Exokeanismós: The (Un)Mappability of Literature

Robert Stockhammer
LMU Munich, Institute for General and Comparative Literature, Germany
robert.stockhammer@lmu.de

Recent applications of the ‘spatial turn’ in literary studies naively presuppose the mappability of literature, reducing fiction to ‘invented events in real places.’ Hence, one should recall the constitutive unmappability of literature. In the oldest extant discussion of the ‘spatial turn’ in literature, the controversy between the geographer-philologist Eratosthenes and his successor Strabo, Eratosthenes advances exokeanismós (‘out-oceanism’), a concept of ‘moving things to the margin of the mappable’ rather than ‘of the earth.’ The Alexandrian theory of fiction implied here seems more adequate to literature than recent Californian non-theories. Apollonius of Rhodes also implicitly discusses conflicting concepts of literature’s (un)mappability. Although most of his Argonautica is mappable, Apollonius differentiates between literature and navigation systems by interrupting the geographical coherence of his narrative with structural exokeanismós.

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Unmappability: Against the Californication of literary theory

“Kokovoko … is not down in any map. True places never are.” (Melville 61) This declaration that true places are not mappable is surprising in the context of Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick, a novel apparently mappable to the degree that several of its editions include charts showing “the cruise of the Pequod” (see Figure 1a). Indeed, most parts of the Pequod’s route from Nantucket, Massachusetts to the Pacific Ocean can be traced by using geographical information taken from the text. At the climax of the novel, however, when the ship eventually meets the whale, the novel’s eponymous hero, somewhere, but only somewhere close to Japan, mappability fails. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, the curbed space is retransformed into smooth space: the geometrical space organized by points within a grid is retransformed into a space of vectors (see Figure 1b).
The ongoing popularity of the ‘spatial turn’ in literary studies offers opportunities for manifold cooperation between organizations for literary studies and national or regional tourism agencies; the production of atlases or cell phone apps supporting walks through the Viennese or Slovenian
‘literary landscape’ is likely to receive government promotion. The underlying assumption is a commonsensical theory of “fictional worlds, where the real and the imaginary coexist in varying, often elusive proportions” (Moretti 63). According to this notion, fiction presents ‘invented events at real places,’ so that even fictional toponyms are considered to be unequivocally decipherable.

For certain reasons, Marcel Proust’s Combray, to quote a familiar example, seems to be identifiable with Illiers, a small town near Chartres; and once this identification was approved by the Société des Amis de Marcel Proust et des Amis de Combray (Society of Friends of Marcel Proust and of Combray), the district council renamed the town, thus hyphenating ‘reality’ and ‘fiction’: today, the town’s official name is Illiers-Combray, and the visitor is invited to retrace Marcel’s famous walks along *du côté de chez Swann* (or *Méséglise*, Swann’s Way) and *du côté des Guermantes* (the Guermantes Way). This visitor, however, will fail to understand the topography of the landscape within the *Recherche* because this literary landscape consists of two spatial organizations that are entirely incompatible. Readers of the first volume have to choose between two alternative walks because it is impossible to proceed from one side to the other. The literary geography of the first volumes is organized by “deux ‘côtés’ … si opposés qu’on ne sortait pas en effet de chez nous par la même porte, quand on voulait aller d’un côté ou de l’autre. … Alors, ‘prendre par Guermantes’ pour aller à Méséglise, ou le contraire, m’eût semblé une expression aussi dénuée de sens que prendre par l’est pour aller à l’ouest.” (I 134) And it is only after having refound time, or after having spent much time on reading almost the entire novel, that is, at the beginning of *Le temps retrouvé*, that Gilberte, a Swann by birth and a de Guermantes by marriage, proposes to the first person narrator to take a walk that combines and reconciles the opposing sides (“‘côtés’ … si opposés”), a proposal that overturns the narrator’s entire spatial conception:

“No, je veux bien aller à Guermantes, en prenant par Méséglise, c’est la plus jolie façon”, phrase qui en bouleversant toutes les idées de mon enfance m’apprit que les deux côtés n’étaient pas aussi inconciliables que j’avais cru. (III 693; emphasis added)

The hyphen between Combray and Illiers, in other words, does not connect a fictional toponym with a real one, but rather marks the difference between, on the one hand, a *readable* geography that contains two incompatible spatial conceptualizations within one and the same novel and, on the other hand, a *walkable* geography supposed to be identical with itself. Even while the two opposing sides are eventually reconciled within
the novel, its twofold conception of space cannot be reconciled with the self-identical conception of space somewhere near Chartres.

