentov, hedonizma in sovražnosti do manjšin, migrantov in vseh ranljivih skupin. Skupno tem gibanjem je, da spadajo med »gibanja izključevanja« in da multikulturalizem vidijo kot sovražnika. Njihovi vodili sta zaustavitev vsakršne migracije in asimilacija že obstoječih migrantov (Rydgren 2005). Meindert Fennema v tej luči ocenjuje:

[...] edino programsko vprašanje, ki je skupno vsem radikalnim desnim strankam, je njihovo zavračanje migrantov in migracijskih politik njihovih vlad. Zato je zavajajoče, da tem strankam pravimo ekstremno desne. Namesto tega jih bomo imenovali antimigracijske stranke. (Fennema 2005: 1)

Nadalje Fennema (2005: 2) trdi, da imajo antimigracijske stranke tri značilnosti: implicitno slavijo fašistično preteklost, zavračajo migracijske politike vlad in slavijo modrost in krepost zdravega razuma in običajnega človeka, zato se kategorije skrajno desnega, rasističnega in populističnega med sabo prepletajo in bi jih bilo težko ločiti. Te stare in nove oblike sovraštva so dandanes uporabljene proti muslimanom. Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin in Brian Jenkins (2012: 4) pravijo, da se krepí »supranacionalni ideal Evrope, ali natančneje »evropski nacionalizem«, kjer je Evropa na splošno veljala kot branik proti amerikanizaciji

1 Za opis zadnje »begunske krize«, kot jo je poimenoval evropski politični vrh in se je začela leta 2015, uporabljam za ljudi, ki so se preseljevali, namesto izraza migrant izraz begunec, saj termin »(i)migrant/priseljenec« ne izraža realne potrebe ljudi po odhodu z ogroženih območij zaradi vojne, konflikta, politične represije, medtem ko se termin »begunec« tega zaveda in to tudi vključuje.

in komunizmu in, v zadnjem času, proti globalizaciji, ameriški hegemonski moči, multi-etničnosti in islamu».

Številni avtorji napovedujejo, da se celotna Evropa premika v desno in se zateka v ek-tremne populistične diskurze. Ferruh Yilmaz (2016) opozarja, da so populistične skrajne desničarske sile uspele potisniti celotni politični diskurz v desno natanko z ugrabitvijo debate o migracijah. To dokazuje z vzponom populističnih desnih strank in s tem, da so uspele migracijo iz delavskega vprašanja uspešno obrniti v kulturno grožnjo naciji, kar je posledično premaknilo teren političnega boja iz ekonomije (razredni boj) v kulturo (kulturni boj) in levice in desnico združilo okoli temeljnih vrednot. Premik v desno so olajšale neskončne verige moralnih panik in nasprotij okoli islama in muslimanskih migrantov ter njihovih kulturnih in verskih praks, ki jih slikajo kot grožnjo skupnim dosežkom – raz-prava o islamu in migrantih se je tako pomaknila v osrčje evropskih političnih diskurzov (Yilmaz 2012: 368). Islam je postal osrednji politični problem, pogosto povezan z razpravami o terorizmu in varnosti (prav tam). Ksenofobni ton razprav o muslimanskih migrantih in islamu je mnoge raziskovalce napeljal na to, da govorijo o novi obliki rasizma v kulturni preobleki, o kulturnem rasizmu oziroma islamofobiji (Meer, Modood 2009; Yilmaz 2012; Modood 2005; Wren 2001). Mouffe (1995; 2005) razlog za to vidi v političnem vakuumu, ki je nastal kot posledica brisanja levo-desne distinkcije. Tako socialni demokrati kot tudi bolj migrantom prijazne leve stranke si delijo skrajno desničarske skrbi o kulturni grožnji, ki jih muslimanski migranti predstavljajo za »naše« skupne vrednote (Yilmaz 2012: 372). Celotni milje se je glede vprašanj migracije premaknil v desno – gre za odkriti in prikriti rasizem, kot pravi Rodney Coates (2007), pri čemer odkriti rasizem uporablja očitne in zahrbtno oblike, prikriti rasizem pa se skriva za fasado vljudnosti, politične korektnosti, primernosti in objektivnosti (prim. Jontes 2010). Pomik v desno se je zgodil natanko prek debat o nekompatibilnosti muslimanov in islama z evropsko kulturo.

Politični in javni diskurzi so s tem premikom močno ožigosani, kar se navsezadnje odraža tudi v medijskem diskurzu, ki je teme migracij, kulture in vere uspel postaviti kot osrednje zadeve javne debate.² Predvsem je namreč v moči medijev, da ti diskurzi odmevajo po javnem prostoru. Že Stuart Hall in sodelavci (1978) so v sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja pokazali na moč medijev pri kreiranju moralne panike o rasi in vlogi skrajne desnice pri tem in opozarjali na vlogo medijev, ki nagovarjajo in interpelirajo »mi« skupnost gledalcev tako, da se fokusirajo na raso kot nekaj nenavadnega oziroma to kreirajo kot nenormalno.

Ker je v sodobnem svetu politika mediatizirana, kar pomeni, da postaja odvisna od medijev in da prav mediji postajajo ena najpomembnejših političnih institucij (Mazzoleni, Schultz 1999: 249–251), se tudi desni populizem za svojo odmevnost lahko zahvali predvsem medijskim diskurzom. Ruth Wodak in Majid KhosraviNik (2013: xviii) opozarjata, da je to še zlasti pomembno zaradi naraščajoče splošne apatije širše javnosti do politike, tako da začenjajo ekstremni populistični diskurzi zapolnjevati vrzeli, nastale zaradi razočaranja javnosti nad politiko. Prav splošno nezanimanje za politiko širom po Evropi pa na drugi strani omogoča krepitev populističnih in ekstremističnih diskurzov, ki privilegirajo

2 Antimigrantski diskurzi in ekstremizmi niso nekaj, kar bi se pojavilo ob zadnji »begunski krizi«, ampak jim v novičarskem, medijskem, političnem in nasploh v javnem diskurzu v Sloveniji lahko sledimo ob različnih migracijskih režimih in državnem upravljanju migracijskih procesov skozi zgodovino (glej Doupona, Verschueren, Žagar 2001; Kuzmanić 1999; Vezovnik 2015; Kalc 2016; Pajnik 2011; Milharčić Hladnik 2016).

šovinistične in nativistične ideologije in krepijo »politiko strahu« (Richardson, Wodak 2009). Za omenjene populistične diskurze je značilna ksenofobna in rasistična propaganda, kar desni populizem ločuje od drugih populizmov; ta namreč polje družbenega na pogosto kontradiktorne načine vzdolž nacionalnih, etničnih, regionalnih in verskih linij ostro dihotomizira v »mi identiteto« nasproti »oni identiteti« (Wodak, KhosraviNik 2013: xx). KhosraviNik (2009: 480) navaja precejšnje število študij medijskih reprezentacij beguncev, prosilcev za azil in migrantov ter drugih etničnih manjšin, in pravi, da so jim skupne predvsem ugotovitve obstoja strategij negativizacije in kriminalizacije ter poudarjanja vloge kulture kot točke kategorizacije, distanciranja in zvrčanja krivde nanje. Paul Hartmann in Charles Husband (1974) sta v sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja ugotovila, da so reprezentacije migrantov v medijih podobne antisemitskim diskurzom o judovskih migrantih v dvajsetih letih 20. stoletja in da je novičarski diskurz v obeh primerih uporabljal določene ksenofobne argumente. Teun Van Dijk (1987) v tem smislu opozarja, da so migracije in družbeni problemi redefinirani kot rasni problem skupaj z jasno ločnico med »mi/oni«, pri čemer te skupnosti niso reprezentirane kot del »naše« družbe, ampak kot tujci, ki jih je treba »držati zunaj«.

V članku analiziram kompleksno naravo populistične medijske govornice o beguncih, ki so leta 2015 množično prihajali v Slovenijo in jo večinoma le prečkali. Cilj je pokazati obrise tiste transformacije novičarske govornice, ki je uspela postaviti migracijo, kulturo in vero kot osrednje teme javne debate in je povezana s političnim populizmom ter se najočitneje razgrinja v diskurzu desno usmerjenih medijev. V ta namen sem pod drobnogled vzela dva politična tednika, *Reporter* in *Demokracija*, ki se samoopredeljujeta kot desno usmerjena in podpirata desno usmerjene politične opcije in svetovne nazore. Ugotoviti poskušam njun način reproduciranja diskurza begunstva in njune morebitne razlike. Razkriti želim značilnosti in mehanizme ekstremne populistične novičarske govornice, ki jo reproducirata in širita v slovenski družbi. Ugotavljanje načina, kako tednika *Reporter* in *Demokracija* diskurzivno konstruirata begunce in značilnosti populističnih diskurzov, ki označujejo tovrstno novinarstvo, sta osrednji raziskovalni vprašanji. Robin Wilson in Paul Hainsworth (2012: 17) ugotavljata, da se ključni točki skrajne desnice, migracija in islam, združujeta pri tematiki beguncev, zato se o njih pogosto poroča kot o »tujih« državi gostiteljici. V analizo sem vključila 119 prispevkov o beguncih iz tednika *Reporter* in 79 prispevkov iz tednika *Demokracija*, ki so izšli med 20. avgustom in 31. decembrom 2015, v obdobju, ko so begunci prihajali v največjem številu.³ Da bi pokazala, na katere specifične interpretativne repertoarje se pri konstruiranju podob beguncev naslanjajo prispevki iz omenjenih časopisov, uporabljam tekstualno analizo in analizo diskurza.⁴ V analizi se osredotočam na prispevke o beguncih in jih obravnavam kot diskurzivne dogodke, ki jim je pomen pripisan v okviru širše diskurzivne formacije. Prispevke obravnavam na semiotiski ravni, pri čemer analiziram verbalne pa tudi vizualne kode (fotografije), na ideološki-kontekstualni (diskurzivni) ravni, ko proučujem kode, ki tvorijo diskurze tovrstnega novinarstva, obravnavam pa tudi diskurzivne formacije, ki prek posamičnih diskurzivnih nastopov – prispevkov ustaljujejo specifične pomene o begunstvu v slovenski družbi.

3 Gradivo za analizo sem pridobila od Urada vlade RS za komuniciranje, in sicer vse novinarske prispevke iz tega obdobja, ki so vsebovali besedne korene: migra*, prebež*, begun*.

4 Za podrobnejšo epistemologijo interpretativnih repertoarjev v novinarstvu kot delov širših novinarskih ritualov glej Jontes in Luthar (2015).

POPULISTIČNO-ETNOKRATIČNI IZZIV IN ETNIČNI NACIONALIZEM: RADIKALIZACIJA KULTURNE RAZLIKE

Michael Kazin (1995: 3) je populizem definiral kot stil politične/javne retorike, ki mobilizira običajne ljudi nasproti uveljavljenim oblastnim strukturam, dominantnim idejam in vrednotam družbe; to pa je osrednji interpretativni okvir, na katerem temeljita *Reporter* in *Demokracija*. Populistična retorika, ki jo reproducirata, vzbuja popularna čustva, jih izkorišča v politične namene in uteleša željo po radikalni spremembi, ki je politična. Kot pravi Hans-Georg Betz (2005: 28), bi bil svet v smislu borbe ljudstva proti kulturnim in političnim elitam lahko drugačen. Ena izmed značilnosti njunega populističnega poročanja o beguncih je antiestablishment oziroma antielitizem. V prispevkih o beguncih se v obeh tednikih nenehno kaže boj ne le proti beguncem, ampak tudi proti kozmopolitskim elitističnim strukturam in, ko govorita o beguncih, se v člankih v negativnem tonu sklicujeta na varuhinjo človekovih pravic, Amnesty International Slovenije, »nepotešene feministke« (Biščak 2015b: 26), »levosučne medije«, Mirovni inštitut, Svet za odziv na sovražni govor, stranko Združena leвица, LGBT gibanja (Kršinar 2015a: 23), evropsko levico, ki »koketira s terorizmom (pri nas somišljeniki titoizma) in je peta kolona v srcu EU« (Ferluga 2015: 8), razne levičarske aktiviste, »ki se kitijo s patetičnimi imeni, recimo protirasistična fronta brez meja« (Sajovic 2015a: 55), Društvo novinarjev Slovenije kot »versko moralno policijo v slogu iranske teokracije, ki nam bo solila pamet, kaj smemo pisati in celo misliti« (Glücks 2015: 20), »prevladujoče promigrantsko razpoložene medije« (Biščak 2015c: 11), (levičarske) družboslovce »s svojo sprevrženo logiko, da so poklicani, da razlikujejo med sovražnim govorom in svobodo govora« (Blažič 2015a: 14). Ti prispevki pripovedujejo metazgodbe o beguncih prek kulturnih in političnih elit in s tem domači politični in kulturni teren povezujejo z vprašanjem beguncev. Gre torej za notranji boj proti domačemu sovražniku, kozmopolitskim elitam, in za zunanji boj proti tujemu sovražniku, beguncem.

Tednika *Reporter* in *Demokracija* se naslanjata tudi na interpretativne repertoarje avtoritarizma, militarizma in nativizma in jih povezujeta s kombinacijo nacionalizma in ksenofobije (prim. Vezovnik 2015), kar Cas Mudde (2007) označuje kot temeljne značilnosti desnega diskurza. Avtoritarna in militaristična govorica je osrednja diskurzivna strategija pri označevanju beguncev, kar pojasnjuje tudi ostre zahteve po žičnati ograji in dodatni krepitvi vojske in policije v boju proti beguncem. Gre za ustvarjanje militantnega vzdušja, saj je begunec kriminaliziran in prikazan kot ogrožujoči sovražnik domači deželi, proti kateremu se je treba boriti: »Prišlo bo do točke, ko bo potrebna sila – ograja, fizično varovanje meje, vračanje na Hrvaško [...] Ni vprašanje, ali se bo to zgodilo, temveč kdaj« (Glücks 2015: 20). Ali pa gre za slikanje vojaške grožnje interesom domače nacionalne skupnosti:

A samo ograja, pa še tu je vprašanje, kakšno so sploh kupili (če ne gre zgolj za navadne kolote bodeče žice, ki se jih da dokaj enostavno uničiti), ne bo zajezila masovnega dotoka prebežnikov, če meje ne bodo varovale trume policistov in vojakov. [...] Tako veliko število (razočaranih) migrantov v osrčju Evrope pa je prava tempirana bomba, ki se lahko kadarkoli sproži. (Šurla 2015a: 3)

Tak novičarski diskurz ves čas ustvarja vojaške razmere in slika nevarno stanje, v katerem živimo zaradi prihoda beguncev:

Povedal bom kar naravnost: razmišljam, da bi si nabavil pištolo. [...] A bom vseeno tvegaj, kajti tudi moje zaupanje v voljo in sposobnost države, da mi zagotovi varen in miren vsakdan, je splahnelo. [...] nenadne invazije več milijonov ljudi iz bližnjevzhodnih dežel v Evropo [...] obljublja pol Evrope z ognjem in handžarjem spremeniti v kalifat. (Guzelj 2015: 45)

Tudi stil poročanja je pogosto udarno militanten, s kratkimi in z odrezavimi stavki (prim. Doupona, Verschueren, Žagar 2001), kot na primer: »Prav imajo Slovaki, ki nočejo muslimanov« (Škorc 2015a: 6), ali: »Sama žičnata ograja ni bog ve kaj. Veliko vprašanje je, ali bo sploh zadržala migrante. Verjetno ne« (Berlec 2015: 3). V takšnem populistično militantnem poročanju je problematičen tudi način poimenovanja beguncev, ki jih z nečloveškimi opisi označujejo kot manjvredne:

[...] ogromne množice tujerodnega prebivalstva, ki prihajajo v Evropo. [...] Zato mora EU drastično spremeniti svojo politiko in odločno zavarovati svoje zunanje meje ter povečati lastno rodnost. V nasprotnem primeru nam grozi propad. Vladavina tujerodne drhali. (Berlec 2015: 3)

Med najbolj razširjenimi populističnimi strategijami v *Demokraciji* in *Reporterju* je prav nativizem, ki v prispevkih reproducira populistično trditev, »da imajo določene skupine kulturno identiteto, ki je ni mogoče integrirati, saj naj bi bila nezdržljiva z liberalnimi vrednotami« (Wilson, Hainsworth 2012: 3). Omenjeni populistični diskurzi gredo z roko v roki s sovražnostjo do beguncev in islama. Nacija ima po prepričanju *Reporterja* in *Demokracije* namreč biološko konotacijo. Tisti, ki ne pripadajo etnični skupnosti, so izključeni iz nacije. Fennema (2005: 5) pravi, da tak etnični nacionalizem temelji na metafizični nociji, da ima nacija dušo in da je članstvo v njej definirano po sorodstveni liniji, etnični nacionalizem je tako izražen v krvi in tudi v kulturi, pri čemer gre za skupne korenine in za »našost« proti tujstvu (prim. Kuzmanič 1999). *Reporter* in *Demokracija* begunce predstavljata kot nezaželene vpadnike, kot nepoštene prosilce za azil in predvsem kot tiste, ki jih je treba odstraniti ali jih zadržati zunaj meja države (prim. Parker 2015: 6–13; za britanski in avstralski tisk). Naj povedano ilustriram z nekaj izbranimi primeri:

Da se bodo v njej integrirali, ni mogoče pričakovati. To niso predsodki, temveč dejstva. (Glücks 2015: 20)

Ampak teh ljudi ni nihče vabil v Evropo. Sami so prišli, zdaj bi pa očitno radi hotele s petimi zvezdicami. Ob vsem še neskončno lažejo. [...] Če komu kaj ni všeč, se lahko obrne in se vrne tja, od koder je prišel, pravijo Posavci, ki nosijo največje breme drugega migrantskega vala. Upajo, da si bodo od teh pritepenec, ki ne znajo drugega kot tožiti, kmalu oddahnili. (Biščak 2015d: 22)

[...] ne gre za spopad civilizacij, pač pa za spopad med civilizacijo in barbarstvom. [...] Je nasprotovanje prihoda beguncev res sovraštvo? [...] Če danes nasprotuješ sprejemu beguncev in priseljencev, si označen za ksenofoba. Če opozarjaš pred nevarnostjo islamizacije, si takoj islamofob. (Blažič 2015a: 14)

S pomočjo tisočev nezakonitih priseljencev, ki vsak dan vdirajo na ozemlje Evropske unije, se rojeva nova Evropa. [...] In kot danes kaže, rezultat tega civilizacijskega trka ne bo evropeizacija

islama, ampak bomo v naslednjih nekaj desetletjih priče islamizaciji Evrope. [...] Nalijmo si čistega vina, kulture niso enakovredne. Zahodna je s svojim humanizmom, zagovorništvo svobode, razuma in dostojanstva posameznika izjemna. Po ekonomskih, tehnoloških in socialnih kazalnikih se v primerjavi z njo islamska izkaže za izrazito manjvredno. Pika. (Brščič 2015: 20)

Bodo Slovenke hodile z naglavnimi rutami? Sloven(islam)ija 2030? Ne! Sam sem za ponosno Slovenijo na veke vekov. [...] A ker je Slovenija integralni del Evropske unije s svojim edinstvenim jezikom, s svojo avtohtono kulturo, s svojim (resda vse prevečkrat skritim) nacionalnim karakterjem, bo hkrati potekal tudi boj za dušo Slovenije. (Kalah 2015: 8)

Značilnost populističnega diskurza so tudi eksplicitne negativne reprezentacije, ki kriminalizirajo in popolnoma dehumanizirajo begunce (prim. Vezovnik 2015). Begunec v prispevkih *Demokracije* in *Reporterja* ni prikazan kot človek, ampak je razčlovečen, večkrat celo animaliziran. Številne so metafore z vodo (begunci so val, poplava, reka), z naravno katastrofo, invazijo in eksodusom, z velikimi količinami, pri čemer so begunci prikazani kot vzrok za strah, stres in nevarnost (prim. Doupona, Verschueren, Žagar 2001; prim. KhosraviNik 2009: 484–491; za britanski tisk) – reka ilegalnih migrantov, begunski roj« (Biščak 2015a: 26), »val migrantov, volkovi iz Evrabije« (Šurla 2015b: 3), »priseljeniški roj, podivjana drhal« (Biščak 2015e: 24), »begunski cunami« (*Reporter* 2015: 15), »roj prišlekov vidijo kot invazijo na slovensko zemljo [...] prevladujejo moški, ki so nadležni kot roj mušic« (Biščak 2015d: 22), »zlasti v zadnjem letu pa se je »snežna kepa« prebežnikov [...] začela valiti vse hitreje in se debeliti do neslutnih razsežnosti« (Kavčič 2015: 7), »invaziji« (Sajovic 2015a: 55). Tovrstne opise v *Reporterju* in *Demokraciji* spremljajo izključno fotografije množice beguncev, kjer je poudarjena masa ljudi, ne pa begunec kot posamični človek.

Prevladuje argumentacija pozitivne samoreprezentacije, ki je postavljena nasproti negativni reprezentaciji Drugih – beguncev. Negativne reprezentacije beguncev se nanašajo na skupne topike, vključujoč številke, grožnje (kulturni identiteti, skupnostnim vrednotam) in nevarnost. Begunci so konstruirani kot razčlovečena homogena skupina, ki si prek procesov agregacije, kolektivizacije in posploševanja deli podobne značilnosti, ozadja, motivacije. V tej luči je zelo pogost tudi fokus na nasilje in spolne zlorabe, vse to pa je predstavljeno v okviru kriminaliziranja beguncev in zastraševalnega diskurza. Naj to ilustriram z nekaj primeri:

Evropa je v vojni in Slovenija z njo. [...] Povsod po Evropi, kjer so taki centri, migranti, ker ni po njihovem, postanejo nasilni, vlamljajo, ropajo in posiljujejo. [...] Zato lahko upravičeno sklepamo, da se utegne tudi v Sloveniji dobrota izkazati za siroto, teroristična grožnja državi se bo povečala. (Biščak 2015f: 42)

Ker dobršen del teh prihaja z Bližnjega vzhoda, se kažejo vzporednice z nekdanjimi turškimi vpadi v Evropo. [...] Nemir se je preselil tudi na državljane. In nehote se je sprožil »zgodovinski spomin« izpred stoletij. Iz časa turških vpadov. (Sajovic 2015a: 55)

[...] da so le-ti huda grožnja za nas in da jim bo presenetljivo hitro uspelo islamizirati Evropo do mere, ko bodo kristjani prisiljeni boriti se za svoje pravice. (Škorc 2015b: 6)

Betz (2005: 32) omenjene značilnosti populizma označuje kot etnokratični izziv, saj takšni medijski diskurzi ponujajo transformacijo liberalne demokracije v etnokratico, ki daje absolutno prioriteto varovanju interesov »svojih ljudi« in zaščiti nacionalne kulture in identitete. Kot ugotavlja, termin etnocracije popolnoma zaobjame bistvo radikalnega populističnega desnega političnega projekta, kot da gre za predvideno obnovo zahodnih demokracij. Z drugimi besedami, gre za obrambo nacionalne identitete, predvsem v smislu ubranitve »naših vrednot, naših običajev in našega načina življenja«. Gre za mehanizme distance in cinizma do tujega, od koder črpa populistični diskurz *Reporterja* in *Demokracije*, s katerim bralci poenostavljajo kompleksnost sveta. Ta mehanizem uporabljajo avtorji prispevkov, saj se namesto k raziskovanju nepoznanega in h kontekstualiziranju drugačnosti zatekajo k radikalizaciji kulturnih razlik in h konstrukciji hierarhij – »našost« je drugačna in večvredna od tujosti. Reproduciranje distance v prispevkih pa disciplinira bralce/ke kot pripadnike določene kolektivitete, saj postavlja ekskluzivni okvir za interpretacijo – vzbuja strah in gnus pred begunci ter hkrati simpatijo in sočustvovanje z domačini (za zgodovinski pregled migracijskih režimov prim. Kalc 2016). Mammone, Godin in Jenkins (2012: 3) pravijo, da je vznik nacionalističnih gibanj, ki v središče kot ključni element politične retorike in razvoja politične agende postavljajo prav nacija, paradoks sodobnosti. Nacija kot zamišljena domovina je tako še vedno ključni koncept. Še več, s krepitvijo nacije nastaja transnacionalni politični prostor ali transnacionalni evropski prostor (Mammone, Godin, Jenkins 2012: 5). Rasizem in nacionalizem sta v *Reporterju* in *Demokraciji* tesno povezana in – ko se begunce sooča z vrednotami, s tradicijami in kulturami domovine – vztrajata pri obrambi monoetnične skupnosti. V reprezentacijah *Reporterja* in *Demokracije* je Evropa pogosto predstavljena kot obsojeni kontinent, ki je zaradi koordiniranih kampanj islamizacije na robu kulturnega izumrtja (prim. Carr 2006). Evrabijske fantazije, kot jih poimenuje Yilmaz (2012: 370), tako begunce nenehno sprevačajo v tujo grožnjo.

ŠOVINISTIČNI OKVIR DRŽAVE BLAGINJE: KULTURALIZACIJA EKONOMSKE POLITIKE

Jens Rydgren (2005) pravi, da se diskurz antimigracijske populistične politike napaja tudi iz šovinističnega okvira države blaginje – resnični ali domnevni stroški migracij so razumljeni kot grožnja programom države blaginje zahodnih družb. Avtorji prispevkov namreč prikazujejo, da se zaradi prihoda beguncev reducira socialna varnost slovenskih državljanov, da ti zaradi beguncev ne bodo dosegali socialne blaginje, ki se nanaša na nacionalni minimum dobrin in storitev.⁵ *Reporter* in *Demokracija* v prispevkih begunce poudarjeno prikazujeta kot ekonomske migrante, ki kot paraziti črpajo državne zaloge:

Že sama logika pove, da so to v veliki večini ekonomski migranti, ki iščejo boljše življenje, ne pa begunci, ki bežijo pred vojno. V vseh državah, ki jih prečkajo, ni vojne, tam pa ne bi ostali, ker so zanje prerevne, vključno s Slovenijo. [...] Če ne bomo zaprli svoje južne meje, bomo v najslabšem

5 Da na primer begunci s svojim prihodom ogrožajo zagotavljanje minimalnega dohodka slovenskim državljanom in da kot finančno breme ogrožajo sistem zdravstvenega varstva in pokojninske varnosti v državi.

črnem primeru postali »begunska« tamponska cona. Migranti bodo besni hoteli v Avstrijo, tja pa ne bodo mogli več, zato bodo verjetno razgrajali po Sloveniji. (Kršinar 2015b: 26)

Begunci so v prispevkih prikazani kot nelegitimni tekmovalci za državna sredstva in kot tisti, ki lahko povečajo nezaposlenost v državi:

Če pa bodo begunci le poležavali ob brezplačni hrani, se jim bodo začeli po glavi poditi ekstremizmi. [...] Cerar o zaposlitvi beguncev tudi ne govori, saj dobro ve, da imamo doma kar 110.000 brezposelnih. (Sajovic 2015b: 14)

Fennema (2005: 14–15) pripominja, da so prav ekonomski interesi tista pomembna spremenljivka, ki omogoča uspešnost antimigracijskih politik širom po Evropi (prim. Kuzmanić 1999; Vezovnik 2015),⁶ Yilmazova študija pa prinaša zanimive zaključke o tem, kako deluje rasizem v odnosu zahodnih evropskih držav do islamskih migrantov.

V tem procesu se je transformirala sama kategorija migrant: migrant delavec se je spremenil v migranta muslimana. Ni bila kulturalizirana le kategorija migranta; debata o kulturalizirani migraciji je zavzela osrednje mesto v političnem diskurzu. (Yilmaz 2012: 370)

Soysal (2009: 5–7) zatrjuje, da je kultura postala glavni način naslavljanja državljanstva, varnosti in ekonomije, ki so bili, konvencionalno gledano, obravnavani kot ločeni od kulture. Še več, po Yilmazu (2012: 370) je kultura islama postala zdravi razum v urejanju, organiziranju in upravljanju gospodarskih odnosov in sveta, kjer muslimani nadomeščajo migrante, ti pa begunce. *Reporter* in *Demokracija* torej ekonomsko vprašanje reducirata na kulturno vprašanje, kjer begunce najprej predstavljata kot izključno ekonomske migrante, ki napadajo ekonomske okvire domače države, ker mora država zanje odšteti precej denarja, nato pa vse to zreducirata na kulturno vprašanje – na muslimana, ki napada ne le ekonomske, ampak tudi kulturne in varnostne temelje slovenske/evropske družbe. Begunec je torej dvojno degradiran, najprej je označen zgolj za ekonomskega migranta in nato za muslimana, ki predstavlja grožnjo evropski skupnosti. Diskurz begunstva je kulturaliziran, ko je kategorija begunca skrčena na ekonomsko breme in na varnostno grožnjo. Za ilustracijo navajam dva konkretna primera:

Po svoje imamo srečo, da se za migrante Evropa začne šele v Šentilju in da je le za vzorec tistih, ki v Sloveniji zaprosijo za azil. [...] Koliko deset tisoč migrantov bo potem ostalo pri nas in kako bo to na plečih davkoplačevalcev reševala vlada, nihče ne ve. (Šurla 2015c: 3)

[...] zato je veliko bolj verjetno, da gre za dobro organiziran, obilno financiran in skrbno načrtovan migrantski val. [...] teza o načrtovani invaziji muslimanov v Evropo ni iz trte izvita. (Blažič 2015b: 16)

6 Kot kažejo študije po Evropi, volivci podpirajo skrajne desničarske stranke ne le iz ideoloških razlogov, ampak tudi iz zelo pragmatičnih razlogov in rešitev, ki jih te stranke ponujajo (Betz 2005: 32–35).

