This article follows the transformation of memories on Sarajevo assassination, reflected during the Assassination Centennial in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The author focuses mostly on touristic representations of Gavrilo Princip and new discourses framed in the Federation BH, in particular counter-discourses that challenge the simplified understanding of memorialisation practices in post-conflict societies as simple battles of antagonistic nationalised versions of the past. Keywords: Sarajevo Assassination, Gavrilo Princip, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, memory, tourism

INTRODUCTION

The First World War centenary provoked a renewed outburst of media and scholarly interest in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) especially in its capital Sarajevo, the site of the assassination of Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie on fatal 28 June 1914. The assassination of the Habsburg couple is often described as one of the most consequential assassinations of modern times (see Moll 2015). It is therefore not surprising that a number of different European political actors viewed the centennial of the Sarajevo assassination as a perfect occasion for the promotion of peace and cooperation. Additionally inspired by the frustration with the failed “reconciliation” in the post-war country, they considered it a suitable opportunity to remind Europe and especially local political leaders of the terrifying tragedies of war. Yet their intentions have had the opposite effect, prompting different and often clashing re-interpretations of WWI events, the Sarajevo assassination, and especially its prominent figures, principally the young student, member of Young Bosnia, and former Yugoslav hero - Gavrilo Princip.

1 Reconciliation became the catch phrase of post-conflict intervention policies in Bosnia-Herzegovina after Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought the war to an end in 1995, but at the same time reinforced national divisions and institutionalised segregation along ethno-national lines. In the last few years we saw the emergence of a more critical view of liberal reconciliation discourses in BH as well as of the outcomes of the external efforts highlighting local responses and meanings, which people attach to external political initiatives (see Eastmond 2010; Jansen 2013; Helms 2003).
As many scholars have argued (Donia 2014; Harrington 2014, 2015; Katz 2014; Lukec 2016; Miller 2014; Petrović-Ziemer 2015; Vervaet 2016), Princip has been a controversial figure from the very beginning of the 20th century, and as Robert Donia notes in his analysis of different characterisations of the young student, he was “served as tabula rasa onto which others could project their interpretation of him.” (2014: 57). The political instrumentalisation of Princip and Young Bosnia flourished in recent years, during the war of the 1990s and in the post-war Dayton era, heating ongoing discussions of identity and memory politics, reflecting simmering political battles and Bosnian (ethno-national and other) divisions, while simultaneously unmasking different visions of the country’s future.

The political struggles in Dayton-era BH, which attributed different meanings to Princip and his act (as well as to Young Bosnia), attracted some interest among scholars. Nevertheless, these regularly exposed authoritative official narratives of the two Bosnian entities - Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) and Republika Srbska (RS), which have been born out of the three-year war and established with the Dayton Peace Accord. Hence, there are two highly polarised dominant re-interpretations of Princip in present-day BH, which fit neatly in the framework of the nationalised “usable past” (Wertsch 2012). One paints a picture of the historically significant figure as a “national hero” (mostly for the Serbian population), and the other as a brutal “terrorist” (exclusively aimed at Bosniaks and Croats). The more nuanced interpretations moving beyond exclusively nationalised readings of Princip are often ignored (for rare exceptions, see Donia 2015; Lukec 2016; Vervaet 2016). This is the consequence of the clear predominance of methodological nationalism in the analysis of the post-Yugoslav societies, which continue to influence scholarly understanding of the remembering and forgetting process in a post-war context (see Bartulović 2013; Jansen 2007).

Following the discussion of memory in divided post-conflict societies, this article aims to challenge the simplified understanding of memorialisation practices in today’s BH. It will outline but also move away from the most obvious political struggles and examine a variety of engagements with the memory of the Sarajevo assassination and its lead protagonists. Since the memory of Princip is not bound to static monuments and official narratives, but “performed by the interaction between different media /…/ and actors of memory” (Varvaet 2016: 552) the relatively neglected spheres of production and reproduction of the memory of the Sarajevo assassination needs to be explored. The article therefore focuses on tourism-related uses of Princip, in particular his commodification and reinterpretations (although always in dynamical relation with his victims), which resurfaced on the centenary of the beginning of WWI in Federation BH. These offer important insight into present-day struggle for Bosnian self-presentation mediated though the dynamic process of re-conceptualisation of past events in touristic narratives. The paper will also examine local responses related to the dominant national narratives and commemoration of the event exposing not only the mediated memory of Princip and assassination but also critical reflections of Bosnian citizens on post-Dayton realities. In this respect, the article aims to
offer a framework of analysis of the Sarajevo assassination in the context of the post-war reconstruction process, where coping with everyday uncertainties frames a platform for negotiation with the dominant collective memories. This is particularly important, since “memory in the Balkans has often been described as binding, authoritative, and non-negotiable” (Vervaet and Beronja 2016: 2).

The article is based on fieldwork conducted in Sarajevo in short stages between 2014 until 2017. Through semi-structural interviews and analysis of varied promotional and educational materials aimed mostly at the international public and intended for the tourism marketing of WWI in Sarajevo, the article will address the commodification and political uses of the Sarajevo assassination. After a brief overview of major events marking the Sarajevo assassination centennial in BH, I will turn to the transformation that occurred in the dominant representation of Princip and his victims in the Federation’s tourism industry. Obvious breaks with the official Yugoslav narrative on the assassination will be demonstrated and some continuities exposed, which remained vital – ironically - precisely because of the radical social transformation. The second part of the article illustrates the dynamic nature of the remembering process in BH through ethnographic examination of various discourses, which reflect on centennial events and different uses of Princip in Sarajevo. It will also focus on “memory tensions” as well as practices of constructing alternative “usable pasts” that enable historical legacy to be mobilised for the construction of a policy of hope even for those segments of Bosnian population that cannot embrace imposed amnesia and predominant nationalised images of the past.

**OFFICIAL CELEBRATIONS AND THEIR REFLECTIONS: THE LASTING POWER OF METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM**

In spite of recent criticism by scholars, who claimed that the persistent focus on the fatal shots in Sarajevo obscures the realities of WWI and diverts discussion to political and ideological clashes, the centennial of the Sarajevo assassination was marked pompously in BH, primarily in its capital in 2013 and 2014 by numerous events, initiated and financed by different (mostly foreign) political actors from the EU and Bosnian eastern neighbour Serbia (which mainly supported events organised in RS) (see Hasanbegović

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2 The authors acknowledge that the on-going research project (Heritage of the First World War: Representations and Reinterpretations, J6-7173) was financially supported by the Slovenian Research Agency.