An interference of unmappability is not just an exception from a rule, but rather a constitutive feature of literature, even within novels that are considered to be mappable to a high degree (like *Moby-Dick* or the *Recherche*). Two layers of mappability, however, should be distinguished:

– The first of these layers, tentatively termed ‘internal mappability,’ applies to cases in which all of the descriptions of geographical features given by a certain fictional text are consistent with each other and with the rules of Euclidean geometry, so that the world created by this text can be unequivocally depicted in a map to be attached to the book. This has been done, for example, for novels by Thomas Hardy, William Faulkner, or J. R. R. Tolkien—all of whom claim internal, but not referential, mappability for their settings.

– The second layer, tentatively termed ‘referential mappability,’ applies to cases in which geographical features given by a certain fictional text correspond to features included in maps that are, at a given time, accepted as being useful for purposes other than mapping literature, that is, world or cadastral maps. Novels such as Joyce’s *Ulysses*, where the wanderings of the protagonists can be retraced on a contemporary city map, even claim referential mappability.

The second definition sounds complicated, and it is necessarily so, because it avoids the notion of ‘reality.’ The need to avoid this notion can be demonstrated by an example taken from *Gulliver’s Travels*. An early edition of the book includes maps based on excerpts taken from Herman Moll’s *New & Correct Map of the Whole World* (1719; see Figure 2a), to which, in the case of Gulliver’s second voyage, the peninsula of Brobdingnag, the land of the giants, is superimposed (see the upper left section of Figure 2b). The island of New Albion, however, indicated in the lower right section of the same map, is completely consistent with the contemporary notion of America’s geography, according to which California was an island (see the lower right section of Figure 2a). Had Gulliver travelled from Nevada to California, the voyage would be referentially mappable only had he used a ship.
Only nowadays has the knowledge of California being an island become lost, so that, ironically enough, the Californian standard of what counts as ‘reality’ has become a standard taken for granted. According to Facebook, headquartered in Menlo Park, ‘reality’ is to be identified with ‘taggability’: as something consisting of areas where photographs can be taken and later ‘tagged’ as taken at a place to be specified by a toponym. A photograph of you and your friends in front of the Eiffel Tower, for example, should be ‘tagged’ as “Paris” in order to prove that the Eiffel Tower is ‘really’ located in Paris and that you have ‘really’ visited Paris. According to Franco Moretti, located at Stanford University (within a walking distance of 4.1 miles from the Facebook headquarters), this technique of tagging can be expanded to fictional texts in order to prove, for example, that Frédéric Moreau lived, even if not ‘really,’ in a supposedly identical Paris.

However, even while the research agenda within this interdisciplinary framework is seductive, it relies on a confusing concept of literature or, more precisely, fiction. The notion of invented events at real places does not distinguish between the fictional (as a mode of writing) and the fictitious (as an ontological category), but instead defines fictional writing in dependence
on fictitious elements used within it. This definition is misleading—as has been clarified by Philip Sidney, approximately at the same time when Francis Drake claimed possession of what later became known as California:

Now for the poet, he nothing affirmeth, and therefore never lieth: for as I take it, to lie, is to affirm that to bee true, which is false. So as the other Artistes, and especially the Historian, affirming manie things, can in the clowdie knowledge of mankinde, hardly escape from manie lies. But the poet as I said before, never affirmmeth. … And therefore though he recount things not true, yet because he telleth them not for true he lieth not. (Sydney)

Vice versa, even if the poet recount things true, he telleth them not for true. Even if he tells us something like “Once upon a time, a girl lived with her mother at the edge of the forest,” he does not affirm that “a girl lived with her mother at the edge of the forest,” even while, obviously, a considerable number of girls actually do live with their mothers at the edge of a forest. The distinctive feature of fiction is not the ontological status of any element evoked by the fictional text—be it its existence or non-existence, or its probability or improbability, or even its possibility or impossibility—but simply the fact that the fictional text consists of non-affirmative, fictional speech acts (to be recognized, in most cases, by conventional markers such as the “once upon a time”).