ONKRAJ POSTHUMANITARNE SENZIBILNOSTI: SOČUTJE KOT GNUS IN SOVRAŠTVO

»Že nekaj tednov sem namreč razmišljala, da bi pomagala – ne samo migrantom, ampak prostovoljcem, ki so utrujeni, neprespani in se ob vsem tem še vedno trudijo, da bi za begunce čim bolj poskrbeli« (Opeka 2015: 30). To je temeljna oblika vzbujanja senzibilnosti med bralci/kami, kot jo prikazujejo prispevki *Reporterja* in *Demokracije*. Za kaj pravzaprav gre?

Chouliaraki (2008) ugotavlja, da nas v času posthumanitarne senzibilnosti reprezentacije trpljenja oddaljenih Drugih bolj zabavajo, kot pa da bi v nas spodbudile solidarne javne akcije, kar veliko pove o tem, v kakšne odnose stopamo z oddaljenimi Drugimi. V globalnem kontekstu in v mediatizirani družbi smo množično vsak dan soočeni z Drugimi, ki trpijo, ne da bi imeli možnost odreagirati na njihovo situacijo, čemur Tomlinson (1999) pravi, da prihaja do deteritorializacije izkušnje (prim. za slovenske primere Vezovnik 2015; Milharčič Hladnik 2016; Pajnik 2011). Še več, *Reporter* in *Demokracija* celo povsem eksplicitno promovirata indiferentnost, apatijo in očitno averzijo, gnus ter sovraštvo do teh oddaljenih Drugih – beguncev. Na primer: »Seveda, ko na ekranu vidiš uboge mokre, lačne in premražene otroke, te stisne pri srcu. Če te ne bi, nisi človek. Toda kdor ne vidi širše slike, ne vidi ničesar. Tudi otroci so orožje za hitrejšo dosegajo cilja« (Glücks 2015: 20). Populistični diskurz *Reporterja* in *Demokracije* se namreč v bralcih/kah niti ne trudi vzbujati sočutja, ampak s tem, ko svoja občinstva izpostavlja številnim vizualnim podobam človeške tragedije in trpljenja (fotografije množice beguncev), na ravni teksta pa jim ponuja podobe gnusa, odpora in sovraštva do beguncev, deluje kot javni spektakel. Bralcem/kam sugerira, kako naj o beguncih razmišljajo in čutijo:

Čeprav so mediji polni srce parajočih fotografij žensk in otrok, ki naj bi bili v večini, tega nismo videli [...] ti ljudje večinoma niso nikakršni begunci, ampak ekonomski migranti. [...] Zgodbe vseh pa so bolj ali manj enake: vsi so iz Sirije, življenje vseh je bilo ogroženo, če ne bi odšli, bi lahko ostali brez glave ali bi jih zadelo bomba. Tudi njihovi očitki in pripombe so si na las podobni: vsi so utrujeni, lačni in žejni, vsem ni jasno, zakaj se po Evropi ne morejo prosto sprehajati, zakaj morajo tako dolgo čakati, zakaj ni zanje boljše preskrbljeno, zakaj so sploh potrebni dokumenti, saj so ubogi begunci, in zakaj morajo hoditi, če bi se lahko peljali z avtobusi ali vlaki. (Biščak 2015g: 22)

Kot bi rekla Susan Sontag (2003), gre na ravni fotografij množice beguncev sicer za klinično narativizacijo trpljenja, za nekaj, kar je daleč od nas in irelevantno. To pa še dodatno blokira povezljivost gledalca/ke in tistega, ki trpi. Gledalec/ka namreč ob ponavljajočih se fotografijah zasede aktersko pozicijo voajerja, priče, osvobojene moralne dolžnosti delovanja, zato v naslonjaču lahko udobno uživa ob medijskih podobah (prim. Chouliaraki 2008: 842–843). Populistični diskurz *Reporterja* in *Demokracije* se v bralcih/kah niti najmanj ne trudi izzvati sočutja do ljudi, ampak jih, nasprotno, zabava z eksplicitnimi opisi averzije in gnusa do njih. Po Kevinu Robinsu (1994: 464) prihaja do »fantazmagoričnega učinka«, ko trpljenje Drugih postaja senzacija. Ponavljanje podob trpljenja pri bralcih/kah vzbuja predvsem odpor, ne pa sočutja. Reprezentacije trpljenja drugih bralce/ke ohranjajo na varni distanci, kar jim omogoča, da se prepustijo »emocionalni simpatiji«, ne da bi njihovo varno izoliranost ogrozila realnost trpečih drugih (Žižek 2002: 291).

Prispevki *Reporterja* in *Demokracije* privilegirajo »naše« ljudi (Karitas, Rdeči križ, prostovoljce, policaje, vojake itd.) in sočutje do beguncev nadomeščajo s sočutjem do njih. Kot na primer:

V največjem begunskem valu po drugi svetovni vojni v Evropi, po podatkih policije je v nekaj dneh prestopilo slovensko mejo več kot 3600 migrantov in beguncev, so se izkazale posamezne dobrodelne in humanitarne organizacije. V sodelovanju z Upravo za zaščito in reševanje, slovenskimi skavti in številnimi prostovoljci je izstopala, tako kot že velikokrat doslej, Slovenska Karitas, zaupanje pri zbiranju pomoči beguncem so si pridobili tudi člani Društva Adra. (Karneža Cerjak 2015a: 45)

Prispevki objavljajo personalizirane zgodbe »naših« ljudi, ki izzovejo veliko mero sočutja pri bralcih/kah, tako da se z njimi zlahka identificirajo in sočustvujejo. Ni pa podobnih zgodb o beguncih, s katerimi bi predstavili njihove osebne zgodbe, personalizirane zgodbe malega človeka – begunca. Predstavljajo jih izključno kot maso ljudi, ki pritiska na Slovenijo/Evropo, tako da tak populistični diskurz v bralcih/kah namesto sočutja izzove zgolj gnus in odpor, hkrati pa bralcem/kam ponuja položaj državljanov – agresivnih voajerjev. Pogoste so fotografije beguncev, ki prikazujejo način dela članov humanitarnih organizacij z njimi, kot npr. Karitas, UNHCR, ti držijo v rokah dojenčke in otroke itd. (Karneža Cerjak 2015b: 49). V ospredju so torej prostovoljci, ki se jim izkazuje sočutje. Prikazani so kot tisti, ki se brezmejno žrtvujejo, begunec pa je samo kulisa, kot tisti, ki stoji tam, da bralci/ke lahko sočustvujejo z domačini, ki morajo delati z njimi. Osrednji moto takega populističnega diskurza je torej prikazovanje humanitarne krize kot varnostne krize, kjer sta pomoč beguncem in sočutje do njih zamenjala pomoč prostovoljcem in sočutje predvsem do njih in lastne države: »Ekipe so izredno obremenjene, zato pričakujejo drugačne rešitve. Karitas in prostovoljci. [...] Redno delo občinske Karitas je ohromelo, občani so deležni manj pomoči, kot bi je bili v normalnih razmerah« (Kocjan 2015: 33).

ZAKLJUČEK: POPULIZEM KOT KULTURNI RASIZEM

Pri islamofobiji in ekstremnih populističnih diskurzih, ki se širijo prek novičarskega diskurza, gre za zamenjavo biološkega s kulturnim, begunca z ekonomskim migrantom in muslimanom, pri čemer ima rasizem drugačno ime ali pa je skrit (prim. Kuzmanič 1999; Doupona, Verschueren, Žagar 2001). Yilmaz (2008: 370) govori o rasizmu v novi, »kulturni preobleki«. Van Dijk (1991: 25; glej tudi Billig 2006) je že pred leti opozarjal na premik k novemu rasizmu, ko pri konstruiranju »nas« nasproti »onim« prihaja do premika od rase h kulturi. Pojavljajo se novi načini artikuliranja »mi« skupnosti – evropske civilizacije proti islamu, kjer postaja »našost« srž nacionalnih skupnosti, ki se krepijo. V članku ugotavljam, da tednika *Reporter* in *Demokracija* v tem oziru izvajata populistično politiko, ki temelji na mehanizmih ekstremne populistične novičarske govornice, kot so avtoritarizem, militarizem, nativizem in etnični nacionalizem, kulturalizacija ekonomske politike in namesto sočutja na tehniki vzbujanja gnusa in sovraštva. Ta politika se reartikulira v odnosu do beguncev, ki so predstavljeni kot nevarnost za »naše« svoboščine. Med tednikoma *Reporter* in *Demokracija* v reproduciranju ekstremnih populističnih diskurzov ni razlike, še več, ob poročanju o begunstvu sta oba uspela postaviti teme o kulturi in veri beguncev

kot osrednje zadeve javne debate. Ugotavljam, da so begunci v novinarstvu *Reporterja* in *Demokracije* diskurzivno konstruirani le v okviru ogrožujočega islama in muslimanske kulture, skoraj nikoli pa ne spregovori o vojnih razmerah in političnih konfliktih, zaradi katerih so se preselili, pri čemer so begunci povsem razčlovečeni in prikazani le kot grožnja slovenski državi.

Novinarstvo, ki ga po javnem prostoru razširjata *Reporter* in *Demokracija*, temelji na kulturaliziranem političnem diskurzu:

Kar je bila tradicionalna delitev med kapitalom in delavstvom, ki je nekoč formirala obrise leve in desnice v Evropi, je to danes kulturna delitev med nacionalnimi državljani na eni strani in kozmopolitskimi kulturnimi elitami in muslimanskimi migranti na drugi. (Yilmaz 2012: 372–373)

To je nova retorika izključevanja, značilna za populistične diskurze, kot jih reproducirata tudi *Reporter* in *Demokracija* in so po Vereni Stolcke (1995) splošna značilnost desne politike. Islamofobne kampanje so namreč postale nov zaščitni znak desnice širom po Evropi (Mammone, Godin, Jenkins 2012: 6). Še več, prihaja do novega hegemonskega premika – ideje, ki so bile nekoč obravnavane na ekstremnem desnem koncu političnega spektra (npr. islam kot inkompatibilen z evropskimi vrednotami), so se pomaknile v sam center in so jih posvojile tako *mainstream* desne kot leve politične skupine (prim. Yilmaz 2012: 373). S tem prihaja tudi do visoke atomizacije družbe, s katero je že Hannah Arendt (1973: 352) pojasnjevala vzpon Hitlerjeve NSDAP in sovraštva do Judov – govorila je o družbeni dezintegraciji. Po njenem mnenju so lahko le množice visoko atomizirane družbe sprejele tako nasilen nacionalizem, družbena izolacija namreč med množicami ustvarja samodestruktivne in iracionalne impulze. To pa pojasnjuje vzpon in krepitev ekstremnega populizma kot novega kulturnega rasizma.

Ta reartikulacija se v Evropi dogaja s pomočjo debat o migrantih in islamu ter ideološko proizvedenih povezav med islamom kot grožnjo in terorizmom, kar potrjuje tudi analiza prispevkov o beguncih v *Reporterju* in *Demokraciji*. Yilmaz (2012: 374) meni, da je zahodna civilizacija v obeh primerih predstavljena kot pogoj za realizacijo emancipatornih projektov. Tako *Reporter* kot *Demokracija* namreč reproducirata islamofobne/ksenofobne perspektive in prav na tak način se kulturalizirajo tudi rasistične hegemonске artikulacije, ki simbolno vpisujejo »Evro-islam razcep« v samo središče družbe. Proti takim ekstremnim populističnim diskurzom pa se je treba vztrajno boriti z antinacionalističnimi hegemonskimi projekti, ki bi nenehno razkrinkavali kulturno rasistično govorico v novinarstvu, zaradi česar potrebujemo tudi ostro kozmopolitsko držo. Če parafraziram Ulricha Becka in Edgara Grandeja (2006), potrebujemo politično filozofijo ustavne strpnosti, ki bi zagotovila, da je prav nevtralno stanje lahko dom posameznikov različnih nacionalnih pripadnosti.

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SUMMARY

THE DYNAMICS OF JOURNALISTIC DISCOURSE ON POPULISM AND EXTREMISM: MORALISTIC STORIES ABOUT REFUGEES

Maruša PUŠNIK

This article investigates the characteristics of extreme populism in journalism in the case of xenophobic discussions of refugees and Islam, which is being spread around Slovenia via news discourse. It analyzes 119 news articles about refugees from the weekly *Reporter* and 79 news articles from the weekly *Demokracija*, which are both self-described as right-wing-oriented political weeklies, and deconstructs the discursive mechanisms which construct the refugees as Muslim immigrants and as a threat to “our” freedoms. The article suggests that two key points of extreme right discourses, migration and Islam, are united on the topic of refugees, which results in the representing of refugees as “alien” to the host, i.e. “our”, country. The aim of the article is to reveal the implementation of the populist policy in news discourses. This policy is based on authoritarianism, militarism, nativism and ethnic nationalism, the culturalisation of economic policy and on the techniques of arousing disgust and hatred instead of compassion. The article notes that Islamophobia and extreme populist discourses, which are being spread via the news discourse, replace the biological with the cultural, but also refugees with Muslim immigrants, which gives us a new form of cultural racism. This results in the emergence of new ways of articulation of the “us” community – European civilization vs Islam, whereby “us-ness” against Islam immigrants is strengthened in the modern era and becomes the core of nationalist communities. The article shows that media discourse in *Reporter* and *Demokracija* is a culturalized political discourse, since it represents the cultural division between national citizens on one side and cosmopolitan cultural elites and Muslim immigrants on the other as the main division in European countries. This is a new rhetoric of exclusion, which is a characteristic of the populist discourses that *Reporter* and *Demokracija* reproduce, and of right-wing politics in general. The article concludes that a new hegemonic shift is occurring – ideas which were once dealt with on the extreme right end of the political spectrum are now permeating mainstream discourses, and this explains the rise and the strengthening of extreme populism as a new cultural racism, reproduced in journalism.

BEGUNCI IN »ODMEVI«: EPISTEMOLOGIJA KONVENCIJ

Breda LUTHAR¹

COBISS 1.01

IZVLEČEK

Begunci in »Odmevi«: epistemologija konvencij

Avtorica v članku obravnava »begunsko problematiko« v oddaji Odmevi na slovenski javni televiziji. Zanima jo, kako konvencionalna naturalizirana pravila novinarske prakse in uprizarjanje nevtralizma kot sestavnega dela profesionalne samopredstave političnega novinarstva določajo obravnavo teme. V tem kontekstu analizira izbor »zunanjih« ali »prisvojenih« glasov v studijskih intervjujih v Odmevih ter diskurzivno umeščanje intervjuvancev v narativ oddaje. Ugotavlja, da a) selekcija in b) diskurzivna obravnava gostov v studijskih intervjujih v Odmevih povzročata oz. omogočata zožanje razprave o »begunski problematiki« na polje legitimnih nasprotij, torej na tiste poglede, ki jih zastopa strankarska politika. S selekcijo in z obravnavo zunanjih glasov (gostov v studiu) se ustvarja t. i. mnenjski ali diskurzivni tunel, zaradi katerega prihaja do popolne simbolne marginalizacije vseh pogledov zunaj parlamentarnega mainstreama in njegovih interesov ter do obravnave »begunske problematike« kot sosledja pripetljajev.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: begunci, tv intervju, prisvojeni glasovi, nevtralizem, analiza konverzacije

ABSTRACT

Refugees and "Odmevi": The Epistemology of Conventions

In this article I investigate the representation of the "refugee problem" in the Odmevi current affairs program on Slovenian national TV. I aim to explore how conventional, naturalized codes and neutralism as a constitutive element of professional self-presentation in political journalism determined the treatment of the "refugee problem". In this context, I analyze the selection of external or "accessed" voices in the Odmevi studio interview, the discursive framing of interviewees and their placement into the show's narrative. The main findings are a) that the selection and b) the discursive treatment of studio guests in Odmevi's interviews caused or rather enabled the debate on the "refugee problem" to be narrowed to the sphere of legitimate controversy represented by partisan politics. The selection and treatment of accessed voices (interviewees and guests) created the so-called opinion or discursive tunnel, which consequently led to the complete symbolical marginalization of all views that fell outside the parliamentary mainstream and its interests, and hence to treating the problem as a mere sequence of events.

KEY WORDS: refugees, tv interview, neutralism, accessed voices, conversation analysis

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UVOD: KONVENCIJE IN INDIVIDUALNOST

V članku se ukvarjam z *Odmevi*, politično pogovorno oddajo na slovenski javni televiziji. Posvečam se formalnim značilnostim žanra, nekaterim problematičnim profesionalnim konvencijam in predpostavkam, ki utemeljujejo žanrsko obliko, ter ideološkim učinkom te standardizirane televizijske forme, zlasti intervjujskim konvencijam. Žanrsko so *Odmevi* »aktualnopolitična« pogovorna oddaja na nacionalni televiziji, ki so jo v času analize izmenično vodili štirje redni voditelji (Bergant, Bobovnik, Gobec in Pesek). Oddaja je sestavljena iz novinarskih prispevkov/reportaž, pogovorov z gosti v studiu in uvodnega, povezovalnega in zaključnega teksta voditeljev.¹ Nacionalna televizija jo predvaja v najbolj gledanem času in ima pomembno vlogo v medijskem preoblikovanju zadev v probleme, torej v t. i. *agenda-setting* funkcijo ali 'funkcijo prednostnega tematiziranja'. Pri analizi se naslanjam na vzorec 41 oddaj v drugi četrtini leta 2015, torej v času »begunske krize« od začetka oktobra 2015 do januarja 2016, obdobju, ki so ga mediji poimenovali »prvi in drugi begunski val«. V analizo so vključene oddaje med 9. 10. in 22. 12. 2015, v času najbolj množičnega vstopanja beguncev v Evropo in Slovenijo po t. i. balkanski poti. Po madžarskem zaprtju meje z Avstrijo in s Hrvaško so prav vse oddaje *Odmevov* obravnavale begunsko problematiko.²

Sociologija, komunikologija in medijske študije obravnavajo novinarske in druge medijske žanre kot institucionalni proizvod in ne kot v prvi vrsti produkt individualne presoje in kompetence novinarja. Formalne žanrske značilnosti vsake televizijske oddaje, tipična kombinacija vizualnega in verbalnega ter način selekcije, uporaba in diskurzivno prisvajanje »zunanjih glasov« (gostov v studiu, intervjuvancev), hišni stil in širše profesionalne norme ter novinarski standardi, delovne rutine, tehnologija, organizacijski faktorji in širše medijsko okolje omejujejo vlogo individualnih voditeljev. Tudi kadar je npr. na televiziji oblika komunikacije konverzacijska in blizu vsakdanji govorici, ne smemo pozabiti, da gre za institucionalno govorico, ki je vedno tudi uprizarjana za zamišljeno občinstvo. Tudi ta analiza izhaja iz vprašanja, kakšno vlogo igrajo institucionalizirane ritualizirane prakse, ki so konvencionalni del uprizarjanja nevtralnosti v političnem novinarstvu, ki ga tu zastopa oddaja *Odmevi*. Izhodišče analize *Odmevov* je torej predpostavka voditeljeve zavezanosti formulacični standardni strukturi konkretne oddaje, ki je še naprej umeščena v širši epistemološki sistem medijskih konvencij in ritualov (gl. Ekström 2002).

Osredotočanje na ritualizirane konvencije, ki so del epistemologije žanra, in na ideološke učinke same novinarske konvencionalne oblike, ne pa na analizo ideološkega diskurza, je pri medijski obravnavi begunske problematike zlasti smiselno pri tistih formatih/žanrih/medijih, katerih profesionalna identiteta temelji na intenzivnem uprizarjanju objektivnosti ali nevtralizma s standardizirano kombinacijo institucionalnih in zunanjih

1 Opis oddaje na uradni strani RTV SLO pravi: »Odmevi vsak delavnik ob 22.00 ponudijo sveže večerne novice ter analize najpomembnejših dogodkov dneva. Ozadja dogodkov in pojavov, prikrite podrobnosti in nove plati vznemirljivih zgodb predstavljajo novinarji in izbrani gosti, ki jih izprašajo voditelji oddaje ali pa se soočijo med seboj ...« Glej <http://4d.rtvsllo.si/oddaja/odmevi/66> (10. 9. 2016).

2 *Odmevi* so po podatkih AGB Nielsen v tem času dosegali 20- do 45-odstotni delež televizijskega občinstva in so bili druga najbolj gledana televizijska oddaja za serijo Usodno vino na POP TV (v tem obdobju predvajana med 21.30 in 22.30). Analiza temelji na transkriptih *Odmevov*, ki smo jih raziskovalci dobili od Urada vlade RS za komuniciranje.

oz. prisvojenih glasov, selekcije zunanjih govorcev in standardnih metaokvirov. Vendar pa, kot ugotavlja Hjelle Sjovaag (2013), medtem ko je novinarska profesionalna avtonomija bistveno omejena na politično, ekonomsko in organizacijsko raven proizvodnje novic, se lahko do določene mere izvaja na uredniški ravni ali na ravni dejanske prakse. Ideološki učinek žanra je sicer prevladujoče odvisen od ritualiziranih konvencij žanra, vendar pa se novinarjeva subjektiviteta in njegova »osebna ideologija« v oddaji lahko uveljavita z naslednjimi elementi: a) začetek oddaje z uporabo okvirov kot neizgovorjenih teorij o tem, kaj se v resnici dogaja, b) uokvirjanje poročila s »terena« (z državne meje, iz zbirnega centra v Srbiji, parlamenta, s tiskovne konference politične stranke itd.), c) selekcije in diskurzivne umestitve zunanjih glasov (intervjuvancev) v narativ oddaje, in d) z retoričnimi značilnostmi novinarjevega povezovalnega, uvodnega in zaključnega teksta.

Za pričujočo analizo so torej ključni analiza konvencionalnih oblik, njihov ideološki učinek in vprašanje dela štirih voditeljev v kontekstu navedenih omejitev. V tem kontekstu pa so najpomembnejši vprašanje selekcije t. i. »zunanjih« glasov v *Odmevih* ter njihova umestitev v simbolno hierarhijo s pomočjo konvencij intervjuvanja ter ideološki učinek te konvencionalne strategije na obravnavo begunske problematike. Konkretnije me zanimajo: a) interpretativna vloga voditeljev pri upravljanju konvencij, posebej v intervjujih z gosti v studiu, b) selekcija in vloga t. i. »zunanjih ali prisvojenih« glasov, c) način, kako so konvencionalna naturalizirana pravila in uprizarjanje nevtralizma kot konstitutivnega dela profesionalne samopredstave določala obravnavo »begunske problematike«, ter d) uokvirjenost begunske tematike oz. uporaba izhodiščne definicije situacije in metaokvirov, torej morebitno sistematično povezovanje problema z drugimi problemi (islamskim terorizmom, manihejsko borbo med slovensko desnico in levico, s trpljenjem slovenskega človeka med ekonomsko krizo ...).³

»ODMEVI« IN VLOGA »SPOSOJENIH« GLASOV – NEKAJ ŠTEVILK

Prepletanje različnih glasov (glasovi s terena, gostje v studiu, povezovanje voditelja itd.) je najpomembnejše sredstvo uprizarjanja objektivnosti in hkrati družbene osrednosti medijev (glej Couldry 2003). Na splošno način, na katerega intervju proizvaja védenje, konstituira osrednjo značilnost epistemologije novinarstva (gl. Heritage 2000; Ekström 2002). Ker gre za institucionalno komuniciranje, se vlogi novinarja, ki intervjuva, in intervjuvanca povezujeta s posebnimi pričakovanji, ki strukturirajo vedenje vsakega od njiju (o tem glej npr. Heritage, Greatbatch 1991; Heritage 1992; Heritage, Drew 2006; Tolson 2006; Montgomery 2010). Kot pravi Meikle (2013: 19), je vsak televizijski intervju »kompleksno razmerje avtoritete, v katerem institucionalni glas voditelja, ki vodi intervju, umesti prisvojeni glas intervjuvanca v okvir oddaje, pri čemer je cilj obeh strani v procesu intervjuja, da iz intervjuvanja izvlečeta še dodatno avtoriteto«. Zunanji glasovi so tako ključni strukturni element novinarskega uprizarjanja nevtralizma in s tem sredstvo potrjevanja

3 Kot primer analize medijskega diskurza o »begunski problematiki« v Sloveniji naj omenim npr. pragmatično tekstovno analizo javnega diskurza o »begunski problematiki« v času prihajanja pribežnikov pred bosansko vojno v Slovenijo (v Marjeta Doupona Horvat idr. 1998/2001) in poznejše analize medijatzacije beguncev ali imigrantskih delavcev, kot npr. Simona Zavratnik (2003), Mojca Pajnik (2007) ali Andreja Vezovnik (2015). Posebej o vlogi »zunanjih« glasov pri obravnavi migrantov v dnevnem tisku leta 2001 glej Ana Kralj (2008).

institucionalne legitimnosti novinarstva in konkretne institucije. Tako lahko ideološka protislovja v obravnavi begunske problematike ugotovljamo prav z analizo razmerja med zunanji in »institucionalnimi glasovi« (reporterji, voditelji).⁴

Zunanji glasovi v *Odmevih* so ob hkratnem zagotavljanju nevtralizma med ključnimi načini vnašanja pristranskosti v obravnavo »begunske problematike«. To velja tako za a) selekcijo zunanjih glasov kot tudi b) za diskurzivno umestitev »zunanjih glasov« v tekst oddaje med intervjujem ter za konkretno novinarjevo upravljanje konverzacije. Gre tako za institucionalne glasove (novinarje na terenu), katerih izjave so uporabljene v novinarski reportaži, ki je praviloma sestavni del *Odmevov*, kot tudi za glasove tistih, ki so kot gosti ali gostje vabljeni v studio in jih v narativ oddaje umesti voditelj. Tako si zunanje glasove (politikov, predstavnikov institucij, policistov, ekspertov ali navadnih ljudi s »terena«, kot so krajani na mejah, lastnik kampa v Beli krajini, prostovoljec, begunec ...) prisvojijo institucionalni govorniki (reporterji – novinarji, voditelji oddaje) in jih umestijo v diskurzivno logiko *Odmevov*. V tem poglavju se osredotočam na drugi tip uporabljenih »zunanjih glasov«, na selekcijo gostov in na intervjuje z gosti v studiu. Med prvimi in drugimi glasovi je namreč pomembna semiotična razlika, ki uvaja hierarhično razliko glede na mesto izjave – »teren« oz. mesto dogajanja (od parlamenta do meje s Hrvaško) na eni strani in televizijskim studiem na drugi. Pri izjavah/mnenju s terena se dopuščajo številni alternativni pogledi ali, bolje, različni občutki, vsaka izjava je po navadi umeščena med druge izjave kot en pogled med mogočimi pogledi oz. doživljanji situacije, zato so te izjave nižje na hierarhični lestvici in v oddaji v primerjavi z glasovi, ki lahko govorijo v studiu, diskurzivno diskreditirane.⁵

Že samo analiza selekcije »zunanjih glasov« v tromesečnem obdobju kaže na to, da je bila večina v studio vabljenih »zunanjih glasov« politikov parlamentarnih strank, političnih funkcionarjev in uradnikov, odgovornih za področja, ki so bila po mnenju novinarjev povezana z »begunsko problematiko«. To pomeni, da je bila neenakost v »distribuciji diskurzivnih resursev« (Hutchby 2006: 33) med različnimi pogledi na begunsko problematiko očitna že na ravni selekcije govorcev. Izjave »s terena« v *Odmevih* so sicer nekoliko bolj raznovrstne kot gostje v studiu, vendar kljub vsemu tudi v reportažah s terena (kamor spada tudi parlament) bistveno prevladujejo izjave politikov iz parlamentarnega nabora strank. To je toliko bolj presenetljivo zaradi nižjega hierarhičnega statusa izjav, ki imajo v semiotiki strukturi oddaje položaj mnenj med drugimi mnenji; tak nabor govorcev in izjav, vsaj načelno, v novinarski profesionalni ideologiji dopušča tudi »radikalna« stališča.

