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Aktualnost filozofije

Alain Badiou*

Predavanje z dne 23. novembra 2015

Nocoj bi rad spregovoril o tem, kar se je zgodilo v petek, 13. novembra, o tem, kar je doletelo nas, to mesto, to deželo in, ne nazadnje, ves svet. Najprej bi rad povedal, v kakšnem stanju duha bi morali po mojem mnenju govoriti o tej pošastni tragediji. Kajti povsem jasno je – kot vsi vemo in kot to nevarno poudarjajo mediji, pa tudi oblasti –, da je tu vloga afekta, torej čustvene reakcije, ki jo izzovejo takšne okoliščine, neizogibna, v nekem smislu celo nepogrešljiva. Gre za nekakšno travmatiziranost, za občutje nevzdržnega odstopa od našega ustaljenega vsakdana, za neznosen vdor smrti. Prav v tem je nekaj, kar se vsiljuje vsakomur, nihče pa tega ni sposoben ne zaježiti ne kritizirati.

A vendar se moramo zavedati – to pa naj bo tudi izhodišče za razumevanje tega, kar sam imenujem stanje duha –, da nas ta afekt, ki se mu v takšnih tragičnih okoliščinah ni mogoče izogniti, izpostavlja številnim nevarnostim, na katere pa, z namenom, da bi lažje pojasnil svojo metodo, vendarle želim opozoriti.

Opažam tri glavne nevarnosti, ki jim bomo zaradi popolne prevlade travme in afekta po tej tragediji izpostavljeni.

Prva nevarnost je, da bomo državi dopustili uveljavljati nekoristne in nesprejemljive ukrepe, od katerih bo imela korist le ona sama. Država se je nenadoma znašla v ospredju pozornosti in v tem trenutku spet prevzema, ali pa vsaj tako misli, vlogo simbolnega poroka narodne enotnosti oziroma še druge temu podobne drže. To je razlog – k temu se bom še povrnil – da lahko pri vladajočih zaznavamo precej zlovešč užitek ob tej zločinski situaciji. V takšnih okoliščinah je treba kljub vsemu ohranjati določeno odmerjenost. V okviru tega, kar je bilo storjeno, kar je bilo izrečeno, moramo biti še vedno sposobni oceniti, kakšni ukrepi so neizogibni in nujni ter kaj je nekoristno ali nesprejemljivo. V tem vidim prvi previdnostni ukrep odmerjenosti spričo – to še enkrat poudarjam – neizogibnega in nepredvidljivega značaja afekta.

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Druga nevarnost takšne prevlade čustev, če naj to tako poimenujemo, je krepitev identitetnih vzgibov. Tudi tu gre za naravni mehanizem. Če v neki družini nekdo nepričakovano umre, je povsem jasno, da se bo družina spet zbrala, se tesneje povezala in se v nekem smislu tudi okrepila. V teh dneh nas s francosko trobojnico v rokah vsi prepričujejo, znova in znova ponavljajo, da lahko takšen grozovit masaker na francoskih tleh le še utrdi narodno zavest. Kot da bi nas travma samodejno usmerjala k določeni identiteti. Zategadelj se vsepovsod izgovarjata besedi »francoski« in »Francija« kot samoumevni sestavini trenutnih razmer. Vprašati pa se moramo: s kakšnim namenom? Kaj sploh ima pri tej zadevi »Francija«? O čem pravzaprav govorimo, kadar danes govorimo o »Franciji« in »Francozih«? To so v resnici zelo kompleksna vprašanja. Njihove kompleksnosti nikakor ne smemo izgubiti izpred oči: besedi »Francija« in »francoski« danes nimata nobenega izrazitega, samega po sebi razumljivega ali očitnega pomena. Poleg tega menim, da se moramo postaviti po robu prav tem identitetnim vzgibom, ki ta strašni dogodek spreminjajo v nekakšen dozdevek, in se spomniti, da so se takšni množični pomori dogajali in se iz dneva v dan dogajajo tudi drugod. Res, prav vsak dan. V Nigeriji in Maliju še prav pred kratkim, v Iraku, Pakistanu, Siriji ... Spomniti se velja tudi, da je bilo pred nekaj dnevi zaradi sabotaže v strmoglavljenem ruskem letalu ubitih več kot dvesto Rusov, zaradi česar pa v Franciji ni bilo občutiti posebne pretresenosti. Morda pa tako imenovani »Francozi« enačijo vse Ruse s hudobnim Putinom!

Sam pojmem kot eno temeljnih nalog pravičnosti, da vselej, kolikor le more, širi prostor javnih afektov, se bojuje proti njegovi identitetni zamejenosti, da se vsakič spomni in zaveda, da je treba prostor vsake takšne nesreče umestiti v okvire celotnega človeštva in da ga nikdar ne smemo zapirati z izjavami, ki bi ga omejevale na določeno identiteto. V nasprotnem primeru pa nesreča že sama po sebi dokazuje, da štejejo zgolj identitete. Torej gre pri prepričanju, da je v nesreči pomembna edinole identiteta žrtev, za nevarno dojetje samega tragičnega dogodka, saj je neizogibno, da *takšno prepričanje preobrazi pravičnost v maščevalnost*.

Zagotovo je skušnjava maščevanja pri takšnem množičnem zločinu na prvi pogled povsem naraven vzgib. Dokaz za to je, da v naših deželah, ki se nadvse rade ponašajo s pravno državo in zavračanjem smrtne kazni, policija v takšnih okoliščinah, kot smo jim priče danes, pobija morilce, takoj ko jih izsledijo, in to brez najmanjšega zadržka, a se zaradi tega očitno nihče ne vznemirja. Vendar

ne gre pozabiti, da maščevanje še zdaleč ni pravično dejanje in da vselej sproži verižno reakcijo okrutnosti. Že zelo davno je bila v velikih grških tragedijah logika pravice nasprotje logike maščevanja. Univerzalnost pravičnosti je povsem nasprotna vsem oblikam in vrstam maščevanj, najsi bodo družinska, deželna, nacionalna ali identitetna. Prav to je glavna tema Ajshilove *Oresteje*. Identitetno gibalno tragedije je navsezadnje nevarnost, da bi si pregon morilcev zamišljali kot golo in preprosto maščevalno gonjo: »Zdaj bomo mi pobili tiste, ki so ubijali.« Morda je v želji po ubijanju tistih, ki so ubijali, res nekaj, čemur se ni moč izogniti. Niti najmanj pa ni primerno, da bi se tega veselili, da bi to razglašali ali opevali kot zmago mišljenja, duha, civilizacije in pravičnosti. Da je maščevanje primitivno, nizkotno in povrh še nevarno početje, so nas Grki naučili že davno.

S tega vidika sem zaskrbljen nad stvarmi, ki so jih mnogi pozdravili kot samoumevne. Na primer izjava Baracka Obame. Ta izjava ni bila podobna ničemur. V njej je bilo znova rečeno, da ta strašni zločin ni bil le zločin nad Francijo in Parizom, temveč zločin nad človeštvom. Vse lepo in prav. Vendar predsednik Obama tega ne izjavi ob vsaki množični moriji, tega ne stori, kadar se takšne stvari zgodijo kje daleč, v kakšnem Iraku, kjer nihče več ničesar ne razume, v kakšnem zamegljenem Pakistanu, v kakšni Nigeriji, polni fanatikov, ali pa v kakšnem Kongu, ki je v osrčju temin. Zato njegova izjava izraža prepričanje, ki naj bi bilo povsem samoumevno, in sicer da to trpinčeno človeštvo prebiva bolj v Franciji in kajpak tudi v Združenih državah Amerike kot pa v Nigeriji, Indiji, Iraku, Pakistanu ali Kongu.

Dejansko nas hoče Obama le spomniti, da je zanj človeštvo razpoznavno predvsem na našem dobrem starem Zahodu. Da bi potemtakem lahko tudi rekli: človeštvo = Zahod, kar venomer poslušamo v podtonu številnih izjav, tako uradnih kot medijskih. Ena izmed oblik te nesprejemljive identitetne podmene se pojavlja kot nasprotje med barbari in civiliziranimi ljudmi, k čemur se bom še povrnil. Vsekakor je z vidika najosnovnejše pravičnosti nezaslišano dati vedeti, pa četudi nehote ali zgolj posredno, da so posamezni deli človeštva bolj človeški od drugih, in bojim se, da se je pri tej zadevi dogajalo točno to in se dogaja še naprej.

Menim, da je treba pretrgati z močno prisotno navado, ki se kaže tudi v načinu, kako o stvareh poročamo, jih predstavljamo, razgrinjamo, ali pa, nasprotno, kako jih zamolčujemo in brišemo, prav zares, znebiti se moramo navade, ki je

malodane vtisnjena v naše nezavedno, namreč da je en mrtev zahodni človek za nas nekaj strahotnega, tisoči mrtvih v Afriki, Aziji, na Srednjem vzhodu in celo v Rusiji pa ne pomenijo kaj dosti. To je vsekakor dediščina kolonialnega imperializma, dediščina tega, čemur pravimo Zahod, torej razvitih civiliziranih in demokratičnih držav. Gre torej za navado, da se imamo za predstavnike celotnega človeštva in človeške civilizacije kot take. To je druga nevarnost, ki preži na nas, če se odzivamo le na podlagi naših afektov.

Potem pa je tu še tretja nevarnost, in sicer ta, da bi storili natančno tisto, česar si moralci najbolj želijo, to pa je doseganje učinka prek vsake mere, trajnejše zavzetje prizorišča na anarhičen in nasilen način, ne nazadnje pa si želijo v okolju žrtev podžgati takšne strasti, da na koncu sploh ne bo več mogoče razločiti, kdo je zločinec in kdo žrtev. Kajti namen takšnega klanja, takšnega odvratnega nasilja, je prebuditi pri žrtvah, njihovih družinah, sosedih in rojakih nekakšen mračen subjekt, tako ga pač imenujem, mračen subjekt, obupan in maščevalen obenem, ki se vzpostavi spričo zločina, po svojem značaju tako nasilnega in skorajda nerazložljivega, ki pa se odlično sklada s strategijo njegovih nalogodajalcev. Ta strategija vselej anticipira učinke mračnega subjekta. Um, tudi politični um, bo izginil, prevladal bo afekt, in tako se bo povsod širilo depresivno malodušje – »čisto iz sebe sem«, »šokiran sem« – v dvojici z duhom maščevanja. Ta dvojica bo državi in uradnim maščevalcem dopustila počenjati vse, kar jih bo volja. Tako se bo za ta mračni subjekt izkazalo, da je tudi on, v skladu z željami zločincev, zmožen najhujšega, na koncu pa ga bodo vsi prepoznali kot simetričnega organizatorjem zločina.

Da bi se torej lahko postavili po robu tem trem nevarnostim, bi po mojem mnenju morali doseči, da bi to, kar se je zgodilo, *mislili*. Izhajajmo iz načela: *Nič, kar počno ljudje, ni nerazumljivo*. Če rečemo: »ne razumem«, »nikoli ne bom razumel«, »ne morem razumeti«, je to vselej poraz. Ničesar ne smemo pustiti v registru nemišljivega. Poslanstvo mišljenja, če hočemo biti zmožni, poleg drugega, da se zoperstavimo tistemu, kar proglašamo za nemišljivo, je, da prav tisto mislimo. Seveda obstajajo tudi povsem iracionalna, kriminalna, patološka obnašanja, ki mišljenja nikoli ne puščajo na cedilu in mu ne onemogočajo, da bi jim vzelo mero. Izjava, da je nekaj nemišljivo, je vselej poraz mišljenja, poraz mišljenja pa vedno pomeni prav zmago iracionalnih in kriminalnih ravnanj.

Zato bom tu, pred vami, skušal celostno razjasniti, kar se je zgodilo. To množično morijo bom obravnaval kot enega izmed številnih aktualnih simptomov hude bolezni sodobnega sveta, tega sveta kot celote, in poskusil bom nakazati pogoje ali možne poti, da bi bilo mogoče na daljši rok ozdraviti to bolezen, katere še posebej nasilen in spektakularen simptom je vse večje število takšnih dogodkov po svetu.

To hotenje po celostni razjasnitvi bo narekovalo načrt in logiko mojega predavanja.

Najprej bom skušal od položaja, v katerem se nahaja celoten svet, kot ga razumem sam in za kakršnega menim, da ga lahko mislimo sintetično, preiti k množičnim zločinom in k vojni, ki jo je napovedala oziroma razglasila država. Od tod se bom s premikom v nasprotni smeri znova približal položaju, v katerem se nahaja celota, a ne takšnemu, kakršen je zdaj, temveč takšnemu, kakršnega želimo, da bi postal in hoteti ter delovati tako, da bi tovrstni simptomi izginili.

Sprva se bomo tako od splošnosti položaja, v katerem se nahaja svet, pomikali proti dogodku, o katerem govorimo, nato pa se bomo od tega dogodka vrnili k položaju, v kakršnem je svet, kot ga bomo že prej pojasnili. Takšen povratni pomik nam bo slej ko prej pomagal naznačiti nekatere zahteve in naloge. Sestavljalo ga bo zaporedje sedmih delov. Torej vam bo to vzelo kar nekaj časa!

V prvem delu bo predstavljena objektivna struktura sodobnega sveta, splošni okvir vsega, kar se dogaja, in tega, se je zgodilo pri nas, a se skoraj vsak dan dogaja tudi drugod. To je objektivna struktura sodobnega sveta, kakršna se je vzpostavila v osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Kje se v njej pravzaprav nahaja ta naš svet z gledišča tistega, kar se je začelo vzpostavljati že pred malo več kot tridesetimi leti, sprva nekoliko potuhnjeno, zatem že odkrito, na koncu pa že predrzno?

V drugem delu bom preučil pomembnejše učinke, ki jih ima ta struktura sodobnega sveta na prebivalstva, na njihovo različnost, njihovo medsebojno prepletenost in na njihove subjektivnosti.

S tem bo pripravljen teren za tretji del, ki se bo ukvarjal s tako ustvarjenimi tipičnimi subjektivnostmi. Verjamem namreč, da je ta svet ustvaril posebne sub-

jektivnosti, značilne za zdajšnje obdobje. Kot boste videli, bom razlikoval med tremi tipičnimi subjektivnostmi.

V četrtem delu, v katerem se bom že približal dejanskemu predmetu tega predavanja, bom obravnaval tisto, čemur pravim sodobne podobe fašizma. Kot boste videli, si po mojem mnenju akterji tega, kar se je zgodilo, zaslužijo, da jih imenujemo fašisti, v prenovljenem in sodobnem pomenu te besede.

Šele na tej točki se bom preusmeril k tistemu, kar moramo storiti, da bi spremenili svet, tako da bi iz njega izključili vse tovrstne zločinske simptome. Peti del mojega predavanja bo torej posvečen samemu dogodku ter vsem njegovim različnim komponentam. Kdo so ubijalci? Kdo so storilci tega množičnega zločina? In kako označiti njihovo dejanje?

V šestem delu bomo spregovorili o odzivu države in javnem mnenju, oblikovanem okrog dveh besed: »Francija« in »vojna«.

Sedmi del bom v celoti posvetil poskusu, kako vzpostaviti drugačno mišljenje, takšno, ki bi se odtegnilo pravkar omenjenemu oblikovanju javnega mnenja in reaktivnim usmeritvam države. Izhajajoč iz vseh svojih poprejšnjih ugotovitev bom govoril o pogojih za tisto, kar bom poimenoval povratek politike, in sicer v smislu vrnitve emancipatorne politike oziroma takšne politike, ki zavrača vsakršno vključitev v shemo sveta, orisano v mojem izhodišču.

I/Struktura sodobnega sveta

12

Govorili bomo o strukturi sodobnega sveta, takšni, kot jo vidim sam in s pomočjo katere bomo zagotovo lažje osvetlili, kar smo si zastavili. Menim, da to strukturo v splošnem lahko opišemo v navezavi na tri teme, ki so med seboj močno prepletene in povezane.

Najprej je tu prva tema, ki se navezuje na že kar preveč obrabljeno nerazveseljivo ugotovitev, za katero pa sam menim, da njene posledice še zdaleč niso prišle na dan. Že trideset let smo namreč pričeli zmagoslavnemu pohodu globalizirane kapitalizma.

Že na prvi pogled je očitno, da gre pri tem zmagoslavju predvsem za vnovično vrnitev nekakšne primitivne energije kapitalizma, čemur se, kljub nekoliko vprašljivemu poimenovanju, reče neoliberalizem, kar v bistvu pomeni vnovičen pojav in znova odkrito učinkovitost od nekdanje znane konstitutivne ideologije kapitalizma, natančneje, liberalizma. Uporaba predpone »neo« ni nujno upravičena. Če si stvar ogledamo pobliže, nimam občutka, da je to, kar se dogaja, tako zelo »neo«. Vsekakor je zmagoviti pohod svetovnega kapitalizma nekakšna znova najdena energija, vnovična možnost, ki ji skoraj nihče ne ugovarja, da se zdaj že javno in brez kančka sramu, z domišljavo prepričanostjo razglša, če smem tako reči, da so splošne značilnosti tega zelo specifičnega tipa organizacije produkcije, menjav in ne nazadnje tudi celotnih družb, edina razumna pot za zgodovinsko usodo človeštva. Vse tisto, kar se je v Angliji spočelo in izoblikovalo že ob koncu osemnajstega stoletja, in kar je v desetletjih, ki so sledila, tudi v celoti prevladalo, so naši današnji gospodarji z nekakšnim divjim veseljem odkrili znova.

Beseda »globaliziran« ima nekoliko drugačen pomenski odtенок. Današnji kapitalizem se je neprikrito usidral, in to v svetovnem merilu. Ta globalizirani kapitalizem ni le kapitalizem, ki je znova odkril svojo energijo, ki je bila že v razkroju, temveč je slednjo tudi razvil do te mere, da danes lahko rečemo, da kapitalizem kot globalna struktura brez večjih nasprotovanj in ugovorov obvladuje praktično celoten planet.

Druga tema je oslabitev držav. To je precej subtilna posledica pravkar obravnavane teme, ki pa si jo je vsekakor zanimivo podrobneje ogledati.

Kot vsi veste, je bila ena od najbolj zasmehovanih tem marksizma odmiranje države. Marksizem je razglšal, da bo reorganizacija države po revolucionarnem uničenju nacionalnih držav, ki jim vlada kapitalizem, s pomočjo močnega kolektivnega gibanja komunističnega tipa, dokončno ustoličila družbo brez države, ki jo je Marx poimenoval družba »svobodne asociacije«. Zdaj pa smo priče povsem patološkemu fenomenu, namreč kapitalističnemu procesu odmiranja držav. Ta je danes eden ključnih fenomenov, čeprav se že kar dolgo zgodovinsko obdobje skriva pod krinko precej učinkovitega ohranjanja centrov državne moči. V resnici je splošna logika globaliziranega kapitalizma v tem, da nima neposrednega in globljega odnosa do ohranjanja nacionalnih držav, saj je polje njegovega delovanja transnacionalno. Že vse od šestdesetih let preteklega stole-

tja je bilo mogoče opazati, da so velika podjetja multinacionalna. Odtlej pa so ta velika podjetja postala prave transnacionalne pošasti povsem drugačne narave.

Zadnja, tretja tema pa zadeva nekaj, kar bom poimenoval nove imperialistične prakse, pri čemer gre za načine delovanja, če mi dovolite ta izraz, pri svetovni širitvi kapitalizma, za nove obraze imperializma, torej za osvojitve planeta, ki naj bi kapitalizmu služil kot baza za njegov obstoj in za njegove dobičke.

Vse naštetje teme bom obravnaval drugo za drugo.

1.) Zmagoslavje globaliziranega kapitalizma

Zmagoslavje globaliziranega kapitalizma je dejstvo, ki se ga zavedamo prav vsi. Dandanes je svetovni trg absolutna orientacijska točka svetovne zgodovinsko-sti. Ves čas in vsak trenutek je v središču pozornosti. Vsi zelo dobro vemo, da se po vsem svetu pojavi zaskrbljenost, čim se strese šanghajska borza, ljudje so prestrašeni, sprašujejo se, kaj se bo zgodilo in tako naprej ...

Agresivnost, ki spremlja to širjenje prevlade svetovnega trga kot merila svetovne zgodovinske resnice, je še posebej spektakularna. Danes smo vsepovsod priče izničevanju nekdanjih poskusov, da bi kapitalu postavili kakršne koli omejitve. Kot »omejitve« razumem pretekle dogovore, predvsem iz obdobja po zadnji svetovni vojni, med logiko kapitala in drugimi logikami. Slednje so lahko bile logike državnega nadzora, popuščanje sindikatom, nenaklonjenosti povečevanju koncentracije bank in industrije, logike delnih nacionalizacij, nadzornih ukrepov zoper nekatere ekscese, ki izhajajo iz zasebne lastnine, protimonopolističnih zakonov ... Sprejeti so bili tudi ukrepi, ki so širili socialne pravice prebivalstva, na primer pravico vsakega posameznika do zdravstvene oskrbe, ali pa je šlo za uveljavitev določenih oblik omejevanja zasebnega izvajanja svobodnih poklicev itd.

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Vse to je zdaj podvrženo sistematičnemu uničevanju, in to celo v državah, ki so nekoč glede vsega tega veljale za zgledne. Pri tem niti ne govorim o socialističnih državah, natančneje, nekdanjih socialističnih državah. Francija je bila ena od tistih držav, ki so prednjačile pri uveljavljanju takšnih ukrepov. Vse to pa se danes skrajno prizadevno uničuje. Začelo se je namreč z denacionalizacijami, s privatizacijami. Beseda »privatizacija« je nadvse agresivna, čeprav se tega morda več ne zavedamo. Gre za besedo, ki nedvoumno označuje dejstvo, da dejavnosti, ki so nekoč služile javni blaginji, znova postajajo zasebna lastnina kot

taka. Privatizacija je torej izjemno agresivna beseda, čeprav je danes postala že povsem vsakdanja in pomensko izpraznjena. Prav tako se neprestano – pa najsi gre za levico ali desnico, v tem se prav nič ne razlikujeta – razgrajujejo celotni sklopi socialne zakonodaje, pa najsi gre za delovnopравни zakonik, socialno varnost, izobraževalni sistem ...

Sprevideti je torej treba, da je objektivno zmagovanje globaliziranega kapitalizma uničevalna in nasilna praksa. Ne gre namreč zgolj za nekakšno preiščeno ali razumno širitev nekega določenega sistema proizvodnje. Zaskrbljujoče pa bi moralo biti tudi, da je odpor zoper to postopno uničevanje precej šibak. Ta odpor je pravzaprav neprestano umikanje. Omejen je le na posamezna območja, je razpršen, pogosto korporativističen, sektorski, brez vsakršne skupne vizije. V resnici to nepretrgano umikanje traja že trideset let.

Obstoji težnja k prevladujoči predstavi, ki prepoveduje, da bi kapitalizem skušali brzdati, s še tako neznatnimi ukrepi. Zato lahko rečemo, da je logika kapitala osvobojena vseh vezi. Liberalizem je osvobojen. Že trideset let nemočno prisostvujemo osvobajanju liberalizma. In to osvobajanje poteka v dveh oblikah: kot globalizacija, torej neprekinjena ekspanzija kapitalizma na celotna ozemlja, kot je na primer Kitajska, obenem pa tudi kot naraščajoča moč koncentracije kapitala oziroma dialektičnega gibanja, značilnega za kapital: širi se in se s širitvijo koncentrira. Ekspanzija in koncentracija sta dve med seboj neločljivo povezani pojavni obliki spremenljivega značaja kapitala.

Koncentracijam ni konca, hkrati z njimi pa se pospešeno vrstijo privatizacije in uničevanja. Zagotovo ste postali vsi pozorni na nedavno združitev trgovskih verig Fnac in Darty, dveh biserov množične maloprodaje, saj jo je zaznamovalo nekaj spektakularnega. Opraviti imamo namreč z združitvijo knjige in hladilnika. Povsem jasno je, da gre pri tem za strogo finančne cilje, ki so značilni za prave kapitalistične združitve, ne da bi bile te v kakršno koli korist širše javnosti. Takšne koncentracije tako postopoma ustvarjajo centre moči, ki jih lahko primerjamo z državami, le da so celo mogočnejši od marsikaterih med njimi. Gre za finančne, proizvodne, včasih tudi špekulativne centre moči, ki zaposlujejo precejšnje število ljudi in imajo nemalokrat zaslonbo močnih varnostnih služb, predvsem pa je zanje značilno, da se širijo na vse strani, pogosto s silo, vselej pa s korupcijo. Ti centri so transnacionalni, pri čemer so z državami v nekakšnem navzkrižnem odnosu. Spričo teh transnacionalnih in ogromnih sil

suverenost države nikakor ni več samoumevna. Tako lahko ugotovljamo, da večja podjetja, na primer največje francosko podjetje Total, v Franciji sploh ne plačujejo nobenih davkov. V čem je potemtakem sploh »francoskost« tega podjetja? Razen sedeža, ki ga ima bržkone nekje v Parizu, vendar ... Kot torej vidite, francoska država še zdaleč nima prave oblasti, niti nad centri moči, ki razglašajo svojo francoskost. Na pohodu je obsežna in razvejana nadvlada transnacionalnih podjetij nad suverenostjo držav.

A to objektivno zmago kapitalizma spremlja še neka druga zmaga, ki je subjektivna. To je popolno izkoreninjene vsakršne ideje o možnosti kakšne drugačne poti. Slednje je nezanemarljivo, saj gre za dokazovanje, ki je skoraj strateškega pomena, da je vsaka drugačna svetovna in sistemska usmerjenost organizacije proizvodnje in družbenega dogovarjanja vsaj trenutno povsem izključena. Tako da so tudi vsi predlogi za ponovno uvedbo tega ali onega ukrepa in tudi tisti, ki jih podajajo odporniki, že postali del defetistične vizije nadaljnjega splošnega razvoja dogodkov. Ti predlogi niso del nobene strategije, ki bi stremela k vnovičnemu zavzetju teritorija ideje. So le še nemočna nostalgija po časih družbenih dogovorov in pol-državnega ukrepanja za vzdrževanje nadzora nad kapitalom.

Osupljivo je videti, kako je program Nacionalnega sveta odporniškega gibanja postal veličastna nostalgična upodobitev Francije oziroma njenega obdobja po osvoboditvi izpod nacistične okupacije, med katero so francoski kapitalisti nemalokrat sodelovali z okupatorjem, saj je tedaj zavezništvo privržencev gibanja generala de Gaulla in komunistov sprejelo pomembne ukrepe podržavljenja in družbene prerazporeditve virov in sredstev.

16 A ta nostalgija po reformističnem programu s konca vojne pozablja na troje: da je tedaj država pravkar izšla iz svetovne vojne, da se je kolaboracionistična buržoazija potuhnila in nenazadnje, da je obstajala močna komunistična stranka. Danes nič od tega ne obstaja več. In nostalgija po socialnem programu Nacionalnega sveta odporniškega gibanja ni nič drugega kot sanjarjenje, ki nima nobene zveze s spektakularno subjektivno zmago globaliziranega kapitalizma. Spričo te zmage je bila moč ideje, da ne glede na vse težave vendarle obstaja neka druga možnost, v zelo kratkem času, od leta 1975 pa do danes, ob vso veljavo in praktično izničena. Tiste ideje, ki je še v šestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja po vsem svetu razvnela milijone političnih uporov.

Ta ideja, ki se že od devetnajstega stoletja generično imenuje »komunizem«, je danes tako bolečna, da se jo celo sramujemo izgovoriti. Pa ne jaz. Na širši ravni pa je kriminalizirana. Za njeno kriminalizacijo obstajajo nekateri razlogi: Stalin itd. A cilj, h kateremu stremijo privrženci kapitalistične globalizacije, nikakor ni etičen cilj, kot nam to skušajo dopovedati njihovi pisuni. Cilj jim je namreč kar se da temeljito, če le mogoče dokončno, izkoreniniti idejo vsakršne globalne, svetovne, sistemske alternative kapitalizmu. Prišli smo z dveh na eno samo. To je ključno. Nikakor ni isto, če o istem vprašanju obstajata dve nasprotujoči si ideji, ali pa če obstaja le ena sama. In prav ta odsotnost še nečesa drugega je ključ za subjektivno zmagoslavje kapitalizma.

2.) Slabitev držav

Danes so države dejansko zgolj lokalni upravitelji te široke svetovne strukture. So neke vrste posrednice, pa še to ne zelo trdno pozicionirane, med splošno logiko, ki sem jo pravkar opisal, in posebnimi razmerami, ki so različne od ene do druge pokrajine, koalicije, federacije, države ... Odvisno je od primera do primera. Zelo daleč od tega, da bi normo moči predstavljale zgolj in edinole države. Seveda še vedno obstajajo centri državne moči, ki so že vzpostavljeni, ali ki navzven kažejo svojo veljavo, in takšna velika centra moči sta na primer ZDA ali Kitajska. A tudi pri teh gre za enak že opisani proces. Ti veliki centri moči niso prinašalci česa drugačnega. Kot sem že opozoril, so danes velika podjetja po velikosti že primerljiva s povprečno velikimi državami. Prav tako se zdi nezaslišano, da so celo banke postale tako vplivni organizmi, da že kar aksiomatično verjamemo, da njihov propad ni možen: »Too big to fail.« Prevelike, da bi propadle. Ko govorimo o velikih ameriških bankah, pogosto uporabimo prav ta stavek. To pa pomeni, da je ekonomska makroskopija prevladala nad vzvodi državnega vpliva. Temu pravim slabitev držav. Ne le, da so države v precejšnji meri postale prav takšne, kot jih je Marx opisoval že v času svojega življenja, da so torej postale »temelji moči kapitala«. Ne vem pa, če si je Marx kdaj predstavljal, da je imel prav celo tako zelo daleč vnaprej, da mu zdaj že trideset let pritrjuje dejansko stanje. Ne le, da so države temelj moči kapitala, tudi neke vrste neskladja med njihovo hierarhijo in hierarhijo velikih podjetij postajajo vse večja, zaradi česar je obstoj velikih podjetij preči države. Moč velikih industrijskih, bančnih ali trgovskih konglomeratov nima ničesar skupnega z državno sfero, niti s sfero večdržavnih povezav. Ta kapitalistična sila preči države, kot bi bila od njih povsem neodvisna in jim bila hkrati nadrejena.

S tem sem prišel do tretje točke, torej do obravnave novih imperialnih praks.

3.) Nove imperialne prakse

Kot že veste, je bil nekdanji imperializem, se pravi tisti iz časa devetnajstega stoletja, povsem podrejen nacionalni ideji, nacionalni državi. Njegova organiziranost v svetovnem merilu je izhajala iz razdelitve sveta med tedanje svetovne velesile, ki so se o tem med seboj dogovarjale na več srečanjih, na primer na berlinski konferenci leta 1885, kjer so Afriko razrezali kot torto in rekli, tole bo za Francijo, tole za Anglijo, tole za Nemčijo itd. Tedaj so tudi vpeljali neposredno upravljanje teh ozemelj iz kolonialnih metropol, kajpada z udeležbo velikih plenilskih podjetij, ki so ropala tamkajšnje surovine, ter morebitno soudeležbo peščice lokalnih veljakov.

Temu sta sledili obe svetovni vojni, začele so se vojne za osvoboditev podjarmljenih narodov, in v tistem času je obstajal blok socialističnih držav, ki je te osvobodilne vojne podpiral. Skratka, med štiridesetim in šestdesetim letom minulega stoletja je zaradi vsega tega prišlo do postopne odprave neposrednega upravljanja teh ozemelj, imenovanega kolonializem v strogem pomenu besede, torej do odprave dotedanje vladavine kolonialnih metropol na ozemljih, ki so jih obvladovali.

Kljub temu pa so morale biti regalne pristojnosti zaščite podjetij, nadzora nad prometom s surovinami ali nad energetske viri še naprej vsaj deloma v pristojnosti državnih služb. Teh nalog pooblaščenca podjetij sami v celoti niso mogli prevzeti. Zato so ta območja že leta, celo desetletja, prizorišča nenehnih vojaških posegov zahodnih držav. Kar spomnimo se francoskih vojaških posredovanj v Afriki v zadnjih štiridesetih letih, bilo jih je več kot petdeset! V Franciji je vladalo tako rekoč skorajda kronično stanje vojne pripravljenosti za očuvanje francoskega afriškega »dvorišča« ... Bili so veliki vojaški posegi, spopadi ogromnih razsežnosti, alžirska in vietnamska vojna, v zadnjem času pa uničenje Iraka in seveda to, kar se dogaja prav zdaj.

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Vendar poanta ni v prenehanju imperialističnih vojaških posredovanj, sploh ne. Gre za vprašanje razlik v načinih imperialističnega posredovanja. Temeljno vprašanje pa še vedno ostaja: kako zaščititi naše interese v daljnih deželah? V nekem nadvse resnem časopisu sem bral o vojaški operaciji v Maliju, češ da je bila izjemno uspešna, saj da nam je z njo uspelo »zaščititi interese Zahoda«. To

je bilo rečeno kar tako, docela nedolžno. Potemtakem v Maliju ščitimo interese Zahoda ... Očitno torej ne ščitimo v prvi vrsti Malijcev. Sicer pa smo njihovo državo razbili na dvoje. Obramba Zahoda pač terja svoje. Tudi če se načini spreminjajo, je potreba po imperialističnih intervencijah še vedno nujnost spričo ogromnih razsežnosti interesov kapitala, ki so v igri: uran, nafta, diamanti, eksotični les, redke kovine, kakav, banane, zlato, premog, aluminij, zemeljski plin. In še marsikaj drugega.

Po moji oceni postaja vse bolj očitna zamisel, da bi bilo mnogo bolje od nehvaležne naloge vzpostavljanja držav pod skrbništvom metropole ali pa celo pod njeno neposredno vladavino, *te države preprosto uničiti*. Zlahka lahko opazite, kako zelo se takšna možnost ujema z nezaustavljivim razdržavljanjem, ki ga spodbuja globalizirani kapitalizem. Navsezadnje je mogoče na posameznih geografskih območjih, kjer se nahajajo še neizkoriščena naravna bogastva, ustvariti proste cone, kjer bi bilo brezvladje in države sploh ne bi več bilo in se zato sploh ne bi bilo več treba pogajati s to strašno pošastjo, kar država vedno je, pa čeprav je šibka. Na ta način se je mogoče izogniti vselej prisotni nevarnosti, da bi se država odločila za prepustitev posla drugemu podjetniku, ter še številnim drugim poslovnim nevšečnostim. Na območjih, kjer država ne bo imela več nobene prave moči, bo mali podjetniški krog lahko deloval brez večjega nadzora. V takšnem okolju bo nekakšno na pol brezvladje, prava oblast bodo oborožene tolpe, ki bodo pod nadzorom, ali pa jih sploh ne bo mogoče nadzirati, posli pa bodo kljub temu tekli dalje, in to celo bolje kot kdaj koli prej. Ob tem je treba vedeti, da se v nasprotju s prevladujočim prepričanjem podjetja, njihovi predstavniki, generalni zastopniki kapitala lahko odlično pogajajo z oboroženimi tolpami, včasih celo lažje kot pa z državnimi oblastmi. Sploh ni res, da so državno brezvladje in nepredstavljlive okrutnosti, ki spadajo zraven, v formalnem nasprotju s strukturo sveta. Prav vsakdo lahko ugotovi, da je že nekaj časa govora o uničenju Islamske države, vendar pa vse do danes še nihče ni proti njej resneje ukrepal, razen Kurdov, ki se nahajajo na kraju samem in imajo na tem območju lastne interese. Vsi si pravijo: »Pa ja ne, da bi poslali tja dol tristo tisoč vojakov? Morda pa bi bilo bolje stvar polagoma umiriti, jo usmeriti k bolj normalni vladavini ...« Konec koncev je Islamska država trgovinska sila, večstransko trgovsko podjetje, ki se dobro spozna na posle! Prodaja nafto, umetnine, veliko bombaža, je namreč pomembna proizvajalka bombaža. Prodaja številne stvari in to na vse konce. Kajti za vsako kupčijo sta potrebna dva. Saj Islamska država vendar ne kupuje sama svojega bombaža.

Za poimenovanje teh novih imperialističnih praks, namreč da je države, namesto da bi jih spodkopali ali jih s čim nadomestili, bolje uničiti, sem predlagal besedo »coniranje«. Hotel sem reči, da bi imperializem, ki je ustvarjal poljubno razmejene psevdo-države, ki pa so kljub temu imele status držav pod skrbništvom metropole, lahko v Afriki, na Srednjem vzhodu in na nekaterih območjih Azije nadomestili z infra-državnimi conami, ki bi bile v resnici brezdržavne cone plenjenja. V teh conah bi bile od časa do časa nedvomno nujne vojaške intervencije, ne bi bilo pa več treba teh kolonialnih držav zares v celoti upravljati, prav tako pa ne bi bilo več treba s pomočjo korupcije vzdrževati cele klike domačih pomagačev, ki izkorišča dodeljene položaje za ropanje bogastva.

Če povzamemo: imamo strukturo sodobnega sveta, ki ji vlada zmagoviti globalizirani kapitalizem. Imamo tudi strateško slabitev držav, ali še bolj rečeno, napredujoče procese kapitalističnega odmiranja držav. In poleg tega imamo še nove imperialistične prakse, ki dopuščajo in v določenih okoliščinah celo spodbujajo razkosavanje ali celo uničevanje držav.

Gornje hipoteze ne gre zanemariti, če se vprašamo o resničnem interesu vojaške intervencije v Libiji. S tem je bila popolnoma uničena država, ustvarjeno je bilo območje brezvladja, nad katerim se vsi, vsaj na videz, pritožujejo, a konec koncev so Američani storili prav isto v Iraku, Francozi pa znova v Maliju in Centralnoafriški republiki. Zdi se mi celo, da je bilo že popolno uničenje Jugoslavije, za kar so bili potrebni močni zahodni posegi, ki so razkosali to državo na skoraj desetero bolehnih in skorumpiranih delcev, prva napoved prakse coniranja. Na številnih kar obsežnih območjih je postalo uničevanje držav že praksa, pri čemer teh uničenih držav ni nadomestilo praktično skoraj nič, razen krhkih sporazumov med manjšinami, religijami in raznimi oboroženimi tolpmami. Sunite smo tako nadomestili s šiiti ali pa poskušali nasprotno, a vse to so v strogem pomenu besede nedržavni posegi. Gre za povsem očitne stvari. A vendar ima vse to za prizadeta prebivalstva uničujoče posledice, ki jih velja na v naslednjem poglavju vzeti pod drobnogled.

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II/Učinek na prebivalstva

Prvi osupljivi učinek vsega, na kar sem doslej opozoril, je, da gre razvoj v smeri vse večje neenakosti hitreje kot kdajkoli. To včasih povzroča skrbi celo parlamentarni desnici. Da namreč obstajajo tako pošastne neenakosti, katerih učin-

kov na življenje prebivalstva pa spričo oslabiljenosti držav sploh ne zmoremo več nadzorovati.

Na tej točki naletimo na nekatere osnovne številke, ki bi jih morali poznati vsi, vsakdo bi jih moral znati stresti iz rokava, saj so opora tistemu, čemur je treba naravnost reči razredna logika, ki je izjemno stroga in brezprizivna, takšna, da se ob njej celo najbolj formalni demokratični standardi zdijo neumni in neuporabni. Pri določeni stopnji neenakosti nima več nobenega smisla govoriti o demokraciji ali o demokratičnih standardih.

Naj spomnim na te številke:

- 1% svetovnega prebivalstva ima v lasti 46% svetovnega bogastva. 1% : 46%: to je skoraj polovica.
- 10% svetovnega prebivalstva ima v lasti 86% svetovnega bogastva.
- 50% svetovnega prebivalstva nima v lasti ničesar.

Če si iz populacijskega in količinskega vidika to zadevo ogledamo pobliže, vidimo, da obstaja svetovna oligarhija, ki predstavlja skoraj deset odstotkov prebivalstva. Naj znova poudarim, da ima ta oligarhija v rokah šestinosdeset odstotkov svetovnega bogastva. Teh današnjih deset odstotkov prebivalstva se skoraj ujema z deležem plemstva v Franciji v predrevolucijskem obdobju. Gre za približno enak red velikosti. Današnji svet torej obnavlja in znova oblikuje oligarhične razmere, kakršne je že davno poznal in presegel, a se k njim, v drugačnih oblikah in z drugačnih vidikov, zopet vrača.

Opraviti imamo torej z oligarhijo desetih odstotkov, potem pa je tu še obubožana množica, ki jo predstavlja približno polovica svetovnega prebivalstva, in vanjo spada strahovita večina prebivalcev Afrike in Azije. V seštevku predstavljata obe ti skupini skoraj šestdeset odstotkov. Ostane torej še štirideset odstotkov. Teh štirideset odstotkov prebivalcev pripada srednjemu razredu, ki skupaj razpolaga komajda s štirinajstimi odstotki svetovnega bogastva.

Ta srednji razred je skoncentriran predvsem v tako imenovanih razvitih deželah. Gre torej za družbeni razred, katerega glavnina je na Zahodu, kjer množično podpira tamkajšnje demokratične, torej parlamentarizirane oblasti. Verjetno lahko trdimo, ne da bi nas skrbelo, da smo to družbeno skupino užalili – saj ji vendar pripadamo bolj ali manj vsi, mar ne? –, da si namreč posamezniki v

tej skupini, ki razpolaga z relativno majhnim deležem svetovnega bogastva, zgolj s skromnimi štirinajstimi odstotki, nadvse prizadevajo, da ne bi padli v ogromno množico revnih in bili z njimi izenačeni ter kot takšni razpoznani. Kar je povsem razumljivo.

Zato je ta razred tako dojemljiv za rasizem in ksenofobijo ter poln prezira do obubožanih. Prav to so tista preteča subjektivna prepričanja, lastna tej srednji množici, ki v širšem smislu definirajo Zahod oziroma predstavo, ki jo ima o sebi, saj takšna prepričanja podžigajo občutke lastne superiornosti. Vsi vemo, da je zahodni srednji razred nosilec prepričanja, ki ne trpi ugovora, češ da je edinole Zahod prostor civiliziranih ljudi.

Ko danes vsepovsod po malem beremo, da je treba stopiti v vojno z barbari, je to nesporno rečeno v imenu civiliziranih ljudi, sploh pa, če ti barbari izhajajo iz ogromne množice tistih, ki so odrinjeni na rob in s katerimi se srednji razred noče za nobeno ceno poistovetiti.

Vse to osvetljuje zelo specifičen položaj srednjega razreda, zlasti evropskega, ki je skrajno občutljiv za razlike – konec koncev ga ves čas ogroža realnost kapitalizma – med njim, srednjim razredom, in ogromno, nekoliko oddaljeno in od njega ločeno množico, ki jo tudi v naših državah predstavljajo tisti, ki imajo čisto malo ali sploh ničesar. In prav ta srednji razred, ki ga ves čas ogroža negotovost, nenehno posluša pridige, kako da je treba braniti vrednote: »Branimo naše vrednote!« V resnici braniti naše vrednote pomeni braniti zahodni način življenja srednjega razreda, pomeni torej civilizirano porazdelitev štirinajstih odstotkov svetovnih virov med štirideset odstotkov »povprečnih« ljudi. Pascal Bruckner, ki s privzdignjeno brado, prav tako kot Hollande v vlogi vojskovodje, govori, da ta način življenja sploh ne sme biti predmet debate. »Zahodni način življenja ne sme biti predmet debate«. Takšna je sodba Pascala Brucknerja, zoper katero zanj ni ugovora. Od nikogar. Pascal Bruckner je o tem prepričan in si že oblači uniformo: vojna! Vojna! Takšni sta pač njegova želja in slepa vera.

To je eden od razlogov, zaradi katerih je množični poboj, o katerem nocoj govorimo, tako pomenljiv in travmatičen. Kajti zadal je hud udarec tej Evropi, ki v več pogledih predstavlja mehki trebuh globaliziranega kapitalizma, zadel je namreč naravnost v srce povprečne množice, srednjega razreda, ki ima samega sebe za otoček civilizacije sredi nekega sveta, ki ga obdaja, uokvirja in vse bolj

stiska, pa najsi gre za oligarhijo, ki je tako maloštevilna, da jo je komaj opaziti, ali pa za ogromno množico revnih. Prav zato je srednji razred zastrašujoči pariški dogodek doživel kot krizo civilizacije, torej kot atentat na tisto, kar je že v svojem zgodovinskem in naravnem obstoju zaradi razvojnih premikov, ki jih povzroča globalizirani kapitalizem, ogroženo, česar pa se kljub temu še vedno krčevito oklepa.

Takšen je torej prvi od učinkov strukture globaliziranega kapitalizma na prebivalstvo. Da pa bi razumeli, kar se dogaja, je poleg tega še druga zelo pomembna stvar. Na svetu živi danes nekaj več kot dve milijardi ljudi, za katere lahko rečemo, da ne štejejo nič. Ne le, da pripadajo množici petdesetih odstotkov revnih, kar je nesporno. Ampak še huje: na obrobje jih je odrinil *kapital*, kar pomeni, da z vidika strukturnega razvoja sveta niso nič in zato, če smo dosledni, sploh ne bi smeli obstajati. Ne bi smeli biti tu. Bilo bi bolje, če jih ne bi bilo. A vendar so.

Kaj pomeni, da ne štejejo nič? To pomeni, da niso ne potrošniki ne delovna sila. Kajti če ne pripadate oligarhiji, vam kapital priznava le še dve možnosti obstoja. Po eni strani morate biti zaposleni in tako zaslužiti nekaj malega denarja, nato pa morate ta denar porabiti za nakup proizvodov, ki jih ta isti kapital izdeluje. Vaša identiteta je v očeh prevladujočih gibanj v današnjem svetu dejansko dvojna identiteta, ki jo vzpostavlja denar: identiteta zaposlenega in potrošnika.

Vendar pa sta na svetu dve milijardi odraslih ljudi, ki jim je tako prvo kot drugo nedostopno. Nimajo možnosti, da bi delali, niti niso več šolarji ali upokojenci, zato posledično tudi nimajo dostopa do trga. Z vidika splošnih zakonitosti sveta, torej z vidika vladajoče in samozadovoljne kapitalistične globalizacije, so ti ljudje, kot bi ne obstajali. Sicer pa je že v polnem razmahu propaganda, kako skrajno nevarnega značaja naj bi bil vdor teh ljudi, ki sploh ne obstajajo oziroma vsaj ne bi smeli obstajati, v našo ljubo civilizirano Evropo. Vse, kar zadeva vprašanje migracijskih tokov, vprašanje rodnosti v Afriki, je neposredno povezano z zaskrbljenim spraševanjem: »Moj bog! Bodo ti ljudje začeli množično prihajati k nam, ko pa je utemeljeno predvidevati, da se bo njihovo število še povečalo, pa jih je že zdaj verjetno več kot dve milijardi?« Prišli smo do točke, ko od tega, da ti ljudje ne bi smeli obstajati, do praks, ki bodo poskrbele za njihov neobstoj, manjka le še korak.

A od kod prihaja ta množica ljudi, ki za sodobni svet ne štejejo nič? Da bi to razumeli, zadostuje, če je v nas malo, čisto malo marksista. Kapital oziroma njegovi lastniki vlagajo v vrednost delovne sile – kar pomeni, da v podjetjih, ki jih vodijo, zaposlujejo ljudi – le, če jim to omogoča, da imajo od tega sami dobiček. Temu pravi Marx v svojem žargonu »prilaščanje presežne vrednosti«. Nikoli ni torej gotovo, da bo kapital lahko izkoristil vso delovno silo, ki je na voljo. V preteklosti so že bila obdobja množične brezposelnosti, predvsem v tridesetih letih, po veliki krizi leta 1929. Danes pa se zdi, da je celo onkraj krize, ki se je začela leta 2008, zaposlitvena stiska vse bolj strukturna in ji ni videti konca. Globalizacija je morda privedla do nekakšne kapitalu inherentne nezmožnosti, da bi kapitalizem, ko je dočakal svoj maksimalen razmah, za doseganje dobičkov, ki si jih prilašča, še naprej vlagal v razpoložljivo delovno silo. Morda se bo stanje še poslabšalo. Zdi se namreč, da je sistem dobičkov, ki so edina gonilna sila kapitala, zadel ob oviro, ki jo je povzročila njegova lastna širitev, četudi bi v resnici moral izkoristiti vrednost vse razpoložljive delovne sile in tudi občutno skrajšati povprečni delovni čas, da bi lahko zagotovil delo dvema milijardama ljudi, ki so nekje obtičali in ostali prepuščeni sami sebi.

Tega pa ne more. In zakaj ne? Ker ne more skrajšati delovnega časa. In zakaj ne more skrajšati delovnega časa? No, čisto preprosto, zaradi mehanizmov ustvarjanja profita: vemo namreč, da je precejšnje število delovnih ur namenjeno ustvarjanju presežne vrednosti, in da izpod tega števila dobička ne bi več bilo. Če bi danes hoteli imeti primerno kapitalistično oplajanje delovne sile, lahko ugotovimo, da bi povprečen delovni čas v svetovnem merilu še naprej moral trajati približno štirideset ur. Čeprav sta trenutno dve milijardi ljudi, morda celo še več, brez dela.

Lahko pa napravimo izračun v obratni smeri. Lahko bi rekli: ob upoštevanju obstoječih razmer bi razumna svetovna vlada, ki bi skrbela predvsem za javno blaginjo, lahko razmislila o odločitvi – tako kot si je to predstavljal Marx –, da bi se povprečni delovni čas v svetovnem merilu moral zmanjšati na dvajset ur tedensko. Ali pa še na manj. Tako bi se ta ogromna množica ljudi, ki zdaj nimajo dostopa do dela in ne morejo priti do plačane zaposlitve, hitro zmanjšala. Skrajšanje delovnega časa je bilo med osrednjimi reformistično-revolucionarnimi ukrepi, ki jih je predlagal Marx, saj mu je bilo jasno, da mora za osvoboditev dela izpod gospostva kapitala delavstvo nepopustljivo izsiliti skrajšanje delovnega časa, in sicer do tiste točke, ko kapital tega ne bi več prenesel.

A ta čas zmaguje kapital. In ker je zmaga na njegovi strani, ne dopušča več nobenega skrajševanja delovnega časa, niti tako skromnega na petintrideset ur, ki ga je dosegla Martine Aubry, ne. In za tiste, ki se ne morejo umestiti v omenjeni okvir, no, za njih brez vsakršnega pomisleka zatrjuje, da so nič. Prav zato v našem svetu obstaja neznanska množica ljudi, ki ne veljajo prav nič. Da bi razumeli, kar se dogaja, moramo slednje nujno upoštevati.

Naj omenimo tudi, da je geografija vsega tega, torej porazdelitev teh razpoložljivih sil, ki ne štejejo nič, po svetovnem prostoru, v zelo jasni zvezi s coniranjem. Na območjih brezvladja, kjer je država odsotna, in po katerih krožijo oborožene tolpe, se brez večjih težav vsi sprijaznijo s tem, da ostajajo tamkajšnja prebivalstva dobesedno brez vsake institucionalizirane zaščite in da gnijejo v »humanitarnih« taboriščih. Čemu bi pretirano skrbeli zanje, saj vendar niso ne potrošniki ne delovna sila? Preostaja jim torej le tavanje med oboroženimi tolpmami ter kapitalističnimi plenilci vseh barv, da se znajdejo, kot vejo in znajo.

S tem je razloženo, zakaj so celotna območja prepuščena političnemu gangsterstvu fašističnega tipa, kar ne bi bilo mogoče in sploh ne bi moglo biti mogoče, če ne bi bilo na svetu milijard ljudi, ki nič ne štejejo. Če bi bili po zaslugi razumnega delovnega časa vsi vključeni v običajne in skupne oblike družbenosti, razmere, v katerih imamo opraviti z banditizmom in trgovino z ljudmi, sploh ne bi bile mogoče. A kombinacija coniranja, torej uničevanja držav, ki ga izvajajo zahodni plenilci, in fenomena, da obstojijo milijoni ali celo milijarde ljudi, ki niso vredni nič, vodi v nekaj, kar še najlažje poimenujemo kot vladavino gangsterskega tipa, in to na precej velikih območjih, včasih celo na celotnih ozemljih ogromnih držav, kakršna je Kongo.

Za kaj torej gre? Vsakovrstna oborožena in divjaška kapitalistična podjetja okupirajo prazna območja, s katerih je država izginila, rekrutirajo ljudi, ki nimajo ničesar, predvsem otroke in mladostnike, ter se lotijo neprikritega plenjenja na svetovnem trgu. Tako kot Islamska država prodaja cele kolone tovarnjakov z gorivom Turčiji. V takšnih razmerah se pojavijo oborožene fašistične tolpe, odele v barve religije.

Oh! Religija! Islam! Pa ste končno vendarle prišli do tega, bodo rekli naši veliki islamofobni misleci. Seveda, vsak hip bom tam. A naj vam takoj povem, da je bila lahko religija že od nekdaj pretveza, retorična krinka, s katero je manipulirala

fašistična sodruga. Tudi krščanstvo ni bilo izjema. Vzemite samo španski fašizem, tistega Francovega, ki je bil izredno naklonjen množičnim usmrtitvam, in to še dolgo po koncu državljanske vojne: ta fašizem je bil dobesedno zlepljen s katoliško vero. Oborožene Francove tolpe so blagoslavljali škofje, govorilo se je o veliki katoliški Španiji, ki naj bi nadomestila strašno republikansko Španijo. Vendar je šlo v resnici le za vprašanje moči države in za njeno plenjenje, ki so ga izvajali fašisti. Zato, resnici na ljubo, nima velikega smisla valiti krivdo na Islam. V nara-vi oboroženih tolpe je predvsem okupacija opustošenih ozemelj kapitalističnega tipa, da bi na njih vpeljale donosno gangsterstvo, ki se lahko nato odene v te ali one verske barve, da bi ugajalo uporniški mladini. Religije, prav tako kot številne druge ideologije, žal tudi revolucionarne, so se že od nekdaj rade spajale z mafij-skimi praksami. Ne nazadnje je tudi italijanska mafija, tista, ki ji vladajo botri, že od nekdaj razkazovala in še danes razkazuje nadut katolicizem.