Fiction is by definition unmappable—even if it produces the fictional effect of internal mappability (as in the case of Hardy, Faulkner, or Tolkien), and even if it produces the fictional effect of referential mappability (as in the case of Joyce’s *Ulysses*). The crucial moments of unmappability in the examples from Melville and Proust challenge both layers of mappability (internal as well as referential); they challenge the conditions of mappability per se, the very notion of taggability. In the example of *Moby-Dick*, one is confronted by true places that are not recorded on any map; in the example of the *Recherche*, one seemingly identical landscape would have to be mapped in two entirely different ways in order to serve as an illustration of the first or the last volume, respectively. These moments of explicit unmappability can be read as indications of the transcendental unmappability of literature, of its fictionality.

**Eratosthenes’ critique of the spatial turn in literary studies**

The earliest traceable discussion on the spatial turn in literary studies appears to have taken place in Alexandria in the third century BC. Unfortunately, one of the rare records of this discussion is to be found
in the much later and probably imbalanced account in Strabo’s *Geography*, which was written around AD 18. Of course, Strabo, Franco Moretti’s forerunner with regard to his unshakable confidence in the mappability of literature, means well with literature. According to him, Homer should be regarded as the first geographer and—because geography (as Strabo declares in his very first sentence) belongs to the realm of philosophy, whereas “poetry [in its turn] is a kind of elementary philosophy” (I.i.10)—the collaboration between geography and literature results in a triangular nobilitation of these disciplines. The *Odyssey* is regarded as a storehouse of geographical information, so that geographers may profit from reading it—while, inversely, literary scholars may map the wanderings of the hero.

For more than two millennia, this premise has been productive to the degree that—if all attempts to localize his wanderings are superimposed on a meta-map—there is almost no place on earth where Odysseus has not been.\(^3\) The premise is especially attractive for traveling literary scholars—at least as long as Odysseus’ wanderings are not localized in the Arctic Sea. One can send expeditions to the bay of Poseidonia, placing an opera singer at one of the Gallos islands, passing it by boat, and conclude that Odysseus must have been a liar because the singer cannot be heard on board, which means that Odysseus must have landed on the island in order to listen to the Sirens. This is in fact what the late Friedrich Kittler (57–8) did—and, even if he could not have meant this seriously, his expedition proves our desire to hyphenate fiction with reality.

In identifying the Gallos islands with those of the Sirens, Kittler relies on their alternative name Sirenuse, which was recorded by Strabo as one of the proofs of his thesis that Odysseus encountered Circe and the Sirens at the southwestern coast of Italy, close to Naples. Strabo’s question, “For what poet or prose writer ever persuaded the Neapolitans to name a monument after Parthenope the Siren, or the people of Cumae … to perpetuate the names of Pyrphlegethon …?” (I.ii.18), seems to be a rhetorical question, insinuating that no writer succeeded in changing toponyms in the ‘real’ world. However, one could as well give an affirmative answer to this question, bearing in mind not only the case of Illiers-Combray, but also—to provide a Californian example—the case of John Steinbeck, who actually did persuade the district council of Monterey to rename their main street *Cannery Row*, after a novel of the same title. Hence, one can simply proceed by quoting Strabo: “The same question may be asked regarding Homer’s stories of the Sirenussae, the Strait, Scylla, Charybdis, and Aeolus” (I.ii.18). All of these toponyms may only prove the widespread fame of the *Odyssey* and the inventiveness of some tourism managers who knew how to profit from this fame.
Strabo, after all, also mentions the earliest critic of his confidence in mappability, Eratosthenes, quoting his ironic statement: “You will find the scene of the wanderings of Odysseus when you find the cobbler who sewed up the bag of the winds.” (I.ii.15) In order to evaluate the authority of this position, it is necessary to briefly recall Eratosthenes’ place in the discursive and non-discursive network of Alexandria. Working as the director of the library of Alexandria, in the second half of the third century BC, Eratosthenes was the first person ever to claim the term φιλόλογος (philólogos) as his job title (see Pfeiffer 196–9) as well as, most probably, the person who coined the term γεωγραφία (geographía: see Roller 1).