3 The national (or entities’) tourism policy has avoided discussion concerning the marketing of the Sarajevo assassination, which is partly related to the difficulties faced by policy makers under the current legal structures of the Dayton agreement. Yet individual voices exist, which notably co-create a dominant imagery of the assassination and Princip in tourism, while tourism officials are yet to decide on a clear strategy for dealing with this “dark,” but significant episode in the life of the city.
Cultural spectacles, educational, and sport events, including the Sarajevo Grand Prix cycling race - “a race for peace” organised under the patronage of the Tour de France, were dedicated to the general public, while several scholarly conferences triggered a new discussion of the beginning of WWI and its legacy. Yet, even academic events, which were designed to intensify debates transcending the politicisation of the memory of the assassination, provoked conflicts and misunderstandings. For example in his detailed analysis of the fragmented commemorations of the Sarajevo assassination in BH, Bosnian historian Husnija Kamberović (2014) states that the most active role in this process was played by the Embassy of France in Sarajevo. According to Kamberović, the Embassy also vigorously opposed the conference organised by the Institute of History in Sarajevo in collaboration with various scientific institutions from Europe, even though the academic discussion, as he claims, was designed with the aim to initiate a dialogue about the insufficiently explored aspects of WWI. The programme and organisers of the conference The Great War: Regional Approaches and Global Context, which was held in Sarajevo from 18 to 21 June 2014, were thus attacked by the Serbian media as well as some French historians for its apparent “pro-Habsburg orientation.” In their critique and endeavours to prevent the academic event, they expressed concern that the conference “threatened to shift guilt for starting the war from Germany and Habsburg Monarchy to Serbia, France and, indirectly to Russia” (Kamberović 2014: 11-12). This severe reaction may have been partly triggered by an interview with a historian in the Sarajevo daily newspaper Oslobođenje, according to analysis of Ljubinka Petrović-Ziemer, a participant of yet another academic conference dedicated to WWI entitled Long Shots of Sarajevo. She noted that the historian proclaimed Princip as a “weak” figure, and according to her he also rejected Princip’s Yugoslavism, arguing that his declarative self-positioning and identification could not be trusted (Petrović-Ziemer 2015: 520).

Thus, even in the academic community – which declaratively fought against reductionist readings of WWI and Sarajevo assassination – the debate was heavily burdened by politically imposed questions such as: “Who was Gavrilo Princip?” It is therefore not surprising that these re-evaluations of the main protagonists, particularly Princip, flooded public discourse and overshadowed most commemorative events. The media attention (and in great part also scholarly analyses of the centennial commemorations) offered

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4 For a more detailed account of these events see Kamberović 2014; Donia 2014; Harrington 2014, 2015.

5 One of the main organisers of these events was the Foundation Sarajevo Heart of Europe, established to coordinate the activities for the commemoration of the centennial, joining the City Council of the City of Sarajevo and the Mission de Centenaire (Paris). It brought together representatives of 7 countries – EU members and cultural, educational, and sport organisations in Bosnia- Herzegovina. See: http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/delegacijaEU_2014053010500312eng.pdf; accessed on 20 April 2017.

6 According to Nazif Hasanbegović, at least five scholarly conferences on the topic of WWI heritage were organised in the last days of June 2014 (2015: 269)
one-dimensional analysis of the events, turning solely towards the two conflicting events, one taking place in Sarajevo (Federation BH) and the other in Višegrad (RS). The two clashing commemorations reflected political debates among Bosnian citizens and their ethno-national division, but even more the division of the political elite, which still feeds on the constitutional pitfalls of the Dayton Peace Accord. One was the mega-spectacle *A Century of Peace After the Century of Wars*, which included the performance of the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra in the Sarajevo City Hall (Vijećnica) officially hosted by Austrian President Heinz Fischer. The other commemoration was entitled *The Rebel Angels*; taking place during the opening of Emir Kusturica’s megalomaniac project entitled Andrić’s Town – Andrićgrad. On St. Vitus day in 2014 the new Serbian “lieu de mémorie” in BH was officially open in the attendance of several Serbian politicians and academics, including RS President Milorad Dodik and Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, who refused their invitations to the main event in Sarajevo.

While the Sarajevo commemoration emphasised values of peace and European unity, desperately and clumsily straining to avoid the topic of Princip, the events organised by the political leaders of RS strove to keep the young assassin at the centre of attention. This was most obvious in Kusturica’s infatuated admiration for Princip both at the centennial and elsewhere. The filmmaker’s fawning performance following the dedication of a mosaic to Princip and Young Bosnia at the Sarajevo assassination centennial in Andrićgrad was paralleled during the unveiling of the statue to Princip in Tovariševo, Vojvodina, in April 2014, where Kusturica gratefully kissed Princip’s statue, crediting him for the existence of modern Serbia (sic!) (Vervaet 2016: 552-553). Moreover, in the Eastern part of Sarajevo, which is under the control of RS, a grandiose bronze monument was erected to Princip accompanied by pompously nationalistic tones, again stripping him of his proclaimed Yugoslavism (Harrington 2015: 568). The Serbian appropriation of the former Yugoslav hero is merely the continuation of a long-lasting, though ambiguous process; it can be followed from the beginning of the 20th century onwards (see Harrington 2014; Miller 2014), however, during the 1990s this process of exclusively national characterisation Princip intensified.

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7 Andrićgrad is an ideological project, initiated and supported by the famous film director, but mostly by the governments of RS and Serbia. The idea of Andrićgrad is to provide a place of memory in BH for Serbian myths and nationalised past. The project also rewrites the local history of Višegrad by erasing the towns’ Ottoman past, pre-war demographic composition, and particularly the ethnic cleansing of Muslims-Bosniaks during the war in 1990s.

8 They refused to attend because of what they perceived as “demonisation” of Serbs (see Harrington 2015: 568) as reflected by the plaque placed on the renewed former library that was completely destroyed during the siege of Sarajevo, which refers to the Serbian army as “Serbian criminals.”