Vse to pa odstira subjektivno plat razmer, v katerih se nahajamo danes.

III/Reaktivne subjektivnosti

Zdaj pa bi rad prešel k nekaj značilnim subjektivnostim, ki se pojavljajo v dandanašnjih gospodarskih razmerah. Z »značilno subjektivnostjo« razumem psihične vzorce, osnovne vzorce prepričanj in afektov, ki so produkti sveta, o katerem govorim. To seveda ne bo noben seznam vseh možnih subjektivnosti. Govoril bom le o tistih, za katere menim, da jih poraja ali ustvarja struktura sodobnega sveta.

Mislim, da je teh troje: zahodna subjektivnost, subjektivnost želje po Zahodu, kar seveda ni isto, in subjektivnost, ki bi jo imenoval »nihilistična«. Menim, da so vse te tri subjektivnosti značilne stvaritve sedanjega stanja sveta.

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Zahodna subjektivnost je subjektivnost tistih, ki si delijo že omenjenih štirinajst odstotkov, ki jim jih je prepustila vladajoča oligarhija. To je subjektivnost srednjega razreda, ki je skoncentrirana predvsem v najrazvitejših državah. Prav v njih se namreč lahko delijo drobtinice. Glede na to, kako ta subjektivnost deluje, bi rekel, da jo določa neko protislovje. Njena osnovna prvina je zelo dobra samopodoba, zahodnjaki so namreč zelo zadovoljni sami s seboj, zelo se cenijo. Temu verjetno botruje nekakšna zgodovinska prevzetnost: še pred kratkim so imeli v lasti ves svet. Če bi tedaj sešteli samo ozemlja, ki so jih z golim nasiljem osvojili

Francozi in Angleži, bi dobili skoraj celoten zemljevid zunajevropskega sveta. Ostanek te neposredne in ogromne imperialne moči je današnja samopodoba zahodnjakov, ki imajo same sebe v nekem smislu še vedno za predstavnike modernega sveta ter za iznajditelje in branilce modernega načina življenja.

A to je le ena plat medalje. Druga plat pa je nenehni strah. Nenehni strah pred čem? Po moji sodbi, če si pomagam z nekoliko grobim materializmom, gre za strah, da bi jim petdeset odstotkov tistih, ki nimajo prav ničesar, spodneslo njihovih štirinajst odstotkov, ki si jih med seboj lahko delijo. Ali so v svetu, takšnem, kakršen je danes, pripadniki srednjega razreda mali privilegiranci, kot bi jim lahko rekli? In večni strah malega privilegiranca je, da bo svoj privilegij izgubil.

Morda ob vseh trenjih sodobnega kapitalizma dejansko ne bo več mogoče ohranjati srednjega razreda tako kot še donedavna. To se zdi precej verjetno. Upoštevajoč vse večjo grabežljivost oligarhije in njene finančno požrešne vojaške posege, v katere se je prisiljena spuščati, če hoče obdržati v svojih rokah območja, ki ji prinašajo dobiček, je povsem možno, da srednji razred ne bo več mogel dobivati svojih zdajšnjih štirinajst odstotkov razpoložljivih virov, temveč, na primer, le še dvanajst. Na plan bo stopila pošast, ki bo grozila z »osiromašenjem srednjega razreda«, kot temu pravimo.

Prav zato imamo ves čas opraviti z značilnim zahodnjaškim dialektičnim razmerjem med oholim samozadovoljstvom in neprestanim strahom. In prav slednje je tisto, kar opredeljuje večščino, ki jo potrebujejo današnje demokratične vlade: večščino preusmerjanja strahu, ki animira njihove ideološke in volilne baze, torej srednji razred, vendar ne proti njim, vladam, temveč proti natanko določenim predstavnikom obubožane množice. Gre za izjemno zahtevno operacijo: srednji razred je treba prepričati, da nevarnosti v resnici obstajajo, da je torej njegov strah utemeljen, vendar pa razlog zanj nikakor ne morejo biti modri vladni ukrepi in demokratično upravljanje države, saj da je edini pravi vzrok za ta strah nevzdržni pritisk ogromne množice obubožanih, predvsem tistih, ki so del te množice znotraj naših družb, to pa so tuji delavci, njihovi otroci, begunci, prebivalci mračnih predmestij, fanatični muslimani. Vsi naštetí so grešni kozli, ki so jih naši gospodarji in njihovi pisuni prepustili na milost in nemilost stráhu srednjega razreda. Med nas se torej že plazi neke vrste podpihnjena državljanska vojna, katere zastrašujoče posledice postajajo vse bolj vidne. Takšna so subjektivna nihanja tistih, ki v nekem smislu predstavljajo samo srž Zahoda.

Zdaj pa namenimo pozornost še tistim, ki ne pripadajo ne oligarhiji ne srednjemu razredu. Torej tistim, ki niso ne potrošniki ne zaposleni s plačami, in ki se zato nahajajo zunaj svetovnega trga. Vedeti je treba, da so neprestano soočeni z vsemi zunanjimi znamenji lagodja in arogance omenjenih dveh skupin. K temu precej prispevajo tudi množični mediji, ki na vsakem koraku spremljajo svetovni razmah kapitalizma ter iz njegove ekspanzije ustvarjajo neprekinjen spektakel. Tako imamo opraviti z dvema med seboj tesno povezanimi fenomenoma. Za povrh pa so vsi svetovni mediji skoncentrirani v velikanskih multinacionalkah, kakršni sta na primer Apple, Google in še druge.

Posledica takšnega spektakularnega spremljanja in poročanja pa ni le ta, da zahodni, prevladujoči način življenja sploh ne more biti vprašljiv, kot pravi naš vrli Bruckner, temveč tudi ta, da se kot takšen kaže vsemu svetu. In zato imajo obubožani, kjer koli že so, ves čas pred očmi ta spektakel blagostanja in arogance tistih drugih. To pa se dogaja v odsotnosti – upam, da le začasni – vsakršne celostne ideološke ali politične rešitve, ki bi težila k zoperstavljanju kapitalistični hegemoniji in nato tudi njenemu odpravljanju. Vsi ti obubožani torej vidijo, da nekje vendarle obstaja neko jedro blagostanja, arogance, težnje po civiliziranosti in modernosti, vendar nimajo nobenih sredstev, da bi se temu dejansko uprli ne z mišljenjem ne z dejanji, tako kot si z njimi ne delijo realnosti. Rezultat vsega tega je bridka zagrenjenost, klasična mešanica zavisti in upornosti.

Od tod izhajata tudi obe preostali značilni subjektivnosti. Najprej tista, ki ji pravim želja po Zahodu: želja, da bi tudi sami imeli in z drugimi delili tisto, kar se povsod slavi in hvali kot zahodno blagostanje. Gre torej za prizadevanja prilagoditi se obnašanju in potrošnji srednjega razreda, a brez za to potrebnih sredstev. To pa potem botruje pojavom, kakršen je migracijski tok, kajti preprosta oblika želje po Zahodu je enostavno želja zapustiti opustošena območja in postati del tako opevanega zahodnega sveta, saj je tam vendar tako lepo, saj so tam vsi tako zadovoljni in se kar kopajo v modernem in čudovitem blagostanju. Kdor že ne more zares tja, se lahko prepusti lokalnim odtujitvam, se pravi težnjam k posnemanju, resda z ubornimi sredstvi, oblik in načinov zahodnega načina življenja, tako kot tiste afriške ženske, ki si obupno prizadevajo, da bi si pobelile kožo ali zravnale lase. O tej želji po Zahodu, ki je v svetu danes tako vsepričujoča in ki ima občutne in vselej katastrofalne posledice, bi lahko govorili zelo dolgo.

Pri zadnji, nihilistični subjektivnosti, pa gre za željo po maščevanju in uničevanju, kar je že na prvi pogled hrbtna stran želje po odhodu in odtujenem posne-manju. Povsem razumljivo je, da se ta strastna želja po maščevanju in uničevanju pogosto izraža in udejanja v reaktivnih mitologijah in tradicionalizmih, ki jih ta subjektivnost povečuje in se zaklinja, da jih bo z orožjem branila pred zahodnim načinom življenja, pred željo po Zahodu.

To je nihilizem tistega, čigar življenje ne šteje nič. Zdi se, kot da ta nihilizem raste iz nasprotovanja želji po Zahodu, a tak vtis nastaja le zato, ker se ta želja po Zahodu njihova prikrita prikazen. Če nihilist ne bi aktiviral svojega gona smrti, če ne bi pustil proste poti svoji nasilnosti, ki je lahko tudi ubijalska, bi v resnici tudi sam podlegel želji po Zahodu, ki je v njem že prisotna, česar se zelo dobro zaveda.

Jasno bi moralo biti, da ti dve značilni subjektivnosti – subjektivnost želje po Zahodu in nihilistična subjektivnost maščevanja in uničevanja – tvorita dvojec, s pozitivno in negativno različico, katerega jedro je fascinacija, ki izhaja iz zahodne dominacije.

Vse to pa poteka v širšem okviru odsotnosti vsakršnega projekta, ki bi spodbu-jal kolektivno vstajo ter zarisoval vizijo neke drugačne strukture sveta. Tako da dejansko vse tri značilne subjektivnosti pripadajo strukturi sveta, kakršno sem opisal. Izhajajoč iz njihove pripadnosti temu svetu pa bom zdaj opisal tisto, kar sam imenujem sodobni fašizem.

IV/ Sodobni fašizem

Menim, da lahko v splošnem imenujemo »fašizem« tisto ljudsko subjektivnost, ki jo poraja in podžiga kapitalizem, bodisi zato, ker je sam v hudi sistemski krizi – kakršno poznamo iz tridesetih let prejšnjega stoletja – bodisi, in to je morda še globlji vzrok, zaradi vplivov strukturnih omejitev kapitalizma, ki so prišle na dan z njegovo globalizacijo. Naj znova poudarimo, da globalizacija hkrati pomeni ekspanzijo in razkritje lastne nezmožnosti angažiranja celotne delovne sile, ki je na voljo.

Fašizem je reaktivna subjektivnost. Je znotraj-kapitalistična, saj ne ponuja no-bene alternative obstoječi strukturi sveta, na svetovnem trgu pa se umesti tako,

da kapitalizmu očita, češ da se zaradi stanja, v kakršnem je, ni sposoben držati lastnih obljub. S tem ko sprejme fašizem, postane posameznik, ki ga je želja po Zahodu razočarala, sovražnik Zahoda, saj v resničnosti njegova želja po Zahodu ni zadovoljena. Tak fašizem spodbuja v njem nagnjenost k nihilistični in destruktivni agresivnosti, saj se poraja iz intimnega in zanikovalnega zatrtja njegove želje po Zahodu. V precejšnji meri je fašizem potlačena želja po Zahodu, ki jo nadomesti nihilistična in smrtonosna reakcija, njegova tarča pa je natanko tisto, kar je bil prej možni objekt omenjene želje. Nahajamo se torej znotraj klasične psihoanalitične sheme.

Glede na njegovo obliko lahko ta sodobni fašizem opredelimo kot gon smrti, izražen v jeziku poistovetenja. Religija je povsem združljiva s takšno držo: za španski fašizem v času državljanske vojne je bila ta religija katolicizem, na bližnjem vzhodu, predvsem na območjih, kjer je imperialistično coniranje uničilo celotne države, je danes to islam. A religija je zgolj preobleka in nikakor ni bistvo zadeve, je oblika subjektivizacije, kar pa ni resnična vsebina stvari. Dejanska vsebina, ki ji drobci verske bajke dajejo zgolj zunanjo podobo, v resnici izhaja iz vseprisotne želje po Zahodu, ki se pojavlja bodisi v pritrjevalni in jasno izraženi ali pa v potlačeni in smrtonosni obliki.

V praksi delujejo ti fašizmi vselej po zakonitostih tolpa in gangsterskega kriminala, začeni s zavzetjem in zaščito območij, v katerih si prilastijo monopol nad vsem, enako kot preprodajalec drog v svojem kotičku blokoveškega naselja. Da se lahko obdržijo, so jim potrebni spektakli skrajne krutosti, plenilski podvigi, pa tudi, kadar gre za razne mafije, nenehna izmenjava robe na svetovnem trgu. Tako kot nihilistična želja ni nič drugega kot hrbtina stran želje po Zahodu, so tudi razdržavljena območja, na katerih je nihilistična subjektivnost v razcvetu, nepogrešljivo prisotna na svetovnem trgu in s tem v realnosti Zahoda. Povedal sem vam že, da je Islamska država trgovsko podjetje, ki prodaja nafto, umetnine, bombaž, orožje, skratka kup stvari. In njeni plačanci so pri njej zaposleni s stalnimi dohodki in nekaj dodatnimi privilegiji, ki jim jih prinašata plenjenje in obravnava ujetnikov in ujetnic kot sužnjevev.

Ta oblika fašizacije je torej inherentna strukturi globaliziranega kapitalizma, obenem pa je na neki način tudi njegova subjektivna perversija. Vsi sicer vedo, da se podjetja, ugledni zahodni poslovneži, pa tudi vlada Savdske Arabije nenehno pogajajo z oboroženimi tolpami z območja Srednjega vzhoda, te pa sebi

kar najbolje izpogajajo, kar jim je v interesu. Nazadnje lahko še rečemo, da je tamkajšnji fašizem, ki ima vojaški ustroj in je organiziran po fleksibilnem vzoru mafijskih združb, za povrh pa je še versko obarvan, pri čemer ima religija zgolj formalno mesto, le druga plat zatrte želje po Zahodu.

Ob vsem tem se sprašujem, s čim ta fašistična subjektivnost privablja mlade in kaj jim ponuja. Konec koncev so tako januarski kot tudi novembrski ubijalci mladi moški med dvajsetim in tridesetim letom starosti, ki povečini izhajajo iz druge ali tretje generacije potomcev delavskih priseljencev. Tem mladim ljudem se zdi, da nimajo nikakršne perspektive, da zanje v tej družbi enostavno ni pravega mesta. Celo tisti vsaj nekoliko izobraženi, ki so dokončali srednjo šolo, vidijo stvari povsem enako: tukaj ni mesta zanje, vsaj ne takšnega, kot bi si ga želeli. Kot slabo plačani zaposleni in kot potrošniki se počutijo odrinjene na rob družbe, oropani vsakršne prihodnosti. Fašizacija (kar jezik propagande povsem neumestno imenuje »radikalizacija«, čeprav gre za čisto navadno in preprosto regresijo) te mlade priteguje z mešanico samožrtvovalnega in zločinskega »junaštva« in »zahodnjaške« zadovoljenosti. Po eni strani bo takšen mladenič postal podoben mafijcu, na kar bo ponosen, in sposoben bo zločinskih samožrtvovalnih dejanj: pobijal bo zahodnjake, premagoval morilce iz drugih tolp, počel neizmerne okrutnosti, zavzemal ozemlja itd. V zameno za to bo lahko okusil »dobro življenje« ter najrazličnejša druga zadovoljstva. Islamska država plačuje svoje pribočnike kar izdatno, daje jim precej več, kot bi sicer lahko zaslužili na območjih, kjer živijo. Imajo torej nekaj denarja, imajo ženske, avtomobile ipd. Gre torej za mešanico smrtonosnih junaških opravil in tipično zahodnjaškega podkupovanja z razkošjem. To pa je preizkušena mešanica, ki je bila, delujoč iz ozadja, že od nekdanj ena izmed značilnosti fašističnih tolp.

Religija je lahko identitetna mešanica vsega omenjenega, saj je prikladen referenčni okvir s protizahodnim nabojem. A konec koncev lahko vidimo, da je poreklo teh mladih ljudi drugotnega pomena, sploh če imamo v mislih njihovo duhovno, religiozno poreklo ipd. Kar zares šteje, je njihova izbira, ki jo pogotuje njihova frustracija. Omenjena mešanica podkupovanja in zločinskega ter samožrtvovalnega »junaštva« jih zasvoji, a ne zaradi njihovega islamističnega prepričanja, temveč zaradi subjektivnosti, ki jim je lastna. Poleg tega je pri njih moč opaziti, da islamizacija v večini primerov ni izhodiščna, temveč je zaključna faza v tem procesu. Lahko bi torej rekli, da je fašizacija tista, ki islamizira, in ne islam tisti, ki fascinira.

V/ Kdo so morilci?

Kdo so v takšnih razmerah novembrski morilci in kaj poreči o njihovih dejanjih? Recimo, da so bili morilci mladi fašisti, kot sem jih pravkar opisal. Brez zadržkov jih lahko primerjam z nekaterimi mladimi pripadniki fašistične milice v Franciji med drugo svetovno vojno. V njihovih tolpah, ki so kolaborirale z Nemci, je bilo udarno vodilo prav tako »Viva la muerte!«, kar je pomenilo, da so lahko počeli kar koli, bili so oboroženi, lahko so pobijali ljudi, jih mučili. Javno so razglašali svojo okrutnost. In tudi njim je bila namenjena cela vrsta drobnih ugodnosti, od udobnega življenja, popivanja po lokalih, do lepih avtomobilov, denarja, deklet ... Tudi tedaj je šlo za mešanico teh istih sestavin. In v nekem smislu so bili tudi razlogi za njihovo početje enaki. Kdo so bili pripadniki te milice? To so bili Francozi, vendar Francozi, ki so netili državljansko vojno in bili so proti temeljnim nacionalnim interesom, saj so sodelovali z nacističnim okupatorjem. A po svoje so bili razdvojeni. Prav tako kot njihov imam, general Pétain, so se ob vsaki priložnosti sklicevali na Francijo, na francosko zastavo: »Francija! Francija!« Četudi so ob tem ves čas, nemalokrat tudi v izjemno umazanih okoliščinah, delovali proti najosnovnejšim nacionalnim interesom, med katerimi je na prvem mestu upor proti tujemu okupatorju lastne države. Oboje skupaj in eno ob drugem pa kar kliče po notranjem razcepu te fašistične subjektivnosti. Današnji morilci pa so v nekem smislu tipični produkt zatrte želje po Zahodu, so ljudje, ki jih nasekuje potlačena želja, še več, želja, ki jih konstituira. Zdi se jim, da jih nosi ta proti-zahodnjaški zanos, v resnici pa so le eden od nihilističnih simptomov slepe praznote globaliziranega kapitalizma, njegove nesposobnosti in nepravilnosti, da bi vključil vse ljudi v svet, kakršnega je ustvaril.

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Njihovo dejanje – nerazsoden množični pomor – ni atentat. Atentate na nemške okupatorje in njihove pétainovske pribočnike so organizirali pripadniki francoskega odporniškega gibanja, nemara še boljši primer atentata pa so bile priprave slavnih ruskih populistov na uboj carja. In če si pobliže ogledamo zaporedje dogodkov ob poboju 13. novembra, nam je brž jasno, da ni šlo ne za organizirano ne za vojaško zadevo, temveč za dejanje, ki je sicer krvoločno, a vendarle strahopetno. Takšno pa je zato, ker so se ti mladi fašisti odločili, da njihova življenja niso vredna nič. To je poslednja motivacija za tako dejanje. Njihovo življenje ni v njihovih lastnih očeh nič vredno. In ker njihova lastna življenja niso vredna nič, tudi življenja drugih niso vredna nič. V osnovi gre za čisto pravi nihilizem. Zapraviti življenje za neko »junaško dejanje«, ki ni le

zločinsko, ampak tudi smešno in prisiljeno. Mislim, da je temu treba reči grozovit »množični pomor«, katerega žrtvam se pridruži tudi morilec sam, kar je prav tako strašno. Gre za nekakšno samomorilno obliko zločina, ki je gon smrti prignala do njegovih skrajnosti. Ničesar več ni, ne žrtev ne morilcev.

Povsem nesporno je, da je bilo to surovo fašistično in kriminalno dejanje. A vendar, je mar primerno govoriti o »barbarih«, kar je postalo že uradno poimenovanje teh ljudi? »Barbar« je že od nekdaj nasprotje »civiliziranega človeka«. »Vojna proti barbarom« je vojna civiliziranih ljudi proti barbarom. Vendar pa ni nobenega razloga za popuščanje tovrstni zahodni aroganci, ki želi predstavljati civilizacijo kot nasprotje nekega okrutnega zločinskega dejanja. Ob tej priložnosti velja vsekakor spomniti, da se zahodnjaški pomori dogajajo vsakodnevno, in da jih je večina izjemno krvavih.

Samo trije takšni primeri:

Zahodnjaki imajo dandanes možnost, da z droni, pa tudi s skupinami specialcev v posegih, ki jih v Franciji označuje izraz »homo« (iz francoske besede homicide, slo. umor), pobijajo ljudi na tajni ukaz voditeljev držav. Z droni je ubijanje postalo mnogo bolj preprosto, saj ubijalcu sploh ni več treba ven iz pisarne. Niti Obama niti Hollande se ne odrekata tem sredstvom, naj so udobna ali manj udobna. Ko že govorimo o dronih, obstajajo tudi statistike: za enega mrtvega, ki je tarča napada, pride v povprečju vsaj devet kolateralnih žrtev, med katerimi so lahko tudi otroci iz soseščine. Da bi ubili deset nasprotnikov, je treba zraven ubiti še osemdeset oseb, ki niso krive ničesar. Takšni so droni. Če torej pomnožimo z droni izvedene uboje, ki jih je ves čas svojega mandata odredil umirjeni in odločni Obama, lahko zelo hitro pridemo do stotin in stotin oseb, ki so bile pomorjene za nič. Če je za nas pobijanje ljudi kar tako barbarsko, se moramo zavedati, da so ravnanja Zahoda ves čas zelo barbarska. S to razliko, da gre v prvem primeru barbarstva, ki so ga zagrešili barbari, za načrten in samomorilen množični pomor, v primeru, ko zagrešijo barbarstvo civilizirani ljudje, pa gre za tehnološki, prikrit in zadovoljstvo zbujač množični pomor.

Drugi primer. Delež zahodnih žrtev v odkritih spopadih, na primer v Iraku ali v Palestini, je približno v razmerju ene proti dvajsetim. Zahod je prišel že tako daleč, da je zanj cilj nič mrtvih na njegovi strani in vsi mrtvi na nasprotnikovi, kar je zelo posebna vojna praksa. A tega vendarle še ni čisto v celoti dosegel. Je

pa že zelo blizu temu: če preštejemo mrtve v iraških, afganistanskih, palestinskih in drugih vojaških spopadih, pride približno en mrtev na Zahodni strani in dvajset mrtvih na nasprotnikovi. Tega neverjetnega nesorazmerja ljudje kajpak ne spregledajo, in za tiste, ki sami živijo v takšnih razmerah in iz dneva v dan gledajo, kako te stvari potekajo, je največji barbar prav zahodnjak.

Tretji primer. Vzemimo primer Gaze, pri čemer puščamo ob strani njegove politične razsežnosti. Dva tisoč mrtvih na palestinski strani, med njimi skoraj štiristo petdeset otrok. Je to civilizirano? Kajti tu so na delu letala, ki ubijajo, zažigajo ljudi in jih trgajo na koščke, ne pa posuroveli mladci, ki najprej postrelijo cel kup ljudi, nato pa še sebe.

Morilci so mladi fašisti, ki spominjajo na pripadnike Pétainove milice, njihovi motivi pa so izprijeni, smrtonosni in za povrh še brez prave vsebine. A vendar ni nobenega pravega razloga za domišljanje, da v primerjavi z njimi zahodne vojske predstavljajo civilizacijo. To bi bilo nekaj povsem nedopustnega. Vojna je vojna, vselej je bolj ali manj umazano pobijanje, in tudi mi sami smo v kolonialnih vojnah in še mnogo pozneje mučili, ubijali in deportirali prav toliko in še več ljudi. In to bomo počeli še naprej, v velikem obsegu, če je zares prišel, kot to razglašajo naše vlade, čas dokončnega obračuna s »terorizmom«.

VI/ Odziv države: »Francija« in »Vojna«

Zdi se mi, da je ena temeljnih nalog države kot države, kakršna je Francija, ustrahovanje srednjega razreda. In to je, čeprav se zdi presenetljivo, predvsem naloga levice. Ko gre za ustrahovanje srednjega razreda, se leвица vselej odlično izkaže. Naj vas spomnim, da je v času moje mladosti, med alžirsko vojno, leвица z Guyem Molletom, ki je tedaj vodila francosko vlado, dobila »posebna pooblastila« – podobno kot danes s skoraj popolnim navideznim soglasjem razglašča »izredne razmere« –, ki so ji omogočila, da se je lahko spustila v totalno vojno. Zdaj se torej znova potrjuje, da lahko z govoričenjem o »vojni«, torej o stvari – namreč vojni –, ki sploh ni več del vsakdana omenjenega družbenega razreda, ljudi ustrahuje le kak beden socialist, ki hoče ustvarjati videz odločnosti. A takšno ustrahovanje srednjega razreda pod geslom vojne je očitno prazna izmišljotina. Pravzaprav prevara, saj v tej deželi nihče ni pripravljen, da bi šel v vojno. Beseda »vojna« tu ni na mestu. Januarja se je vlada sklicevala na laično družbo, zdaj se skuša opreti na stari nacionalizem, na Francijo in na trobojnico,

v navezavi na slogan: »To je vojna«, ki je še vselej deloval. A danes ta naveza očitno nima več nobenega pravega smisla. Poleg tega menim, da njen učinek ne bo dolgotrajen.

Zato bi rad nekaj malega povedal o obeh besedah, Franciji in vojni.

Začnimo s Francijo. Današnja Francija je označevalec brez določljive afirmativne vsebine. Kaj je pravzaprav danes »Francija«? Je akter drugega ranga v obstoječi svetovni strukturi, ki sem jo opisal. Vzklikamo sicer »naše vrednote!«, a kaj le so francoske vrednote? Na to imam svoj pogled. To, zaradi česar je bila Francija dolgo nekaj posebnega – kajti če res obstajajo francoske vrednote, se moramo vprašati, v čem so posebne –, je njena revolucionarna tradicija. Sprva, torej po revoluciji leta 1789, je bila ta tradicija republikanska. Nato socialistična, anarhosindikalistična, komunistična in na koncu levičarska, vse to v letih od 1789 do, denimo, 1976.

A tega je konec. Konec. Francija danes ni več spodoben zgled države, ki bi se lahko ponašala z revolucionarno tradicijo. Trenutno je zanjo morda značilnejši nenavaden zbir intelektualcev, ki zagovarjajo identiteto. Izkazala se je tudi z nečim, česar niso storili nikjer drugje: z odkrito diskriminatornimi zakoni, ki prizadevajo del revnih, ki jih je sama ustvarila. Zakoni o prepovedi nošnje naglavne rute, zelo mi je žal, a vse to so zakoni, ki povzročajo stigmatizacijo in segregacijo, in to koga? Revnih kajpada, revnih skupin prebivalstva, ki imajo svojo religijo, kot so jo nekdanj imeli Bretonci, ki so veljali za strogo katoliške. Zakaj jih je le treba diabolizirati, če pa je za njihovo revščino kriv prav francoski kapitalizem? Zakaj? Prav ta kapitalizem je namreč uničil francoski industrijski kompleks. Zakaj je prišlo k nam tako veliko število ljudi iz držav tretjega sveta? Ker smo jih tja hodili iskat sami! Kar spomnimo se obdobja med petdesetimi in osemdesetimi leti prejšnjega stoletja, ko smo v Maroko pošiljali letala, da so od tam vozila delovno silo, ki smo jo tedaj potrebovali za delo v tovarniški verigi. Ti ljudje so s seboj pripeljali tudi svoje družine, in tako je zrasla druga generacija mladih ljudi, ki bi morali prav tako postati delavci, kvalificirani delavci ali tehniki ... A uničili smo proizvodne strukture, tovarn skorajda ni več, proizvodnja se pospešeno seli v druge države. In ti mladi zato nimajo nikakršne prihodnosti. Vse to temelji na prevari, na odvratni goljufiji. Uvozili smo jih brez vsakršnega jamstva, zdaj pa bi jih radi izvozili ... A vendar to ne gre, s »človeškimi viri« se vendarle ne ravna na tak način ... Zato prav zares menim,

da danes »Francija« v nekem smislu pomalem pomeni vse zgoraj našteto, kar pa zanjo ni kakšna posebna odlika, zaradi katere bi bila zanimiva in opazna. Zelo lahko je razumeti, kaj hočejo tisti, ki jih skrbi identiteta Francije. V skrajni fazi hočejo, kot je pri tovrstnih identitetnih zadregah običajno, da bi preganjali druge. Navsezadnje namreč identiteta vedno pomeni prav to, če seveda nima univerzalnega pomena, kakršnega je imela revolucionarna tradicija. Identiteta, ki nima univerzalnega pomena, je opredeljena le s pregonom vsega, kar ni ona sama. Le na ta način lahko dobi občutek, da je živa. Kaj pa za Francijo sploh naredijo ljudje, ki ves čas ponavljajo »Francija, Francija«? No, razen tega da se na vse pretege pritožujejo nad Arabci? Prepričan sem, da s tem ne delajo Franciji nikakršne usluge. To Francozom niti najmanj ni v čast. Ob tem bi bilo le nekaj manj od treh odstotkov teh hrabrih »Francozov« pripravljenih umreti za domovino (o tem obstaja raziskava).

Kar pa se tiče vojne, je jasno eno: vojne niso napovedali »barbari«, saj je bila francoska država tista, ki se je pustila povleči za sabo velikim podjetjem in občasno Američanom ter se pogosto vmešala v umazane imperialistične posle, začela sodelovati pri coniranju, uničevanju držav, s čimer je soustvarila razmere, ki jih skušam na tem mestu razgrniti in razčleniti. Te razmere pa vključujejo tudi subjektivno genezo mladih fašistov na območjih, kjer je zaradi opustošenj zamrlo vsakršno družbeno življenje, pri čemer je v mnogočem odločilno dejstvo, da velik del svetovnega prebivalstva ne šteje nič.

VII/ Pogoji za vnovično vrnitev politike emancipacije, ki bi izstopila iz sheme sodobnega sveta

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Zdaj prehajam k vprašanju, ki me bo pripeljalo do zaključka: kako naj v obstoječih okoliščinah poskušamo oblikovati drugačno mišljenje? Kako se iztrgati iz primeža teh okoliščin? Oziroma: kako se izmakniti propagandi, ki spremlja vsako vojno napoved, pa četudi gre za namišljeno ali potvorjeno vojno. Obstaja dolga tradicija vojnih napovedi, nacionalističnih širokoustenj, torej docela izmišljenih propagandnih ofenziv. Samo poglejte literaturo o »Švabih« iz leta 1914. Pošasti! Morilci! Po pravici pa bi bilo treba reči, da se Nemci leta 1914 skorajda niso razlikovali od Francozov.

A kako se tega lotiti? Mislim, da bi bilo za začetek treba v glavah in v praksi nadomestiti prostor, ki se imenuje »Francija«, pa tudi fantomske Francoze, z

mednarodnim prostorom. Potreben je namreč nov način mednarodnega, rekel bi celo transnacionalno usmerjenega razmišljanja, ki bi se lahko kosalo s kapitalistično globalizacijo. Kajti kapitalisti že davno niso več Francozi in so zato v prednosti. Povsod, v Šanghaju, San Franciscu, Maroku, Kongu, Sao Paulu se počutijo doma ...

Bomo torej mi, neznatni Francozi, ki pripadamo srednjemu razredu, ostali udobno zviti v klobčič v tej njihovi Franciji? To bi bil hud zaostanek. In lahko bi postal še hujši, če ga bomo povečevali še s tem, da ne bomo sposobni sprejeti k nam in medse ljudi, ki so že tu, a jih zavračamo s smešnimi izgovori, češ da so muslimani, da prihajajo globoko iz Afrike, ali pa, kar je še huje, da imajo takšna in ne drugačna oblačila in pričeske, ali da jedo na poseben način pripravljeno meso. Skratka, če bomo tudi mi sami imeli te ljudi, ki v očeh kapitala ne štejejo nič, za ničvredne ali celo za sovražnike. Če ne bomo sposobni, da bi se s temi ljudmi pogovarjali in skupaj z njimi složno delovali, da bi lahko iz obstoječih razmer naredili preboj in odprli pot novi politiki, da bi torej skupaj z njimi našli prodorno in ustvarjalno rešitev za ta Zahod, ki že tone v temo.

Prav tako strašno pa se je sprijazniti s tem, da je bil revolucionarni poraz tako hud, da si ta hip problemov sploh ne znamo predstavljati globalno, medtem ko je to našim neposrednim nasprotnikom uspelo že davno. To pa jim je uspelo prav na škodo vsega tistega, kar so bili nekoč zaščitni mehanizmi države. Zdaj smo torej na vrsti mi, da zberemo moči in se vsaj delno nehamo ukvarjati samo z državo, saj je država v vsakem primeru takšna, kakršna pač je. Nehajmo hoditi na volitve! Ne nasedajmo več lažnim in praznim izjavam naših vlad! Umakni mo se drugam, v kraje, kjer prebiva sicer pogosto nerazločna, a še vedno živa prava volja ljudstva. Kajti država bo prišla na vrsto šele tedaj, ko »Francija« ne bo več pomenila veliko. In tedaj se bo država obrnila na nas, kot to počne zdaj. Ampak mi dobro vemo, da je država za zdaj v vseh pogledih le agent nove globalizirane sekvence kapitala.

Nedvomno obstaja protislovje med frustracijami, ki vodijo v fašizem in zločine na eni strani, in svetovnim razvojem kapitalizma, ki uživa množično podporo srednjega razreda, na drugi. To je ubijalsko protislovje, kot zlahka vsi vidimo. A to je hkrati tudi subjektivno notranje protislovje samega kapitalizma. Ne gre za protislovje med dobrim in zlim. Niti za protislovje med vrednotami civilizacije in barbarstvom. To je nekakšen notranji obrat, ki povzroča, da se Zahodu nazaj

vrača precejšen del njegove nemoči. Njegove nemoči, da bi ustvaril subjektivni prostor, kjer bi ga lahko naseljevala vsa mladina tega sveta.

A to ne opravičuje ničesar, ne opravičuje prav nobenega zločina. Fašizem je strahota, in to v vsakršni obliki. Povsem jasno pa nam mora biti, da sami nikdar ne moremo in ne smemo postati agenti omenjenega protislovja, protislovja med morilskim nihilizmom fašistov ter uničujočo in votlo imperialistično širitvijo globaliziranega kapitalizma. Nikakor ne moremo in ne smemo dopustiti, da bi nas pri sprejemanju katere koli od naših ključnih odločitev zaznamovalo to protislovje.

Danes nosimo posledice tega, da v svetovnem merilu ni prav nobene politike, ki bi bila osvobojena utesnjujočih okvirov kapitalizma. Odsotnost takšne politike po vsem svetu je razlog za pojav in razmah fašistične mladine. Mladim fašistom ne gre pripisovati krivde, da nimamo nobene emancipatorne politike, ki bi bila sposobna oblikovati lastno vizijo in definirati lastne prakse. Saj je prav odsotnost takšne politike omogočila nastanek fašizma, banditizma in verskih blodenj.

To me spomni na Racinovo tragedijo Fedra, na besede, ki jih Fedra izreče v trenutku, ko bi morala priznati svojo ljubezen, ki pa se njej sami zdi zločinska: Moja nesreča prihaja od daleč.¹ Tudi mi bi lahko rekli, da vzrok za našo bolečino sega dlje od priseljencev, od islama, od razdejanega Bližnjega vzhoda ali od oplenjene Afrike ... Naša bolečina izhaja iz zgodovinskega neuspeha komunizma. Torej v resnici sega že kar daleč v preteklost.

»Komunizem« zame ni drugega kot ime, zgodovinsko ime za strateško mišljenje, ki ni bilo ujeto v hegemonistično kapitalistično strukturo. Njegov usodni neuspeh je bil najverjetneje zapečaten že sredi sedemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Zato se periodizacija, ki jo na tem mestu predlagamo, začne v osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja, ko smo v obliki neke nove energije kapitalizma že lahko zaznali zapoznele učinke omenjenega neuspeha.

In kje smo danes? Obstajajo nekatere lokalne izkušnje, obstajajo neka prepričanja, ne pravim, da ni ničesar. Obstaja pa cela vrsta stvari, ki jih mora preprijiti novi način mišljenja. Imamo tudi zelo jasno predstavo o razpoložljivih

¹ Prevod Jože Udovič, Cankarjeva založba v Ljubljani, 1972 (op. p.).

silah. Imamo nomadski proletariat, ki prihaja z najbolj opustošenih območij. Ta nomadski proletariat je že zdaj močno internacionaliziran, najdemo ga povsod po svetu. Številni delavci v Koreji so pretežno iz Nepala, ali pa so prišli iz Bangladeša, tako kot ogromna množica delavcev prihaja sem k nam iz Maroka ali Malija ... Imamo torej ta ogromni nomadski proletariat, ki tvori potencialno avantgardo velikanskih množic ljudi, katerih životarjenja v svetu, kakršen je danes, prav nihče ne upošteva.

Vseeno pa obstajajo tudi intelektualci, ljudje iz srednjega razreda, tudi zahodnega, ki so dovzetni za to novo mišljenje in ga razširjajo, ali pa to vsaj poskušajo početi. Nadaljnji korak pa je, da se z nomadskim proletariatom povežejo, ga obišejo, se z njim posvetujejo in pogovarjajo. Novo mišljenje se v politiki lahko rodi le iz nepričakovanih in malo verjetnih zavezništov. Na skupnih poteh in enakopravnih srečanjih.

Poleg tega so tu še mladi ... Mladi, ki se znajdejo na robu sveta, kamor so jih prignali že prej omenjeni razlogi, sprašujejo, kaj jim pravzaprav ta svet sploh ponuja. In morda se ne želijo ugnezditi v nobeni od treh subjektivnosti, ki sem jih poimenoval tipične. Morda si ne želijo peti slave Zahodu: morda si ne želijo, da bi se vdajali želji po tej slavi in z njo povezali svoje usode; in morda si tudi ne želijo bivati v morilskem nihilizmu. Če ne bodo dobili nobene drugačne strateške ponudbe, bodo ostali dezorientirani. Kapitalizem je stroj za dezorientacijo subjektov, če se že takoj ne vdajo in ne pristanejo na življenje znotraj izpraznjene binoma potrošnik/mezdni delavec.

In če bo prišla takšna ponudba, če bo novo mišljenje res oplajajoče, bo sodobni fašizem onemogočen. Ne bodo ga onemogočile umazane vojne, ki jih napoveduje država in ki nam ne obetajo ničesar dobrega. Pojavila se bo zmožnost resorpcije, izničenja naraščajoče fašizacije, saj bo na voljo nekaj novega. Ustvarili bomo še četrto obliko značilne subjektivnosti, ki bo preseгла dominacijo globaliziranega kapitalizma, a se ne bo nikdar prepustila nihilizmu, morilski preobrazbi želje po Zahodu. To je najbolj bistveno. Da bi to dosegli, je treba sklepati posebna zavezništva, treba je razmišljati na drugi ravni. Intelektualci bi se morali organsko povezati z mladimi iz različnih okolij na podlagi izkušenj in praks, najprej lokalnih, nato pa tudi širših in splošnejših. Na točki, kjer se zaenkrat nahajamo, je vprašanje nižje ali višje ravni drugotnega pomena. Vse-

kakor pa bi morali tako mladi, ne glede na njihov izvor, kot tudi intelektualci napraviti kakšno gesto, premik, korak naproti nomadskemu proletariatu.

Stvari so nujne, strateško nujne, in se tičejo vseh. Gre za delo, ki je delo za vse. Predvsem je delo mišljenja, a tudi drugačno delo, pot, ko gremo sami pogledat tistega drugega, o katerem smo že marsikaj slišali, da bi na lastne oči videli, kdo je ta človek v resnici, da bi se seznanili z njegovim razmišljanjem, njegovimi idejami, spoznali njegov pogled na svet, in da bi se skupaj z njim lahko vpisali v strateško vizijo usode človeštva, ki bi poskušala spremeniti smer sprejete zgodovine človeštva in jo iztrgati iz te mračne nesreče, v kateri se trenutno utaplja.

Sam sem neomajen optimist, mar ne, saj verjamem, da se bo vse to tudi zgodilo. Vendar se že mudi. Zelo mudi ...

Prevedla Janina Kos

Philosophy and Psychoanalysis

Alan Bass*

The Heideggerian Thing

The Handkerchief and the Fetish

Fetishism enters *Being and Time* as a temptation to be avoided. How? Why?

We are in Division One, the long analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The aim is to prepare the analysis of Dasein and temporality. To restate the well known themes: Dasein is always already *in* a world, a world which is not objectively present for a subject. Rather the “worldliness” of world—what the “in” of being-in-the-world means— is itself constitutive of the existential structure of Dasein. Introducing the analysis of worldliness, Heidegger asks the question of where to take his point of departure: “Which beings are to be our preliminary theme and established as a pre-phenomenal basis? / We answer: things” (1996, p. 63). While it would be a mistake to equate Dasein with “mind,” Heidegger’s point of departure is nevertheless related to my fundamental theme: the relation to things.

The fetish as thing will be discussed as a possible example of this point of departure, a possibility to be dismissed. The reasons for this dismissal will also concern another fundamental theme: the history of the European encounter with fetishism. This history is always a conception of the “primitive.” Heidegger is no exception, so one must attend to his remarks about the role of ethnological data in the existential analytic. The context is his justification for the analysis of everyday Dasein, which will eventually yield the structure of care, Dasein’s being. He asks whether everydayness is a “primitive stage of Dasein, that we become acquainted with empirically through anthropology” (p. 47). The answer is no, because everydayness is “a kind of being of Dasein” even in “a highly developed culture” (*ibid.*). Nonetheless, “primitive Dasein” has its own forms of “noneveryday being... and its own specific everydayness” (*ibid.*). There might be an advantage to orienting the analysis of Dasein toward “the life of primitive peoples”: “...‘primitive phenomena’ are often less hidden and complicated by extensive self-interpretation on the part of the Dasein in question. Primitive

Dasein often speaks out of a more primordial absorption in ‘phenomena’ (in the pre-phenomenological sense)” (*ibid.*). In other words, primitive absorption in phenomena is free of the objectifying, theoretical relation to phenomena, the kind of relation that obscures the existential analytic. (This is not so far from Comte on fetishism as non-metaphysical, direct engagement with things.)

But our knowledge of “primitive peoples” is compromised by its source, ethnology itself.

...ethnology already moves in certain preliminary concepts and interpretations of human being in general... We do not know whether commonplace psychology or even scientific psychology and sociology, which the ethnologist brings with him, offer any scientific guarantee for an adequate possibility of access, interpretation, and mediation of the phenomena to be investigated... Ethnology itself already presupposes an adequate analytic of Dasein as its guideline. But since the positivistic sciences neither ‘can’ nor should wait for the ontological work of philosophy, the continuation of research will not be accomplished as ‘progress’; but, rather, as the *repetition* and the ontologically more transparent purification of what has been ontically discovered (*ibid.*).

From within the entire project of the “destruction” of metaphysics, this is a clear point. If the history of metaphysics is the history of the forgetting of being, then any empirical discipline which does not engage its metaphysical presuppositions inevitably repeats that forgetting. All anthropologies, including the great ones of Kant and Hegel, participate in this structure. They “presuppose an adequate analytic of Dasein” which they do not possess. Thus, they will have to misconstrue “primitive Dasein,” because they do not understand Dasein itself. The ethnological data requires ontological “purification”. This “purification” is not the acquisition of more data, but rather the rehearsing, the repetition, of that data from the ontological point of view. Hence, it is an “illusion” to think that knowledge of the “most exotic and manifold forms of existence” (p. 48) will itself be of any use in elaborating the conception of world necessary for the analytic of Dasein. Here, the “primitive” is not excluded from the existential analytic; excluded, rather, is the compromised knowledge we have of it.

The brief discussion of fetishism itself will be a complement to the discussion of primitive Dasein. It will be introduced by a knot in a handkerchief. The knot

will be an example of everyday Dasein's relation to things, Heidegger's point of departure.

Things are in the world. The worldliness of the world is revealed through the analysis of things as tools or equipment. Everyday Dasein always already is in the mode of using things—I use the doorknob to open the door. Phenomenological access to beings encountered this way must reject the “interpretational tendencies” that cover over “‘taking care’ of things in general, and thus even more of beings *as they are encountered of their own accord in taking care*” (p. 63). Calling the things we encounter in taking care “useful,” Heidegger says that there is “no such thing as *a useful thing*” (p. 64). Rather, there is a totality of useful things, of things used “in order to” do something. “In order to” always contains a “*reference of something to something*” (*ibid.*). In other words, because reference itself is not a specific being, yet belongs to the totality of useful things, (the world), the structure of reference is ontological; it reveals the worldliness of world.

To sharpen this point, Heidegger uses the example of a broken tool, an unusable thing. A broken hammer is just there, in its “unyielding objective presence” (p. 69). Apparently the referential structure of the “in order to” is disturbed.

But in a *disturbance of reference*—in being unusable for...—the reference becomes explicit... circumspect noticing of the reference to the particular [i.e. ontic] what-for makes the what-for visible and with it the context of the work, the whole ‘workshop’ as that in which taking care of things has always already been dwelling. The context of useful things appears not as a totality never seen before, but as a totality that has continually been seen beforehand in our circumspection. But with this totality world makes itself known (p. 70).

Heidegger consistently uses this kind of argument: a global disturbance of what something is reveals what it is. The apparently “unyielding objective presence” of the broken hammer does not demonstrate that usefulness and reference are attributes added to objective presence. Rather it demonstrates that world as reference is “always already disclosed for circumspection” (p. 70). “Disclosure” itself means “‘to unlock’—‘to be open’” (*ibid.*). Anyone familiar with *Being and Time* will grasp the portent of this remark. Heidegger is preparing the analysis of truth as disclosure, which always means the understanding of “opening” as the existential space for the possible encounter with the thing.

Heidegger now defines being-in-the-world as “circumspect absorption in the references constitutive for the handiness of the totality of useful things” (p. 71). Because “reference” is the pivotal concept, and reference points to something beyond specific use, i.e. to usefulness in general, Heidegger looks at the “sign structure” of reference. Signs themselves are “useful things with manifold references ...the sign structure itself yields an ontological guideline for ‘characterizing’ any being whatsoever” (p. 72). By “signs” as useful things Heidegger means *things that indicate*, such as signposts, flags, the directional signal of a car. Indication is the “ontic concretion” of the ontological determination “of the useful thing as a useful thing” (p. 73). Signs, then, are “*useful things which explicitly bring a totality of useful things to circumspection so that the worldly character of what is at hand makes itself known at the same time...*” (p. 74). Because reference and signs reveal the “worldly character of what is at hand,” and because the structure of worldliness is constitutive of Dasein as being-in-the-world, they intimate the structure of existential space, the “in” of being-in-the-world. “Signs address themselves to a specifically ‘spatial’ being-in-the-world” (*ibid.*).

Heidegger then envisages an inevitable objection. What is taken as a sign, (e.g. the south wind as a sign of rain), must have become accessible first before the sign is established, (there has to have been a south wind). Yes, he says, what is taken as a sign does indeed have to “be there in some way or another” (p. 75). But what is essential is not to assume that something present at hand which is *not yet* a sign is something “merely objectively present” (*ibid.*).

As an example, Heidegger takes making a knot in a handkerchief as a reminder of something to do. (Stambaugh renders Heidegger’s “Knopf in Taschentuch” as a “string on one’s finger” [p. 76], which is more familiar to the English reader, but loses the feel of the example.) One might, however, forget what one is supposed to remember. The “knot” then does not entirely lose its “sign character, but rather acquires the disturbing obtrusiveness of something near at hand” (p. 76). The broken tool was also a disturbance of the structure of reference, a disturbance which could mislead one into assuming the priority of objective presence. Instead, this very disturbance illuminates the ontological status of reference.

The disturbing knot is the hinge to fetishism. Let us consider it. Heidegger wants to show that something unusable that is apparently “just there” cannot be divorced from the sign structure of useful things. Even if I have forgotten why I put

the knot in the handkerchief, I know that I wanted to *use* it as a reminder, just as I know that the broken hammer was a useful thing. But Heidegger seems to gloss over a difference between the broken hammer and the perplexing knot. If I forget what I have put the knot in the handkerchief for, but of course know that I wanted to use it as a reminder, I am reminded of why I put a knot in the handkerchief in the first place: I might forget something. I know that memory is fallible. I might be able to compensate for this fallibility with a thing. This could certainly reinforce Heidegger's point about the sign structure of useful things. But it also raises the question of the relation to the memory aid.

The psychoanalyst will always wonder whether forgetting what one wanted to remember is a slip. If so, then the perplexing knot is another kind of sign—a sign that for reasons I am not aware of, I might not want to remember what I intend to remember. (Heidegger would reject this point, as he makes clear in his refutation of the Freudian theory of slips in the much later *Zollikon Seminars*.) The knot in the handkerchief is then a symptom in the fabric of the mind. Whether for psychoanalytic or putatively non-psychoanalytic reasons, the knot then refers to mind referring to itself. I know that my mind is not consistently reliable. In fact, it is so unreliable that I might even forget how I have tried to compensate for that unreliability. I cannot remember why I put the knot in the handkerchief. There is nothing like this in the example of the broken hammer.

After the knot, new paragraph, first sentence: “One could be tempted to illustrate the distinctive role of signs in everyday heedfulness for the understanding of the world itself by citing the extensive use of ‘signs,’ such as fetishism and magic, in primitive Dasein” (p. 76). “Primitive” immediately alerts one to the earlier discussion of ethnological data. Heidegger at first seems to follow his previous line of reasoning, stating that “the establishment of signs that underlies such use of signs does not come about with theoretical intent and by way of theoretical speculation” (*ibid.*). He is typically describing a relation to things not obscured by the theoretical distancing which assumes that things are objectively present. The use of signs in fetishism and magic “remains completely within an ‘immediate’ being-in-the-world” (*ibid.*). But the temptation to use fetishism and magic as an illustration of the sign structure is to be avoided: “... when one looks more closely, it becomes clear that the interpretation of fetishism and magic under the guideline of the idea of signs is not sufficient at all to comprehend the kind of ‘handiness’ of beings encountered in the world of primitives” (*ibid.*).

If reference and sign disclose the worldliness of world, and if the handiness of fetishism and magic cannot be a sign, then there is no possible ontological status of fetishism and magic. This is what Heidegger goes on to explain, using a variant of the argument of the broken tool:

With regard to the phenomenon of signs, we might give the following interpretation, that for primitive people the sign coincides with what it indicates. The sign itself can represent what it indicates not only in the sense of replacing it, but in such a way that the sign itself always *is* what is indicated. This remarkable coincidence of the sign with what is indicated does not, however, mean that the sign-thing has already undergone a certain 'objectification,' has been experienced as a pure thing and been transposed together with what is signified to some region of being of objective presence. The 'coincidence' is not an identification of hitherto isolated things, but rather the sign has not yet become free from that for which it is a sign. This kind of use of signs is still completely absorbed in the being of what is indicated so that a sign as such cannot be detached at all. The coincidence is not based on a first objectification, but rather upon the complete lack of such an objectification. But this means that signs are not at all discovered as useful things, that ultimately what is 'at hand' in the world does not have the kind of being of useful things at all. Perhaps this ontological guideline (handiness and useful things), too, can provide nothing for an interpretation of the primitive world, and certainly for an ontology of thingliness. [Macquarrie and Robinson render this sentence: "Perhaps even readiness-to-hand and equipment have nothing to contribute as ontological clues in Interpreting the primitive world; and certainly the ontology of Thinghood even less" (p. 113)] But if an understanding of being is constitutive for primitive Dasein and the primitive world in general, it is all the more urgent to develop the 'formal' idea of worldliness; namely of a phenomenon which can be modified in such a way that all ontological statements which assert that in a given phenomenal context something is *not yet* or *no longer* such and such may acquire a *positive* phenomenal meaning in terms of what it is *not* (pp. 76–77).

Heidegger here repeats the major aspect of the European encounter with fetishism: the fetish is what it indicates. The rock *is* the god. As in the entire tradition, Heidegger understands the fetish as not detached from, not free from, what it seems to signify. It does not have the sign structure of replacement. Whether from a philosophical or a psychoanalytic point of view, the consistency of this description cannot be avoided. The point is always to see what happens when

it enters thought. We have seen the contrasting views of De Brosses and Comte. For De Brosses it is a question of both an “excess of stupidity” that precludes reason, and of the aporias of accounting for the relation of the concrete and the abstract. For Comte it is a question of a non-metaphysical absorption in things which could yield a scientific “subjective synthesis”. For psychoanalysis, it is the analogous question of “concreteness” (Bass).

For Heidegger the primitive cannot even have a metaphysics of objective presence. The fetish that is what it indicates is not a transposition of something objectively present to something else objectively present: there is no objectification at all. One might think that this would be all to the good for Heidegger; he has already accredited the non-theoretical, immediate “being-in-the-world” of primitive fetishism and magic. However, the lack of objectification means that signs themselves are not discovered as useful things. In other words, a sign that indicates only itself—the constant theme in the history of fetishism—lacks the referential structure which is essential to understanding the worldliness of the world. This is why Heidegger says that “Perhaps this ontological guideline (handiness and useful things), too, can provide nothing for an interpretation of the primitive world, and certainly for an ontology of thingliness.” But, extending the earlier remarks about the Dasein of primitive peoples, there has to be some way of conceptualizing their being-in-the-world. There has to be a “formal” idea of worldliness. Such a formal idea could yield positive ontological knowledge in terms of what it is not—as for the broken tool, or even the perplexing knot.