Already in antiquity, Eratosthenes was famous for his calculation of the earth’s circumference. The epistemological implications of his method are important, even if some details may be skipped. Eratosthenes measured the south-north distance between Syene and Alexandria (5,000 stadia) and compared the respective angles of incidence of the sun at noon at both places. From the difference of about 7.14 degrees, he concluded that the circumference of the earth is 360 divided through 7.14 times the distance between Syene and Alexandria, resulting in 252,000 stadia. In order to judge the exactitude of his calculation, one would have to know the unit of the stadion he used—which, unfortunately, is not known. If his stadion corresponded to 158.76 meters (which is a possible, although an unlikely estimation), he would have attained the standard value used for the reference ellipsoid of 1980 (40,007,863 km) with a deviation of no more than some 300 meters. Even in the worst-case scenario, based on the Phoenician-Egyptian standard of the stadion, his calculation would not have deviated from the contemporary circumference of the earth by more than about 30%. In any case, the epistemological originality of his method consisted in a combination of terrestrial and astronomical procedures, or, in other words, of procedures of ‘geometry’ in both senses of the Greek word: in its literal meaning (‘measurement of the earth,’ a practice highly developed in Egypt, where the annual flooding of the Nile made constant surveying necessary; see Herodotus II.109), and in its more familiar meaning today of a discipline concerned with the general laws of elementary bodies.

Today, regrettably, one would not regard the measurement of the earth as belonging to philology. In Alexandria, on the contrary, knowledge had not yet been split into ‘two cultures,’ which is why Eratosthenes was also able to write, among many other things, essays on comedies. Most importantly, he also reflected on the relationship between the various fields of his occupations, particularly on the relationship of literature with geography. Instead of simply ‘applying’ allegedly geographical procedures to literature—as in recent attempts to map literary landscapes—Eratosthenes challenged the possibility of their application.
The difference between his and Strabo’s conceptions becomes most clear when they seemingly agree: contrary to Polybios, they both associate certain incidents of Odysseus’ wanderings with the Okeanos, as explicitly mentioned in the *Odyssey* itself (see XI.693, and XII.1, cited in Strabo I.ii.18). Strabo, however, like localizers in general, interprets this as the geographical location of certain events that actually happened in a sea at the edge of the earth, called Okeanos; for Eratosthenes, on the contrary, this is a poetic device intended “to develop each incident in the direction of the more awe-inspiring and the more marvelous,” “ἐπὶ τὸ δεινότερον καὶ τὸ τερατωδέστερον ἐκαστα ἐξάγειν” (I.ii.19). The technical term ἐξοκεανισμός (*exokeanismós*, ‘outoceanism’), also used as a verb (*ἐξοκεανίζειν*, *exokeanízein*, to ‘out-oceanize’: see I.ii.10, 17, 37), therefore has two very different meanings: in the conception of localizers such as Strabo, *exokeanízein* means ‘moving things to the margin of the earth,’ and in Eratosthenes’ conception of literature it means ‘moving things to the margin of the mappable.’ Something similar can be conjectured with regard to ἐκτοπισμός (*ektopismós*), a word used by Strabo (I.iii.4 ff.) as a synonym for *exokeanismós*. Like its English translation, ‘displacement,’ *ektopismós* literally denotes not so much a movement from one place to another, as a taking away of the place, de-localization. Eratosthenes’ ocean is the non-spatial ‘space’ of fiction, a fiction that does not simply feign ‘imaginary’ things, but rather things beyond the crude distinction between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ things. It is not an ocean populated by literary inventions, but the ocean of the literary (see Romm 187).