Medtem ko je bilo v tromesečnem obdobju več kot 110 izjav in studijskih nastopov politikov, je bilo v oddaji uporabljenih izjav ljudi zunaj mainstream politike manj kot dvajset, nekaj več kot deset pa je bilo izjav uradnih oseb (predstavnik Zveze slovenskih časnikov,

4 Tu se strinjam s Claymanom (1992), ki se, ko govorimo o televizijskem intervjuju, zavzema za uporabo pojma nevtralizem namesto nevtralnosti ali objektivnosti. Nevtralizem namreč po njegovem poudarja dejstvo, da novinarji, ki sprašujejo, dosežejo vtis nevtralnosti in dobijo status nevtralnega spraševalca preko vrste specializiranih diskurzivnih praks. To je v nasprotju z zdravorazumskim razumevanjem nevtralnosti kot značilnosti, ki je v samem spraševalcu – novinarju ali v značilnosti njegovega vedenja. Nevtralnost je torej družbeno organizirani, natančneje, interakcijsko organizirani fenomen, torej nekaj, kar oba, spraševalec in intervjuvanec, kot bomo videli, »delata skupaj«. Več o ideologiji objektivnosti v novinarski samopredstavi in praksi glej D. Jontes (2011).

5 Glej Fiskejevo znano analizo televizijskih poročil, še posebej del o vzpostavljanju hierarhije diskurzov kot taktiki semiotičnega in hkrati ideološkega obvladovanja v okviru novinarskega diskurza (2004).

direktor policije, Generalni konzul Jordanije, Vodja sektorja za organizirano kriminaliteto, pomočnik direktorja uniformirane policije, namestnica generalnega direktorja policije, predstavnik slovenske vojske, župani s terena ..).⁶ Zaradi večkratnega pojavljanja istih politikov v oddaji (kot gostje ali z izjavami v reportaži, večinoma iz parlamenta) je bila raznovrstnost političnih glasov majhna. Izjave ozkega nabora politikov so bile hkrati redno vključene v poročila o parlamentarnih razpravah, nekaterih, npr. Janeza Janše, redno ali pogosto (Šefic, SMC; Gorenak, SDS; Katič, SD; Janša, SDS; Pahor, SD; Cerar, SMC; Tonin, NSI; Novak, NSI; Godec, SDS; Bratušek, Zavezništvo; Mesec ZL; Grims, SDS). Po pogostosti oglašanja politikov iz posameznih strank glede »begunske problematike« je očitno, da je tematizacijsko funkcijo v teh treh mesecih odigrala stranka SDS, levica (formalno v levico štejem ZL in SD) pa je bila v ponudbi alternativnih interpretacij in vizij begunske problematike praktično neslišna (ali pa, manj verjetno, neslišana). Kaj lahko iz te velike prevlade političnih in parapoličnih glasov v oddaji sklepamo? In, nadalje, kako so bili ti glasovi diskurzivno umeščeni v *Odmeve*?

Že samo podatki o selekciji glasov (izjav) s terena kot pomembnem diskurzivnem elementu oddaje govorijo o tem, kako je bil metaokvir begunske problematike v *Odmevih* v resnici slovenski strankarski konflikt v mainstream politiki in kako se je pri obravnavi »begunske problematike« uveljavila rasistična in nacionalistična hegemonija. Konflikt okoli reševanja begunske problematike je torej samo konkretna podtéma, na kateri se je ta konflikt uprizarjal. Še bolj izrazito se to kaže pri studijskih gostovanjih: v studio vabljeni govorci, ki jih gledalcem posreduje institucionalni (primarni) glas voditelja in ki imajo, kot sem že omenila, višji hierarhični položaj glede statusa resničnosti svojih izjav, so skoraj izključno politiki parlamentarnih strank, predvsem predstavniki vladajoče koalicije in opzijske SDS. Če sem nekoliko ohlapna – saj ni vedno lahko uvrstiti govorce v tabor koalicije ali opozicije – in uporabim kriterij politične, nestranske afilicije, lahko ugotovim, da je bilo iz koalicije v studiu šest politikov (nekateri seveda večkrat, kot npr. ministra Erjavca in Gyorkos Žnidar, drugi enkrat ali dvakrat, Cerar, Kozlovič, Matič, Vajgl), opzijskih obiskov v studiu pa je bilo pet (Zver, Janša, Rupel, Horvat, Boh Žibert), zunaj tega dvojčka pa še neodvisni poslanec Dobovišek. Strokovnjaki so bili v tem tromesečnem obdobju povabljeni sedemkrat: štirikrat geopolitični analitik/obramboslovec, enkrat strokovnjak za korporativne varnostne študije, enkrat mednarodni politolog in enkrat pravnik/borec za človekove pravice. Geopolitični analitik Klemen Grošelj je bil tako v studiu štirikrat (16. 10., 2. 11., 10. 11., 19. 11.) in bi ga lahko šteli za hišnega eksperta, Denis Čaleta, predsednik sveta inštituta za korporativne varnostne študije enkrat (14. 11., oddajo je vodil Bergant), Zlatko Šabič, mednarodni politolog, profesor na FDV, prav tako enkrat (30. 8., oddajo je vodil Bobovnik), enkrat Matevž Krivic, dne 10. 12., oddajo je vodil Bergant. Gostovanje Matevža Krivica je tudi edini trenutek, ko je v oddajo vključen alternativni in kritični pogled na slovensko migrantsko politiko. Tega sta že po postavitvi ograje in ob samem koncu naše trimesečne analize predstavila Matevž Krivic, gost oddaje, in voditelj Bergant.

6 Sem ne štejem peščice izjav tujih politikov (hrvaških, avstrijskih, nemških, srbskih ter uradnikov Evropske unije), ki še povečujejo število političnih glasov.

UPRIZARJANJE NEVTRALIZMA IN INTERVJU V STUDIU

Ker ideologija nevtralizma v oddajah, kot so *Odmevi*, določa celoten produkcijski proces, je intervju osrednjega pomena za konstrukcijo pomena »begunskega problema«. Pri tem ne gre le za vprašanje selekcije »zunanjih glasov«, temveč tudi za njihovo diskurzivno prisvojitvev. Hartley in Fiske v svojem klasičnem tekstu televizijskih študij (Hartley, Fiske 1978; Hartley 2007) oblikujeta tri žanrske kategorije novičarskega intervjuja, ki so hkrati tudi tri različne diskurzivne strategije: *vox pop* vprašanje za navadne ljudi, ki jih sprašujejo po njihovih emocijah in osebnem izkustvu, vprašanje za politično in drugo elito, zastavljeno kot pritisk nanje v domnevno dobro občinstva, ter vprašanje za vabljenе eksperte. Torej »kako se počutite vprašanja ...« za navadne ljudi, »... toda gotovo bi lahko pričakovali vprašanja ...« za politike in »... ali ni ...« vprašanja za strokovnjake. Montgomery pa v svoji konverzijski analizi televizijskega intervjuja (2010: 110–111) razlikuje štiri ključne generične tipe intervjujev, tako da Hartleyevi kategorizaciji doda še kategorijo »kolegialnega« intervju in tako predlaga kategorizacijo na štiri diskurzivne strategije: izkustveni intervju, odgovornostni intervju, ekspertni intervju in intervju s korespondentom, reporterjem, torej t. i. kolegialni ali afiliacijski intervju (glej tudi Harman 2004). Večino televizijskih intervjujev je mogoče neproblematično uvrstiti v eno od kategorij, obstaja pa seveda vrsta intervjujev mešane narave, ali pa se med samim razgovorom intervju ene vrste spremeni v intervju druge vrste.

Ta kategorizacija za mojo analizo ni pomembna, ker so ti intervjujski tipi del standardiziranih institucionalnih konvencij, hkrati pa predstavlja vsak zase poseben diskurzivni režim, ki ključno prispeva k statusu intervjuvanca, novinarja ter medijske institucije, pa tudi k avtoriteti in h kredibilnosti izjav intervjuvanca ter k percepciji bližine teh izjav o resničnosti. Status sodelujočih intervjuvancev je namreč lahko redefiniran samo s premikom, preusmeritvijo diskurzivne prakse. Intervju je torej v okviru nevtralistične norme način opredeljevanja brez opredelitve in je v tem smislu lahko vedno strateško uporabljen. Ena od konvencionalnih strategij v novinarskem intervjuju s politiki, s katero se uprizarja nevtralizem, je t. i. »premik osnove«.7 To se zgodi, ko novinar v intervjuvanje vnese mnenje, stališče, toda hkrati ohranja nevtralistično držo. Konkretno se to zgodi tako, da izraženo mnenje pripiše komu drugemu (Podatki kažejo drugače, gospod minister ...; Toda kot meni opozicijska SDS ...; Večina Slovencev ima občutek ...; Nekateri strokovnjaki so prepričani ...; Dr. Grošelj je opozoril ... itd.). Premik osnove je torej strategija, ki omogoča novinarju, da s tem, ko izjavo pripiše drugemu, v diskusijo vtihotapi svoja stališča.8

S tem ko novinar pripiše stališče, mnenje, občutke, izjavo ipd. komu drugemu, lahko vzpostavi distanco med seboj in jasno izraženim mnenjem. Novinar je tako le animator, ne pa tudi avtor stališča. Nasploh trditev, ki jo novinarji pripisujejo neki kolektiviteti (slovenskim ljudem, slovenskim davkoplačevalcem itd.) in jo uporabijo za spremembo

7 V angleščini *shift of footing*. Koncept je v izhodišču Goffmanov (1981) in temu v *Predstavljanju sebe ...* (1959/2014) še reče 'distanca vlog'. Pozneje so koncept razvijali znotraj konverzijske analize, posebej konverzacije, ki se dogaja v kontekstu institucij in se torej na različne načine ujema z institucionalno ideologijo – npr. v medicini, medijih, šoli, korporativnem okolju itd. – tako pri predstavnikih teh institucij kot njihovih »klientih« (glej npr. avtorje, kot so Garfinkel, Sacks, Drew in Heritage, Greatbach, Jucker, Montgomery, Hutchby, Scannell itd.).

8 To so sicer res lahko strateško namerne strategije, toda v principu jih moramo razumeti kot institucionalni diskurz in (problematičen) kulturni referenčni okvir novinarske prakse.

»osnove«, implicira vsestransko popularnost tega mnenja in je zdravorazumsko tudi dokaz faktičnosti izrečenega mnenja, na katerega se sklicuje novinar. To strategijo v *Odmevih* zlasti pogosto uporablja voditelj Bobovnik, ki s tem, ko sprašuje »v dobro gledalcev«, hkrati retorično ustvarja zavezništvo z zamišljenim občinstvom. S »spremembo osnove« novinar podeli glas »drugi strani« kontroverzne zadeve tako, da uravnoteži mnenja intervjuvanca z drugačnimi stališči. Premik osnove namreč doseže več kot le potrditev nevtralizma govorca. Hkrati lahko podeli zadevi, o kateri teče beseda, pridih kontroverznosti, lahko pa tudi vsesplošne konsenzualnosti in univerzalne sprejetosti (Slovenski ljudje imajo občutek ...; Večina strokovnjakov meni ...). To lahko sicer počne tudi bolj posredno z uporabo ironije ali šaljivega tona, ali pa z aforizmi, splošno znanimi citati ali s pregovori.⁹ Tudi s tem voditelj implicira, da uporabljene besede niso v celoti njegovo stališče (glej npr. Goffman 1981; Sacks 1992).

Sprememba osnove seveda lahko dosega tudi druge cilje, ne le odpovedi avtorstvu izjave in predstavitvi »druge strani«. Lahko pomeni uvajanje kontroverzne (pod)teme, spodbujanje nestrinjanja med več intervjuvanci, torej dramtizacije, še zlasti intenzivno pri panelnih razpravah tabloidne vrste, t. i. zabavobojih. Ker je premik osnove praviloma rezerviran za relativno kontroverzna ali, bolje rečeno, domnevno kontroverzna stališča ali stališča, drugačna od intervjuvančevega pogleda, je treba poudariti, da že sama odpoved avtorstvu in (samo)redukcija vloge voditelja zgolj na animatorja neke trditve ali stališča »te izjave reflektivno zaznamuje kot sporne«, saj niso sporne same po sebi in vnaprej (gl. Clayman 1992: 170). Poglejmo si na primer intervju voditeljice Tanje Gobec z Janezom Janšo. Ta intervju dobro ponazarja razmerje med institucionalnim in zunanjim/prisvojenim glasom, pomen intervjujske konverzacije za vnašanje ideološke pristranosti v oddajo ob hkratnem uprizarjanju nevtralizma, vir diskurzivne moči strankarskih politikov kot intervjuvancev, uporabno analitično vlogo žanrske kategorizacije intervjuja kot specifične diskurzivne strategije ter vlogo »spremembe osnove« v intervjuju.

28. oktobra 2015 je bil v studio *Odmevov* povabljen Janez Janša, predsednik SDS. Razlog za povabilo je bila po besedah voditeljice Janševa odsotnost na seji Sveta za nacionalno varnost, domnevno zaradi »zavračanja njegovih predlogov«, kjer je »pustil pismo z novimi predlogi« in ugotovil, da naj bi »Slovenija zamudila priložnost, da evropsko politiko prisili k ukrepanju«. Za *Odmeve* je bila ta politikova dramatična uprizoritev vladne nesposobnosti razlog, da ga povabijo v studio. Pogovor o ograji, ki se je obetala in katere postavitev je Janša zagovarjal, je voditeljica uokvirila z referenco na vladne ministre in Avstrijo, ki naj bi že sprejemali idejo o ograji. Tako je intervju z Janšo umestila v oddajo tako, da je hkrati prispevala k normalizaciji same ideje ograje/pregrade:

Gobec: »Kot smo slišali, je na seji Sveta za nacionalno varnost manjkal predsednik SDS-a. Zdaj pa ga pozdravljam v studiu. Dober večer, gospod Janša.«

[...]

Gobec: »Rekli ste danes, da besede ograja nihče, da pred časom besede ograja nihče noče izreči. Danes jo že izrekajo tudi ministri te vlade, tudi Avstrija. Kakšne pregrade so sploh v igri?«

9 Ta se namreč bolj kot drugi voditelji v svojem govoru sklicuje na imaginarnega gledalca pred ekranom in govori njemu in zanj ter retorično prevzema položaj občinstva, je torej bolj pogovoren.

Janša: Takšne, kot jih je pred leti postavila na meji z Marokom Španija, ali dve leti nazaj Bolgarija na meji s Turčijo, ali kot jih je postavila Madžarska. Ali kot so jih postavljale Združene države na meji z Mehiko.« [...]»

Gobec: »Kaj je to tehnična prepreka? Je to potem varovanje? Ljudje si ne predstavljajo. Pravijo tehnične prepreke, ne ograje, ampak kaj to pomeni?«

Janša: »To je igra besed, no.«

Gobec: »Saj to.«

Janša: »[...] To ni ograja, kot je bil berlinski zid, ki je preprečeval, da bi šli ljudje iz Vzhodne Nemčije v svobodo, ampak je ograja, ki brani svobodo. Je ograja, ki brani red, je ograja, ki omogoča, da se obvlada množica brez nasilja. Druga možnost je samo uporaba nasilja, tega si pa nihče ne želi. [...]«

Gobec: »Ampak to ograjo, gospod Janša, je potrebno varovati ...«

Janša: »No, zagotovo, ampak ...«
[...]

Za ta intervju je značilno, da voditeljica ne »spremeni osnove« pogovora, da bi v njem s politikom dosegla cilje te institucionalizirane konverzijske strategije novinarskega intervjuja (predstavitev »druge strani«, uvajanje drugačnih pogledov, uvajanje kontroverzne (pod)teme, spodbujanje nestrinjanja). S tem ko njegovega mnenja ne konstituira kot mnenja med mnenji, soočenega z drugačnimi mnenji, poveča »resničnost« njegove interpretacije ograje, saj ne tematizira alternativnih pogledov nanjo in drugačnih vizij migrantske politike. Kljub temu da je ta (sicer problematična) praksa reduciranja novinarja na animatorja, ki ni subjekt svojih izjav, usklajena s tradicionalnimi standardi nepristranosti v TV novinarstvu, saj premik osnove omogoča novinarju, ki vodi intervju, da to stori ob ohranjanju nevtralizma, voditeljica Gobec do konca pogovora z Janšo postavlja vprašanja, ki so le nadaljevanje in utrjevanje »resničnosti« Janševe definicije zadeve, ne uporabi običajne strategije premika osnove, ki je sicer ključni del uprizarjanja nevtralizma in profesionalizma v političnem novinarstvu. Prav tako ne uporabi taktike predstavitve »druge strani« kot demonstriranja kontroverznosti izjav intervjuvanca.

Samo pri enem vprašanju izzove sogovornika z omembo problema varovanja ograje, čeprav tu v resnici le »animira« izjavo strateškega analitika Grošlja iz ene prejšnjih oddaj *Odmevov* in s tem v resnici le ponovno podpre Janševu stališče. Tako se voditeljici, da bi ohranila nevtralistično držo (npr. z običajnim uvodnim stavkom, npr.: Toda kot je v naši prejšnji oddaji dejal strateški analitik dr. Grošelj ...), ni treba zavarovati s premikom osnove in se omejiti na animatorsko vlogo. S to »animacijo« ne postavi pod vprašaj postavitve ograje, temveč le specifikira stranske vidike njene neizogibne postavitve in s tem ponovno retorično prispeva k njeni legitimizaciji in normalizaciji. Pravzaprav bi temu lahko rekli lažno nasprotje, ki ritualno potrdi muckrejkersko vlogo novinarke v pogovoru, ki pa ga v celoti vodi agenda intervjuvanca. To potrdi tudi z zadnjim vprašanjem intervjuvanca:

Gobec: »Gospod Janša, ali je schengen padel v Sloveniji? Rekli ste v Evropski ljudski stranki schengenske meje padajo. Ali tudi s Slovenijo?«

Janša: »Seveda!« [...]

Gobec: »Torej še veliko izzivov tudi za Evropo. Hvala lepa, gospod Janša, za obisk *Odmevov*.«¹⁰

POLITIK KOT EKSPERT: UČINEK PREMESTITVE

Glede na idealnotipično žanrsko klasifikacijo televizijskega novičarskega intervjuja v štiri generične ter tudi diskurzivne tipe (odgovornostni, izkustveni, ekspertni in kolegialni intervju), bi lahko intervju z Janšo nedvoumno uvrstili v tip ekspertnega intervjuja, ne pa, kot bi pričakovali, odgovornostnega intervjuja. Kaj to pomeni? Medtem ko je razlog za »odgovornostni« intervju vedno delovanje intervjuvanca in njegove odgovornosti, povezane s tem delovanjem ali izjavljanjem, naj bi ekspertni intervju nepristransko predstavil ozadje, kontekst in implikacije zadeve, o kateri teče beseda, ter podal domnevno neodvisni komentar. Zunanji ekspert je v vlogi projiciranja vtisa neodvisne informacije ali interpretacije, čeprav je njegova vloga pogosto le ritualistična. Seveda je eden od paradoksov ekspertnega intervjuja, kot opozarja Montgomery (ibid.: 121), da čeprav ti intervjuji zadevajo znanje o nečem (podatke, dokaze, znanstveni pogled, interpretacijo), bistveno prispevajo k oblikovanju končnega stališča o zadevi, o kateri teče beseda, ali pa to končno stališče že vključujejo. Pomembno pa je, da je zagovarjanje tega stališča lahko v celoti immuno pred preverjanjem in iskanjem protislovij s strani novinarja/voditelja, kar je ključno za t. i. odgovornostni intervju.

Po drugi strani odgovornostni intervju temelji na zagovoru in razlagi delovanja ter na novinarjevi nalogi, da izzove zagovor ali razlogo in med njima odkriva protislovja. Odgovornostni intervju vabi občinstvo, da se identificira z novinarjem, ki intervjuja, kot s svojim zastopnikom. Danes običajno tak intervju poteka tako, kot bi spraševalec spraševal v imenu občinstva, intervjuvanec pa je predstavljen kot odtujen od občinstva (izmuzljivi politik). V izkustvenem intervjuju pa je intervjuvanec obravnavan kot eno z občinstvom (utrufeni mejni policist, krajani v obmejnem kraju, katerih življenje je moteno zaradi migrantov ipd.).¹¹ Pri zgornjem intervjuju Tanje Gobec z Janšo je očitno, da novinarka uporabljala strategije, značilne za ekspertni intervju, s čimer izjavam intervjuvanca omogoča

10 Tudi 30. januarja 2015, ko je *Odmeve* vodila Rosvita Pesek, je bil Janša ključni »zunanji glas« oddaje, ki je podpiral novinarko v dramatizaciji situacije in kritiki nesposobnosti vlade v spopadanju z varnostno ogroženostjo Slovenije. V *Odmevih* 18. novembra pa je voditeljica Tanja Gobec uporabila SDS kot primarnega opredelitelja problema: po Grimsovi (SDS) izjavi o domnevno velikem številu radikalnih migrantov, ki se nahajajo v Sloveniji ali jo prečkajo, podatek torej, ki ga voditeljica ni preverjala, je ugotovila, da »... zato prvak SDS vidi le dva izhoda ...« Podobno se je 17. decembra cela oddaja (voditelj Bobovnik) ukvarjala s predlogom zakona o prepovedi nošenja burke in z zaostritvijo azilne zakonodaje, ki ga je napovedala SDS.

11 Dober primer uporabe tega retoričnega orodja je Bobovnikov intervju z direktorjem policije (22. 10. 2015), ki ga je začel takole: »Kdaj ste se zadnjič naspali? Bo šlo še nekaj dni?« ter ga končal: »Prenesite naš hvala tudi vašim ljudem, ki so tako rekoč na meji noč in dan!« Pravzaprav se zdi, da je trpljenje beguncev v primerjavi s trpljenjem in heroizmom policistov obrobne pomena.

bistveno bolj avtoritaren položaj, in to zato, ker mu omogoči zagovor stališč, ki so v kontekstu ekspertnega intervjuja imuna pred iskanjem protislovij in pred relativiziranjem z drugačimi pogledi, kar je sicer značilno za intervju s politikami. Tako je pogovor s politikom Janšo, ki je intervjujan kot neodvisni ekspert, osrednje diskurzivno orodje za oblikovanje končnega pomena in intepretacije gradnje ograje in migrantske politike v pogojih uprizarjanja nevtralističnega novinarstva.

Ob koncu intervjuja (glej zgoraj) spraševalka uporablja strategijo reformulacije tega, kar izreka intervjuvanec, tako da z drugimi besedami potrdi ali nadaljuje pogled intervjuvanca, torej, da je »schengen padel«. To stališče je Janša že pred intervjujem dovolj pogosto izjavljal v reportažah, vključenih v *Odmeve*. To je strategija reformuliranja (glej Heritage v van Dijk 1985; Montgomery 2010). Novinar povzema, olepšuje in razvija bistvo intervjuvančeve izjave. V navadni vsakdanji konverzaciji je to zelo redko, v institucionaliziranem pogovoru, ki mora uprizarjati predstavo za imaginarno občinstvo, pa je del institucionaliziranih novinarskih strategij. Praksa povzemanja ali prikrivanja/olepševanja se uporablja kot »pakiranje« ali »prepakiranje« izjave intervjuvancev. Prakse reformuliranja izjav intervjuvanca se lahko uporablja na različne načine, kot relativno nedolžno povzemanje, kot potrjevanje (recikliranje izjav intervjuvanca in s tem sodelovanje z njim) ali pa kot kritiziranje tega, kar izreka intervjuvanec, torej kot »poskus inferenčnega elaboriranja« (Heritage 1985). S tem se voditelj intenzivno postavlja v vlogo spraševalca v dobro občinstva. Intervjuvanec je vedno »povabljen«, da se strinja ali ne z novinarjevo elaboracijo ali radikalizacijo njegovih lastnih izjav. Nasprotno pa Tanja Gobec v zgornjem intervjuju reformulacijo uporablja za nadaljevanje in podporo intervjuvančevim izjavam. Njena reformulacija je samo potrditev izjave intervjuvanca in je v funkciji kooperativnega recikliranja izjav intervjuvanca. Osrednjega pomena je tako seveda sekvenca v nadaljevanju pogovora, ko intervjuvanec zavrne ali potrdi verzijo, ki jo je predlagala novinarka.¹² Gobec: »Gospod Janša, ali je schengen padel v Sloveniji?« Janša: »Seveda!« Pri tej diskurzivni strategiji je pomen izrečenega torej odvisen od sodelovanja ali konflikta med intervjuvancem in novinarjem.

Voditeljica Tanja Gobec gostu, »prvaku največje opozicijske stranke«, kot se rutinsko konvencionalizira jezik v televizijskem novinarstvu, tako v celoti prepusti postavljanje agende in uokvirjanje tematike. Pogovor zredicira dilemo na ograjo ali nasilje, metaokvir pa predstavlja nesposobnost aktualne administracije, da ograjo pravočasno postavi in neodvisno od Evrope uveljavi restriktivno migracijsko politiko. Gostu prepusti tudi, da rasistični element v problem uvede z uporabo kazalnih zaimkov, ki so sicer lahko v vlogi časovnega in prostorskega ponatančenja, vendar tu te vloge ne igrajo in so torej nepotrebni.¹³

Ekspertiza je pri intervjuju s strokovnjaki (podobno kot emocije ali izkustvo navadnih ljudi) umeščena v diskurzivno ekonomijo televizijskih oddaj tako, da je onstran dvoma.

12 Ta strategija se obilno uporablja v t. i. »zabavobojih«, torej panelnih diskusijah, tako na komercialnih kot tudi na javni televiziji, ko novinar z elaboriranjem/radikaliziranjem v razpravo vnaša dramo in konflikt. Panelni format tako s to strategijo omogoča voditelju, da ustvarja bojno interakcijo (glej npr. Garzia 1991; Greatbach 1992).

13 Janša namreč v celotnem pogovoru uporablja kazalne zaimke v povezavi s problematiko beguncev: [...] s tem migrantskim valom iz Afrike, [...] ko je prišlo do te islamske revolucije, [...] gre za socialni element tega radikalnega islama. Podobno tudi voditeljica Rosvita Pesek v oddaji 19. novembra: »[...] odkar imamo ta begunski val in se s temi begunci soočamo« [...]. Kazalni zaimki tu namreč ne pomenijo zgolj izrecne določnosti, da bi se v naboru različnih islamskih revolucij in več vrst »radikalnih islamov« lahko sklicevali na konkretnega.

Toliko pomembneje je torej, da je Janša v studiu (pa tudi v kratkih intervjujih, ki so delčki reportaže o dogajanju v parlamentu) intervjuvan v okviru diskurzivne strategije eksperimentalnega intervjuja, ki je značilna za intervjuje z »neodvisnimi« strokovnjaki, ne pa politiki. Ta in podobne premestitve so ključni element proizvodnje védenja o begunski problematiki v *Odmevih* in prispevajo k učinku »mnenjskega tunela«, torej radikalnega zoževanja nabora legitimnih, normaliziranih pogledov na problem.

Zgoraj opisano gostovanje v studiu se je nadaljevalo s predvajanjem Bobničevih in Dervaričevih izjav z Radia Študent, s katerimi sta se zavzemala proti povečanju pooblastil vojski. V nadaljevanju je oddaja tej izjavi zoperstavila uradni vladni glas sekretarja Šefica. Toda, kot sem omenila zgoraj, mesto izjavljanja proizvaja semiotsko in torej ideološko razliko, tako da so vsi zunanji glasovi s terena glasovi, ki so hierarično/ideološko podrejeni institucionalnemu glasu (voditeljici) in gostu v studiu (Janši). Nasploh je uporaba »radikalnih« glasov, ki eksplicitno ali implicitno nasprotujejo ograji ali pod vprašaj postavljajo restriktivno azilno politiko, v celotnem analiziranem obdobju v *Odmevih* praktično nična. Srečamo jih le pri glasovih s terena, pa še to redko in posredno. Edina izjema je, kot rečeno, gostovanje Matevža Krivica v oddaji že po postavitvi ograje, 10. decembra 2015, in sicer na temo predloga Zakona o mednarodni zaščiti – azilu in na temo mednarodnega dneva človekovih pravic, ko so, po besedah voditelja Berganta, sodelovanje v oddaji zavrnilo vabljeni člani vlade ali pristojnega ministrstva. V celotnem trimesečnem obdobju *Odmevi* niso uporabili »zunanjih glasov«, ki bi sistematično problematizirali »transportno« funkcijo Slovenije in tematizirali možnost sprejema in vključevanja beguncev v slovensko družbo. Humanitarni vidik ostaja omejen na oskrbovalno funkcijo na poti skozi periferno državo v osrednje evropske države. Prav zaradi selekcije govorcev ostajata rdeča nit razprave debata o kakovosti transporta in strankarski konflikt o tem, kdo je kriv za slabo učinkovitost transportiranja.