I will outline two readings of this passage.

The first might see Heidegger blindly repeating the entire history of the ethnology he rejects. In this history of fetishism the self-referential, concrete nature of the fetish precludes the abstraction of symbolization. This is what Mauss called the “immense misunderstanding”. In this view, the fetish cannot co-exist with symbolic structures. There is no possibility of symbolization, of the sign as replacement, in the primitive world. The ethnologist then overlooks the complex symbolic structures that co-exist with apparently non-symbolic fetishism. Analogously, Heidegger says that there is not even objectification in the primitive world, so that signs cannot be discovered as useful things. The self-reference of the fetish precludes reference. This is why Mauss protested: “The object which serves as a fetish is never, no matter what has been said about it, just any given

object, chosen arbitrarily; rather it is always defined by the code of magic and religion” (p. 216). In other words, the fetish is never exclusively self-referential.

And how could it be the case that “primitive Dasein” completely lacks the sense of the handiness of things as tools “for something”? Would “primitive Dasein” be unable to understand the south wind as a sign of rain, without confusing it with rain, even if wind or rain themselves might be worshiped? Or, inversely, would Heidegger say that even in an “advanced state of culture” there are no self-referential structures? The psychoanalyst encounters patients who simultaneously do not conflate signs with what they indicate, and yet who do resist symbolic interpretation, forming a fetishistic transference to the analytic process. And where does Heidegger get the idea that there simply is no “objectification” for “primitive Dasein”? He could be making the historical point that for “primitive Dasein” the “object” in the modern sense, which emerges out of the work of Descartes, does not yet exist. But he seems to be saying something broader: the conflation of indication and indicated precludes any possible objectification in the sense of *ob-ject* or *Gegen-stand*: that which stands against one, and hence is separate from one—“free,” in Heidegger’s sense.

From a Nietzschean point of view one could say the opposite. When Nietzsche says that “metaphysics begins in dreams,” he means that the dream experience, the feeling of being visited by apparently real “spirits,” initiates belief in a second, transcendent world. Historically the argument about fetishism has always been that it has no possible relation to transcendence. However, it was precisely the persistence of fetishistic formations in modern religions, with their belief in an abstract god, that led Hume to his statement about the universal error of objective presence. In other words, wherever there is belief in either real “spirits” or transcendence, there is conviction of a “world” apart from oneself, and hence some form of objectification. This is why Nietzsche ironically spoke of belief in the primacy of consciousness and in the reality of a second world as metaphysical fetishes.

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One can extend Nietzsche’s thought about dreams and transcendence to Freud’s conception of the dream experience (1900). To explain the “reality effect” of the dream, Freud emphasizes its hallucinatory nature. To experience a hallucination is to have the feeling of experiencing something objectively real. Hallucinatory reality is a product of what Freud calls perceptual identity and temporal

immediacy. If I see something now that is identical to something I have seen before, it is objectively real for me—even if it is a hallucination. The primal example is the hungry baby who hallucinates the image of the breast that previously fed it, an image stored in unconscious memory. Freud’s conception of hallucination provokes the vexing problem of reality testing: to see something now cannot be the ultimate criterion of reality, because this is also true for hallucinations. But it also says that once there are dreams, there is always a version of objective presence—which would also have to hold for “primitive Dasein”. Integrating Mauss, Nietzsche, and Freud, to construe the fetish *only* in terms of lack of reference, transcendence, and objectification would be evidence of blindness to anything other than immediate self reference, a blindness based on both prejudice and failure to consider how the fetish is constructed. Particularly from Freud’s point of view, any symptom—whether in neurosis, in the slips of the psychopathology of everyday life, or in the construction of a fetish—is a compromise between knowing and not knowing. This is why at the end of his life he extends the construction of the fetish backward to account for the action of mind on itself that produces symptoms or slips.

But, one could object, if Heidegger says that the fetish is *not yet* a sign, just as the broken tool or the perplexing knot are *no longer* signs, then there would have to be a link between the self-reference of the fetish and the reference of the unusable thing. The fetish which is not yet a sign has to be capable of becoming one. This too, is a question examined throughout the history of fetishism. De Brosses’ universalization of fetishism put him in the awkward position of having to account for the possibility of abstract monotheism across an apparently unbridgeable divide; recall his argument about the sons of Noah. Derrida commented on this issue in *Glas*, via Kant and Hegel. For Kant the “teleological horizon of ‘true and unique religion’ is the disappearance of the fetish” (p. 207). For Hegel, the fetish as African is foreign to historical consciousness. It belongs “to an unconscious that does not let itself be dialectized as such, that has no history... But this nondialecticalness, this ahistoricity can always be interpreted as negativity, as resistance proper to the dialectic economy, and consequently interned in the speculative process” (*ibid.*). Although Heidegger is making an argument about worldliness, not religion, like Kant and Hegel he sees the fetish as both foreign to reference, and as destined to reference, in its not-yetness. This is why there has to be a “formal” structure of worldliness that could account for “primitive Dasein,” which does not yet encounter things as referential. If the

fetish is poised between not being a sign and potentially becoming a sign, then the sign structure cannot be completely foreign to it. But does Heidegger explain how this is so? Or is he unable to do so, and hence the dismissal of fetishism? Is the fetish a perplexing knot for Heidegger?

If one grants this argument, there is a second way to read the passage. Heidegger does say that the fetish's lack of referentiality, even more than the broken tool or the perplexing knot, contains the possibility of an ontology of things that is wider than the one elaborated on the basis of handiness. Is Heidegger momentarily considering the universality of fetishism? "One could be *tempted* to illustrate the distinctive role of signs in everyday heedfulness for the understanding of the world itself by citing the extensive use of 'signs,' such as fetishism and magic, in primitive Dasein" (p. 76 [my emphasis]). He imagines the possibility of an ontological status of the fetish, but resists it for the traditional reason of its self-referentiality, while knowing that there has to be a "formal structure" of being-in-the-world that would have to include the primitive. What if his resistance were misguided? Whether ethnologically or clinically, apparently non-abstract and closed self referential structures always co-exist with apparently abstract and open symbolic structures. One cannot simply say that the fetish is foreign to symbolism. This is the problem of self-reference: is it ever simply closed in on itself, ever simply concrete?

This is the central question: can the self-reference of the fetish open onto other ways of thinking what we usually call "mind" and what we usually call "thing". Recall the perplexing knot, the thing that is both no longer a sign of what one was supposed to remember, and that is a sign of mind's fallibility, its action upon itself—which Heidegger does not consider. Heidegger would justifiably suspect the traditional concept of mind, but his point of departure from things to elucidate Dasein's being rethinks "mind" and "thing" in terms of their relatedness. And this relatedness is always a question of finitude, a question itself always related to how "mind" acts on itself (This will become clearer via *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.) As finite being-in-the-world, as always already related to things, the existential structure of world and things *are* Dasein.

And vice versa, when being-in-the-world as care becomes the structure of time. Care is temporality because both care and time are simultaneously being ahead (the existential future), being already (the existential past), and being together

with (the existential present)—but not as a future present, a past present, and a present present or now. If that were the case, time would occur and elapse in an objective present, making time itself something objectively present—which it cannot be. Hence, Heidegger writes: “Temporality ‘is’ not a *being* [i.e. something objectively present] at all. It is not, but rather *temporalizes* itself... temporality [is] the *ekstatikon* par excellence. Temporality is the primordial ‘outside’ of itself... [I]ts essence is temporalizing in the unity of the *ecstasies*” (1996, p. 302). To paraphrase: the way in which Dasein exists only as outside itself, as being-in-the-world (existential space), as *ek-static*, as always already outside itself, is the structure of time as the reaching out toward each other, the *ek-stasis*, of past, present, and future. Since none of this is objectively present, is not a being, is neither a subject acting on an object nor vice versa, time is this “outsiding”. But although time is not an objectively present being, nonetheless, it is a kind of thing—the *ekstatikon* par excellence. This non-present thing is an auto-affective process—temporalizing itself.

Two critical strands come together here. The first is the understanding of the *being* of being-in-the-world. Since being-in-the-world is always a relation to things, but things not objectively present, worldliness or thingliness must be integrated with the structure of time. Hence the paradoxical noun form of time temporalizing itself: *the ekstatikon* par excellence. The second is the understanding of time itself. If existential space is existential time, if being-in is being-outside, and if time itself is this “outsiding,” then time has to have a non-objectively present spatial aspect. As spatial it is thingly, is a kind of *thing*—again, *the ekstatikon* par excellence. This kind of thing is auto-affective. Is the auto-affective thing completely foreign to the self-referential thing? Could being as time, as auto-affective thing, as care, as being-in-the-world, simply exclude fetishism?

From a psychoanalytic point of view, everyday universal phenomena such as dreams and slips reveal the basic structure of mind. Eventually, and unwittingly, Freud joins a long tradition in universalizing fetishism, to say more about the basic structure of mind (1940). Heidegger is tempted by fetishism, but then rejects it, based on the false premises that have characterized the metaphysics he wants to “destroy”. Does the temptation speak to an intuition that fetishism does open onto the crucial ontological questions of the thing and time? What if Heidegger had known of the anthropological finding of the universality of fetishism? And had also known of Mauss’ critique of traditional analyses of fetish-

ism, had known that the apparently exclusive self-reference of the fetish always exists in the context of a symbolic code? And had been able to question the usual conceptions of the “primitive”? Could he have yielded to his temptation, and used fetishism to expand his ontology of thingliness? And could this have been a place where Freud’s universalization of fetishism would have had to encounter Heidegger on the thing?

The Transcendental Imagination: The Iridescent Thing

The questions of the relation to things and the auto-affective structure of time are sharpened in Heidegger’s reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. To understand how, and to begin to examine the consequences, require a detailed examination of that work.

Heidegger gives a clear indication of his “method” in general when he writes in *KPM*: “...with any philosophical knowledge in general, what is said in uttered propositions must not be decisive. Instead, what must be decisive is what it sets before our eyes as still unsaid, in and through what has been said” (p. 140). One can restate this in terms of Kant’s guiding question in *CPR*: how does man, a finite creature, have knowledge of things he has not created, since creation of things belongs to the infinite reason of God? By ferreting out the unsaid in Kant’s answer to this question, a question about the relatedness of mind and thing, Heidegger will make Kant’s conception of mind and thing ontological, i.e. temporal. My contention will be that Heidegger’s controversial reading of Kant has crucial resources for the psychoanalytic conception of “mind”; I began to lay this out in *Interpretation and Difference* (2006, pp. 77–83), and will have to return to that here. And because my major point is that Freud’s late generalization of fetishism would have to affect his entire conception of unconscious processes, I am attempting to demonstrate that Heidegger’s analysis of the unsaid in Kant is essential to the unsaid in the theory of fetishism, and even to the dismissal of fetishism in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger has to begin by contesting the traditional understanding of the *CPR* as an epistemological work. That understanding derives from Kant’s well known idea that the metaphysical foundations of natural science provide the means to understand the possibility of man’s knowledge of things he has not created. However, when Kant says that the purpose of the *Critique* is to lay “the ground

for metaphysics as a whole” (*KPM*, p. 8), Heidegger takes him at his word. To lay the ground for metaphysics as a whole means “unveiling in the inner possibility of ontology” (*ibid.*). Specifically, it means that Kant’s most general question about the possibility of knowledge—how are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible?—is itself the question of “the inner possibility of ontology.”

This is why Heidegger consistently inflects Kant ontologically. For Kant, pure reason, reason which does not depend upon experience, is a faculty of knowing according to *a priori* principles. The issue is to determine how *a priori* synthetic judgments—i.e. judgments which add to knowledge—are possible. Heidegger says that this means that Kant is concerned with the “quiddity”—the whatness—of the thing, an ontological question. Quiddity, then, is itself a question of experience free synthesis. “...bringing forth of the determination of the Being of the being is a preliminary self-relating to the being. This pure ‘relation-to...’ (synthesis) forms first and foremost the that-upon-which and the horizon within which the being in itself becomes experientiable...” (p. 10). Why “self-relating”? Because every judgment, according to Kant, is an “I connect” (*ibid.*). Heidegger here is looking at Kant in terms of process. Whatever the content of the “I connect,” it is a process of “mind” *relating to itself*. Heidegger’s entire argument seeks to demonstrate that self-relating is actually the possibility of *a priori* synthesis, “access” to the being, the thing. The demonstration itself will be guided by the auto-affective nature of time. To follow the complex structure of Heidegger’s argument it is useful to know this in advance.

Continuing. Because human reason is finite, Heidegger zeroes in on Kant’s initial statement about finite knowledge: “In whatever manner and by whatever means a knowing may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it relates itself immediately to them and upon which all thought as a means is directed” (p. 15). Heidegger comments: “In order to understand the *Critique of Pure Reason* this point must be hammered in, so to speak: knowing is primarily intuiting. From this it at once becomes clear that the new interpretation of knowledge as judging (thinking) violates the decisive sense of the Kantian problem. All thinking is merely in the service of intuition” (*ibid.*).

If we know in advance that Heidegger will be concerned with auto-affection, we can see why he starts with Kant on intuition as a “knowing” that is an *immediate relating of itself to objects*. But, to return to the order of Heidegger’s

argument, he is “hammering” in the point about intuition to justify the weight he will give to the very short transcendental aesthetic that begins the *CPR*. Intuition is sensory in the Greek sense, *aisthesis*. Kant, of course, is not concerned with empirical intuition, but with experience free, *a priori* intuition: hence the *transcendental* aesthetic. Heidegger makes a crucial point about the necessity of a transcendental aesthetic:

The essence of sensibility exists in the finitude of intuition... With this, Kant for the first time attains a concept of sensibility which is ontological rather than sensualistic. Accordingly, if empirically affective intuition of beings does not need to coincide with ‘sensibility,’ then the possibility of a non-empirical sensibility remains essentially open... if finite intuition is now to be knowledge, then it must be able to make the being itself as revealed accessible with respect to both what and how it is for everyone at all times (p. 19).

There is an enormous amount embedded in this comment. By taking Kant at his word Heidegger approaches the “unsaid” in his thought: the paradoxical concept of “non-empirical sensibility” is the key to a new understanding of intuition as the primal relation to the thing. In combined Kantian and Heideggerean language: “...the synthesis of thinking and intuiting accomplishes the making evident of the encountered being as object...” (p. 20). Heidegger always questions the encounter of the “being as object”. But by analyzing this encounter in terms of the “synthesis of thinking and intuiting,” Heidegger will go beyond the being as object—and man as subject.

This takes us to the next crucial step of the argument. Kant famously characterizes thinking and intuiting, concept formation and sensory reception, as the “two basic sources of the mind,” other than which there are “no others” (p. 25). How can they be synthesized? Heidegger cites Kant from the beginning of the *Critique*: “...there are two stems of human knowledge, *sensibility* and *understanding*, which perhaps spring forth from a common, but to us unknown, root” (*ibid.*). He juxtaposes this statement with one from the conclusion of the *Critique*, in which Kant says that he has begun where “the common root of our power of knowledge divides and throws out two stems, one of which is reason” (p. 26). Kant explicitly says that the purpose of the *Critique* is to “outline the *architectonic* of all knowledge arising from *pure reason*” (*ibid.*). This is why the

Critique is usually read as an epistemological work. Heidegger, however, hears in these statements an opening to the unsaid:

...the ‘sources’ are understood as ‘stems’ which spring forth from a common root. But whereas in the first passage the ‘common root’ was qualified with a ‘perhaps,’ in the second the ‘common root’ is reputed to exist. Nonetheless, in both passages this root is only alluded to. Kant not only fails to pursue it further, but even declares that it is ‘unknown to us’. From this, something essential arises for the general character of the Kantian laying of the ground for metaphysics: it leads not to the crystal clear, absolute evidence of a first maxim and principle, but rather goes into and points consciously toward the unknown... (*ibid.*).

The rest of *KPM* will be a demonstration that the “common root” indeed exists, that Kant himself has embedded an explanation of it in the *CPR*, but that this explanation undermines his entire architectonic. It will be something from which Kant has to “recoil”. My aim will be to show the importance of Heidegger’s delineation of the common root for the psychoanalytic conception of mind in relation to fetishism.

If there could be a common root, it would have to explain the synthesis of the elements of pure knowledge—pure intuition and pure thinking (p. 27). This would have to be a demonstration of the possibility of a pure, experience free, transcendental synthesis which requires “clarification of the original ground for the inner possibility of this synthesis” (*ibid.*). This original ground is what Heidegger means by “ontological”. One knows that if it is ontological it will depend upon the forgotten question of being (time) itself. This is why Heidegger says about the demonstration of a transcendental synthesis is a “projecting freeing of the whole, which an ontology essentially makes possible”. It thus “brings metaphysics to the ground and soil in which it is rooted as a ‘haunting’ of human nature” (p. 29).

“Haunting” is a citation; Kant’s word is *Heimsuchung*. Richard Taft adds an important translator’s note about it: “The German *Heimsuchung* is translated by Kemp Smith [the translator of the *CPR*] as ‘visitation,’ but the term also connotes a haunting or an obsession. I render it ‘haunting’ to show the sense in which the questions Kant asks are an inescapable and lingering part of human nature. We should at the same time be attuned to the literal sense of the word, which

suggests the seeking of a home” (p. 29, n. 57). Whether as visitation, haunting, obsession, or the search for a home, Heidegger is emphasizing Kant’s word to show that the question of being, the forgotten or unsaid of metaphysics, cannot not be at work in a critique of pure reason. It cannot not visit a laying of the ground for metaphysics, but this visit can be a visitation, comparable to the way a spirit or ghost insinuates itself. It cannot not haunt, or obsess, any attempt to find the home of metaphysics—a home which is foreign to it. A foreign home: the *unheimlich*, the uncanny, which is such an important theme throughout Heidegger’s work. The *unheimlichkeit* of this *heim*, the “unknown common root,” will be the reason for what Heidegger will call Kant’s “recoil”.

Let us return to the stages of the argument. From within Kant’s framework, the possible common root of pure intuition and pure knowledge must be a transcendental synthesis. And if all thought is in service to intuition, the “transcendental synthesis must be an intuition, and as *a priori* knowing, it must be a pure intuition” (p. 30). Space and time are the pure intuitions of the transcendental aesthetic. Kant defines space as the pure external sense and time as the pure internal sense. Because Kant says that time “is the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever” Heidegger says that time “has preeminence over space” (p. 34). Hence, he is going to show how “time shifts more and more to the forefront in the course of the individual stages of the laying of the ground for metaphysics, and hereby first reveals its own particular essence in a more original way than the provisional characterization in the Transcendental Aesthetic permits” (*ibid.*).

Heidegger justifies his approach:

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If in general the grounding of the universality of time as pure intuition is to be possible, this can only happen if it can be shown that although space and time as pure intuitions both belong ‘to the subject,’ time dwells in the subject in a more original way than space. Time immediately reduced to the givens of inner sense, however, is at the same time only ontologically more universal if the subjectivity of the subject exists in the openness for the being. The more subjective time is, the more original and extensive is the expansiveness of the subject (p. 35).

One hears the echo of *Being and Time*. Existential space, being-in-the-world as the relation to things, yielded existential time, ecstatic time temporalizing itself.

Heidegger cannot literally accept Kant's characterization of time as subjective. Rather he is pushing Kantian subjectivity to its limits, wanting to show how the temporality of the subject expands—or even explodes—it. (Again: this is the importance of the preliminary point about knowing as a *self-relating* to the being.) The overall aim is the integration of expansive time, which opens the “subject” to the thing, with the delineation of the common root. Let us already envisage the integration of the common root with expansive time, the very relatedness of mind and thing, as the possibility of fetishism.

Proceeding carefully, Heidegger says that intuition and thinking as the elements of finite knowledge demonstrate a “pull of the elements toward one another” such that “their unity cannot be ‘later’ than they are themselves, but rather that it must have applied to them ‘earlier’ and must have laid the ground for them. This unity unites the elements as original in such a way that even at first in the uniting, the elements as such spring forth” (p. 41). In other words, there has to be a “prior” synthesis of intuition and thinking that at the same time permits their distinction. The unity of intuition and thinking “may be sketched out initially in such a way that it shows how each of these elements structurally supports the other. They indicate seams [*Fugen*] which point in advance to a having-been-joined-together” (p. 43).

A seam joins and articulates. The seam of intuition and thinking indicates ahead of them that they can be separate. The seam, then, precedes what it joins. The seam is the “unknown common root”. It is a synthesis that is “neither a matter of intuition nor of thinking” (p. 44). Heidegger cites Kant on synthesis itself: “Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the *power of imagination*, a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are seldom conscious even once” (*ibid.*).

“Seldom conscious even once.” The psychoanalyst can wonder: unconscious? In the usual sense, no. Kant is not talking about anything like a dynamic unconscious in the Freudian sense, an unconscious that is the source of drives and wishes that inevitably place the mind in conflict. Rather, he is talking about a possibility of conscious knowledge, a possibility which itself does not operate consciously. In another sense, however, there is a link to Freudian thought. In an unusual passage of the paper on “The Two Principles of Mental Functioning”

(1911, p. 221) a passage that I have referred to in both *Difference and Disavowal* and *Interpretation and Difference*, Freud speaks of “originally unconscious thought.” The passage is unusual in that Freud speaks of an unconscious source of the possibility of conscious knowledge. This is the source of secondary process, which itself is the inhibition, the binding, of the tendency toward the immediate discharge of the primary process. In other words, it is the possibility of delayed gratification. Delay itself implies increase of the tension that discharge would release. “Originally unconscious thought” is not thought in the usual sense, involving connection to words. Rather it is the unconscious tendency toward binding of tension. And this unconscious tendency toward binding is synthetic. Freud specifies that as tension raising delay, originally unconscious thought also binds the *relations* of unconscious memory traces of “objects” (*Objekteindrücke*). This is a unique moment in Freud’s thought, whose many possible implications he does not pursue. Is originally unconscious thought a “blind but indispensable function of the soul”—*Seele*, psyche—of which we are never conscious? Has it any possible connection to a rethinking of time? For the moment, these are only questions.

To return to Heidegger on Kantian imagination and synthesis, he predictably speaks of them temporally. Time as the pure internal sense for Kant is synoptic, the *a priori* unification of time as succession. If pure knowledge itself is synthetic, and pure time synoptic, a “pure synthesis of the power of imagination” would not simply join together intuition and thought. As per his conception of the “seam,” Heidegger sees pure, i.e. transcendental, imagination as the structural center in which “the pure synopsis and the pure, reflecting synthesis meet and join together... [which is] the original, rich wholeness of one which is composed of many members” (p. 45). One “composed of many members” recalls the structure of care as time—an articulated whole of *ek-static* future, past, and present which is itself *the ekstatikon*. This temporal “thing,” we saw, is a process. The transcendental imagination as the possible unknown common root that is a temporal, articulated whole would also have to be conceived in processive terms.

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The essential unity of ontological knowledge cannot be the conclusion, but must instead be the correct *beginning* of the laying of the ground for ontological knowledge. This ground-laying has been transformed into the task of bringing to light pure synthesis as such. But because it is an action, its essence can only become apparent to the extent that it is itself traced out in it springing-forth (p. 46).

This process or action is the possibility of the relation to the thing for finite knowledge. “Finite creatures need this basic faculty of a turning-toward... In this original turning-toward, the finite creature first allows a space for play [*Spielraum*] within which something can ‘correspond’ to it. To hold oneself in advance in such a play-space, to form it originally, is none other than the transcendence which marks all finite comportment to beings” (p. 50). This is a complex point. Heidegger is saying that if we follow Kant on the finitude of human reason, then the “finite creature” structurally, transcendently, *needs* something that makes possible any relation to a thing. This transcendental need is “fulfilled” by a process, the action of pure synthesis, itself a function of the transcendental imagination. This process itself, like the spatiality being-in-the-world, is the opening to the thing, a play-space.

Heidegger does not immediately justify calling this opening a “play-space”. If one is familiar with the rest of his work, one knows how important a notion play is, from the essence of truth as the freedom compared to the play at the center of a wheel, to the commentary on Heraclitus on time as play. In the immediate context of *KPM* one can at least be struck by the oddness of putting play at the center of the Kantian architectonic, whose aim is to lay the metaphysical grounds for deterministic science. But we already know that Heidegger wants to show how the Kantian architectonic has to undermine itself. Once the self-undermining is demonstrated, Heidegger will say more about the *Spielraum*.

Proceeding step by step toward this undermining, Heidegger asks whether the pure synthesis of intuition and thought, a necessary Kantian question, has a place within the Kantian system:

...pure synthesis falls neither to pure intuition nor to pure thought. For this reason, the elucidation of the origin of pure synthesis which is about to begin can be neither a transcendental-aesthetic nor a transcendental-logical one... But to which transcendental discipline, then, does the central problem of the possibility of ontology fall? This question remains foreign to Kant (pp. 46–47).

The foreignness of the question is precisely why Kant can envisage a common root, but say both that it is unknown, and that it is “a blind but indispensable faculty” of “which we are seldom conscious, even once”. Heidegger insists that if one reads the *CPR* without considering these issues, then it will always be

understood as an epistemological work. “But precisely for this reason, the interpretation must free itself from the Kantian architectonic, and it must make the idea of transcendental logic problematic” (p. 47). The implications of this statement are large. If the transcendental logic is the metaphysical ground of Newtonian science, then Heidegger is saying that the transcendental logic cannot really account for its own ground. The possibility of the relation to the thing would be foreign to the conceptual framework of Newtonian science. Psychoanalytically, one can extend this statement: the possibility of something like fetishism, a relation of mind and thing, cannot be conceived in terms of the logic of “classical” science. Is there any possibility that this could have to do with Freud’s “originally unconscious thought”? Or with time?

Proceeding further toward the integration of time with the transcendental imagination, Heidegger undertakes an analysis of the transcendental deduction, one of the most difficult sections of the *CPR*. His daring move is to show that the transcendental deduction itself can be clarified via the relation of imagination to time, even if this “appears to contradict Kant’s own explicit explanation of what deduction means” (p.53). The issue, as always, is the pure synthesis of pure intuition and pure thought, but from the point of view of the formation of the “play-space” which a finite creature *needs* in order to encounter any being at all. Here we come to the question of the transcendental apperception, the Kantian *cogito*, the “I think,” (described above as an “I connect”), which Kant calls “pure, original, unchangeable consciousness” (p. 55). Kant also says that the transcendental apperception “presupposes a synthesis, however, or includes one” (p. 56). Recall that Kant has already established that synthesis itself is a function of imagination—the non-conscious, blind, but indispensable faculty. The pure synthesis of pure intuition and pure thought cannot represent anything empirical. Rather, it is “formative *a priori*, i.e. purely productive” (*ibid.*). Again, this pure synthesis is an action, a process. Crucially for Heidegger, Kant says: “Thus the principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the power of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground for the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience” (*ibid.*). Heidegger can then remind us that if pure synthesis unifies *a priori*, *a priori* unification itself is a question of the pure intuition of time as synopsis. The elements fall into place: “...the intuition which in advance is pure, given, and universal, and which takes things in stride is time. Hence the pure power of imagination must be related to it essentially. Only in this way is the pure power of imagination unveiled as the

mediator between Transcendental Apperception and time” (p. 57). Since Kant also says that “all modifications of the mind... are subject to time... as that in which they must all be brought... into relation with another” (*ibid.*), Heidegger can now say that it is “striking” that Kant does not explicitly pursue “the *a priori* essential relationship of the pure power of imagination to time” (*ibid.*). He is implying that Kant could not pursue the relation of imagination to time because it is the “foreign home” of his entire system.

Kant himself registers discomfort: “That the affinity of appearances... only becomes possible by means of this transcendental function of the power of imagination is indeed strange...” (p. 58). Heidegger intensifies the strangeness via time as the “pure universal intuition... wherein things can be joined in general and [as] that wherein it is possible to form connections” (*ibid.*). Following the implications: if the “I think” is allegedly unchangeable, not subject to modification in time, but if it requires, as Kant says, “a pure power of imagination... which serves as basis for all knowledge *a priori*,” and if the transcendental imagination as synthetic has to be relative to time—can the *cogito* really be unchangeable, timeless?

Heidegger moves more directly toward a temporal *cogito* when he looks at Kant’s highest synthetic principle: “the conditions for the *possibility of experience* in general are at the same time conditions for the *possibility of objects of experience*” (p. 84). Heidegger says that “at the same time” is more important than the italicized words. “At the same time” expresses “the full structure of transcendence,” as the “horizon of objectivity in general,” i.e. the relatedness to the being, the thing. This relatedness is “a going-out-to..., which was previously and at all times necessary in finite knowing, and thus is a constant standing-out-from... (*Ecstasis*)... In itself, transcendence is ecstatic-horizonal. The highest principle gives expression to this articulation of transcendence unified in itself... The grounding principle... is the expression of the most original phenomenological knowledge of the innermost, unified structure of transcendence” (p. 84).

Heidegger is here integrating his reading of Kant’s conception of time as the possibility of the relation to things with the analysis of time itself as *ekstasis*, i.e. the “outsiding” which accounts for Dasein as being-in-the-world (*Being and Time*). And we can ask again: would this not also be the possibility of fetishism, of the relatedness of mind and thing?

Heidegger then takes up the faculty of imagination itself. Kant says that the laying of the ground of metaphysics belongs to the human soul, so Heidegger looks at the discussion of imagination in the *Anthropology*. This recourse to the *Anthropology* will provide an essential insight into imagination, which Heidegger will then seem to disqualify, and then again to revalidate. The structure of this twisting argument is itself essential to understanding the relation of the transcendental imagination and time.

In the *Anthropology* Kant defines imagination as “a faculty of intuition even without the presence of the object” (p. 90). Heidegger reframes this definition: “imagination ‘can’ intuit, ‘can’ take the look of something in stride, without showing the intuited which is referred to...” (p. 91). “Can” is in scare quotes to emphasize that the Kantian faculty is always a capacity, a power, an ability to do something. Here, it is the ability to “see,” to take in a “look,” without actually seeing anything. Heidegger: “...we find in the power of imagination... a peculiar non-connectedness to the being” (*ibid.*). This leads him to a critical point about imagination, a point whose methodological status he will have to question:

The power of imagination can hence be called a faculty of forming [*Vermogen des Bildens*] in a peculiar double sense. As a faculty of intuiting, it is formative [*bildend*] in the sense of providing the image [*Bild*] (or look). As a faculty which is not dependent upon the presence of the intuitable, it fulfills itself, i.e. it creates and forms the image. This ‘formative power’ is simultaneously a ‘forming’ which takes things in stride (is receptive) and one which creates (is spontaneous). In this ‘simultaneously’ lies the proper essence of its structure. But if receptivity means the same as sensibility and if spontaneity means the same as understanding, then in a peculiar way the power of imagination falls between both. [Heidegger’s footnote: Already in Aristotle’s *De Anima*, book G3, *phantasma* stands ‘between’ *aisthesis* and *noesis*.] This gives it a remarkably iridescent character... (*ibid.*).

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If, following Kant, intuition is receptive-passive, and thought, concept formation, spontaneous-active, then imagination, in its power to “see,” to form an image without actual presence, is receptive-spontaneous, active-passive. Iridescent. Shifting its color in and of itself.

But the *Anthropology*, unlike the *CPR*, is an empirical, not a transcendental investigation. “The way of Kant’s *Anthropology*, which at first appears to be self-evi-

dent... has revealed itself to be the wrong way” (p. 94). Nonetheless, “reference to transcendental structures always already lies in the empirical interpretation of the faculties of the soul, which properly speaking, can never simply be purely empirical themselves” (*ibid.*). If the iridescent imagination of the *Anthropology* is to have any relation to time, the “reference to transcendental structures” will have to be demonstrated.

Returning to the *CPR* Heidegger isolates an important contradiction. As transcendental, imagination is the pure synthesis of intuition and thought. There are three basic transcendental faculties—sensibility, imagination, thought. But we know that Kant also says that there are “two basic sources of the mind, sensibility and understanding,” and that “aside from these two sources of knowledge, we have no others” (p. 95). Using a significant word, Heidegger says that the “transcendental power of imagination is *homeless*. It is not even treated in the Transcendental Aesthetic where, as a faculty of intuition, it properly belongs. On the other hand, it is a theme of the Transcendental Logic where, strictly speaking, it may not be as long as logic remains confined to thought as such” (p. 95; my emphasis). Heidegger then cites other passages in which Kant speaks of three original faculties.

Two or three? Is Kant inconsistent? Relying on the previous analysis of the transcendental imagination as the original unification, the seam of intuition and thought, which also allows their separation, Heidegger makes the essential point: “What if this original, formative center was that ‘unknown common root’ of both stems? Is it an accident that with the first introduction of the power of imagination Kant says that ‘we ourselves, however, are seldom conscious [of it] even once?’” (*ibid.*). In other words, the “homelessness” of the transcendental imagination makes it the necessarily “unknown,” foreign, home which “haunts” the *CPR* [*Heimsuchung*].

Is it iridescent? To answer, Heidegger returns to the transcendental aesthetic, where the transcendental imagination, as intuition, “properly belongs”. Space and time are pure intuitions in that they do not allow any beings to “spring forth” (p. 99). Rather, they “pro-pose [*Vor-stellen*] the look of time and space in advance as totalities which are in themselves manifold” (*ibid.*). Heidegger calls this in advance pro-posing of time and space “the formative self-giving of that which gives itself” (*ibid.*). Note the self-relating: the self-giving of that which

gives itself. Because what is “given” here cannot be a present being, as per the *Anthropology* it belongs to imagination, but of course, a pure, transcendental imagination. Technically, the look of time as a purely intuited manifold totality is “synoptic,” according to Kant’s conception of synopsis as the temporal intuition of the whole of time as succession. As the self-giving of that which gives itself, this synopsis is formative intuition—which “is only possible in the transcendental power of imagination, and that is all the more so as this [transcendental power of imagination] is in general the origin of all that is ‘synthetic’” (p. 100). The co-implication of time–synopsis—and the *a priori* synthesis at the heart of knowledge draws closer, but via the transcendental imagination (p. 101). Which means that “that which gives itself” is an “*ens imaginarium*,” not in the sense of an imaginary being, but in the sense of a “some-thing” which cannot be a present object (*ibid.*). Call it the non-sensuous sensuous thing, the thing of time itself: time as *the ekstatikon par excellence* (*Being and Time*). This is what the discussion of iridescent imagination in the *Anthropology* could not encompass.

How to conceive the self-giving of the *ens imaginarium*? Returning to the transcendental apperception, the “I think” which accompanies all thought, Heidegger looks at the status of the “I.” The *ego* of the *cogito* as concept forming, as pure understanding, is a “representing, forming spontaneity”. This pure thinking as “representing, self-orienting-toward” clearly is not judging in Kant’s usual sense, but is “thinking in the sense of the free, forming and projecting conceiving of something” (p. 106)—a something which is not objectively present. This is the thinking of the *ens imaginarium*. In a startling statement, Heidegger says: “This original ‘thinking’ is pure imagining” (*ibid.*). Spontaneity, however, “constitutes but one moment of the transcendental power of imagination” (p. 107). As pure intuition, it is also receptive. “And it is receptive, moreover, not just apart from its spontaneity. Rather it is the original unity of receptivity and spontaneity” (*ibid.*). This is the transcendental, i.e. ontological, justification of the iridescence of the imagination, as *per* the *Anthropology*. Heidegger had asked if it was an “accident” that Kant had introduced the transcendental imagination as that of which “we are seldom conscious even once”. He is now alleging that as the “iridescent seam,” the foreign home, of the *CPR*, the transcendental imagination cannot belong to Kantian consciousness, to the *ego* of the *cogito*. Rather, this “I” itself can only be thought in relation to the transcendental imagination: “... original ‘thinking’ is pure imagining”.

All of this permits a summary statement:

This original, essential constitution of humankind, 'rooted' in the transcendental power of imagination, is the 'unknown' into which Kant must have looked if he spoke of the 'root unknown to us,' for the unknown is not that of which we simply know nothing. Rather, it is what pushes against us as something disquieting in what is known. And yet, Kant did not carry through with the more original interpretation of the transcendental power of imagination... On the contrary: Kant shrank back from this unknown root (p. 112).

Heidegger here is describing something like philosophical disavowal: the registration and repudiation of the disquieting in the known, the disquieting which pushes against the known, that which makes the known other than what we think it is. This is the structure Freud discovered in fetishism, such that the fetish itself is a "monument" to what it apparently repudiates. For Heidegger, the Kantian *cogito* is a "monument" to the transcendental imagination.

Can one go further in this direction? Here I must return to the question of the "unsaid" in Freud's theory of fetishism. Just as Heidegger gains access to the unsaid via a contradiction in Kant—two or three transcendental faculties?—so I have insistently tried to gain access to the unsaid via a contradiction in Freud. He says that the reality the fetish repudiates is the reality of castration (1927). If Freud contends that the fetish disavows reality by using fantasy as a "patch" over that reality, then the contradiction is flagrant: castration is itself a fantasy. Freud does not notice that his own theory implies that the entire fantasy structure of phallic monism—sexual difference equals phallic or castrated—is the "patch" over the reality of sexual difference. And just as Heidegger contends that the transcendental-ontological questions are always at work in the empirical ones, so I have contended that something of that order is at work within the disavowal of empirical sexual difference. Likewise, I wondered above if Freud's singular mention of "originally unconscious thought" could have anything to do with Heidegger's contention that the origin of Kantian thought is in a faculty of which we are not conscious even once. We will have to follow the rest of Heidegger's argument about the *CPR*, and what Kant had to disavow—shrink back from—to pursue this question.

Heidegger examines the differences between the A and B editions of the *CPR* in the treatment of the transcendental imagination to strengthen his point about Kant's recoil. He summarizes:

Will not the *Critique of Pure Reason* have deprived itself of its own theme if pure reason reverts to the transcendental power of imagination? Does not this ground-laying lead us to an abyss?

In the radicalism of his questions, Kant brought the 'possibility' of metaphysics to this abyss. He saw the unknown. He had to shrink back. It was not just that the transcendental power of imagination frightened him, but rather that in between [the two editions] pure reason as reason drew him increasingly under its spell... The problematic of a pure reason amplified in this way must push aside the power of imagination, and with that it really first conceals its transcendental essence (pp. 117–118).

What is the transcendental essence that pure reason must push aside? If this has to be an ontological question, then of course it must be a question of time. Heidegger reframes his entire effort to this point. As the common root, the transcendental imagination must

make possible something like a pure, sensible reason. Pure sensibility, however, namely in the universal meaning according to which it must come to be grasped in the laying of the ground for metaphysics, is time.

Should time as pure sensibility stand in an original unity with the 'I think' of pure apperception? Should the pure I, which according to the generally prevailing interpretation Kant placed outside of all temporality and all time be taken as temporal? And all this on the grounds of the transcendental power of imagination? How in general is this related to time? (p. 121)

One could insert all of *Being and Time* at this point. Suffice it to say that Heidegger demonstrates that the pure intuition of time cannot be confined to the current now, but must concern the sequence of nows such that each now looks ahead and looks back—synopsis. Recall the temporality of care, and recall “the self-giving of that which gives itself,” the non-sensuous sensuous of the *ens imaginarium*. Heidegger says: “In pure intuition, the self-giving which takes things

in stride is in principle not related to something which is only a presence and is related least of all to a being which is at hand” (p. 122). Rather, he wants to demonstrate how the transcendental imagination allows time as the sequence ofnows to “spring forth,” and “as this springing forth” is “original time” (p. 123).

The demonstration is quite detailed. It winds up at the question of time as both the subjectivity of the subject and as that wherein all connections are made—the possibility of synthesis itself (p. 131). If, as Kant says, space and time as *a priori* intuitions always “affect” the representation of an object, then as the pure internal sense, time itself is to affect us. But affection implies a relation to something at hand, something outside. How, then, can time affect us?

Time is only pure intuition to the extent that it prepares the look of succession from out of itself... This pure intuition activates itself with the intuited which was formed in it, i.e. which was formed without the aid of experience. According to its essence, time is pure affection of itself... As pure self-affection, time is not an acting affection that strikes a self which is at hand. Instead, as pure it forms the essence of something like self-activating. However, if it belongs to the essence of the finite subject to be able to be activated as a self, then time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity (p. 132).

Being and Time: time temporalizing itself is care; care is being-in-the-world as the relation to things. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*: time as pure self-affection is the transcendental imagination; the pure intuition of the transcendental imagination is the intuition of the *ens imaginarium*. The idea that pure intuition is pure auto-affection is actually derived from Kant. Heidegger says that the following passage from the transcendental aesthetic can only be understood in the light of everything that he has said so far. Kant writes:

Now that which... can be antecedent to every act of thinking anything, is intuition, and if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition. Since this form represents nothing except insofar as something is posited in the mind, it can be nothing other than the way the mind, through its own activity... comes to be affected through itself... (p. 133).

Freud: originally unconscious thought, the “antecedent” to secondary process, conscious verbal thought, is the tension raising binding, synthesis, of *relations*

between memory traces of “objects.” What are such memory traces? They express what Freud understands to be a basic property of the unconscious: to be permanently *affected* without the participation of consciousness. To be affected is to be differentiated. One must add to this conception something like a Freudian conception of “care.” Freud himself says in the “Two Principles...” that the infant might look like a monadic “chick in the shell” because it appears unrelated to the maternal care that surrounds it. He does not pursue the question very far, but consistent with his conception of unconscious memory traces, particularly with his theory of the memory trace of being fed, (the experience of satisfaction), the unconscious is always “affected,” even if in traditional terms it is not yet a subject related to objects in the usual sense. Is it stretching Freud too far to read his idea about unconscious binding of the relations between memory traces of “objects” to mean traces of relation, relation before a subject-object structure? Traces of the relation to “the self-giving of that which gives itself” (the “breast” of the experience of satisfaction)? If the infant is not a subject and the breast not an object, is this a relation to an *ens imaginarium*? And thus, an intuition of “pure” relation, of “mind” acting upon *itself* in relation to that which gives *itself*? And if so, does this have any relation to time—*the ekstatikon*? Does it bring the Freudian unconscious close to Heidegger’s iridescent transcendental imagination?

Considering “mind” itself, Heidegger says:

...time as pure self-affection is not found ‘in the mind’ ‘along with’ pure apperception. Rather, as the ground for the possibility of selfhood, time already lies within pure apperception, and so it first makes the mind into the mind... Time and the ‘I think’ no longer stand incompatibly and incomparably at odds; they are the same (p. 134).

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Thus, despite Kant’s stated intent, there can be no timelessness of the *cogito*.

This conclusion is what led Derrida to say that one would have to read Freud’s repeated statements about the timelessness of the unconscious the way Heidegger read Kant on the timelessness of the *cogito* (1978, p. 215). I have previously examined Freud’s own step in this direction in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. In another unusual passage, he momentarily wonders about the possibility of an unconscious time that would challenge Kant’s conceptions of time and space (p. 28). Significantly, Freud situates this possibility in the context of his recon-

sideration of trauma, and even wonders whether conscious time, the time in relation to which the unconscious is “time-less,” might itself be the defensive response, the “stimulus barrier,” to a traumatic unconscious time. Trauma in Freud always means raised tension levels. In fact, in *Beyond...* the unconscious possibility of trauma leads Freud to envisage a “before” of the pleasure principle. This “before” is itself the binding of tension—especially the too much tension of trauma. Such binding is a prerequisite for the regular functioning of the pleasure principle. And at the very end of *Beyond...*, Freud wonders whether binding itself has to be understood as a tension poised between pleasure and unpleasure in relation to “units of time”.

In “Two Principles...” Freud envisaged binding as unconscious thought. Is there any possible relation between Freud on binding, unconscious time, and unconscious thought, and Heidegger’s deconstructed Kant, for whom auto-affective time and mind acting upon itself are the possibilities of relation to the thing?

Heidegger has already established that a finite creature *needs* a play-space, a *Spielraum*, for any possible relation to a thing. In the discussion of the play-space above, we said that Heidegger would come back to it once the self-undermining role of the transcendental imagination as time was established. It is now clear that “Original time make possible the transcendental power of imagination which in itself is essentially spontaneous receptivity and receptive spontaneity” (p. 137). In other words, “iridescence” is the joint unity and separation of active and passive. This has to be a quality of any auto-affective process, in which there is no subject-object structure, no opposition between action and acted upon. An auto-affective process has to have within it the *Raum*, the room, the space, for the play of iridescence. Heidegger writes:

Kant wants to say: the encountering of the being itself occurs for a finite creature in a representing whose pure representations of objectivity as such have *played* up to one another [*auf einander eingespielt*]. This Being-*played* -up [*Eingespieltsein*] is...determined in advance in such a way that in general it can be *played* out in a *play-space* [*in einem Spiel-Raum abspielen kann*]. This [play-space] is formed through pure determinations of the inner sense. The pure inner sense is pure self-affection, i.e. original time (pp. 138–9).

Hence, Heidegger can put “play” at the heart of the Kantian architectonic. If auto-affective time is the activating process of the finite self, it has to be spatial: “...like time, space in a certain sense also belongs to the self as something finite... this [self], on the grounds of original time to be sure, is essentially spatial” (p. 140). As in *Being and Time* existential space is existential time. *Ekstasis*, time temporalizing itself, is the *ekstatikon par excellence*, and the space for play intrinsic to auto-affection of *KPM*. The “I,” the self, is as much the time-space of the *ens imaginarium* as the *ens imaginarium* is the thing, the space, of time. The space-time of the self-giving of that which gives itself.

At the end of his life, Freud jotted down the following sentence: “Being the breast precedes having the breast”. Can one read this ontologically? Certainly, Freud had always said that in the oral phase, the libidinal relation to the object is incorporative, identificatory: one is what one loves. But when he distinguishes “being” from “having” Freud also implies that the breast is not initially something one can possess, is not yet an object. The baby is the breast in that it is related to it before a subject-object structure. Above we asked about this relation in terms of Freud’s passing thought about originally unconscious thought, and in terms of the self-giving of that which gives itself, the *ens imaginarium*.

It is now necessary to answer these questions, via Freud’s explicit examination of the auto-affective structure at the heart of his theory of sexuality. This is the relation of Freud’s theory to *KPM* on the transcendental imagination that I began to examine in *Interpretation and Difference* (pp. 77–83). In “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915) Freud takes up an essential point in his theory of infantile sexuality. The “component drives,” i.e. the sexual impulses of infancy, before their organization under the dominance of the genitals, are always pairs of opposites, an active and passive version of the same drive. For example, sadism and masochism are the active and passive versions of enjoyment of pain. When Freud examines voyeurism (scopophilia) and exhibitionism, he expects to find the same structure, but does not. To summarize a complicated development: sadism, which is always active, itself is not originally sexual. The task is to show how it becomes sexual, which for Freud is a consequence of what he calls turning around upon oneself. Voyeurism, also always active for Freud, (the exhibitionist is passive, looked at), unlike sadism, is originally sexual. But infantile sexuality is essentially auto-erotic. This is why Freud says, “the scopophilic instinct is auto-erotic; it has indeed an object, but that object is part of

the subject's own body" (p. 130). Freud calls this a "preliminary stage" of voyeurism, which is "the source of *both* the situations represented in the resulting pair of opposites" (*ibid.*). In the preliminary stage "oneself looking at a sexual organ" equals "a sexual organ being looked at by oneself" (*ibid.*). The first half of the equation ("oneself looking") becomes active looking at "an extraneous object" (the voyeuristic subject); the second half ("at a sexual organ") becomes a part of oneself passively being looked at by an "extraneous person" (the exhibitionistic object) (*ibid.*). In the preliminary stage of scopophilia the distinctions subject-object and active-passive do not hold. For this reason, Freud calls it intermediate. He is describing an auto-affective process.

Remarkably, this intermediate auto-affective process has a clear relation to the temporality, the historicity, of sexuality. Sexuality itself was the key to the unconscious history of the individual, the history at work in the formation of neurotic symptoms. Looking at this history Freud found not only that the component drives of infantile sexuality occur as pairs of opposites, but that the active version of the drive could always turn into the passive version, and *vice versa*. To account for this possibility, Freud postulates the intermediate, active-passive, subjective-objective source of the drive. Speaking specifically of scopophilia he says, "The only correct statement to make about the scopophilic instinct would be that all of the stages of its development, its auto-erotic, preliminary stage as well as its final active or passive form, co-exist alongside one another" (pp. 130–131). One may be a voyeur for a period of time; for another period an exhibitionist. These may appear to be distinct identities, but the fact that voyeurism can turn into exhibitionism is made possible by their common root. Freud concludes: "This reference to the developmental history of instincts and the permanence of their intermediate stages should make the development of instincts fairly intelligible to us" (p. 131).

Freud uses a geological metaphor to describe this history. Each apparently distinct period of sexual activity is like a volcanic eruption, leaving behind lava. The accumulated strata of "successive eruptions of lava" give the history of the development of the drive. The primary, intermediate phase, though, has to "accompany" each eruption, because it makes it possible for each stratum to appear distinct, but to become the other. To mix metaphors, the primary, intermediate phase is both the "volcano" itself and a Heideggerean "seam" which

unites and separates active and passive. As an auto-affective, temporal, process it is never present. It is the non-sensuous sensuous of sexuality.

Heidegger had said that the more subjective time becomes in Kant, the more it expands the subject, opens it to the thing. Can one say something similar about Freud's "eruptive" intermediate drives? With interpretation I believe so. The interpretation concerns "being the breast," a relation without a subject-object structure. It is a relation in which mind is affected—an unconscious memory trace is formed. The trace of a relation in which "mind" is the thing—which "gives itself." Which gives itself periodically, in "units of time." Which can be reconfigured in terms of primary scopophilia. If one is the breast, then oneself looking at the breast is the breast being looked at by oneself. The originally sexual mind is auto-affective in relation to the self-giving, temporal thing.

At the beginning of his work, accounting for unconscious memory, and the origin of dreams, Freud had to conceptualize the trace of the experience of satisfaction—the baby being fed. At the end he spoke of "being the breast." In between, he postulated primary scopophilia, which in combined Freudian-Heideggerean language could be said to provide the "pure look" of the thing. An "iridescent" active-passive process opens the "play-space" of the relation to the thing.

Without noticing the connection, Freud hypothesized primal binding in relation to unconscious thought and unconscious time. In the former, raised tension levels and relations between memory traces are the possibility of the temporal delay of secondary process, conscious rationality. The latter is potentially traumatic; conscious time is the protective barrier against it. As the possibility of secondary process, delayed gratification, unconscious thought is the tension of the "spacing" within the relations between memory traces. As the possibility of conscious time, the tension of unconscious time meets the mind's tendency to reduce tension. The least one can say is that Freud's usual descriptions of "the unconscious" as timeless primary process becomes much more complex. The unconscious iridescent auto-affective processes of the primary, intermediate phases of the drives open the relation to the thing. They are "eruptive-expansive," related to the tension of unconscious thought and unconscious time. All of this is very close to Heidegger's understanding of the transcendental imagination as auto-affective time—the blind faculty of which we are seldom conscious even once; the abyss of metaphysics, from which Kant had to recoil.

The possibility of fetishism in the usual sense, the universal capacity for worship of, or sexual arousal by, a thing, would then reside in the integration of unconscious thought, unconscious time, and primary scopophilia. That is, in the auto-affective unconscious process of “being the breast,” i.e. mind acting on itself as the opening to the thing that it is. This is the temporal space of the *ens imaginarium*. The traditional motifs of the description of the fetish—its self-referentiality, its “unity of opposites” (protective or harmful, phallic or castrated, good or bad)—are the recoil from its conditions of possibility, and from what they say about both mind and thing. Self-referential conflation of indication and indicated is disavowal of the auto-affective processes that constitute mind and thing. The “reality effect” of oscillation between opposites is disavowal of “iridescence”. Apparently objective opposites are the conscious, closed versions of the unconscious opening of the relation to the thing. The non-symbolic, non-referential fetish is not exactly not yet a transcendental god, or an abstract sign. Rather, its complex structure of opening and closure show why open and closed structures, auto-affection and self-reference, always co-exist. Auto-affection is the possibility of self-reference.

Returning to fetishism in *Being and Time*: Heidegger could not follow through on his idea that what the fetish apparently is *not* could indeed yield a formal conception of being-in-the-world larger than the one based on the sign structure of useful things. Perhaps Heidegger evaded another aspect of everyday Dasein, which can always make the thing into a god or a sexual object. Freud, on the other hand, sees the opening to a general structure in sexual fetishism. But could he have rethought unconscious processes in terms of the relatedness of mind and thing, i.e. in terms of unconscious time and unconscious thought? These are the processes that are the unsaid of the transcendental imagination. Such processes themselves are the reality of the *ens imaginarium*, mind and thing in their auto-affective relatedness. This is the reality that is the “foreign home” of reality conflated with objectivity. It is the reality of uncanniness. Freud, then, is somewhat like Kant in Heidegger’s reading. He does not pursue possibilities he envisages, possibilities that undermine some of his basic ideas. But he is also somewhat like Heidegger himself, in that he does glimpse these possibilities: binding before the pleasure principle, unconscious thought, unconscious time, primary intermediacy.

Let us recall that Freud's own point of departure—how is it possible to have memories of which we are not conscious? what does defense say about mind?—is a question of mind acting upon itself. His most general answer is the theory of repression. When he generalizes fetishism and disavowal at the end of his life he says that he is returning to his point of departure, to something both “old and familiar, and new and puzzling”. I think that he did not see how large the puzzle was, the puzzle of the general structure of fetishism. To remain on the terrain of Heidegger and Freud, let us also recall that the perplexing knot of Heidegger's handkerchief in *Being and Time* can indicate Freud's most enduring questions: what is mind, what is conscious, what is unconscious, if I can always forget what I intend to remember? And then what is mind if fetishism is its most general condition? Both questions trench upon mind acting on itself and upon the relation to the thing, whether as memory-aid, or as religious or sexual object.