Contamination of incompatible geographies in Apollonius’ *Argonautica*

In the evenings, Eratosthenes used to discuss the topic of the spatial turn in literary studies with his older colleague, his predecessor as director of the Alexandrian library, now retired and busy with writing an epic in four volumes: Apollonius—known as “Apollonius of Rhodes,” but most likely not from Rhodes, his birthplace not being recorded on any map. *Argonautica*, the most bookish of all the bookish books written in Alexandria, is so stuffed with geographical information that Emile Délage, one of its translators and commentators, summarizes it as follows: “L’épopée d’Apollonios est surtout géographique.” (9) Almost all of the information in the epic is consistent and with the state of the art in Alexandrian geography, which means that the epic—which Strabo must have liked —is highly mappable at the first and the second levels: with respect to its internal geographical coherence, but also to the contemporary knowledge of travelable geography.5
The epic is completely mappable with regard to the first three books, which narrate the Argo’s voyage through the Bosporus to Colchis at the Black Sea, where Jason and his men carry off Medea and steal the Golden Fleece; and it is almost completely mappable with regard to Book IV, which narrates the return journey, on which the Argonauts take a much longer route with several detours, so that Apollonius drastically accelerates the speed of his report (measured in miles per verse: see Figure 3). Some geographical information concerning the eastern and the western Mediterranean world differ from contemporary information: according to the Argonautica, the Ister (Danube) splits somewhere in Serbia, with one of its arms flowing into the Adriatic near the Istrian peninsula; a large lake in Switzerland from which the Po, the Rhone, and the Rhine flow off enables the travelers to proceed from the Adriatic, via the Po, the lake, and the Rhone, to the Tyrrhenian Sea—while the Argonauts avoid the dangerous Rhine because it threatens to draw them directly into the Okeanos. Of course, these differences between Apollonius’ conception of several European rivers and ours do not contradict its referential mappability because Apollonius’ conception is, as far as can be reconstructed, in compliance with contemporary notions of geography. It would be the same, to recall the earlier example, in the case of a seventeenth-century novel set on the island of California, or, to use a more recent example, in the case of an early twenty-first-century novel set on the Maldives (an archipelago still existing at that time)—much to the surprise of twenty-second-century readers who will not find it on any contemporary map anymore.

![Map of the Mediterranean region](image)

Figure 3. Source: Stella.
Things become complicated, however, in the Tyrrhenian Sea, where the Argo follows Odysseus’ traces—or, rather, the traces of the localizers of the *Odyssey*. The intertextuality of this route is intricate because the author of the *Odyssey* had already known an archaic Argo epic now lost but perhaps still available in the library of Alexandria (see West for a summary and reappraisal of the discussions). According to the *Odyssey*, the journey of the Argo preceded Odysseus’ wanderings. Circe, Odysseus’ trip advisor (to use the name of a popular Facebook app), explicitly refers to the Argo as she explains the alternative routes the hero may take after passing the Sirenes. While leaving it to him to decide whether to pass the Planctae, also called the Wandering Rocks, or sail through Scylla and Charybdis, Circe warns Odysseus that only one human ship has ever succeeded in passing the Wandering Rocks:

Οἴη δὴ κείνη γε παρέπλω ποντοπόρος νηῦς,  
Αργὼ πάσι μέλουσα, παρ᾽ Αἰήταο πλέουσα.  
Καὶ νῦ κε τὴν ἔνθ᾽ ὦκα βάλεν μεγάλας ποτὶ πέτρας,  
ἄλλ᾽ Ἡρη παρέπεμψεν, ἐπεὶ φίλος ἦν Ἰήσων.  