ZAKLJUČEK: POGLED SKOZI TUNEL

Nevtralizem s standardizirano konvencionalno izmenjavo institucionalnih in zunanjih glasov je ritual v vlogi konstitucije institucionalne avtoritete medijev. Zgornji intervju z Janšo in razlog zanj ilustrirata, kako je problem beguncev v celotnem obdobju upovedovan v kontekstu političnih razmer v Sloveniji. Sam problem beguncev, slovenska in evropska migracijska politika, mednarodni kontekst begunske problematike in stanje v državah, iz katerih begunci prihajajo, je tako postavljen v funkcijo obravnave borbe med vlado in opozicijo. Obstaja standardni nabor zunanjih govorcev, razen ljudi na terenu (policistov, lokalnih županov, tu in tam beguncev ali prostovoljcev ...) so to na političnem področju skorajda izključno politiki vladajoče koalicije in opozicijske SDS, tako da je obravnava begunske problematike uokvirjena le kot poseben primer slovenskega notranjepolitičnega konflikta.

Cilj tega članka je analiza selekcije ter semiotske in ideološke umestitve in obravnave »zunanjih glasov« v *Odmevih*. Ti so namreč osrednje orodje, s katerim se določen pogled na reševanje begunske problematike v nevtralističnem novinarstvu potisne v polje deviantnega, naivnega ali neodgovornega. Zanimalo me je, kaj je bilo v tromesečnem obdobju obravnave begunske problematike konstituirano kot konsenzualno, kaj je bilo potisnjeno v sfero radikalnega, kako je bila vsakdanja razprava v *Odmevih* reducirana na strankarski konflikt (sfero legitimne kontroverze) ter kako je bilo to doseženo s selekcijo in z obravnavo

zunanjih glasov ter institucionaliziranimi strategijami uprizarjanja nevtralizma. Selekcija »zunanjih glasov« v *Odmevih* na političnostrankarski mainstream in prostorsko razlikovanje, ki generirata semiotsko/ideološko razlikovanje, ter diskurzivni red intervjuvanja imajo nekaj pomembnih posledic, ki jih bom na kratko povzela v petih točkah.

Ugotovim lahko, **prvič**, da je selekcija »zunanjih« ali »prisvojenih« glasov ključni element uokvirjanja tematike, saj dominantnega okvira kot osrednje ideje, ki ponuja kontekst za razumevanje zadeve in ki sugerira, kaj je v resnici problem, ne moremo zreducirati le na voditeljev jezikovni nabor metafor, diskurzivnih poudarkov in elaboriranja. Umestitev problema v okvir (npr. borbe proti terorizmu, pokvarjene elite, ki »krade državo«, borbe med levico in desnico itd.) razumemo kot samo značilnost novičarskega diskurza in je vidik, ki pomembno vpliva na to, ali se bo zadeva sploh povzpela na lestvici medijske agende, zato mediji rutinsko uporabljajo že prej obstoječe zgodbe, torej metaokvire (ti pa so oblikovani na ozadju t. i. primarnih okvirov), na osnovi katerih obravnavajo begunsko problematiko (Glej Goffman 1974; Entman 2008; Zelizer 2010).¹⁴ Ključni sestavni del postopka uokvirjanja je torej izbor intervjuvancev, ki personalizirajo določeno razumevanje problema. V primeru *Odmevov* selekcija govorcev prispeva k uokvirjanju, ki ga podpirajo/»sponzorirajo« parlamentarne politične frakcije, v tem primeru omejene na parlamentarno desno SDS in vladajočo stranko koalicije.

Tematiziranje je tako tudi s pomočjo govorcev uokvirjeno kot a) vprašanje varnosti Slovenije, b) kot vprašanje (ne)učinkovitosti vlade v zagotavljanju varnosti in ustrezne transportne funkcije, c) izmenično kot vestnost in heroizem Slovenije glede na politiko in zahteve referenčnih Avstrije in Nemčije (torej držav prvega ranga), in d.) konflikt s Hrvaško (ta pa ima vsaj dva vidika – orientalističnega, ki se nanaša na nekulturno obnašanje »južne sosed« , ki ga sponzorira vladajoča koalicija, ter nesposobnost vladajoče koalicije, da doseže sporazum s Hrvaško, vidik, ki ga sponzorira opozicija). Te zgodbe presegajo konkretni dogodek ali konkretni problem in ga osmišljajo onstran njegove navidezne arbitrarnosti, enkratnosti, posebnosti. Begunska problematika je tako prevladujoče le instanca ali del širše zgodbe a) manihejskega konflikta med slovensko levico in desnico, b) del zgodbe o nesposobnih politikih in prevaranih državljanih, in c) del zgodbe o razmerju med civilizirano Evropo in primitivnim islamom.

Drugič, tak izbor intervjuvancev v studiju podpira epizodično (dogodkovno) uokvirjanje tematike in zapostavlja t. i. tematsko uokvirjanje (to je problemsko obravnavo dogodkov, umeščenih v širši družbeni, mednarodno politični itd. kontekst), tako da v obravnavi beguncev pride do radikalne strukturne amnezije. Kljub temu da *Odmevi* kot žanr omogočajo tematsko (torej kontekstualizirano) obravnavo begunskega problema, še več, glede na samoopis je to njegov glavni *raison d'être*, je oddaja praktično v celoti epizodična. To

14 O razmerju med analizo uokvirjanja in diskurzivno analizo glej Pan, Kosicki (1993). Avtorja menita, da uokvirjanje lahko razumemo kot strategijo konstruiranja in procesiranja novičarskega diskurza ali kot diskurzivno značilnost samo po sebi.

pomeni, da oddajo poganjajo dogodki in dnevni pripetljaji ter tematizacija teh pripetljajev kot problemov. Sosledje pripetljajev pa je večinoma inscenirala strankarska politika.¹⁵

Tretjič, premestitve političnega, tj. odgovornostnega intervjuja, v ekspertni intervju (glej primer Janše in voditeljice Tanje Gobec), ki je v principu imun pred iskanjem protislovij, neresnic in interesa, so v oddaji ključni element proizvodnje védenja o begunski problematiki. Prispevajo k učinku »mnenjskega tunela«, torej radikalnega zoževanja nabora legitimnih, normaliziranih pogledov, in k veliki simbolni/definijski moči institucionaliziranih političnih akterjev.¹⁶

Intervju z Janšo tako ni izbran naključno ali iz t. i. aktualnopolitičnih razlogov, temveč zaradi a) ključne vloge SDS in Janše v parlamentarni dramatizaciji opozicijskega stališča do »begunske problematike« in vloge *Odmevov* oz. izbranih voditeljev pri povzemanju te dramatizacije, b) zaradi prominentne vloge tega intervjuja pri zožanju medijske obravnave na legitimna protislovja, ki jih zastopa strankarska mainstream politika, ter c) ker predstavlja tipično materializacijo vloge *Odmevov* pri »kooperativnem recikliranju« (Heritage 1985) izbrane politične agende s pomočjo t. i. zunanjih glasov, odvija pa se ob hkratnem vzdrževanju novinarskega nevtralizma.

Četrtrič, tak izbor intervjuvancev v celoti izključuje vsako definicijo problema, ki je zunaj bodisi t. i. »materinstvo in potica« konsenza, če parafraziram Hallina (1994), ali pa zunaj tistih interpretacij, ki so institucionalizirane in jih zastopajo politični akterji v okviru parlamentarne ali paraparlamentarne politike. Razprava o begunski problematiki in njenih različnih vidikih in možnem pristopu je bila s konstituiranjem/reduciranjem problema v polje »legitimnih kontroverz«, zastopanih v političnih strankah, radikalno zreducirana. Družbeni problem postane torej medijska »zadeva« v okviru za politične sfero tako prominentnih oddaj, kot so *Odmevi*, šele ko njegovo reševanje postane del konflikta med institucionaliziranimi političnimi akterji, praktično izključno parlamentarnimi strankami, ki so bodisi zagovorniki ali nasprotniki specifične interpretacije ali rešitve. Zaradi obstoječe parlamentarne levice, ki bi se ponudila kot močan zastopnik »tretje rešitve«, je bil problem zreduciran na konflikt o kvaliteti transportiranja beguncev čez Slovenijo in varovalnih ukrepov. Zožitev razprave na »legitimne kontroverze«, ki jih zastopa strankarska politika, torej na mnenjski ali diskurzivni tunel, v *Odmevih* in v medijih na sploh (gl. članke Vezovnikove, Pajnikove, Pušnikove in Jontesa v tej številki), ustvarjen tudi s selekcijo in z obravnavo »zunanjih glasov«, je preprečil vsako resno razpravo o begunski problematiki in slovenski migrantski politiki. Kar ostane, sta le obravnavava problema kot sosledja pripetljajev in popolna simbolna marginalizacija vseh pogledov zunaj parlamentarnega mainstrea in njegovih interesov.

15 O učinkovanju upovedovanja realnosti kot sosledja pripetljajev glej Macdonald (2003). Iyengar (1991, 2010) v svoji znani empirični analizi vpliva tematskega (problemskega) oz. epizodičnega (dogodkovnega) uokvirjanja dokazuje, kako uokvirjanje ključno vpliva na prevladujoči diskurz o nujni politiki in ukrepih na določenem področju. Epizodično, torej dogodkovno ali pripetljajsko uokvirjanje npr. kriminala, terorizma itd. bistveno prispeva k zavzemanju za represivne ukrepe in individualistične, ne pa strukturne interpretacije družbenih problemov.

16 S konceptom mnenjskega tunela je mogoče primerjati starejši koncept »mainstreamizacije« pogledov na določen problem, ki ga uvaja teorija kultivacije in ki ga po Gerbnerjevem mnenju povzroča predvsem televizija.

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SUMMARY

REFUGEES AND “ODMEVI”: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONVENTIONS

Breda LUTHAR

In this article I investigate the representation of the “refugee problem” in the *Odmevi* current affairs program on Slovenian national TV. The show is aired during prime time and plays an important role in the thematization of national issues or rather the ways in which the media transformation of public problems into public issues, i.e. the so-called agenda-setting function. The analysis includes shows aired from October 9 to December 22, 2015, a time when Europe and Slovenia witnessed the greatest influx of refugees along the so-called Balkan route. I focus on some problematic professional conventions and assumptions that serve as the legitimization of the genre and in particular on the ideological effects of conventions of interviewing. Within this context, I analyze the selection of external and “accessed” voices in the *Odmevi* studio interview, the discursive framing of interviewees and their placement into the show’s narrative. Given that the ideology of neutrality in news shows such as *Odmevi* dictates the entire production process, interviews play a central role in the discursive construction of the “refugee problem”.

In the conclusion of the analysis I argue that, **first**, the selection of speakers in the program contributes to framing that is sponsored by parliamentary political fractions. The refugee problem is, therefore, predominantly only a part of a much larger story about a) the Manichean conflict between the Slovenian left and right wing politics, b) incompetent politicians and misled citizens, and c) the relationship between civilized Europe and primitive Islam. **Second**, such selection of interviewees completely marginalizes any definition of the problem that falls outside the so-called “motherhood and apple-pie” consensus (see Hallin 1994) or outside interpretations that are institutionalized and represented by political actors within the framework of parliamentary or para-parliamentary politics. **Third**, such selection of studio interviewees supports episodic framing of the subject and marginalizes the so-called thematic framing (i.e. problem treatment of events placed within a broader social, international political, etc. context) to ensure a radical “structural amnesia” in treating refugees. **Fourth**, there are sporadic attempts in the news show to transpose the political, i.e. accountability interview genre (see Montgomery 2008), used to conduct interviews with politicians, into an expert interview, thus positioning politicians as experts (see the example of the politician Janez Janša and the presenter Gobec) and contributing to a great symbolic/defining power of institutionalized political actors. The narrowing of the debate to the sphere of “legitimate controversy” represented by partisan politics has led to the construction of the opinion or discursive corridor. The latter, ensured through the selection and treatment of “external voices”, has crucially contributed to treating the problem as a mere sequence of events and the complete symbolical marginalization of all views that fall outside the parliamentary mainstream and its interests.

MEDIJSKO-POLITIČNI PARALELIZEM: LEGITIMIZACIJA MIGRACIJSKE POLITIKE NA PRIMERU KOMENTARJA V ČASOPISU »DELO«

Mojca PAJNIK¹

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IZVLEČEK

Medijsko-politični paralelizem: legitimizacija migracijske politike na primeru komentarja v časopisu »Delo«

Avtorica v članku izhaja iz teze, da metaprocesi medijizacije medijsko delovanje definirajo do mere, ko se »medijska logika« prilagodi politični agendi. Tezo preverja s kvalitativno analizo novinarskih komentarjev o evropski migracijski politiki, objavljenih v časopisu Delo (avgust–december 2015). Analiza pokaže, da je najbolj razpoznavna značilnost novinarskih komentarjev, da v problematiziranju evropske migracijske politike kot rešitev predlagajo iste migracijske politike (kvotni sistem, schengenski sistem, bilateralne dogovore med državami idr.). Ugotavlja, da se migracijske politike legitimizirajo s pomočjo komentatorstva, ki izpušča refleksijo nevladnih virov in se v veliki meri utemeljuje na evrocentričnem zamišljanju Evrope.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: migracijska politika, schengen, kvotni sistem, Evropa, novinarski komentar

ABSTRACT

Media-Political Parallelism: Legitimization of Migration Policy in Editorials in the Daily Newspaper "Delo"

The article starts with the thesis that metaprocesses of mediatization define the operation of the media to the degree that "media logic" follows political agendas. We verify the thesis based on a qualitative analysis of journalistic commentary (editorials) that were published in the Slovenian daily newspaper Delo (August–December 2015) on the topic of European migration policy (quota system, Schengen regime, bilateral agreements etc.). The analysis shows that migration policy is legitimized by commentary that omits the views of non-governmental sources and is largely based on Eurocentric imaginings of Europe.

KEY WORDS: migration policy, Schengen, quota system, Europe, journalistic commentary

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UVOD

Migracije z afriške celine pa tudi iz Azije v Evropo so se intenzivirale v zadnjih petnajstih letih s porastom vojaških konfliktov in slabšanjem življenjskih razmer, ki jih sooblikujejo zahodne družbe. Prizori, ki se prvi prikažejo ob misli na migracije v tem obdobju, so povezani s pogosto tragičnimi poskusi prihoda v Evropo po morskih poteh; otok Lampedusa se je v medijskih podobah usidral kot simbol novodobnih migracij. Tragične zgodbe o potovanju s čolni, ki so z leti postale medijska stalnica, so se jeseni in pozimi 2015 umaknile iz središča medijskega zanimanja za »migracijsko problematiko«. Ob povečanju migracij v Evropo z vojnih območij, zlasti iz Sirije in Iraka, Pakistana, Afganistana in od drugod, jih je zamenjalo poročanje o »begunski krizi«. Podobe mokrih, premraženih in umrlih na italijanski obali so zamenjale podobe premraženih, izčrpanih beguncev na »balkanski poti«. Medtem ko številne teorije, če med njimi omenim samo novejšo progresivno teorijo, povezane denimo s konceptom avtonomije migracij (Balibar 2007; Mezzadra 2010; Papadopolous, Tsianos 2013), migrante in migrantke poimenujejo akterji in akterke, ki niso samo žrtve konfliktov, ampak tudi agensi, ki spreminjajo ustaljeni tok dogajanja in prevprašujejo obstoječi družbeni red, mediji pogosto reproducirajo delitve med begunci, »drugimi« in domačini, »nami«, slikajo podobe »ubogih nesrečnežev« ali svarijo pred potencialnimi nasilneži in teroristi med njimi.

Članek se konceptualno naslanja na kritične migracijske študije, ki migracijsko-integracijski menedžment Evropske unije razumejo kot brezupni odraz vztrajanja nacionalno-etnične aksiomatike, ki večino »varuje« z brezpogojnim izključevanjem »drugega« (Brubaker 2003), kot prakso »rekolonizacije« (Balibar 2007). Ta migrante in migrantke vzdržuje v položaju »krožnega pogojevanja«, ko, čeprav že »integrirani«, ostajajo zunaj ali na robu pravic (Pajnik 2011). Argumentacija je obenem povezana s konceptom avtonomije migracij, ki v polje kritičnih migracijskih študij prinaša relevanten premik od preučevanja postopkov kriminalizacije migracij (t. i. krimigracije) k artikulaciji procesov in uporov, ki jih prinašajo same migracije in njihovi akterji, akterke, kot tudi širša globalna gibanja za avtonomijo migracij in pravičnost. Ta perspektiva v ospredje postavlja izogibanje politikam krimigracije, prakse, prek katere se vzpostavlja 'skupno-v-gibanju' (*mobile commons*) (Papadopolous, Tsianos 2013; prim. Lipovec Čebren, Zorn 2016).

V pričujočem članku se posvečam analizi medijskega poročanja o »begunski krizi«, kot je naturalizirana medijska formulacija teme, na primeru časopisa *Delo*¹ v obdobju od avgusta do decembra 2015, pri čemer se osredotočam na žanr novinarskega komentarja. Izhajam iz teze o medijsko-političnem paralelizmu (Hallin, Mancini 2004), ki opozarja na sobivanje medijske in politične agende; temi migracij in begunstva sta medijsko zanimivi zgolj toliko in tako, kolikor sta povezani z aktualnim dnevno-političnim dogajanjem, ki ga kreirajo politične elite, v našem primeru na nacionalni in evropski ravni. Tezo v *Delovih* komentarjih preverjam na podlagi analize komentiranja evropske migracijske politike in z njo povezanega »zamišljanja Evrope« (prim. Anderson 2003). Ugotavljam (ne)skladnost politične agende, ki je lansirala različne migracijske politike – kvotni sistem, schengenski

1 Po podatkih nacionalne raziskave branosti je *Delo* med splošnoinformativnimi dnevnimi časopisi na prvem mestu; v povprečju je en izvod *Dela* leta 2015 dosegel 141.000 ljudi, sledita mu *Dnevnik* (98.000) in *Večer* (95.000). *Delo* je v ospredju (pred *Dnevnikom* in *Večerom*) tudi po povprečni prodani nakladi, ki za leto 2015 znaša 31.817 izvodov (gl.: <http://www.nrb.info/>, 18. 10. 2016).

sistem, bilateralne dogovore med državami idr. – z medijskim poročanjem na primeru izbranega komentatorskega tiska. Teoretskemu in metodološkemu orisu sledi umestitev vsebine v obstoječe raziskave, empirični del pa se osredotoča na analizo preišljanja evropske migracijske politike in z njo tesno povezane predstave o Evropi, zaznamovani z »begunsko krizo«.

IZHODIŠČA IN METODA

»Zlitje« medijske agende s politično (in nasprotno), kar poleg koncepta medijsko-političnega paralelizma (Hallin, Mancini 2004) ponazarja tudi koncept medijatiizacije (Mazzoleni, Schulz 1999), preverjam na podlagi komentarja, žanra, ki v nasprotju z novicami ali novinarskimi poročili novinarju oziroma novinarki omogoča kritično refleksijo, poglobljeno analizo, tudi iskanje alternativ v obravnavi. Medijatiizacijo razumem kot metadružbeni proces, ki označuje tesno prepletenost »medijske« in »politične logike« delovanja v sodobnih družbah. V članku razčlenjujem »medijsko logiko«, ki je v aktualnih študijah medijatiizacije definirana kot logika, ki normativne vrednote komuniciranja zamenja s komercialno preračunljivostjo (Landerer 2013). V empirični analizi se ne ukvarjam toliko z metavidikom razumevanja koncepta, ampak se osredotočam na razumevanje medijske logike, ki sta jo Altheide in Snow (1979) definirala kot logiko formatiranja, oblikovanja, ki določa kategorizacijo gradiva, izbrani slog prezentacije in način medijskega uokvirjanja družbenega izkustva. Medijska logika me torej tukaj zanima kot novinarska tehnika, pri njeni operacionalizaciji pa upoštevam tri dimenzije. Gre za logiko, ki poganja a) izbiro teme, b) selekcijo virov, c) način upovedovanja teme v povezanosti s politično agendo. Politika je tukaj razumljena v pomenu političnega odločanja, odločanja političnih akterjev, ki sprejemajo specifične politike na določeno temo (Strøm, Müller 1999) – politična logika je torej logika maksimiziranja političnega interesa za specifično politiko. Izhajam iz teze, da metaprocesi medijatiizacije definirajo medijsko delovanje do mere, ko se medijska logika, pa čeprav gre za žanr komentarja, prilagodi politični logiki.

Analize »medijske logike« v komentarjih se lotevam s kombinacijo kritične diskurzivne analize (Fairclough 1992; Wodak, Meyer 2001), pogosto uporabljene v študijah, ki obravnavajo procese družbenega izključevanja, marginalizacije etničnih, spolnih, verskih idr. Manjšin. Ta je za našo analizo relevantna zaradi poudarka na kontekstualiziranem, interpretativnem in analitičnem branju besedil glede na omenjeno operacionalizacijo. Metoda je za nas relevantna tudi zato, ker predpostavlja analizo razkrivanja neposrednih in posrednih vidikov konstrukcije pomena z upoštevanjem specifične družbenopolitične realnosti – v našem primeru realnosti evropske migracijske politike. Obenem je za nas relevantna tudi zaradi dediščine uporabe znotraj kritične teorije, vključno s perspektivami, ki izhajajo iz konceptov enakosti, pravičnosti, nediskriminacije in antirasizma, na katerih se utemeljuje tudi tisti del migracijskih študij, ki je na tem mestu konceptualno ozadje. Analizo diskurza kombiniram z uporabo koncepta »strateškega uokvirjanja teme«, kar Bacchi (2009) definira kot »ozaveščeno in namensko izbiro jezika in konceptov, da bi vplivali na politično razpravo in odločanje«. Rečeno drugače, avtor, avtorica besedila specifično uokvirja temo, uporablja specifični jezik – tisto, za kar meni, da lahko najbolj učinkovito mobilizira njihove cilje. Bacchi predvideva analizo na podlagi para izbranih vprašanj, in sicer, kaj je problem in kakšna je v besedilu predlagana rešitev, kar prevzemam v svoji

analizi. Ti metodološki poudarki so še zlasti relevantni, ker se osredotočam na obravnavo specifičnih *policy* problemov (migracijska politika), v komentarju, ki v nasprotju z denimo novičarskim ali poročevalskim tiskom ponuja žanr strateškega, ciljno usmerjenega upovedovanja. Besedila torej analiziram na podlagi omenjenih vprašanj in skladno s konceptom medijske logike.

Empirična analiza zajema 97 novinarskih komentarjev, ki so bili v časopisu *Delo* objavljeni med 4. avgustom in 28. decembrom 2015.² Vzorec zajema komentarje, ki so omenjali refleksijo mehanizmov evropske migracijske politike oziroma so se z njo podrobneje ukvarjali. Analiza je pokazala tesno prepletenost govora o migracijskih politikah z zamišljanji Evrope / Evropske unije, zato pozornost posvečam tudi diskurzom o Evropi.³

Pričujočo analizo razumem kot prispevek k razumevanju delovanja medijsko-političnega paralelizma na primeru poročanja komentatorskega tiska o »begunski krizi« v specifičnem obdobju. Obenem jo postavljam ob bok že obstoječim študijam, ki analizirajo vlogo medijev v odnosu do različnih skupin »marginaliziranih drugih«, v primeru pričujoče analize do migrantov in migrantk. Število tovrstnih študij v zadnjih desetletjih v mednarodnem kontekstu narašča, to prav tako velja za slovenski prostor – članek se tako umešča v dosedanje analize, ki so obravnavale medijsko poročanje zlasti dnevnega in tedenskega tiska o beguncih iz prostora nekdanje Jugoslavije, še zlasti iz BiH, v Sloveniji, poročanje o migracijah leta 2000 in pozneje o migrantih in migrantkah iz afriških držav, Azije in Južne Amerike (Doupona Horvat idr. 1998; Jalušič 2001; Zavrtnik 2003; Pajnik 2007; Kralj 2008).⁴

POLITIKA V MEJAH MOGOČEGA

Najbolj razpoznavna značilnost v analizi novinarskih komentarjev na podlagi dvojice vprašanj – kaj članek naslavlja kot problem in kaj kot rešitev (Bacchi 2009) – je, da v kritiki evropske migracijske politike kot rešitev predlagajo iste migracijske politike. Zaznamo kontradiktornost v argumentaciji, ki jo je mogoče povezati z ne dovolj poglobljenim poznavanjem obravnavane teme. Sklepamo lahko, da se novinarji v temo ne poglobijo bolj kot pri spremljanju dnevnepolitičnega dogajanja, kjer vladne akterje na nacionalni in evropski ravni obravnavajo kot (edine) protagoniste. Ko je kot problem izpostavljena politika, ki Evropo spreminja v trdnjavo, ko »obramba trdnjave Evrope ruši njene temelje«, je Evropa obenem predstavljena kot nemočna, da bi »ustavila prtok beguncev v izvornih državah«. Branjenje trdnjave je predstavljeno kot problem, ki je hkrati relativiziran, oziroma, še več, migracije ne bi bile problem, če bi jih Evropa zaustavila – politika preprečevanja migracij pa je prav politika branjenja »trdnjave Evrope«.

2 Analiza se osredotoča izključno na novinarski komentar in se ne ukvarja z mnenji gostujočih peres in s komentarji bralcev.

3 V analizi se neposredno sklicujem na izbrana besedila – uporabljam specifične naracije, dele besedil, ki so v primerih, ko so navedbe daljše oziroma bolj substancialne, navedeni v seznamu virov. Zaradi prostorske omejitve seznam izključuje članke, iz katerih črpam, ko omenjam uporabo metafor oziroma specifičnih poimenovanj oseb in pojavov, povezanih s temo migracij.

4 V našem primeru se osredotočam na obravnavo izbranega žanra v izbranem dnevnem časopisu, medtem ko omenjene obstoječe študije praviloma analizirajo novinarska besedila, objavljena v različnih dnevnikih in tednikih, pri čemer ne ločujejo novinarskih žanrov.

Brambovstvo schengenskega in kvotnega sistema

Članki pogosto analizirajo kvotni in schengenski sistem kot prevladujoča mehanizma evropske migracijske politike, v njuni obravnavi pa prevladujejo realpolitični pogledi: problem niso kvote, z njimi bi »begunce vsaj nekoliko pravičneje razdelili po državah članicah in s tem olajšali bremena« – z argumentom o »pravični delitvi« in distribuciji beguncev kot »bremena« so kvote ves čas zagovarjali politiki. Problem je »zmedenost« politike, ki utegne ogroziti »schengenske svoboščine« in »pokopati še tisto temeljno družbeno in socialno solidarnost med članicami, ki Unijo v svetovnem merilu še vedno definira kot najbolj napredno in pravično skupnost držav« (Slabe 2015a: 5). K »razčlovečenju Evrope«, ki je predstavljena kot napredna, tako ne prispevajo politike, ampak sami begunci – »begunska kriza« namreč postane tisti krivec, ki »utegne pokopati čut za pravičnost« (prav tam).

V komentarju o migracijah v Veliko Britanijo, ki je, v realističnem tonu, naslovljen V okviru mogočega (Kosec 2015: 5), komentator takole opredeli politiko: »Naloga politike je, da pomirja in pojasnjuje. Tudi če takoj ne najde rešitev, mora delovati pametno, predvsem pa se zavedati, kje so meje njenih možnosti.« Kot je pokazala Hanna Arendt (1972/2003), takšna pragmatična, marketinško naravnava opredelitev politiko in politike odveže odgovornosti do javnosti. Članek ne ponudi analize britanske politike omejevanja priseljevanja, kot bi sprva pričakovali, ampak, »v okviru mogočega«, pove le, da bi vlada Davida Camerona cilj, tj. zmanjšanje priseljevanja na ne več kot sto tisoč ljudi letno, morala »prilagoditi evropski realnosti, v kateri živi« (cilj je previsoko postavljen). V sklepu avtor uporabi vojaško retoriko, ko pravi, da mora »spopadanje s problemom priseljevanja temeljiti na tehtnih argumentih, ne ekstremnih stališčih in arbitrarno določenih ciljih« (poudarila M. P.). Letna kvota sto tisoč ljudi je označena kot »ekstremna«, niso pa problem kvote – »razmeram prilagojena« številka bi bila namreč »tehtna«. V tem kontekstu politično-medijskega paralelizma so kvote obravnave »realistično«, so »danost« migracijske politike, ki je v okviru »politike mogočega« pač ni mogoče prevpraševati.