A knot binds. This binding is a synthesis of mind and thing. When the apparent reference is forgotten—really disavowed—and the knot, like a broken tool, appears just to be there, like the fetish—and *contra* Heidegger—the binding of mind and thing is “indicated”. But indicated the way one indicates that which cannot be indicated: the iridescence of the *ens imaginarium*. The uncanniness of auto-affective process.

In the paper on “Fetishism” Freud says that he will surely disappoint in saying that the fetish is a substitute for the penis. He then goes on to say that it is a substitute for the fantasized maternal phallus, the antidote to the possibility of castration. Similarly, I might surely disappoint by saying that the possibility of fetishism is the relation to the breast. However, I am claiming that this is a relation to an *ens imaginarium* in Heidegger's sense. I am also claiming that the possibility of the memory of the experience of satisfaction, of the opening of the unconscious, its capacity to be affected, is the auto-affective structure of mind “acting upon itself” in relation to an auto-affective, self-giving thing. This is why in both *Difference and Disavowal* and *Interpretation and Difference* I attempted to revise the basic theory of unconscious process to include “registration,” tracing, of non-objectively present reality—summarized under the rubric of the reality of differentiating process.

It is essential to remember that the origin of fantasy in Freud's sense is the hallucinatory revival of the experience of satisfaction. In other words, the prior

condition of fantasy is the registration of the *ens imaginarium*. One can understand fantasy in this sense as imaginary in the way Heidegger read Kant on imagination in the *Anthropology*—the bringing forth of the “look” of something without its actual presence. To which Freud of course would add that this bringing forth can be hallucinatory, such that there is an effect of actual presence without actual presence. But one would have to add to this Heidegger’s understanding of the *transcendental* imagination, in which imagination itself is auto-affective time in its paradoxical synthetic capacity. Empirical imagination can be responsible for apparent self-reference, but transcendental imagination is responsible for its condition of possibility—auto-affectation. To circle back to our constant theme: auto-affectation as the opening to the thing, and as the possibility of symbolism, always co-exists with self-reference as the apparent closure of the possibility of symbolism. But co-exists in a structure of disavowal: paradoxically differentiating auto-affectation is the uncanny, tension raising home of concrete self-reference.

In *KPM* Heidegger increasingly emphasizes the play-space of auto-affectation. It fulfills the transcendental *need* of a finite creature for the relation to the thing. In *Being and Time* care is ecstatic time. “Care” itself always implies finitude and need, opening, relation to what is other than oneself. In Freudian terms, the need for care is the obvious empirical fact of the helplessness of the human infant, but it also has a more “transcendental-ontological” status in the theory of the drives. All of my previous work not only attempts to explore the import of Freud’s generalization of fetishism, but also to rethink the question of therapeutic care in relation to Freud on need and drive. This is what led him to postulate the life-drive, Eros. To recapitulate quickly: In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud corrected his previous assumption of inherent conflict between self-preservation and libido, the mainspring of the original theory of repression. While there is such a conflict in neurosis, this is no longer a general condition of mind. Rather, one must think of a combined libidinal-self-preservative drive, a life drive. This drive combines three functions, all of which relate to everything we have seen in *KPM*: it synthesizes mind with environment, binds energy, and “introduces fresh vital differences” into the psyche. Because it raises tension levels, Eros itself has to be in conflict with the tendency of mind to reduce tension, the pleasure principle hypostasized into the death drive. Again, Freud postulates a primacy of binding, and again does not notice the connections to his other postulations of a primacy of binding. Nor does he see any connection to

primary intermediate scopophilia, or to the question of “being the breast”. Both the latter concern the question of care.

Eros as care is both self preservative and libidinal. What does this have to do with fetishism? The libidinal aspect of the fetish, the thing, clarifies why it can always be an object of sexual arousal or worship. In psychoanalytic terms, it is actually both, in that the sexualized thing is venerated, and the venerated thing sexualized. This raises the very large question of idealization, Freud’s point of departure for his discussion of fetishism in the *Three Essays* (1905). But idealization can always be reversed, as consistently pointed out in the history of discourse on fetishism: the replacement of the the maternal phallus with the thing is a monument to the horror of castration; the worshiped thing can be harmful, persecutory. Each side of the equation can be taken as concretely real, as the result of the disavowal of the auto-affective process of Eros in its differentiating-synthetic function. The fetish then oscillates between apparent opposites: sexuality and destructiveness, phallic and castrated, idealized and persecutory.

In *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, Freud offers an explanation of how this can come about. There, he said that “In the real world transitional and intermediate stages are far more common than sharply differentiated opposite states” (1937, p. 228). He is saying that apparent opposition is less “real” than one usually thinks. Later in the paper he uses his old theory of universal bisexuality as an example. He wonders about a clinical issue. While bisexuality itself is part of “normal mental life,” some people experience it as “irreconcilable conflict”. Why? Not for the reason one might expect: the castration complex. Rather, conflict over normal bisexuality illustrates an independent “tendency to conflict... [which] can scarcely be attributed to anything but the intervention of an element of free aggressiveness”, the death drive in action. And Freud goes on to compare the life and death drives to Empedocles’ *philia* (love) and *neikos* (strife). The implication is clear: intermediate, “iridescent” bisexuality becomes an apparently irreconcilable conflict over hetero- and homo-sexuality because of the destructive, tension reducing, dedifferentiating aspects of the death drive. Intermediate, universal bisexuality is an aspect of *philia*, Eros, care.

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This conception can be generalized. Eros “begins” with “being the breast,” a binding, tension raising, auto-affective-differentiating process, a relation to an *ens imaginarium*. It encounters two other aspects of unconscious process: the

capacity to form memory traces which can be revived with hallucinatory intensity and the concomitant tendency toward tension reduction. When this occurs objective presence is conflated with tension relief: what I see now is supposed to rid me of pain, while I am unaware that this objective presence is the *trace* of the *ens imaginarium*. In other words, the structure of wish fulfillment is the disavowal of “being the breast”. One must not confine this operation to the oral phase. Whenever mind “affects itself” with differentiating process, it is always possible that mind will “attack itself,” with the result that the trace of differentiating process is disavowed via objective presence. This is the point at which intermediacy becomes opposition, such that opposite states appear discrete, but can turn into each other. Again: the fetish as phallus and castration, the breast as idealized and persecutory. Overall *philia* and *neikos* interact. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* Freud briefly noted a primal tendency to respond to differentiation with aggression, but said he could not explain it. This is the explanation.

This attack of the mind on itself—a kind of auto-immune response—would result in the closure of the *Spielraum*, the temporal play space of auto-affective process. In psychoanalytic terms, it would be the closure of Winnicott’s “transitional space,” the origin of play. Winnicott famously calls transitionality a “third area of experiencing” between the subjective and the objective (1975, p. 230). The present participle, *experiencing*, can remind us of Heidegger’s reading of Kant’s highest synthetic principle—the condition of possibility of experience in general. Heidegger had said that when Kant claims that this condition is *at the same time* the condition of possibility of the object of experience, the *simultaneity* of experience and object itself expresses exactly what Kant had to recoil from—the *Spielraum*. Winnicott himself says that because playing occurs on the “theoretical line” between the subjective and the objective, it is “precarious” (1971, p. 50). This precariousness may lead to a “high degree of anxiety” (1971, p. 52). “Games and their rules” are then part of “an attempt to forestall the frightening aspect of playing” (1971, p. 50). Heidegger makes a similar point about Kant. The *Spielraum* is what a finite creature *needs* for any possible relation to a thing (p. 50). But Kant grants supremacy to the faculty of rules (pp. 52–3)—in Heidegger’s reading the inevitable recoil from the auto-affective temporality of the *Spielraum*.

Winnicott in general has not much use for Freud’s death drive. Clearly, though, the “high degree of anxiety” of the intermediate experiencing of play can pro-

duce rule bound activity, which controls the “precariousness” of what is on “the theoretical line” between subjective and objective. In the context of Heidegger on Kant, of the *Spielraum* as the “abyss of metaphysics,” Winnicott’s sense of the anxiety of play requires a closer look at “transitional phenomena” themselves. He does not attend to Freud’s “being the breast” or primary scopophilia, which are entirely relevant to his conception. But he comes close when he says that “two babies are feeding at the breast. One is feeding on the self, since the breast and the baby have not yet become...separate phenomena. The other is feeding from an other than-me source” (1971, p. 89). This division of the baby is an expression of differentiation within auto-affection: the baby *is* the breast, but the breast is also a thing that is not an object. (The memory trace of the experience of satisfaction is the trace of the *ens imaginarium*.) This division within the baby is the “third area of experiencing”. For Winnicott, this is why all babies at some point make use of a *thing* that is “not part of the infant’s body,” yet is “not recognized as belonging to external reality” (1971, p.2). The baby moves from auto-affection of the body—“fist, fingers, thumbs” in the mouth—to attachment to a thing, typically soft and pliable. But while this thing comes from without for the observer, it does not for the baby. As intermediate, the transitional thing is akin to the division of the baby, both itself (feeding on itself) and not itself (other than me).

This auto-affective, differentiating process is the origin of play in terms of space and time. “*Playing has a place and a time. It is not inside by any use of the word... Nor is it outside, that is to say, it is not a part of...that which the individual has decided to recognize as truly external*” (1971, p. 41). This is the “first use of a symbol and the first experience of play” (1971, p. 96). Winnicott expands on symbol, time, space, union, separation:

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The object is a symbol of the union of the baby and the mother... This symbol can be located. It is at the place in space and time where and when the mother is in transition from being (in the baby’s mind) merged in with the infant and alternatively being experienced as an object to be perceived... The use of an object symbolizes the union of two now separate things, baby and mother, *at the point in time and space of the initiation of their state of separateness* (1971, pp. 96–97).

Rephrased: the space-time of transition, of play, of the relation to the thing, is the origin of symbolism as union-separation.

Winnicott says that the transitional object is the “substance of illusion,” in a strong sense: it is the “stuff” out of which all cultural activity, all art, science, and religious experience, emerges. But it can be delusion, or even madness, to insist on the objective reality of illusory, or play, experience: the communicant must always know that the wafer is not literally the body of Christ. If not, one has Hume’s error of objective presence, magnified into possible insanity if one insists that others accept the reality of one’s delusion. And one also has the possibility of a fetish, which Winnicott typically sees as an indication of environmental failure. He contends that “good enough” maternal care allows the extension of the transitional object onto the “entire cultural field”. The fate of the transitional object is not to be lost or mourned, but to fade away. However, absent good enough environmental provision, the transitional object can become an infantile fetish, an object that always has to be present, that cannot fade away.

This is perhaps the point at which Winnicott’s failure to consider the death drive is important. I have no dispute with his theory of environmental impingement, the impact of not good enough care. However, he does not take into account that in the situation in which the baby *is* the breast-mother, pain, or even trauma, is also auto-affective. Differentiation is then *neikos*. The play-space of transitionality becomes mandatory objective presence, or the threat of its absence. There is a Kleinian idealized good breast and persecutory bad breast. In fact, one could say that the Kleinian good and bad breasts are the fetishism of the oral phase, the disavowal of the differentiating “transitional” breast—again the *ens imaginarium*.

The distinction between transitional thing and fantasy object is critical here. Freud’s brief account of *philia* and *neikos* potentially explains how intermediate thingliness *becomes* oppositional fantasy—with the proviso that each side of the opposition can become the other. This is why Freud and Klein, in their respective ways, theorize both splitting of, and oscillation between, phallic and castration, idealized and persecutory. The very possibility of this splitting oscillation is something like a Heideggerean iridescent seam. The transitional “object”—and here I think that “thing,” or even Winnicott’s “phenomenon,” are the preferable words—is itself a “symbol” of transition. The mother and the baby are in transition from union to separateness; the breast that one *is* becomes the breast that one *has*. Transition itself is the *Spielraum*, the play of time and space, that is both union and separateness, being and having. As union and separateness are themselves differentiated, transitionality is “subjectivized”. One becomes a

separate subject in relation to a present or absent external object; the breast that one has can also be the breast one does not have. The potential anxiety related to any play on the border of the subjective and the objective becomes the destructiveness directed against tension raising intermediacy. The “rule bound” game of closed reference, of the conflation of fantasy and objective presence, apparently dominates. But it is always “haunted” by the auto-affective transitionality of oneself as thing. If this is so, then an integration of Winnicott on transitionality and Freud on primary intermediacy takes the theory of the unconscious further in the direction of Heidegger’s conception of the transcendental imagination.

Sensation, Thinging, Fourfold

Heidegger returns to the *CPR* in *What Is A Thing?* (1967). There is a kind of *mea culpa* to *What Is A Thing?* Heidegger says that his aim is make up for what *KPM* lacked (p. 125), namely the significance of the mathematization of physics (Newton) for the delineation of the *a priori* synthesis. As in *KPM* Heidegger begins with the question of the “quiddity,” the thingness of the thing, and observes that every thing is “this particular” thing. (Recall the supposed singularity of the fetish.) But this is precisely what Kant is not interested in; for him the thing is an object of mathematical-physical science (p. 128). The thing is an object of experience to the extent that it is knowable according to axiomatic rules. Hence, Kant has “disregarded what is manifest (*das Offenbare*). He does not inquire into and determine in its own essence that which encounters us prior to an objectification into an object of experience” (p. 141). The manifest is what has come into the open. Heidegger’s consistent point is that the singular, *particular* thing is not an “object of experience,” but rather an “experience” of what cannot be objectified, what cannot be conceptualized according to mathematical science: opening itself. What he called the *Spielraum* in *KPM* he here calls the *Zeitraum*, the time-space of opening, of non-objectifying encounter with the thing.

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As in *Being and Time* and *KPM* Heidegger seeks the inner relation between the immediate, non-objectifying encounter with the thing via sensory reception and *Zeitraum*. Sensation, he says, “occupies a peculiar intermediate position between things and human beings, between object and subject” (p. 208), and “reflects the uncertainty of the relation between man and thing” (p. 211). Intermediacy and uncertainty: what rules cannot govern.

In *KPM* Heidegger used the transcendental imagination in its relation to intuition and time as the lever to deconstruct the Kantian architectonic; here he uses Kant on “intensive magnitude” in a similar way. “Extensive magnitude” is the understanding of space as everywhere uniform, and so measurable: this is Newton. Again, this is why the principles of mathematical physics are the condition of possibility for objects of experience: all objects are extended and measurable. “Intensive magnitude,” however, concerns the “quantity of quality”: how brightly does the moon shine? Kant himself says that all appearances are extensive magnitudes as intuitions, and intensive magnitudes as sensations (p. 222). But, says Heidegger, this means that all sensory perception contains an “anticipation,” a “reaching out” that makes it possible for sensation to be a “receivable, encountering this and that” (p. 220)—i.e. a *particular, qualitative* encounter. Kant’s discovery of anticipation in perception, says Heidegger, is “astounding” in light of the role of mathematical physics in the *a priori* synthesis, because it puts the particular and the qualitative into sensory reception *a priori*.

Because Kant says that all appearances themselves are subject *a priori* to rules determining their relation in time (p. 228), Heidegger can use non-rule bound intensive magnitude, and its relation to time, to delineate another aspect of the “unsaid” in Kant. Time, says Heidegger, is the “connection” in which *a priori* rules themselves have anticipatory power (p. 229). Here, Heidegger enters into another detailed examination of aspects of the *CPR*, of what Kant says about time in relation to the analogies of experience. The latter are the *rules* that indicate the temporality of experience of an object (permanence, cause and effect, reciprocity) (p. 235). But Kant has also posited quantity, quality, relation and modality as the categories of thought—and quality, he has said, is a function of intensive magnitude (p. 236). Hence, if there has to be a unity of pure conceptions of understanding, (which has to be governed by rules), with space and time as forms of intuition, (with space itself presupposing intensive magnitude), then there is a “circle” in which the “rulable” and the “non-rulable” turn into each other. (Recall the relation between the *Spielraum* and the faculty of rules in *KPM*.) This circularity is the essence of experience: “Experience is in itself a circular happening through which what lies within the circle becomes exposed (*eröffnet*). This open (*Offene*), however, is nothing other than the between (*Zwischen*)—between us and the thing” (p. 242).

Undermining Kant's stated intent, Heidegger now says that we cannot understand the *CPR* from the scientific viewpoint. The "between" itself "is not like a rope stretching from the thing to man," but is an "anticipation" that "reaches beyond the thing and similarly back behind us" (p. 243). He concludes:

Kant's questioning about the thing asks about intuition and thought, about experience and its principles, i.e. it asks about man. The question 'What is a thing?' is the question 'Who is man?' That does not mean that things become a human product (*Gemachte*), but on the contrary, it means that man is to be understood as he who always already leaps beyond things, but in such a way that this leaping-beyond is possible only while things encounter and so precisely remain themselves—while they send us back behind ourselves and our surface. A dimension is opened up in Kant's question about the thing which lies between the thing and man, which reaches out beyond things and back behind man (p. 244).

That the question "what is a thing?" is the question "who is man?" means that "who" and "what" are in a circular relation. They are open to each other, opening itself being the intermediacy—the transitionality—that "links" (binds) them. But binds them not as a rope ties together two pre-existing objects, but as a structural futurity, an "anticipation," which again means that the who is a who by means of its relation to a what. This anticipation takes us back to particularity: things remain themselves. *This thing* is not encountered according to any rule (*Spielraum* as opening to the thing). Such an encounter sends "us back behind ourselves and our surface." What does that mean? If our surface is our consciousness, then the encounter is "behind" it. Can one hear a reference to that of which we are not conscious, even once? To a non-conscious, non-rule-bound play (Winnicott) of a relatedness to the thing (the "what") that I (the "who") am? A play in which particularity cannot be abstracted away, leapt beyond? In other words, a play in which "my" singularity is the particularity of the thing?

Throughout the history of discourse on fetishism, particularity is the spoke in the wheel of reason. For Kant fetishism is the veneration of the "trifling" with no sense of the sublime (1960, p. 180). This includes any sort of "fetish faith" in which "clericalism" prescribes "certain formalities" as the means to have God satisfy one's wishes, tantamount to dismissing all recourse to an "in itself" (1960, p. 181). But such dismissal would also dismiss any understanding of a non-deterministic, non-conscious process in which particularity is transitional-

ity or intermediacy. Or in which the “object of experience” is made possible by the relation to a thing which is not an object, a relation which itself is “behind ourselves and our surface”.

Heidegger’s own dismissal of fetishism in *Being and Time*, then, sounds Kantian. The fetish is only understood in terms of the conflation of indication and indicated, excluding it from the freedom of the sign structure. For Kant reason and moral law also are the guarantors of a certain freedom. But this freedom rests upon rule bound “leaping beyond” the thing, i.e. encountering the thing as an *object* of experience. Paradoxically, this is why there is always a “Kantian” aspect to fetishism. As Mauss made clear, a fetish never exists without reference to coded rules. And as Freud made clear, the fetish itself is an “object of experience,” in that its “reality effect,” as in dreams and hallucinations, depends upon the objectification of time and space (perceptual identity and temporal immediacy). Which is also why Freud himself had so many difficulties with the role of reality testing in his theory, especially in the theory of fetishism. (What is the reality disavowed by the fetishist?) But this would also explain why the fetishist as “Kantian” supports Heidegger’s reading of Kant: rule bound objective reality is a disavowal of the play of intermediacy, which relates man and thing—behind ourselves and our surface. And relates them via singularity and sensation (intensive magnitude). But this also explains the disavowal structure of Heidegger’s envisaging a possible opening to being-in-the-world in fetishism in *Being and Time*, and then repudiation of this possibility. He could not see that fetishism itself is possible because of the encounter with the thing in its sensation and singularity. But one must always recall Mauss’ point about the coded nature of the fetish. Fetishism then would be precisely where singularity and the rule turn into each other—Heidegger’s circle of experience in which the rulable and the non-rulable turn into each other.

When Heidegger describes “experience as a circular happening through which what lies within the circle becomes exposed” the reader familiar with *Being and Time* will recall what he says there about the hermeneutic circle. Countering the usual understanding of it as a vicious circle—the project of interpretation presumes interpretability itself, so has no foundation—he says that the question is how to enter the circle in the right way. Similarly, in the concluding remarks of *What Is A Thing?* he is saying that Kantian “experience” unwittingly presumes a circular “happening,” which Kant himself could not enter in the right way. Cir-

cularity can be another way of describing auto-affection: concept and intuition, rules and play, have to move around each other, revealing the opening to the thing. Experience as this circular moving around becomes a circular mirror play in “The Thing.”

Heidegger contends that things “have never yet at all been able to appear to thinking as things” (1971, p. 171). In other words, a thinking that does not participate in the forgetting of being, a non-metaphysical thinking, would be able to let the thing appear as thing, in its particularity. Quickly summarizing his understanding of the history of metaphysics, Heidegger says that this means that the thing would appear as neither Latin *res*, nor medieval *ens*, nor modern object of representation.

His example is a jug (*Krug*). The jug, he says, is a hollow vessel that holds liquid. It holds by taking what is poured in and keeping it. The pouring in and the holding are joined by outpouring from the jug: “The holding of the vessel occurs in the giving of the outpouring... the poured gift” (1971, p. 172). The gift of the outpouring is “drink for mortals,” but may also be a “libation poured out for the immortal gods” (*ibid.*). The drink itself—say, wine—is the meeting of earth (what is grown) and sky (sun and rain).

Mortals and gods, earth and sky dwell in the gift of the outpouring. In the gift of the outpouring earth and sky, divinities and mortals dwell *together all at once*. These four, at once because of what they themselves are, belong together. Preceding everything that is present, they are enfolded into a single fourfold... This manifold-simple gathering is the jug’s presencing. Our language denotes what a gathering is by an ancient word. That word is thing (*Ding*). The jug’s presencing is the pure, giving gathering of the one-fold fourfold into a single time-space... The jug presences as a thing... But how does the thing presence? The thing things (*Das ding bedingt*). Thinging gathers. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the fourfold’s stay, its while... We are now thinking this word [thing] by way of the gathering-appropriating staying of the fourfold (1971, pp. 173–4).

The “gathering-appropriating,” is not simply unification. Rather, “thinging” brings the remoteness of earth and sky, mortals and divinities, near to one another, but near in a way that preserves their distance (1971, p. 178). As always for

Heidegger, relatedness is union-separation. This is why each of the four is itself because it reflects the other in a play of mirrors:

Each of the four [earth and sky, mortals and divinities] mirrors in its own way the presence of the others... Mirroring in this appropriating-lightening way, each of the four *plays* to each of the others. The appropriative mirroring sets each of the four free into its own, but it *binds* these free ones into the simplicity of their essential being toward one another. The *mirroring that binds into freedom is the play* that betroths each of the four to each... None of the four insists on its own separate particularity. Rather each is expropriated, within their mutual appropriation, into its own being. This expropriative appropriating is the mirror *play* of the fourfold... This appropriating mirror-play...we call the world. The world presences by worlding... the inexplicable and unfathomable character of the world's worlding lies in this, that causes and grounds remain unsuitable for the world's worlding... The thing stays-gathers and unites-the fourfold. The thing things world... we let ourselves be concerned by the thing's worlding being. Thinking in this way, we are called by the thing as the thing. In the strict sense of the German word *bedingt*, we are the be-thinged the conditioned ones. We have left behind us the presumption of all unconditionedness (1971, pp. 178–81, *passim*; my emphases).

A passage like this can call for infinite commentary. I will pick out elements relevant to my argument so far. “Lightening” for Heidegger is opening that permits what one might call ontological seeing: the “light” required for “vision,” of what is never objectively seen. This is the possibility of reception of the “non-sensuous sensuous,” a kind of “experience free” intuition. Like the transcendental imagination in relation to time, this lightening is auto-affective: mirroring. But a mirroring of what is always simultaneously itself and other. Hence, it *binds* each to the other in such a way that each remains itself, in its particularity, *as* the relation to the other. Particularity *is* relation. This is a non-Kantian “freedom,” because it is *play* (*Spielraum*). In other words, it is an *a priori* synthesis without rules, without cause or even ground. Hence, the deliberately paradoxical “mirroring that binds into freedom”. The things that were the point of departure for the analysis of being-in-the-world in *Being and Time* now have “a life of their own,” a “freedom” perhaps greater than the freedom of the referential sign-structure. Rather, things are the auto-affective structure of world itself: the thing “things world”. *Das ding bedingt*. To be in the world, then, to be oneself *as* bound to things, is to be auto-affected by the auto-affective thing. *Bedingen*

means “to be conditioned”—to be affected; to be differentiated. (Again Nietzsche on the madness of the metaphysics which derives the conditioned from the unconditioned.) To be in the world is to be conditioned *a priori*. To be conditioned is particularity, singularity. There is no possible “unconditionedness,” no possibility of not being auto-affected by the auto-affective thing: the world.

Is this not a description of the possibility of fetishism as being the breast, as being the thing *a priori*, before subject and object, in an originally differentiating, auto-affective play?

The play of the fourfold in “The Thing” cannot be divorced from Heidegger’s contemporaneous delineation of the fourfold play of time *as* space. The title of his late essay, *On Time and Being* itself indicates the relation to *Being and Time*. Returning to his earlier sense of ecstatic time as the reaching out to each other of the past, present, and future, and meditating on the givenness of time and space, that there is being (*Es gibt Sein*) and there is time (*Es gibt Zeit*), Heidegger says that past, present, and future are inter-related as

the presencing that is given in them. With this presencing there opens up what we call time-space... Time-space now is the name for the openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and primarily provides the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold... the unity of time’s three dimensions consists in the *interplay* of each toward each. This *interplay* proves to be the true extending, *playing* in the very heart of time, the fourth dimension. True time is four dimensional (1972, pp. 14–15; my emphases).

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The play of the world as fourfold mirror play of the thing *is* the play of four dimensional time. The spatial thing, the extended thing, the particular thing, can only “bething” if it is temporal. The fourth dimension of time, opening, *is* space. Time as thing, the *ekstatikon* of *Being and Time*, is four dimensional play. This is world itself as time-space. Derrida has commented on this passage:

Whether it is a matter of Being, of time, or of their deployment in presence (*Anwesen*), the *es gibt* plays (*spielt*) says Heidegger... The *play* (*Zuspiel*) also marks, works on, manifests the unity of the three dimensions of time, which is to say a fourth dimension: The ‘giving’ of the *es gibt Zeit* belongs to the play of this

‘quadridimensionality’... The fourth dimension, as Heidegger makes clear, is not a figure, it is not a manner of speaking... *it is said of the thing itself...* (1992, p. 22; my emphasis).

That the thing itself is four dimensional time also means that as auto-affective mirror play the thing itself must be iridescent.

For Heidegger it is critical that before Plato, Heraclitus characterized time as play with a thing. Heraclitus’ enigmatic Fragment 52 is given by Heidegger as “Time is a child that plays, shifting the pawns” (cited Schurmann, p. 42). The more literal translation is “Time is a boy playing, playing *pessoī*, kingship belongs to the boy” (Kurke, p. 265). Scholars do not know exactly what *pessoī* was, but from references in Homer and Plato, it seems to have been a game in which pieces were moved around, probably on a board. Some scholars think that “kingship” refers to a king piece in the game. For Heidegger, it is the movement of the thing, the “shifting of the pawns” by a playing child that characterizes time. Heraclitus is also the thinker of iridescence, the shifting of opposites (day and night, the living and the dead, the young and the old). In Fragment 52 he is specifically concerned with day and night as One, *Hen*—a one that is famously in difference with itself in and of itself, the *hen heautoi diapherein*. Heidegger says that there is no explanation, no reason *why* “the great child of the world-play seen by Heraclitus” plays (Schurmann, p. 42). Commenting on this play as time Schurmann writes:

Hen ...in the sense of...the oneness of day and night... [is the] ‘originary form of the difference’... time is the simultaneity of *phuein* and *kruptesthai*, of breaking forth into presence and of retreating from the sunlight... This agonistic play...designates the intrinsic motility of the One... [T]he temporality of presencing-absencing, understood as a play, means that the One founds nothing. It is ‘without why,’ ‘only play’... (pp. 178–9).

One can wonder whether Heidegger was too eager to ignore the possibility that Heraclitus’ child was playing a game with rules, a game in which there is a king piece, perhaps like checkers or chess. Giving the fragment a psychoanalytic, or Winnicottian gloss, one can also wonder whether the pieces in the game are themselves the fetishes of transitional time, time as the iridescent *hen heautoi diapherein*, the seam of presencing-absencing. In other words, the rules of a game which disavow the anxiety of what is on Winnicott’s “theoretical line”

between the subjective and the objective, the anxiety of the one in difference from itself in which the rutable and non-rutable turn into each other. Schurmann wrote that in general for Heidegger the “step back” to thinking *presencing* as the open and the between is quasi-traumatic. Such thinking “is abrupt since the resistances may suddenly vanish by which the ‘rational animal,’ the metaphysical animal, defends itself against polymorphous *presencing* as against its death” (1987, p. 42). Such “resistances” themselves have the disavowal structure that Heidegger attributed to Kant’s recoil from the “abyss of metaphysics,” the unsaid, or the unknown, that structures his work.

For one can also think that Winnicott’s divided baby, feeding from itself and something other than itself, is a version of the one in difference from itself. And in a Freudian sense, structured by a different version of a fourfold mirror play. What is the experience of satisfaction? The experience of four elements, each of which reflects the other: self-preservation, erotic arousal, feeding from oneself, feeding from the other. (The splitting of self-preservation and arousal, as discussed above, account for the fetish as religious or sexual object.) In a Heideggerian-Freudian-Winnicottian sense this auto-affective play is “perceived” in the passive-active sense of the relation to the thing in primary scopophilia. It conditions, “bethings,” is traced in the “*a priori* synthesis” of originally unconscious thought and the inevitable tension of unconscious time as binding. Precisely because this is so, there will always be primal anxiety and recoil from this non-objective, non-rule-bound transitional reality. *Philia* meets *neikos*. In the auto-immune response to oneself as *bedingt*, objectification becomes the economical rule of tension relief. The iridescent thing becomes an idealized presence or a threatening absence.

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Which is why one can ask what might appear to be an absurd question: is Heidegger’s jug a breast? He does choose a thing which holds and gives liquid to describe the fourfold mirror play of the thing. Heidegger did not read Freud carefully enough to notice where auto-affection and other ways of thinking time entered his work. And Freud did not read Heidegger, particularly *KPM*, such that he could understand why his claim that psychoanalysis was not metaphysics, could not simply be a claim that psychoanalysis was science in the Kantian sense—precisely because that science was a defensive response to transitional, auto-affective time-space. And neither saw that the unavoidable question of fetishism has to be understood in these terms.

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Freud and Derrida: Writing and Speculation (or When the Future Irrupts in the Present)

In the documentary film *Derrida*¹, Derrida prescribes to those who say that *Seinfeld* is a deconstructive “sitcom” to do their homework, to read and study, because a sitcom has little or nothing to do with the project of deconstruction. On the contrary, regarding Freud and philosophy, Derrida did his homework and he did it really well. He read Freud carefully and closely studied him, looked into him attentively, examined him and finally established an intellectual relationship with Freud in which his thought began to *speculate with* that of the psychoanalyst’s. (To speculate is the verb that will run through this entire essay). *Freud and the Scene of Writing* and *To Speculate – On “Freud”*, rather than being mere analysis or criticisms of certain Freudian discoveries, are both texts that turn out to be reading and writing exercises, which entail an almost obsessive (ob-scene) observation of the structure, style, and of the marginal of some of Freud’s manuscripts. In both these articles, the creativity of Derrida’s pen has a profoundly theoretical and radically metaphysical sense. What I mean is that beyond his gestures, small signs, *double entendres* and expositive digressions, there is a sage metaphysic meditation.

I said meditation, but in this context, Freud’s and Derrida’s, it seems more appropriate to say metaphysical speculation. *To Speculate – On “Freud”* is fundamentally a reflection on Freud’s speculation in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.² I think the text’s title has more than one meaning. *Speculate* and *specular* – which come from the same Latin root, *specere*, to look, according to the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, have the following meanings: 1. Specular: relating to, or having the properties of a mirror. 2. Speculate: to think about something and make guesses about it, to form ideas or theories about something usually

¹ Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman, “Derrida,” (USA: Zeitgeist Films, 2000). DVD.

² Chapter IV of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* opens with a sort of confession where Freud says: “What follows is speculation, often far-fetched speculation...” (Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. XVIII. Ed. James Strachey. London: Vintage, 1920. p. 24).

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when there are many things not known about it. 3. Speculate: to invest money in ways that could produce a large profit but that also involves a lot of risk. Derrida holds that *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* is an athletic text, but not because of a limitation, a weakening, or biographical irruption³ in Freud's intellect, but because the object of psychoanalytical thought is specular and cannot be apprehended, named, conceptualized or seen under a microscope. The psychic apparatus does not have a material foundation, and we therefore cannot make an anatomical preparation with views to a scientific analysis *comme il faut*. In this sense, within the questions of psychoanalysis that excited Derrida's philosophical thought, I would point out three as the most fundamental that, in addition, belong altogether to the realm of the "speculative/specular" in its spectral sense as well as in the economic one. These are: the virtuality of the psyche, the idea of the mnemonic trace and that of "deferral" (*après-coup*). As I said before, in *To Speculate — on "Freud"*, it becomes very clear that Derrida's reflexive and critical exercise does not have only one direction, i.e., at the same time that, from a deconstructive interest, he is criticizing the metaphysical assumptions of psychoanalysis, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* reflects on his philosophical thinking an image of Being as economy. But this "story" doesn't end here: this economy is speculative. Moreover, the Freudian psyche is no longer unveiled as an *a priori*, but as a product of the reflection of other mirrors, here more than one (and I am not saying that Derrida and Freud are each an indivisible one, for they too *are* their legacy, so I say "here" for expositive simplicity), for the psyche is a mere link in a larger ecosystem (which is itself an ecosystem of psychic systems) of social, mental, and environmental order, to follow Guattari's topology.⁴ The interactions between the different psychic systems are, according to Freud, economic, but this economy is also speculative in more than one sense: first, the different systems are altered transversally and second, they negotiate in terms of expense, savings and pain/pleasure future projections. Besides, the mnemonic trace is in Freud the outcome of relationships between different forces (more than two, which meet face to face) of irruption and resistance whose result is

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³ In *To Speculate — on "Freud"*, Derrida sustains that *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* can also be read as an autobiographical text.

⁴ I will not speak of this here, but it turns out to be quite interesting that the French word *psyché* also means "cheval mirror". Derrida speaks at length of this point in his book *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*. See Jacques Derrida, *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg, 2 vols., Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.

never predictable. And finally, psychic time and the time of *hauntological* ontology are both non-linear temporalities wherein the *possibility* of a future overflowing is always at play. In short, Derridian hauntology⁵ and Freudian metapsychology have a specular relationship. The engagement between Freud and Derrida, between psychoanalysis and deconstruction, amounts to two mirrors facing each other producing infinite reflections, where the instant of identity is lost in the very moment of their facing each other.

From this point onward, I will go about exploring those ideas of Freud which, seem to me, “traffic” the most with Derrida’s ideas, in no particular order; for the specular cannot be ordered...

According to Derrida in *Freud and the Scene of Writing*, “the Freudian concept of trace must be radicalized and extracted from the metaphysics of presence which still retains it...”⁶ At this point, the deconstruction of psychoanalysis becomes a pressing matter and one that, besides, awaits a very happy and productive harvest (of course, many fruits have already been reaped). But the reading task of this essay must go in the opposite direction, i.e., we must examine what Freud told Derrida, and not deconstruction to psychoanalysis. In this context, what place does the analogy of the mystic writing pad and the psychic apparatus hold within the history of philosophy? Why, from the standpoint of deconstruction, psyche and Being are considered writing? Why did Derrida write and say so much about Freud?

Just as it was pleasant and scandalously timely for Freud to find the mystic writing pad in the market, such, I imagine, was Derrida’s discovery of the economy of *différance*⁷ in the Freudian psyche. Let us call attention to that fact that the

⁵ See *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf, New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 10, and *passim*.

⁶ Jacques Derrida, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

⁷ The neographism *différance* tries to shed some light on various problems of the history of thought. This is the very word that encompasses all the preoccupations of deconstruction, and more than a word, this orthographic violence is a drill, a performative act that reveals: ontology as hauntology, the falsehood of the authority of *phoné* over writing that, both in semiotics and philosophy, had been thought of as the bearer and giver of truth, for voice has been thought of as presence, and this latter had been considered condition of possibility for truth, and finally, *différance* shows how an act of speech can transform the history of thought. First, *différance* (with a) tries to convey the sense of spatiality and temporality

psyche does not only work in this economy, but it is an end result of *différance*. This means that the psyche is not an *a priori*, but rather a speculative negotiation. Moreover, this economic relationship is speculative in all the senses of the word cited above. First of all, the psyche is the result of an encounter (by the way violent) between a living organism and an outside. It is also the incorporation of the outside, the other, though of course this incorporation is not total, for psyche and world are not identical. The psyche is the difference resulting from the vital force of the organism that affirms itself in the world plus/minus the incorporation of the outside. The outside can be understood as world, Law, the other, the others, the realm of culture (in the sense of “civilization and its discontents”) or a very long etcetera. The result is not the sum of two things, but a whole ecosystem. In psychic terms we know, on the one hand, that the psyche is more than one registry, and on the other, that the unconscious is the organization that resists the world or otherness in general.

In *To Speculate – on “Freud”*, it is clear that, first, the psyche is, like Being, a speculative economy, and second, that Being and the psyche have a specular relationship in Derrida’s writings on Freud. That is, we are not talking about an analogy between the psyche and Being, but rather, we have to think, on the one hand, that everything that *is* is a speculative/specular economy and, on the other, that the psyche is part of this eco-logy, as an organism in an *oïkos*, i.e., part

that has been forfeited by *différence* (with e). *Différer* in French can be translated as either of two English verbs: ‘to differ’ and ‘to defer’. The first indicates that at least two distinguishable entities are not identical, and the second, a spatial and temporal postponement. In French, ‘difference’ and ‘deferral’ are contained in the same word, *différence*, however, Derrida points out that the second meaning has become forgotten, therefore he decides to commit this orthographic violence in order to call attention to the temporality and spatiality that is always at play in any differential relationship. But in French, *différence* and *différance* are pronounced exactly the same, there is no phonetic difference, so the only way to know which one is at play is through its written form. This is fundamental for Derrida, because he thus shows the falsehood in that the voice, in as much as it is presence, is privileged in truthful communication. Finally, in an ontological sense, *différance* is the origin of everything that is: “... [*Différance*] will be the playing movement that ‘produces’—by means of something that is not simply an activity—these differences, these effects of difference. This does not mean that the *différance* that produces differences is somehow before them, in a simple and unmodified—in-different—present. *Différance* is the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences. The name ‘origin’ no longer suits it.” [*Différance*,” in *Margins of Philosophy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. p. 11]

of a house, a habitat or environment, or as a logic of echo or resonance of otherness. Thus, what we end up with is a “*mise ‘en abyme’*”⁸, in which we become vertiginously lost just in economies (at this point we must open up a parenthesis à la Derrida and ask, which economies are just or pure if they are struck through by more than one force from the get-go). In the more metaphysical points of Derridian thought, what becomes seductive of the Freudian conception of psychic life is that it does not fall outside the economy of life (or *life death*, as he precisely calls this undecidable phenomenon in *To Speculate...*). In short, psychic economy is organized within the economy of finiteness.

It is in this sense that Being is writing. The encounter of different forces is an economy that leaves a trace. What is is in fact a collision between *different* quantities; thus, there is always a stronger one that imprints upon the other leaving a mark. This is what Derrida means when he says that Being is text. Being is *différance* and *différance* is writing. Another timely and scandalous discovery in Freud by Derrida: the psyche, in *A Note upon the “Mystic Writing Pad”* is also writing.

The mystic writing pad is a writing artifact (a toy to be exact) composed of three layers. The bottom layer is made up of dark colored wax mounted on cardboard. Upon it, there is a translucent sheet of wax paper, and at the top, a sheet that serves as a protection for the middle sheet not to get torn. These two sheets are fixed together at the top and loose at the bottom, so they can be separated from each other except at the two lateral edges. The most interesting thing is that in order to write, this device does not need ink, “a pointed stilus scratches the surface”⁹. When one is tracing with the stylus, the layer of wax paper adheres to

⁸ I cite Alan Bass’ translation notes on this term: “*En abyme* is the heraldic term for infinite reflection, e.g. the shield in shield in the shield ... Derrida has used this term frequently. The appearance of *mise en abyme* here is the overlap between what Freud says and what Freud does in *Beyond...*” (“To Speculate—on ‘Freud’,” in *The Post Card. From Socrates to Freud and Beyond* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). p. 304-5 n. 9.) “*En abyme* is Derrida’s usual expression for the infinite regress of a reflection within a reflection, etc. The term originally comes from the heraldic notion of an escutcheon within an escutcheon; Derrida plays on *abyme* and *abîme*, abyss”. (“Du Tout,” in *The Post Card. From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 511 n. 10.)

⁹ Sigmund Freud, “A Note upon the Mystic Writing-Pad.” *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. XIX, ed. James Starckey, London: Vintage, 1920, p. 229.

the wax and the impression is perceived. But if this contact is broken, the writing disappears. So both the capacity of reception and the capacity of archiving are unlimited, for as Freud describes, the disappearing or erasing of the written trace is a mere illusion. If we lift the celluloid and the wax paper, we can see how all the traces have become recorded on the wax slab. But this slab has a perimeter and limited matter, so each trace that is inscribed on the pad will fill this area and will write on top of what has already been drawn. Furthermore, the old inscriptions will cause what is being written to take certain paths, i.e., they condition the new traces. Freud thought this artifact fitted perfectly as an illustration of the psychic apparatus, which he thought could characterize as a sort of machine. Yes, I am certain that Freud experienced a moment of rejoice when he found this children's toy, but I imagine Derrida was equally happy when he found Freud's text, *A Note Upon the "Mystic Writing-Pad"*, for the mystic writing-pad is a machine of hauntology, a machine of an ontology haunted by ghosts (specters) rather than one of the metaphysics of presence. We are not dealing with a camera that registers a live present, full and self-identical, but a machine that is always in the "in between", between life and death, between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, between the primary process and the secondary one. The mnemonic trace is always *between* legacy and future. The trace is a trace of writing, trace of a trace, as Derrida says, an *architrace*. There where we find the trace as an effect of writing on a support (wax slab) that is modified with each irruption of the other (another *Derridian* parenthesis is called for: how much of a support is something that is modified *each time* it is effected upon?), there, we can think of Being and the history of Being also with the analogy of the mystic writing-pad. The psyche and Being fit with the image of a wax receptacle that allows itself to be inscribed upon and, at the same time, cannot free itself from this inscription. Let us think of the uppermost layer of this children's toy, the one that Freud compares to the perception/conscience system. Can we think of another mode in which, if they do at all, beings present themselves? Don't they manifest themselves in such a way? Don't beings disappear as soon as the contact with that wax, the mnemonic archive, the archive as/of history is broken? The mystic writing-pad allows us, on the one hand, to think of beings as fiction and as a snapshot within the course of history, and, on the other, of Being as *khôra*. So let us remember Derrida's text on Plato's *khôra*, a text where he also evokes the Freudian psyche.

Khôra is the figure in the ontology of Plato's *Timaeus* that intervenes as an atopic space that is logically prior to the divided world of the sensible and intel-

ligible, but that, at the same time, allows this very distinction. In his study of the origin of the universe, Plato concludes that there is a state prior to the creation of the world. The primary elements are fire, water, air, and soil, but they are only primary in a metaphorical way, for they are really caused principles. Before introducing *khôra*, Timaeus had already put forth two different causes, one originating the intelligible and the other the sensible. But all of this had to have a prior state, a state of chaos and indiscernibility embraced by *khôra*. He thus proposes a more vague and difficult kind of cause for the universe. *Timaeus* reads: “What must we suppose it to do and to be? This above all: it is a *receptacle* of all becoming—its wetnurse, as it were.”¹⁰ And further goes on to say:

We must always refer to it by the same term, for it does not depart from its own character in any way. Not only does it always receive all things, it has never in any way whatever taken on any characteristic similar to any of the things that enter it. Its nature is to be available for anything to make its impression upon, and it is modified, shaped and reshaped by the things that enter it. These are the things that make it appear different at different times. The things that enter and leave it are imitations of those things that always are, imprinted after their likeness in a marvelous way that is hard to describe.¹¹

In this sense, *khôra* can be thought of as a sort of critique of locating things spatiotemporally. *Khôra* is something that can be imprinted upon, but whose inscription exceeds it. We thus speak of an “inscriptionality” that is prior—by economy of discourse and not chronologically—to any binary logic and which calls the heritage of metaphysics into question. The enigmatic and paradoxical nature of *khôra* questions the primacy of the principle of non-contradiction and of excluded middle. *Khôra* cannot be submitted to a logic of participation and exclusion. According to Derrida, we are dealing with a sort of oscillation, of dwelling in the oscillations, but not a movement that goes from one extreme to the other, but of an oscillation “between two types of oscillation: the double exclusion (*neither/nor*) and the participation (*both this and that*).”¹² Sometimes *khôra* is neither this, nor that, and sometimes is both, this and that.

¹⁰ Plato, “Timaeus,” in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997, §49

¹¹ *Ibid.* §50c

¹² Jacques Derrida, “Khôra,” in *On the Name*, ed. Thomas Dutoit, *Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 91.

The psychic apparatus, like *khôra*, is neither a space nor a container. Freud says, on the one hand, that it can be a virtual apparatus, and, on the other, that it functions as a writing machine. In other words, we can say it is a virtual apparatus “where” a mnemonic trace can be imprinted.

In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which is considered the opening text of psychoanalysis, Freud makes use of analogies to optical devices to make it clear that his psychic apparatus cannot be reduced to any anatomically defined component; it is rather an imaginary design. Thus, we must think of the psychic as that which takes place *in-between* the components of a somewhat materially apprehensible support. According to Freud, it is in this *in-between* that the psychic apparatus is located. So we can indeed speak of a location, but an *a-topical* one. The psyche now becomes a sort of *khôra*; it turns into an *a-topical* place, *where*, thus, inscription occurs. The psychic apparatus exceeds the anatomy of the nervous system. Neither *khôra* nor the psychic apparatus are a ground or foundation, for neither are a thing or a being, in fact, we cannot say that either *khôra* or the psychic apparatus *are*. They are not a subject, a substance, nor a substrate of anything.

This is what Derrida has to say of *khôra*:

For on the one hand, the ordered polysemy of the word always includes the sense of political place or, more generally of *invested* place, by opposition to abstract space. *Khôra* “means”: place occupied by someone, country, inhabited place, marked place, rank, post, assigned position, territory, or region. And in fact, *khôra* will always already be occupied, invested, even as a general place, and even when it is distinguished from everything that takes place in it. Whence the difficulty—we shall come to it—of treating it as an empty or geometric space...¹³

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Plato insists that *khôra* is a receptacle, a place of harboring and reception. It is in this sense that *khôra* cannot be an empty space *where* simply imprinting occurs, rather, *khôra* can only come to be, or better said, there can only be *khôra* in as much as something is sheltered in it, in as much as something occupies it, or is invested upon it; the psychic apparatus is—and let us say rather that *there is* psychic apparatus— only when it is occupied, invested upon, imprinted,

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

marked. There is no psychic apparatus prior to or before the so-called psyche. There is a psychic apparatus, something *like* a psychic apparatus because there is a psyche; there is a psyche that functions *as* an apparatus, *as* a machine.

On the other hand, the reading Derrida has of this section of Plato's *Timaeus* does not intend to set forth a word that actually does any justice to *khôra*; he assumes the unavoidability of any geography or topology, but nonetheless shows that "it is structure which makes them thus inevitable, makes of them something other than accidents, weaknesses, or provisional moments."¹⁴ The psychic apparatus and *khôra* are spaces without regularities or essences; there are no full-fledged presences, there is only *différance*. Let us recall how the Freudian psychic apparatus is shown in the *Project for a Scientific Psychology* as a difference between breaches,¹⁵ in the *Note Upon the Mystic Writing Pad* as a *difference*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

¹⁵ James Strachey, the editor of the Standard Edition of Freud's Complete Psychological Works, chose "facilitation" to translate *Bahnung*. Alan Bass's translation of Derrida's *Freud and the Scene of Writing* renders *Bahnung* as *breaching* or *path-breaking*. This latter translation is more closely related to the neural model Freud sets forth in his *Project...* The image *Bahnung* evokes is more similar to the opening of a way, or following Derrida, the tracing of grooves, than to the "facilitation" of energy transmission –Q-. Luiz Hanns' *Dictionary of Freud's German Terms* says that "the noun *Bahn* evokes the image of a 'road', 'excavate', 'to install', 'open up' a treadable path" [See Luiz Alberto Hanns, *Diccionario De Términos Alemanes De Freud* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Lumen, 2001.) p. 268.] It also says, "*Bahn* is the beginning of something flat and horizontal, a runway on which one can easily 'slide' or 'transit'. The *Bahnung* is, therefore, something built upon a rugged terrain." I find two main issues in choosing *facilitation* as a translation of *Bahnung*; first, it makes no reference to the "permanent alteration" of the contact-barriers of ψ neurons, which turns out to be the most substantial to the psychic process of memory. Thinking of pathbreaking can render that meaning. *Facilitation* means to make an action possible, to make easier achieving an end, or to give something. These meanings generate confusion and erroneous interpretations, for memory in Freud does not give exclusive account of making the transmission of energy possible, but instead, the fundamental part of the memory phenomenon is the repetition provoked by the exciting of that prior alteration of the neuron contact-barrier, which is rendered by that image of pathbreaking or the tracing of a groove. This is what Freud means by "there is a learning-on based on memory". Second, breaching, pathbreaking or the trace of a groove, also renders the violence *Bahnung* implied for Freud. This groove that opens responds to the difficulty of leaving a trace or inscription due to the resistance or defense the psychic apparatus displays, we might say, of its own nature. The breaking of this path always implies difficulty and violence. On the other hand, pathbreaking or breaching also refers to the tie between two elements, which the notion of facilitation does not confer. In English, the term facilitation does not

between the force of impression and that of the resistance of the wax slab, and how this difference is also, as Derrida states, a spatiotemporal game, making space in time and/or time in space. The space that is opening is a never-ending openness to alteration; more over, this openness brings with it the formation of new spaces. Thus we can speak of an openness that temporally projects future and differed openness. In fact, more than a-topic spaces, the psychic apparatus and *khôra* are actually *spacings*.

Just like the Freudian psyche, which lacks a material reference, *khôra* “does not have the characteristics of an existent, by which we mean an existent that would be receivable in the *ontologic*, that is, those of an intelligible or sensible existent. There is *khôra* but *the khôra* does not exist”¹⁶. Derrida says it is more a “setter” than settled.

From the standpoint of deconstruction, ontology is hauntology.¹⁷ That which is and “presents itself” is traversed by that which is not, and this occurs in both ways, that is, by that which is no longer there and by which is not yet there. The ghost haunts by inhabiting a place without occupying it. This is how a specter inhabits what *is*, it does not overfill, but it is nonetheless there, it makes itself noticed without presenting itself, without showing itself, but it makes things and produces effects. Just like the ghost that does not *present* itself in the room, but moves objects, and in so doing, makes noises. The ghost can also come from the past or from the future, but the threat of his haunting is always that it *will* present itself. In other words, it is a promise that will be fulfilled in the future. Here the temporality of the future becomes the protagonist in deconstruction. It is a time that philosophy has forgotten or that has been at least denied a proper place. But psychoanalysis has done so too. There seems to be an impossibility to read the

evoke anything related to the physical interrelationship between two elements, it does refer to a process of removing obstacles, however, these difficulties are figurative; on the contrary, *Bahnung* holds a concrete quality of these obstructions.

¹⁶ Derrida, “Khôra,” p. 97.

¹⁷ It is important to point out that in French *hauntologie* and *ontologie* sound almost exactly the same. The fact that Derrida did not choose a complete different word to indicate the urgent necessity to do a new ontology (or no ontology at all) deciding for one than in speech is impossible to distinguish, seems to me a gesture that, besides stressing the ungrounded privilege of voice over writing (like in *différance*) within the history of metaphysics, acknowledges the insurmountable significance for philosophy to think ontology, thus one that thinks Being haunted by absence.

future in Freud and in philosophy. It has been there, nonetheless, written out fully. For reading the future is not guessing it, nor is it the case with the past, despite what we might have thought all this time. The metaphysics of presence has deceived us because the past is not a present past, and thus, cannot be read as something that is there inalterable in its full manifestation and material nature. Neither is the present. The metaphysics of presence has told us that the future is not at play, but it in fact haunts us like the past; its ghost has an effect, albeit a deferred effect... This future that opens up and that at the same time alters (each time) what presents itself is the future of speculation, i.e., an unpredictable time that is always and radically to come, waiting to happen without it doing so, for it is a time that takes place without happening. This is the time Derrida calls *l'avenir* (that which is “to come”) and which is different from the *future*: the future is what we know because it is predictable because we can be certain that it will occur. *L'avenir* is the time that haunts as a *possibility* of imminence or irruption, and that is what alters. Thus it cannot be presence, not even future presence, it is a promise, a *perhaps* that moves and does without coming to be.