9 For example, during the war in BH, Serbian troops introduced a new medal for bravery inscribed with Princip’s name (Kamberović 2014: 10). Also, immediately after the war, some renowned politicians, intellectuals, and public figures of Serbian descent, who stayed in Sarajevo and thereby expressed their loyalty for BH, received death threats from a relatively unknown terrorist group, called – Serbian liberation front Gavrilo Princip (Srbska osvobodilna fronta Gavrila Principa) (Alibečirević-Lunjo 2013).
The inconsistent avoidance in the Federation as well as the renewed, transformed heroisation of Princip in the register of Serbian nationalism were both noticed and even emphasised in global media coverage; as expected due to the well-known appeal of sensationalist news, during the centenary reporters became preoccupied with the story of the conflict tied to the reinterpretations of Princip. A simple analysis of the titles in print and Internet media reveals the endurance of the balkanistic optic and the irresistible attraction of the ascribed on-going prevalence of “ethnic” nationalism and antagonism in the Balkans. The media blindly followed the logic of reconciliation discourse, emphasising how even twenty years after the war “In Sarajevo, Divisions That Drove an Assassin Have Only Begun to Heal” (Burns 2014). Again, we were faced with the tireless reiteration that in today’s BH there are just two nationalised re-interpretations of Princip (Princip as hero and Princip as terrorist), as was clearly illustrated in the segment of the article, entitled “Franz Ferdinand Assassination: Serb Leaders Boycott Sarajevo Ceremony to Unveil Gavrilo Princip Tribute in Andricgrad,” written by Gianluca Mezzofiore: “Princip’s legacy is still disputed in Bosnia. Celebrated as a hero by Serbs, he is regarded as a terrorist by Croats and Bosnian Muslims. These polarities provide a microcosmic snapshot of the wider divisions in a country which has been divided in two entities along ethnic lines.” Analysis of various media reports thus reveals an almost uninterrupted coherence of narratives as well as undisturbed dominance of the interpretative framework of methodological nationalism resulting in the narrow focus on ethno-national divisions. This position also presumes the homogenisation of national communities through the remembering process.

However, in recent decades, the complexity of post-Yugoslav memory has been explored in depth by numerous (ethnographic) studies (for examples see Belaj and Škrbić-Alempijević 2014; Jansen 2007; Beronja and Vervaet 2016). Surprisingly, these have remained overlooked by many scholars and journalists who simply confirm the prevailing generalised views of authoritative national collective memory in lieu of tackling the complex process of remembering the Sarajevo assassination. It is therefore not surprising that both media reports and scholarly analysis of the assassination memory in post-war BH remained blind to a relatively small, but loud protest taking place in Sarajevo during the official celebration at City Hall (Vijećnica), where people gathered wearing Princip masks to convey a strong message. It would be easy to view the protesters through the lenses of methodological nationalism, interpreting them as a small minority of Serbs standing against the transformation of the

10 The main problem with reconciliation discourse is the obsession with the national idiom. Furthermore, liberal discourse of reconciliation often functions as an orientalising practice, which hides and simplifies past and present social realities and ignores the moral worlds and value system of local inhabitants (see Bartulović 2013; Jansen 2013, 2015).
11 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/world/europe/in-sarajevo-gavrilo-princip-set-off-world-war-i.html?_r=0; accessed on 5 April 2017
12 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/franz-ferdinand-assassination-serb-leaders-boycott-sarajevo-ceremony-unveil-gavrilo-princip-1454487; accessed on 15 April 2017
official Yugoslav narrative of assassination, and its marginalisation in the Federation in particular. However, the reasons behind their rejection of the mega-spectacle marking the fatal shot lied elsewhere, and I will address these in my final remarks.

RE-IMAGINING PRINCIP, (RE)PRESENTING BH: THE ROLE OF TOURISM IN THE COMMODIFICATION AND POLITICISATION OF THE ASSASSINATION IN POST-WAR SARAJEVO

Princip only experienced massive “glorification” after the creation of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Along with partisans and other members of Young Bosnia, he was finally proclaimed one of Yugoslav heroes and liberators (Hajdarpašić 2015: 159). As Paul Miller notes in his detailed analysis of discursive construction of Yugoslav identity, the reinterpretation of Princip began immediately after WWII, when not only the political elite but also and predominately “ordinary Yugoslavists with no backing from the government or sovereign, began constructing the Sarajevo assassination as a story of opposition and liberation transcending the particularist identities of ethnicity, nation, religion, and history” (Miller 2014: 4). Nevertheless, political support and official narratives of the assassination were crucial to this process (see Donia 2014; Harrington 2015). The memorialisation and commemoration of Princip and members of Young Bosnia became highly politicised. Socialist Yugoslav interpretations established Princip and Young Bosnia as predecessors of the partisan anti-fascist struggles that brought the German expansionistic tendencies to an end and enabled Yugoslav brotherhood and unity to finally flourish. Many streets names in major Yugoslav cities and schools were changed to honour members of Young Bosnia; being the site of the assassination, Sarajevo was the core “epicenter” of the “Princip cult” (Miller 2014: 23-24). This was echoed in the Sarajevo’s cityscape, particularly in the re-established and re-interpreted sites of memory.13 The turning point occurred on the 27 June 1953, when the Museum of Young Bosnia opened and a red Cyrillic inscription in the rough stone clearly framed Princip’s role in Yugoslav history: “From this place on June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip’s shot gave voice to the national protest against tyranny and our nations’ centuries-long aspiration for freedom.” The Sarajevo street corner’s magnetic allure for tourists (and even more so for locals) was increased with the addition of “Princip’s” footprints imprinted in the pavement on the spot where he purportedly stood when firing the shots.14 These invited the visitors to engage with the appealing sign on the pavement, enabling anyone to reenact the shots and so feel part of the historic event. But already in

13 In socialist times, the bridge crossing the Miljacka river at the assassination site has been renamed to bear Princip’s name. In 1995, after the war the pre-Yugoslav name has been restored – the Latin Bridge (see also Katz 2014: 110), however a number of Sarajevans still refer to it as Princip’s bridge.
14 The fake footprints belonged to the author of the modern Young Bosnia bas-relief, sculptor Mirko Ostojić (Harrington 2015: 579).
the 1960s, the enthusiastic praising of Princip and the heroism of his assassination slowly started to fade. In 1964, during the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination a few high ranked Yugoslav politicians including Josip Broz Tito, started tactfully distancing themselves from the official celebrations in Sarajevo (Miller 2014: 31). In the 1970s, Yugoslav authorities’ succeeded in lending Princip celebrity status (see Donia 2014). However, in the early 1980s the lonely and previously marginalised opponents of the official Yugoslav narrative of the event “that shook the world” started raising their voices against the so-called “glorification” of Princip and Young Bosnia. In this decade local authorities, despite the interest of foreign visitors, began feeling uneasy and abstained from grandiosely celebrating anniversaries of one of the most known political assassinations in history (Harrington 2014: 131). So, this process of re-assessment and transformation of Princip, Young Bosnia, and the assassination could not be interpreted as a straightforward break that happened suddenly during the war in the 1990s. However, during the transformative period of the Yugoslav dissolution official narratives experienced a radical push. Immediately before the war in BH, abuses of Princip grew more evident (see Miller 2014), particularly among Bosnian Serbs; this provoked subsequent debates among other Bosnian inhabitants, especially the political and intellectual elite, who felt uneasy celebrating violence and murder, especially on the eve of another bloody war. During the devastating conflict and siege of Sarajevo, Serbian troops abused Princip’s name. This prompted many Sarajevans to make ungrounded correlations between the Serbian Army and Young Bosnia, reinterpreting Princip as a proponent of the idea of Greater Serbia. Thus, some Bosnians began to view Princip as a symbol of Serbian nationalist territorial appetite for Bosnian land (see also Miller 2014: 35; Kamberović 2014: 9). In a new context, which supported erasure of the Yugoslav collective memory of Princip, it was easier to proclaim his act a terrorist attack; the so-transformed image of the former hero offered justification for the Croatian army to demolish his museum-home in Obljaj (Miller 2014: 35). According to one version of events, even the famous footprints, which despite their lack of authenticity became “the emblematic icon of the assassination” (Miller 2014: 215), were demolished by the Bosnian army and thrown into Miljacka river.