V članku z naslovom Begunci, dobrodošli (Močnik 2015: 12), v katerem avtor sugerira razumevanje aktualne situacije beguncev na podlagi spomina na migracije kot »najbolj boleče zgodovinske izkušnje Slovencev« in poudarja, da »smo bili Slovenci pred sto leti enaka »groznja« kakor danes Sirci«, je sklepni stavek, s katerim avtor zagovarja kvote in v kontradiktorni maniri izniči lastni poziv k razumevanju: »Seme od plevela naj namesto nestrpnježev ločijo evropske oblasti, saj imajo za to dovolj osebja, znanja in opreme« (prav tam). Domnevamo lahko, da so za avtorja Sirci »seme«, tj. pravi, upravičeni begunci, ki naj jih razporedijo s kvotami, vsi drugi pa so »plevel«. V komentarju avtorja zmotijo »rasistični in fašistični skrajneži«, češ da svarijo pred »islamskim pogromom«, ne prepozna pa selektivnega mehanizma evropske politike (kvot) oziroma prevzema njeno selektivno logiko, ki jo legitimizira kot zeleno politiko ločevanja »semena od plev«.

Brezupno (Žerjavič 2015a: 5) je naslov komentarja, v katerem avtor pisanje o Evropi, ki je »doživela hud udarec«, »ni bila pripravljena«, »spodkopava temelje svojega delovanja« in »razkrajaja svoje institucije«, sklene za legitimizacijo schengenskega sistema. Ugotovitev, da »schengenski režim ne more delovati, če v njegovo območje začne nenadzirano prihajati več deset tisoč ljudi«, uporablja kot napoved (in potrditev) politike strožjega nadzora: »Tudi strožji nadzor zunanje meje bo neizogiben del politike« (prav tam). Evropski kaos bi v red lahko spravili tudi s politiko zbirnih centrov in kvot: »Vzpostavitev velikih centrov v Italiji, Grčiji in na Madžarskem, v katerih naj bi odločali o usodah beguncev in jih nato

razporedili po članicah, bi lahko spravilo postopke v neki red« (prav tam). Ugotovitve, da »EU nima taktike, kaj šele strategije priseljevanja«, da je evropska azilantska in priseljska politika »zmedena« ali da »prave politične rešitve ni na vidiku« (prav tam), pa ne napeljujejo na kritiko migracijskih politik, kar bi pričakovali, ampak v komentarjih običajno vodijo v njihovo legitimizacijo. »Begunska kriza«, ponovno, postane krivec, ki spodjeda opevano idejo o odprtosti evropskih meja. Tudi v primerih, ko članki opozarjajo na »nesmiselne dublinske uredbe in medsebojno podtikanje beguncev« ali na »nesmiselne bruseljske kvote«, se kvote nazadnje pokažejo kot prava rešitev, begunci pa kot problem, ki ga je treba, kot ponavljajo politiki, »pravično porazdeliti med članicami«.

Več komentarjev postrže z brambovstvom schengna, poimenovanim tudi »velika pridobitev evropskega združevanja«. Ta je deloval, »dokler begunci niso prišli na vrata«. Največkrat zaznamo obžalovanje, da »dublinsko-schengenski red izgublja temelje«, z njim pa izgublja tudi vsa Evropa – o izgubi za begunce se ne govori – medtem ko nekateri prepoznanje omejitev režima razumejo tudi kot priložnosti za njegovo spremembo:

Schengenska pravila lahko uveljavljaš, ko imaš opravka z nekaj posamezniki, ki poskušajo nezakonito prestopiti državno mejo in mejo Evropske unije. Ko na vrata potrka več tisoč obupanih ljudi, birokratska pravila odpovejo. Grčija in Italija sta že nakazali, da je mogoče biti fleksibilen. Podobno sta ravnali tudi Nemčija in Avstrija« (Potič 2015a: 1).

V tem primeru avtor namreč opozarja na potrebo po spremembi pravil oziroma po prepuštnosti meja – zaznamo kritično refleksijo obstoječega sistema. Hkrati pa je v avtorjevem zavzemanju za brambovsko pozicijo, ko omenja »nezakonito vstopanje obupanih ljudi« (poudarila M. P.), opazen dvom o smiselnosti rahljanja meja.⁵

»Spodjedanje schengna« je predstavljeno kot problem, zaradi katerega sta menda Uniji »ostali le še dve izbiri, in obe sta neprijetni: lahko žrtvuje schengen [...], druga pot je logika trdnjave Evrope – priprtje vrat beguncem v navezi s Turčijo in evropski prevzem nadzora grške meje«. ⁶ V tem primeru realpolitičnega komentatorstva nas avtor prepričuje celo, naj bi zapiranje meje dejansko ne bilo zapiranje meje: »To ne bi bilo zapiranje meje, ampak upočasnitev in nadzor begunskega toka.« Evropa mora vzpostaviti »red«, sicer schengnu grozi propad – to pa je domnevno problem oziroma nekaj, kar nočemo, da se zgodi: »Četudi niti izločitev Grčije iz schengna ne bi rešila krize, se mora v sistemu brez meja vzpostaviti red. Sicer res ne bo druge poti kot njegov propad ali skrčenje« (Žerjavič 2015i: 1). Red se tukaj pojavlja kot metafora za politiko trde roke, ki da je potrebna za »obvladovanje razmer«.

Legitimizacija schengna se v naslednjem primeru zgodi z uprizarjanjem »evropske krize nesposobnosti ustvarjanja enotne politike« (Čibej 2015a: 5): ko vsi delajo »vsak zase in vsi proti vsem«, ko vzhodne države »solirajo«, vse države pa potiskajo schengen »proti smrtni postelji«, je rešitev naslednja: »Vzpostavitev strožjega nadzora nad zunanjimi mejami schengenskega območja, za katerega bo skrbela »zvezna« policija, ki ne bo podrejena lokalnim »urbanom«, »cerarjem« ali »faymannom«, je najbrž zadnja mogoča rešitev pred za

5 Kritiko rabe terminov, kot so nezakonit, ilegalen, nelegalen idr. v povezavi z upravljanjem migracij gl. Benhabib (2004).

6 V kritiki novega evrocentrizma (Velikonja 2005: 38) v obdobju »pridruževanja« Slovenije EU schengen, »območje brez meja«, nastopa kot simbol odprtosti Evrope (in Slovenije). V kontekstu »begunske krize« se evrocentrizem pokaže v brambovstvu tega simbola odprtosti pred begunci.

ljudi (ne pa tudi za kapital!) ponovno zaprtimi evropskimi mejami« (prav tam). Iz zapisanega razberemo kritiko solističnih lokalnih politik in tudi same ideje schengna, ki pa je obenem relativizirana – obramba schengna tudi v kritičnem zapisu ostane »zadnja rešitev«. Tako v *Delu* ne najdemo komentarja, ki bi analiziral schengenski sistem, kar bi prispevalo k razumevanju režima, kot tudi ne poskusa premisleka o smiselnosti njegovega obstoja. Sklicevanje na vire, ki jih komentarji povsem zaobidejo, je sicer pogost premislek zunaj *mainstream* političnih krogov, in sicer v teoriji, številnih raziskavah s področja migracij, nevladnem sektorju idr.

Podobno je z refleksijo ideje o evropski mejni straži kot mehanizmu schengna: po eni strani je »še eno znamenje nemoči struktur Unije«, po drugi – kontradiktorno – zagotovilo za boljši nadzor: »Niti najbolj učinkovita evropska obalna straža ne more rešiti begunske krize. Lahko zagotovi le boljši nadzor nad njo« (Žerjavič 2015j: 5). Komentatorski tisk tudi v kritikah dejansko zagovarja schengenski sistem in politiko kvot – analiza diskurza pokaže, da sta sistema hkrati predstavljena kot problem in njegova rešitev. Člankom umanjka analiza mehanizmov migracijskih politik, njihova refleksija, ki bi prispevala k razumevanju takšnih politik in bi presegla enodimenzionalne pozive k zagotavljanju reda in nadzora. Medijsko-politični paralelizem na primeru poročanja komentatorskega tiska o migracijskih politikah lahko potrди – skupaj z že obstoječimi študijami, ki so ugotovljale podobno (Pajnik 2008) – tudi popolna odsotnost nevladnih virov.

LEGITIMIZACIJA PREVLAJUJOČIH MIGRACIJSKIH POLITIK SKOZI ZAMIŠLJANJA EVROPE

V komentarjih zaznamo entropijo metafor o Evropi in Evropski uniji. Prevečkrat uporabljene ne učinkujejo zgolj kot cinizem, učinkovita literarna prvina, ki bogati komentatorski jezik, kar je lahko njihova funkcija, ampak tudi kot odveza odgovornosti, ko bi točneje identificirale problem in podale konsistentno argumentacijo. V mnogih komentarjih je na primer izrazita nekakšna drža resignacije, tudi pritoževanja – »Oh, Evropa« – kjer prednjači vsebinsko bolj ali manj prazno slikanje »klavrne« podobe Evrope, ki je »nepripravljena in nemočna v bitki s krizo«, ki doživlja »krizo vrednot«, je »apatična«, kar lahko učinkuje kot odveza za politiko: »EU ni bila pripravljena«, »doživela je hud udarec«, »EU ni kos krizam«.

»Klavrna Evropa« tako »nima več moči«, »izgublja temelje« ali pa je »povsem odpovedala« oziroma njene članice nimajo »zmogljivosti«, »ne morejo« in »ne zmorejo«: »Unija očitno nima več moči za sprejemanje odločitev [...] in spet kaže klavrno podobo.« V tem kontekstu je klavrna podoba pogosto pripisana tudi beguncem, ki so prikazani kot žrtve: »reveži«, »množica nesrečnikov«, »tisoči nesrečnežev« ali »nič krivi nesrečneži«, klavrna Evropa pa se sooča s »kolono trpeče človečnosti« in »kalvarijo tisoč in tisoč ubogih duš«. Če sta nemoč in kaotičnost prikazani kot problem, potem rešitve v komentarjih pogosto sugerirajo idealizirano podobo združene Evrope, ki bi »morala nastopiti skupaj«, sicer da je »ne potrebujemo« ali pa bo z njo kmalu »konec«.

Če se na prvi pogled pričakuje, da bodo članki, ki slikajo Evropo v njeni klavnosti, podali kritiko evropske begunske politike, je zanje dejansko značilno, da rešitev »begunske krize« vidijo v *mainstream* politikah, nekateri tudi v pozivu k bolj »trdim« politikam (kar sem podrobneje analizirala zgoraj). Eden med članki na primer zgoščeno slika klavnost:

beremo o tem, kako je »kaos postal popoln«, kako je v Evropi »razpadel sistem« in da je »Evropa odpovedala na celi črti«, »grozi ji popolna blokada« in tudi možnost, da je »v hipu ne bo več« (Slabe 2015d: 1). Jadikovanju o »razpadu sistema« v Evropi sledi sklepni odstavek, v katerem avtor legitimizira aktualne politike gradnje zbirališč/taborišč, selektivne politike in kvotni sistem:

Če se 28 šefov držav ali vlad ne bo zmoglo takoj in za vse obvezujoče dogovoriti o skupnih evropskih begunskih zbirališčih, kjer bi bilo vse te prebežnike mogoče vsaj dostojno namestiti, potem pa v miru [...] določiti, kdo izmed prebežnikov je *sploh* upravičen do pomoči in katera članica mu jo je dolžna zagotoviti, Evropi grozi popolna blokada. (Poudarek M. P.)

Tu se avtor domnevno zavzame za »humano« namestitev, ki naj ji sledi selekcija »pravih« beguncev in razpored izbranih po državah – če teh politik (ki jih zagovarjajo »evropski voditelji«) ne bo, bo sledila »blokada«. Ponovno lahko potrdim kontradiktornost v argumentaciji, ko se problem hkrati kaže kot rešitev. Še več, sledi stavek, v katerem avtor napoveduje, kaj se utegne zgoditi, če bo Evropa še naprej delovala »malo po svoje«, in pri tem kriminalizira begunce: »Si kdo sploh upa zamisliti, kaj bi se zgodilo, če množice lačnih in žejnih zaradi zaprtih meja začnejo ropati trgovine [...]« (prav tam). Podoben zagovor restriktivnih politik je zgovoren tudi v članku, v katerem avtor »bitko« z evropsko begunsko krizo najprej označi za »polomijo«, Evropo slika za »nemočno« in obenem zagovarja restriktivne politike: »Da bo Unija lahko preživela krizo, se bo prej ali slej *moralna* lotiti bolj neprijetnih ukrepov, ki bodo vse prej kot kultura dobrodošlice. Tako ali drugače bo po logiki trdnjave Evrope začela strogo nadzirati meje [...]« (Žerjavič 2015f: 1, poudarek M. P.).

Temna evropska duša: o nacionalnih interesih in beguncih kot povzročiteljih zatona Evrope

Besedila pogosto ustvarjajo podobe ogrožene Evrope – ogrožajo jo begunci: »proti Evropi se valijo množice nesrečnežev«, soočamo se z »navalom beguncev, kakršnega stara celina ni poznala vse od druge svetovne vojne«, priče smo »begunski drami, ki maje temelje Evrope«, in beguncem, ki »Evropo in evropski projekt postavljajo pred eno največjih preizkušanj do zdaj«. Begunci so predstavljeni kot »problem« ali kot »vprašanje«; kot problem se pojavljajo z referenco na krizo ali dramo: begunska kriza je »postala večja od grške in ukrajinske«, Evropa se sooča z »gladiatorsko begunsko dramo«. Govori se o »navalu ljudi, ki so se odločili iskati srečo v Evropi«, zelo pogoste so metafore, povezane z vremenski pojavi, ki implicirajo katastrofo: »vse bolj neustavljivi begunski cunamiji«, »begunski val«, »reka beguncev«, »tokovi beguncev se ne ustavijo«, »reka bežečih ljudi« – podobno so študije v slovenskem prostoru zaznale ob poročanju o beguncih iz nekdanje Jugoslavije v devetdesetih letih (Doupona Horvat, Žagar, Vershueren 2001).

Begunci in begunska kriza se pojavljajo kot krivci zatona Evrope. Komentarji uporabljajo prisposodbe o temi, diskurz katastrofičnosti prevzema tudi dramatisiranje, ki so ga izvajali nosilci politične oblasti: »nad staro celino se spušča tema«, »dublin je mrtev, schengen je mrtev«, »evropska duša je temna«. Podobne so prisposodbe o koncu Evrope, npr. v naslovu članka Nekoč je bila EU, ali pa: soočamo se »pravim črnim scenarijem, ki je

počasen, boleč zaton Evrope«. Obstoje EU je predstavljen kot »čedalje bolj negotov«, zato: če Evropa ne bo »držala skupaj«, »je ne bo«.

Hkrati je Evropa v komentarjih pogosto opredeljena kot celina ali skupnost, ki jo na eni strani ogrožajo begunci, na drugi pa se z odnosom do beguncev in s politiko, ki je označena za propadlo, spodletelo, ogroža sama; begunska kriza tako postane »evropska sramota«, »velika sramota za Unijo«. V takšnih člankih je kritika Evrope, ki da se sama ogroža, običajno omenjena zgolj mimogrede, medtem ko je poudarek v argumentaciji na uprizarjanju uboge Evrope: »Horde beguncev [...] vdirajo v evropski prostor blaginje, socialne pravičnosti in demokracije, in grozijo, da bodo, gole in bose, tako kot so barbari nekoč sesuli Rim, spodjedle vse pridobitve naše visoko humane in civilizirane skupnosti« (Slabe 2015b: 6). V istem komentarju avtor spodbuja imaginacijo bralcev in bralk o futurističnih možnostih množičnega vdora Kitajcev ali Indijcev z insinucijo o uničujočih posledicah: »Si kdo predstavlja, kaj bi iz Evrope nastalo, če bi se ob tako zmedeni evropski priseljski politiki na beg za boljše življenje podalo pol milijarde Kitajcev ali Indijcev?« Članek svari pred uničujočo politiko »na stečaj odprtih vrat« za Evropo, češ da je »eno žejnemu dati vode, nekaj drugega pa je integrirati milijone migrantov«. Tu gre za sugestijo, naj se Evropa brani pred migranti, sicer jo bodo ti pogubili.

Evropska (ne)moč v obravnavi »begunske krize« se kaže tudi v sklicevanju na Bruselj, njegov oportunitizem ali ravnanje, ki »spominja za zmedo v generalštabu«. Če bi Bruselj vodil »orientirano« politiko, bi se Evropa lažje »spopadla z begunsko krizo«. V tem kontekstu komentarji pogosto izpostavljajo problem samovolje posameznih držav članic: »Unija [...] se je spremenila v zvezo sprtih članic, ki druga drugi očitajo pomanjkanje solidarnosti, sebično solirajo ali tiščijo glavo v pesek« (Žerjavič 2015c: 1), »odločanje na evropski ravni« tako poteka »v slogu bazarja nacionalnih egoizmov v odsotnosti osrednjega telesa, ki bi prevzemalo odgovornost« (prav tam), in tudi: »azilni sistem EU je kot nekakšna krpanka, v kateri vsaka država dela po svoje« (Žerjavič 2015b: 6).

Pogosto se poudarjajo problemi dezorientiranost Bruslja, pomanjkanje skupne evropske politike in posledično vzpon nacionalnih egoizmov. Prisotne pa so tudi naracije, ki v odsotnosti skupne evropske politike zagovarjajo soliranje nacionalnih držav; v teh besedilih zaznamo prevzem nekakšne državniške države – da pride v primeru »nevarnosti od zunaj« do močnega procesa identifikacije novinarjev z nacijo in nacionalnim interesom, so potrdile že nekatere pretekle študije (Doupona Horvat, Žagar, Vershueren 2001; Zavrtnik Zimic 2003; Jalušič 2001; Mihelj 2001): ker je »Evropa povsem odpovedala«, je »računati nanjo iluzorno«, zato se bo »Slovenija morala, morda celo prvič v svoji četrtsloletni zgodovini, odzvati kot suverena država, ki ne more računati na nikogar, ki pa sama dobro ve, kaj je pošteno in prav [...]« (Slabe 2015e: 1). Sledi: »Vseeno pa zna v skladu z evropskimi vrednotami (vsaj o teh menda še lahko govorimo) poskrbeti tudi za svoje interese in ugled.« Če bi prvo misel lahko razumeli tudi kot poziv k odgovornosti Slovenije, v nadaljevanju vidimo, da avtor samostojnega ravnanja države – paradoksalno, v skladu z evropskimi vrednotami – ne zagovarja zato, ker bi ga skrbeli »nesrečneži«, ampak ugled države. Bruselj je v člankih tudi opravičilo za žico, ki je »zgolj simptom evropske nemoči« ali »odraz popolne dezorientiranosti evropskih vlad in Bruslja«.

Nemška Evropa: o neciviliziranih vzhodnjakih in tujih beguncih

Evropa in evropskost sta – v slogu »novega evrocentrizma« (Velikonja 2005) – pogosto omenjeni kot sinonim za dobro in napredno, pri čemer »begunska kriza« ogroža evropske dosežke. Vsebine, ki pomanjkanje skupne evropske politike povezujejo z egoizmi posameznih držav članic, na nekaterih mestih ločijo članice po klasični liniji zahod/sever–vzhod, pri čemer so vzhodne predstavljane kot parazitske, češ da »prejemajo milijarde pomoči iz proračuna EU, niso pa pripravljene pokazati solidarnosti z najbolj obremenjenimi državami«. »Obremenjene« severne države komentator omenja kot »redke izjeme z izdelanim azilnim sistemom« (Žerjavič 2015: 1), pri tem pa ne izvemo, kaj ta izdelanost pomeni. Številni komentariji ponavljajo krilatice politikov o »pravični porazdelitvi bremena med članicami«, pri tem pa nekritično sprejemajo politiko žuganja severnih držav (predstavljenih v idealiziranih podobah) v odnosu do vzhodnih in južnih.

»Evropa bi morala nastopiti skupaj«, »bistvo evropskega projekta je skupno reševanje težav«, kot rešitev je poudarjena potreba po »enotni begunski politiki«. Omenjene krilatice so postavljene v dvomljiv kontekst, v katerem denimo beremo o nadcivilizacijskosti zahodnih evropskih držav v odnosu do držav južne Evrope:

Tudi Albanija, Kosovo, Srbija ter Bosna in Hercegovina potrebujejo evropsko perspektivo, če ne drugače, skupaj s trdo vzgojo uprave svoje države, kakršno zdaj zaradi nespametnega preteklega zadolževanja doživlja Grčija. (Kramžar 2015a: 5)

Komentarji nekritično ponotranjajo realpolitične razmere, v katerih »nastopiti skupaj« pomeni delovati po diktatu močnejšega, kar lahko interpretiramo kot reprodukcijo neokolonialne perspektive, tokrat ne v odnosu do »zunanjega drugega« (begunca), ampak »notranjega drugega« (vzhodnjaka, južnjaka).

Politika postavljanja žice na meji in zavračanja migracij madžarskega premiera Orbana je v komentarjih deležna kritik, pomenljivo pa je, da komentariji ksenofobne voditelje Evrope iščejo predvsem v vzhodnih članicah. Besedila, ki se kritično lotevajo »trde« politike vzhodnjakov, so obenem tista, ki nekritično uprizarjajo romantično podobo razsvetljenske Evrope: »Orbanizem načenja osnovne evropske vrednote, kot so svoboda, enakost, bratstvo. In toleranca« (Potič 2015b: 5). Dva komentarja presegata neokolonialne perspektive, ko avtorica in avtor problematizirata »licemerstvo« velikih članic, ki kandidatke in predkandidatke postavlja v »mučno vlogo branika meja Evrope«. »Bruseljska logika« državam juga in vzhoda »zabiča, naj bolje sodelujejo, medtem ko bi bilo še bolj pomembno k boljšemu sodelovanju prisiliti predvsem tiste velike evropske članice, ki se še kar držijo ob strani in skrivaj upajo, da se jih begunski val ne bo dotaknil« (Slabe 2015g: 7).

Ko je Angela Merkel pozvala Evropo h gostoljubju, so evropske medije preplavila poročila in njene podobe kot rešiteljice Evrope, kar je zgovoren primer uprizarjanja tega, kar je Beck (2013) poimenoval »nemška Evropa«. Nekateri komentatorji *Dela* so se pridružili »valu navdušenja«: Nemčija je tako kot »obljubljena dežela« postala »dobra Nemčija«, ki je že v preteklosti »nesebično pomagala drugim«, zaradi česar so Nemci postali »boljši ljudje«. Angela Merkel in Nemci so *Gutmenschen* (Kramžar 2015b: 5): »svetla Nemčija [...] je lahko vsej Evropi vzor za pomoč ljudem.« Nemčija / Angela Merkel je predstavljena tudi kot vzor v odnosu do vseh drugih držav, češ da si bo »še naprej prizadevala za evropske in mednarodne rešitve, a je velika večina držav EU najbolj izpostavljene države do zdaj

puščala na cedilu« (Kramžar 2015e: 5). Zgolj dva komentarja kritizirata tak pogled: avtor se sprašuje, kako se je Angeli Merkel iz furerke, ki je z zategovanjem pasu na beraško palico spravila pol Evrope, čez noč uspelo preleviti v »begunsko sveto Johano«, ki sta je sami usmiljenje in solidarnost (Slabe 2015c: 8). Ali pa navedba komentatorja: »sarkastično je že to, da zdaj velja vodilna evropska konservativka za simbol liberalne odprtosti do beguncev« (Čibej 2015b: 1). V tem kontekstu je mogoče prebrati kritiko sicer opevanega nemškega gostoljubja: »Tako so v Berlinu najprej človekoljubno obljubili, da bodo vzeli vse begunce, potem pa čez noč zaprli meje.«

Komentarji o sprejemu beguncev v Nemčiji v slavonspevu nemškega gostoljubja postrežejo še s podobo o nevarnih beguncih: »svetlo« Evropo in Nemčijo tako ogrožajo »spopadi med begunci v zatočiščih«, ki kažejo, da v Evropo bežijo »nepopisani listi, ki svojo resnico postavljajo proti vsem drugim«. Sledi zaščitništvo Evrope pred »barbari«: »Evropa, ki zdaj stavi na strpnost, je takšna prepričanja že plačevala s krvjo« in »stara celina se nima kam umakniti, ne pred begunci in tudi ne pred klavci«. Podobno v drugem komentarju avtorica sugerira, da se Nemčija, ki jo predstavi kot »osrednjo evropsko državo«, poleg z »neznan-skim navalom beguncev« spopada še s težavami, »značilnimi za islamsko vero«. Mnogi begunci v Nemčiji, ki so predstavljeni kot »drugi«, Neevropejci, Nenemci, nasproti podobi dobrih Nemcev z Angelo Merkel na čelu, tako »ne bodo potrebovali le učenja jezika, ampak tudi kulturo, strpnost, delovne navade [...]«. Če bodo Nemci beguncem »vse to sploh mogli dati«, »si kanclerka Angela Merkel najbrž res zasluži Nobelovo nagrado za mir [...]« (Kramžar 2015c: 5).

Delitev na »dobre« in »slabe« begunce je še več, kot na primer ločevanje tistih, ki so prihajali »do zdaj«, tj. »ambicioznih vzhodnoevropskih in drugih mladih«, od tistih, ki prihajajo zdaj, tj. »moških islamske vere, njihovih z rutami pokritih mater, sestra in žena«, zaradi česar »še ne bo kmalu konec dilem z evropskimi vrednotami, morda pa tudi ne s priseljenci« (Kramžar 2015d: 5). »Slabi« begunci so tudi »gospodarski begunci« ali »begunci, ki prinašajo finančno breme« (Kramžar 2015a), pri čemer poimenovanja prevzemajo idejo o gospodarski ogroženosti Evrope (za podobno prevzemanje idej t. i. blaginjskega nacionalizma v medijih prim. Kralj 2008). »Nepravi« so tudi »tujci« ali »val Sircev«, kjer gre za izpostavljanje etničnosti kot kriterija izključevanja oziroma mehanizma poustvarjanja begunca kot »drugega« (prim. Doupona Horvat, Žagar, Vershueren 2001; Pajnik 2007).

Dobra Evropa, slaba Turčija in slabi teroristi

Pogajanja s Turčijo, ki so pripeljala do zaprtja balkanske poti in preprečitve legalne migracije v Evropsko unijo po kopnem (novembra in decembra 2015), je večina komentarjev pospremila z nekakšnim kritičnim odobravanjem, kot tudi sicer velja za druge že analizirane migracijske politike. Ko »ograje ne rešujejo ničesar« in ko je Evropa (Nemčija) že povsem »na robu moči«, postane Turčija rešitev: »zadnje upanje«, »strateški zaveznik« in »tamponsko območje za ustavitve beguncev«. V odsotnosti kritike in refleksije, kaj denimo za begunce pomeni preprečevanje migracije, je »za silo prepričljiva rešitev« ali »boljša rešitev od vsega, kar je krožilo v zadnjih mesecih«, predstavljena kot edina možnost za EU: »EU druge izbire nima« (Žerjavič 2015d: 1). Na drugem mestu komentator podobno meni, da po tem, ko je »padel« dublinski sistem, ko na jugu niso več nadzirali zunanje meje EU in ko so znotraj schengna spet začeli uvajati nadzor potnikov«, evropska politika

z dogovorom s Turčijo »poskuša vzpostaviti vsaj bolj urejen sistem« (ni pojasnjeno, kako) (Žerjavič 2015e: 1).

Podobno beremo v drugih komentarjih: v kontekstu, da lahko »begunci celo raznesejo Evropsko unijo«, tej »preprosto ne preostane nič drugega kot obupen poskus Ankaro ne glede na ceno pridobiti na svojo stran [...]« (Slabe 2015f: 5). Iz komentarja je na nekaterih mestih mogoče zaznati avtorjev cinizem, češ, zdaj ko EU »teče voda v grlo«, kliče na pomoč Turčijo in Asada, da bi le ustavila »naval beguncev«, pa kljub temu avtor konča s poenostavljeno podobo, prevzeto od politikov, »da Evropi ne preostane nič drugega«.