Derrida states in *Freud and the Scene of Writing* that the irreducibility of the “effect of deferral” is, no doubt, Freud’s greatest discovery.¹⁸ According to Freud, the trauma is a scene that does not happen in a precise time, but is rather an irruption that “falls” upon the “already happened” within the story of a subject, and whose catastrophic or disorganizing effects do not occur once and for all. In this sense, the trauma is always radically yet to be fixed, yet to come. This temporality of the trauma does not trigger the re-signification of an event by itself traumatic, but instead, the irruption of the signification of an episode. I do not mean to say that there is no repetition (as in re-signification), but rather that there is always a re-presentation. In other words, the temporality of trauma is neither linear, nor harmonic in any way. The traumatic scene builds up with repetition. According to Freud, as a traumatic episode to come, its own registry in memory can be due to two different causes: either one force is at once excessive or the force of repetitions is added on. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to look for a direct and horizontal causality:

The structure of delay (*Nachträglichkeit*) in effect forbids that one make of temporalization (temporization) a simple dialectical complication of the living present

¹⁸ Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” p. 203.

as an originary and unceasing synthesis—a synthesis constantly directed back on itself, gathered in on itself and gathering—of retentional traces and protentional openings. The alterity of the “unconscious” makes us concerned not with horizons of modified—past or future—presents, but with a “past” that has never been present, and which never will be, whose future to come will never be a *production* or a reproduction in the form of presence. Therefore the concept of trace is incompatible with the concept of retention, of the becoming-past of what has been present. One cannot think the trace—and therefore, *différance*—on the basis of the present, or of the presence of the present.¹⁹

Certain strength irrupts (by addition or intensity) and the trauma is “to come” in the psychic archive by association with other forces and other registries. Moreover, the registry as trace is modified, just like the wax slab, by new traces.

The temporality of hauntology is that of the haunting of **absence**. I cross out absence since the ghost has been thought of as an absence that presents itself and that can be conjured, however, if there is something radical in Derrida’s and Freud’s assessments regarding the spectral, is that what is absent becomes present in its effects and never “in person”. All the phrases where I have said “presence” or “absence” have, each time, the exact same meaning if absence is substituted by presence and vice versa. For the ghost is, as Derrida says, an undecidable²⁰, an operation rather than a concept. It cannot be a concept because it cannot be defined, we cannot decide whether it is an absence or a presence, nor is it an oscillation or tension between two providences. The undecidable is the experience of the alien irrupting in that which we consider our own. Thus, it puts into crisis the experience of what is our own, of what is one, unified, ruled, predictable, and autonomous. I remember here Freud’s gripping statement:

¹⁹ Derrida, “Différance,” p. 21.

²⁰ Undecidables are indeterminate concepts that point out where the classificatory order falls down. That is, they mark the limit of ordering and disturb the logic of binary oppositions. Undecidables do not have a proper or determinate character; we are talking about possibilities, of movement in and out the oppositions. The supplement, for example, is an undecidable because it is, *at the same time*, something that replaces, that can be en lieu de and something that adds up or complements. It is important to make clear that, on one hand, for Derrida, philosophy can not go beyond undecidables and, on the other, deconstruction is not an attempt to take over undecidability.

“the ego is not master in its own house”²¹, not because there is a hypo-mnemonic archive that inhabits the ego, for that would be as innocuous as an encapsulated benign tumor, but because that archive irrupts in the ego and makes us do things. Ghosts, though they may not present themselves, they do in fact produce effects, they do things and make us do things, thus they have existence, a-typical, if thought from the perspective of the metaphysics of presence, but an existence nonetheless.

The temporality of deferral in Freud and of the opening to the *avenir* of deconstruction is that which displays and makes writing possible, it is the temporality of the trace of grooves on a bottomless depth, an *archi-writing* says Derrida. There is a speculation between psychoanalysis and philosophy, which translates into a hauntology. Being is speculative and thus what is is writing; it is ghost. The *un-founding* is paramount to understanding, on the one hand, why the origin is always displaced (delayed) and, on the other, why *l’avenir* never comes to presence. Derrida says in *Différance*:

And it is this constitution of the present, as an “originary” and irreducibly non-simple (and therefore, *stricto sensu* nonoriginary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and protentions (to reproduce analogically and provisionally a phenomenological and transcendental language that soon will reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to call *archi-writing*, *archi-trace*, or *différance*. Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporization.²²

What is “present” (Derrida would write ~~present~~) to perception is caught between at least two absences that, as if it weren’t enough for the dislocation of the metaphysics of presence, make it possible. At this point it is worth recalling that Freud thought, in more than one occasion,²³ that the origin of perceptions

²¹ Sigmund Freud, “A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis”. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. XVII, ed. James Starchey, London: Vintage, 1917, p. 143.

²² Derrida, “Différance,” p. 13.

²³ See Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. XVIII, ed. James Strachey, London: Vintage, 1920, p. 28; Sigmund Freud, “Negation”. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. XIX, ed. James Strachey, London: Vintage, 1925, p. 238; Sigmund Freud, “Note upon the Mystic Writing-Pad”. *The Standard Edition of the Complete*

was in the discontinuous excitation of the cathexis that reached out from the unconscious into the conscience. This means, in the first place, that there is no presence at conscience (there is no conscience) without memory (unconscious), and second, Freud says so explicitly, that the rhythm of excitation and interruption gives the quality in perception (and the sense of time, he adds in the *Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad*). What is present to the conscience is a sort of hallucination or, best-case scenario, so that we are not overwhelmed with this vocabulary of the pathological, the result of an equation between the other (the thing or the phenomenon) and our hypo-mnemonic archive.²⁴

We can then ask the question: “How much of a presence is that which is traversed, pierced by absence?” Or with a slight variation: “how much of a conscience is that which needs the excitation of the unconscious and which, thus, cannot be radically differentiated from a hallucination?” This present and this conscience must be crossed out. We speak of ~~present~~ and ~~conscience~~. Both keep a trace of the past and allow themselves to be inscribed upon, from the get-go, by the relationship with the element that is yet to come. We must stress, that likewise, both elements never presented themselves. The abyss... again, each time... These times are not modified presents:

An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the subject. In constituting

Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIX, ed. James Strachey, London: Vintage, 1925, p. 231.

²⁴ I must clarify here that I have indistinctly said memory, unconscious, or hypo-mnemonic archive to refer to what Freud calls “unconscious”, because, though there might be a problem or even a contradiction in thinking memory as hypo-mnemonic or the unconscious as anamnesis, in Freud memory excludes conscience, and it takes place *in place* of consciousness. Contrary to tradition, for psychoanalysis, memory is another system from perception. The unconscious is therefore a mnemonic–hypomnemonic archive. Freud attempts to salvage this contradiction with his topologies. We must then question Freud’s compulsion to locate things, we would do better in thinking (or if we are even more radical, stop thinking...) in economies, or as Guattari says, ecologies, where connections are transversal and, in as much as the origin of every phenomenon is heterogeneous, the different registries, regions or territories are the product of transversal relationships that can never be linear.

itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called *spacing*, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporization).²⁵

The grammatical tense of hauntology is that of the middle voice. Conscience *arrives*, *it becomes* present, nothing, and no one presents itself or becomes present. There is no transitivity. These *presences* are inhabited, struck through, haunted by an alterity that alters them every moment. Hauntology is an ontology of heterogenesis, an ontology of processes and not of substances with a linear temporality. There is a superposition not only of agencies and spaces, but also between times. What we have is a conflictive and non-harmonic temporality, an implosive temporality.²⁶ A temporal implosion means that the present is modified by history as much as history is modified by the present and that the future, *at the same time*, impresses as a possible (always possibility, never present) modification to come. This pressure, just as any other that finds resistance, creates an inscription. The future is written in the sense of *presenting itself*. In other words, this openness, as an expectation, modifies, alters, the trace at every moment. Let us note two more things: first, that which resists the new inscriptions is memory or history as text, and second, that the cavity, which “contains” the implosion, can be thought of as *khôra* or as the psychic apparatus, for both are bottomless depths that make writing possible without being “primal writing”. Neither *khôra* nor the psychic apparatus are text. They are nothing. *Khôra* is prior to what *is*, it is the wetnurse of being. The psychic apparatus has no anatomical delegate, it has no place, is not even prior to the psychic. Both of them hold writing, yes, but only virtually. We could also say that in a specular way, since this kind of relationship makes Being as a specter, and not as a manifestation that is fully present.

²⁵ Derrida, “Différance,” p. 13.

²⁶ An implosive temporality is the temporality of writing. The *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary* says that to implode means: “to collapse inward as if from external pressure”. In written text, the grammatical tenses of past, present and future are fragmented, except not dispersing outward, but rather amalgamating. This is not an explosion because the tenses do not bust out, they are not separated into different paths, since the breaking is inward-bound, the tenses mix up and even, in some cases, become fused together. Here they overlap with each other, making it impossible to differentiate exactly the events of the past, the present, and even the future.

The temporality of deferral is also that of constructions in analysis and of historical truth. What I mean to say is that this is the temporality of the myth of the totemic feast (or act, Freud never actually made up his mind in *Totem and Taboo*), of the reconstruction of the history of Moses that Freud expounds in *Moses and the Monotheist Religion* and that of the clinic of the *Wolf Man*. In all of these texts Freud underlines the irrelevance of the materiality of acting out or of the act that is actually witnessed. It does not actually matter if the primitive horde ate their father, it is irrelevant whether the Jews actually murdered God or not; or whether the *Wolf Man* could have seen his parents making love. The strength of the virtual, of the intangible, is capable of having the same psychic or historic effects. The sole desire to assassinate, the sole fantasy of being in the middle of an oedipal scene can have the same traumatic effects as the actual experience. All of civilization is grounded on the guilt of parricidal and incestuous desires. All of the Judaic culture revolves around the attempted murder of Moses. The madness of the *Wolf Man* has an etiological explanation in the desire-fantasy of witnessing a sexual scene between his parents. Although in some cases we can distinguish between material and historical truth (I would say that this is only in terms of the “amount” of testimony, the number, and the “quality”, understood as a corollary of power relationships, of the witnesses), when it comes to the effects and passages to act or materializations, this difference turns out to be unimportant. As I said before, grammatically, deferral occurs in the middle voice, for the trauma is not formed nor does *a* subject suffer it. Evidently, we must not understand this statement as “nobody has a trauma” or “no one is responsible of having traumatized someone else”. Following Derrida, the subject is fundamentally the subject of right²⁷ and, in this sense, must respond (take responsibility) of even that which does not respond within or to him. There is no subject means that *there is (il y a)*²⁸ or *it may* become a traumatic event. In psychic terms, in order for an episode to become traumatic more than *one* and/or more than once are needed. More than one subject is required means, firstly, that the trauma exceeds the subject, for subject and psyche do not correspond, and secondly, that the subject may not notice what is building up in his psyche. Judith Butler makes a very clear distinction between subject and psyche: “It is

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²⁷ See the interview with Derrida in 1992 for the *Oxford Amnesty Lectures*, available in written form as Barbara Johnson, ed. *Freedom and Interpretation: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1992*, London: Basic Books, 1993.

²⁸ The French voice “*il y a*” implies no subject, it only points out that *there is* something, but without an agent or cause.

important to distinguish between the notion of the psyche, which includes the notion of the unconscious, and that of the subject, whose formation is conditioned by the exclusion of the unconscious”²⁹. Therefore, psyche and subject are notions that refer to different psychic functions. The subject is subject to Law, while psyche is the product of exclusion (repression) of the undesired within the subjective organization.

If we could think of something such as “The Freud method”, this conception of deferred trauma would be its spinal column. It is true that Freud, as Derrida rightly states in *Archive Fever*, traversed two itineraries, that is, without forfeiting his archeological interests, he always had a rebel gesture against his positivist “self-demands”. *Totem and Taboo* is a good example of this double program. On the one hand, when he points out that the history of civilization has kept secret crimes of incest and parricide, he sets it forth as a hypothesis and as necessary deductive speculation; he states, one day in the history of homo-sapiens, these violations must have been perpetrated materially, for, otherwise, they would not have left so many traces in history and in the collective as well as the individual psyche. Nonetheless, he then holds that the passage to act makes no difference; desire is enough, in the psychological realm it “actually” happened. So it is a historical truth, a construction. In psychic terms, desire and fantasy have the same strength as act. Thus, despite the fact that the Jews did not kill Moses, they are responsible for his “assassination”, for they were not able to commit the crime because of the external will of God that put a cloud between them. In this same sense, the guilt caused by the parricidal desire is as strong as if the assassination had actually been perpetrated. There is a phylogenetic guilt that is originated in desire and passes through the entire history of the psyche. The crime that is actually “committed” as well as the repressed memory of it, i.e., the negation of it, which preserves it in the unconscious; both are equally important in thinking the origin and conservation of social order. Let us not forget that the most radical hypothesis in *Totem and Taboo* is that these prohibitions take place in as much as both incest and cannibalism are desires inherent to human nature. The argument here is very simple, if they were not desires there would not be any reason to prohibit them.

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²⁹ Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 206. n. 4.

If we follow the “Freud method”, the symptoms must be analyzed only as the union of events that have fallen together. Some chance and coincidence are at play. This is precisely what the sense of the word symptom points to: “*symptom* comes from the Greek *sympiptein* to happen, from *syn-* + *piptein* to fall, coincide. It refers to something as simple as two things falling together, side by side, two things that coincide, and that may or may not happen “properly” (without leaving this family); also what falls forth, what is precipitated symptomatically, which means, fortuitously.”³⁰ Psychoanalysis does not unveil histories, it constructs them; and Freud explains it clearly in his text “*Constructions in Analysis*”.³¹ The memory and history of a subject are always and radically to come (what is memory if not a recollection to come?) There is no past present because the mnemonic traces have been altered “already and always”. The mark has been modified from its origin, at the very moment in which it came into contact with the mnemonic tissue that hosted it. An event “falls upon” a psyche and this creates a symptom. The trauma is a coincidence to come, a trace expecting new carving. In this previous paragraph, we could substitute trauma with historical event.

For Derrida and for deconstruction, to think in speculative/specular and not metaphysical terms has implied, at the same time, a critical interpretation of culture and a political strategy (without an end, for as Derrida himself states, teleology and speculative economy cannot be thought of together) in which the stress has been put on the impossibility of the big projects of humanity, fundamentally, political work itself, democracy and justice. However, within this mode of dwelling in thought, impossibility is precisely and paradoxically, the only way for democratic or just events to take place, to happen or to fall symptomatically. When what is opened in time is the possibility and space for a possible irruption of radical alterity (the other), all these projects must remain—and even be thought of as—suspended, i.e., awaiting to overflow, for example, of other subjective positions or other living forms. This possible irruption will

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³⁰ Paco Vidarte, “Derriladacan: Contigüedades Sintomáticas. Sobre El Objeto Pequeño J@Cques,” in *Conjunciones: Derrida Y Compañía*, ed. Cristina de Peretti and Emilio Velasco, Madrid: Dykinson, S.L., 2007, Derriladacan: Contigüedades Sintomáticas. Sobre El Objeto Pequeño J@Cques; in *Conjunciones: Derrida Y Compañía*, ed. Cristina de Peretti and Emilio Velasco, Madrid, Dykinson, S.L., 2007. Translation ours.

³¹ See Sigmund Freud, “Constructions in Analysis”. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. XXIII, ed. James Strachey, London: Vintage, 1937.

need for it to be recognized and that a place be opened within the organization that hosts it, i.e., the “host organism” must be modified. Democracy and justice, states Derrida, are what they are, if and only if, they are always and radically to come. To wave, triumphantly, the flag of a successful culmination of the democratic and/or justice project (in this case it can be thought of as a constitutive text) would be THE actual proof of its failure. Democracy and justice only are when they are open to the possible untimely arrival of the other. All of this is not primarily an ethical prescription, it is a phenomenological description of the befalling of Being and then, yes, deconstruction acts as a political strategy that seeks to find a certain kind of harmony with the economy of Being (or the economy that Being is), its implosive time, its spectrality and its lack of completeness.

Vladimir Safatle*

Temporality, Ontology, Dialectics: Hegel Against a Formal Concept of Time

One of John McDowell's most recurrent criticisms of Kantian idealism is its conception of space and time as *a priori* conditions for any and all experience. This criticism leads McDowell to state that:

The harshest way to put this criticism is to say that although the Aesthetic purports to ground *a priori* knowledge that is objective in the only sense we can make intelligible to ourselves, what it puts in place is indistinguishable from a subjectivistic psychologism.¹

In this context, one can speak of subjectivistic psychologism because a transcendental institution of time and space is not likely to escape from being a mere projection of the subject's organising capacities over a shapeless external reality. So one must follow the idea that:

The image of a projection from a self-standing subjectivity gets no purchase if we insist, as we should, that thought and the world must be understood together. The form of thought is already just as such the form of the world. It is a form that is subjective and objective together, not primarily subjective and thereby supposedly objective.²

In this article, I would like to delve further into McDowell's deep understanding regarding a holism between the form of thought and the form of the world that does not imply subordination. I intend to go into this holism as part of a reflection on time, seen not merely as a category of perception, but also as a structure of reason in its capacity to join concept and world. This will allow us to show how Hegel criticises all formal conceptions of time in order to expound, through

¹ McDowell, John, *Having the World in View: essays on Kant, Hegel and Sellars*, Harvard University Press, 2013, p. 76.

² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

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a broad articulation between temporality and history that does not appear as a systematic object of McDowell's reflections, a concept of concrete temporality that is not merely the fruit of the subjective activity of the organisation of the conceptual capacities of perception. This concrete temporality is, in a way, the conceptual elaboration of the impact of the time of things, that is, of the impact of events initially not predicated by current forms of experience, but which nonetheless forces these forms to modify their ways of determination. Thought and world should be understood together, but not under the form of specularly or of immediate identity. The point, then, is to understand how the experience of time can show us the dialectic process that allows thought and world to come together in a movement proper to the free self-development of reason. This dialectic process should enable us "to understand the spatial and temporal forms of our sensibility in terms of adjustment to the mode of being of all reality"³.

The Criticism Against Duration

It is said that everything is born and passes away in time. When everything is abstracted from time, namely, the content of time and space, then empty time and empty space will be left, i.e., time and space are posited as abstractions of externality and represented as if they were for themselves. But not everything is born and dies in time. On the contrary, time itself is the *becoming*, the arising and passing away, the existing abstraction, Chronos, who engenders everything and destroys his offspring.⁴

It is clear how Hegel rejects here the notion, so important to Kant, that there is a pure form of time, or a pure form of space, established as a general condition of the possibility of movement and change. For Hegel, the idea so well summarized by Kant that time does not pass but the existence of changeable things passes in it, that things change in time while time doesn't change, hide the wrong belief that the form of the time would not be subjected to changes, genesis or exhaustion. This means thinking time as a immobile totality due to the formal stability of what allows the perception of becoming. If time is an immobile totality then everything that happens in its interior, every becoming and succession will be

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³ McDowell, John, "Hegel et le mythe du donné", *Revue Philosophies*, 99, 2008, p. 61.

⁴ Hegel, G.W.F. *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, 1991, para. 258.

an expression of such totality. Singular things could change but they will just actualize the possibilities of a totality assured in its eternity. Thinking changes under the idea of a “succession of opposites determinations,”⁵ as Kant does following an aristotelician tradition, would mean understanding movement through the stability of a counting principle.

Thinking on these problems, Hegel will understand that, taken as pure forms of intuition, time and space are abstractions of externality. There can be no transcendental deduction of the categories of time and space. This is not surprising for a philosophy in which “all transcendental constitution is a social institution”⁶. This is apparently confirmed when Hegel states that temporality (*Zeitliche*) is an objective determination of things, and not merely a subjective determination of the subject that grasps them. “The process of effective things themselves produces time”⁷ (*macht also der Zeit*) not only in the sense that the changes we perceive in things, their generation and destruction, would reveal to us the existence of time: a classical *topos* that insists that, if things neither changed nor moved, we would be unable to perceive the time that goes by. If we are to state that the process of effective things themselves produces time, it is because this concrete process makes time be born and perish, changes its mode of passing, paralyses it or speeds it up, or removes it, for example, from the regime of succession and places it in a dynamic of simultaneities. Time is engendered by the process of things because time itself is a formally changing processuality. There is a fundamental plasticity of time, which may explain why Hegel found it necessary to say that time itself is the becoming, the being born and the perishing⁸.

⁵ Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of pure reason*, London: Dent, 1991, B 291/A 461.

⁶ Brandom, Robert, *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 285.

⁷ Hegel, G.W.F., *ibid.*, para. 258. This phrase must be read against Kantian ideas as: “Time is not an empirical concept. For neither co-existence nor succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time did not exist as a foundation *a priori*” (Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of pure reason*, *op. cit.*, B 46).

⁸ This problem concerns the plasticity of time is also a problem about the structure of a time in revolution. A major question for a philosopher like Hegel, if we accept that: “the French Revolution will remain the burning center of Hegel’s philosophy: the event crystallizes the untimeliness of historical experience” (Comay, Rebecca, *Mourning sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution*, Stanford University Press, 2011, p. 5). A time in revolution is a time relieved from the illusion of stativity of its formal determinations, time that produces other categories of movement and change.

But if things are so, what can be said of this mute tendency of Hegelian dialectics to try to overcome time toward the eternity of the concept? Such a movement, at least externally, would seem to reiterate Spinoza's defense as regards reason necessarily conceiving from the perspective of eternity. It is impossible to forget how Hegel clearly states that: "time itself is eternal in its concept". Nor was he afraid to construct an apparent opposition between time and concept already present in a famous passage in the last chapter of *Phenomenology of the Spirit*:

Time is the concept itself that exists there and is represented to consciousness as empty intuition. Consequently, spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it does not grasp its pure concept, which is to say, as long as it does not annul time. Time is the pure self externally intuited by the self but not grasped by the self; time is the merely intuited concept. Since this concept grasps itself, it sublates its temporal form, comprehends the act of intuiting, and is intuition which has been conceptually grasped and is itself intuition which is comprehending.⁹

We should note, however, the specificity of this eternity of the concept. Two characteristics should draw our attention, namely, the distinction between eternity and duration, and the Hegelian definition of eternity as "absolute present"¹⁰. Regarding the first characteristic, Hegel said: "For this reason, duration is distinct from eternity because it is merely a relative sublating (*Aufhebung*) of time. But eternity is infinite, that is, not relative, a duration reflected into itself"¹¹. Duration is only a relative sublating of time because eternity presupposes neither staticity nor permanence. If Hegel states that in the self-apprehension of the concept there is a sublating of time, one must remember that something of the restlessness of time is conserved by the eternal movement of the concept.

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In this regard, Hegel's insistence on discrediting permanence itself in his reflection on time and history is not by mere chance. We might remember the meaning of a statement of his like: "The Persians were the first people in history, because Persia was the first empire to disappear (*Persienist das erste Reich, das vergan-*

⁹ Hegel, G.W.F., *Phenomenology of Spirit* (translation of Terry Pinkard in: <https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/21288399/Phenomenology%20translation%20English%20German.pdf>) p. 721.

¹⁰ Hegel, G.W.F., *Encyclopaedia, op. cit.*, para. 247.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 259.

gen ist),”¹² leaving only ruins behind. This phrase says a great deal about what Hegel really understands by “progress” in his philosophy of history. Progress is the awareness of a time that is no longer subject to simple repetition, but rather is subject to disappearance. Initially, “progress” does not refer to a destiny but to a certain way of thinking about origin. This is because, under progress, origin is that which, from the very beginning, appears marked by the impossibility of remaining. “Origin” is, in fact, the name we give to the awareness of the impossibility of remaining in silent stativity. For this reason, the true origin, that which appears in Persia, is characterised by a space full of ruins, by a mixture between time and fire that consumes all.

This is an important statement, in that it reminds us that the ruins left in the wake of history’s continual movement are actually modes of the manifestation of Spirit in its potential for irrealization. If the Persians are the first historical people, that is because they allowed themselves to be animated by the restlessness and negativity of a universal that brings particular determinations to ruin.

But this act of disappearing isn’t a flawless statement of the need for an sublat-ing toward perfectibility. In fact, there is a continuous pulsation of disappearance within history. This continuous pulsation is a part of the telos of history. Actually, history performs its purpose when this movement gains continuity, when it is no longer experienced as irreparable loss, but when the disappearance paradoxically opens us to a new form of presence, a form different from the paradigm of the presence of things in space. This explains why Hegel will say that “One must first discard the prejudice that the duration would be more valuable than the disappearance.” Only things with the power of disappearing allow to manifest a spirit that only builds destroying their finite determinations.

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A close reading of the chapter dedicated to spirit in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* reveals, for instance, the history of spirit to be a peculiar movement that brings into relief the ruptures in and insufficiencies of systems of social determination, which accounts for why such figures as Antigone (who exposed the disintegration of the normative substance of the *polis*), Rameau’s nephew (who exposed the disintegration of the normative substance of the *ancien régime*), and the

¹² Hegel, G.W.F., *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Hambourg: Felix Meiner, 2005, p. 215.

“beautiful soul” (who rather tragically reveals the limits of morality) have such central roles in this particular narrative. If they have a important role in the account of Spirit is because such narrative is fascinated by moment where the act of give an account is confronted with the disaggregation of the language, with the dry violence of a indifferent death and with the impasse about norms. We might recall here the words of Gérard Lebrun:

If there is any certainty to be had regarding the fact that this progress is not repetitious, but renders explicit what had been hidden, that is because Spirit does not come to be through the production of finite formations, but, on the contrary, by refusing them one after another. It is not the strength of empires that endows History with its ‘reason,’ but their downfall. ... From the perspective of the history of the world, all state formations are but evanescent moments.¹³

It may seem that with this, we are vulnerable to some criticisms of Heidegger, for whom: “Hegel shows the possibility of the historical actualization of spirit ‘in time’ by going back to the identity of the formal structure of spirit and time as negation of a negation.”¹⁴ As if the movement of the negation of a negation was just the formal structure, the generic normative basis for the possible forms of time and spirit. The succession as general form of movement would be replaced by dialectical sublations produced by negations of negations. However, we must insist that the negation of negation doesn’t expresses in this context any strength of normative determination. It is the assumption of the existence of relationships between processes that consciousness sees as disconnected. It is the requirement that consciousness think relations “unthinkable” because contradictories. We must not think these relations under the form of previous modes of relationship, such as causality, the relationship between substance and its accidents or even as reciprocal action. Hegel’s logic is the exhaustion of all these previous forms of relations and the openness for relations that are constituted upon the contingency of its situation. That is why the negation of the negation can not be defined as a formal structure of the time. That is why, too, is difficult to agree with Adorno when he states that:

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¹³ Lebrun, Gerard, *L'envers de la dialectique*, Paris: Seuil, 2005, pp. 28–33.

¹⁴ Heidegger, Martin, *Being and time*, SUNY Press, 1996, p. 396.

As his version of dialectics extends to time itself, time is ontologized, turned from a subjective form into a structure of being as such, itself eternal ... For Hegel, the dialectic of time and temporality logically turns into a dialectic of time in itself.¹⁵

The Concrete Temporality

If the eternity of the concept is not to be confused with duration, then one must ask how we are to understand its absolute present, so well described in passages such as: “Eternity is not before or after time, not before the creation of the world, not even when it comes to an end. But eternity is absolute presentness, the now without before or after.”¹⁶ In fact, time, as that which not being is, and as that which being is not, ignores absolute presence, as we might find it, for example, in Cartesian instantaneous time, the latter being a time of pure presence, for it is unaware of potency and is totally act¹⁷. Hegelian time is an eternity that overcomes time by conserving it. That is, by refusing a simple denial of time and its latencies, it could also not establish the absolute present as absolute presence. The absolute present is time without expectation, without fear, without hope, as it has no longer raised contingency to a process that could break immanence with eternity. The absolute present is not time of pure presence, which would imply the total absorption of the instant into itself. The absolute present is the expression of concrete temporality, the expression of how: “The concrete present is the result of the past and is pregnant with the future.”¹⁸ A temporality that is the production of the concrete process of things. We may try to understand its structure if we start off with an important statement by Hegel:

The life of the present spirit is a circle of stages that, on the one hand, remain simultaneous (*nebeneinander*), and only on the other hand appear to be past.

¹⁵ Adorno, Theodor, *Negative Dialectics*, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 331–332.

¹⁶ Hegel, G.W.F., *Enzyklopädie*, *op. cit.*, para. 247.

¹⁷ As Jean Wahl says about Cartesian time, everything is totally act: “because the idea of potency isn’t a clear and distinct idea. Everything that is, is given in each instant. Descartes’s idealism is an actualism” (Wahl, Jean; *Du rôle de l’idée d’instant dans la philosophie de Descartes*, Paris: Alcan, 1920).

¹⁸ Hegel, G.W.F., *Encyclopaedia*, *op. cit.*, para. 259.

The moments that the spirit seems to have left behind, it still possesses in its present depth.¹⁹

This is the present as a circle of stages that appear, at one and the same time, as both simultaneous and as past. These moments are, at the same time, behind and present. As we can see, this is a contradictory temporal experience from the perspective of understanding, but it can be comprehended if we remember how concept, as an expression of eternity, is a form of movement that transforms all disconnected processes into moments of a unity that had not existed before. That is, it is created *a posteriori*, but (and this is the fundamental point) it can only be created because it radically puts in check the form of unity and connection that had been in place until then. It could not be otherwise since concept is not the expression of an ontologically ensured substance in its eternity, but an operator of pragmatic adaptation. Since it is a pragmatic operator, it can performatively produce entirely new forms of synthesis, thus imploding the impossibilities of language with the strength of the confession of another language that is born. At first, the concept obliges the world to speak a different language.

With the strength to place in simultaneousness what until then had been radically disjointed and to create the contemporariness of the non-contemporary, concept can instate the time of an absolute present where there is nothing more to expect. But there being nothing more to expect does not mean that, from now on, events will be bereft of history or that history will be bereft of events. There is nothing more to expect because the impossibles can now become possible because contradictory relationships have been reconstructed in the same process in progress. In this sense, we could remember what is presupposed in Hegel's construction of the concept of "universal history", history that is progress in the awareness of freedom.

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To accept that something like "universal history" exists would seem to imply that the multiplicity of historical and temporal experiences should be subject to a single measurement of time. As Reinhart Koselleck might say, this is a necessary

¹⁹ Hegel, G.W.F., *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, *op. cit.*, p. 104. English translation from: https://books.google.com.br/books?id=WxYoBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA67&_lg=PA67&dq=hegel+%22now+without+before+or%22&source=bl&ots=AsCeYacLyU&sig=vEZK3EMVmsHiKicENxZouBIChvU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=-ABQVenfC4GdgwT2kICADQ&ved=oC-BoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=hegel%20%22now%20without%20before%20or%22&f=false

consequence of the definition of history as a “singular collective”. According to Koselleck:

The collective singular permitted yet another step. It made possible the attribution to history of the latent power ... power that connected and motivated everything in accordance with the secret or evident plan for which men could feel responsible, or in whose name one could believe oneself to be acting.²⁰

It seems that Hegel had something similar in mind when he talked about the spirit of the world as “the inner soul of all individuals,” or as a unified social body in the multiplicity of its national spaces through a plan that is a secularised version of Divine Providence.

However, the figure of the circle of stages, simultaneous and past, does not entail any reference to temporal unifications that are reducible to an all-embracing general plan from which all becomings, all transformations, flow. It is better to think of the coming of a time defined as a relationship between times that are immeasurable without being indifferent to one another. And this is related to the fact that national spaces, animated by the spirit of the world, cannot, in turn, be subject to a common plan for eternal peace without making room for sovereign decisions marked by contingencies. The national spaces that comprise universal history inter-relate without guaranteeing either peace or stability²¹.

Likewise, immeasurable but not indifferent times inter-penetrate one another in a continual process of change. This is something very different from the universality produced by the primacy of the homogeneous, measurable, and abstract time of global capitalist production so well described by Marx. In this regard, to speak of “universal history” implies simply defending that immeasurable temporalities are not indifferent. This interpenetration of immeasurable times entails a constant openness to what is not subject to the previously stabilised form of time. And this makes the totality represented by universal history – and the absolute present that this history instates – a processuality in continual reorganisation,

²⁰ Koselleck, Reinhart; *Futures past: on the semantics of historical time*, Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 52.

²¹ As we see in hegelian criticism against Kant’s perpetual peace in Hegel, G.W.F., *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Recht*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986, para. 333.

by contingent events, of the form of the series of elements previously put into relationship with one another. This results in its changeable plasticity.

In this sense, we can say that the relations among moments obey a process of transfiguration from contingency to necessity, but this does not imply simple denial of contingency. In Hegel, contingency is not seen as the result of a “defect in our knowledge” as in Spinoza. For him, contingency is integrated as a moment in a process of the constitution of necessity based on a retroactive historicity. Hegel tries to understand how the necessary is engendered *upon* actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), how actuality produces necessity. But this doesn’t mean that actuality must be totally philosophically justified, a usual criticism against Hegel. Actually, this means understanding how contingent phenomena don’t find a place within the necessary determination of actuality, how they appear initially as existence in disperse situation (*zerstreuer Umstände*) and how they can open singular processualities that create necessity.

Hegel characterizes contingency as an “external necessity,”²² since events appear to be caused by something other than themselves, and they do not integrate into the immanence of an “internal necessity” that posits its own circumstances. “The ground of its being isn’t in itself, but in an other”²³, says Hegel about a notion of contingency understood as pure possibility, as the possibility to always be an other. However, this externality is not an error that we should abstractly deny. It is rather a necessary moment resulting from the fact that the immanence of the concept to the empirical world is not immediately posited. Externality is retroactively constructed from the liberty of reason in seeking to retroactively integrate what is produced on the basis of contingent empirical events²⁴. The major question for Hegel is how to understand the transformation of the “immediate actuality” of contingency into a presupposition (*Voraussetzung*) for a “new actuality”, integrating contingency as a moment of “the self-movement of form”²⁵.

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²² Hegel, G.W.F., *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte – Band 1: Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, op. cit., p. 29.

²³ Idem, *Encyclopaedie*, op. cit., para. 145.

²⁴ For that reason is very complicated to follow Gilles Marmasse in his idea about a paralelism between Hegel and Spinoza concerning the problem of contingency in Marmasse, Gilles; “Raison et déraison dans l’histoire”, *Revista Eletrônica de Estudos Hegelianos*, n. 14, v. 1.

²⁵ As Hegel puts it: “This self-movement of the form is activity, activation of the matter [itself], as the real ground, which sublates itself into actuality, and the activation of the con-

At the limit, such liberty requires that we think of the totality posited by universal history as a system open to periodic instability because the continuous integration of new events, initially experienced as contingent and indeterminate, reconfigures the meaning of events that have already occurred. If we want, we can say that a beautiful example of this movement is the way Hegel remembers that the spirit can “undo what has happened” (*ungeschehen machen kann*)²⁶ by re-absorbing the fact into a new meaning. It is only in a totality of thought as processuality in continuous formal plasticity that what has happened can be undone and that the wounds of the Spirit can be healed without leaving scars. On this point it is difficult not to agree with Gerard Lebrun, for whom:

If history progresses, it is to look back; if it is progression from a line of meaning, it is by retrospection. ... Hegel’s “necessity-providence” is so minimally authoritarian that it seems more to learn, with the course of the world, what its designs were.²⁷

On the other hand, this can explain why there is no formal time nor mere becoming without time in Hegel. There is a very specific type of concrete temporality. The point is not to define the general forms of the experience of time, with its limiting immanent normativity of the possible modes of experience. The point is to explain *how temporal forms are empirically engendered and modified* through the continuous interpenetration and the retroactive integration of discontinuous temporalities that were, in turn, produced by the “process of effective things”. In this way, time does not appear as a transcendental normativity. It is a field of

tingent actuality, i. e., of the conditions: their inward reflection and their self-sublation into another actuality, the actuality of the matter”. (Hegel, G.W.F., *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, *op. cit.*, para. 147).

²⁶ “The wounds of the spirit heal and leave no scars behind; it is not the deed which is imperishable. The deed is taken back by spirit into itself; it is the aspect of individuality, whether present in the deed as intention or as an existing negativity and limitation to the deed which immediately vanishes” (Hegel, G.W.F., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, *op. cit.*, para. 669).

²⁷ Lebrun, Gerald, *L'envers de la dialectique*, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–6. Accepting this lecture, Slavoj Žižek will say: “This is how one should read Hegel’s thesis that, in the course of the dialectical development, things “become what they are”: it is not that a temporal deployment merely actualizes some pre-existing atemporal conceptual structure—this atemporal conceptual structure is itself the result of contingent temporal decisions” (Žižek, Slavoj, *Less than nothing: Hegel and the shadow of dialectical materialism*, London: Verso, 2012, p. 54).

plastically reconfigured relationships (in their dimensions of past, present, and future), based on the impact of events that were initially contingent.

Glorifying the Status Quo

But let us go back to this strength of the Spirit to “undo what has happened” because it can provide us with further orientation as to what is at stake in the concept of the absolute present. It has often seemed, with this strength, that we were dealing with a defence of the theory of consummated fact that transforms the violences of the past into necessities along the road to fulfilment of the normative universality of a Spirit that narrates history from the perspective of one who is “deifying what exists”²⁸. In this case, trust in the Spirit might be seen as a password for a certain quietism regarding the present. It might look like a philosophy trying to explain how “historical men” [*geschichtlichen Menschen*] or, one might say, the “individuals of world history” [*welthistorischen Individuen*] – those whose particular ends are not posited only as particular ends, but who submitted these ends to transfiguration, thus allowing them to contain the “will of the spirit of the world” [*Wille des weltgeistes*] – could only lead us to some sort of justification of the course of the world. Adorno expressed this fear in his *Negative Dialectics*, repeating a criticism already made by Nietzsche in his second *Unfashionable Observations* and by Marx when he accuses Hegel of “glorifying the status quo”²⁹. For, if what is manifested by the wishes of historical men is the will of the Spirit of the world, then how can one escape from the impression that, retroactively, the Hegelian philosophy of history constructs universality based on those particularities that ended up winning the battles of history? As Nietzsche might say: “those who learned early to kneel and bow down before the power of history, kneeling and bowing down to all power”³⁰. But one can avoid this impression by further exploring two fundamental characteristics of historical action in Hegel, namely, first its unconscious nature and, second, its strength to recuperate what seemed lost, in other words, to reactivate lost opportunities that seemed paralysed, by reopening what is at stake in the present. In this process of recuperation it is not a matter of simply justifying the current configuration of the present, but of modifying the potentialities of the present

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²⁸ Adorno, Theodor, *Negative dialectics*, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

²⁹ Marx, Karl, *The Capital vol. I*, London: Penguin, 2002, p. 93.

³⁰ Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Unfashionable Observations*, Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 73.

by un-fulfilling what seemed fully determined reality. These two characteristics are linked together, since the understanding of the existence of an unconscious dimension of action dismantles the illusion that the present is only what is determined by the established form of the representation accessible to the current historical configuration of consciousness. On this first point, we might recall statements by Hegel such as the following:

In world history in general, other things issue from people's activities than what they are striving for, what they achieve, and what they immediately know and want. They bring about their own interest, but in doing so they bring about something more that is hidden within it, but that did not lie in their consciousness or their intentions.³¹

That is, history is made of actions in which men do not see themselves, in which they do not understand themselves. There is an apparently involuntary dimension that constitutes the field of history. Or, better said, there is a motor of history, which, for the individual conscience, necessarily appears as something in the order of the unconscious. It is the trust in this involuntary realm, this unconscious, that constitutes "historical men". This may seem strange if we continue to accept that there is some type of reconciliation between consciousness and time remembered in history. It is a strange reconciliation where consciousness should recognise itself in the dimension of that which this consciousness itself cannot see, because this is a reconciliation with something it does not know how to get nor how to use. In a certain way, historical men are not under the jurisdiction of themselves, because they are continuously dispossessed by their own actions (and we could say that Hegel, in his own way, takes this contradiction to the extreme: *To be dispossessed by what is my own*).

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By taking this into account we can understand, among other things, why it is not the individuals who cling to the finiteness of their particular systems of interest who make history. Therefore, they are not the ones who can narrate it. For Hegel, it is not men who narrate history, but the Spirit³². When the Spirit comes

³¹ Hegel, G.W.F., *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, op. cit., p. 42.

³² We are in agreement, then, with Derrida, for whom "the *Phenomenology of Spirit* ... does not have to do with something one might simply call man. As the science of the experience of consciousness, the science of the structures of the phenomenality of the spirit itself relating to itself, it is rigorously distinguished from anthropology. In the *Encyclopedia*, the

on the scene and narrates history, its prose is radically distinct from the prose of those individuals who actually witnessed the facts. First, because the Spirit does not witness. It totalises processes and reviews what happened behind the back of consciousness. The spirit is Minerva's owl that remembers but can only take flight after the event. This is a totalisation that is not mere recounting, re-description, but performative construction of what, until then, did not exist. An account is not just an account, it is a decision about what will have visibility and be perceived from now on. This is why accusations that see in Hegelian philosophy a form of "pastism" miss their mark entirely. In this regard, we might remember, for example, Vittorio Hösle, for whom Hegel's pastism shows how

[p]hilosophy is remembering, a retrospective look at the past. It is not a prolepsis or a project of what is to come, of what is to become reality. And, to the extent that what it should be is not yet fulfilled, it cannot be of interest to philosophy. Philosophy should embrace only what is and what was. Kant's question, 'What should I do?', therefore, has no place in the Hegelian system. An answer to this question, at best, might be: 'Recognise the rational in reality.'³³

Nothing could be farther from the perspective I would like to defend, because this position presupposes that "to remember" is equivalent to "rediscovering" facts that were filed in the social memory. If it is true that, for Hegel, philosophy is remembering, we should recall that all acts of remembering are re-inscriptions of what happened based on pressures in the present. To remember is also to act, and not simply to arrive after reality has lost its strength. To remember is rather to show how the past is continually reconfiguring and redefining possibilities for both present and future. In this sense, to ignore the strength of the decision of the description of the past is to operate with the fiction of history as a stable framework "of what really happened (*wie es eigentlich gewesen*)," as Ranke said. But we will be more faithful to Hegel if we say that the past is what is constantly happening because it is not comprised of a succession of instants that are disconnected from one another. It is comprised of moments in retroaction.

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section entitled *Phenomenology of Spirit* comes after the *Anthropology*, and quite explicitly exceeds its limits" (Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, translated by A. Bass. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982, p. 117).

³³ Hösle, Vittorio, *O sistema de Hegel: O idealismo da subjetividade e o problema da intersubjetividade*, Belo Horizonte: Loyola, 2006, p. 468.

Work of Mourning for the Concept and its Ghosts

We can better understand this performative power of remembering if we explore how the narrative of history in Hegel is similar, in certain important points, to the work of mourning. This fact is hard to ignore in someone who describes the sequence of experience of awareness toward absolute knowledge as a “path of despair”. In this sense, perhaps the clearest expression here is his canonic passage in *Reason in History*:

Everything seems to pass, nothing stays the same. What traveller among the ruins of Carthage, of Palmyra, Persepolis, or Rome, has not been stimulated by reflections on the transitoriness of kingdoms and men, and to sadness at the thought of a vigorous and rich life now departed?³⁴

Again, ruins, the discovery of which now shows up initially as a sign of sadness. This sadness seems to express fixation on the ruined past, where things could apparently have been otherwise and continued in their splendour. This fixation discredits the status quo for supposedly not having been on a par with the promises that the ruins of great conquests once assured. What else could this sadness produce except a circuit of loss and reparation, and the belief that transitoriness tells us about the suffering over our extreme vulnerability to the contingency and bitterness of the present? We might also remember that “universal history is not a place of joy”. This is a melancholic position where the rejection of the status quo can easily be transformed into conformist resignation with what is³⁵. But it is up to us to get free of any melancholic fixation on the past and open up to retroactive processuality, which concept will deal with. Thus, in the same passage Hegel says, “But this category of change is also connected to another aspect, where new life emerges out of death.” This is truly a work of mourning, but the work does not take place by a mere substitution of the lost object by displacing libido. To call this work a substitution would seem to be equivalent

³⁴ Hegel, G.W.F., *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte – Band 1: Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, op. cit., p. 35.

³⁵ “This dialectic explains the ideological versatility of melancholia: an uncompromising rejection of the existent (nothing short of total transformation is tolerable) coupled with an easy accommodation to whatever happens to be the case (everything is equally terrible, so why bother ...). Accepting nothing, I tolerate everything: the formalist impasse” (Comay, Rebecca, *Mourning sickness*, op. cit., p. 120).

to placing the objects in a system of structural interchangeability, a system by which the lack produced by the lost object could be completely filled in by the construction of a substitute object to occupy its place. The time of mourning is not a time of absolute reversibility. The emptiness that the loss of the object produces is not simply reversed. Therefore, to equate mourning with an operation of forgetting would be to raise lobotomy to the status of an ideal for life.

Mourning is neither substitution nor forgetting, nor does it mean to stop loving lost objects. We might state that a compromise operation proper to the work of mourning is inseparable from the establishment of a form of existence between presence and absence, between permanence and duration. A *spectral existence*, which, far from being a flirt with the unreal, is objective existence of what inhabits a space that forces present determinations through temporal resonances.

As Derrida saw quite clearly regarding Marx: “The semantics of the *Gespenst* haunt the semantics of the *Geist*.”³⁶ To an extent, this association also applies to Hegel because the existence of the Spirit is only describable in a language of spectres that animate the living, who give reality a spectral substance, because life is that which, in dead objects, was never destined to disappear. It is life that still pulsates by taking the spirit from other objects in continuous metamorphosis. Hegel was not afraid of this metamorphosis when he found his first and imperfect elaboration in the oriental representation of the transmigration of souls (*Seelenwanderung*).³⁷ Even though Derrida would not accept this, we can say that there is nothing better than the Hegelian Spirit to show, in this quotation from Derrida himself, that:

If there is something like spectrality, there are reasons to doubt this reassuring order of presents and, especially, there are reasons to doubt the borderline between the present, the actual or the present reality of the present, and everything that is contrary to it, such as absence, non-presence, non-effectivity, backwardness, virtuality, or even simulacra in general, and so forth. There is first of all the doubtful contemporaneity between the self and the present. Before knowing whether one can differentiate between the specter of the past and the specter of the future, of the past present and the future present, one must perhaps ask oneself whether

³⁶ Derrida, Jacques, *Spectres de Marx*, Paris: Galilée, 1993, p. 175.

³⁷ Hegel, G.W.F., *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

the *spectrality effect* does not consist in undoing this opposition, or even this dialectic, between actual, effective present, and its other.³⁸

Derrida did not realise how it is through this effect of spectrality that, in Hegel, disappearance disappears. This is how the Spirit affirms itself as a process of absolute conversion from the violence of losses and separations into a broadening of the present and allowing the concept and the world to become one. This space of metamorphoses produced by mourning is a privileged figure in the language of multiple temporalities that interpenetrate one another. So we can say that the work of mourning is the production of a temporality that may be available in an absolute present. This does not mean to justify reality but, in a certain way, to *unrealise* it and show how the spectres from the past are still alive and ready to inhabit other bodies and open up other potentialities. With this in view, we can understand the final paragraphs of *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, which are dedicated to absolute knowledge. Speaking about history as a becoming of the Spirit, Hegel states:

This coming-to-be exhibits a languid movement and succession of spirits, a gallery of pictures, of which each, endowed with the entire wealth of spirit, moves itself so slowly because the self has to take hold of and assimilate the whole of this wealth of its substance. Since its consummation consists in spirit's completely knowing what it is, in spirit knowing its substance, this knowledge is its taking-the-inward-turn within which spirit forsakes its existence and gives its shape over to recollection. In taking-the-inward-turn, spirit is absorbed into the night of its selfconsciousness, but its vanished existence is preserved in that night, and this sublated existence – the existence which was prior but is now newborn from knowledge – is the new existence, a new world, and a new shape of spirit. Within that new shape of spirit, it likewise has to begin all over again without prejudice in its immediacy, and from its immediacy to rear itself once again to maturity, as if all that had preceded it were lost to it and as if it were to have learned nothing from the experience of the preceding spirits. However, that inwardizing re-collectio1 has preserved that experience; it is what is inner, and it is in fact the higher

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³⁸ Derrida, Jacques, *op. cit.*, p. 72. English translation from: https://books.google.com.br/books?id=llyB8oE4TncC&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10&dq=derrida+%22if+there+is+something+like+spectrality%22&source=bl&ots=oAs6gfCCHs&sig=-8o3qbeO9_ckKKk9ciLGAldo&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NG1TVe-wH8igNr3sgOAH&ved=oCC8Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=derrida%20%22if%20there%20is%20something%20like%20spectrality%22&f=false.

form of substance. However much therefore this spirit begins its cultural development all over again and seems to start merely from itself, still it is at the same time making its beginning at a higher level.³⁹

Yes, history is a recollection whereby the formations of the spirit pass like in a gallery of images where one must take one's time, perhaps going back to look again, as if one were in a work of mourning. In this way the Spirit transfers existence to recollection. But this transference is quite singular because it initially resembles forgetting as it takes us into the night of awareness of self. The spirit re-begins as if it had learned nothing, as if everything had been lost, left helpless for having lost everything. But this total loss is a necessity because it simply means that this "new world", this "new existence", is the result of the strength of the spirit to open up new beginnings with the naturality of one who has nothing more to carry on one's back, with the naturality of one who heals their wounds without leaving scars, undoing what has happened. By acting as if it had forgotten, the Spirit can re-encounter past experiences in a higher form. It can take them up once again from a more advanced point because it perceives that it simply allowed the unconscious depth of these experiences to act through its gestures and allowed its spectres to inhabit its gestures. Nothing is ever lost. It is just that a world that can no longer be sustained comes to an end, a world that gave everything it could give, so that another world can begin by reconfiguring the time of past experiences in another field of existence, another mode of existence. This is how the spirit re-encounters the productive destiny of the experiences that left it helpless. No pastism, no glorification of the status quo. Only the belief that no fact can make us lose forever the possibility to re-begin worlds. I quote from Heraclitus:

This Cosmos, the same for all, was not made by any god, nor by any man. It always was and is and will be an ever-living fire, kindling and being extinguished according to fixed measures.⁴⁰

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³⁹ Hegel, G.W.F., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, op. cit., p. 719.

⁴⁰ Heraclitus, *Fragmentos contextualizados*, Rio de Janeiro: Odysseu, 2012, p. 135 – English translation adapted from: <http://www.philosophy.gr/presocratics/heraclitus.htm>.

Davide Tarizzo*

The Door

Todo es puerta

Octavio Paz

Among the many kinds of “limits” we come upon in both philosophy and ordinary life, the door is one that “delimits”, or confines, every human world. I would even dare say that without doors there would be no human world at all. But why? Let us start with some basic remarks. On the one hand, the door is an object, a structure that belongs to the material reality of architecture and probably represents the material *a priori* of architecture – indeed, can we think of a building without any door? On the other hand, the door is a notion, a concept, a function, a word, that belongs to the ideal reality of philosophy and politics, myths and religion, poetry and literature, theatre, painting, sculpture. As a material and architectural element, the door is a passage or threshold that can be opened or closed, and through which a living being – say, a human being, but also animals or gods – can enter into a different space or time. As an element of the ideal realm of human beings, the door keeps these same properties, although they are enriched by a symbolic surplus value that plays a crucial role in constructing a human world. The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan once said: “The door is a real symbol, the symbol *par excellence*, that symbol in which man’s passing, through the cross it sketches, intersecting access and closure, can always be recognised.”¹

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In the first part of my paper I will offer a sample of the many and diverse occurrences of the door in our cultural tradition; in the second part I will try to be more specific about what is a door and, above all, what *is not* a door; in the third part I will present my own hypothesis about the nature of the door and its

¹ Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book 2. The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954–1955*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 302.

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particular function in the architecture of a human world. In short, I will argue that in a human world there must always be doors, as long as a world as such exists, and one of them has to be kept closed, barred – otherwise our world would fall apart.

* * *

In a sense, the opening scene of Western philosophy is that of an opening door. This is the scene Parmenides describes at the beginning of his poem *On Nature* (fragment 1, lines 1–30) – one of the first philosophical documents of our culture, dating from the 5th Century B.C.

The mares, which carry me as far as my heart desires, were escorting me. They brought and placed me upon the well-spoken path of the Goddess, which carries everywhere unscathed the mortal who knows. Thereon was I carried, for thereon the wise mares did carry me, straining to pull the chariot, with maidens guiding the way. The axle, glowing in its naves, gave forth the shrill sound of a musical pipe, urged on by two rounded wheels on either end, even whilst maidens, Daughters of the Sun, were hastening to escort me, after leaving the House of Night for the light, having pushed back the veils from their heads with their hands.

Ahead are the gates of the paths of Night and Day. A lintel and stone threshold surround them. The aethereal gates themselves are filled with great doors, for which much-avenging Justice holds the keys of retribution. Coaxing her with gentle words, the maidens did cunningly persuade her to push back the bolted bar for them swiftly from the gates. These made of the doors a yawning gap as they were opened wide, swinging in turn the bronze posts in their sockets, fastened with rivets and pins. Straight through them at that point did the maidens drive the chariot and mares along the broad way.

The Goddess received me kindly, took my right hand in Hers, uttered speech and thus addressed me: “Youth, attended by immortal charioteers, who come to our House by these mares that carry you, welcome. For it was no ill fortune that sent you forth to travel this road (lying far indeed from the beaten path of humans), but Right and Justice. And it is right that you should learn all things, both the persuasive, unshaken heart of well-rounded Truth, and the subjective beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true trust.”

As these lines illustrate, the door that philosophy opens, following Parmenides' first steps, will be henceforth the door of Truth, the door dividing Night and Day, Darkness and Light. According to Parmenides, nobody knows the name of the Goddess who greets the arrival of the philosopher – maybe she is Dike, the divine personification of Justice, maybe not. What really matters, however, is something else, something that has to do with the heavy presence of a door between man and Truth. For Parmenides' door separates our world from the divine realm of Truth (*Aletheia*), which is not attainable by humans except in its opposition to the realm of non-Truth (*Doxa*). The two ways, the way of Truth and the way of non-Truth, both lie behind the door, so that one can eventually ask: does Parmenides' door actually open into the Truth? Since his door opens both into the path of Truth and the path of non-Truth, one should finally answer that this door opens into the *opening* dimension of Truth as such, rather than into an already opened and manifest Truth. In other words, this door opens into the *openness* of Truth rather than into a meaningful and defined Truth.