One of the leading figures in so-called “de-mythologisation” of Princip, was historian Mustafa Imamović, who already during the 1970 presented the paper at the conference, where he “began cautiously debunking the myths of Princip and Young Bosnia as fighters for Yugoslav unification” (Kamberović 2014: 9). Yet it is important to note that the historian is also well-known for his immense contribution to the Bosniak nation-building process in the 1990s.

Miller in fact claims that Yugoslav history textbooks were rather neutral when describing the assassin and that “Princip actually only began to be heroized in Serbian textbooks when Serbs turned towards nationalism in the late 1980s.” (2014: 23).

In fact, there is still on-going debate about the Princip’s and Young Bosnian nationalism, since historically speaking the gap between the Yugoslav and Serbian nationalism was very narrow (Aleksov 2014; Vervaet 2016: 556).

It must be noted that in socialist Yugoslavia when collective memory on the assassination is concerned the homogenisation process was never completed.
along with the plaque bearing a Yugoslav ideological message. In this manner, Princip grew increasingly nationalised after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and ethnic cleansing in BH and at the same time – at least at first glance – also forcibly expelled from collective memories of Bosniaks and Croatians. However, it should be noted that even during and after the war, in spite of the nationalisation of the remembering process, the memories of Princip have not settled neatly in nationalised images of past.

Despite a transparent break with the former Yugoslav representations of the assassination, its interpretations in tourism expose ambiguities in the Federation. It is therefore at this point important to address the changes that shook the official Socialist Yugoslav narrative. It is beneficial to do this through analysis of the new touristic representations of the assassination, which were framed in the context of the beginning of WWI celebrations in 2014. Discursive analysis of tourist brochures, maps, guidebooks, and texts following the exhibitions and events, as well as informative books written for general audiences mostly in English by Museum curators, historians, or even amateur historians, demonstrates an interesting break with the Yugoslav era perception of Princip and the assassination. To give a brief illustration, the Guidebook to Sarajevo, published in 1983 in Zagreb, and written by prof. Đemal Ćelić, proclaimed Young Bosnia to be composed of Serbs, Muslims, and Croats – mainly students, but also “workers, peasants, teachers and merchants,” who fought against foreign domination and exploitation. The author also emphasised their pro-Yugoslav orientation and stated that the assassination was used by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a pretext to declare war on Serbia (1983: 15). Yet, the guidebook exhibits no admiration for the high school boy. Compassion for the murdered Franz Ferdinand and his wife is also completely absent. In contrast, most of the analysed material from 2014 and 2015 disregards Princip not to mention Young Bosnia, preferring to place strong emphasis on the victims, attempting to humanise them and encourage readers to empathise with them. It emphasises, for example, that Sophie was pregnant at the time of the assassination. Similarly, when author – historian Vahidin Preljević and editor – Muamer Spahić undertook the demanding task of making history accessible for general audiences in their illuminating book Sarajevo Assassination (2015), they included a detailed description of the forbidden love between Franz Ferdinand and Countess Sophie Chotek, who “belonged to an impoverished family of ancient Czech aristocracy,” which excluded her from the official political occasions within the Monarchy (2015: 47-48). Highlighting the tragic irony of fate, they point out that the couple’s lethal visit to Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 was their first official

19 There are two competing stories about the fate of the footsteps, one ascribing their removal to Bosnian defenders, the other, supported also by Husnija Kemberović (2014: 9-10) states that these are misconceptions and that the footsteps were destroyed in a heavy shelling from Serbian troops.

20 The analysis includes material that was most widely available in Sarajevo’s bookstores, museums, and tourist information offices, published in 2014 and 2015. It is therefore a pragmatic selection of the material, which is obviously written to address specific needs of visitors from abroad, who rarely understood the praise of Princip and Young Bosnia in former Yugoslavia (see Miller 2014). Yet the chosen material is also reflection of the »approved« narratives and public memory politics in Federation BH.
journey within the borders of the Monarchy (2015: 48). They claimed that Franz Ferdinand was prone to pacifism and “supported the idea of unification of South Slovenes, but within the bounds of Habsburg monarchy,” strongly rejecting any division of Bosnian soil between two parts of the monarchy (2015: 43). This emphasis is extremely important, especially when read in the context of persistent calls for the partition of BH.

Although Franz Ferdinand’s pacifist side was not mentioned in other analysed materials, it is not surprising that, on the occasion of the assassination centennial for the first time in history, the people of Sarajevo as well as visitors to the city were invited to step into the victims’ shoes, or to be more specific, the victims’ car. They could spend a few minutes in the replica of the car that drove Franz Ferdinand and Sophie during their visit to Sarajevo. The automobile was located in front of The Sarajevo City Museum of 1878 – 1918, which bore the name Young Bosnia Museum until 1992, and which has completely altered its exhibition, making it more neutral and open to different interpretations (Harrington 2015: 582), or according to another view, to present the “‘hero cult” in reverse” (Miller 2014: 39).21 Visitors could pose in the car wearing attire resembling that worn by the couple (Donia 2014: 72).22 Museum curators also displayed two separately exhibited informative panels, one at the beginning of the bridge where the monument dedicated to the assassinated couple stood before its removal by the authorities of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the other in place of the imprints of Princip’s footsteps (Kamberović 2014: 14). Yet, on this occasion there was no official invitation to put oneself in Princip’s shoes; instead, identification with the victims has been officially promoted as the appropriate way to commemorate the tragic event. This is further attested by the footsteps never being re-installed in their original spot after the war, in spite of the heated debated in 2003, in which official city authorities were overruled by war veterans strongly opposing the intention to re-introduce Princip’s mark on the street corner (Kamberović 2014: 10). However, in 2014, the Minister of Culture and Sport of the Federation of BH, Samir Kaplan stated for the Croatian Večernji list newspaper that he strongly supports the reconstruction of the imprint as well as the monument dedicated to the memory of Franz Ferdinand and Sophie; he viewed these as a successful step in the commodification process of the assassination while enhancing the experiences of tourists in Sarajevo (Medunjanin 2014).23 It is worth mentioning that a cast of the footsteps was made but the new imprints ended up at the entrance of the Museum, where they do not provide the tourists and visitors with the same experience, though the latter still – with no visual invitation – regularly try to re-enact the assassination.