The only vessel that ever sailed and got through, was the famous Argo on her way from the house of Aeëtes, and she too would have gone against these great rocks, only that Hera piloted her past them for the love she bore to Jason. (XII.69–72)

Hence, Odysseus chooses the alternative route, the one through Scylla and Charbybdis, even while this decision implies a sacrifice of some of his men, as a sort of customs duty.

Apollonius’ Argo also visits Circe, located at a spot whose name the local tourist agency had, in the meantime, changed into Monte Circeo. As Circe meets her niece Medea for the very first time, the Colchian emigrants talk in their native language, as in a multicultural documentary. In contrast to the *Odyssey*, Circe has to hand over her geographic authority to Jason’s special guide, Hera; the goddess, however, is obviously an incompetent trip advisor. She boasts, saying that she has already guided the Argonauts through the Planctae, so that the only thing left to do now is to pass through Scylla and Charybdis:

Οίσθα μέν, ὅσσον ἐμῆσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ τίεται ἱρώς  
Αἰσονίδης, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἀσσητῆρες ἀέθλου,  
οἷος τε σφ’ ἐσάωσα διὰ πλαγκτὰς περόντας  
πέτρας, ἐνθα πάρος δειναὶ βρομέουσι δυέλαι,  
κύματα τε σκληρὴσι περιβλύει σπιλάδεσιν.  
Νῦν δὲ παρὰ Σκύλλης σκόπελον μέγαν ἢδε Χάρυβδιν  
δεινὸν ἑρευγομένην δέχεται ὃδὸς.
[Hera speaking:] Hearken now, lady Thetis, to what I am eager to tell thee. Thou knowest how honoured in my heart is the hero, Aeson’s son, and the others that have helped him in the contest, and how I saved them when they passed between the Wandering Rocks (πλαγκτάς), where roar terrible storms of fire and the waves foam round the rugged reefs. And now past the mighty rock of Scylla and Charybdis horribly belching, a course awaits them. (IV.784–90; emphasis added)

According to Émile Delage, at this point of the itinerary “the author commits two errors because he follows Homer too closely” (Delage 278, my translation). First, the Apollonian Argonauts obviously had not yet passed the Planctae and, second, the Planctae, on the one hand, and Scylla and Charybdis, on the other, are usually conceived as alternative, not consecutive, routes (that is, in structuralist terms, as paradigms, not syntagms, of an itinerary). These contradictions, however, can also be explained by assuming that it is Hera, and not the author, who errs, and that the error is just one, and not two, with the second one automatically following from it.

By claiming that she had already assisted the Argo in passing through the Wandering Rocks, Hera mixes up (1) past and future, (2) different formations of dangerous rocks, or (3) the epic in which she is acting.

The first mistake would be not all too human, but perhaps all too divine: the Argonauts will indeed cross the Planctae, and Hera, as an inhabitant of mythical time, may simply have mixed up events that already happened with those yet to come within the narrative of the epic.

The second mistake might be motivated by the fact that the Argonauts, already on their journey to Colchis, opened up another dangerous place marked by rocks, the Symplegades.7 Symplegades (Clashing Rocks) and Planctae (Wandering Rocks), however, have very different features: two huge rocks at the banks of a sea gate in the case of the Symplegades, and numerous smaller rocks falling from the sky or drifting in the water in the case of the Planctae; different etymologies: Συμπληγάδες: from πλήσσω, ‘to beat’; Πλαγκταί: from πλάζω, ‘to err’; and different locations: the Symplegades are usually, in the Argonautica even unambiguously, located at the Bosporus, whereas the Planctae are obviously associated with the products of a volcano, thus pointing to the area of today’s southern Italy. Following Eratosthenes’ reservations concerning the referential mappability of literature, the last argument does not count as evidence for the non-identity between two mythical or literary places per se—in the case of Apollonius’ Argonautica, however, the identification of the Symplegades and Planctae would destroy its mappability not only with regard to a crucial detail, but almost completely. For why should the Argonauts, finally sailing through the Planctae on their voyage back to Iolkos, Greece, via the Tyrrhenian Sea, cross the Symplegades at the gate to the Black Sea.
again? The whole geographical concept of Apollonius’ epic is based on a distinction that Hera mixes up. Nevertheless, even today some philologists, for example Bertrand Westphal (112), identify the Symplegades with the Planctae, so that one is tempted to say that Hera’s error could be excused by her having consulted the wrong website or having chosen the wrong books from the realm of the spatial turn in literary studies (or géocritique).