In the context of Parmenides' poem, this explanation helps one to see the structure, or architecture, of the philosophical drama. It becomes apparent, for instance, why the Goddess must remain unnamed, for she gives access, not to a named Truth, but to the unnamed and empty openness of Truth. And it becomes equally apparent that this openness must be qualified not as a specific knowledge, but as a kind of truthful persuasion or conviction (*Peitho*)² that is the right attitude towards the Truth. The philosopher, the master of Truth that Parmenides is depicting, does not possess any detailed science of the world. Yet he is endowed with a personal candour that essentially means frankness and fairness.

Most significantly, it becomes evident that no human being can open the door through which we, human beings, enter into the openness of Truth. The first door, the one through which we enter into the opening of Truth, is a gift, and not a product of humans. It is a gift that simultaneously encloses the human world on itself while opening it into the undefined openness of its Truth, by which the world itself is spherically shaped and contained.

² Regarding the relation between Truth (*Aletheia*) and Persuasion (*Peitho*) in ancient Greece, see Marcel Detienne, *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, which offers an original interpretation of Parmenides' poem, as well.

The door then is a gift, the gift of Truth, the gift of philosophy itself. As such, the door will haunt the entire history of Western philosophy after that dazzling beginning. Let us quote a few examples. Very close to Parmenides, Aristotle states in his *Metaphysics* (993b) that the gift of Truth, by which he means once again the mere openness of Truth, looks like an opening door: no one can miss it. “In so far as it seems that Truth is like the proverbial door which no one can miss, in this sense our study will be easy.” However, since Aristotle is speaking here of the empty openness of Truth, what remains debatable for him is the exact knowledge of Truth, its full and detailed content, so that from now on the task of philosophy will turn out to be precisely the discovery and definition of true knowledge. “Philosophy is rightly called the knowledge (*episteme*) of Truth.” Two thousand years later, at the opposite end of our philosophical tradition, someone else seems to announce once and for all the vanishing of Aristotle’s dream. According to Martin Heidegger’s seminar on *Parmenides*, Western philosophy is all about doors that open and shut, but just one step is really decisive, namely the exit from ancient Greek language and the entrance into Latin. The Greek word for Truth, *aletheia*, which meant for the Greek people the openness of the Truth, happens to be replaced by the Latin word *veritas*, which means exactly the opposite, a closed door rather than an opening one. Thus, Heidegger argues, thanks to the Roman Empire, the Latin language and its betrayal of the initial openness of the Truth contaminate the entire Western world, poisoning its philosophical language. As a result, Heidegger concludes, Western philosophy is now completely overwhelmed by a radical oblivion of its initial Truth, while the true translation for the Greek *aletheia* has to be re-called – at least in his anamnestic teaching – as *das Offene*, the Open.

From the original word *ver*, a meaning has been extracted that clearly comes to the fore in the old Latin *veru* in the sense of gate and door, but also in the German *das Wehr*, the gate that shuts and locks, the dam that seals off. The original element in *ver* and *verum* is that of closing off, covering, concealing, and sheltering. ... The corresponding Greek word of this Indo-Germanic stem is *eruma* – the defensive weapon, the covering, the enclosure. *Eruma* – to which the Roman word *verum* is immediately connected – means in Greek, however, precisely the opposite of the Greek word for “true”, i.e., it is the opposite of *aletheia*. *Verum*, *eruma* – the enclosure, the covering; *aletheia* – the dis-covering, the dis-closing. ... The opposite of *ver*, *verum*, as the enclosing, is the non-enclosing. This “opposes” the *verum*. “Opposing”, acting against, is expressed in Latin by the prefix *op-*; to be

“against” the enclosing, against the *ver*, is *op-verio* or *ap-verio*, whence the latin *aperio*: “I open”. ... According to the verbal structure, the participle of *aperio*, *apertum*, the un-enclosed, corresponds to the Greek *alethes*, the unconcealed.³

Curiously enough, in this seminar Heidegger quotes the well-known passage from Gospel of John (14, 6), where Jesus says, “I am the Way and the Truth and the Life,” emphasising the shift from the Greek *aletheia* to the Roman *veritas*, but he does not stress the importance of another passage from the same Gospel (10, 9) where the Christ affirms: “I am the Door.” Greek: *Ego eimi he thura*. Latin: *Ego sum ostium*. From my point of view, this passage, extensively commented on by Augustine, John Chrysostom, and Thomas Aquinas, should have interested Heidegger. Indeed, much more than the replacement of *aletheia* with *veritas*, the straight identification of Truth and Door embodied by Jesus, who says both “I am the Door” and “I am the Truth,” is one of the deep genealogical roots of what Heidegger calls the enclosure of the initial openness of Truth. The reason why I am making such a statement would need a long explanation, taking into account Christian theology and its repeated predicament before the question of doors and keys. In short, let us say that if Jesus is the Truth, if he is actually the ultimate revelation of Truth, then we are no longer open to the Truth, simply because the empty openness of the Truth is from now on closed or enclosed by the Christ into one single, available and meaningful, Truth, which is the full content of the Gospels and God’s word. Said in a slightly different way, if Jesus is the Door, then he is an everlasting open door, i.e. a door that cannot be closed; hence he is no longer a real door, i.e. something that by definition can be closed. Rather, through him we face a radical change in the overall architecture of the human world, where an ever-open door denies us any access to the very opening of the Truth, to its initial dis-covering and dis-closing – that dis-covering and dis-closing by which Parmenides’ world was formerly shaped and contained. This Christian anamorphosis of the door, and therefore of human architecture, might remind each us of a widespread nightmare, incisively described by Walter Benjamin as follows:

The dread of doors that won’t close is something everyone knows from dreams. Stated more precisely: these are doors that appear closed without being so. It was with heightened senses that I learned of this phenomenon in a dream in which,

³ Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, pp. 47–48.

while I was in the company of a friend, a ghost appeared to me in the window of the ground floor of a house to our right. And as we walked on, the ghost accompanied us from inside all the houses. It passed through all the walls and always remained at the same height with us. I saw this, though I was blind. The path we travel through the arcades is fundamentally just such a ghost walk, on which doors give way and walls yield.⁴

Jesus' metaphorical embodiment and ghostly absorption of the door perhaps lies behind modern philosophy's recurrent puzzlement concerning hidden, waning, or missing doors. Consider, for example, Gottfried Leibniz's monad without doors or windows, a metaphysical theorisation that can be seen as an extreme outcome of the fading door in Christianity. Or consider the central episode of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Nietzsche's "The Vision and the Enigma," where an ancient door suddenly appears as the gateway of eternal return and an answer to Christian nihilism. Closer to our times, many people have speculated about the human relation to doors. In the field of literature alone, examples include Franz Kafka's tale *Vor dem Gesetz*, Simone Weil's lyric *La porte*, and Samuel Beckett's *Four Poems*. In the field of philosophy, at least six major thinkers focused their attention on this topic of doors: Georg Simmel in his paper entitled "Bridge and Door", where the door is presented in its double function of "separating and connecting";⁵ Franz Rosenzweig in his masterpiece, *The Star of Redemption*, whose last pages end in a glorious celebration of the door;⁶ Walter Benjamin in *The Arcades Project*, already mentioned for his oneiric exploration of doors and thresholds; Gaston Bachelard in *The Poetic of Space*, praising the door as the "cosmos of the Half-open";⁷ Gilles Deleuze in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where the plan of immanence is termed "the ultimate Door";⁸ and finally, Emmanuel Lévinas in *Totality and Infinity*, where the question of hospitality echoes

⁴ Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 409.

⁵ Georg Simmel, "Bridge and Door", Neil Leich (ed.), *Rethinking Architecture*, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 67.

⁶ Franz Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005, p. 441.

⁷ Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetic of Space*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, p. 222.

⁸ Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, London: Continuum, 2004, p. 277.

the riddle of the door, devoid of any metaphorical meaning and restored as a phenomenological structure of the human being.⁹

Is it insignificant that Lévinas speaks in this place of a door (*porte*)? Is the place that he designates in this way simply a trope in a rhetoric of hospitality? ... The open door, as a manner of speaking, calls for the opening of an exteriority or of a transcendence of the idea of infinity. This idea comes to us through a door.¹⁰

As Jacques Derrida brilliantly points out, Lévinas's philosophy opens a door that is altogether different from Heidegger's. While opening this door in front of us, Lévinas does not address the question of Truth. Instead, his is the door opened to the Other, the door of hospitality from which a human plurality draws out its ethical and political orientation towards the Other, towards its infinite exteriority and transcendence. Certainly, from Lévinas's perspective, this infinite transcendence of the human Other merely hides and reflects the infinite transcendence of the divine Other. Nevertheless, Lévinas's divinity is not the same as that of Jesus Christ, who swallows every door in the metaphor of his unbounded epiphany. Lévinas's God is more ancient, even older than philosophy, and tells us something about the archaic architecture of doors.

Going far beyond Lévinas's philosophical framework, one can sense some features of this archaic architecture in the works of Mircea Eliade, a historian of religions who has often underscored the centrality of the door in ancient civilisations and its vital role in shaping the human world.

The world becomes apprehensible as world, as cosmos, in the measure in which it reveals itself as a sacred world. ... Hence there must be a door to the world above, by which the gods can descend to earth and man can symbolically ascend to heaven. ... Dur-an-ki, "Link between Heaven and Earth", was a name applied to a number of Babylonian sanctuaries (it occurs at Nippur, Larsa, Sippara, and elsewhere). Babylon had many names, among them "House of the Base of Heaven and Earth", "Link between Heaven and Earth". But it was also in Babylon that

9 Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1961.

10 Jacques Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 26.

the connection between earth and lower regions was made, for the city had been built on *bab apsi*, “the Door of Apsu”, *apsu* being the name for the waters of chaos before Creation.¹¹

It is impossible to sum up in a few words the manifold symbolism of this archaic architecture. Moreover, I am not sure that those architectural designs should be read as just “symbols”. Therefore, I shall confine myself to a brief remark. In the archaic universe depicted by Eliade, a door separates the profane world of humans from the sacred world of gods, while another door separates these two worlds from the lower regions of Chaos and shapeless matter. Given this assumption, one can immediately ask: How many worlds are there? And why does Eliade claim that the world becomes graspable as *one* world only as long as it reveals itself as a sacred world? What about the profane world of humans? Is it still a world? If the answer is affirmative, as it must be; it happens to be so just because the human and divine worlds are actually one single world hinged on a single Door, separating and connecting these two sides of the same Cosmos, the sacred and the profane; and also because, in addition to that first Door, there is elsewhere one more Door dividing that single and double-sided world, or Cosmos, from the watery and amorphous matter of deathly Chaos – the Romans called this second Door *mundus*,¹² a word from which stem the Spanish *mundo*, the French *monde* and the Italian *mondo*. As a result, following Eliade’s account, in the archaic world there were always at least two doors, one of which was not to be opened, otherwise the world as such, the Cosmos, would be destroyed. At that time, rituals, myths, and human architecture had to deal with this hierarchy of Doors, which was the hierarchy itself, hierarchy, which literally means “the rule (*arche*) of the sacred (*hieros*)”. The human task was not to open both Doors, but, on the contrary, to keep one of them closed. Humans closed the Door between the Cosmos and Chaos, by assuring the gods that they could walk through the other Door, the one situated between the sacred and the profane, whenever they wanted to. In so far as humans accomplished their mythological task, they preserved the unity, harmony, and integrity of their double-sided Cosmos, keeping it enclosed on itself and making it impervious to the storming hurricane of Chaos.

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¹¹ Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: the Nature of Religion*, New York: Harcourt, 1987, pp. 64, 26, 41–42.

¹² Joseph Rykwert, *The Idea of a Town: The Anthropology of Urban Form in Rome, Italy and the Ancient World*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988, p. 58.

* * *

In sum, Jesus' ever-open door should not be confused with Parmenides' door of Truth, neither should it be confused with the archaic doors of an even more ancient world. Now, moving from the historical to the phenomenological analysis, I will explore three features or properties of the door that are fundamental to identifying it as an architectural *a priori*. I call them *ontological properties* because they represent a provisional answer to an ontological question: What is a door?

- 1) To start with, the door is an architectural element, perhaps the most important element of all. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to imagine any building or architectural structure without an entrance or exit. Conversely, one might claim that where there is a door, there is architecture. This is why the door is a sort of architectural *a priori*. The same cannot be said about thresholds. One can think of thresholds that do not have architectural connotations. A certain temperature, for instance, can be termed a threshold between liquid and gas; a certain river can be considered a threshold between two countries; and so on. Thus, here is the first property of the door: *a door is not the same as a threshold*, although the two concepts are sometimes confused. As any dictionary of architecture would confirm, a door always includes a threshold, which is its bottom part (occasionally situated beneath the leaf, if the door has any). A door then is a way of dealing with thresholds. A door builds upon a threshold an entrance or an exit – not necessarily visible and tangible as a leaf, but sometimes engraved on matter as a hollow and yet concrete, material structure – that will give or deny access to an inside or an outside. Moreover, thresholds like the temperature or the river mentioned above are not human artefacts, but they simply belong to the realm of nature. Thresholds, then, are both natural and cultural entities, while doors are purely cultural means of dealing with these natural and cultural entities. Unlike thresholds, doors are architected “limits”, designed by humans – so that we could even raise the question of whether the door itself is the very “limit” that separates and connects these two ontological planes: nature and culture.
- 2) From here it is only a short step to raising the question of the relation between doors and animals. Do animals build doors? So it seems when we look at animals like the trap-door spider. But do animals live in a world which is

delimited by doors? By all means, every biological species lives in its own peculiar environment. Still, what is an environment? Is it the same as a human world? The German zoologist Jakob von Uexküll employed the word *Umwelt* to designate the animal environment.¹³ For him, animals live in a closed *Umwelt* from which they cannot escape. However, do they perceive that they cannot get out of their environment? According to Heidegger, they do not. If animals had the smallest perception of their environmental cage, they would live in a world quite similar to ours, a world where one or more doors close the passage to a formless and meaningless outside, namely Chaos, thus encircling and shaping the world, namely the Cosmos, as in human architecture. But this cannot be said about animals, unless we project onto them some anthropomorphic qualities or behaviours. As Heidegger famously stated, animals are “poor in world”¹⁴. Following his line of reasoning, one might also say that they are poor in architecture. On the one hand, in fact, animals do live in a meaningful and well-formed *Umwelt*, so that their behaviour cannot be explained only in terms of instincts and reflexes, as Uexküll stressed in many of his works. In a sense, then, animals are open to a number of truths, just like us, because they truly interpret and truly understand their own environment. Because of this capacity, Uexküll equates humans and animals, calling them both “subjects”. On the other hand, Heidegger polemically contends that animals cannot be described as “being-in-the-world”. Unlike humans, animals are not open to the very openness or “disclosing” of the Truth by which the world as such is enclosed on itself. Although animals can seize the meaning of something occurring in their environment, they cannot seize that something is occurring in a world confined as a whole by its openness to a coming and still empty Truth. Stated differently, animals do not perceive that they perceive like humans do, nor are they haunted by the existence of an outside that is closed off by their environment. Accordingly, animals cannot experience doors, nor can they build doors, as they cannot see the door “as such”, that is, the opening of a world, or Cosmos, against the background of outer Chaos, which is kept off. Animals are trapped in their own environment, and this is the reason why, at most, they can build

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¹³ See Jakob von Uexküll, “A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds”, *Semiotica* 89–4 (1992), 319–391.

¹⁴ Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 196.

trap-doors. If they pass through real doors, instead, the latter are always human artifacts that animals, differently from humans, could not keep locked until the end of the world. Hence the second property of the door: *that which divides humans and animals is precisely the door*. Probably, there is no single threshold between *humanitas* and *animalitas*, as many philosophers insist nowadays. Indeed, the border between *humanitas* and *animalitas* is more than just a threshold; it is a plurality of doors.

- 3) Lastly, the door has to be reckoned with as the condition of the possibility of a human world where a human community gathers and dwells. By defining the limits of worlds and communities, doors let in or shut out someone or something. A door is always there to welcome or to repel, to group and to estrange, not only humans and other humans, but also humans and animals, or humans and gods. Sheltering behind the door, human communities fix their position in the world by defining their laws of hospitality and hostility, which are the laws of politics, the laws of life in common. This leads to another significant conclusion about the nature of doors. A door always has to do with collective entities rather than individuals. As a matter of fact, it is quite difficult or almost impossible to imagine a door that is simply related to one single person without any connection to other beings. A door is instead a regulated access for a number of people, for human beings (but also animals – and gods) united or divided by the same laws of human hospitality, i.e. by the same doors. In that sense, among the “common notions” Spinoza referred to in his *Ethics*,¹⁵ the door can be seen as the most common notion of all. It is the material, structural, architectural *a priori* of the common as such. The door is always already there before the community, before the world and its inhabitants. It is the access to a community that establishes and defines that very community. Therefore, one might determine its third property as follows: *a door is common and yet is more than common, it is the condition of the possibility of the common itself, it is the law of the common as such, a law that is at the same time internal and external to any given community or being-in-common*. Exceeding and preceding any human world and community as their own condition of possibility, the door is not even universal, since it should more properly be understood as the topological or architectural site

¹⁵ See Benedictus de Spinoza, *Ethics*, Ware, Wordsworth, 2001, p. 77 (*Second Part, Proposition 38, Corollary*).

of any conceivable act of universalisation. Absolutely singular (non-universal, or pre-universal) and absolutely common, the door has to be accepted as the “essence” (Spinoza again) of any human world. That essence both grounds and delimits, confines, even drains, every universalisation of the common. Without doors no human community would be possible. And yet, outside the door someone or something is always waiting to get in. This is the law of the door; someone or something has to remain somehow excluded, despite any attempt to fully universalise the common. Given that inflexible law, however, what about our so-called global world? What about a world where the empire of the “open door” has seemingly succeeded in replacing the unreachable “sublime door” of ancient empires? What about a world where the political, historical, cultural order dictates that doors cannot be closed and each of us, at least in principle, has the right to open the door of the Other, so as to finally abolish the Otherness of the others? The question of whether or not we can call this world global, capitalistic, or Christian, etc., remains open, perhaps too open. But the ultimate question, the one that cannot remain unanswered, the one at which we all get mad nowadays, is as simple as follows: Where is the exit?

* * *

A minimal definition of the door might be the following: *a door is a way of closing off an outside*. As a closure is the condition of any opening or openness, including the opening or openness of the world onto its own Truth (from Parmenides to Heidegger), this condition is materialised by the door. In that sense, the door is the material *a priori* of any human architecture, that is, of any humanly designed world and community. A door is required before the world, as long as a world as such exists. And that door, in order to be opened, has to have been formerly closed.

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Given that premise, what happens in a world of open doors like our so-called global world, where apparently the door loses its function, becoming an ever-open threshold in a human global environment? I will not discuss this topic in relation to the most recent evolution of architecture *stricto sensu*, although it

would be worth considering.¹⁶ I would rather raise a more basic philosophical question: Do we still live in a common world? And, if so, where is its door?

If our world still exists as a human world, then its main door, the closed door that allows the opening of our world as such, must be hidden somewhere. What is the name of that door? And who are its guardians? Maybe the arts and literature are today, more than ever, the doorkeepers of our world. Here are two examples.

The first one is Anish Kapoor. One of his works is entitled *Non-object (Door)*. In this, as in many other creations, Kapoor questions the fading border between architecture and sculpture, or between architecture and the visual arts, by insistently provoking our uncanny disease in front of the door, which is sometimes a *Non-object*, sometimes a *Cloud Gate*, sometimes *My Body Your Body*, sometimes the riddle of *Adam*, the first man on Earth. As a critic has sharply remarked, in his works Kapoor does not open any door into a meaning or into a truth. On the contrary, he puts forth the door in all its topological or architectural urgency. But this door cannot be seen. This door is now inside us, as the non-universal and common essence of the human being, closing our being to ourselves, and thus making the existence of a common world still possible – outside the door. Without meaning or truth, this door, the door in the depths of human architecture, is sealed. The Other, or the Otherness, has moved from outside to inside. We are the mouth of Chaos. Each of us is a door before the world.

Kapoor's works are doors or entry signs to other places, they are never symbols or metaphors. Because of this, they are detached both from traditional art, which – whether Western or Eastern – always uses symbols, and from modern art, which tends to express itself in metaphors as best it can. ... The doors open to something that lives beyond what they designate: they open onto the infinitely possible, which as yet does not exist and is therefore called “nothing”. From this “nothing”, however, arises the whole of being: a being that is an all-embracing totality.

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¹⁶ Just an example: Daniel Liebeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin – a building without any entry door; a building that has seemingly been designed as The Door itself (to our world); a building that literally embodies our opening and closing question: Can we think of a building without any door?

... The artist is the one who builds the door, a door structured in the nature of a frame, a prepared area that separates the world and being.¹⁷

My second example is from a tale by Julio Cortázar, *La puerta condenada* (The Condemned Door). Petrone, the main character, is a businessman from Buenos Aires who has to spend a week in Montevideo. He takes a room in a peaceful and almost empty hotel, where everything is quite ordinary, except that at night he cannot sleep due to the soft cry of a baby in the adjacent room. Behind the wardrobe he discovers a condemned door that once linked his room and the other one, now occupied by a solitary woman. Who is that child? Why is it crying? As Petrone soon learns from the concierge, the woman has no child with her, nor is she the source of that noise that persists even after she has left the room. Is it nothing more than a dream? Petrone's answer, as well as the fact of his weird, obstinate listening to something at the end of the tale, can perhaps help us to fix the role and the place of literature in our world, which is not the place of dreams, but rather the place of a condemned door between us and our dreams. A door that we might simply call "the unconscious".

At last he had all the necessary silence to sleep at ease, and it weighed on him. Turning around and around, he felt almost defeated by that silence he had cunningly claimed and now came back to him whole and vengeful. Ironically, he thought he missed the cry of the baby, and that such perfect calm was not enough for him to sleep or even less to remain awake. He missed the cry of the baby, and when he heard it much later, weak but distinct through the condemned door, over his fear, above his escape in the dead of night he knew the baby was well and the woman had not lied, had not lied to herself on cradling the baby, on wanting the baby to shut up so that they could sleep.¹⁸

¹⁷ Pier Luigi Tazzi, "Anish Kapoor Biography", <http://www.doononline.net>.

¹⁸ "Por fin tenía todo el silencio necesario para dormir a pierna suelta, y le pesaba. Dando vueltas y vueltas, se sintió como vencido por ese silencio que había reclamado con astucia y que le devolvían entero y vengativo. Irónicamente pensó que extrañaba el llanto del niño, que esa calma perfecta no le bastaba para dormir y todavía menos para estar despierto. Extrañaba el llanto del niño, y cuando mucho más tarde lo oyó. débil pero inconfundible a través de la puerta condenada, por encima del miedo, por encima de la fuga en plena noche supo que estaba bien y que la mujer non había mentido, no se había mentido al arrullar al niño, al querer que al niño se callara para que ellos pudieran dormirse" (Julio Cortázar, *Final de juego*, Madrid: Alfaguara, 1987, p. 50).

* * *

Somewhere, in the Slovenian countryside.

A. – Please, close the door.

B. – Pardon?

A. – I said: please, close the door.

B. – What do you mean? I don't see any door.

A. – Alright, then build one.

B. – What? Now? How can I build one? There are no walls.

A. – I don't mind, build a wall, and then close the door.

B. – What? A wall? But why? What's going on?

A. – I hear voices, and they bother me. I want to shut them out.

B. – Who them? What are you talking about?

A. – The voices.

B. – The voices?

A. – Yes, I hear them, right now.

B. – Look, keep quiet for a moment... Do you hear anything?


A. – No.

B. – So, shut up. The only door around here is your mouth.


Anish Kapoor, *Non-object (Door)*, 2008



Anish Kapoor, *Cloud Gate*, 2004



Anish Kapoor, *My Body Your Body*, 1993



THE DOOR



Anish Kapoor, *Adam*, 1988–1989

Poti in stranpoti metafizike

Diana Gasparyan*

Od metafizike k filozofiji razlike: Deleuze in Derrida¹

*...razlika je zadaj za vsako stvarjo,
zadaj za razliko pa ni nič.
Gilles Deleuze*

Uvod: začetek začetka

Da bi se približali pojmu Razlike, si najprej odgovorimo na preprosto vprašanje: kaj je sploh tematsko polje filozofije? V čem se razlikuje od vseh drugih raznovrstnih disciplin? Aristotelova učbeniška definicija nam na to kar ustrezno odgovori: Filozofija je preučevanje temeljnega vzroka in temeljnega smotra (Shields, 2007: str. 139). Poudarek pri tem je na izrazu »temeljni«. Filozofija se ne ukvarja le z iskanjem vzrokov, ampak išče absolutni vzrok, orientacijske točke, tisto izvorno, pred čemer ne more obstajati prav nič. Filozofija poskuša zvesti raznovrstnost znanja na omejena osnovna načela oziroma prapočela stvari – njena naloga je, da razpozna en sam izvor oziroma eno samo prapočelo stvari, ki se na prvi pogled zdijo le kaotično izkustvo naključnosti. Lahko bi rekli, da vse znanosti brez izjeme počno prav isto. A vendar ni čisto tako. Preprosto povedano, nobena od znanosti ne gre pri tem tako daleč kot filozofija. Vsako od znanosti zanima le sistematizacija vednosti na njenem zamejenem področju. Svojskost filozofije pa je v tem, da je njen predmet preučevanja celotna stvarnost, zato mora biti zakon, na katerega bo filozofija zvedla svoja opažanja, nekakšen osnovni, najvišji metazakon – vseobsegajoč in izvoren (Politis, 2004: str. 365–378). Zato je filozofija metafizika (iznad fizike). Poleg tega znanosti, za razliko od filozofije, niso obsedene z odkrivanjem takšnih zakonov stvarnosti, ki jih ne bi bilo mogoče zvesti na še bolj temeljne zakone. Če se da zakon privlačnosti pojasniti z nekim drugim, bolj splošnim zakonom, ni s tem prav nič narobe. Vendar pa filozofija ne dopušča nenadzorovanih redukcij – ker je analitična (deduktivna)

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¹ Pričujoče besedilo je rezultat projekta »Sledenje pravilom: mišljenje, razum, razumnost«, ki je potekal na Visoki šoli za ekonomijo Državne univerze v Moskvi (HSE).

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disciplina, z njo lahko odkrivamo posebno v splošnem in ne obratno, zato je določitev začetka, ki ni več reduktibilen in je torej sam po sebi očiten, aksiomatičen, zanjo načelno vprašanje (Zimmerman, 2006: str. 167).

Tako se filozofija začne kot izkustvo iskanja takšnega začetka, ki ne bi izhajal iz česa še bolj prvobitnega – in prav v tem je izraženo bistvo problema, ki utemeljuje filozofijo kot zelo posebno vrsto vednosti (Inwagen, 1998: str. 125–127). Filozofija se začne tedaj, ko definira svoj izvor kot izvor-en in svoje torišče kot izkustvo postavljanja meja. Prav omenjeni pogoji predstavljajo pomemben metodološki postopek filozofije, po katerem jo je mogoče natančno razločevati od vsake druge discipline.

Kje natančno se filozofija začne? Heidegger pravi, da njen začetek ni nič drugega kot Eksistenca, eksistenca kot taka ali Bit (Heidegger, 1962: str. 67). In prav Eksistenca je na začetku celotne metafizike. Po Heideggerju je to zato, ker Eksistenca nedvomno razodeva najbolj bistvene značilnosti večnosti (Heidegger, 1961: str. 71). Poskusimo vključiti koncepcijo Biti v višjo generično koncepcijo (kot species). To je precej težavno. Nič lažje pa nam ni, če o »Biti« (Eksistenci) ne razmišljamo kot o pojmu, temveč kot o zelo realnem svetu, celotnem svetu, ki eksistira. Je mogoče reči, da se vse, kar eksistira, vklaplja v nekaj drugega, prilega nečemu drugemu? Verjetno ne, saj bi moral takšen kraj, v katerega bi se prilegale vse stvari, prav tako eksistirati, zato bi moral biti tudi takšen kraj del vsega, kar eksistira. Tako torej ves svet vselej povsem pripada samemu sebi in obstaja sam zase, ne da bi imel nekakšen »zaboj«, v katerega bi spadal, prav tako kot sam pojem biti nima generičnega imena (Inwagen, 1998: str. 125–126).

Kaj je bilo pred začetkom?

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Začetek, ki ga potrebujemo, je torej tu, ugotovili smo njegovo izvornost, filozofija je tako našla ničelno točko in gre lahko naprej. Na tem mestu pa bosta vanjo posegla Jacques Derrida in Gilles Deleuze s svojimi kritičnimi pomisleki. Srž svoje kritike bosta zvedla na en sam ugovor – to, kar je za metafiziko začetek, v resnici sploh ni začetek (Cisney, 2012: str. 80). To pa zato, ker lahko le neznatna površnost, naključna ali namerna, botruje napaki, katere posledice pa so neznanke, saj je prav posledica te napake omogočila rojstvo filozofije.

V čem je pravzaprav ta napaka oziroma površnost? Hegel, čigar vpliv na Derridaja in Deleuza je več kot očiten, je dokazal, da se na ničelni točki ne moremo omejiti le na Bit (Eksistenco). Bit lahko obstaja le v logični dvojici z Nebitjo (Hegel, 1969: str. 110). Če vzamemo Bit kot začetek, le stežka spregledamo, da je že obdana z Nebitjo, to pa nam onemogoča, da ne bi razmišljali o njej, razen če se z močno voljo ali z vzpostavitevijo intelektualnega embarga temu izognemo. Z drugimi besedami, Bit ni nekaj, kar bi bilo povsem prvo, oziroma točneje, Bit na tem mestu ni edina. Bolj verjetno je, da se na prav na začetku nahaja pojmovni par: »Bit in Nebit« (»Eksistenca in Neeksistenca«). V tej zvezi si prikličemo v spomin učbeniški pristop klasične filozofije, ki ga je utrl Parmenid – Nebit je treba odločno zavreči, kajti Nebit ne obstaja (Curd, 2006: str. 171). Spomnimo se tudi Heglovega dialektičnega pristopa – Nebit je treba obdržati, če nočemo govoriti zgolj o logiki, temveč tudi o fizičnem svetu (Hegel, 1969: str. 112). Pri tem zdaj ne gre za vprašanje, kdo od njiju ima prav, Parmenid ali Hegel. Govorili bomo o tem, kaj omogoča razločevanje med Bitjo in Nebitjo nasploh. Z drugimi besedami, govorili bomo o sami Razliki.

Najprej se moramo kajpak popraviti in reči »seveda, Eksistenca, prav tako pa tudi Neeksistenca, nista začetek. Začetek je Razlika, ki ločuje prvega od drugega, in le izgubi filozofske čuječnosti lahko pripišemo krivdo, če tega morda nismo opazili.« Pravi začetek je namreč Razlika med Eksistenco in Neeksistenco; Razlika je tista, ki ji gre pravica prvorojenca, in filozofija bi si morala priznati, da se je o začetku preprosto motila. Bi torej lahko rekli, da je ta spodrslijaj stvar preteklosti in da gre lahko metafizika naprej po svoji poti, potem ko je v svoj kategorialni besednjak vnesla določene spremembe? Tako preprosto pa to le ni, in v nadaljevanju bomo videli, zakaj ne.

Sodobni francoski filozof Vincent Descombes, dober poznavalec Derridaja in Deleuza, piše:

»težava je v tem, da gre pri razločevanju temeljnih kategorij za drugo stvar kot pri razločevanju med posameznimi (ne-temelnimi) pojmi. Razume se, da vsa nasprotja potrebujejo še tretji nasprotek – tistega, od katerega je nasprotni par ločen. Če sta si A in B različna, potem obstaja A in obstaja B, ter neki X, ki producira pravo razliko oziroma mesto, kjer se ta razlika pojavi. Ta logični truizem postane paradoks v tistem trenutku, ko ga skušamo uporabiti za razločevanje osnovnih kategorij. Prav res, če je Bit različna od Ne-bit, potem tisto nekaj, v čemer se raz-

likujeta, ne bi smelo pripadati ne Biti, prav tako pa ne Nebiti. Kaj potemtakem zaobjema Bit in Nebit, kadar sta postavljeni v nasprotje? Če bi rekli, da je Razlika preprosto tam, bi postala del eksistence in bi jo s tem ukinili. Vključitev razlike v Nebit pa je še bolj nemogoča – to bi bilo tako, kot če bi jo dojeli kot neeksistirajočo, s tem pa bi dejansko izjavili, da sta Bit in Nebit eno in isto.« (Descombes, 1980: str. 234).

Potem ko smo odkrili to nesrečno prevaro na samem začetku filozofske misli, lahko še enkrat pazljivo preučimo vse njene temeljne vzroke, da bi odkrili morebitno logično nedoslednost. Prvo, kar je ob tem početju moč opaziti, je očitna dualna (nasprotna in v nekaterih primerih kontradiktorna) narava samih filozofskih temeljev. Pri sestavljanju taksonomije svojega filozofskega besednjaka se klasična metafizika jasno nagiba k delitvi sveta na dvoje. V njenih okvirih vsepovsod naletimo na nasprotja: subjekt – objekt, duh – telo, razum – izkustvo, transcendentno – imanentno, stvari – ideje, fenomenalno – noumenalno itn. Še več, moderna filozofija vztraja, da je svet razdeljen na pojmovne pare brez vsakršnega preostanka. Vsi ti pari so temelj za začetek analize; z vzpostavitvijo razdelitve na izvorne pare se lahko šele začne naše filozofsko delo. Prav tej tezi o izvornosti temeljnih nasprotij pa Deleuze in Derrida oporekata (Descombes, 1980: str 256–257). Deleuze na primer prepričljivo dokazuje, da pri določanju začetka filozofija vsakič zgreši bistvo – par je že neizvoren, izvor je nekje za njim, kot nadrejena in določujoča razlika, ki naredi par sploh možen. »Globina razlike je povsod prva ... [in je postavljena] na začetek, kjer ovija drugi dve dimenziji« (Deleuze, 2011: str. 107). Elementi opozicije v parih, ki jih filozofija zmotno razume kot izhodiščno točko, so rezultati skritega dela, ki je bilo opravljeno iz nam nevidnih razlogov. Razlika, ki jo tu omenja Deleuze, naj bi ukinila uveljavljeni dualizem temeljnih kategorij v klasični metafiziki ter bila tako soudeležena pri nekem drugem začetku – »diferencirajoči razliki« (Deleuze, 2011, 80). »Obstaja neko ključno izkustvo razlike: vsakič ko se znajdemo pred neko omejitvijo ali v njej, pred nekim nasprotjem ali v njem, se moramo vprašati, kaj takšna situacija predpostavlja. Predpostavlja mrgolenje razlik, pluralizem prostih, divjih ali neukročenih razlik, strogo diferencialni prostor in čas, ki vztrajata skozi poenostavitve meje ali nasprotja. Da bi se lahko izrisala nasprotja sil ali omejitve form, je najprej potreben neki globlji realni element, ki se definira in določa kot razobličena in potencialna mnogoterost. Nasprotja so grobo izrezana iz finega okolja prekrivajočih perspektiv, razdalj, divergenc in komunicirajočih disparatnosti v mnogoterosti« (Deleuze, 2011: str. 107).

A kaj bi to lahko bilo, če upoštevamo, da delci, ki so rezultat takšnega delovanja, izčrpavajo univerzum možnih definicij? To ne more biti ne ideja, ne stvar, ne telo ali duh, niti plod izkustva, niti eksistirajoče ali neeksistirajoče (Bell 2006). Razlika med Eksistenco in Neeksistenco se tako znajde v težavnem položaju – nemogoče je namreč, da ne bi eksistirala, prav tako nemogoče pa je, da bi eksistirala. Prav zato je v celotnem procesu razmikanja temeljnih nasprotij vsa pozornost usmerjena na prostor in načelo takšnega gibanja – vmesen pojav. Kje se nahaja, kdo oziroma kaj ga sproža?

Deleuze namiguje, da se prav Razlika izkaže kot tisti *tertio*, v luči katerega se porodijo vsa nasprotja (Pearson, 1997: str. 411–414). Prav ta Razlika pa mora ostati v ozadju, biti mora produktivna, ne pa tudi zaznavna kot rezultat njenega lastnega delovanja, kajti sicer se bo spet obnovil paradoks razločevanja temeljnih kategorij. Dobesedno to pomeni *tertium non datur*, vendar je v luči tega skritega *tertiuma* dano prav vse. Zdi se torej, da je razlika instanca, ki jo težko dojemamo v okviru istih pojmov, ki jih razločuje. Zato prej tudi nismo imeli odgovora na vprašanje o eksistenci ali neeksistenci Razlike. Vendar pa je razlika, ki jo razumemo na takšen način, nerazumljiva, njenega razumevanja ne omogoča noben pojem, saj predstavlja nepojmovni pogoj vsega drugega (Keith, 1997: str. 238–241). Le tako razumljeno jo je mogoče vključiti v filozofske kategorije kot nekaj, kar je dano, kot vedno, da ne bi bilo dano.

»Ista stvar je ista le, kadar prevzame obliko drugačne stvari ...«

Vrnimo se k zgoraj zastavljenemu vprašanju, ki smo ga sicer že načeli, in sicer, ali lahko Razlika, ki smo jo odstrli, četudi neulovljiva in nedoločljiva, vseeno nadomesti začetek ter tako postane pravi začetek metafizike? Zagotovo je mnogo tega, kar je bilo o Razliki že povedanega, za nas razlog, da jo razpoznamo kot pristen metafizični začetek, ki ustreza vsem zgoraj naštetim zahtevam. Mar nam ne pravi Deleuze: »... razlika je zadaj za vsako stvarjo, zadaj za razliko pa ni nič« (Deleuze, 2011: str. 116). Mar ni to še kar avtentična metafizična definicija izvornega? To je eno najbolj kočljivih vprašanj, in če se Deleuze in Derrida strinjata, da bosta nanj odgovorila, bosta to storila le na zelo izmuzljiv način. Razumeti motiviranost za takšno izmuzljivost ne bi smelo biti težko ob spoznanju, da je Razlika najmanj posrečen način za začetek česar koli. »Takšna je vselej dvoumnost pojma izvora ... izvor pripiše temelj zgolj svetu, ki se je vrgel v univerzalno raztemeljenje« (Deleuze, 2011: str. 318). Neprikladna pa je predvsem zato, ker

mora vsak začetek izpolnjevati zahtevi stalnosti in identitete. Minimalni zahtevi za začetek sta, da mora biti 1. prisoten (razpoložljiv) in 2. sovpadati mora s samim seboj, ostati isti (Identiteta). Vendar pa prav obeh teh zahtev Razlika nikakor ne more izpolniti. Njena narava je paradoksalna: lahko ostane identična, torej je lahko Razlika le, če je različna, vključno s tem, da je različna od same sebe (Beistegui, 2004: str. 302–310). Razmislimo o tej zadevi še podrobneje. Rekli smo, da mora Razlika ne le razločevati, temveč mora biti tudi različna; vrhu tega mora to veljati vedno in povsod. Samo tako bo lahko zvesta sami sebi – če preneha razločevati, to zanjo kratkomalo pomeni, da preneha biti Razlika. Če pa naj bi razlika vselej razločevala, se mora razločevati tudi od same sebe, saj vendar ne more biti identična sama sebi, ker bi v tem primeru nehala delovati razločevalno in bi začela služiti kot identifikacija, torej bi nehala biti Razlika in bi postala Identiteta. Prav v tem je skrivnost Razlike – lahko je to, kar je, le če to ni (Descombres, 1980: str. 384). Identiteto je mogoče ohranjati le na račun Razlike. Ali kot pravi Derrida »ista stvar je ista, le kadar prevzame obliko drugačne stvari« (Derrida, 1999: str. 253). V tem smislu naj bi bila njegova Razlika drugačna od klasične razlike. Če je slednja nasprotna identiteti, nam mora prva dopuščati, da mislimo razliko ne le kot ne-identiteto, temveč tudi kot »razliko med identiteto in ne-identiteto« (Deleuze). Tako oba filozofa vpeljujeta Razliko kot različno od same sebe ali celo od nekega drugega sebe, kajti ker ni niti realna niti pojmovna, omogoča zgolj razločevanje. Potemtakem naj bi bila Razlika, kot jo določa filozofija filozofije razlike, namerno različna od razlike, ki jo je privzela metafizika. Ampak ali bo lahko nadomestila klasični začetek v takšni obliki, da bo zmogla zadovoljivo odigrati svojo vlogo dejanskega začetka? Situacijo, povezano s tem vprašanjem, še najbolje ponazarja metafora izvirne zamude, h kateri se je Derrida v svojih delih vedno znova vračal (Derrida, 1999: str. 119). Če si natančno ogledamo, kako Razlika funkcionira, se bomo morali sprijazniti, da nam ne bo nikdar uspelo priti do samega začetka – vselej, ko bi bili na tem, da ga bomo ujeli, bi bili že nekoliko prepozni. Temu razkoraku botruje dejstvo, da se nam je usojeno soočiti le z rezultati delovanja dela Razlike kot začetka, ne pa z Razliko samo. (Harvey, 1986: str. 25). Nihče ne more biti prisoten, kadar je na delu Razlika, predvsem zato, ker Razlika sama ni nikdar prisotna. Ne v mislih ne v izkustvu se ne pojavlja na način, na kakršnega je metafizika razumela svoj lastni začetek – v prisotnosti Biti-Eksistence. Slednje je mogoče in se lahko producira, ker sovpada samo s seboj, gre za čisto Identiteto. Razlika pa ni identična niti sama sebi. Tudi Deleuze se strinja s povedanim. » Tako razumljena razlika ni predmet reprezentacije. Reprezentacija kot element metafizike podredi razliko

identiteti, četudi jo naveže na neki *tertium* kot središče primerjave med dvema členoma, ki naj bi se razlikovala (bit in bivajoče) ... Toda metafizika ne zmore misliti razlike na sebi ali pomen tistega, kar ločuje, pa tudi tistega, kar združuje.« (Deleuze, 2011: str. 127). S čim se nam je torej srečati?

A čeprav smo pripravljeni prevprašati obstoj Razlike, je še vedno nemogoče zanikati dejstvo, da je resnična, kajti o tem pričajo njeni sledovi, preostanki njenega dela, ki jih pušča za sabo (Derrida, 1973: str. 58–75). Prav s temi dozdevno temeljnimi kategorijami se je nekdaj začejala klasična metafizika. Njihova prisotnost kaže na to, da je začetek, ki ni nikoli prisoten v dejanju neposredne percepcije, uspešno izpolnil svojo nalogo. A to je tudi razlog, zakaj srečanja z začetkom nikoli ne ujamemo. Ne glede na to, kako zgodaj nam uspe priti na prizorišče, ne moremo ugledati začetka prav nikjer, razkrile se nam bodo le sledi njegovega umika. Razlika ne bo nikoli Razlika sama, vselej bo različna, in zato nam bo, ne glede na to, kako blizu bi ji hoteli priti, vedno stopilo na pot delo samega razločevanja. V tem pogledu je Razlika izjemno kontroverzen kandidat za vlogo metafizičnega začetka, in najmanj, kar lahko pri tem storimo, je, da ponovno razmislimo o sami ideji filozofskega začetka. Novi pogled nam bo dovolil trditev, da začetek ni ne narava ne eksistenca, niti prisotnost in ne razpoložljivost, skratka nič, kar bi lahko sprejeli kot neke vrste objektivnost (Baudrillard, 1994: str. 48–51). Če ostanemo pri starem jeziku metafizike, kar pomeni, da smo ločili začetek tako od eksistence kot od prisotnosti, bi morali ob takšnem vložku preprosto ugotoviti, da začetka sploh ni. Ni prvega koraka, so pa drugi, tretji in vsi nadaljnji koraki. Naj se še tako trudimo sestaviti celotni niz, nam bo vedno manjkala njegova prva postavka. Pravilneje bi bilo tak svet primerjati s »komedijo, kadar prideš v gledališče med drugim dejanjem« (Cortazar, 1995: str. 132). Konec koncev lahko začetek obdržimo edinole, če se za vselej odrečemo upanju, da bi ga opisali na način prisotnosti. Razlika sama ni nikoli prisotna, čeprav odreja prisotnost vsega drugega. Nima nobenega para (identitete); vendar pa se pari (vključno s klasičnim parom »identitete-razlike«) pojavijo kot rezultat njenega produktivnega dela. In končno, začetka se ne da substancirati, saj mora substanca ustrezati kriterijem stalnosti.

Razlika, opredeljena *per negationem*, bi lahko postala večno odloženi začetek metafizike, metafizična zgodba, kar dejansko je, ali pa mora nekje biti (Beistegui, 2009: str. 305–306).

Kako deluje Razlika?

A če že ne moremo objektivizirati skrivnostne instance Razlike, mar lahko vsaj pridobimo jasnejši uvid, kako do nje pride? Na to vprašanje naj bi ponujal odgovor pojem razlike² [*differance*], za katerega Derrida (ki je njegov avtor) pravi, da »ni niti beseda niti pojem« (Derrida, 1973: str. 98). Gre za neografizem, ki se je pojavil z vpeljavo črke *a* v francoski samostalnik »différence« (v pomenu »razlikovanje«, »razlika«). Samostalnik je izpeljan iz glagola *différer*, ki pa ima dvoje pomenov: 1. »razlikovati«, »razločevati« in 2. »odgoditi«, »ločiti v času«, »prestaviti na kasneje«. Presenetljivo je, da samostalnik »différence« pomeni le »razlika« (»razločevanje«), medtem ko svoj izvorni drugi pomen glagola, »odgoditev«, »odlašanje« »preložitev«, izgubi. Derrida pravi, da skuša z besedo razlika kompenzirati to izgubo pomena (Derrida, 1978: str. 177–190). Nasploh pa je vpeljava črke *î* [a] povezana s prikazom treh idej: 1. to, kar je najbolj bistveno pri besedi razlika v pomenu odlašanja ali odgoditve, se mora ohraniti tudi pri samostalniku (saj bo to imelo vlogo ključnega koncepta) 2. razlika med črkama *î* [a] in *i* [e] je vidna le, če je beseda zapisana, ni pa je mogoče slišati (v nadaljevanju bomo pojasnili, zakaj je ta druga točka tako pomembna), 3. pojem, ki označuje Razliko, se mora razločevati od samega sebe – ne gre le za klasično razliko, temveč za to, kar jo dela možno v aktu pričakovane, celo neke predhodne Razlike.

Ali obstaja način, kako podrobneje opredeliti skrivnostno instanco razlike? Spet si bomo pomagali z definicijo znaka in jezika, katere avtor je bil de Saussure, ki je nedvomno odigrala nezanemarljivo vlogo v celotni filozofiji razlike. Le zelo na kratko naj spomnimo, da so, kot trdi de Saussure »v jeziku zgolj razlike. ... razlika v splošnem predpostavlja pozitivne člene, med katerimi se vzpostavlja. ... V jeziku ni ne idej ne glasov, ki bi obstajali pred jezikovnim sistemom, so zgolj pojmovne in glasovne razlike, ki iz tega sistema izhajajo« (Saussure, 1995: str. 135). Ali to pomeni, da je razlika jezik sam? Pravzaprav ne, lahko pa rečemo, da je precej »blizu« temu. Razlika funkcionira na enak način kot jezik, kakor ga opisuje strukturalna lingvistika: oblikuje in prenaša pomene, deluje kot čisto in izvensnovno »gibanje razločevanj«. Drugače rečeno, to, kar počne razlika, je

² [Pri prevajanju neografizma *différence/differance* smo se v pričujočem besedilu oprli na prevod spisa *Razlika*, ki je izšel v knjigi *Izbrani spisi*, Ljubljana: Knjižna zbirka Krt, 1994 (prev. Uroš Grilc), (op. p).]

v celoti ponovitev tistega, kar počne jezik. Jezik generira svoje pomene s spreminjanjem razmerij med znaki in njihovim premeščanjem, in prav to velja za mehaniko razlíke. Lahko rečemo, da se razlíka le minimalno razlikuje od jezika, četudi z njim ne sovпада. Glavna prepreka, da razlíka in jezik ne moreta biti identična, je v tem, da načelo čistega razlikovanja ni primerno le za jezike kot predmete lingvističnih študij, temveč za vse znakovne sisteme. Prav zato bi bilo treba v prvem približku razlíko razumeti ne kot jezik, temveč kot kateri koli znakovni sistem. Prav razlíka dovoljuje, da se fonemi razločujejo v živem govoru, črke pa v pisanem govoru. Enako velja za razločevanje glasu od črke in pisane besede od govorjene. V nekem smislu gre pri tem za isto načelo razlikovanja, ki je vselej predhodnik in mediator vsakega začetka (Wood, Bernasconi, 1988: str. 455–462). To pa ni jezik sam, temveč tisto, kar ga sploh dela možnega, in zaradi česar jezik ni kateri koli znakovni sistem, temveč proces, v katerem se lahko pojavi in znotraj katerega lahko deluje takšen ali drugačen sistem simbolov. »... razlíko lahko pripišemo temu, kar bi v klasičnem jeziku poimenovali izvor razlik, proces njihove tvorbe, razlike med razlikami, igra razlik« (Derrida, 1999: str. 243). Po tem načelu je nasploh mogoče ustvariti sistem pomenov, da bi z njimi nato lahko operirali – pa najsi je to mehanizem filozofskih kategorij ali kateri koli drug jezik za opisovanje sveta. Vse tehnike znanja so konstruirane v skladu z zakoni razlíke, najprej je tu razločevanje, zatem pa še vse ostalo. Potemtakem začetek vedno ostaja nekje vmes, ostaja čisto, brezimno in netvarno gibanje sredi tistega, kar zmotno zamenjujemo za izvirne pomene. Torej razlíka ni nikoli prisotna (omogoča pa nam, da razločujemo »prisotnost« od odsotnosti«), in prav zato je težko reči, da eksistira (razločuje »eksistenco« od »neeksistence«), da bi ji s tem končno lahko dali standardno definicijo. O tem smo govorili že prej. Nemogoče je poimenovati in umestiti nekaj, kar samo briše umestitve in daje poimenovanja, kot se mu zdi. Razlíka poskrbi za prisotnost pomenov (vsaj za iluzijo njihove prisotnosti), a sama ne more biti prisotna. Mehanizma napotil ni mogoče unovčiti, ne da se ga dokončno določiti in ga pokazati – to bi bilo enako, kot če bi ga spremenili v identiteto. Ker vedno le razločuje in odlaga, je smiselno reči, da se nadaljuje, ni pa smiselno reči, da eksistira. Kljub vsej zagonetnosti njenega položaja jo je še vseeno mogoče upravičiti – razglasitev Razlíke kot identične same s seboj bi bila namreč izraz čistega protislovja. Če za Razlíko velja zgolj to, da se sama od sebe razlikuje, da sama s sabo ne sovпада in da ni, kar je, nam je lažje razumeti, zakaj ni imena za nekaj, kar »se nezadržno razpršuje znotraj verige razlíkujočih substitucij« (Derrida, 1994: str. 26). Prav zato gre o Razlíki govoriti z apofatično retoriko, čeprav, kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju,

bi jo bilo treba razločevati od vsakršnih ugaslih transcendenc. V tem pogledu pravi Derrida tole: »... če je (in prečrtujem tudi ta je), različka tisto, kar omogoča prisostvovanje prisotno bivajočega ni nikoli mogoča kot taka. ... različke ni, ne eksistira, ni prisotno bivajoče, kar koli naj bi že to bilo; V vsaki izpostavitvi bi bila izpostavljena temu, da izgine kot izginotje. Tvegala bi, da se pojavi: da izgine.« (Derrida, 1994: str. 6).

Če pa vseeno poskusimo biti kar se da jasni, lahko rečemo, da je treba različko razumeti kot mehanizem za formiranje vsakršnih pojmov in pomenov, kot nekaj, kar dopušča pridobitev pomena zgolj v igri odnosov z drugimi. Različka se pusti zaznati skozi neprekinjeno gibanje vzajemnih referenc in zamenjav, in tako je geneza vsakršnega smisla v njeni domeni (Gasché, 1986: str. 411–453).