V komentarjih, ki obravnavajo dogovarjanja s Turčijo, je pogosto uprizarjanje kontrasta med demokratično Evropo, ki, ubogi zaradi begunskega toka, ki je »neobvladljiv«, ne preostane drugega kot dogovarjanje z nedemokratično Turčijo. »Turška Evropa« tako postane Evropa, ki se je »zblížala s Turčijo, a tudi odtujila od same sebe«; dogovor z Ankaro je predstavljen kot »evropski samomor« in »poraz Evrope kot take«. Čeprav iz komentarjev razberemo kritiko »kravje kupčije« Evrope s Turčijo, kritike ohranjajo dualizem slaba Turčija – dobra Evropa. Dogovor s Turčijo komentator vidi tudi kot priložnost za gradnjo politike preprečevanja migracij: »EU bi v navezi s Turčijo lahko uporabila model Španije, ki v sodelovanju z Marokom odvrča prebežnike iz Afrike« (Žerjavič 2015g).

»Ali se Nemčija v zameno za zadrževanje sirskih in drugih beguncev lahko zavzame za odpravo vizumov z vse bolj avtoritarno Turčijo, v kateri živi že skoraj toliko ljudi kot v Nemčiji?« (Kramžar 2015e: 5), je vprašanje, ki prevzema črno-belo podobo dobre Nemčije in slabe Turčije in ki obenem (brez argumentov) hvali evropsko vizumsko politiko. Tako je »čas za preplah«, saj je v dogovorih s Turčijo predmet političnega barantanja postala »evropska vizumska politika, ki je od nekdanje zelo visoko na lestvici tistih političnih instrumentov in svoboščin, s katerimi je EU spodbujala reforme v svoji soseščini« (Slabe 2015h). Avtor problematizira žrtvovanje vizumske politike kot pomembne evropske pridobitve v barantanjih s Turčijo, ki jo loči od demokratične Evrope. Vizumski režim postane »demokratična svoboščina«, ki je »edino, kar lahko Evropo obdrži skupaj« (prav tam). Zgolj en komentar je manj kritičen do Turčije in manj prizanesljiv do Evrope: »Namesto podkupovanja Turčije potrebujemo rešitev za begunce in ustavitev vojne, s Turčijo pa nadaljevanje procesa in demokratizacije«. EU se »z nedemokratičnim režimom spogleduje zato, da bi se znebila beguncev« (Vidmajer 2015: 6).

Komentarji, ki so naslavljali teroristične napade v »jedro Evrope« (napadi v Parizu 13. novembra), so se pogosto sklicevali na evropske ideale in vrednote (o čemer sem že pisala): napadi so »grozili samim temeljem evropske mirovne ureditve«, »Evropa mora ubraniti svoje vrednote – svobodo, odprtost, strpnost«, zaščititi mora »demokratične, odprte družbe«. Zaščititi je treba »človekove pravice, humanizem in svobodo [...], ki so temelji, ki nas združujejo in povezujejo«.

Podobno kot je zaostrovanje migracijske politike kot samoumevno predstavljeno v primeru dogovarjanja s Turčijo, so tudi komentarji po terorističnih napadih v Parizu v kontekstu izpostavljenе nemoči Evrope sugerirali nesmiselnost politike »odprtih vrat« in z nekako samoumevno lahkotnostjo napovedovali njeno zaostrovanje: »V Bruslju še vztrajajo pri nadaljevanju odprte begunske politike, a težko si je predstavljati, da napadi ne bodo privedli do njenega zaostrovanja.« Podobno zapisu, da po napadih »v Evropi nič več ne bo tako, kot je bilo«, sledi samoumevnost v komentarju o zaostrovanju pravice do azila v Nemčiji – ker je »morda vsaj eden od teroristov v Francijo prispel kot begunec«, postane samoumevno, da se mora Nemčija »vsaj malo spokoriti zaradi odprtja meja«. V

tem primeru komentar sugerira, da so napadi posledica politike »odprtih meja«. V podobnem kontekstu je tudi »subtilni« zagovor maksischengna: ko se je po terorističnih napadih »pokazalo, da obstoj schengna ni več samoumeven«, komentar napove schengen prihodnosti: »Da bi zdržali pritisk od zunaj, bo moral biti njegov zid še višji«, evropske družbe bodo morale pa še pokazati, »ali so se v imenu večje varnosti pripravljene odpovedati pravicam« (Žerjavič 2015 h: 1).

SKLEP

V članku sem analizirala delovanje medijsko-političnega paralelizma, udejanjanje medijske logike, ki narekuje a) izbiro teme, b) selekcijo virov, c) način upovedovanja teme skladno z dominantno politično agendo, kar sem pokazala na primeru analize novinarskega komentarja v časopisu *Delo* iz druge polovice leta 2015. Kljub interpretativni odprtosti, ki jo ponuja žanr komentarja, je analiza pokazala, da refleksije t. i. begunske krize v veliki meri ostajajo znotraj prevladujočega uokvirjanja teme s strani nosilcev politične oblasti. V dialogu s kritičnimi študijami s področja migracij (Balibar 2007; Brubaker 2003; Mezzadra 2010), ki problematizirajo prevladujoče trende kriminalizacije migracij in persistentnost neokolonialne politike EU na primeru mehanizmov migracijsko-integracijskega menedžmenta, lahko ugotovimo, da se komentarji, pa čeprav na nekaterih mestih kritični, v veliki meri dejansko umeščajo v prevladujoči politični kontekst.

Komentar, ki se odziva na dnevno-politično dogajanje, tega legitimizira, pri čemer se legitimizacija pogosto dogaja skozi kritiko migracijske politike, ki pa to dejansko ni. To sem potrjevala z analizo na podlagi vprašanj, kaj je v tekstu definirano kot problem in kaj kot rešitev (Bacchi 2009). Če je kvotni sistem kot mehanizem migracijske politike obravnavan kot problem, je hkrati obravnavan tudi kot rešitev problema – s kvotnim sistemom Evropa kaže klavrno podobo, svojo nesposobnost reagiranja na »begunsko krizo«, obenem pa, če pride do pravične porazdelitve beguncev, kot da kvotni sistem nima alternative. Podobno brambovstvo trdnjave Evrope sem analizirala na primeru obravnave schengenskega sistema in viznega režima. Pokazala sem, da se legitimizacija prevladujoče politične agende v formiranju migracijske politike v veliki meri izvaja skozi zamišljanja Evrope. Podobe klavrne, uboge Evrope učinkujejo kot moraliziranje in v odsotnosti poglobljene razprave rešitev za Evropo (pred begunci) postanejo politike »preprečevanja migracij«. V tem kontekstu analiza obenem pokaže na veliko mero medijske reprodukcije agende »velikih« v Evropi, zlasti nemške politike, kar sem problematizirala tudi s prikazom naracij o vzhodnih državah in njihovih egoizmi, ki imajo v argumentaciji vse značilnosti reprodukcije evropocentrizma.

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SUMMARY

MEDIA-POLITICAL PARALLELISM: LEGITIMIZATION OF MIGRATION POLICY IN EDITORIALS IN THE DAILY NEWSPAPER “DELO”

Mojca PAJNIK

The article analyses the functioning of “media logic” using the example of editorials which address the topic of migration with regard to the so-called (ongoing) “refugee crisis”. We start from the thesis that meta-processes of mediatisation define the operation of the media to the degree that “media logic” follows political agendas. The media logic is analysed as a set of principles that defines the topic of media debate, the selection of journalistic sources and the types of narration in their relation to the “political logic”. We verify the thesis based on a qualitative analysis of journalistic commentary (editorials) that were published in the Slovenian daily newspaper *Delo* in the period from early August to the end of December 2015 on the topic of European migration policy (quota system, Schengen regime, bilateral agreements, visa regulations etc.). The analysis is based on 97 editorials and it applies critical discourse analysis in combination with strategic framing analysis as a method.

We show that these articles most often refer to various mechanisms of migration policy which adopt a “realist” political view, in the absence of a more informed analysis that would increase reader’s understanding of policies. The media-political parallelism, i.e. the fusion of the media with the political agenda, is also shown in the omission of the views of non-governmental sources. The legitimization of European migration policy is largely based on narratives about Europe/the European Union that reflect Eurocentric views. Refugees are represented as the culprits for the collapse of Europe, and as those endangering the values of Europe; also common are representations about eastern Europeans as “other Europeans” and of Turkey (reflecting the political “trading” of refugees between the EU and Turkey) as uncivilised – which is then used to legitimize strict migration regimes.

MED DISTANCIRANOSTJO IN ANGAŽIRANOSTJO: PROTISLOVJA POROČANJA O »BEGUNSKI KRIZI« V DNEVNEM TISKU

Dejan JONTES¹

COBISS 1.01

IZVLEČEK

Med distanciranostjo in angažiranostjo: protislovja poročanja o »begunski krizi« v dnevnem tisku
 Avtor v članku analizira poročanje o »begunski krizi« v treh osrednjih slovenskih dnevnikih, *Delu*, *Dnevniku* in *Večeru*, v obdobju, ki so ga novinarji poimenovali »prvi in drugi begunski val«. Pri analizi se osredotoča na uokvirjanje problematike in na prevladujoče novinarske konvencije, s katerimi se uprizarja objektivnost, pri čemer skuša prikazati temeljno protislovje pri poročanju o »begunski krizi«. Na eksplicitni ravni je namreč v dnevnikih časopisih problem z distanciranim poročanjem prevladujoče uokvirjen s humanitarno krizo, v redkih primerih tudi z varnostno grožnjo, na konotativni ravni pa se z značilnostma poročanja, kot sta faktizem in epizodičnost, utrjuje prevladujoči strah pred množičnostjo beguncev. Poleg tega v poročanju prihaja tudi do odmika od konvencij objektivnosti in bolj angažiranega poročanja, kjer dnevne novice z zatekanjem k arhetipskim podobam herojev delujejo podobno kot mit.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: begunska kriza, migracije, novinarske konvencije, kakovostni tisk, objektivnost, faktizem

ABSTRACT

Between Detachment and Engagement: Paradoxes in Reporting about the “Refugee Crisis” in Daily Press

The paper analyses reporting about the “refugee crisis” in Slovenia’s three main daily newspapers *Delo*, *Dnevnik* and *Večer* in the first weeks of mass migrations through the country that were named “the first and the second wave of refugees” by the journalists. The analysis focuses on the question of framing and on the dominant journalistic conventions through which objectivity is performed. The paper tries to reflect on the paradox in reporting these issues where the problem is dominantly framed in terms of humanitarian crisis on the explicit level and rarely as a security issue but on the connotative level factism and episodic framing suggest another reading of the problem that supports the fear of the immigrants. What is more, examples of more engaged reporting can be found where archetypal figures of heroes are called upon and where daily news functions similar as myth.

KEY WORDS: refugee crisis, migrations, journalistic conventions, quality press, objectivity, factism

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UVOD

Migracije so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih deležne velike medijske pozornosti, še zlasti pa se je interes za diskurze o migracijah okrepil po 11. septembru 2001, čemur je sledilo tudi povečanje raziskovalnega interesa. Ugotovitve teh študij variirajo od poudarjanja podreprezentiranosti migrantov v medijih (Sjöberg, Rydin 2014), stereotipnih vizualnih reprezentacij (Cheregi 2015) do negativnih oziroma zelo ozkih in izključujočih reprezentacij te družbene skupine. Benson (2002: 49) tako denimo ugotavlja, da se je v ZDA in Franciji med letoma 1973 in 1991 prevladujoče družbeno uokvirjanje te teme progresivno premikalo od altruističnih skrbi za družbeno dobrobit migrantov k politiki strahu. Še zlasti v Franciji se je po ugotovitvah njegove študije »ideološka leča«, skozi katero so mediji prikazovali migrante, v tem času zožila in premaknila v desno. Benson in Saguy (2005: 246) pa pokažeta, da je poročanje odvisno predvsem od »nacionalnih kulturnih repertoarjev«, povezanih s temo, in ne z realnostjo migracij. Tudi A. Lawlor (2015) na primeru longitudinalne študije britanskega in kanadskega poročanja o tej temi ugotovi podoben premik k sekuritizaciji in s tem povezanim strahovom, kar pa kljub temu ne postane dominantna tema, saj v poročanju še vedno prepozna tudi precejšnje variacije.

V slovenskem primeru analize poročanja o beguncih že od devetdesetih let kažejo bolj enotno sliko. Doupona Horvat, Verschuere in Žagar, ki se ukvarjajo z retoriko begunske politike v Sloveniji na primeru bosanskih beguncev, ugotavljajo, da je bilo vprašanje beguncev uspešno opredeljeno kot problem. »Z drugimi besedami, *ustvarili* so krizo, tako da so odkloni od nekaterih načel zlahka obveljali za izjemne ukrepe, ki sami po sebi ne spodbijajo temeljnjšega in domnevno trdnega vrednostnega sistema« (Doupona Horvat idr. 2001: 39). Podobno ugotavlja Mojca Pajnik (2007), ki je v analizo poročanja o beguncih zajela obdobje med letoma 2003 in 2005, ko se je o beguncih še vedno poročalo kot o številčno visoki grožnji, državniška drža pa se je po njenih ugotovitvah uporabljala kot legitimizacijski okvir za nekatere diskriminatorne diskurzivne obrate. Kljub temu je zaznala premike v poročanju, kot so osredotočanje na zgodbe, v katerih govorijo begunci, poročanje o težavah, s katerimi se soočajo in podobno (Pajnik 2007: 1). V nadaljevanju zato svoje ugotovitve na nekaterih mestih primerjam tudi s ključnimi ugotovitvami predhodnih študij in se pri analizi uokvirjanja nanje navezujem tudi v metodološkem pristopu.

V članku skušam k obstoječim študijam prispevati z analizo poročanja o »begunski krizi« v treh osrednjih slovenskih dnevnih časopisih,¹ *Delu*, *Dnevniku* in *Večeru*, časovno pa sem se osredotočil na izbrana dva tedna v obdobju največjega povečanja prehodov migrantov čez državo, jeseni 2015, in sicer na začetek obdobja, ki so ga novinarji poimenovali »prvi in drugi begunski val«. ² Analiza se osredotoča na vprašanja, kako je povečan prehod

1 Poročanje v tabloidih in (desnem) revijalnem tisku v tem sklopu obravnava Vezovnik (2017) in Pušnik (2017), Odmeve analizira Breda Luthar (2017), mnenjski tisk pa Mojca Pajnik (2017).

2 Z metaforami se v tem tekstu ne bom posebej ukvarjal, a tudi na mojem vzorcu je kljub temu treba poudariti prevlado metafore »begunskega vala«, kar ugotavljajo že pretekle raziskave, ki analizirajo poročanje o bosanskih beguncih v prvi polovici devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Doupona Horvat in drugi (2001: 20) tako poudarjajo, da »metafora begunskega vala uteleša enega najočitnejših vidikov pri konstruiranju begunske problematike – gre za gole številke, s katerimi je mogoče objektivno podpreti omejitve glede tega, kaj Slovenija lahko stori. Politiki in novinarji so z združenimi močmi prikazovali podobo resničnega tveganja, da slovenska država doživi kolaps.«

migrantov skozi državo³ uokvirjen v dnevnem tisku ter o delovanju prevladujočih novinarskih konvencij in z njimi povezanih formalnih vidikov novinarskih zgodb. Tako »kaj« pripovedi (vsebina) kot »kako« pripovedi (način izrekanja) namreč skupaj konstituirata pomen povedanega (glej tudi Jontes, Luthar 2015). Z analizo delovanja ključnih novinarskih konvencij in pomenov, ki jih te generirajo, tako dopolnujem analizo prevladujočih medijskih okvirov. Metoda uokvirjanja, kot opozarja Reese (2003: 8), lahko kljub bolj »prefinjenemu« pristopu od tradicionalne analize vsebine enostavno zdrsnje v problematično paradigmo medijskih učinkov.

TEORETSKO IZHODIŠČE IN METODA

V analizi treh osrednjih časnikov sem se osredotočil na obdobji med 18. in 25. septembrom in 19. in 26. oktobrom 2015, to sta prva tedna po začetku prvega in drugega obdobja množičnega prehoda beguncev skozi Slovenijo. V izbranem obdobju je bila ta tema v *Delu*, *Dnevniku* in *Večeru* dnevno umeščena na prvo⁴ stran, ki sem jo zajel v analizo, v nadaljevanju pa se na prvi strani ne pojavlja več dnevno. Poleg prispevkov informativnih zvrsti in komentarjev so bile v tem času na to temo v *Delu* objavljene tudi štiri karikature, ki jih nisem posebej obravnaval, sicer pa analiza zajema 50 novinarskih prispevkov.⁵

Tabela 1: Število analiziranih prispevkov po publikacijah

	Delo	Dnevnik	Večer	Skupaj
Uvodnik/komentar	9	2	0	11
Novica (s fotografijo)	19 (14)	11 (9)	9 (9)	39

V analizi uokvirjanja se deloma naslanjam na pristop, ki sta ga v longitudinalni študiji poročanja o migrantih v ameriškem in francoskem tisku uporabila Benson in Saguy (2005). Avtorja razlikujeta med tremi glavnimi okvirji, in sicer med problemi za migrante, problemi, ki naj bi jih povzročali migranti, ter med okvirom, ki tematizira migracije v okviru pozitivne kulturne diverzitete. V sklopu »problemi za migrante« nadalje razlikujeta med družbenim, kulturnim in rasnim/etničnim okvirom. Družbeni okvir naslavlja težave, s katerim se soočajo migranti, kot so slabe bivanjske razmere, kršenje človekovih pravic ali dostojanstva migrantov, kriminalna dejanja nad migranti, nesreče in podobno. Kulturni

3 Širši družbeni kontekst je orisan v uvodniku k temu tematskemu sklopu.

4 Zavedam se, da osredotočanje samo na prvo stran lahko ponudi do neke mere omejene rezultate, saj je tema obravnavana tudi v drugih rubrikah in prilogah izbranih časopisov, vendar pa je tako zaradi dodatne teže, ki jo nosi naslovnica, kakor tudi zaradi spremenjenih bralskih navad občinstev ključno ravno to, kako je problem uokvirjen na prvi strani.

5 Izbor člankov za analizo je bil opravljen iz vseh člankov s korenem migra*, prebež*, begun* v obdobju med 20. 8. 2015 in 31. 12. 2015, posredoval pa jih je Urad vlade RS za komuniciranje. Po podatkih Nacionalne raziskave branosti je bil leta 2015 doseg *Dela* 141.000, *Dnevnika* 98.000 in *Večera* 95.000 (Valutni podatki NRB 2015). Za metodologijo Nacionalne raziskave branosti in razlago pojma »doseg« glej spletno stran raziskave: http://www.soz.si/projekti_soz/nrb_nacionalna_raziskava_branosti/valutni_podatki_nrb_2015.

okviri vključujejo grožnje migrantom in poudarjanje emocionalne razpetosti med njihovo izvorno in prisvojeno kulturo, rasni/etnični pa vključujejo diskriminatorno obravnavo migrantov na podlagi rase ali etničnosti. Na drugi strani Benson in Saguy probleme, ki naj bi jih povzročali migranti, kodirata v dve vrsti, kulturne in finančne. Kulturni okviri kulturo migrantov in njihove religijske prakse obravnavajo kot grožnjo kulturi države, v katero prihajajo, finančni okviri pa se osredotočajo na različne stroške migrantov za davkoplačevalce (glej Benson, Saguy 2005: 243). Na ravni članka sem kodiral vseh 50 analiziranih prispevkov, pri čemer sem članek v določeni okvir umestil ob eksplicitni omembi (novinarja ali vira) zgoraj opisanih problemov, rezultate pa predstavljam v nadaljevanju.

Analiza uokvirjanja je na prvi ravni pomembna, ker so okviri kognitivne strukture ter pomemben element javnega diskurza o neki temi (glej Cheregi 2015: 98). Entman (1993: 52) opredeli uokvirjanje kot proces izbire »nekaterih vidikov percipirane realnosti, s katerim se ta v tekstu bolj poudari in spodbuja točno določeno definicijo problema, vzročno interpretacijo, moralno oceno in/ali priporočilo za rešitev«. Reese (2003: 7) izhaja iz konstruktivistične paradigme in okvire opredeljuje kot »organizacijske principe, ki so deljeni v družbi, vztrajni skozi čas in simbolno delujejo, da bi smiselno strukturirali družbeni svet«. Lawlor (2015: 329) poudarja, da so okviri več kot pozitivne ali negativne leče, skozi katere opazujemo problem, saj so hevristični pripomočki, pridobljeni predvsem iz medijev, ki javnosti pomagajo sintetizirati in integrirati nove informacije. Pri vprašanju migracij je ta vidik še zlasti pomemben.

V analizi konvencij, s katero dopolnjujem analizo uokvirjanja, se osredotočam na delovanje oziroma uprizarjanje objektivnosti, ki je kljub številnim kritikam v dnevnem tisku še vedno osrednji element t. i. novinarske paradigme (glej Reese 1990; Hackett 1984). Hackett poudarja, da objektivnost in z njo povezana pravila nepristranskosti ne samo prikrivajo ideološka sporočila v medijih, ampak so ključni del njihovega ideološkega dela. S tem ko novinarji sprejemajo »nevtrarno« in distancirano poročanje kot normo, utrujejo meje, vrednote in pravila, ki jih vzpostavljajo in interpretirajo predvsem elitni viri.

Pri tem bom izhajal iz t. i. kulturne obravnave novinarstva, ki nasprotuje prevladujočim novinarskim pojmovanjem (in je z njim pogosto neusklajeno) o tem, kako nastaja védenje in kako je lahko reprezentirano, kar je temelj novinarske samopercepcije (glej npr. Zelizer 2004). Z novinarskim diskurzom je takšen pristop nezdržljiv že v izhodišču, saj zavrača glavni novinarski mit o novicah kot bolj ali manj natančnem odsevu realnosti ter vztraja, da so novice rezultat številnih dejavnikov, od birokratskih omejitev in poklicne ideologije do številnih narativnih strategij, s pomočjo katerih novinarske zgodbe sploh nastajajo. Kulturni pristop namreč poudarja, da so, tako kot vsi drugi, tudi novinarji umeščeni v jezik in z njim do neke mere tudi konstituirani, zato njihovih percepcij in proizvodov, torej novic, ne moremo pojasnjevati zgolj v okvirih individualne avtonomije in namere (prim. Dahlgren 1992: 11; Luthar 2001).

DOGODKOVNOST IN UOKVIRJANJE »BEGUNSKEGA VALA«

Primerjalne nacionalne študije poročanja o migracijah, kot sta denimo Bensonova (2010) ali Lawlorjeva (2015), prepoznavajo vrsto z migracijami povezanih okvirov, od varnostnega, ekonomskega, zaposlitvenega, multikulturalističnega, ali okvira, ki tematizira diverziteteto. V mojem vzorcu prevladujoči okvir tematizira »begunsko krizo« v okviru različnih

družbenih problemov za migrante, kršenja človekovih pravic in humanitarne krize ter viktimizacije.⁶ Med tremi analiziranimi časopisi pri tem ni bistvenih razlik. Na prevlado omenjenega okvira kažejo že sami naslovi, v nadaljevanju pa navajam še nekaj tipičnih primerov takšnega uokvirjanja zgodbe:

Ob takšni tragediji bi morale pasti vse meje in pregrade. (Gaube, Roglič 2015: 1)

Begunci premraženi in dehidrirani. (Škerl Kramberger 2015: 1)

Tragični prizori Slovenijo in Hrvaško prisilili k popuščanju. (Gaube 2015: 1)

Trnova balkanska pot. Če se bodo uresničile bavarske grožnje z zaprtjem avstrijsko-nemške meje, bo to šele prava begunska kriza. (Čibej 2015: 1)

Počeni avstrijsko-slovensko-hrvaški člen na zahodnobalkanski migracijski poti je v dežju in hladnih temperaturah grenil življenje tisočim beguncev v vsaj petih državah na njihovi poti proti Nemčiji. (Gaube 2015a: 1)

Tragični prizori Slovenijo in Hrvaško prisilili k popuščanju. (Gaube 2015a: 1)

Premraženi čakajoči begunci na dežju. Pretepi za suh kotic v šotorih. Tragični prizori so po dnevu zaostrovanj vzdolž zahodnobalkanske poti včeraj najprej Slovenijo, zatem pa še Hrvaško prisilili k popuščanju. (Gaube 2015a: 1)

Kot alternativni okvir se v posameznih izoliranih primerih v vseh treh časopisih pojavlja še varnostni okvir, ki tematizira problem v kontekstu nelegalnih prehodov meje in množičnosti migrantov, ne povezuje pa ga s terorizmom ali kakšnimi drugimi kriminalnimi dejanji migrantov, kot je pogosto v desnem tisku.

Na obzorju zaostritev begunske krize? (Roglič, Gaube 2015: 1)

Vojska razširja svoja krila. (Škerl Kramberger, Roglič 2015: 1)

Prihajajo dnevi kaosa? Bilanca sinočnjega večera: solzivec na mejnem prehodu Rigonce, meddržavni incident in opozorilo z Dunaja. Razmere so se sinoči na mejnem prehodu Rigonce zaostriale. Hrvaška policija je okoli 500 beguncem odprla poti proti Sloveniji, vendar jih v Slovenijo ni pustil kordon naših policistov. (Bercko idr. 2015: 1)

Zaradi napovedi, da bo drugi begunski val bolj množičen, kot je bil septembrski, se je v soboto sestal Svet za nacionalno varnost, takoj za njim pa tudi vlada. Premier Miro Cerar je povedal, da je bilo sklenjeno, da policiji pri varovanju meje s Hrvaško lahko pomaga tudi vojska. (C. R. 2015: 1)

6 O diskurzu viktimizacije na primeru migrantskih delavcev z območja nekdanje Jugoslavije glej analizo Andreje Vezovnik (2015: 16–19).

Čeprav ne gre za izključno negativno reprezentacijo beguncev, lahko kot zlasti problematično poudarim izjemno ozek nabor okvirov, v katerih je problem obravnavan, in v tej luči tudi popolno odsotnost okvira pozitivne kulturne raznolikosti, saj niti en prispevek te teme ne obravnava niti eksplicitno niti implicitno. Lahko pa na drugi strani v vzorcu kot pozitivno poudarim odsotnost t. i. neoliberalnega⁷ uokvirjanja problematike, ki se pri poročanju o migrantih razmeroma pogosto pojavlja v ameriškem tisku (Benson 2002: 58); ta migrante obravnava kot poceni delovno silo, ki prinaša ekonomsko korist.

Vsi prispevki z izjemo enega opisujejo konkretne dogodke, kar v nadaljevanju podrobneje obravnavam pri vprašanju epizodičnosti. Benson (2010: 16) poudarja, da je učinek teh okvirov ustvarjanje serije dramatičnih naracij, ki poudarjajo epizodične dogodke, kot je recimo poskus prevare ali nelegalno prečkanje meje, s tem pa se pozornost preusmerja stran od konstruktivne razprave, ki bi lahko pripeljala do bolj celostnega razumevanja konteksta politik, povezanih z migracijami. Če Lawlor (2015) pokaže, da mediji to vprašanje obravnavajo tudi kot večplastno notranjepolitično vprašanje, v mojem primeru to ni tako. Prav odsotnost kakršnih koli razprav o migracijskih politikah, z izjemo problematizacije evropskih kvot v komentarjih, je eden najbolj problematičnih vidikov poročanja vakovostnem tisku.

V nasprotju z uokvirjanjem zgodbe kot humanitarne krize več kot polovica od 32 fotografij v vzorcu na drugi strani prikazuje predvsem nepregledne množice migrantov, pogosto s policisti ali z vojaki v ospredju. Na konotativni ravni lahko podobe množic migrantov razumemo kot grožnja in vizualno utrjevanje varnostnega okvira. Messaris in Abraham (2003: 225) poudarjata, da slikovno uokvirjanje ni pomembno le zato, ker lahko podobe prenašajo neubesedljive pomeni, ampak tudi zato, ker je zavedanje o teh pomenih še zlasti izmuzljivo. Podobe se zaradi podobnosti s stvarjo, ki jo reprezentirajo, zdijo tesneje povezane z realnostjo kot besede, čeprav so tudi fotografije »človeško ustvarjene umetne konstrukcije« (2003: 216). Fotografije so tako pri artikulaciji ideoloških sporočil precej bolj učinkovite kot besedilo (prim. Cheregi 2015; Messaris, Abraham 2003).