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21 This museum exhibition presented Austro-Hungarian era as golden years of Bosnian history, leading the country towards the European future and aspired modernity. Princip’s shots in this narrative are therefore exposed as crucial steps that obstructed this process of Bosnian European integration (Miller 2014: 39-40).

22 The exhibition also includes life-size models of Franz Ferdinand and Sophie.

Recent Bosnian evaluations of the assassination exhibit a strong shift towards humanising the Habsburg aristocratic couple. These efforts go hand in hand with open praise of the modernisation and Europeanisation of BH under Austro-Hungarian rule, but mostly with altered depictions of Princip.\textsuperscript{24} Emphasising the positive aspects of imperial rule, which gained impetuosity in the Federation in the last two decades,\textsuperscript{25} often supports the idea that Yugoslavia was an exploitative project of the Serbian expansionist policy that obstructed the cultural and economic development of BH. This obvious change in the perception of the former multinational state and rejection of Yugoslav legacy (see for example Beronja and Vervaet 2016; Jezernik 2015; Karačić, Banjeglav and Govedarica 2012; Petrović 2012; Potkonjak and Pletenac 2016), borders on a particular form of Autronostalgia, which presents the old Austro-Hungarian empire as an “orderly country” (see Baskar 2007: 48). These memories obviously express a general dissatisfaction with the non-functioning Dayton’s state (see Bartulović 2013; Jansen 2015; Kurtović 2015) and with the slow Bosnian progression towards the praised EU. Rejecting Yugoslavia as a Serbian project, many in BH (not just the educated elite) turned to the reinvented and highly romanticised image of the Austro-Hungarian empire, celebrating its multi-ethnic character and “rule of law and order” as a model for a better Bosnian future. Even tourism industry in BH therefore openly flirts with Austro-nostalgia.

NEW PRINCIP AND NEW PRINCIPLES

Though the public opinion that in the Federation Princip is often regarded as a Serbian “terrorist” and also publically displayed as such, the analysed material demonstrates that the memories of Princip are much more diverse. Here, I will expose just two interrelated and prevailing perceptions of Princip that subtly erode his Yugoslav heroisation while at the same time avoid his simplified framing in the nationalistic register.

\textsuperscript{24} Interestingly, Austria played a key role in the commemoration process, but its involvement in the Federation was not as problematised as the activities of Embassy of France. For example some of the projects financed by the EU resemble the paternalistic logic and imperial attitudes of the Austro-Hungarian era (see Hajdarpašić 2015; Lipa 2006; Ruthner 2008). For example the following could be read on the page of art project \textit{SHARE – too much HISTORY, MORE future}: «The commemorative year 2014 is an occasion for Austria to carry out a European project in the field of contemporary art that is intended to make the creative potential of Bosnia and Herzegovina visible across all borders. An important concern in the same context is to enable artists from that country to come into contact with the European art scene». See: http://www.share-sarajevo2014.eu/projekt/; accessed on 10 May 2017.

\textsuperscript{25} Despite Yugoslav negative depictions of the former empire, which were entrapped in the ethno-nationalistic perspective, viewing it as “a basically ethnic German state” (Baskar 2007: 54-55), it seems that memories of Austro-Hungarian rule in BH were in fact cherished for decades among (the educated elite of) Bosnian Muslims (see Baskar 2007: 48).
Princip gets presented as problematic, bad-tempered, and aggressive, but also as a weak schoolboy, who suffered from tuberculosis and social alienation. Besides, he has been noted to have been dissatisfied with his small and weak figure, which prevented him to fight in the Balkan Wars. These frustrations inspired him to search for other opportunities for self-validation. Sometimes analysed material also emphasise his hate towards the Sarajevo “čaršija,” – Ottoman city’s social and trade-centre, for example underlying the episode of his encounter with Muslims in an inn upon his transfer from the native village Obljaj to Sarajevo when he was just 13 years old. He apparently refused to sleep in the same house as the “Turks” (Preljević, Spahić 2015: 52). This focus on his week figure and tormented psyche could be read as an unconscious humble apology to the world for the devastating consequences of WWI; however, in the new post-conflict Bosnian context this may be viewed as an attempt to present Princip’s action as unreasonable, committed by an individual with personal issues, who was easily manipulated by the nationalistic politics. This also clearly obscures the whole context of Austro-Hungarian imperialism and young Princip’s anti-colonial emancipatory ambitions. In a way, reconceptualisation of Princip lifts the burden of collective guilt, particularly off the Bosniak and Croatian inhabitants of BH as well as counteracts the balkanistic perception of the country. This is further manifest in ascribing Princip negative, almost orientalistic attitudes towards Sarajevo’s Muslims; these establish for the readers that the assassin did not identify with the Muslims, viewing them not as his Yugoslav brothers, but distant Others. Here, therefore, Princip’s Yugoslav aspirations for the unification of South Slavs are kept quiet.

The second noticeable accentuation of new representations of Princip is the focus on his rural background and bandit family origins. It should be noted, however, that this aspect should not be regarded as very novel; we found the first use of the notion of “agrarian terrorism” in connection with the members of Young Bosnia in the famous book by Vladimir Dedijer Sarajevo 1914, published already in 1966. It has been condemned in recent years for “idealising the Sarajevo assassination” (Preljević, Spahić 2015: 79). However in its time, this assessment was linked to the agrarian question, which was one of the main reasons behind Young Bosnians’ dissatisfaction with Austro-Hungarian rule (see also Varvaet 2016: 558; Dedijer 1966: 337). Yet Princip’s involvement in the politics related to the agrarian questions was abused in the post-war years. For example, terminological coinage “agrarian terrorism” was misinterpreted, with the inevitable hash tag, also in the informative infographic map of Sarajevo, published in 2014 by the R2.1 multi-media and publishing company based in London for the purpose of “informing, education and visually communication a particular

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26 He disobeyed the (school) authorities; a frequent guest at taverns with billiard tables he became the »passionate player in Tuzla, who during arguments about the game was known to use his stick« (Preljević, Spahić 2015: 52).