Torej je treba priznati, da je njeno delovanje predhodno pojavljanju temeljnih filozofskih kategorij, ki so druge z drugimi v razmerju opozicije. To pa še posebej za filozofijo, a tudi za vse druge teoretične discipline in vsakršno znanje, pomeni, da je vse, kar lahko vemo, opišemo, vidimo in izrazimo z besedami, določeno z notranjim pomagalom sistema označevanja. Znanje sledi kot drugi korak, potem ko se je sistem razporejanja pomenov že začel vzpostavljati. Zato je znanje uporaba izrazov, katerih semantika je določena od znotraj; je prehajanje od pojma do pojma, od koncepcije do koncepcije znotraj obstoječega mehanizma sistema simbolov. Kako znanje, tudi filozofsko, deluje, lahko ponazorimo s partijo šaha, v kateri smo vse možne poteze dognali vnaprej, vsakič pa lahko odigramo povsem nov niz potez. Vseeno pa vsako akcijo, ki se razvije v območju šahovnice, usmerja načelo notranjih pravil in razporeditev – torej je na delu razločevanje. Morda je potem tudi filozofijo mogoče tako igrati: če smo se naučili pravil gibanja znotraj kategorialnega sistema filozofije, kjer prevzamejo vlogo kralja ali kraljice pojmi Bit, Esenca in Subjekt, se lahko gremo vznemirljivo igro »učenja«, v kateri vsak nov niz potez napoveduje novo filozofsko teorijo. Prav to prvobitno izvorno delo Razlike, ki določa pravila igre, razporeditev figur in vrstni red potez, smo intuitivno že zaznali ko smo se spraševali, kaj je tisto, kar razločuje temeljne filozofske kategorije. »... različka odpira tudi prostor, v katerem onto-teologija – filozofija – proizvaja svoj svoj sistem in svojo zgodovino, le-to zajema, se vanjo vpisuje in jo nepovratno presega.« (Derrida, 1994: str. 6). Če smo natančni, nam načelo različke, v katerem je eno vedno določeno skozi drugo, pojmi pa niso nikoli prisotni sami zase, kot stvari in pomeni, ki bi bili identični samim sebi, ne dopušča, da bi osnovna metafizična nasprotja posta-

vili v nasprotni vrstni red – razlika med njimi se razblini prav v prid Razliki. Naj znova zapišemo, da nam različka kot pojmovno načelo omogoča, da nekaj doumemo, ali še splošneje rečeno, da obravnavamo resničnost skozi dejstvo, da je tisto, kar vsakič doumemo, vselej rezultat njegovega razločevanja od ostalih elementov v sistemu. Pri tem je pomembno, da je prav samo-identiteta elementov sama po sebi nemogoča, izven in onstran sklicevanja na drugega, izven sistema diferencialnih razmerij. Če to načelo prenesemo na temeljna nasprotja, bomo ugotovili, da je vzpostavitev temeljnega (kot ireduktibilnega, skrajnega), kar je za filozofijo osrednjega pomena, neizvedljiva. Pari, ki so si v opoziciji, so gibljivi vsaj v tem smislu, da so izjemoma smiselni, kar gre pripisati njihovim obojestranskim referencam. »Subjekt« je nekaj, kar ni »objekt«; »duševno« je nekaj, kar ni »fizično«; ideja je nekaj, kar ni »stvar« itd. Seveda se ta oscilirajoči mehanizem določanja pomenov razhaja z metafizičnim prizadevanjem za poglobljanje vednosti o tem, kaj so Subjekt, Ideja ali Zavest onstran njihovih neposrednih pojmovnih parov. To pa še ni vse. Nikar ne pozabimo, da se ustrezno zamišljena Razlika razločuje od same sebe – njeno sovpadanje same s seboj jo povsem izniči. To pa pomeni, da moramo po tem, ko smo preučili vse znane filozofske koncepcije, ugotoviti njihovo neujemanje samih s seboj, njihov »razlikujoči-razločujoči« značaj. Četudi se oscilirajoče gibljejo od enega k drugemu, ne eden ne drugi ne bo nikdar le »eden« ali le »drugi«. To je povezano z dejstvom, da se končni pojem in temeljni pomen sama nikoli ne pojavita, temveč nas zgolj usmerjata h krogu pomembnih referenc, ki pa zgolj obljublajo prisotnost pomena. In kakšno korist imamo od te ugotovitve? Predvsem se ne moremo zanašati na pare temeljnih filozofskih pojmov s takšno gotovostjo, kot smo se lahko prej. Nasprotje ni le nekaj, kar ni primarno, je tudi precej nezanesljivo. Na nasprotje se ne moremo niti najmanj zanašati, to pa zaradi sproščanja napetosti in pritiska (kontrasta) med njegovimi poli. To pa dejansko pomeni, da je pojmovanje dualistične strukture tako znanja kot tudi sveta, ki je tako zelo pomembno za klasično filozofijo, na izjemno majavih nogah. Dvomeč v dualizme bi kajpak lahko sklepali, da v samem osrčju sveta na splošno ni nikakršnih podvojitvev, temveč prej nekaj, kar nam dopušča oblikovati in hkrati omejevati vsakršno nasprotje česar koli že, in da drugačnost od sebe samega ustvarja vse ostale razlike. »... filozofija živi v različki in od nje ... Na ta način bi lahko povzeli vse pare nasprotij, na katerih je zgrajena filozofija, in od katerih živi naš diskurz, a ne zato, da bi opazovali, kako se nasprotja brišejo, temveč da bi pokazali na nujnost, po kateri se eden izmed členov pojavlja kot različka drugega, kot drugi, ki je razlikovan v ekonomiji istega: intelegibilno kot različujoče od čutnega, kot razlikovano čutno, pojem

kot razlikujoč-razlíkovan zor; kultura kot razlikujoča-razlíkovaná narava; vse drugo od *phýsis-téchné, nómos, thésis*, družba, svoboda, zgodovina, duh itn. kot razlikujoča ali razlíkovaná *phýsis*. (Derrida, 1994: str. 17).

Zaključek: Je razlika metafizičen pojem?

Na tej točki naše razprave, ki bo kmalu izčrpala vprašanje razlike, moramo navesti še poslednjo pripombo. Kljub vsemu, kar je bilo o razlíki (Razlíki) povedanega, ne smemo pozabiti, da to ni v nobeni zvezi s kakršnim koli obnavljanjem transcendentnega (ki ga predstavlja Razlika-razlíka). Prostor porazdelitve pojmov je imanenten samemu sebi, pa tudi mehanizem, ki ga ureja, ne nadzira procesa od zunaj, temveč mu že od samega začetka pripada, temelječ na nekakšni strukturni praznini. Drugače rečeno, Razlíko bi bilo treba opisovati izključno kot imanenco. Ne nahaja se onkraj druge strani pomena, ampak je v precejšnji meri vključena v svoje lastno gibanje, vgrajena v referenčno omrežje in zategadelj pripada notranji dimenziji znakov. Treba bi bilo torej tudi ponovno premisliti koncept klasičnega začetka v metafiziki. Poslej razumemo takšen začetek ne kot zakon ali niz pravil, ki se nahajajo na drugi strani sistema filozofske pomensko-sti, temveč kot notranje gibanje, ki je temu sistemu lastno in od njega neločljivo. S tem se vračamo k takšnemu dojetanju Razlike, na kakršno smo se že naleteli v Deleuzovih delih: »Bit ... se izreka v enem samem in istem smislu skozi vse svoje forme ... a to, o čemer se izreka, se razlikuje, to, o čemer se izreka, je sama razlika.« (Deleuze, 2011: str. 458–459).

Derrida pa po drugi strani v svoji »Razlíki«, posvečeni analizi tega pojma, pravi: »Kajti to, kar je tu vprašljivo, je natanko zahteva po pravem začetku, po absolutnem izhodišču, načelni odgovornosti. Svojega predavanja torej ne bom mogel razviti preprosto kot filozofski diskurz, ki se ravna po načelu, postulatih, aksiomih ali definicijah ter se premešča glede na diskurzivno linearnost reda razlogov. Na trasi razlíke je vse strateško in tvegano. Strateško, kajti nikakršna transcendentna in zunaj polja pisave prisotna realnost ne more na teološki način obvladovati celote polja.« (Derrida, 1994, str. 6–7)

Tako se izkaže, da je Razlika, če jo jemljemo kot kvazi-metafizičen začetek, ki stremi k samemu izvoru in prvemu načelu, nedosegljiva na isti način, kakršnega je posvojila klasična metafizika. Če klasično pomeni, da se vse zvede zgolj na začetek, na *arhé*, je, ko gre za Razlíko, to strategijo izjemno težko uporabiti. Ker

se Razlika izmika vsem znanim klasičnim postopkom zvajanja (na Eno), lahko v razmerju do nje najdemo primerne klasifikacije v smislu *genus-species*, vendar pa ostajajo distribucije pomena docela onkraj vsakršne klasifikacije. To pomeni, da pomenskost pojavnega sveta (stvari, stanj, vsega, v odnosu do česar je primerno uporabljati pomen, vrednost in potemtakem tudi razumevanje), svojega obstoja ne dolguje kakšnemu prvotnemu (transcendentalnemu) Pomenu, ki sega onkraj sveta. V osrčju sveta ne obstaja noben takšen osrednji razporejevalec smislov – smisli in pomeni se vzpostavljajo z razločevanjem medsebojne povezanosti enih z drugimi in ne v odnosu do dominantne instance, ki bi določala hierarhično mesto vsake stvari. Deleuze bo takšno razporejevanje pomenov imenoval »nomadska razporeditev«, ki se razlikuje od »sedentarne« (klasično hierarhične) razporeditve. »V teh kategorijah se ne razporeja analogna bit in ta ne porazdeljuje fiksnega deleža bivajočemu. ... Sedentarnim razporeditvam analogije se zoperstavljajo nomadske razporeditve ali kronane anarhije v enoglasnem. Samo tu se razlega 'Vse je enako!' ... A *Vse je enako* se lahko izreka le tam, kjer je dosežena skrajna konica Razlike.« (Deleuze, 2011: str. 459)

V vseh teh argumentih ni ničesar nadrealističnega. Filozofija razlike skuša zgolj postaviti ontologijo na nove temelje. Vabi nas, naj se ozremo naokrog in se sami prepričamo, da je povsod najti le razlike. Tudi iskanje ustreznega začetka vodi k taisti trditvi. Temelječa na njej, odpira filozofija razlike možnost za posodobitev našega filozofskega besednjaka – poslej bo morda filozofija, ki je bila vselej filozofija identitete, morda poskušala postati filozofija razlike. Končno bi se že morali posloviti od preživetega projekta, projekta metafizike. Vendar pa filozofija razlike ne bo zlahka uporabna in uresničljiva. Na vsakem koraku nas čakajo pasti – že ko, na primer, rečemo, da je vse rezultat Razlike in ničesar drugega, s tem izrazimo metafizično trditev. Filozofija razlike nas prepričuje, da »na svetu ni drugega kot zgolj Razlika«, pri čemer skuša pridušiti metafizični pridih svojega zaključka. Konec koncev je pravi temelj metafizičnega projekta v nameri, da bi našli začetek, vendar ne tistega, na katerega se s klasifikacijo *genus-species* zvede prav vse, temveč tistega, ki vendarle obvladuje vse, in ki je v samem temelju metafizičnega projekta. Upošteva vztrajnost, s katero metafizika ponovno vzpostavlja svojo nadvlado, je filozofija razlike celo pripravljena priznati, da njena naloga ni premagovanje metafizičnega izročila, temveč prej njena preobrazba v smeri večjega realizma. Problem ni toliko v samem projektu metafizike, temveč v načinu, kako se je ta projekt izvajal znotraj zahodnoevropskega racionalizma. Če pa že je nekaj, kar nam preprečuje, da bi vzkliknili »pa saj se ta

izvorna Razlika prav nič ne razlikuje od Biti (Identitete, Enosti), ki razširja svojo avtoritarno vladavino povsod! To je prava metafizika!«, potem je to dejstvo, da Razlika, kot smo že rekli, ne eksistira in »ni prisotno bivajoče, pa če si še tako želimo, da bi bila nekaj odličnega, edinstvenega, temeljnega in transcendentalnega« (Derrida, 1994: str. 21). V nasprotju z »začetkom« pri klasični metafiziki, ki je predstavljen kot nekaj, kar je, je »začetek« »metafizike« v filozofiji razlike opredeljen kot nekaj, kar ni. V tem je glavna razlika. »Od tod bi lahko sklepali, da v filozofiji ni pravega začetka, natančneje, da je pravi filozofski začetek, in sicer razlika, v sami sebi že ponavljanje« (Deleuze, 2011: str. 216). A zavoljo dejstva, da je ta neeksistenca produktivna in ustvarja vse, kar poznamo kot eksistirajoče, se nam vendarle lahko dozdeva, da neeksistenca sama le ni absolutna, temveč je morda le rezultat oziroma posledica nekakšne nespretnosti, nekaterih neuspešnih poskusov, da bi jo našli in jo poimenovali. Kot izjavlja filozofija razlike, je metafizika vedno znova žrtev prav tega neuspeha; še več, Razlike ne moremo ne uloviti ne reprezentirati v njenem jeziku. In prav zato filozofija razlike razglaša svoj umik iz metafizične igre. V očitnem pričakovanju, da bo imela več sreče pri iskanju izvirnega zunaj svojih zamejitev.

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Livia Georgeta Suciuc*

Bližnji dotik med derridajevsko dekonstrukcijo in negativno teologijo: *Kenoza jezika in presežek povsem Drugega*

1. Dekonstrukcija in negativna teologija

V širšem kontekstu dekonstruktivne analize govornice, ki jo je opravil francoski filozof Jacques Derrida v zadnjih nekaj desetletjih, je pristop k dekonstrukciji teološkega diskurza, za katerega se zavzema, eksemplaričen, ker preučuje meje govornice nasploh, a s prav posebnim poudarkom na mejah religioznega diskurza, ter nas tako vpelje naravnost v območje krize pomena, diskurza in govornice. Derrida se zavzema za kritiko govornice, ki izhaja iz tega eksemplaričnega primera analize teološkega diskurza, kajti, kot pojasnjuje, je to tista izkušnja, ki omogoča, da najlažje mislimo meje govornice, oziroma, ki lahko predstavlja najustrežnejše okolje, v katerem se začno sprožati temeljni razmisleki o govornici, ki jo uporabljamo, in o njenih mejah. V tem pogledu so Derridajeve trditve nekoliko šokantne: »... ne zaupam nobenemu tekstu, ki ni kakor koli že kontaminiran z negativno teologijo, in celo med temi teksti ne tistim, ki na videz nimajo nobene zveze s teologijo sploh, je ne želijo imeti ali mislijo, da je nimajo. Negativna teologija je povsod, vendar nikdar sama zase.« »Negativna teologija tako ne bi bila le govornica in preizkušanje govornice, ampak predvsem najbolj misleča, najzahtevnejša, najnedostopnejša izkušnja »bitnosti« govornice.«¹

V svoji analizi diskurza negativnih teologij nam Derrida predstavi nekatere najpomembnejše sodobne filozofsko-teološke spore – ne le tiste, ki se nanašajo na dekonstrukcijo teologije, temveč tudi tiste, ki se tičejo radikalnih teoloških tipov fenomenologije in hermenevtike. To gre pripisati obuditvi stare razprave o razmerju med singularnostjo izkušnje in univerzalno govornico: kako lahko sploh govorimo o ireduktibilni singularnosti kot taki, saj je vendar ne moremo poplošiti, formalizirati, določiti in zamejiti, pa najsi bo to singularnost Drugega, *Chôre* ali Boga? Kako se lahko sploh obračamo k Bogu in o njem kot takem tudi

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¹ Jacques Derrida, *Postscriptum: aporije, poti in glasovi*, v: J. Derrida, *Izbrani spisi o religiji*, Kud Logos, Ljubljana, 2003; str. 138, 139; 126.

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govorimo, ne da bi ta pojem zamejili v dosegu naših misli in govornice, ne da bi opredelili Boga kot prikazen, podobo, malika ali doktrino? Kako lahko smiselno in razumljivo govorimo o osebni, skrivnostni in povsem edinstveni izkušnji vere in verskega čutenja?

Zdaj lahko že slutimo posebno perspektivo, ki jo odpira dekonstruktivistični pristop, saj lahko že predvidimo zaključek, da se vsakršna interpretacija, pa naj bo filozofska, teološka, verska ali etična, izmakne »onkraj-pomenskemu« odklonu. Ta odklon se izmika tako hermenevtičnim prizadevanjem za vzpostavitev samovlade pomena kot tudi fenomenološkimi poskusom, da bi se vse zvedlo na pomen, na enak način, kot delujeta »nedekonstruktibilno« v derridajevski dekonstrukciji in neizrazljivo v negativni teologiji. S preizpraševanjem vsega, kar terja strogo identifikacijo skozi omejene oblike naše misli in govornice, s preizpraševanjem možnosti konceptualizacije in izraznosti, nas dekonstrukcija napeljuje k temu, naj pristanemo na »odklon« naših izkušenj in občutkov, ki je ne moremo opredeliti ali razmejiti znotraj okvirov našega védenja in govornice. Posledično bo pričujoča raziskava usmerila našo pozornost k dejstvu, da moramo celovito pristopiti k operaciji dekonstrukcije govornice in kritike naših zmožnosti, da bi sporočali vsesplošno razumljive in izrazljive pomene.

Poleg Derridajevih pripomb k negativnim teologijam Dionizija Areopagita, Mojstra Eckharta, Avguščina in Angela Silezija v *Kako ne govoriti: odznanjanje* in v *Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum)*, upoštevamo na tem mestu tudi interpretacijo Johna D. Caputa, ki prav tako zaobjema te iste interpretacije,² saj John D. Caputo vztraja pri enaki nenavadni podmeni, ki izhaja iz derridajevske filozofije: po eni strani moramo vse, kar je onkraj meje omejenih konstruktov naše misli in govornice vselej dekonstruirati; po drugi strani pa moramo izpostaviti pojav, ki ga je zaslediti v teh konstruktih, a se jim izmakne in ostane neuničljiv vsem našim konstrukcijam in dekonstrukcijam navkljub. V pogovorih z Johnom D. Caputom Derrida pojasni, da ta »double bind«, pogojen z dekonstrukcijo, pomeni, da je dekonstrukcija v igri edinole znotraj napetosti med občo formalnostjo in absolutno heterogenostjo: »prav iz tega sestoji dekonstrukcija: ne gre za zmes, temveč za napetost med spominom, zvestobo, ohranjanjem nečesa, kar nam je bilo

² Glej bibliografijo.

dano, in obenem tudi heterogenostjo, nečim povsem novim in prekinitvijo.«³ Postopek dekonstrukcije v bistvu pomeni nenavaden »odnos brez odnosa« z drugim: odnos, ki vključuje drugega, a hkrati vse druge naredi transcendentne. Ta zamegljena povezava je dejansko bistvo našega odnosa z drugim: »odnosa, v katerem je drugi popolnoma transcendenten. Ne morem doseči tistega drugega. Ne morem poznati tistega drugega od znotraj in tako dalje. A to ni nikakršna ovira, temveč pogoj ljubezni, prijateljstva, pa tudi vojne, pogoj za odnos z drugim.«⁴ Pripomnimo lahko le, da se, začeni z vprašanjem o odnosu do drugega, tako dekonstrukcija kot tudi negativna teologija vrtita okrog vprašanja o mejah govornice in nas soočata z istim nereduktibilnim problemom: kako govoriti in kako ne govoriti, »kako govoriti o neizrekljivi božji transcenci«, kako govoriti o tem, kar je »onkraj«, »beyond«, »hyper«, »über«, »epekeina«, »au-delà«, pa najsi gre za transcendentnost povsem drugega ali pa za transcendentnost Boga.«⁵ Na tem paradoksalnem presečišču se teološka perspektiva sreča z derridajevsko, saj Derridaja zanima predvsem aporija oziroma – kot pojasnjuje Robyn Horner – »tisto, kar je za misel nemogoče«, »kar se misli upira«, »kar se ji izmika«, »kar se ne da misliti«.⁶ Derrida se v svojih besedilih ves čas ukvarja prav s tem vprašanjem: kako lahko mislimo in ubesedimo tisto, kar preseka in preseže našo sposobnost mišljenja in izražanja? To nas seveda pripelje k enaki aporetični in paradoksalni rešitvi, s katero nas je derridajevska dekonstrukcija že seznanila: pozicioniramo se lahko le na nedoločljivi meji »double bind«. Govorimo in obenem ne govorimo; govorimo, da bi s tem zanikali možnost govorjenja in dejansko priznali, da se odklon nenadzorovano izmika našemu govorjenju. Prav tako ugotavlja Georges Leroux⁷: govornica, ki skuša izpostaviti pojavnost transcendentnosti vsake radikalne drugosti, že samo s tem tvega, da je ne bo mogla izpostaviti. Tako derridajevskega vprašanja, »kako ne govoriti« o tem »onkraj«, ni mogoče zastaviti drugače kot na paradoksalen način, upoštevajoč dejstvo, da v govornici ni mogoče izpostaviti razodevanja transcendentnosti nekoga povsem

³ John D. Caputo (ur.) *Deconstruction in a Nutshell. A conversation with Jacques Derrida*, Fordham University Press, New York 1997, str. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, str. 13.

⁵ John D. Caputo, *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida. Religion without Religion*, Fordham University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1997, str. 2.

⁶ Robyn Horner, »Derrida and Gos: Opening a Conversation«, *Pacifica*, Victoria, 12 (Februar 1999), str. 12–16.

⁷ Georges Leroux, »Passion: transcendence. Derrida lecteur du platonisme negative«, *Études françaises*, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 38 (1–2/2002).

drugega, čeprav se, po drugi strani, povsem drugi vselej razodevajo prek posredništva govornice.

Derrida priznava, da je glavni predmet njegovega zanimanja negativna teologija, saj ta zavrača možnost govorjenja o transcendentnosti Boga, ki se izmika našemu vedenju, govoru in jezikovnim zmožnostim. Kljub vsemu pa je teološka misel napredovala v tem svojem negativnem, apofatičnem in mističnem pristopu, tudi ko se je sprijaznila, da se z neizrekljivo božjo prezenco ne moremo soočiti drugače, kot da zanikamo pojmovne predstave in govornico ter se na ta način prepustimo tihi mistični zvezi z Bogom, onkraj vseh imen, besed in pojmov. Če pozitivna, katafatična pot teološko-filozofske misli pristaja na pojme in zagovarja njihovo ustreznost tihi intuiciji božje prezenze, negativna, apofatična pot zavrača pojme, ki se ji zdijo preširoki, da bi lahko vključevali intuicijo. Vendarle pa poleg sprejemanja ali zavračanja obstaja tudi tretja pot, ki prav tako poudarja nezadostnost pojmov, a nas že v istem hipu zavihiti onkraj vedenja in diskurza, onkraj pojmovne, povedne in nominalistične govornice. To je pot mistične apofatične teologije, v kateri, kot nam fenomenološko pojasnjuje Jean-Luc Marion, nas preplavlja presežek intuicije, izvirajoče iz religioznih občutij in izkušenj, ki segajo onkraj vsakršnih meja naših pojmovnih predstav in govornice. A vendarle nas Derrida, z dekonstruktivnega gledišča, popelje⁸ naproti novemu nedoločljivemu, zamegljenemu in kontaminiranemu obzorju, ki je iznad poti teoretičnih pojmovnih predstav, kot tudi poti fenomenološke intuicije in mističnih izkušenj. V tem smislu torej Derrida zastavlja vprašanje, ali ne zgrešujemo religioznih izkušenj kot takih že v temelju, in jih ne moremo prepoznati in jih opisati, ne na konceptualno-teoretičen, ne na intuitiven, fenomenološki, niti na mističen način. Pojav religiozne izkušnje kot take v resnici ostaja povsem heterogen kar zadeva prepoznave in opredelitve, pa najsi gre za vednost in govornico ali pa za fenomenološko intuicijo in mistično vizijo.

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Jacques Derrida se v neskončnost sprašuje, ali se je elementu govornice ter logične in onto-teološke gramatike z versko izkušnjo in mistično razsvetlitvijo sploh mogoče izmakniti. Derrida se ves čas vrača k temu spraševanju, ker se negativna apofatična teologija, paradoksalno, zavzema za opustitev neustreznih oblik

⁸ Jacques Derrida, »On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion« v: John D. Caputo, Michael J. Scanlon (Ur.), *God, the Gift and Postmodernism*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington Indianapolis 1999.

pojmovne govorice, oziroma vsaj za njihovo uporabo na negativen, apofatičen način, da bi bil s tem dostop do višje ravni »tihe božje intuicije« neposrednejši. A pri tem se Derrida sprašuje, ali lahko odkrijemo mistično in neizrekljivo enost onkraj govorice, njene pomenskosti in izraznosti, k čemur stremi negativna teologija, ali pa je posredništvo govorice skoraj neizogibno, pa četudi je indirektno in neustrezno. Ali pa se morda že ne nahajamo na *nedoločljivi*, *neopredeljivi* in *kontaminirani* meji med obema naklonoma edinstvene verske izkušnje na eni in univerzalnega pojmovnega jezika na drugi strani?

Dvojna apofaza

Celo v Derridajevih pripombah v njegovem eseju »Kako ne govoriti: odznanikarja« k negativni teologiji Dionizija Areopagita je eden od ciljev Derridajeve interpretacije pokazati, da celo diskurz, ki pritiče negativni teologiji, v praksi ne pomeni razkola »dvojnega izročila«, ki postavlja ločnico med mistično, skrivnostno, neizrekljivo in neizrazljivo izkušnjo na eni strani, ter izrazljivo, sporočljivo, logično, filozofsko in teološko pomenskostjo na drugi. Prav nasprotno, v razvoju teološke misli je prav Dionizij tisti, ki uveljavlja »dvojni način prenosa«, pri katerem oba naklona, od katerih predstavlja prvi neizrazljivo skrivnost, drugi pa izrazljivi pomen, dejansko drug drugega *sekata*. Derrida skuša dokazati, da se celo v kontekstu negativnih, mističnih teologij prejkone nahajamo na meji nerazločljivega *spajanja* in *razmikanja* obeh naklonov: ker ne moremo govoriti o skrivnosti božanskega, moramo molčati, a kljub temu božanstvo samo nastopa in se razodeva v misli in govorici, in le s predpostavko tega skrivnega razodevanja lahko bodisi govorimo ali pa molčimo. Tako celo pri Dioniziju odkrijemo »tretjo pot«, ki presega izključujoče se nasprotje med nujnostjo afirmiranja jezika ter nujnostjo odrekanja jeziku, in ki rajši kaže proti nečemu *onkraj*, *hyperousios*, *nad* in *več* kot bit, več kot naša misel in govorica, več kot naša afirmativna ali negirajoča govorica. To nas napotuje k transcendentnosti Boga, ki »je« *onkraj* in *več* kot bit in, seveda, *onkraj* in *nad* vsakršnim izrekanjem, pa najsi bo afirmativno ali negirajoče. Derrida priznava, da raziskuje dvoje predikativnih in pozicionalnih metafizičnih poti teološkega jezika (katafatično-afirmativnega in apofatično-negirajočega), vendar počne to prav zato, ker ga zanima teološka invokacija drugačne poti, takšne, ki bi preseгла izključevalnost afirmacije/negacije, kakršna je na primer pragmatična ne-predikativna, ne-diskurzivna pot molitve in bogoslužja.

Derrida se v nadaljevanju obrača k mističnemu teološkemu diskurzu, Mojstra Eckharta, v katerem najdemo bolj ali manj enake misli: treba je molčati in se izogibati govorjenju, kajti, kot zapiše Eckart, je »Bog brezimen« in »nihče ne sme o njem ničesar reči ali ga skušati razumeti.« To je napotitev k tej isti meji med nedostopno skrivnostjo samo po sebi in povedmi, ki so sporočljive le kot negacija; tako torej dosežemo isto »*mesto prehoda*«, »*filter*«, »*sito*« in »*prag*« med Bogom kot takim in tistim, kar Bog ni. Da se nekaj lahko zgodi, da se nekaj udejanji ali preide v govorico, mora najprej prestopiti ta *prag* in biti presejano skozi to *sito*, stati mora v praznini tega brezmejnega prostora: »Brez iznajdbe takšnega filtra ni besedila, predvsem pridige ne, ni možnosti pridiganja.«⁹ Največji izziv, s katerim Derrida sooči teološko misel, se torej navezuje na kritiko enostranskega razlikovanja med izkušnjo in govorico: bi bila edinstvena izkušnja »čiste« molitve sploh mogoča brez dodatka teorij, logike in teološkega diskurza? In če se izkušnja molitve ne bi »stekala« v univerzalni pomen teološkega diskurza ali bila vanj vključena in v njem izražena, bi bila teologija potemtakem še vedno možna?

A ta hip se osredotočamo na Derridajev komentar iz *Sauf le nom*, ki ga je podal ob preučevanju več fragmentov negativne teologije, ki pa ni ravno klasična ali kanonična: gre za delo *Kerubski popotnik* Angela Silezija. V kontekstu analiziranja negativne teologije je Angel Silezij eden najboljših primerov, saj nas, kot trdi Derrida, pravzaprav sooči z nekakšnim *postscriptumom*, glede na to, da njegovo pisanje privzema obliko aforizmov, poetičnih prebliskov ter odlomkov nedokončanih zapisov, ki spričo svoje raznorodnosti nikoli ne dosežejo logične forme filozofsko-teološke razprave. Raznorodnost teh aforizmov napeljuje k absolutni heterogenosti in absolutni diskontinuiteti v območju možnega. Spričo nepovezanosti Silezijevih aforizmov se kraljestvo možnega ustrezneje razpira k »bolj nemožnemu«, k »onkraj«, »hiper«, tja, kjer, kot piše Silezij, spregovori Bog.

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V skladu s to obrazložitvijo opažamo absolutno heterogenost in obenem ireduktibilno kontaminacijo tudi v Derridajevem pristopu k negativni teologiji s pomočjo »double bind«. Že na samem začetku njegove obrazložitve ne moremo spregledati derridajevske razlage, da imamo tukaj opraviti tudi z dvojno apofazo:

⁹ Jacques Derrida, »Kako ne govoriti: od zanikanja«, v: J. Derrida, *Izbrani spisi o religiji*, Kud Logos 2003, str. 89.

»obstaja ena apofaza« in »druga apofaza«¹⁰. »Ena apofaza« bi torej bila določen tip govora, ki bi potekal v vprašalno-nikalnem jezikovnem načinu, saj bi se ta povsem približal vrhuncu jezikovne formalizacije. V nasprotju s tem pa bi »druga apofaza« izzvala absoluten premolk v mediju govornice, v svetu možnega, saj stremljeva k »absolutni heterogenosti«, k nemožnemu, k onkraj, *hyper*, k tistemu, česar se ne da dotakniti, tako kot pri Angelu Sileziju: Najnemogočejše je mogoče / Ti ne moreš sonca s puščico doseči / Jaz pa morem večno sonce s svojo obstreliti. (6:153)« »Pojdi tja / kamor ne moreš: poglej / kamor ne vidiš: Prisluhni kjer nič se ne oglasja in ne zveni / tako si kjer Bog govori. (1:199).¹¹

Negativna teologija Angela Silezija v tem smislu predpostavlja neko »paradoksalno hiperbolo«, tj. gibanje transcendence ki nas pošilja *onkraj*, onkraj biti in bitij, onkraj tega, kar je, onkraj bivanja, bistva ali božjega imena, proti »*hyper*«, »ultra«, »*au-delà*«, »über« ali »*epekeina tes ousias*«. A težava je v tem, da mora z izrekom tega napotila k nečemu *onkraj* absolutne transcendence negativna pot samo sebe razlastiti in izkoreniniti, tako da se odtrga od vsega ustaljenega in uveljavljenega; in zato mora premagati prav sam diskurz negativne teologije o božanskem. In če si še naprej pomagamo z analogijo, Derrida zapiše, da se stvari zgodijo »kot da podpis ne bi bil sopodpisan, ampak bi se mu oporekalo v kodicilu oziroma preklicu *postscriptuma* na dnu pogodbe.¹² Izkaže se, da negativni postopki delujejo kot *postscriptum*, ki mora odkloniti, zavrniti in zanikati govornico, zapise, izročilo in zgodovino krščanstva.

3. Kenoza jezika in pragmatizem molitve

Do tega pride po eni strani zato, ker negativna teologija samo sebe predstavlja kot tradicijo, institucijo, kulturo, spomin ter zgodovino, ki uporablja formalno, trdilno, teoretično in prepričljivo govornico. Derrida torej dokazuje, kako ni mogoče videti, da »je to, kar se v idiomu grško-latinske filiacije imenuje 'negativna teologija', govornica.«; »Skratka, negativna teologija dopušča, da k njej pristopamo kot h korpusu (jo pred-razumevamo kot korpus), v katerem so zvečine arhivirane izjave, katerih logiške modalnosti, gramatika, leksika in še zlasti se-

¹⁰ Jacques Derrida, »Postscriptum: aporiije, poti in glasovi«, v: J. Derrida, *Izbrani spisi o religiji*, Kud Logos, Ljubljana, 2003, str. 107.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, str. 114, 115.

¹² *Ibid.*, str. 138.

mantika so nam že dostopne, to pa vsaj v tem, kar je v njih določljivo.«¹³ A po drugi strani je negativna teologija ali prej omenjena »druga apofaza« neodvisna od jezika, pripovedi, dogem in zgodovine krščanstva. Negativna teologija premaguje meje jezika in razvema najbolj silovito miselno izkušnjo na teh mejah, saj se ves čas ukvarja s »prekomernim«, »presežnim«, ki sta značilnosti jezika: »Neposredna, vendar neintuitivna mistika, nekakšna abstraktna kenoza osvobaja to govorico vsakršnega verjetja – in sicer na ločnici od vsake vere.«¹⁴

S tem, ko se poskuša odmakniti od vsakršne govorice ali pripovedi, začinja negativna teologija izvajati »kenozo diskurza.« Na ta način negativna pot uspešno izkorišča negativno modaliteto jezika in izčrpa vse njegove diskurzivne možnosti. Po Derridajevem prepričanju je to, kar se dogaja, »abstraktna kenoza« diskurza, »prazno«, »mehanično«, »formalno« in »repetitivno« delovanje govorice. Negativna teologija se prazni vsakršne »intuitivne polnosti« in vsakršne vsebine, prezenca ali pomena, ter povzroča prazno intenco, ki naj traja neomejeno, brez nebrzdane, izvorne ali dejanske intuicije. Tako se znajdemo v momentu »krize«, kot je to predvidel Husserl, momentu, ki se izmika »pastem intuitivne zavesti in fenomenologije.«¹⁵ To, do česar smo se pravkar dokopali, je običajni pristop k tej tematiki: tako dekonstrukcija kot negativna teologija se zavzemata za »kenozo diskurza«, tj. za izpraznitev jezika vsakršne vsebine in intuitivne polnosti in za omogočanje dostopa do prazne puščave, v kateri ne moremo najti nobenih začrtanih oblik niti nikakršne prezenca, ki naj bi jo dojemali in izražali znotraj zamenjenih oblik našega mišljenja in govorice. Dekonstrukcija celo govori o prostoru *razlike* [différance], diferencialne matrice, v kateri se rojevajo vsa imena, besede in jezikovni pojmi. *Razlika* je prazni prostor *Chôre*, ki je starejša od vseh imen in besed ter je matrica neke vrste »govorice – pred govorico«¹⁶.

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Po drugi strani predstavlja za negativno teologijo kenoza jezika, se pravi puščava, razsulo, praznota in praznost jezika, pogoj, da se lahko nekaj zgodi, pogoj, da se lahko pojavita jezikovni *presežek* in njegov *prebitek*. Kenoza jezika je pogoj, da lahko do pojava sploh pride. Zato lahko rečemo, da zanimajo negativno teologijo »ostaline« jezika, ki »presegajo« jezik: »Negativna teologija bi bržkone

¹³ *Ibid.*, str. 119; 122–123.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, str. 141.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* str. 122.

¹⁶ Jacques Derrida, »Kako ne govoriti: odznanikanja«, v: J. Derrida, *Izbrani spisi o religiji*, Kud Logos 2003, str. 39.

bila nič, kratko in malo nič, če presežek ali prebitek (glede na govoro) ne bi vtisnil znamenja posamičnim dogodkom govorce in če ne bi pustil ostankov na telesu jezika ...«¹⁷. Drugače povedano, presežek povsem edinstvenih religiozних *dogodkov* pušča sled v univerzalnem korpusu jezika in govorce. Kaj ostane za praznino oziroma kenozo govorce? Seveda, po Derridajevem prepričanju je Bog »poslednji ostanek« oziroma »sled« jezika: »Bog 'je' ime tega brezdanjega kolapsa, tega brezkončnega puščavljenja govorce.«¹⁸ Vendar ta »sled« ni nekaj, kar *obstaja*, temveč je zgolj prazen namig na pustinjo onkraj vseh stvari, kajti, kot razlaga Derrida, »dobro veš, da *via negativa* skoraj v vseh grških, krščanskih oziroma judovskih ožičevalnicah [*filiières*], zvezuje sklicevanje na Boga oziroma Božje ime z izkušnjo kraja. Puščava je torej figura čistega kraja«¹⁹. Priklicevanje božjega imena oziroma imena, ki ne poimenuje »ničesar, kar obstaja«, pripominja Derrida, je v grško-krščanskem in judovskem izročilu v bistvu priklicevanje puščave, čistega, praznega prostora *chóre*. V tem priklicevanju puščave lahko odkrijemo le *sledi ostaline, pepel, brazgotine, duhove* pradavnega, nespoznavnega in nedostopnega dogodka božjega daru. Seveda se, kot meni Derrida, do tega dogodka pride le ob samem »robu govorce«. »Dogodek ostaja v govoric in hkrati *na* njej, torej znotraj in na površini (odprti, izpostavljeni, nenadoma preplavljeni površini, zunaj samega sebe).«²⁰ Govorica tako nosi sled »rane«, ki *po* vsakem dogodku vselej ostane. Govorica torej zgolj omogoča dostop do *sledi* pradavnega dogodka, ki ga ni mogoče prestaviti v sedanost. Tako da, kot pojasnjuje Derrida, vsakršen govor, če sodi v negativno teologijo, poteka le v *sledi* nekega dogodka, ki je že davno mimo. Pradavni, nespoznavni, aporetični, skrivni in nedostopni dogodek božjega daru pušča *sled* v govoric, v dopolnilnem diskurzu teologij. Teološkemu diskurzu so dostopne le *sledi* pradavnega dogodka božjega daru. Govorica, pisava, maksime in aforizmi negativne teologije so zgolj *postscriptum*, ki lahko nastane šele *po* dogodku, tako da s seboj zgolj prenaša *sled* ali *rano*, ki jo je pradavni in skrivnostni dogodek zapustil na samem robu govorce. Prav zato lahko postanemo pozorni še na eno nezanemarljivo derridajevsko podmeno: niti dekonstrukcija niti negativna teologija ne moreta premostiti *prepada* oziroma *razpoke* med dogodkom in govoro. Govoric so dostopne le *ostaline, sledi* in *pepel* dogodka, ki nam sam po sebi nepovratno

¹⁷ Jacques Derrida, »Postscriptum: aporije, poti in glasovi«, v: J. Derrida, *Izbrani spisi o religiji*, Kud Logos, Ljubljana, 2003 str. 126.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, str. 127.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, str. 127–128.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, str. 129.

uhaja. Vendar dogodek, ki ves čas uhaja, pušča *sledi* v govorici – in prav v tem je Derridajeva interpretacija še posebej izvirna: ne le *razkol* med dogodkom in govorico, tudi *kontaminacija* je ireduktibilna.

Torej smo ujeti v ireduktibilno »double bind«, »dvojno zapoved« ali »dvojno gibanje«, iz česar ne izhaja le absolutna heterogenost, ampak hkrati tudi nedoločljiva kontaminacija med dvema poloma: »Takšna neustreznost prevaja in izdaja odsotnost skupne mere med odpiranjem, odprtostjo, razodetjem in védenjem na eni strani ter absolutno, nepredvidljivo skrivnostjo, heterogeno v razmerju do vsakega manifestiranja, na drugi.«²¹ Ali pa, še krajše povedano, ujeti smo med »védenjem« in »skrivnostjo«, med »govorico« in »dogodkom«, med dogodkom božjega daru in izreki negativne teologije, ki so zgolj nekakšen *post-scriptum*, zapis, ki ohranja *sled* rane, ki jo je za seboj zapustil pradavni dogodek, ki nam je zdaj že nedostopen, in za takšnim dogodkom, do katerega nimamo več neposrednega dostopa, ostaja le pepel.

Pri apofatičnem gibanju gre tako po eni strani za kenozo naše omejene izkušnje diskurza, govorice in védenja. Po drugi strani pa gre tudi za davni, minuli dogodek, za dejanje »spovedi«, »molitve« in »pogovora z Bogom«. Izjemnega pomena je posebno pozornost nameniti derridajevskemu namigu, da je moč negativne teologije prav v tem razmerju, ki je »razpeto med dva pola«²², saj v njem jasno izstopata pol te praznote ali izpraznjenosti govorice in pol polnine molitve. Če je formalizacija tisto, kar govorico negativne teologije izprazni »vsakega unavzočenja oziroma ponavzočenja [*presentation or representation*], brez podob in, denimo, celo brez Božjih imen v tem jeziku ali tej kulturi,«²³ lahko tedaj po drugi strani pripomnimo, da deluje polnina molitve prav nasprotno in nas ščiti pred to izpraznjenostjo ali mehanično formalizacijo govorice. V aktu molitve ne prosimo Boga, naj nas obdaruje, temveč »molitev prosi Boga, naj raje kot darove da sebe.«²⁴ Molitev je priklicala boga samega kot dar. Bog je dogodek daru.²⁵

²¹ *Ibid.*, str. 129.

²² *Ibid.*, str. 122.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, str. 127.

²⁵ Derrida nenehno usmerja našo pozornost k dejstvu, da smo ujeti nekje na nedoločljivi meji med tem, kar nam je dano, kar je že razodeto in je opredmeteno v naših teološko-verskih obzorjih, in po drugi strani med nejasno vero v dogodek daru kot tak, ki se bo uresničil znotraj preroške razsežnosti neskončne transcendence.

Derrida se sklicuje na Avguštinov diskurz, v katerem je akt molitve afekt: spoved je »akt milosrčnosti, ljubezni in prijateljstva v Kristusu« in ne izkustvo védenja; »prav nobene zveze z védenjem nima – z védenjem kot takim«; je akt pragmatičnega udejanjanja resnice: »Avguštin govori o 'narejanju resnice' (*veritatem facere*), ki ni isto niti kot razodevanje ali odstiranje niti kot obveščanje v redu spoznavajočega uma. Morda je zvedeno na *pričevanje*«; »Izpoved kot tujka v razmerju do spoznavanja, s tem pa tudi v razmerju do vsakega določanja oziroma upovedovalnega pridajanja, deli isto usodo z apofatičnim gibanjem. Avguštinov odgovor se od začetka vpisuje v krščanski red ljubezni oziroma milosrčnosti – kot bratstvo.«²⁶

Čeprav se Jean-Luc Marion s fenomenološkega stališča ne strinja povsem z derridajevskim razumevanjem negativnih teologij, pa vseeno priznava, da je s sklicevanjem na argument *tretje poti*, ki dopušča pragmatično uporabo govornice pri molitvi in bogoslužju, med njim in Derridajem doseženo soglasje. »Menim, da oba obravnavava ista vprašanja,« piše Marion, saj »se strinjava, da obstajajo trije načini govora o Bogu.«²⁷ To pa je v neskladju z negativnimi teologijami in metafiziko diskurza, saj zanju obstajata le dva možna načina, kako govoriti o religioznem izkustvu: afirmativno-katafatični in negirajoče-apofatični. Kako bi bil lahko onkraj omrežja predikativnega jezika sploh možen kak *tretji način*? Ta *tretji način*, priznava Marion, je morda pragmatična uporaba govornice, ki jo zasledimo v praksah religioznih izkustev pri verskih opravilih, to je pri molitvi in bogoslužju. Pri obredu krsta, na primer, Boga ne vključujemo v teoretsko obzorje naših predvidevanj, temveč nas liturgična uporaba govornice vpiše »v samo obzorje²⁸ Boga.« Pragmatična uporaba govornice odpira nove razsežnosti (kjer so odsotni prezenca, esenca, imena in pojmi) onkraj obzorja onto-teološke pojmovnosti ali metafizične predikativne govornice. Na ta način se lahko izognemo zamejevanju Boga znotraj skrajnega dosega našega pojmovnega sveta in hkrati nakažemo neskončne razsežnosti nepoznavanja, nepredstavljanja in neizražanja Boga. V skladu s tem Jean-Luc Marion priznava, da se fenomenološki pogled srečuje z derridajevskim na točki, kjer apofatična teologija ni več umeščena znotraj onto-teološkega obzorja metafizike. Iz opisanega sozvočja tako izhaja, da *tretji način* v

²⁶ *Ibid.*, str. 109.

²⁷ Jean-Luc Marion, »In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of 'Negative Theology'« v: John D. Caputo, Michael J. Scanlon (ur.), *God, the Gift, and Postmodernism*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1999, str. 46.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, str. 38.

apofatičnih teologijah deluje in da je ta tretji način način pragmatizma govornice, onkraj predikativne govornice, najsi bo ta afirmativna ali negirajoča.

Akt pragmatične govornice molitve je naravnano k »posamičnemu brez pojma,«²⁹ in naslovljen na absolutno singularnost nepoznanega Boga, ki presega akt védenja in tudi vse atribute teološkega védenja, najsi bodo afirmativni ali negirajoči. Derrida nadalje vztraja, da se govornica in znanje vselej določita »po« aktu spovedi iz srca (o katerem govori tudi Avguštin). Iz tega sledi, da ne more biti nobeno pisanje, pa najsi pripada pozitivni ali negativni teologiji, nič drugega kot »postscriptum«, ki se lahko udejanji šele »po« aktu nagovora Boga, ki je bil izvršen že prej. V svojih pogovorih z Marionom, ki so objavljeni v knjigi *God, the Gift, and Postmodernism*, Derrida tudi ne zanika, da je nanj vplivala kantovska kritika védenja ter da ga zelo vznemirja nedoločljivi dar mišljenja, osvobojenega pojmovnosti, vere, delovanja, navad in stremljenja, ne pa tudi védenja, identifikacije in pojmovne determinacije.

A presenetljivi zaključek, ki nas povede korak naprej v Derridajevih izpeljavah, in na katerega nas opozarjata tako John D. Caputo kot tudi Robyn Horner, je, da derridajevska dekonstrukcija, četudi ne zaupa v pot pojmovnega mišljenja in védenja, vsekakor zaupa v pot vere: da če Drugi presega naše miselne sposobnosti, ga ne moremo dojeti drugače kot skozi vero. Nedostopni presežek mišljenja odstopi prostor dostopnim sledem vere. Zato lahko le še enkrat poudarimo, da je to še eno od paradoksalnih mest, kjer se dekonstrukcija srečuje z apofatičnim načinom.

4. Dogodek singularnosti

Če sledimo tej isti liniji Derridajeve interpretacije, lahko opazimo, da absolutna heterogenost teh »dveh brezen«, »dveh mest«, »dveh načinov,« »obenem dovoljuje in preprečuje to, kar bi lahko imenovali eksemplarizem«, kar je nenavadna povezava-razvezava, na katero pa nas je Derrida že privadil: »Ta eksemplarizem združuje in hkrati razdružuje, pregrajuje tisto najboljše kot tudi nerazličnostno:

²⁹ Tudi Mojster Eckhart se naveže na to Avguštinovo vrstico: »pogosto ga citira Mojster Eckhart, predvsem njegov »brez«, kvazizanikovalno upovedanje posamičnega [*singular*] brez pojma, na primer: »Bog je moder brez modrosti, dober brez dobrote, močan brez moči«. Derrida, *Postscriptum: aporije, poti in glasovi*, str. 111.

na eni strani, eni poti, globoko in brezdažno večnost, temeljno, vendar dostopno teleo-estahološki pripovedi in določeni izkušnji oziroma historičnemu (ali historialnemu) razodetju; na drugi strani, drugi poti, nečasovnost brezna brez dna oziroma površine, absolutno brezčutnost (niti življenje niti smrt), ki daje vznikniti vsemu, kar ni. Dve brezni, pravzaprav.« Ti »dve brezni«, ki ju Derrida tako pogosto omenja – absolutna nečasovnost in na drugi strani tista časovnost, ki nam je dostopna prek naših izkušenj in zgodovinskih razkritij ter teoloških pripovedi – sta ujeti v tej čudni in paradoksalni povezavi brez povezave, ki ju hkrati veže in ločuje, saj, kot pesniško zapiše Silezij »Brezno kliče breznu.«³⁰

Še več, Derrida presenetljivo trdi, da »vsaka stvar, vsako bivajoče, ti, jaz, drugi, vsak X, vsako ime in vsako Božje ime lahko postanemo zgled drugih zamenljivih X-ov. Gre za proces absolutne formalizacije. Vsak drugi je povsem drugačen [Tout autre est tout autre.]³¹ Caputo razloži, da je »ta povsem drugi katera koli singularnost, karkoli, kdor koli, katerega obstoja, bližine ne moremo povzdigniti, ne posplošiti, ne univerzalizirati, ne formalizirati ...«³² Ta drugi je Bog oziroma kar koli edinstvenega, ni pomembno, kaj. Absolutna singularnost pripada drugemu ali pa Bogu. Kajti zagotovo obstajajo primeri absolutne singularnosti, ki se jih ne da zamejiti, določiti ali vključiti v univerzalno celoto. Absolutna singularnost drugega biva v tem praznem prostoru, kraju, puščavi, nedoločljivi obliki, prividni ali prikazenski formalni strukturi, v kateri poteka »redukcija«, »kenoza«, »epoche« in puščavljenje vsakršne vsebine. Absolutna singularnost ostaja nedoločna in neopredeljiva, tako kot puščavski prostor *chôre* – brezoblični prostor, v katerem so vpisane določne oblike. Prav k temu kraju nas napotuje dekonstrukcija: dekonstrukcija odpira vrata v ta nedoločni prostor absolutne singularnosti Drugega, arhaične prostorske *chôre* in mesijanske časovnosti.

Da bi nam nakazal pot k temu nemogočemu kraju (absolutno heterogenemu kraju singularnosti), uporabi Derrida v svojih komentarjih k aforizmom Angela Silezija izraz *Gelassenheit*. Njegovo besedilo se osredotoča na izraz »*Gelassenheit*«, ki deluje kot leitmotiv pri usmerjanju njegove interpretacije, kajti ta *Gelassenheit* kot element ravnodušnosti, zapuščenosti, vedre pomirjenosti, pomeni »predajanje nemogočemu«. Še več, v tem kontekstu »predajanje nemogočemu«

³⁰ *Ibid.*, str. 145.

³¹ *Ibid.*, str. 144.

³² Caputo, *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida*, str. 51–52.

pomeni »predajati se drugemu«, dajati samega sebe drugemu v dejanju ljubezni kot brezmejnega odrekanja.³³ In nemogoče je lahko Bog sam ali pa katera koli druga singularnost. Podati se proti nemogočemu pomeni, s Silezijevimi besedami, »pojdi tja/kamor ne moreš«: iti onkraj, na kraj absolutne singularnosti povsem drugega, pa najsi bo to brezsmiseln, neviden in nedoločljiv kraj Boga kot bitja, ki je onkraj, ali pa miren kraj chóre, »'starejši' kakor čas stvarjenja, kakor sam čas, kakor zgodovina, pripoved, beseda itn.«³⁴ Dvojna zapoved zahteva, da se v tej *Gelassenheit* odmaknemo od vsega in zapustimo, na primer, celo samega Boga, da bi ta lahko ostal »obvarovan«, »nedotaknjen« in da ga kot takega pustimo ostati onkraj, ne da bi ga zamejili ali reducirali na karkoli drugega. »Double bind« pa prav na ta način deluje kot »dvojna gostoljubnost«, ki ohranja odprt prehod med obema breznoma in dejansko ohranja odprt tudi dostop do singularnosti drugega: »Puščati prehod k drugemu, povsem drugemu, je gostoljubnost.«³⁵

John D. Caputo pripominja, da v tem praznem prostoru absolutne singularnosti ni nobene resnične skrivnosti: »a za Derridaja je skrivnost v tem, da ni nobene skrivnosti, tj. nobene skrite semantične vsebine, nobenega prednostnega dostopa, nobenega transcendentnega označenca, nobene hiperesencialne intuicije, nobene *Ding an sich*, do katere imamo zunajtekstualen (ali zunajzemeljski) dostop ... S površja besedila se ne da pobegniti in zatorej tudi ni nobene možnosti za pomiritev naših interpretativnih polemik ...«³⁶. Ne moremo govoriti o skrivni resnici, ki jo odstirata védenje ali intuicija. Ravno nasprotno, prav zato, ker se nahaja onkraj védenja ali intuicije, je skrivnost ne-skrivnost v ne-védenju in ne-intuiciji: čista skrivnost, tako kot čisti dar, se nikoli ne prikaže in nima nobene pojavnne oblike. »Skrivnost *kot taka* ne obstaja; to zanikam.«³⁷ Ne obstaja nobena skrita semantična vsebina, noben transcendentalni označenec, tudi ne takšen, ki bi se bil izmaknil verigi pomenov in besedilnosti, saj do te vsebine ni nobenega prednostnega dostopa s pomočjo tiste intuicije, ki naj bi zapolnila prazno intencionalnost s prebitkom intuicije. Prav obratno, s tem ko negativna teologija naznači Boga, izprazni igro pomenov vseh označenih vsebin ter izprazni omrežje vsakršnega intuitivnega polnila. Negativna teologija nas zgolj usmeri na pu-

³³ Derrida, »Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum)« str. 74.

³⁴ Derrida, *Postscriptum: aporije, poti in glasovi*, str. 144.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, str. 148.

³⁶ Caputo, *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida*, str. 34.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, str. 33.

ščavski kraj, kjer poteka kenoza vsakršne reference in vsakršnih predikativnih pristojnosti, kenoza vseh intencionalnih predmetov in intuitivnega polnila. Caputo pojasnjuje, da prav zato v Derridajevi interpretaciji ni nobenega govora o skrivnem védenju, védenju o nevédenju: »docta ignorantia«, temveč o ljubezni nevédenja: »ignorantia amans«. Govorimo o klicanju vere, hrepenenja, strasti, ljubezni, joka, molitve, da bi se mesijansko pojavilo »nemogoče presenečenje.«³⁸ Dekonstruktiji in religiji je skupna ista zavzetost za tisto, kar presega obzorja možnega, strast »do nemožnega«, strast do nepoimenljivega, nespoznavnega, nepredstavljivega, skratka vsega, kar je onkraj tistega, kar lahko vemo, poimenujemo ali si predstavljamo; strast do čakanja, obljube, vere v *povsem drugo*, v tisto, kar pride spontano in se izmika vsem vidnim in predstavnim zaznavam; strast do mesijanskega čakanja na *povsem drugo*, onkraj mesijanske določenosti konkretnih religij.