Na ravni novinarskih konvencij je prva in ključna značilnost analiziranih prispevkov epizodičnost ali dogodkovnost, ki pri poročanju o migrantih v resnem tisku v celoti prevladuje nad tematsko obravnavo. Na splošno dogodkovna obravnava zapostavlja družbeni kontekst problema, kar je še zlasti izrazito v našem primeru, poleg tega pa sproža drugačne interpretacije vzrokov za neki družbeni problem ter drugačno percepcijo njegovega reševanja (gl. Iyengar 1991). Vsi analizirani prispevki z izjemo enega opisujejo izključno konkretne dogodke in problema ne obravnavajo tematsko. Poleg tega je za vseh 11 v vzorec vključenih komentarjev značilna prav dekontekstualizacija, čeprav bi kot interpretativna zvrst lahko – oziroma naj bi – ponujali prav kontekstualizacijo. Tako pa večina komentarjev »begunski val« obravnava zgolj v luči nesposobnosti evropskih držav za reševanje tega problema in posledično nesposobnosti uresničevanja »evropskih vrednot«.⁸

Da prevlada dogodkovnosti ni značilna samo za obdobje krize oziroma večjih ekscesov, pokaže Mojca Pajnik (2007) v analizi medijskih besedil na temo begunstva v letih 2003–2005, kjer ugotavlja, da je poročanje izrazito vezano na posamične dogodke, kot so

7 Za študijo novinarskega upovedovanja neoliberalizma glej Trdina, Pušnik (2010).

8 Podrobneje o mnenjskem tisku glej analizo Mojce Pajnik (2017) v tem sklopu. Andreja Vezovnik (2013: 613) tudi na primeru izbranih pokaže, kako je Evropa konstruirana kot idealizirano utelešenje demokratičnih vrednot, ki jih je treba zasledovati tudi v Sloveniji.

svetovni dan beguncev, odprtje azilnega doma in podobno. Ker je percepcija nekega problema v javnosti v veliki meri odvisna od prevladujočega načina okvirjanja tega problema v medijih, lahko moč medijev razumemo predvsem v konstruiranju in omejevanju družbenega znanja, ta pa igra ključno vlogo tudi pri razumevanju »begunske krize«. Časopisni članki, uvodniki in druge rubrike v tiskanih medijih so javni diskurzi, v katerih se konstruirajo in reproducirajo podobe o migrantih, to konstruiranje in razpravljanje v javni sferi pa ni nevtralno, objektivno in apolitično.

FAKTIZEM

Druga ključna značilnost analiziranih prispevkov je faktizem, eden osrednjih strateških ritualov prevladujoče objektivistične novinarske paradigme. Strateški ritual predpostavlja, da se neka oblika poročanja uporablja nepretrgano in s stiliziranim, ponavljajočim se uprizarjanjem oblikuje tradicijo in posledično legitimnost tega delovanja/poročanja.⁹ Objektivnost se v novinarstvu uprizarja s pomočjo ritualiziranih praks, poklicnih kod in tekstualne konvencije objektivnega novinarstva. Resnica dogodka je tako rezultat protokolov utemeljevanja resničnosti.

Faktizem (gl. Johnson Cartee 2005: 133) se v medijih udejanja predvsem z dekontekstualiziranim nizanem dejstev, to je s proizvodnjo dejstev, npr. anket javnega mnenja v časopisih, ter v rutinski in ritualizirani uporabi t. i. zunanjega glasu oz. izjav v novinarski zgodbi. Javnomenjske ankete in avtoritativni uradni viri, ki naj bi ponujali uradna, verodostojna dejstva, sta dva osrednja strateška rituala faktizma.

Med 13 *Dnevnikovimi* prispevki je tako kar 18 uradnih¹⁰ virov, največ vladnih,¹¹ po enkrat pa kot vir nastopijo migranti, prostovoljci in predstavniki nevladnih organizacij. Zelo podobno je v *Večeru*, kjer je uradnih virov devet, po enkrat pa nastopijo predstavniki Rdečega križa in »običajni« ljudje. Razmerje v prid uradnim virom je najbolj izrazito v primeru *Dela*, kjer v 19 prispevkih informativne zvrsti kar 36-krat nastopijo uradni viri, štirikrat strokovnjaki, tri glasove so dobili »navadni« ljudje, dva begunci in enega predstavnik nevladnih organizacij. S takšno selekcijo virov je povezano tudi fetišiziranje »močnih javnosti«, kot to imenuje Mojca Pajnik (2015: 65), temu primerno pa je po njenem mnenju redukcionistično razumevanje politike.

Če Mojca Pajnik (2007: 1) v preteklih analizah zaznava premik, da namreč v novinarskih zgodbah do glasu občasno pridejo tudi begunci, v pričujočem vzorcu ti kot »vir« nastopajo le v peščici primerov, in še takrat v množini ali anonimizirani obliki.

9 Gaye Tuchman strateški ritual opredeli kot »rutinsko proceduro, ki je relativno slabo ali le bežno povezana z zastavljenim ciljem« (1972/1999: 298). Strateški ritual potrjuje tudi kolektivno izkustvo novinarjev in novinarskih organizacij ter ustvarja in predstavlja retorično legitimacijo novinarskega poklica (glej Zelizer 1993: 191).

10 Zaradi tako velike odvisnosti od uradnih virov McChesney (2002) novinarstvo imenuje kar »stenografija za uradne vire«.

11 Premier Cerar se denimo v vseh prispevkih kot vir pojavi kar 15-krat, notranja ministrica Györkös-Znidar devetkrat in državni sekretar na Ministrstvu za notranje zadeve Šefic prav tako devetkrat.

Mlajša farmacevtka je povedala, da v Iraku zaradi nasilja, neprestanih bojev in eksplozij ni več mogoče bivati. Četudi v Nemčiji nima nikogar, si želi tja, saj je prepričana, da ji bo tam dobro. (Sečen 2015: 1)

Kako daleč je do Avstrije, so včeraj spraševali begunci v Šentilju. (Večer 2015: 1)

»Edino, kar si želimo, je, da nadaljujemo pot skozi Slovenijo in naprej,« so si edini utrujeni obrazi, ki sta jim najpomembnejši le dve besedi: »water, Slovenija«. (Vodovnik 2015: 1)

»To je zapor,« je včeraj povedal eden od tam nastanjenih sirskih beguncev. »Ne morem poklicati družine, nimam dostopa do spleta, ne morem se preobleči,« je našteval v angleščini. Bil je v skupini, ki so jo slovenski policisti pred tednom dni prijeli blizu Lendave pri »nedovoljenem prestopu državne meje«. Tako kot preostalih trinajst je zdaj vložil prošnjo za mednarodno zaščito. »Ni bilo druge izbire. Ali vrnitev na Madžarsko, ampak tja nočem, ali pa ostati tu,« je pojasnil petintridesetletnik, po izobrazbi ekonomist. Toda raje bi šel v Avstrijo ali Nemčijo. (Zabukovec 2015: 1)

Odsotnost perspektive beguncev pride še bolj do izraza ob naslednji značilnosti faktizma, nizanju števil, ki naj bi govorile same zase. Ta pristop je značilen za vse tri časnike in veliko večino analiziranih prispevkov. Navajam zgolj nekaj izmed številnih primerov, za katere je pogosto značilno – brez kakršnegakoli konteksta – do številke natančno preštevanje migrantov ali policistov in vojakov.

Do včeraj opoldne je v državo vstopilo 6092 migrantov, od petka 19.469. Težave in huda kri so zlasti zaradi nenapovedanih prihodov iz sosednje države, kot včeraj v Rigoncah, ko je pripešalo tisoč ljudi, za njimi pa dopoldne še nova, večja skupina. (D. R. 2015: 1)

Lani je v vsem letu v Evropsko unijo pribežalo 282.000 ljudi, letos pa jih je samo v prvih devetih mesecih evropska agencija za nadzor zunanjih meja Frontex uradno zabeležila 710.000. Od tega jih je »le« 129.000 priplulo čez Sredozemsko morje, ki je bilo prej glavna pot za prebežnike, drugi pa so prišli po balkanski poti. Septembra je po podatkih Frontexa v EU vstopilo 190.000 migrantov, kar je 20.000 manj kot mesec pred tem ... (Čibej 2015: 1)

Slovenija bo morala zdaj sprejeti 631 beguncev, kar naj bi bila po besedah ministrice Györkös-Znidarjeve zgornja meja. (Gaubé 2015c: 1)

Zadnja dva dni je mejo varovalo 731 rednih policistov in 264 pripadnikov posebne policijske enote. (C. R. 2015: 1)

Prihajajo preko rek, skozi polja koruze, po železniških tirih [...] V Slovenijo se je tudi včeraj zgrnilo več tisoč prebežnikov, večinoma z Bližnjega vzhoda, ne da bi bili naši policisti o tem predhodno obveščeni. Niso še na koncu moči, na robu pa, kot tudi na tisoče drugih – pripadnikov človekoljubnih organizacij, prostovoljcev, čisto navadnih ljudi, katerih vas in mesta so se nenadoma spremenila v begunsko promenado. Toda občutljivost in sočutje se delita v omejenih količinah – a vedno ob pravem času, smo ugotovili včeraj v begunskem centru v Šentilju, ta čas najbolj obremenjeni in frekventni točki v Sloveniji. Krivično bi bilo reči, da so prebežniki hudobni, toda nestrpni in nervozni nedvomno so. (Večer 2015b: 1)

Kot sem že omenil, je eden ključnih mehanizmov faktizma tudi uporaba javnomnenjskih anket. Kot pravi Breda Luthar, so ankete v medijski tematizaciji problema uporabne zaradi »domnevne epistemološke jasnosti, nedvoumnosti in jedrnatosti rezultatov (54 % za, 30 % proti, 16 % neopredeljenih), kjer so tako poenostavljeno artikulirana družbena nasprotja in alternative njihovih razrešitev« (Luthar 2004: 673). V mojem vzorcu je bila na prvi strani objavljena anketa, ki naj bi prikazovala visoko podporo širšim pooblastilom vojske.

Anketa Dela: Za sodelovanje vojakov na južni meji sedem desetih Slovencev.

Zadnja anketa v oktobru daje odgovor na eno večjih dilem v begunski krizi: ali naj država uporabi vojsko kot pomožno silo pri nadzoru begunskega vala [...] V anketi še izvemo, da je kljub kritikam še vedno več tistih, ki menijo, da je bila država dobro pripravljena na drugi begunski val. Slovenci so zaradi beguncev zaskrbljeni, ni pa jih strah. (Z. P. 2015: 1)

Faktizem kot osrednja novinarska konvencija objektivistične paradigme skupaj z epizodično obravnavo problema torej narekuje distancirano poročanje in dekontekstualizirano nizanje golih dejstev, ki naj bi govorila sama zase, implicitni pomen teh zgodb pa je ustvarjanje vtisa o množičnosti migrantov, s katerimi se Slovenija težko sooča, in posledično vzpostavljanje kulture strahu.

Kot poudarja Couldry (2003: 19), je osrednji paradoks, ki ga moramo dojeti, če želimo oceniti družbene posledice in moč medijev, ta, da ne moremo ločiti naših upov, mitov, občutka pripadnosti in konflikta od medijsko posredovanih oblik, v katerih se ti danes skoraj vedno pojavljajo. »Teh oblik pa ni mogoče ločiti od neenake krajine moči, iz katere izhaja medijski proces« (prav tam). Pripovedna oblika torej učinkuje na vsebino poročanja in na reprezentacijo realnosti.

Zahteva po objektivnosti in konvencije, ki objektivnost uprizarjajo, tako paradoksnopredpostavljajo, da naj bi tako prepletanje različnih mnenj na koncu ustvarilo objektivni pogled na dogodek oz. problem. Elizabeth Bird (2009: 49) vidi zmanjšanje odvisnosti od uradnih virov kot enega ključnih prvih pogojev za izhod novinarstva iz (samo)deklarirane krize. Po njenem mnenju ima novinarstvo dve možnosti, in sicer se lahko oklepa tradicionalnega koncepta objektivnosti in se še naprej bori za obstanek v »relativističnem, ciničnem svetu, kjer zmaguje vse, kar se prodaja« (prav tam). Način »delanja novinarstva« bi lahko redefinirali predvsem z zmanjšanjem odvisnosti od uradnih virov, s povečanjem samostojnega poročanja ali pa z vključevanjem občinstva s pomočjo pomembnih, etnografskih zgodb, ki lahko ponudijo drugačna izkustva kot spletna zgodbe, dosegljive z enim klikom.

ODMIK OD USTALJENIH KONVENCIJ V ČASU KRIZE IN MITSKE PODOBE HEROJEV

Čeprav sem v prejšnjem delu v ospredje postavil delovanje ključnih konvencij objektivnosti, se poročanje v času krize pogosto premakne v t. i. sfero konsenza (Hallin 1989), ki narekuje odmik od konvencij objektivnosti. Kot poudarja Shudson (2002: 41) v izvrstni analizi poročanja *New York Timesa* v prvih dneh po 11. septembru 2001, v trenutkih tragedije¹²

novinarji zavzamejo pridigarstvo vlogo [...] V trenutkih javne nevarnosti novinarji zamenjajo objektivnost za sosedsko tolažbo, ne glede na to, ali nevarnost prihaja od teroristov ali hurikanov. Skušajo ponuditi praktične napotke in posredovati podobne občutke. Postanejo del javne zdravstvene kampanje, ne le sistem javnega informiranja.

V takih primerih, poudarja Shudson (2002: 40), se poročanje premakne v sfero konsenza, prej distancirani novinarji pa spremenijo ton poročanja. Čeprav to v mojem primeru ni prevladujoč način, lahko kljub temu identificiram številne primere, ki razsežnost krize opisujejo z drugačnim, bolj angažiranim tonom, ne zgolj suhoparnim navajanjem števil:

Najprej tihi pogledi v daljavo proti zelenemu zahodu in nato redki glasni protesti so bili vse, ves odziv ljudi iz Sirije, Iraka [...] Začelo se je dolgo nočno čakanje, ali bodo Hrvati prižgali zeleno luč za njihovo vrnitev v Zagreb. Na tamkajšnji železniški postaji pa na pot proti Sloveniji sili novih več sto obupanih. (J. Z. 2015)

Bil je čas besed, zdaj je čas dejanj. (Sečen 2015: 1)

Hallin tako poudari, da novinarji objektivnost uprizarjajo le v vmesnem krogu, v sferi legitimnega nasprotovanja. Gre za obdobje volilnega boja in zakonodajnih razprav ter za vprašanja in probleme, ki jih kot take prepoznajo uveljavljeni »igralci« v političnem sistemu. Na področju teh družbenih problemov sta objektivnost in uravnoteženost glavni novinarski vrline. Kateri od teh modelov novinarstva prevlada, je po Hallinovem mnenju (1989: 117–118) odvisno od političnega vzdušja v državi.

Ne glede na skoraj popolno odvisnost od uradnih (vladnih) virov in nekritično reproduciranje njihovih izjav, predvsem vladajoče politike, pa je v prispevkih pogosto populistično vzpostavljanje distinkcije med »navadnimi« ljudmi in vlado/oblastjo, denimo v prispevku z naslovom Klanjanje Bruslju škodi domačinom in s podnaslovom Ali država razume lokalno prebivalstvo (Zore, Galun 2015: 1):

Dobovčani so vladno trojico želeli povabiti tudi na najbolj obremenjen travnik v državi. A visoka delegacija se je blatu, smetem in iztrebkom na polju – Gjorkoševa je bila v Brežicah obuta v modne teniske z nizkim podplatom – ognila. Zaradi premika novih več sto beguncev proti enemu izmed zbirnih centrov so namreč njihova vozila pred Rigoncami obrnila proti Ljubljani. (Zore, Galun 2015: 1; poudarki dodani)

12 Ob takšni tragediji bi morale pasti vse meje in pregrade, je eden izmed naslovov v *Dnevniku* (19. 9. 2015).

Medtem ko bodo politiki v Bruslju danes in jutri menda zelo resno razpravljali o begunski krizi, ki je udarila po Evropski uniji, še zlasti njenem jugovzhodnem delu, navadni ljudje vedo, da so begunci tukaj – in zdaj. (Bizjak 2015: 1)

Avtorji tovrstnih prispevkov, ki tematizirajo odnos med vlado in lokalnim prebivalstvom, so najpogosteje dopisniki. Novinarji poleg tega v času krize namesto obravnave političnih in družbenih vprašanj pogosto črpajo tudi iz mitskih tem in arhetipskih podob (glej tudi Lule 2002). Lule loči štiri glavne vrste mitov, ki se pojavljajo v časih krize, mit, da nikoli več nič ne bo, kot je bilo, mit o žrtvah, mit o herojih ter mit o temačni prihodnosti. V našem primeru gre predvsem za reprodukcijo mita o herojih, v vlogi katerih nastopajo policisti, gasilci, prostovoljci in »običajni« ljudje:

Najtežje breme prvega vala beguncev so na slovenski strani nosili policisti in prostovoljci. Tako v Dobovi kot v Rigoncah in na Obrežju je bilo pri policistih opaziti veliko mero strpnosti, vzdržnosti in mirnosti. (Gaubé 2015b: 1)

Poleg policistov so izčrpani tudi domačini. (Zore, Galun 2015: 1)

Premier Cerar svari, da Evropa ne bo zdržala, prebivalci Rigonc pa so pokazali, da lahko zdržijo in pomagajo. (D. R. 2015: 1)

Na tisoče policistov, humanitarcev in prostovoljcev gara, prebežniki pa kar rinejo naprej. Dokler bodo meje odprte. (Večer 2015: 1)

»Na voljo sem jim dala elektriko, vodo, stranišče, tudi umijejo se lahko pri meni. Danes sem jim skuhala čaj in pripravila zajtrk,« pove Ana Petrič iz Rigonc. Ko jo je novinarka vprašala, kaj bo, če ostanejo dlje, je povsem mirno povedala: »Bomo že kako.« Pa čeprav ima le 430 evrov plače. (D. R. 2015: 1)

Lule (2002: 277) opredeli mit kot družbeno zgodbo, ki izraža prevladujoče ideale, ideologije, vrednote in prepričanja. Širše gledano je mit pripoved, ki črpa iz arhetipskih figur in form, da bi ponudil zgledne modele za družbeno življenje, in je še vedno nepogrešljiv za razumevanje sveta. Številni kritiki (glej tudi Rothenbuhler 2016) tako poudarjajo, da sodobne novice pogosto delujejo kot mit, s katerim pa se pojavi predvsem vprašanje njihove vloge pri vzdrževanju *statusa quo* v družbi. »Konec koncev je mit način upravljanja družbene spremembe« (Rothenbuhler 2016: 146).

SKLEP

V članku sem skušal pokazati, da lahko konvencije, ki so na delu pri upovedovanju »begunske krize«, generirajo protislovne pomene, saj je problem na eksplicitni ravni uokvirjen predvsem v terminih humanitarne krize, kršenja človekovih pravic in nespoštovanja dostojanstva, redko tudi kot varnostna grožnja, na konotativni ravni pa se s pomočjo prikazanih primerov in fotografskega gradiva utrjuje strah pred migranti. Poleg tega prihaja v

poročanju tudi do odmika od konvencij objektivnosti in bolj angažiranega poročanja, kjer novice z zatekanjem k arhetipskim podobam herojev delujejo podobno kot mit.

Ugotovitve v članku so pomembne predvsem iz dveh razlogov: prvič zato, ker lahko pomembno vplivajo na percepcijo javnih politik, še zlasti na področju, kot je imigracija, kjer ljudje nimajo neposrednih izkušenj (glej Lawlor 2015: 330). Po drugi strani pa je zelo pomemben in pogosto prezrt vidik recepcija teh medijskih tekstov pri občinstvih; ta bi namreč lahko dopolnjevala tekstualne analize v tem tematskem sklopu. Sjöberg in Rydin (2014) tako na primeru Švedske na podlagi intervjujev ugotavljata, da je prevladujoči medijski diskurz zelo učinkovit pri vzdrževanju izključenosti in simbolne segregacije, namesto da bi gradil na vključenosti in spodbujanju medsebojnega razumevanja.

V kontekstu razprav o novinarstvu pa se poročanje o migracijah pogosto poenostavlje- no povezuje z vzponom senzacionalizma. V tem smislu je pomenljiva Bensonova ugotovi- tev (2002: 58), da pri premiku uokvirjanja v smer kulture strahu komercializacija novinar- stva in še zlasti komercialna televizija ne igrata osrednje vloge. Tako se pogosto posplošeno sklepa tudi v tukajšnjih obravnavah novinarstva, kjer sta političnoekonomski pogled in splošna teza o komercializaciji novinarstva ponavadi osrednja vzroka za večino težav. To tezo morda najbolj prepričljivo zavrne Bolin (2014: 345), ki trdi, da je teza o komercializaci- ji v veliki meri naturalizirano doksično prepričanje, saj bi morali po njegovem sile komer- cializacije v polju kulturne produkcije, vključno s televizijsko produkcijo, postaviti ob bok preostalim močnim silam, kot so politične, izobraževalne in podobno. Bolin tako trdi, da smo zaradi dejstva, da se je novinarstvo diverzificiralo v številne podoblike, bolj kot koncu novinarstva priča začetku obdobja hipernovinarstva (prav tam). Podobno bi seveda lahko trdil tudi v svojem primeru, zato se mi posplošene razprave o krizi novinarstva ne zdijo preveč plodne, posledično pa pri tematizaciji posameznih družbenih problemov ob veliki moči novinarskega diskurza zagovarjam kritično prevpraševanje novinarskih standardov in konvencij.

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SUMMARY

BETWEEN DETACHMENT AND ENGAGEMENT: PARADOXES IN REPROTING ABOUT THE “REFUGEE CRISIS” IN DAILY PRESS

Dejan JONTES

The paper analyses reporting about the “refugee crisis” in Slovenia’s three main daily newspapers Delo, Dnevnik and Večer in the first weeks of mass migrations through the country that were named »the first and the second wave of refugees« by the journalists. The analysis focuses on the question of framing and on the dominant journalistic conventions through which objectivity is performed. The paper tries to reflect on the paradox in reporting these issues where the problem is dominantly framed in terms of humanitarian crisis on the explicit level and rarely as a security issue but on the connotative level factism and episodic framing suggest another reading of the problem that supports the fear of the immigrants. While comparative studies highlight number of frames in news reports about immigration, in the present study the ideological focus is extremely narrow although not explicitly negative. A complete lack of discussions about immigration policy on national level is brought to fore as problematic, considerations of cultural diversity are also missing in the analysed examples. What is more, cases of more engaged reporting can be found where archetypal figures of heroes are called upon and where daily news functions similar as myth, reinforcing the status quo. In the conclusion the importance of these discourses on the perception of public policy is emphasized and reception studies of these and similar texts about refugees is suggested as an useful point for further analysis.

K N J I Ž N E O C E N E

B O O K R E V I E W S

Gregory Feldman, *The Migration Apparatus: Security, Labor, and Policymaking in the European Union*

Stanford University Press, 2012, pp. 224

At a time in which the European Union is fortifying its borders in order to prevent “undesired” migrants from entering its territory, Gregory Feldman’s book *The Migration Apparatus: Security, Labor and Policymaking in the European Union*, published by the Stanford University Press in 2012, is of invaluable importance for understanding the mechanisms governing EU policymaking on migration. In this book, Feldman maps EU migration policies and their development in the context of global economic inequality from an ethnographic point of view, using a Foucauldian approach.

The Foucauldian apparatus is a key concept in Feldman’s work. This concept enables him to grasp the decentralized nature of EU migration policy, in which the actors involved are increasingly unrelated to each other. The apparatus furthermore contributes to making migration and migrants “manageable” through a variety of strategies. This also leads, according to Feldman, to the fact that migration policies are not the result of the morally best, but of the most practical approach. Moreover, the apparatus gains autonomy, which prevents individuals from counteracting it.

Feldman’s aims are, firstly, to analyse the EU’s migration apparatus within the global political and economic order, and secondly, to apply an adequate methodology to achieve this aim, something he terms “nonlocal ethnography”. With these objectives, Feldman takes the reader on a journey through the world of EU policymaking. In the first chapter, he sets the scene of an increasingly disconnected and therefore merely mediated world. In the second chapter, Feldman identifies the sphere of EU migration policy as dominated by neoliberals and neonationalists, the former demanding a flexible workforce, the latter the protection of national interests. These two are, as Feldman argues, not different in kind but merely in degree. In the third chapter, Feldman describes strategies of unification and simplification as key mechanisms to achieve conformance within the apparatus. Having sketched the general workings of EU migration policies in the first three chapters, Feldman devotes the subsequent three chapters to specific EU policy fields: border control, biometrics, and circular migration. EU policies on border control are conceived by Feldman to be an attempt by the EU to harmonize its policies with the objective of keeping out “undesired” migrants from the Global South. While migration is treated as a mass phenomenon in this policy field, the migrants are highly individualized in the policies on biometrics. These policies, however, go hand in hand, since biometrics equally serve to distinguish between “desired” and “non-desired” migrants. According to Feldman, circular migration policies work as the “right solution”, reconciling neoliberals and neonationalists, the entry of workers being allowed but limited to a specific time frame. In the final chapter, Feldman undertakes a methodological discussion, arguing for the use of nonlocal ethnography as a tool to map decentralized structures in a globalized world.

Having provided a brief summary of the book, four issues should be discussed more critically: the apparatus concept, the methodology of nonlocal ethnography, the supposed political divide, and the specificities of the EU.

Even though the use of the concept of the apparatus allows the conceptualization of the decentralized logic of EU migration policies, it methodologically excludes the agency of both policymakers and migrants in counteracting the migration apparatus. The denial

of the agency of migrants is also an effect of the framework in which Feldman places migration, namely in the context of globally economic inequality. Even though these global inequalities must be acknowledged, poverty-related reasons are not the only causes of migration, as Feldman's analysis might sometimes lead us to believe.

Closely linked to the discussion of the apparatus as the key concept of this book is the discussion of the methodology of nonlocal ethnography. The author attempts to use this methodology to overcome the difficulty of mapping decentralized phenomena and thereby provide a methodological equivalent to the apparatus concept. The underlying logic of the methodology is that neither core locations for ethnographic study exist nor should the mere interconnectedness of sites be studied, the rationales and practices being "present *in* multiple locations but are not *of* any particular location".

On the one hand, nonlocal ethnography does provide an answer to the problematic of doing ethnography in a globalized world. On the other hand, the necessity of choosing loci for the research, be they virtual or real, cannot be circumvented. In the case of Feldman's study, one of his main claims, namely that EU policymaking follows a technocratic logic, is undermined by his choice of loci. Even though the descriptions and analyses of the various conferences and meetings are very insightful, the sites appear to be quite homogeneous, in the sense that none of them is a political space. His argument that migration policy tends to be technocratic would be more compelling if he could show his readers that this logic is also present at the core of the EU's political institutions. An analysis of more political spaces would also either reinforce or contradict his claim that EU migration policy is dominated by the neoliberal and the neonationalist right. An alternative explanation would be the makeup of the EU as a structure which is highly influenced by national interests.

In the same line of argument, the EU's circular migration policies are portrayed to be the perfect compromise between neoliberals and neonationalists. Feldman's reasoning that neoliberals and neonationalists would both see their claims fulfilled, the first pushing for a mobile workforce, and the latter for a restriction of the migrants' stay in their respective countries, is convincing. Nevertheless, one might ask whether these policies do not also partially fulfil the claims of the moderate left – which Feldman supposes to be non-existent – since circular migration schemes provide possibilities, at least for some migrants, to come to Europe. Even though these schemes might follow a neoliberal rationale and might, as Feldman warns, be used to obfuscate structural sources of inequality, a closer examination of circular migration schemes should be undertaken in order to avoid the risk of discarding them too rapidly.

One of the book's general underlying arguments is that the communautarization of migration policies in the EU has led to harsher rules concerning immigration processes. However, a comparison with the pre-Schengen situation is misleading, since information technologies allowing for enhanced control of borders and the collection of biometric data have continued to develop since the implementation of the Schengen Area. No explicit argument is given as to why individual nation-states would not have adopted similar policies. The choice of policy areas for the analysis of this book also receives no further justification. It would have been interesting, for instance, to see whether the same logic governs EU asylum policies, which are not addressed in this book. Even though asylum is a very restricted policy field, the EU being very far from having a common asylum policy, the adopted policies have led to some legal improvements in some of the Member States, most notably in form of the Qualification and the Reception Directives.

In summary, the main weaknesses of the book are the limitations of the findings relating to the utility of the apparatus concept and some open questions regarding the methodology of nonlocal ethnography, the specific institutional characteristics of the EU and the supposed divide in the political sphere. In spite of this, one can say that the book delivers what it promises to deliver in the introduction. First, Feldman succeeds in analysing the decentralized field of EU migration politics in a globally unequal world order. He argues in a well-structured and convincing way how the various domains of migration policy are part of the migration apparatus, which produces a specific subject position for migrants and “functions to maintain a large-scale apartheid between the North and South precisely because the prosperity of the former cannot be universalized to include the latter”. Second, Feldman successfully opens up new perspectives for ethnographic research in a globalized world, thereby contributing to the debate on how ethnography is well-suited to respond to globalization, as discussed since the 1980s.