27 This supposed aversion was actually related to social hierarchy, not ethnic belonging. According to his former schoolmate Borivoje Jevtić, Princip developed animosity towards the mercantile elite while living in the outskirts of Sarajevo (van Hengel 2014: 93).
event” to an “eclectic international audience.”28 The title is telling and corresponds with the conceptualisation of Sarajevo as a dark tourist destination: Sarajevo 1914–2014: 1 city, 3 wars, 1 Olympic = 1 lesson.

Many anthropologists writing about the violent break-up of Yugoslavia commented on noticing rural-urban dichotomy in urbo-centric discourses of Balkan’s “urbanites” along with discourse blaming “parochial peasants” for violence, antagonism, and the rise of nationalism (see Armakolos 2007; Bartulović 2013; Jansen 2005; Stefansson 2007). Common interpretations of the 1990s’ war were often framed in narratives of “urbicide” (violence against the city), of peasants’ misunderstanding of the cities, or even those of the “revenge of the countryside” (Allcock 2009; Baskar 1999; Bougarel 1999). During the siege of Sarajevo, nationalisation of blame was sometimes disguised or even completely rejected through shifting blame to “rural primitives” who purportedly never managed to adapt to urban environments and reach the stage of modernised subjects. Consequently, the Sarajevo assassination was also seen by many as an assault of uneducated peasants on the civilised urban environment. Even some scholars presented Princip’s life-story, especially his rural-urban migration as an important trigger for his frustration and with it anger, which found its release in the fatal shot. Guido van Hengel argued that Princip, along with his friends, indeed suffered because their dream to “become fully accepted members of urban community” (2014: 93) was never fully realised;29 meanwhile he dismissed Dedijer’s characterisation of Young Bosnia’s members as “primitive rebels.” Instead, he argued that Princip was a “modern activist”, whose problems and ideas were developed in a particular “‘in-between-space’ of the Arrival city” (van Hengel 2014: 96). Hence, political correctness along with the prevailing power of urban-rural dichotomy in BH, ascribed the radicalisation of Princip not to his devotion to the ideas of Serbian expansionist nationalism, but mostly to his stubbornness, non-flexibility and assimilation difficulties he faced as a rural youngster.

Moving back to touristic representations, it is almost needless to say that other Princip’s traits and personal aspirations were completely ignored. Informative tourism literature rarely mentions that he was an intelligent, mature, and well-read youngster, with ties to the broader European youth movement, and that he was striving for better living conditions, social equality, and freedom. The literature also strategically overlooks his idealised Yugoslavism (although Yugoslavism of Young Bosnia is known to have been extremely heterogeneous), atheistic orientation as well as anticlerical stances (Varvaet 2016: 546, 557; see also see Aleksov 2014; Dedijer 1966; van Hengel 2014), however, these traits have not completely disappeared from public discourse.

29 According to him, this alienation was felt even more in Belgrade, where Bosnian Serbs were in fact marginalised, living in »Little Bosnia« near the train station without any contact with the locals (van Hengel 2014: 94).
On the streets of Sarajevo, various perceptions of Princip can be found, even among tourism workers. As a result of the imposed nationalist perspective and official usable histories, these attitudes and their multiplicity were left blurred and unexplored. However, opposing memories on Princip and the assassination have leaked through certain media reports. For example, they were revealed in the talk-show hosting prominent historians from the former Yugoslav area, produced in 2014 by the Al Jazeera TV station predictably entitled Contexts: Gavrilo Princip – terrorist or hero? One of the guests, Croatian historian Ivo Banac, expressed deep shock when a quick survey of random interviewees in Sarajevo demonstrated that the majority perceived Princip as a positive historical figure; Banac expressed concern that applauding Princip’s act meant endorsing the war. Though they did not blindly praise his act, most of my interlocutors from different backgrounds in Sarajevo were in agreement with the above survey, however they generally remained reluctant to call Princip a hero. For example, during a short tour of one of the most successful hostels in the region Franz Ferdinand, a member of staff stated he was schooled in a system that viewed Princip as a terrorist. Nevertheless, he voiced his doubts about the post-war education system, which took a radically different direction in its representation of Young Bosnia than Socialist Yugoslavia had: “I am smarter than that and I don’t see him as a bad guy. You cannot take for granted what they teach you in our schools, /…/ we know that it is mostly politics, not history at all. Maybe this school system is not so bad, because it forces you to check everything that they teach you twice.”

The thematic hostel offering accommodation in rooms named after important actors in the Sarajevo assassination and WWI, as well as after different battles and battlefields of the Great War, knew how to fill a gap in the Sarajevo tourism industry and reserved a prominent spot for itself among mushrooming accommodation facilities in the Sarajevo city centre. National, entity’s as well as private tourist agencies undeniably remain hesitant to market the assassination as one of the city’s most relevant tourist sites, although they are quite aware of its appeal to foreign visitors. Speaking with guides and Sarajevo’s tourism workers, I have detected their concern that they might be judged by the public for indulging in the interpretation of the Sarajevo assassination, exposing their own understanding of the event, and consequently be proclaimed defenders of the murder. Therefore, they focus on the recent war, justifying their decision by citing higher interest among tourists for recent war-related history. In addition, they have no doubts about which interpretations of the events of the 1990s are appropriate. The reluctance in marketing the assassination is also reflected in an almost complete absence of special tours and souvenirs related to the famous event.

30 In his study of dark tourism, Johnston notes that local guides in Sarajevo reported tensions between them and their local tourist board. Conflicts were grounded also in different ideas and perspectives concerning the appropriate promotion of their city (2011: 204).