The third reason for Hera’s mistake—that she is simply mixing up the epic in which she is acting—is the most plausible solution. According to the Odyssey (the passage quoted above), and probably in the archaic Argo epic to which Circe refers, Hera had actually guided the Argo through the Planctae, which means that, in terms of literary tradition, her account is correct with regard to the rock formation (Wandering Rocks instead of Clashing Rocks) as well as with regard to the time scale (past instead of future). Because, to her knowledge, the passage through the Planctae had already been opened by Jason, the ‘other’ hero—the hero of the epic in which she is now acting—must take the alternative route, the one between Scylla and Charybdis. Hera simply forgets that the hero whom she now advises is not Odysseus, but Jason again, Jason’s doppelgänger (because intertextuality always produces doppelgangers). Hera, in other words, sticks to a literary geography that does not necessarily correspond to a taggable geography, as it is presupposed in the ‘rest’—almost the whole—of Apollonius’ epic. She is following Homer closely, as closely as can be expected from a reader of Homer, but too closely for a reliable trip advisor.

Fortunately, however, Thetis—who is ordered to communicate Hera’s instructions to the Argonauts—corrects these instructions while feigning to simply convey them. She neither repeats the erroneous information that the Planctae had already been passed, nor mentions Scylla and Charybdis. Instead, she most effectively warns the Argonauts that they will have to sail “through the midst of the rocks which are called Planctae” (IV.860 ff.). Thetis’ route guidance (to use the appropriate navigation system vocabulary) works out well. Before the passage through the Planctae is described, the epic evokes the familiar (Circean) topography in a structural masterpiece of a binary opposition one of whose poles consists in yet another, subordinated binary opposition:

(1) Τῇ μὲν γὰρ Σκύλλης λισσή προφαινέτο πέτρῃ:
(2) Τῇ δ’ ἄμοτον βοάασκεν ἀναβλύζουσα Χάρυβδις:

For on one side appeared the smooth rock of Scylla; on the other Charybdis ceaselessly spouted and roared; in another part the Wandering Rocks were booming beneath the mighty surge. (IV.922–4; emphasis added)
The following verses, however, exclusively narrate the Argo’s passage through the Planctae.\(^9\) With the assistance of the Nereids, everything goes well.

Now it is possible to reconstruct the discussions on the spatial turn in literary studies that Apollonius and Eratosthenes conducted, in front of the Alexandrian library, on some gemuetlich evenings in the fall of 232 BC. Apollonius was eager to get all the geographical data that Eratosthenes could afford, in order to convert them into an epic that localizers such as Strabo and Moretti would be happy to plot on the map. Eratosthenes voluntarily provided him with the data from the Geographical Information System in the library, but never stopped to insist on the difference between the unmappable and the mappable, between literary and taggable geography, between literary geography in the strong sense, and mere geography in literature. Advocating the complexity of literature, Eratosthenes contradicted the presumption that only neat things are interesting.\(^10\) When he proposed to Apollonius to *exokeanizein* at least part of his narrative, the author of the *Argonautica* finally agreed. While explicitly resisting the temptation to send his heroes into the dangerous ocean, he inserted a complex version of structural *exokeanismós* into his epic. He did so by inventing personifications of conflicting geographies: Thetis as a navigator whose route guidance proves to be reliable, and Hera as a representative of autonomous literary geographies that are not down in any map. Apollonius ‘contaminates’\(^11\) the readable and the travelable geography, precisely in their incompatibility; reading the epic, therefore, not only makes it possible to retrace the readable geography, but also provides insights into the relationship between the readable and the travelable.