Laura Boucsein

Paolo Barcella, Michele Colucci (ur.), *Frontalieri*

ASEI – *Archivio storico dell'emigrazione italiana* 12, Edizioni Sette Città, Viterbo, 2016

Archivio storico dell'emigrazione italiana, ena od treh italijanskih znanstvenih revij, posvečenih zgodovini italijanskega izseljenstva, zadnjo monografsko številko namenja vprašanju 'čezmejnih delavcev' (it. *frontalieri*, nem. *Grenzgänger*). Čezmejni delovni migranti živijo razpeti med dvema sistemoma, izkoriščajoč njune neenakosti in diferencialna razmerja v gospodarskem in življenjskem standardu. Navadno domujejo v državi z nižjim življenjskim standardom, delajo pa v državi z bogatejšim plačilnim režimom in trgov zaposlovanja, kjer zasedajo deficitarna delovna mesta ali pa konkurirajo domačim delavcem. Pojav je zakoreninjen na območjih z odprtimi in kolikor toliko prepustnimi mejami, povezan pa je s številnimi kontroverznimi vidiki, ki netijo populizem, ksenofobijo, konflikte in zahteve po restrikcijah.

Monografska številka revije prinaša osem prispevkov s primeri z italijanske meje. V uvodni razpravi Matteo Sanfilippo predstavlja evropsko historiografijo o čezmejnem delu, ki se vse od prve svetovne vojne v povezavi s političnimi debatami na to temo vedno znova prebija v ospredje. Na Zahodu je glavno središče pojava Švica, ki sprejema polovico vseh čezmejnih delavcev v Zahodni Evropi. Ti so predmet nasprotovanj in referendumskih zahtev po omejitvah. Evropska populistična gibanja, nastrojena proti priseljencem, so si po eni strani podobna, po drugi različna. Medtem ko v Švici nasprotujejo čezmejnemu delavcem, so v Italiji in drugod v Evropi problem stalni afriški in azijski priseljenci. Prihaja pa tudi do sporov med »bratskimi« populizmi, kot na primer med švicarskim populizmom in ligaškim gibanjem v Lombardiji, ki je zagrizen nasprotnik priseljencev v severni Italiji in hkrati najglasnejši branilec italijanskih čezmejnih delavcev v Švici.

Paolo Barcella razpravlja o odnosu sindikatov do dnevnih migrantov iz Italije v švicarskem kantonu Ticinu. Tu se sindikalno gibanje ni razvilo med domačimi delavci, ki so se sezonsko zaposlovali na bogatejšem nemškem trgu dela, pač pa so bili njegovi nosilci italijanski delavci, ki so ustanovili tudi socialistično stranko. Zato se tu ni uveljavil »delavski protekcionizem« kot v industrializiranih kantonih, kjer se je zavzemal za zaščito švicarskih delavcev pred priseljenimi. Po prvi svetovni vojni se je položaj v Ticinu spremenil. Nastopila sta ksenofobično vzdušje in odpor švicarskih delavcev do italijanskih, čemur sta botrovala lojalnost italijanskih delavcev do delodajalcev in njihovo konkuriranje z nižjimi mezdami. Zaradi krepitve zahtev po ukinitvi italijansko-švicarskega sporazuma o prostem pretoku delovne sile so leta 1931 uvedli sistem dovoljenj za bivanje oziroma dnevno čezmejno delo. K preobratu je prispevalo širjenje fašizma med delavci in njihov osip v sindikatu, kjer je prevladal švicarski element. Po drugi svetovni vojni so se z zaostritvijo vprašanja povečale tudi zahteve po planiranem priseljevanju, ki naj ne bi konkuriralo švicarskemu delu. Ker so delodajalce stali manj kot domači delavci ali stalni priseljenci, so bili tarča švicarskega sindikata ponovno čezmejni delavci. Zaradi možnosti zaposlovanja čezmejnih delavcev se je Ticino industrializiralo. Industrializacija je v petdesetih letih temeljila na dveh ločenih temeljih: del proizvodnega sektorja je zaposloval samo domače delavce, drugi del pa skoraj izključno čezmejne, plačane skladno z življenjskim standardom v Italiji. V šestdesetih letih je prišlo do strukturne spremembe: na obmejno območje so se priselili in na švicarski trg dela stopili nižje kvalificirani delavci z juga države, kar je okrepilo ksenofobijo in zahteve sindikatov po stabilizaciji tujcev ter omejevanju dotoka novih priseljencev. V sedemdesetih letih je sodelovanje italijanskih in

švicarskih sindikatov obrodilo vzajemno reševanje vprašanja čezmejnih delavcev, s čimer je njihovo število v devetdesetih letih naraslo na tretjino vseh zaposlenih v kantonu; leta 2014 je to s podporo levih strank privedlo do uvedbe kontingentov.

Francesco Garufo piše o podobnem položaju v močno industrializiranem kantonu Jura, kjer so pomemben delež aktivnih delavcev čezmejni delavci iz Francije. Problemi pa so tu drugačni. Po drugi svetovni vojni je bilo odpiranje trga čezmejnimi delavcem strategija proti pomanjkanju delovne sile. Prednost te opcije je bila v visoki kvalifikaciji francoskih delavcev, nižjih cenah dela, blagodejnem vplivu na inflacijo in gospodarski razvoj zaradi prihranka pri bivalni in drugi infrastrukturi. Francoski delavci tudi niso predstavljali nevarnosti kulturne kolonizacije. Zaradi tega je bilo čezmejno delo izključeno iz kontingentizacijske priseljske politike in je iz dopolnilnega postalo strukturna sestavina gospodarskega sistema. Njegova številčna rast pa je odprla več problemov: porast cen dela na francoski strani, prikrajšanost krajevnih uprav za davke, ob krizah so brezposelni delavci bremenili francoski socialni sistem, priliv visokokvalificiranih profilov iz notranjosti države, ki jih nekonkurenčni francoski trg dela ni uspel zadržati in vključiti v francoske razvojne procese. Krhkost sistema, proti kateremu so se borili francoski delodajalci, se je pokazala ob krizi leta 1970, ko so čezmejni delavci plačali velik socialni in tudi moralni davek, saj so jim očitali špekuliranje in okoriščenje z ugodnostmi ene in druge države.

Giulia Fassio o pojmu meje ob italijanskem izseljevanju v Francijo razpravlja na primeru Grenobla, ki je v italijanskem imaginariju najbolj italijansko mesto v Franciji. To lahko pripišemo bolj bližini in tesnejšim stikom italijanskih priseljencev z matično državo kot njihovem številu. Italijansko priseljevanje v Grenoble je postalo množično v drugi polovici 19. stoletja. Konec šestdesetih let je močno upadlo, spremenila pa se je tudi poklicna struktura. Od osemdesetih let prihajajo predvsem izobraženci, ki se zaposlujejo v znanstvenoraziskovalnih ustanovah, medtem ko so prej prevladovali pripadniki delavskega razreda, tehniki in mali podjetniki. V teh migracijah ima pojem geografske, politične in kulturne meje velik simbolni in konkretni pomen. Po drugi svetovni vojni so imeli priseljenci iz Doline Aosta v primerjavi z drugimi Italijani v Franciji privilegiran status, Francija je namreč podpirala idejo o aneksiji dežele in jih obravnavala kot nekakšne politične izseljence. Priseljenci iz celotne severozahodne Italije so se po svoje v Franciji počutili bolj »domače« kot priseljenci iz južnih italijanskih dežel in se od njih razmejevali tudi v kulturnem in družbenem življenju. Priseljenci iz obdobja pred drugo vojno pa so z nelaгодjem gledali na priseljence iz prvih poveljnih let in so si predvsem s sklicevanjem na skupni francosko-italijanski partizanski odpor ter na francosko-italijanske Alpe kot območje skupnega bojevanja proti nacifašizmu s pogajanjem zagotovili poseben status. Meja je bila inštrument političnega dogovarjanja in regulacije migracijskih gibanj z dvostranskimi sporazumi med državama. Posledica regulacije migrantskih gibanj je bil porast nelegalnega prehajanja meje, ki je zaradi nevarnosti visokogorskega okolja postalo humanitarni problem. Med najnovejšimi italijanskimi priseljenci v Grenoble so poleg visokokvalificiranih profilov ponovno nekvalificirani migranti. Te migracije olajšuje prosti trg delovne sile znotraj evropske skupnosti in se v percepciji ter samopodobi migrantov razlikujejo od migracij zunaj evropske skupnosti, odvisnih od birokratskih pregrad. Nekdanje evropske državne meje ohranjajo predvsem kulturne pomene. Zanimiv pojav pa je čezmejno delo visokokvalificiranih italijanskih tehnikov v Švici, kamor se dnevno vozijo iz Grenobla. Švicarski referendum iz leta 2014 je to dnevno migracijo omejil s kontingenti. Odprava starih državnih meja in evropska integracija sta spodbudili nove birokratske ovire za zaščito

lokalnih interesov pred konkurenco iz zunajevropskih držav kot tudi iz držav Evropske skupnosti.

Stefano Gallo piše o premikih prebivalstva v alpskem prostoru in o fašističnih migracijskih politikah na italijanskih mejnih območjih v letih 1938–1944. Konec tridesetih let so bile te politike povezane s pripravami na vojno in z usklajevanjem zaveznitva z Nemčijo, v vojnem času pa z repatriacijo italijanskih državljanov iz sovražnih držav ter migracijami na zasedenih ozemljih. Članek osvetljuje tri pomembnejše primere. Prvi je regulacija narodnega vprašanja v Zgornjem Poadižju (Južnem Tirolskem), ki je postalo aktualno po avstrijskem anšlusu leta 1938. Pogajanja z Nemčijo so leta 1939 pripeljala do sporazuma o opcijah italijanskih državljanov nemške narodnosti za nemško državljanstvo in preselitev v Nemčijo, oziroma za italijansko državljanstvo in obstanek v Italiji. Italija je poskušala kar 200.000 optantov nadomestiti s priseljenci iz severnih italijanskih dežel, predvsem z zglednimi in lojalnimi fašisti; operacija ni uspela. Hkrati se zaradi dolgih birokratskih postopkov in odlašanja Nemčije, ki se še ni odpovedala Južni Tirolski, izseljevanje Nemcev ni odvijalo po načrtih. Aparat, ki ga je Italija vzpostavila za izpeljavo zamenjave prebivalstva in italijanizacijo dežele, so na začetku štiridesetih let močno okrnili. Po razpadu Italije je dežela prešla pod nemško oblast. Tudi v primeru Jugoslavije so italijanski organi pred napadom iz Dalmacije evakuirali Italijane, po ustanovitvi Ljubljanske pokrajine pa v Ljubljani odprli Urad za upravljanje migracij. Ta je poskrbel za izselitev kočevskih Nemcev v Nemčijo, niso pa jih uspeli nadomestiti z Italijani iz Italije. Tretji deležniki državnega posega so bili povratniki iz sovražnih držav in tudi zavezniške Nemčije. Država naj bi, da bi čim bolj koristili demografski politiki, gospodarstvu in vojnim potrebam, poskrbela za njihovo zaposlitev. Razmere pa niso dovoljevale upravljanja migracijskih gibanj, kot se je Italija ves čas zaman nadejala.

Z vzhodno italijansko mejo in s slovenskim prostorom se ukvarja Alessio Marzi. Na tem območju je bila pozornost raziskovalcev usmerjena v migracije, povezane s premikom državnih meja, s političnimi in z vojnimi dogajanja, v senci pa so ostala gibanja, ki so sodila med običajne ekonomske in družbene strategije. Avtor poudarja mitološki in ideološki pomen tukajšnje meje, ki se je v predstave preteklosti ugnezdil kot jezikovni, etnični, ideološki in civilizacijski limes ter z vidika normalizacije neskladij politične in etnične geografije. Ideja o nacionalni homogenizaciji teritorijev je povzročila prisilna preseljevanja in vzpostavitev navidezne »retorične« meje, na primer med mestom in podeželjem kot etnične ločnice, ločnice med gospodarskimi, političnimi in drugimi interesi ter med različnimi kulturami. Članek poudarja »druge« migracije in posledice premikov meja, med njimi delovne migracije iz Italije v Avstrijo in Trst do prve svetovne vojne. Med migracijami s slovenskega dela območja avtor opozarja na migracije žensk kot nosilk integriranih ekonomskih modelov z močnimi kulturnimi implikacijami ter množično izseljevanje iz Primorske v Jugoslavijo in Argentino med obema svetovnima vojnama. Za obdobje po drugi svetovni vojni opozori na nastanek Svobodnega tržaškega ozemlja, kar je imelo za posledico birokratsko zapleten pojav čezmejnega dela iz tradicionalnega mestnega zaledja. Po ukinitvi STO in zadnji fazi istrskega eksodusa je nastopila nova faza, ki jo je zaznamoval odhod 20.000 Tržačanov v Avstralijo. Tudi ta migracijski pojav je bil do pred kratkim med »pozabljenimi«, saj se ni ujema l z nacionalnimi in s političnimi predstavami o migracijah na italijanskih vzhodnih mejah.

Prispevek Francesce Rolandi je posvečen jugoslovanskim čezmejnimi delavcem v italijanskih vzhodnih deželah po drugi svetovni vojni, predvsem po osimskih sporazumih.

V šestdesetih letih je postala italijansko-jugoslovanska meja prepustnejša, naraščalo je število prehodov jugoslovanskih državljanov bodisi zaradi nakupov bodisi zaradi dela v Italiji, predvsem v Furlaniji - Julijski krajini. Te delovne migracije so bile nadaljevanje tradicionalnih gibanj, ki jih je prekinila vojna, in so sovpadale z začetki liberalizacije izseljevanja v Jugoslaviji, na italijanski strani pa z ekonomskim razvojem in s povečanim povpraševanjem po delovni sili. Ugodni sosedski odnosi, ki so sledili obdobju napetosti, so privedli do vzpostavitve integriranega delovnega trga na meji med Italijo in Jugoslavijo, ki je bil v obojestransko korist. Jugoslovanski delavci niso bili konkurenčni italijanskim, ker so zapolnjevali deficitarne delovne sektorje, niso bremenili italijanskih infrastruktur in socialnih služb. Z jugoslovanskega vidika je čezmejno delo omogočalo dragocen devizni pritok, ne da bi delavci zapuščali državo, višje plače so dvigovale njihov življenjski standard. To ni veljalo za delavce, ki so se na Tržaško priselili iz Srbije (predvsem iz Požarevca) in so živeli v tipičnih migrantskih razmerah. Njihovo priseljevanje je večala popotresna obnova v Furlaniji v drugi polovici sedemdesetih let. Obenem je njihova prisotnost netila strahove političnih sil, ki so se po osimskih sporazumih načrtovani industrijski coni uprle s tradicionalno retoriko o nevarnosti slovanske penetracije v italijanski prostor. Italija je bila v osemdesetih letih nezaupljiva tudi do mešanega slovensko-italijanskega podjetništva oziroma gospodarskih pobud, s katerimi si je slovenska narodna skupnost v Italiji s pokroviteljstvom Jugoslavije prizadevala ustvariti pogoje za delo in preprečevati izseljevanje slovenskega zamejskega prebivalstva. Italijanske oblasti so to izseljevanje, zlasti v Benečiji, celo spodbujale, na Goriškem in Tržaškem pa so čezmejno delo omejevale z dajanjem prednosti priseljencem iz Italije in s tem pogojevale izdajanje delovnih viz. Zaradi tega se je povečevalo delo na črno, ki je obsegalo štiri petine vsega čezmejnega dela. Čezmejni delavci z jugoslovanske strani so s tem kršili delovno zakonodajo, zakonodaje pa niso kršili kot migranti, saj so se s prepustnico za obmejni promet dnevno vračali domov. Nesposobnost ali nepripravljenost države, da bi uredila njihov položaj, so v sedemdesetih letih zapolnili italijanski sindikati, ki so jim, v nasprotju z drugimi kraji, priznavali enake pravice kot italijanskim delavcem in si prizadevali za regulacijo njihovih pravic. Pomen čezmejnega dela v Italiji se je povečal v osemdesetih letih, ko je zaradi inflacije dinarja in krize prinašalo dobiček in na jugoslovanskem obmejnem območju spodbujalo investicije v zasebne gradnje. V tem obdobju je bilo čezmejno delo v prid tako delojemalcem kot delodajalcem. Z razpadom Jugoslavije se je čezmejno delo še okrepilo, do njegove regulacije pa postopoma prihaja z evropskim združevalnim procesom. V vsem obravnavanem času so jasno izraženi tako strukturni značaj čezmejnega dela kot prednosti, ki jih ta prostor ustvarja za diferencialno ekonomijo in življenje ob meji ter z mejo.

Aleksej Kalc

NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA PRIPRAVO PRISPEVKOV ZA DVE DOMOVINI / TWO HOMELANDS

1. Usmeritev revije

Revija *Dve domovini / Two Homelands* je namenjena objavi znanstvenih in strokovnih člankov, poročil, razmišljanj in knjižnih ocen s področja humanističnih in družboslovnih disciplin, ki obravnavajo različne vidike migracij in z njimi povezane pojave. Revija, ki izhaja od leta 1990, je večdisciplinarna in večjezična. Letno izideta dve številki v tiskani in elektronski obliki na svetovnem spletu (<http://twohomelands.zrc-sazu.si/>).

Prispevke, urejene po spodnjih navodilih, pošljite uredništvu v elektronski obliki na naslov hladnik@zrc-sazu.si. Članki so recenzirani. Avtorji naj poskrbijo za primerno jezikovno raven in slogovno dovršenost. Prispevki morajo biti oblikovani v skladu z *Navodili avtorjem za pripravo prispevkov za Dve domovini / Two Homelands*. Rokopisov, ki jih uredništvo revije *Dve domovini / Two Homelands* sprejme v objavo, avtorji ne smejo hkrati poslati drugi reviji. V skladu z Zakonom o avtorskih pravicah in 10. členom Poslovnika o delu uredništva revije *Dve domovini / Two Homelands* se avtorji z objavo v reviji *Dve domovini / Two Homelands* strinjajo z objavo prispevka tudi v elektronski obliki na svetovnem spletu.

2. Sestavine prispevkov

Članki morajo imeti sestavine, ki si sledijo po naslednjem vrstnem redu:

- glavni naslov članka (z velikimi tiskanimi črkami, okrepjeno);
- ime in priimek avtorja (priimku naj sledi opomba pod črto, v kateri so navedeni: 1. avtorjeva izobrazba in naziv (na primer: dr. zgodovine, znanstveni sodelavec); 2. ime in naslov avtorjeve institucije (na primer Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo in migracije ZRC SAZU, Novi trg 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana); 3. avtorjev elektronski naslov);
- predlog vrste prispevka (izvirni, pregledni ali kratki znanstveni članek/prispevek, strokovni članek);
- izvleček (slovenski naslov članka in slovenski izvleček, skupaj s presledki do 1000 znakov);
- ključne besede (do 5 besed);
- abstract (angleški prevod naslova članka in slovenskega izvlečka);
- key words (angleški prevod ključnih besed);
- članek (1. skupaj s presledki naj ne presega 45.000 znakov; 2. celotno besedilo naj bo označeno z »Normal« – torej brez oblikovanja, določanja slogov in drugega; 3. pisava Times New Roman, velikost 12, obojestransko poravnava, presledek 1,5; 4. odstavki naj bodo brez vmesnih vrstic; prazna vrstica naj bo pred in za vsakim naslovom in predvidenim mestom za tabelo ali sliko; 5. odstavki so brez zamikov; 6. naslove označite ročno, podnaslove prvega reda z velikimi tiskanimi črkami in okrepjeno, podnaslove drugega reda z malimi tiskanimi črkami in okrepjeno; 7. (pod) poglavij ne številčimo;
- summary (angleški povzetek članka, največ 3000 znakov s presledki).

V besedilih se izogibajte podčrtovanju besed, okrepjenemu in poševnemu tisku; s poševnim tiskom označite le navedene naslove knjig in časopisov. V slovenskih prispevkih uporabljajte naslednje okrajšave in narekovaje: prav tam, idr., ur., »abc«; v angleških: *ibid.*, et al., ed./eds., "migration". Izpust znotraj citata označite z oglatim oklepajem [...].

Poročila in ocene morajo imeti sestavine, ki si sledijo po naslednjem vrstnem redu:

- poročila s konferenc in drugih dogodkov, razmišljanja: naslov dogodka, datum poteka, ime in priimek avtorja, besedilo naj obsega med 5.000 in 15.000 znaki skupaj s presledki;
- knjižne ocene: ime in priimek avtorja ali urednika knjige, ki je predmet ocene, naslov knjige, založba, kraj, leto izida, število strani, besedilo naj obsega med 5.000 in 15.000 znaki skupaj s presledki, na koncu sledita ime in priimek avtorja ocene.

3. Citiranje

Avtorji naj pri citiranju med besedilom upoštevajo naslednja navodila:

- Citati, dolgi pet ali več vrstic, morajo biti ročno oblikovani v ločenih enotah, zamaknjeni, brez narekovajev.
- Citati, krajši od petih vrstic, naj bodo med drugim besedilom v narekovajih in pokončno (ne poševno).
- Navajanje avtorja v oklepaju: (Anderson 2003: 91–99); več navedb naj bo ločenih s podpičjem in razvrščenih po letnicah (Milharčič Hladnik 2009: 15; Vah Jevšnik, Lukšič Hacin 2011: 251–253).
- Seznam literature in virov je na koncu besedila; v seznamu literature na koncu se navajajo samo navedbe literature iz besedila; note naj bodo razvrščene po abecednem redu priimkov avtorjev, note istega avtorja pa razvrščene po letnicah; če imamo več del istega avtorja, ki so izšla istega leta, jih ločimo z malimi črkami (Anderson 2003a; 2003b).
 - a) Knjiga:
Anderson, Benedict (2003). *Zamišljene skupnosti: O izvoru in širjenju nacionalizma*. Ljubljana: Studia Humanitatis.
 - b) Članek v zborniku:
Milharčič Hladnik, Mirjam (2009). Naša varuška. *Krila migracij: Po meri življenjskih zgodb* (ur. Mirjam Milharčič Hladnik, Jernej Mlekuž). Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, 15–20.
 - c) Članek v reviji:
Vah Jevšnik, Mojca, Lukšič Hacin, Marina (2001). Theorising Immigrant/Ethnic Entrepreneurship in the Context of Welfare States. *Migracijske i etničke teme* 27/2, 249–261.
 - d) Spletna stran:
 - Becker, Howard (2003). *New directions in the Sociology of Art*, <http://home.earthlink.net/~hsbecker/newdirections.htm> (1. 2. 2008).
 - *Interaction: Some ideas*, <http://home.earthlink.net/interaction.htm> (1. 2. 2008).

4. Grafične in slikovne priloge

- Fotografije, slike zemljevidi idr. – z izjemo tabel, narejenih v urejevalniku Word, ki pa morajo biti oblikovane za stran velikosti 16,5 x 23,5 cm – naj ne bodo vključeni v Wordov dokument. Vse slikovno gradivo oddajte oštevilčeno v posebni mapi z vašim priimkom in imenom. Opombe v podnapisih ali tabelah morajo biti ločene od tekočega teksta. Fotografije naj bodo v formatu jpg.
- Lokacijo slikovnega gradiva v tekstu označite na naslednji način:
Fotografija 1: Kuharica Liza v New Yorku leta 1905 (avtor: Janez Novak, vir: Arhiv Slovenije, 1415, 313/14) ali Preglednica 1: Število prebivalcev Ljubljane po popisu leta 2002 (vir: Statistični urad RS, Statistične informacije, 14).
- Za grafične in slikovne priloge, za katere nimate avtorskih pravic, morate dobiti dovoljenje za objavo.

INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS PREPARING ARTICLES FOR PUBLICATION IN *DVE DOMOVINI / TWO HOMELANDS*

1. Editorial content

Dve domovini / Two Homelands welcomes the submission of scientific and professional articles, reports, discussions and book reviews from the humanities and social sciences focusing on migration and related phenomena. The journal, published since 1990, is multidisciplinary and multilingual. Two volumes are published per year in print and electronic form on the internet (<http://twohomelands.zrc-sazu.si/>).

Articles should be prepared according to the instructions stated below and sent in electronic form to the editorial board at the following address: hladnik@zrc-sazu.si. All articles undergo a review procedure. Manuscripts that are accepted for publishing by the editorial board should not be sent for consideration and publishing to any other journal. Authors are responsible for language and style proficiency. Authors agree that articles published in *Dve domovini / Two Homelands* may also be published in electronic form on the internet.

2. Elements

Articles should contain the following elements in the order given:

- Title (in capital letters, bold);
- Name and surname of the author (after the surname a footnote should be inserted stating the author's: 1. education and title (e.g. PhD, MA in History, Research Fellow etc.); 2. full postal address (e. g. Slovenian Migration Institute, Novi Trg 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana); 3. e-mail address;
- Type of contribution (original, review or short scientific article; professional article);
- Abstract (title of the article and abstract, up to 1000 characters with spaces);
- Key words (up to 5 words);
- Article (1. should not exceed 45,000 characters with spaces; 2. the style of the entire text should be "Normal"; 3. font: Times New Roman 12; 4. paragraphs should not be separated by an empty line, empty lines should be used before and after every title and space intended for a chart or figure; 5 paragraphs following titles should not be indented, bullets and numbering of lines and paragraphs should be done manually; 6. titles should be marked manually, Heading 1 with bold capital letters, Heading 2 with bold lower-case letters; 7. (sub)sections of articles (Heading 1 and Heading 2) should not be numbered);
- Povzetek (summary in slovenian language, 3000 characters with spaces).

Avoid underlining and using bold in all texts. Italics should be used when emphasising a word or a phrase. Italics should also be used when citing titles of books and newspapers. In articles in English, the following abbreviations should be used: *ibid.*, *et al.*, *ed./eds.* When using inverted commas/quotation marks, use double quotation marks; single quotation marks should be used only when embedding quotations or concepts within quotations. Omitted parts of quotations should be indicated by square brackets with ellipsis [...].

Reports and reviews should contain the following elements in the order given:

- Reports from conferences and other events, discussions: title of the event, date of the event, name and surname of the author, 5,000 to 15,000 characters with spaces;
- Book reviews: name and surname of the author or editor of the book, title of the book, name of publisher, place of publication, date of publication, number of pages, 5,000 to 15,000 characters with spaces, with the name and surname of the reviewer at the end.

3. Quotations in articles

- Long quotations (five lines or more) should be typed as an indented paragraph (using the “tab” key), without quotation marks, the first line of the paragraph after the quotation should not be indented; quotations shorter than five lines should be included in the main text and separated with quotation marks, in normal font (not italic).
- When citing an author in brackets use the following form: (Anderson 2003: 91–99); when citing several authors separate their names with a semicolon and cite them according to the year of publication in ascending order (Milharčič Hladnik 2009: 15; Vah Jevšnik, Lukšič Hacin 2011: 251–253).
- A list of references should be placed at the end of the text and arranged in alphabetical order according to the author’s surname. The list of references should include only cited sources and literature. Multiple references by one author should be arranged according to the year of publication. Multiple references by one author published in the same year should be separated with lower-case letters (e.g. Ford 1999a; 1999b).
 - a) Books:
Anderson, Benedict (1995). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, New York: Verso.
 - b) Articles in a series:
Milharčič Hladnik, Mirjam (2009). Naša varuška. *Krila migracij: Po meri življenjskih zgodb* (ed. Mirjam Milharčič Hladnik, Jernej Mlekuž). Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, 15–20.
 - c) Articles in journals:
Vah Jevšnik, Mojca, Lukšič Hacin, Marina (2001). Theorising Immigrant/Ethnic Entrepreneurship in the Context of Welfare States. *Migracijske i etničke teme* 27/2, 249–261.
 - d) Internet sources:
 - Becker, Howard (2003). *New Directions in the Sociology of Art*, <http://home.earthlink.net/~hsbecker/newdirections.htm> (1 Feb. 2008).
 - *Interaction: Some Ideas*, <http://home.earthlink.net/interaction.htm> (1 Feb. 2008).

4. Graphics and illustrations

- Photographs, illustrations, maps etc. – with the exception of charts produced in Microsoft Word, which have to be adjusted to page size 16.5 x 23.5 cm (6.5” x 9.25”) – should not be included in the Word document. All illustrative material needs to be numbered and submitted separately in separate folder with the author’s name and surname. Please submit visual material in .jpeg form.
- Locations of figures in the text should be marked as follows:
Figure 1: Lisa Cook in New York in 1905 (Photo: Janez Novak, source: Archives of Slovenia, 1415, 313/14) or Chart 1: Population of Ljubljana after the 2002 Census (source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Statistics, p. 14)).
- Permission to publish must be obtained for uncopyrighted graphic and illustrative material.

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