31 On one of the guided tour in Sarajevo the assassination was presented in detail, although young tourist guide stated declared that: “I don’t want to voice my opinion about Princip. Let’s be politically correct. After all, you are leaving and I am staying here. I have my own opinion, which I am keeping for myself. You have to form your own. I am just giving you the facts.”
Indeed, it seems that the commodification of Princip (in tourism) is much more present in Serbia (Velikonja 2018) than in BH. This cannot be ascribed simply to the reservations about the so-called dark tourism or thanatourism in post-war Sarajevo (see Johnston 2010). Despite the assassination’s potential for the tourism industry, a souvenir hunt in Sarajevo revealed that there existed just a few Princip-themed T-shirts and some mouse pads depicting the famous footprints, available in the Museum; these were printed for the centennial and soon disappeared from the shelves (mostly due to great interest among visitors). Even though local craftsmen are well known for seizing opportunities to earn money in order to sustain their multi-generational households, they have completely disregarded the option to sell products related to the assassination and – as they claim - not because of ideological reasons. As one of the craftsmen explained: “Nobody is interested in that, only politicians, but they don’t buy anything, they just wait for the presents.” However, visitors’ indifference towards the Sarajevo assassination and its lead protagonists, could not be confirmed with tourists who openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the tourist industry failing to make note of such an important part of (Bosnian) history. A few exceptions managed to respond to their needs. Supported by their private memories they turned Princip into an object of consumerism. A woman working in a small souvenir shop, the only one in Sarajevo’s Old Town to offer WWI memorabilia (apart from outlets in the Museum and Hostel Franz Ferdinand), commented on the absence of these kinds of souvenirs ascribing it to Bosnian laziness, lack of creativity, ignorance of the past, and subjection to political manipulation including historical revisionism. She condemned the import of cheap goods from Turkey and China, stating that these cannot represent Sarajevo: “When one looks at the souvenirs sold in Čaršija and generally in Sarajevo, it seems that silkworms are living on Trebević.” She sells products designed by one of the best-known Bosnian graphic designers, who initially decided to only produce a small series of bags and badges bearing the faces of Princip and Franz Ferdinand, sometimes even side by side on the same product. It began as a test, but these products proved irresistible to consumers and sold out instantly. Tourists from former Yugoslavia as well as those from Western Europe expressed interest in these products, with the latter, according to the shop assistant, usually more attracted to Franz Ferdinand (also because of the Scottish rock bend of the same name), while people from the area of former Yugoslavia, irrelevant of their origin, prefer Princip. When asked to explain this difference, the shop assistant responded without hesitation: “Simple; Gavrilo Princip was and still is our Che Guevara.”

Therefore “Princip’s cult” has not completely disappeared from post-war Sarajevo, although it has undergone certain transformations. In contrast to the dominant selective interpretations that focus only on politically motivated assessments of Princip in today’s BH and noticeably moving away from the trap of methodological nationalism, Donia (2014)

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32 Trebević is one of the hills surrounding Sarajevo. The comment addresses the massive selection of cheap imported scarfs, which remain one of the most popular souvenirs and gifts from Sarajevo.
claims that in the last decades of the 20th century, Princip in fact became a global celebrity and pop-cultural icon. In these reformulations he became a politically ambiguous, but nevertheless fascinating person that changed the course of history. Donia even goes so far as to posit that this image of Princip will most probably outlive all the ideologically inspired representations that trigger conflicts and misunderstandings (2014: 69). However, it appears that where financial benefits of Princip’s celebrity status are concerned, post-war BH and Sarajevo in particular are not as successful as former Yugoslavia. Also, his transformation into a pop-cultural icon, did not strip him of his political might, rather it gained Princip new political power in a post-war context. He is not only (ab)used as an instrument in ethno-national battles and divisions, but his post-mortem existence also points to sentiments and identifications that are subversive, oppositional and hence antinational or non-national.

A FEW CONCLUSIONS: THE OTHER SIDE OF PRINCIP

In her monumental book Imagining the Balkans, Maria Todorova confirms that the assassination in Sarajevo left an indelible mark on the assessment of the region; Princip’s shots in 1914 wiped out all existing ambivalence about the Balkans in European imagination cementing the perception of the semi-peripheral area as a European powder-keg (Todorova 2009: 118-119). Balkanistic attitudes also remained vital in the understandings of the commemoration of the assassination centennial in post-war BH, although - like the developments leading to WWI - the events of 2014 were caused by initiatives and activities of numerous international political actors, who called for the marking of the centennial in Sarajevo with various ambitions and goals in mind. Yet, academics and journalists jointly inscribed the ceremonies in the ethno-national register as reflections of Bosnian internal divisions, which were easily explained through varied nationalised understanding of young Princip.

Princip has of course undergone various transformations throughout the 20th and in the beginning of the 21st century. His person has been exploited by various regimes: for the Austro-Hungarian empire Princip was a terrorist and criminal, in Yugoslavia a national hero, and even a Jew during the short-lived Independent State of Croatia (Aleksov 2014), a revolutionary heroic youth, a Serbian martyr, a primitive rebel, a problematic boy, a naïve victim, a celebrity – stripped of political association, but also just a lost young boy filled with ideals and frustrations (see Donia 2014). In post-war Bosnian society, where national segregations and division continue to monopolise public discourse and even influence the commodification of the Sarajevo assassination in the tourism industry, it became

Moreover, he argued that this kind of depiction has even been strategically promoted by the Yugoslav government since the mid 1970s. This is confirmed by the state’s massive financial support for the film “The day that shook the world,” depicting Princip as a true Hollywood movie star. Obviously the goal of the film was to entertain a foreign audience, with the ideological message reserved mostly for Yugoslavs (Donia 2014: 70-71).
commonplace to frame the discussion in terms “burdens of the past,” which separate Bosnian constitutive nations. Yet, ethnographic study of the marking of the assassination and its commodification gleams a more complex image and leads to the conclusion that even today Princip cannot be reduced to a limited and highly nationalised binary opposition of “terrorist” - “hero”. It seems that the official touristic narratives of Federation put forth three dominant though conflicting ideas, which are illuminated relative to the new perceptions of the Austro-Hungarian couple and hence imperial legacy. Firstly, Princip is depicted as a young frustrated man, lead to his violent act by personal traumas and failures. Secondly, his ideological Yugoslavism is often untrusted or silenced, but also rarely openly reinterpreted as Serbian nationalism. Lastly, he is usually proclaimed as an unassimilated rural Other with a developed aversion to cities (and often Muslim elite), the only space in (post)Yugoslav context where imagined and Eurocentric model of modernity could flourish (see Alcock 2000; Bartulović 2013; Jansen 2005). Despite relative coherence of tourism-related material and numerous differing perceptions of Princip among the inhabitants of Sarajevo, which still need to be observed with ethnographic patience, it is obvious that Princip in today’s BH cannot be easily regarded as a pop-cultural icon and neutral celebrity stripped of his political power for the sake of profit and entertainment.