**NOTES**

1. See Stockhammer, for the notion of “(Nicht)-Kartierbarkeit” (84–8 ff.) as well as for a more detailed account of mapping and unmappability in *Moby-Dick* (187–209).

2. “Il était une fois une petite fille qui vivait avec sa maman au bord d’une forêt.”—the example is taken from Gérard Genette (49), who, in turn, obviously quotes from a version of *Chapeau rond rouge*.

3. For a history of these localizations, see Wolf 225–309.

4. For the sake of convenience, I am using today’s familiar partition of the circle into 360 degrees, even if it was only introduced by Eratosthenes’ follower Hipparchus.

5. Geographers themselves are much more reflective on the map as a medium that is far from transparently ‘representing’ something. Most of the maps used in literary cartography do not even account for the most important parameters such as scale or projection, and others are anachronistic with regard to the items they display.

6. Because the space of Alexandrian geography is already a ‘striated’ space in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, it is debatable whether Apollonius’ *Argo* navigates through *l’espace lisse* (smooth space, as argued by Westphal 113)—even if this might be claimed for a hy-
pothetical ‘archaic’ Argo. Remarkably enough, Apollonius’ Argo precisely avoids “Σκύλλης λισσὴ … πέτρη” (IV.922), the ‘smooth rock of Skylla’ (French *lisse* being indeed a correct translation of Greek *λισσὴ*).

7 Apollonius, deviating from common usage, calls them the Πληγάδες, leaving out the prepositional prefix (see II.596).

8 The article “Symplégades” in the French version of *Wikipedia*, for example, repeats the identification of these rock formations, whereas the article “Symplegades” in the English version plausibly distinguishes them. (See “Symplégades” and “Symplegades,” respectively.)

9 According to Delage (244–5) and some others, it is true that the Argo is passing “à la fois par les Planctes et par Charybde et Scylla” (“by both the Planctae and Scylla and Charybdis”). The passage through Scylla and Charybdis, however, is neither described nor mentioned by Thetis, which means that the misreading can only be explained as a tribute to Hera’s Odyssean geography.

10 “Granted, things are not always so neat [as in an example given before]. But when they are, it’s interesting.” (Moretti 42)

11 For the notion of Apollonius as a ‘contaminator’ of competing mythical traditions, see, among others, Delage 267 and Dräger 324–6.

WORKS CITED


Eksokeanismos: (ne)zmožnost kartiranja literature

Ključne besede: kartografija / prostorski obrat / fikcijskost / Strabon / Eratosten / Apolonij iz Rodosa / Argonavtika / Odiseja / Moretti, Franco

Nedavni trend vpeljevanja »prostorskega obrata« v literarno vedo zaznamuje osušljiva vera v zmožnost kartiranja literature, ki fikcijo celo zvaja na medel pojem »izmišljenih dogodkov v resničnih krajih«. Zato moramo ne le razlikovati med dvema pomenoma zmožnosti kartiranja, ampak tudi opozoriti na element nemogočnosti kartiranja kot na konstitutivni moment literature. Članek tako z zgodovinskega kakor s teoretskega gledišča obravnava najstarejšo znano debato o uporabnosti »prostorskega obrata« za literaturo. Eratosten v polemiki z naslednikom Strabonem predlaga koncept eksokeanismos, in sicer ne toliko v Strabonovem pomenu »prestavljanja reči na rob Zemlje«, kolikor v pomenu »prestavljanja reči na rob kartiranju dostopnega«. Aleksandrijska teorija fikcije, implicirana v tem koncepcu, je bržkone uporabnejša za razumevanje literature kakor nedavne kalifornijske ne-teorije. Zadnji del članka pokaže, da Apolonij iz Rodosa v Argonavtiki implicitno obravnava tu vpleteni koncepte (ne)zmožnosti kartiranja literature, s tem ko jih kontaminira. Čeprav je večina epa zelo dostopna kartiranju, Apolonij vztraja na razliki med literaturo in navigacijskimi sistemmi, tako da geografsko koherentnost pripovedi zmoti v redkem, a ključnem strukturnem momentu eksokeanismos.

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