His (imposed) political power is also evident among the segment of Bosnian population, which opposes to the political manipulation of the past, since it is known that even in post-conflict country “individuals engage actively with the official histories they encounter, incorporating some elements in their personal narratives, while ignoring others.” (Jansen 2007: 207). Personal (mediated) memories in post-war BH are still contesting nationalist versions of the past. This was confirmed by interviews with the workers in the Sarajevo tourism industry, who refuse to accept the marginalisation of Princip for the sake of a new reinterpretation of the assassination. In fact, memories of Princip that encompass personal dimensions of remembering also have the power to deconstruct ethno-national separations. Princip is therefore also used to embody an antinationalist ideological position and express resistance to the ethnicisation of everyday life and memories, but most of all he succeeds in portraying dissatisfaction with Bosnian post-war realities, including everyday uncertainties, a sense of loss, high unemployment rates, poverty, corruption, state’s inefficiency etc. In rejecting the rival nationalised interpretation of Princip, protests outside Sarajevo Town Hall, to which I have referred briefly at the beginning of the article and which were ignored by journalists and scholars, offered alternative readings of the assassination, making use of Princip to produce another alternative usable past. Highlighting social inequality and irrational costs of mega spectacles (according to some reports, the spectacle in Sarajevo cost the European Commission in the vicinity of 250,000 euros); people in Princip masks voiced their disagreement with the celebrations and patronising discourses of peace and cooperation, which again refocused attention from important issues of everyday survival to those that provoke conflict among Bosnian citizens. Through the use of Princip, political demands were developed and voiced loudly with slogans such as “We are all Princip” and
“We are occupied again.” One of the protesters pointed out that these events were organised in the immediate wake of catastrophic floods, which left people homeless and hungry and that the massive centennial celebration clearly reflects the priorities of local and foreign politicians favouring “national interest” at the expense of the well-being and “decent living standard” of Bosnian inhabitants. The protest was thus as much a public call as it was an unveiling of the invisible – those who are not easily manipulated by politicians from ruling national parties nor by the international community (whom many view as displaying colonial attitudes), as a means to shape and reinforce a collective identity that looks beyond national segregation. In fact, this kind of re-politicising Princip in the context of the centennial acknowledged the fact that there is a need for a new solidarity among the citizens of BH who became a “new community of the excluded” (Arsenijević 2010: 194).

The former ambassador of BH to Croatia and the Middle East Zlatko Dizdarević explained his understanding of the commemoration of the centennial in a similar way: “These celebrations re-opened a battle among us over Gavrilo Princip /…/ Why do we need to discuss these things now? We have a country, Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is completely destroyed. It doesn’t function. It does not exist. And Europe’s politicians will come here smiling for a week, with colorful balloons and grandiose declarations, “Never Again,” to remember Europe’s love for Sarajevo and European principles. It speaks to an incredible cynicism. If there is a place where European principles have been abandoned, it is Sarajevo /…/ All of this cynical. It happens so as to forget the reality of Bosnia-Herzegovina today /…/ There is a lot of rhetoric and falsehood in these celebrations. People in Sarajevo are not interested. This is not our celebration.”34 (quoted in Oskari Rossini 2014). Dizdarević, like the protesters, strongly criticised the new semi-colonial attitudes towards BH, which have in fact been embraced by other segments of Bosnian population. This was clearly manifest in the resurgence of Autronostalgia in Bosnian public discourse. At the same time, it seems that in the discourse among many Sarajevans, Princip is also employed as a mechanism of struggling against the repressive acts of memory erasure leading to the appearance or nurturing a different kind of nostalgia – Yugonostalgia, which is essentially tied to hopes and aspirations for a better future or capacity to hope in post-socialists context and in “Dayton Meantime” (Jansen 2015; see also Bartulović 2013; Hage 2009; Luthar and Pušnik 2010; Palmberger 2008; Petrović 2012; Velikonja 2013a, 2013b). While Austronostalgia might be a manifestation of yearning for Bosnia’s place in the European Union, Yugonostalgia mostly reflects persistent yearning for normal and secure lives (see Jansen 2015). Ironically the two discourses, both of which appropriate Princip in their own way, emanate strong dissatisfaction with troubling Bosnian post-war realities.

Remembering the assassination, as well as calling to silence the debates about Princip, which is usually the starting point to introducing questions of social inequalities into the

34 https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Bosnia-Herzegovina/Sarajevo-One-Hundred-Years-151730; accessed on 20 April 2017.
public discourse, testify that the ambiguity of memories remains part of post-war Bosnian highly nationalised context and that memory is not necessarily bound to a specific national or religious group. The heterogeneity of cultural memory of the Sarajevo assassination and its lead protagonists, which is expressed through various discourses and practices, calls for analysis of the production of various usable pasts in a post-war context and provides and argument in favour of further and more ethnographically based investigations into the transformative power of memory and remembering process in post-war societies.

INTERNET SOURCES


REFERENCES


REPRESERATIJE GAVRILA PRINCIPA. TURIZEM, POLITIKA IN ALTERNATIVNA SPOPRIJEMANJA S SPOMINOM NA SARAJEVSKI ATENTAT V POVOJNI BOSNI IN HERCEGOVINI

Ob zaznamovanju stoletnici začetka Velike vojne se je mednarodna pozornost znova obrnila k Sarajevu, prizorišču atentata, ki ga je na Franza Ferdinanda in njegovo ženo izvedel Gavrilo Princip. V nasprotju z večino študij, ki so analizirale reprezentacijo dogodka in osrednjih protagonistov v sodobni Bosni in Hercegovini, se prispevek po uvodni predstavitvi oddaljuje od političnih diskurzov in dominantnih medijskih reprezentacij ter ponuja analizo turističnih reprezentacij Gavrila Principa in atentata po letu 2014, zlasti v Federaciji BiH. S kritičnim pretresom pisanja o spominjanju v post-konfliktnih družbah članek analizira raznovrstne vidike aktivnega spoprijema s procesom nacionalizacije spominjanja v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Te prakse namreč ne odsevajo le očitnih transformacij osrednjih pripovedi o sarajevskem atentatu in Gavrilo Principu v primerjavi z obdobjem SFR Jugoslavije, temveč kristalizirajo tudi kompleksne procese oblikovanja alternativnih »uporabnih preteklosti«. Članek tako etnografsko sledi mobilizaciji zgodovinske osebnosti v soustvarjanju politike upanja tudi za tiste segmente prebivalcev Bosne in Hercegovine, ki niso pripravljeni sprejeti vslilene amnezije. Prispevek tako ponuja drugačno smer analize, ki se oddaljuje od metodološkega nacionalizma in pomnjenje sarajevskega atentata in osrednjih protagonistov postavlja v kontekst povojne rekonstrukcije, pri kateri je v ospredju spoprijemanje z ekonomsko in politično negotovostjo, občutkom izgube, visoko brezposelnostjo, revščino, nefunkcionalno državo, korupcijo itn. Etnografska raziskava razgrne raznovrstne rabe Gavrila Principa v identitetnih politikah, družbeno-kritičnih diskurzih in procesih oblikovanja različnih nostalgij (avstronostalgija, jugonostalgija), ki med drugim
izrisujejo sodobne (politične) težnje in aspiracije turističnih delavcev ter drugih Sarajevčanov in Sarajevčank v post-daytonski družbi.

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