V svojih pogovorih z Johnom D. Caputom, objavljenih v *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, Derrida razlikuje med religijo in vero, kajti, kot pojasnjuje, prva v formalizirani obliki vsebuje vse, kar je bilo na nas preneseno, zbir dogem in doktrin, s katerimi upravlja cerkev, medtem ko razkriva druga presenetljivo povezavo z absolutno transcendentnostjo drugega, z nedoločnim, nerazložljivim in nespoznatnim ne-formalnim, ki se pojavlja kot spontan nenadzorovan dar. In formalnost religije je v imenu vere treba dekonstruirati, kajti le vera razkriva tisto nedekonstruktibilno ne-formalno oziroma dogodek božjega daru, daru transcendentnega absolutnega drugega, ki je heterogeni absolut. Na enak način kot razlikuje med religijami in vero, razlikuje Derrida med mesijanstvi in mesijanstvom, tj. med posameznimi mesijanstvi judaizma, krščanstva, islama, ki ponujajo določeno figuro mesije, in med splošno strukturo mesijanstva, neko univerzalno mesijansko strukturo, ki skozi vero razodeva obet prihoda tistega drugega, tistega nedoločljivega, kar bo prišlo. Derridajevska dekonstrukcija tako reducira vso mesijansko vsebino, saj jo zanima le »mesijanska oblika«, v praznem obzorju čakanja in obeta tega »opustelega mesijanizma«, izpraznjenega vsebine in neprepoznavnega mesije. K vsemu temu Derrida še dodaja, da je mesijanska razsežnost nedoločene vere, čakanja, obeta, da bo prišel tisti povsem drugi, ireduktibilna, kar pomeni, da je na koncu koncev prav to tisto nedekonstruktibilno v dekonstrukciji.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, str 103.

Derrida nam torej pomaga razpoznati to pragmatično in nedoločno strukturo vere kot take onkraj povsem določenih verovanj, religioznosti kot take onkraj konkretnih religij; mesijanstva kot takega onkraj posameznih mesijanstev. Vse, kar nam preostaja, je, da si želimo, čakamo, molimo in verjamemo, da bo zagotovo prišlo do dogodka absolutne singularnosti tistega povsem drugega, ki se izmika vsaki formalizaciji, posplošitvi in našim odločitvam, pa najsi te izvirajo iz naše intuicije ali pa iz našega védenja in govorice. Zato ni Caputov sklep prav nič presenetljiv: dekonstrukcija je že sama po sebi oblika vere, vere v *viens*, upanja v to, kar prihaja, češ da smo tako ali tako vselej nekoliko slepi ter da enostavno moramo verjeti. *Il faut croire.*« »Dekonstrukcija privzame obliko splošne ali nedoločljive vere v nemožno, tega, kar Derrida v knjigi o Marxu poimenuje 'bitnost vere *par excellence*, ki lahko vselej verjame zgolj v neverjetno'.« »Dekonstrukcija ne more nastopati proti veri, ker je dekonstrukcija že *sama po sebi* vera, saj posnema in obnavlja strukturo vere v veri brez dogme.«³⁹ Na mejah govorice in védenja nas dekonstrukcija povzdigne k sleposti vere. Ali bolje rečeno, dekonstrukcija nas le drži na samem robu, s tem ko ohranja vse meje in vse robove odprte in nedoločljive. Dekonstrukcija pušča prostor ne-določljivosti odprt, prostor med našim jezikovno, spoznavno, družbeno-zgodovinsko določenim svetom in dogodkom nečesa nedoločljivega in nedostopnega povsem drugega. Kajti na eni strani »smo vselej in dejansko že umeščeni v takšno ali drugačno *določljivo* vero, v takšen ali drugačen *določljiv* družbeno-zgodovinsko-jezikovni svet ali matrico«⁴⁰, zaradi česar živimo v našem determiniranem svetu, ujeti v kvazisisteme razlik, v tekstualne in kontekstualne omejitve in pritiske. Po drugi strani pa se povsem drugi pojavi na nedostopen in nedoločljiv način. Po eni strani je v našem svetu prav vse kontaminirano in ujeto v kvazisisteme razlik, po drugi strani pa povsem drugi prav tako izhaja iz praznega prostora *razlike*.

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Zaključek, h kateremu nas prav tako usmerja John D. Caputo, je, da nam dekonstrukcija pravzaprav kaže pot k univerzumu vere: »z zanikanjem védenja – ali 'intuicije' – da bi napravili prostor za vero, ima skrivnost brez skrivnosti političen izid.«⁴¹ Dekonstrukcija podpira mesijansko verovanje v tisto, kar se ima zgoditi, v drugi prihod iz arhaičnega prostora »epekeina tes ousias« in mesijanskega »izpahnjenega« časa, iz dežele prapasivnosti, ki je bolj pasivna od pasivnosti. Ca-

³⁹ *Ibid.* str. 18, 64, 57.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* str. 67–68.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* str. 110.

puto pripominja, da Derrida, toži in moli za nekaj mesijanskega, kar naj bi prišlo iz mesijanske puščave, iz strukture mesijanskega obeta, iz nedoločne, prazne in abstraktne mesijanske oblike mesijanstva nasploh, v katerem se dogaja kenoza določnega, konkretnega, bibličnega ali filozofskega mesijanstva. Ko je naša molitev obrnjena k drugemu, kar naj bi prišlo, se lahko predaja pričakovanju, da bo to prišlo iz praznega puščavi podobnega prostora oziroma strukture, ali pa iz abstraktne oblike mesijanstva, v kateri se odvija kenoza vsakršne določne ali določene mesijanske vsebine. Mesijanski dogodek se ne more pojaviti drugače kot povsem nedoločen, neprepoznaven, ni ga mogoče dekonstruirati, saj je onkraj vsakršne določenosti, vseh omejitev in vsake vsebinske razpoznavnosti. Dekonstrukcija se torej prepušča pričakovanju mesijanskega dogodka popolne singularnosti, da bo prišel in nam pomagal razviti neko novo strpnost, strpnost, ki »bi spoštovala razdaljo neskončne drugačnosti vsakršne singularnosti.«⁴²

Dekonstruktivistična dvojna zapoved nam dopušča, da zgolj osciliramo na »nevidni meji«, ki je ločila ne toliko konstrukcijo od dekonstrukcije, temveč eno in drugo od nedekonstruktibilnega. Ali drugače povedano, ločila je proces formalizacije (ki spominja na obliko Babilona – tako konstrukcija kot dekonstrukcija babilonskega stolpa) od nedekonstruktibilnega samega, pa najsi bo to Bog ali *chōra* ali katera koli druga absolutna singularnost. Na nedoločen način lahko zgolj osciliramo med Babilonu podobnimi prizorišči zgodovine, razodetij, mesijanstev, zavez, diskurzov, jezikov, in med nedekonstruktibilnim krajem onkraj vsega drugega, krajem singularnosti Drugega kot take, krajem »posamičnosti nepoznanega Boga«.⁴³

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⁴² *Ibid.*, str. 156.

⁴³ Derrida, *Postscriptum: aporije, poti in glasovi*, str. 123.

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Rastko Jovanov*

Heidegger na fronti: metapolitika, zbiranje, vzgoja

Sam Heidegger je priznal, da je bil njegov nacionalsocialistični angažma napaka.¹ Zapeljal naj bi ga duh časa in vpliv raznih jezikovnih oblik, ki so naravnost izžarevale duha konservativne revolucije Nemčije tridesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Zapeljali so ga tudi pojmi in liki njegovega lastnega mišljenja, kar so nam nedavno predočili tudi njegovi zasebni zapiski v t. i. »črnih zvezkih«. Toda vprašanje je, kako se je lahko sam Heidegger pustil zapeljati? Govorimo lahko namreč o zapeljevanju Heideggerja, o njegovem lastnem zapeljevanju, o samo-zapeljevanju. Morda še najbolj lahko govorimo o odmikih, o motenju, o blodenju, ne samo o čisti napaki (*Irnisse*, in ne *Irrtum*) ki jo Heidegger pripiše sami zgodovini Biti, ki poleg nemškega zbiranja ter prevlade tehnike na koncu zahodnega mišljenja metafizike, zajema tudi njega samega kot pastirja Biti?

Kako se je glede na to Heidegger lahko zmotil? Kako so ga lahko pojmi in kategorije njegove lastne filozofije zapeljali? Na ta vprašanja bomo skušali odgovoriti v pričujočem tekstu prav skozi branje nedavno objavljenih »črnih zvezkov«. Gre tudi za našo nalogo, ki jo je sam Heidegger postavil ob stoletnici Prve svetovne vojne, ki sovпада z objavo zadnjih zvezkov njegovih zbranih del. Datumi v tem primeru niso niti nepomembni niti nedolžni. V nadaljevanju si bomo ogledali katere datume Heidegger omenja v svojih zapiskih. A morda bi morali biti še

¹ »Moje rektorjevanje se nahaja pred veliko napako...«, (GA 94, 162). Heideggerjeve spise navajam, če ni drugače označeno, po izdaji njegovih zbranih del (*Gesamtausgabe* = GA).

² Heidegger svoj politični angažma eksplicitno imenuje »napaka«, *Irrtum*, in ne »blodenje«, *Irmis*. Napaka je bi bila po njegovem mnenju v tem, da leta 1993 »niso spoznali, kako malo so bile sile pripravljene in zgodovinsko primerne ... in da v funkcionarjih niso videli funkcionarjev.« Vendar pa Heidegger dodaja, da njegova odločitev o političnem angažmaju ni bila napaka »politično ali v svetovnozgodovinskem smislu«, temveč je naredil napako, ker je menil, da je mogoče nacionalsocializem mišljen kot konec metafizike in kot prehod »v trenutku neposredno usmeriti in izboljšati.« (GA 95, 147–148) Napaka, *Irrtum*, je torej povezana z »vulgarnim« nacionalsocializmom, medtem kot je bil »duhovni« nacionalsocializem pravilno gibanje, čeprav se je kasneje, tako kot samo Heideggerjevo mišljenje leta 1933, za nazaj izkazal za blodenje, *Irmis*. Prim. tudi GA 16, 414.

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bolj pozorni na datume, ki jih Heidegger ne omenja, na datume, ki jih njegov tekst izpušča.

Heideggerjev odnos do politike bomo na tem mestu skušali misliti skozi njegovega »drugega«; ravno izhajajoč iz tistega, kar skuša sam izključiti, negirati, mu odvzeti teoretski pomen in dejansko živost, ki pa ga takoj zatem prične obsedati. S pomočjo pojma »metapolitike« skuša namreč Heidegger dekonstruirati moderno politiko, to pa prav na osnovi same imanentne logike, ki je v pozni Moderni vodila razpravo med posameznikom in družbo. Heidegger namreč negativnemu pojmovanju svobode ne priznava nobene veljave in se – v razpravi in spoprijemu s Heglovo in Schmittovo politično filozofijo v predavanjih iz let 1933–1934 – vrne k antičnemu, pozitivnemu pojmovanju politične filozofije kot sodelovanju in zbiranju. V nekem zelo specifičnem smislu, saj je duhovno sodelovanje v t. i. »konzervativni revoluciji«, ki se je zgodila pred drugo svetovno vojno, skrajna konsekvenca neke posebne linije nemške filozofije, ki politični boj zvede na duhovnega³. Metapolitika, kot bom skušal pokazati na tem mestu, ne bo predstavljala nobene nadpolitike ali kakega teoretskega oziroma ontološkega premisleka, pa tudi ne opravičevanja političnega dejanja na ontičnem nivoju ne. Pojem metapolitike bo Heidegger na kratko izkoristil za opis svojega položaja na fronti duhovnega boja tekom svojega rektorstva, tega položaja, ki je zahteval, da se teoretski razmislek umakne akciji.⁴ Četudi to v bistvu še naprej ostaja intelektualno dejanje, se to dogaja skupaj z drugimi in to ravno na domači fronti oziroma *Heimatfront*.⁵ Izkazalo se bo, da (meta)politika ostaja nekaj tujega Heideggerjevi misli, zaradi česar se bo na neki točki popolnoma prepletla

³ To linijo intenzivnega neposrednega povezovanja med *polemosom* in *logosom* lahko spremljamo vse od Nietzscheja dalje. Prim.: »In moja resnica je strahotna: zakaj do zdaj so laži rekli resnica. Ko resnica stopi v boj s tisočletno lažjo, se zatrese, nastopi potres, takšno premikanje hribov in dolin, o kakršnih do tedaj niso niti sanjali. Pojem politike se je tedaj pretvoril v duhovno vojno, vse tvorbe moči stare družbe je razneslo v zrak – vse počivajo na laži: na zemlji bo prišlo do vojn, kakršnih še ni bilo. Šele od mene naprej je na zemlji *velika politika*.« (Nietzsche 1989, 156)

⁴ Prim. Heideggerjevo pismo Carlu Schmittu, v katerem Heidegger zapiše, da se je znašel sredi polemosa in da mora njegova književna eksistenca prepustiti mesto političnem angažmaju, oziroma zbiranju duhovnih sil na univerzi (GA 16, 156).

⁵ Naj omenimo, da Heidegger svoj »politični« angažma napove že v § 74 *Biti in časa*: »Če pa usodnostna tubiti kot bit-v-svetu bistvenostno eksistira v so-biti z drugimi, je njeno dogajanje sodogajanje in določeno kot *usodnostno*. S tem označujemo dogajanje skupnosti, naroda. ... Moč usodnosti se sprošča šele v soudeležbi in boju. Usodna usodnost tubiti v njeni in z njeno ‚generacijo‘ šele tvori polno, samolastno dogajanje tubiti«. (Nav. po Mar-

z antisemitisko prostorskostjo prava in teritorialnostjo *politične* države kot »temeljnega značaja« zahodnega človeka (Heidegger 2009, 82).

Osnovni cilj pričujočega dela je poskusiti pojasniti naravo Heideggerjevega političnega angažmaja skozi optiko nedavno objavljenih »črnih zvezkov« iz časa njegovega rektorata,⁶ pri čemer bomo vztrajali pri nekem pojmu, ki v sicer obsežnem Heideggerjevem opusu nastopa samo na tem mestu: pojmu *metapolitike*.⁷ Kot bomo videli je za Heideggerja metapolitika mesijanska kategorija, projekt, nekaj, do česar bo prišlo zgolj in samo če bo v tem *prehodnem* obdobju leta 1933 nacionalsocialistično gibanje sledilo nalogi, ki je zgodovinsko dana nemškemu narodu, ki pa je oblikovana in pripravljena ter vsem dostopna v njegovih spisih. Izpostaviti velja prav praznino, nemožnost, mesijanstvo tega pojma, ki se usmerja na tisto Prihajajoče (das Kommende). V tem smislu je tisto »drugo«, kar nenehno obseda samega Heideggerja in sam pojem metapolitike prav njegova lastna zaslepljenost za resnično ontično politiko, v kateri ni več prostora za junaka ali (kar je isto) velikega zločinca. Tako junak kot zločinec spadata – kot je pokazal že Hegel – v predržavno stanje. Pojem metapolitike nam bo tako kar najbolj jasno pokazal način, na katerega je Heidegger bil in ostal zapeljan s strani duha konservativne revolucije ali »nevidno fronto skrivne duhovne Nemčije« (155).

Datumi

Naj takoj na začetku izpostavimo tiste datume, ki jih v »črnih zvezkih« omenja Heidegger. Kateri datumi razkrivajo nemško zbiranje kot rešilno resnico Zahoda?

1806 Hölderlin odide in začne se nemško zborovanje.

1812 Nemški zagon doseže svoj vrh in rodi se Richard Wagner.

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tin Heidegger, *Bit in čas*, prevedli Tine Hribar et al., Slovenska matica, Ljubljana 1997, str. 519–520.)

⁶ Osnovni tekst, ki ga skušamo tu interpretirati se nahaja na straneh 111-162, ki nosijo naslov *Aus der Zeit des Rektorats* v: M. Heidegger, *Überlegungen II-VI* (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938), Gesamtausgabe 94, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 2014. Vsi navedki v tekstu, ki so označeni samo s številko strani se nanašajo na omenjeno delo.

⁷ Zgodovino pojma metapolitike bi bilo treba šele napisati. Naj omenim, da konec osemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja prične izhajati konservativni in, kolikor so najbrž okoliščine dopuščale, tudi antisemitski časopis z naslovom *Elemente zur Metapolitik*, kjer nastopajo teksti Julienu Freunda, Alaina de Benoista in kjer nastopajo naslovi kot so »Naš notranji Reich«, »Zakaj se borimo«, »Svet indoevropcev«, »Čas zgodovine«, itd.

1843 Hölderlin zapusti »svet«, leto kasneje se rodi Nietzsche.

1870 Nemška leta osnutka so utemeljena in izidejo Nietzschejeva »Času neprimer-na preišljevanja«.

1883 Izide »Zaratustra I« in umre Richard Wagner.

1888 Konec decembra: Nietzschejeva »evforija« pred zlomom ter --
(26. 9. 1889).

(GA 94, 523)

Zadnji navedeni datum je tudi datum Heideggerjevega rojstva. Vsej tej kronologiji je dal Heidegger naslednji naslov: »*Igra in prikazen številčk pri računanju časa v preddverju prepadne [abgründigen] nemške zgodovine.*« Potemtakem je torej resnična nemška zgodovina duhovno-politična zgodovina, zgodovina za-snujočih pesnikov in mislecev, ki so varuhi biti, a tudi državnikov⁸ – zgodovina kot usodnost zgodovinskega naroda. Datumi izražajo kronologijo nemške zgo-dovine, ki odraža njeno brezdajnost, njen prepad. Ne bi se preveč ustavljal pri tem terminu, ki je eden od temeljnih za konstitucijo Heideggerjevega tako ime-novana preobrata. Nemara zadošča, če ob njem poudarim, da Heidegger prepad misli kot nujno predpostavko, kot izvir novega začetka, katerega priložnost se je pojavila v tridesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Naj potemtakem najprej na kratko nakažem, na kaj se vsi ti zgoraj omenjeni datumi nanašajo.

»Hölderlin odide« – ne meri samo na Hölderlinovo norost, na datum, ko je bil Hölderlin sprejet na tübingenško kliniko in takoj zatem tudi z nje odpuščen z diagnozo neozdravljive manije, temveč tudi na nemško zgodovino, na bitko pri Jeni, na Heglovo *Fenomenologijo duha*, predvsem pa na neuspeh estetske sprave svobode in narave. Naj spomnim, da se je v tem času Schellingu postavljalo vprašanje: Kako je mogoče živeti skupaj z naravo, ki ima moč nad zgodovino, če živeti estetsko ni več dovolj?

»Nemško zbiranje« se nanaša na bujenje nemškega nacionalizma in bojem proti Napoleonovi Franciji ter na, kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, tudi na Fichtejeve govore nemškemu narodu, kjer je govora o liku despota, *Zwingherr*. Heidegger v to zgodovino zbiranja uvršča tudi Wagnerja, Nietzschejevo rojstvo leta 1844,

⁸ Up. GA 39, 51: »...izvorni, zgodovinski čas naroda je zaradi tega čas pesnikov, mislecev in državnikov, tistih, ki pravzprav utemeljujejo in osnujejo zgodovinski obstanek nekega naroda.«

razglasitev drugega nemškega cesarstva, drugega rajha leta 1870, Nietzschejevo evforijo leta 1888 pred njegovim živčnim zlomom in – na koncu – tudi datum svojega lastnega rojstva.

Heidegger torej sebe uvršča znotraj zgodovine nemške filozofije in to kot eno ključnih zbirnih točk nemške zgodovine. Drugače rečeno, brez njegove dekonstrukcije predhodne filozofske tradicije ne bi bil možen novi začetek ne samo nemškega naroda, temveč tudi celokupnega človeškega obstoja v svetu, tj. novega načina postavljanja vprašanja Biti. V predavanjih o Heglovi filozofiji prava v zimskem semestru 1934/35 je omenjen še en datum, ki nam omogoča še boljše osvetliti ozadje te kratke zgodovine.

30. 1. 1933 je Hegel umrl – ne! on sploh še ni 'živel'! – tu je najprej postal živ – tako kot se zgodovina poraja, tj. umira.

Pa vendar – ravno zaradi tega ni mogoče nobena »obnova«.

Če razumemo njegovo filozofijo državno-filozofsko kot metafiziko birokratske države ... potem postane vse brez smisla – eno samo zamenjevanje bistvenih motivov Heglove ideje države z »dejstvi«.

(GA 86, 85)

30. januarja 1933 – če spomnimo – Hitler dobi oblast in postane kancler. Istega leta Schmitt objavi delo *Staat, Bewegung, Volk*, kjer najdemo naslednji zapis: »Hegel [ist] gestorben« (Schmitt 1933, 32), v pomenu, da je prišlo do prevlade Heglovega razlikovanje med državo in družbo v korist razlike država–gibanje–narod. Heideggerjev zgornji zapis je torej usmerjen proti Schmittu, čeprav se Heidegger strinja, da je obnova Heglove politične filozofije nesmiselna, saj se je politična realnost spremenila: instituciji civilne družbe in liberalnega razsvetljenstva sta preseženi. Toda v nasprotju s Schmittom za Heideggerja Hegel še le sedaj postane živ, ravno v trenutku, ko umre. Hegel je za Heideggerja najvišja točka metafizike in obenem njen konec, medtem ko trideseta leta prejšnjega stoletja predstavljajo vrh celotnega metafizičnega svetovnega nazora, ki gre kot vsak vrh nujno skupaj z lastnim propadom in novim začetkom. Smrt in žrtvovanje v *prehodnem* obdobju se izkažeta kot konstitutivna za Bit in za vprašanje o njej.

Zaradi tega je leto 1933 za Heideggerja isto kot leto 1806 za Hegla – trenutek, ko se duh, oziroma Bit pojavi in iz idealnosti vprašanja preide v najbolj trdo realnost obstoja: miselna revolucija se udejanji v zgodovini. Kot leta 1806, ko se

nemško zbiranje po Heideggerju pričinja in dobi svoj zagon, je leto 1933 že povsem izoblikovano in čaka Führerja, da stopi v akcijo. Sile so *zbrane*, potrebno je le še duhovno-politično vodstvo – *metapolitika*.

Meta-aspirin

Toda, kaj je za Heideggerja metapolitika? Že sama pojavitev te besede v Heideggerjevih spisih je videti nekaj povsem pošastnega. Njen nastop v samo treh trenutkih v prvem zvezku »črnih zvezkov« nastopa kot nekaj bliskovitega, *Augenblick*, prav kot nek zaslepljujoč trenutek. Kakor, da bi bila beseda v trenutku in v skoku vržena v sam dogodek revolucioniranja dejanskosti in preobračanja ne samo vseh vrednot, temveč predvsem vprašanja o Biti. S to besedo tubit vpele vseplošno izredno stanje s ciljem osnovanja »izvirne skupnosti«, ki ne bo poznala pojma nevtralnosti.

Preden navedem te zaslepljujoče trenutke, *Augenblicke*, v katerih beseda metapolitika zapelje Heideggerja in ga dobesedno sili, da sam prevzame vodenje in se postavi na fronto tako, da je tudi sam voden, pa tri leta pred tem, v predavanjih o *Osnovnih pojmih metafizike* v zimskem semestru 1929/30, Heidegger spregovori o tem, kaj ta beseda ni. Meni namreč, da je termin »metafizika« spodbudil podobno izoblikovanje meta-logike in meta-geometrije, ter, da je celo privedla do tega, da metapolitike imenujemo tiste, ki praktično filozofijo utemljujejo na filozofskih sistemih. Tako »lahko celo govorimo o nekakšnem meta-aspirinu, ki presega delovanje običajnega aspirina« (GA 29/30, 60). Heidegger torej ni metapolitik, ki bi želel politično delovanje utemeljiti na svoji ontologiji. Eno izmed možnih branj tega teksta je v tem, da si za Heideggerja metapolitika kot poskus neposredno povezati filozofijo in politiko pravzaprav ne zasluži pozornosti. To je sicer točno, kajti za Heideggerja filozofija ni nič koristnega, v državi lahko predstavlja samo motnjo. Toda neko drugačno branje bi k temu dodalo – a šele potem, ko se termin leta 1933 pojavi –, da metapolitika, čeprav političnih postulatov ne izpeljuje iz filozofskih teorij, ponuja politični in filozofski *izhod* iz predhodne filozofije (kot metafizike) ter tudi iz politike. *Izhod* je seveda lahko samo političen, vodenje pri tem *zgodovinskem* izstopu iz zgodovine pa je dodeljeno preobratu vprašanja o Biti, ki se trenutno – v tem trenutku, torej *tega* leta 1933 in na *tej* univerzi – razrešuje istočasno teoretično in praktično.

Priznam, da nekoliko okolišim, saj si ne upam takoj preiti na te zaslepljujoče momente, ki kar vrejo iz te nasilno skovane besede, preden ne omenim epiloga, ki ga je ta beseda imela v svoji zadnji (in po črnih zvezkih tudi edini) pojavitvi. V sklopu govora o mejah obstoja, ki so bile objavljene v zasebnih zapiskih pod skupnim naslovom »K mišljenju dogodka« namreč naletimo na naslednje:

Meje Političnega – (zasnovati *politično* – ne tehtati odločitve).

Metapolitika!

...

Meje Političnega (bistvena odločitev).⁹

Tisto Politično in čisto politično osnovanje obstoja, ne prinašajo bistvene odločitve, ker jih niso v stanju bistveno obravnavati ali pretehtati, saj ne poznajo svoje meje: ravno metapolitike. Metapolitika torej ni politika, s Političnim, ki ostaja zaobjeto v metafiziki, nima ničesar skupnega. Obe zgoraj navedeni mesti nam govorita o tem, kaj metapolitika ni in kaj ne more biti. Obenem nam vseeno sporočata, da je metapolitika meja Političnega in da je bistvena odločitev v njenih rokah, odločitev, ki je na koncu lahko samo politična, saj zadeva tisto »Mi«, *Wir*. Sedaj pa si lahko ogledamo, kaj je pravzaprav za Heideggerja metapolitika in da obenem postavimo tudi vprašanje: ali lahko metapolitika izpelje zbiranje logosa sredi polemosa tega revolucionarnega leta 1933?

Metapolitika

Poglejmo si torej, kaj Heidegger piše o metapolitiki na samem začetku svojega rektorata in v sklopu obravnave nove sestave univerze, pri čemer ne gre za nadgradnjo [Aufbau] ali ponovno izgradnjo [Neubau] univerze, temveč za njeno uničenje [Zerstörung] preko vzgoje novega naraščaja, o revoluciji znotraj visokega izobraževanja (prim. str. 115–116). Kasneje bomo videli zakaj je govora o vzgoji in zakaj o revoluciji, saj znanstveni napredek znotraj novega začetka, torej po

⁹ GA 73.1, 565. Heideggerjevi spisi, ki so zbrani v tem zvezku segajo vse od leta 1932 do konca njegovega življenja. Za mesto, ki smo ga navedli, ni točnega datiranja. Naslov, ki uokvirja navedeno mesto, pa se glasi »Napad in prevzetje službe«, podnaslov pa »Kaj se mora zgoditi?«. Če ga beremo podrobneje in če smo pozorni na besede, ki v njem prevladujejo, pa se zdi predpostavka, da je nastal tekom ali pa neposredno po umiku iz mesta rektorja (saj v nekem trenutku naletimo na besedo »samoprevara«), na mestu.

metafiziki in v okviru metapolitike, ni cilj sam po sebi – sedaj je smoter učenje kot vzgoja (123).

Konec »filozofije«. – Moramo jo dokončati in s tem tisto povsem drugo – metapolitiko – pripraviti.

Glede na to gre tudi za *premeno znanosti*. (115)¹⁰

Metafizika kot meta-politika. (116)¹¹

Metafizika tubiti se mora poglobiti in razširiti na osnovi svojega najnotrajnejšega sklopa k metapolitiki zgodovinskega naroda. (124)¹²

Sedaj smo končno pri mestih, na katerih Heidegger omenja termin metapolitika. Metapolitika mora priti na mesto metafizike, pod katere »terorjem« nad mišljenjem se po Heideggerju nahaja celotna zgodovina filozofije. Kot pa je razvidno iz tretjega zgornjega navedka, pa je metapolitika zelo ozko povezana z narodom, metapolitika je vselej metapolitika določenega naroda, in to ne katerega koli naroda, temveč zgolj zgodovinskega naroda. Naroda, ki mu je dana naloga, za Heideggerja pa je to samo nemški narod, katerega naloga je zasnovati novi začetek človeške zgodovine, pognati v tek dvojno pogojeno revolucijo – revolucioniranje vednosti in revolucioniranje politične ureditve znotraj končnosti tubiti in samega sveta. Za izpolnitev te naloge pa ni potreben samo *Führer*, vodja, temveč tudi filozof, duhovni *Führer*, sam Heidegger.

Kaj najprej pomeni narediti konec »filozofiji«? S tem, ko jo postavlja v narekovanje, jo Heidegger zvede na njen metafizični pomen, temu pa uhaja osnovno vprašanje njegove filozofije. »Premena znanosti« je tisto, kar pojasnjuje skriti odnos filozofije in metapolitike. Dokončanje filozofije kot metafizike je pogoj pojavljanja metapolitike. Heidegger pa k temu hitro dodaja: *glede na to* pa tudi nove znanosti, nove vednosti. Metapolitika je torej povezana s premeno vednosti. A že sama »[p]riprava premene vednosti zahteva desetletja« (122). Zaradi tega je metapolitika tega leta 1933 samo projekt. Trenutno, torej 1933, je govora samo o *pripravi* za njen prihod: šele »vstopamo v neko dobo« (126). Priprava [Vorbereitung], prehod, revolucija – vse to so besede, ki vsebujejo spremembo,

¹⁰ »Das Ende der »Philosophie«. –Wir müssen sie zum Ende bringen und damit das völlig Andere –Metapolitik –vorbereiten. Demgemäß auch der Wandel der Wissenschaft.«

¹¹ »Metaphysik als Meta-politik.«

¹² »Die Metaphysik des Daseins muß sich nach ihrem innersten Gefüge vertiefen und ausweiten zur Metapolitik »des« geschichtlichen Volkes.«

skrito nasilje, in ki *prostor* za izkazovanje svoje »pravice« lahko najdejo samo v izrednem, revolucionarnem stanju. Heidegger je tu že na fronti.

Boj, ki se ga udeležuje, je boj za bistvo nemškega naroda, katerega zgodovina je, kot smo videli v zgoraj navedenih datumih, predvsem zgodovina pesnikov in mislecev. Zgodovina, v katero Heidegger uvršča tudi sam sebe. To zgodovino je treba odkriti in jo zavarovati preko duhovno-političnega vodenja univerze. Torej z neko politiko univerze in visoke šole.

Metapolitika je neko bodoče stanje, v katerem se je stabiliziralo in ohranilo revolucionarno nasilje prehodnega obdobja, ki je ves potopljen v boj [Kampf]. Ta samostalnik določa Heideggerjev rektorski angažma. Že na samem začetku njegovega delovanja povsem prevladuje: »Iz vsakega boja priti bolj gotov ... Führer je prebudil novo stvarnost, ki našemu mišljenju nudi pravo pot in udarno moč. ... Z literarno eksistenco je konec.« (111) Heidegger vidi svoj rektorat kot sredstvo, s katerim tudi sam stopa neposredno v boj. Takoj, v trenutku, zavrže svojo prejšnjo eksistenco (»Z literarno eksistenco je konec«), njegov osebni »jaz« se utopi v »Mi«: vsi so na fronti, nevtralnih ni. Odprt je »svetovni trenutek«, *Weltaugenblick* (112), ki ne nalaga »[n]obenega bega, nobene utrujenosti, vedno napad« (116), saj je trenutek za akcijo [Augenblicks-aktion] prišel. Zato tudi ni potrebe po programih, sistemih, teoriji (111), saj »duhovni nacionalsocializem« ni nič »teoretičnega« (135). Teorija je že tu, utelešena je v »tistih Redkih« ki vedo (120) in ki bodo vzgajali.

Vzgoja

Neposredno povezovanje vzgoje in politike – politična vzgoja je tautologija, bo rekel Heidegger – je eno od impozantnejših lastnosti nemške filozofije. S svojimi predavanji pred nemško javnostjo Fichte slovi kot tisti, ki je utrl to posebno pot, ki vodi k Heideggerju.¹³ Njuna bližina je še toliko bolj nenavadna, saj sicer Heidegger o Fichteju sploh ne govori. V svojem obsežnem pisanem in predavateljskem opusu Heidegger posveti Fichteju samo majhen del predavanj o nemškem idealizmu iz letnega semestra leta 1929. (Prim. GA 28, 50–183). Fichte namreč v svoje politične spise in predavanja iz leta 1813 vpelje lik *Zwingherr* (despota, tirana,

¹³ Spomnimo na to, da tudi Hegel svojo *Filozofijo pravice* najprej koncipira kot *Staatspädagogik*, kot vzgajanje za državo.

prisilnega gospodarja). Ta je »despot za nemštvo« [Zwingherr zur Deutschheit], katerega naloga je »vzgajanje za svobodo«¹⁴. Do te naloge, ki je za Fichteja časovno omejena, tako kot izredno stanje, ima despot izvorno, umsko pravico, zaradi tega, ker Nemci nimajo zgodovine. Kot brezzgodovinski so Nemci izvoren narod; njihovo sebstvo ni zgodovinsko, temveč metafizično, saj so se edini uspeli povzpeli do *pojma* svobode in na njem izgraditi svojo nacijo (VII, 565–566). Despot mora samo slediti resničnemu uvidu, ki je bil poprej predstavljen v Fichtejevem *Wissenschaftslehre*, ki ga »ne moremo imeti za nepravilnega, če je bil poprej pravilno razumljen« (VII, 681). Na tej osnovi bi se moral utemeljiti razred učenjakov, ki bodo s pomočjo novonastalih izobraževalnih institucij druge vzgajali za svobodo« (VII, 444). Vednost despota je »genetična«, saj edini pozna zgodovino nastajanja in razvoja sveta (VII, 449), medtem ko so mu s pojmom svobode skupne določilve: »absolutni začetek, iz samega sebe odločujoče, novo-vzpostavljaljoče« (VII, 592). Kot tak, kot nekdo, ki uči druge, vse druge znotraj neke politične skupnosti, je despot nujno transcendenten v razmerju do skupnosti in se nahaja zunaj nje. Despot se ne nahaja skupaj z drugimi na fronti, tako kot Heidegger. Na koncu je despot *sacer*, prvi, ki bo po izpolnitvi naloge žrtvoval samega sebe. Despot torej v nekem *Augenblick* vskoči v imanentni zgodovinski razvoj, da bi ga s svojo žrtvijo zapustil. V tem se tudi nahaja bistvo vsakega pojma diktature, tudi nacistične, kot nas je o tem poučil Schmitt, kajti gre za izjemo v organskem razvoju, ki upravičuje eliminacijo sovražnega elementa.

Omenjena Fichtejeva stališča, ki jih je izrekel pred berlinskim občinstvom tekom vojne s Francozi odzvanjajo leta 1933 v Freiburgu. Vzgoja je za Heideggerja zbiranje, *Sammlung* – tisto, kar v teku polemosa s pomočja logosa tistih, ki vodijo, učiteljev, gospodarjev, zbere skupaj zgodovinske sile. Heidegger jih imenuje *Meisterschaft*, tiste, ki imajo prvenstvo,¹⁵ ki vzgajajo. Heidegger torej vzgojno vlogo naredi za svoj boj. Njegov lastni rajh je ustanovitev ene same cesarske visoke šole, *Reichshochschule* (117), kjer bo vladalo najvišje duhovno-politično vodstvo. Zanj več ni delitve na eni strani na duhovno, na drugi na politično, na eni strani na teoretsko, na drugi na praktično vednost. Cilj je s spremembo ustroja univerze, preko njenega uničenja, zagotoviti same osnove prihodnjega

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¹⁴ J. G. Fichte, *Sämtliche Werke*, De Gruyter, Berlin 1971, zv. VII, str. 565. Navedke iz Fichtejevih zbranih del v nadaljevanju navajam samo z rimsko številko zvezka in arabsko številko strani.

¹⁵ *Meisterschaft* v nemščini pomeni tako mojstrstvo, kot tudi prvenstvo.

»duhovno političnega vodstva« [geistig politische Führung] (115), to je, metapolitike kot rešilnostnega načina človeškega obstoja v svetu.

Heidegger, ta novi *Zwingherr*, govori o učitelji kot o tistih Redkih, ki edini eksistirajo zunaj sebe in nad sabo (120).¹⁶ Oni so gibalo vsakega kolektivnega delovanja ali tistega, kar Heidegger v *Biti in času* imenuje dogajanje ali usodnost naroda (GA 2, 384). »Führen und Folgen«, voditi in slediti v tem kratkem tekstu večkrat odzvanja. Vrednost posameznega Jaza je izgubila svoj pomen s končnim zlomom liberalnih vrednot buržoazne države. Obstajaj zgolj en sam edini Jaz in vsi ostali, *Wir*. Zato pa je toliko bolj nujno podpreti *Meisterschaft* in ustanovitev cesarske visoke šole (128). Prva naloga duhovno-političnega vodstva je »ustvariti orožje« (139), oziroma nov ustroj univerze in ustvariti novo institucijo, v kateri bo vzgoja predstavljala nič drugega kot izvajanje »državne moči« (121), kajti radikalnost gibanja se lahko obdrži le v duhovnem. Da pa bi sploh lahko prišlo od ustvarjalnega revolucioniranja človeške tubiti, najprej v Nemčiji, nato pa še med drugimi narodi na Zahodu, mora nacionalsocializem ostati v boju, mora vztrajati na svojem položaju, ki ne podrazumeva samo lastnega razširjanja, temveč predvsem lastno izvajanje (141). Toda konstrukcija nacionalsocialistične identitete ne more pobegniti novoveški logiki Političnega, saj mora tudi ona ustvariti sovražnika, da bi uspela v svojem vztrajanju, ki ni nič drugega kot ostati buden v boju. »Kje se nahaja sovražnik in kako ga ustvariti?« (141) Ali – kot lahko preberemo na drugem mestu – treba si je izbrati tekmeča, »oziroma moči samega sebe postaviti pod vprašaj«¹⁷.

V tej točki že lahko vidimo konec Heideggerjevega rektorskega angažmaja. Nacionalsocialisti niso dovolj radikalni; izza njihove mimikrije se še naprej skriva malomeščanstvo. Ostajajo samo navadni funkcionarji in niso se zmožni duhovno-politično dvigniti k aristokraciji vodstva [Führerschaft]. Heidegger svoj angažma v nacionalsocialističnem gibanju vidi veliko radikalneje: zahteva in kot prvo stvar nudi svojo lastno žrtev. Ko poveljuje Nemce, narod pesnikov, mislecev in državnikov, jih Heidegger imenuje »veliki nasprotnik«, ki vodi »veliko

¹⁶ Zanimivo bi bilo razsikati pot, ki vodi od Heglovega »pravega junaka«, preko Benjaminovega »velikega zločinca« do Heideggerjevega »junaka« v § 74 *Biti in časa* (GA 2, 385) [Slov. prev. str. 521].

¹⁷ Prim. GA 95, 83: »... den Gegner wählen, d. h. sich selbst dabei in Frage stellen können...« Ta motiv bo po Drugi svetovni vojni prevzel Schmitt v svojih razmišljanjih o sovražniku.

spodbujajoče nasprotstvo« v boju starega sveta z novim, liberalne buržoazije in nove metapolitične kolektivnosti:

In kje je veliki tekmeč v tem boju, v katerem rastejo tisti Prihajajoči [die Kom-mende] ...? Kje mora biti veliko spodbujajoče nasprotstvo, če ne pri nas, ki se žrtvujemo kot prihod za tiste Prihajajoče ...? (125)

Podobno kot *Zwingherr* od metafizičnega in brezgodovinskega nemškega naroda v Fichtejevih govorih prejme nalogo, da vzgoji Nemce za svobodo in da se potem »izniči«, Heidegger daruje žrtev v prehodnem obdobju, v katerem bo nemški narod, kot resnično zgodovinski, pod »duhovno političnim vodstvom« Učiteljev končno »dokončal« filozofijo kot metafiziko in prispel v »izvirne« predele metapolitike, s tem pa svojo usodnost zatrdil *nasproti* osnovni tendenci dobe tehnike. Za izpeljavo bistvenega sam posameznik ni dovolj, pač pa je potrebna »skupnost Redkih« (16), katere vodstvo tako kot pri Fichteju, predstavlja *vzgoja* za samostojnost in samoodgovornost. »Kaj je to? – Samoodgovornost? Zavzemati se za nekaj in žrtvovati se?« (16) Heidegger sam sebe nima samo za vodjo, ki vzgaja za samoodgovornost in za žrtev pri osnovanju »izvirne skupnosti«; on je *duhovni* vodja, ki *budi* ustvarjalne sile, ki jih ob razcvetu polemosa *zbira* okoli logosa:

Trenutno se nahajam sredi polemosa in književno se mora odpovedati. ... Zbiranje duhovnih sil, ki bi moralo poroditi tisto Prihajajoče [das Kommende], postaja vse nujnejše. (Pismo Schmittu, GA 16, 156)

Zbiranje

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Da bi leto 1933 lahko predstavili kot »prehodno obdobje«, kot izredno stanje, je moral biti že pripravljen in izoblikovan revolucionarni trenutek, *Augenblick*. Zgoraj smo si ogledali *duhovno-politične* datume, ki po Heideggerju zbirajo sile za preobrat – od leta 1806 do leta 1889; videli smo tudi posameznike, okoli katerih se je zbiranje dogajalo – Hölderlin, Wagner, Nietzsche in, kot zadnji, sam Heidegger. Leto 1933 se je torej začelo že prej »v duhovno-politični zgodovini Zahoda« (GA 39, 3). Po Heideggerju je že odločeno, poslanstvo nemškega naroda je že duhovno pripravljeno, saj se je »resnično zbiranje posameznikov v izvorno skupnost že zgodilo« (GA 39, 8). Politične akcije na ontičnem nivoju, koncentracijska taborišča, pohod dolgih nožev – vse to je nebistveno in se lahko označi

kot »pomožna priprava, ne bistvo« (GA 39, 8). Heideggerja ne zanimajo ne družba ne moderna politika, ki imajo v njem svoj topos; on sam se je posvetil *izvorni skupnosti*, premisleku in izpeljavi le-te, ter vprašanju, kako je mogoče »vzajemno brezpogojno pripadati« (GA 39, 72). Resnična¹⁸ skupnost ne nastane z vzpostavljanjem vzajemnih odnosov zasebnih individuuumov – posameznikov kot lastnikov neke posesti, kot članov družine ali korporacije. Tako po njemu lahko nastane le družba, vsaka ontična povezava posameznika z njo je nebistvena. V skupnosti se posameznik poveže s tistim, kar »vsakega posameznika presegajoč povezuje in določa«, pri čemer je resnični primer takšne izvorne skupnosti »tovarištvo vojakov na fronti« (GA 39, 72). Tisto, kar jih presega, določa in povezuje, je prav smrt in pripravljenost na njeno žrtev: smrt kot »svobodna žrtev« (GA 39, 73) ustvarja *prostor* skupnosti, v katerem lahko *drug drugega slišimo*.

Zbiranje posameznikov se dogaja skozi pogovor in jezik članov neke skupnosti, ki jih skupaj povezuje pripravljenost žrtvovati se za tisto Prihajajoče. Menim, da bi v teh besedah lahko zbrali skupaj raztresenost in ambivalentnost Heideggerjevega »političnega« angažmaja. Tudi pisec je kot bojevnik na fronti, saj ga zavezuje ista skupnost in isti »borbeni frontni duh« (GA 96, 29) – bo zapisal Heidegger v razdelku o »*Skritem Nemštvu*« ob samem začetku Druge svetovne vojne.

Toda ali Heidegger sliši »druge«? Sliši samo Nemce, razumljiv mu je samo nemški jezik. Vztrajanje pri tem enem edinem jeziku pa nujno vodi do intenziviranja nasilja, pa naj gre za politično kršenje sporazuma ali za nasilno odvzemanje ali ukinjanje govora nekemu drugemu. Že od antike dalje, se pravi od samih začetkov filozofskega mišljenja, je prisotna tendenca, da se »onega drugega« izniči in določi zunaj meja jezikovnega polja. Oblike takšne ukinitve segajo od barbara, preko sužnja, kolonialnega divjaka, do zločinca, ki krši človekove pravice. Drugi, ta sovražnik, ki ga Heidegger išče, se leta 1933 nahaja v lastnem narodu. V svojem drugem predavanju »O bistvu resnice« iz zimskega semestra v letih 1933–34, se pravi v časovnem obdobju, ki ustreza analiziranim zapiskom iz »črnih zvezkov«, Heidegger vpelje nov, radikalnejši tekst:

... tekmeč ni partner, temveč sovražnik. ... Sovražnik ni nujno zunanji in ni vedno najbolj nevaren, lahko se zdi, kot da sovražnika ni. Tedaj je osnovna potreba najti sovražnika, ga postaviti na svetlo, ga najprej ustvariti ... Sovražnik se lahko utrdi

¹⁸ Pridevnik »resnični« [wahrhaft] teološko obvladuje sam Heideggerjev angažma.

v najnotrajnejšem korenu obstoja nekega naroda in se zoperstavi ali deluje proti bistvu tega naroda. (GA 36/37, 91)

Sovražnik ni nujno nekaj povsem zunanega nekemu narodu, recimo drugi narod. Takšnega sovražnika – Heidegger končno končuje – je treba »postaviti s ciljem popolnega uničenja« (GA 36/37, 91). Da pa bi prišli do metapolitične eksistence nemškega naroda kot resnično zgodovinskega, je treba najprej politični boj izpeljati na ontičnem nivoju. Niti »duhovni nacionalsocializem« (135) ne more strpno opazovati »tujih elementov« v nemškem narodu, ki ostajajo neukoreninjeni v bistvo tega naroda. Glede na slednjega je videti, da z *nomadskim duhom* Židov ni mogoče zgraditi ljudske skupnosti, *Volksgemeinschaft*, ki bi jo bilo treba postaviti za prvi cilj duhovno-političnega delovanja. Zaradi tega mora utemeljujoča vzgoja fronte že jasno postaviti cilj boja in določiti svojega sovražnika (Prim. 147). A prva naloga vodje je, da »ustvari orožje« [waffen schaffen]. Drugi cilj duhovnega nacionalsocializma je ustvariti državo, ki bo prevzela nalogo, ki je nemškemu narodu zgodovinsko naložena. Kot tretji, resnični, a tudi najbolj oddaljeni cilj, Heidegger vidi vzpostavljanje »zgodovinske veličine naroda v doseganju in oblikovanju bitnih moči [Seinsmächte]« (136). Tretji cilj je identičen z vzpostavljanjem metapolitičnega obstoja nemškega naroda in videti je, kot da zadošča, da je izvajan samo *ex catedra*. Prvi cilj pa zahteva politično delovanje »vulgarnega nacionalsocializma« (142) in povezovanje s »krvjo in tlemi« (127).

V tem smislu Heidegger tega istega zimskega semestra v letih 1933–34¹⁹ izpostavlja, da biti naroda, kakor tudi človeški biti, pripada njen lastni prostor: »vsak narod ima prostor, ki mu pripada« (Heidegger 2009, 81). Če pa je tako, potem pa tudi samemu načinu eksistence nekega naroda pripada »odnos do prostora, tj. obvladovanje prostora in biti-prežet-s-prostorom [Vom-Raum-geprägt-Werden]« (*Ibid.*). V istem kontekstu Heidegger pravi:

Zgodovina nas uči, da nomadi niso samo označeni z brezupnostjo puščave in steppe, temveč da tudi za seboj puščajo puščavo tam, kjer so se prej nahajala plodna tla in kultivirana zemlja ... (*Ibid.*, 82)

¹⁹ Seminar *O bistvu in pojmu, narave, zgodovine in države* izdajateljska »politika« ni uvrstila v izdajo njegovih zbranih del. Seminar je bil kljub temu objavljen leta 2009 v *Heidegger-Jahrbuch*.

Iz takšnega odnosa so-pripadanja naroda in prostora izhaja tudi specifična vednost nekega naroda o naravi lastnega prostora. Drugače, heideggerjansko reče – način, na katerega se temu narodu raz-kriva narava. Kajti

Nekemu slovanskem narodu se bo narava našega nemškega prostora razprla povsem drugače kot nam, semitskim nomadom pa se morda nikdar ne bo razprla. (*Ibid.*, 82)

Nomadi torej predstavljajo nevarnost opustošenja kultiviranih evropskih prostorov. Pri tem se je nemara povsem na mestu vprašati, še zlasti danes, v informacijski dobi, v kateri informacijski prostor skorajda ne pozna kategorije ukoreninjenega ali fiksiranega mesta: ali sploh obstaja in ali je sploh nujna ontološka vez med Bitjo in prostorom? Morda ni Biti kot take, temveč samo bivajoče v gibanju, samo nomadizem, ukoreninjenost v neka tla in znotraj nekih nacionalnih meja? Se je Edmundu Husserlu ali Karlu Löwithu narava gozda okoli Freiburga prikazovala in razkrivala drugače? Se je metropolitanski prostor Dunaja sploh razkrival Arnoldu Schönbergu in oblikoval njegove kompozicije ali pa je ta Žid (»Zavračam te kot Žida« – mu je zabrusil Kandinski) ustvarjal samo iz »nomadskega židovstva«? Heideggerjeva znana stališča o ukoreninjenosti v tla in rojstni kraj lahko razumemo in pojasnimo kot čisto konzervativnost še enega nemškega filozofa tridesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Lahko bi si, čeprav malce na silo, tudi predstavili določeno logiko, ki se nahaja med povezavo naroda in prostora. Pa vendar je neka novost, ki jo Heidegger uvaja v letih 1933–34 problematična: povezovanje prostora kot *teritorija* in *občevanja* [Verkehr] s pojmom *politične* države. Po Heideggerju lahko namreč z dedukcijo države iz družbene pogodbe pridemo samo do pojma liberalne države blagostanja. Resnični pojem države pa je treba nasproti temu izpeljati »v smislu tistega Političnega kot osnovnega značaja v filozofiji eksistirajočega zahodnega človeka« (Heidegger 2009, 79). Toda kot politična je država nekega naroda, Bit nekega bivajočega, določena s teritorijem,²⁰ ne pa rojstnim krajem, ki se razkriva samo posamezniku. Kot po-

²⁰ Družbeno-ontološko nikakor ni nujno, da država kot politična skupnost, kot skupina ali kot kolektiv, obstaja samo znotraj predhodno določenih meja. Ko je Srbija zapustila svoje teritorialne meje tekom Prve svetovne vojne in se umaknila preko Albanije, ni prenehala obstajati kot država – še naprej so plačevali reparacije, podpisovali mednarodne pogodbe in dokumente opremili s pečatom. Prav tako ni jasno, zakaj bi duhovno zbiranje nemškega naroda imelo za nujno posledico tudi njegovo teritorialno zaokrožitev in razširitev na tiste Nemce, ki so ostali izven meja Rajha (up. Heidegger 2009, 82).

litično, kot teritorialno določeno, državo bistveno nosi volja po njeni razširitvi, delovanju in navezovanju na vse mogoče prostore. Teritorij kot prostor države ima svoje meje in sega do tja, do koder seže njeno delovanje, se pravi, njeno osvajanje oddaljenih prostorov. Toda sprašujemo se, kako se bo nekemu Nemcu razkrila ukrajinska stepa ali meglena banatska ravnina, če v njej ni ukoreninjen [Bodenständig]? Se bo razkrila z orožjem, krvjo in žrtvijo? Ali prej preko vsebine knjig, duhovno izmenjavo in prostim časom, kot pogojem za ukvarjanje s filozofskim delom? Se ni prostor Rusije Heideggerju odprl preko Dostojevskega? Morda Heidegger v svojem zgodovinsko-filozofskem pogovoru in spoprijemu, spopadu [Auseinandersetzung] ni dobro slišal Aristotela, ko ta pravi:

biti mora namreč zmožen udejestvovati se in se vojskovati, še bolj pa ohranjati mir in uživati brezdelje; mora se ukvarjati z nujnimi in koristnimi zadevami, še bolj pa s plemenitimi. Zato je treba upoštevaje te smotre vzgajati te, ki so še otroci, pa tudi ljudi drugih starosti, ki potrebujejo vzgojo. (Pol. VII, 13 1333a–1333b)²¹

Heideggerju, ki zvaja Politično na antagonizem, ki zahteva žrtev, je treba zoperstaviti pojmovanje politike, ki se ne zmeni za nobeno zgodovinsko vezanost kakega naroda na zemljo, prostor ali za partikularno, samo temu narodu lastno navado. Edino kot normativna in kot tista, ki se nahaja izven konkretne, zgodovinske pogojenosti vprašanja, se bo politika, in z njo tisto Politično, lahko izognila žrtvenim ritualom *samopotrjevanja* [Selbstbehauptung] lastne identitete in se prepustila prostem času, nedelji, sedmemu dnevu, tej veliki instituciji meščanskega življenja.

Heideggerjev bistveni argument proti židovstvu se nanaša na njihovo navezanost na tla, oziroma z njegovimi besedami, njihovo izkoreninjenost (GA 96, 243). Zakaj pa bi morali Židje svojo identiteto nujno dobiti preko prostora, iz ukoreninjenosti? Svojo identiteto so dobili nevezano za prostorskost. Njihov prostor – kot rojstni kraj, ne kot (politični) teritorij – je beseda,²² beseda iz Tore. To je bistveno pojmovna ukoreninjenost, ne glede na to, da norme svoje identitete izvaja na zunanji način, oziroma jih prevzema kot dane in kot veljavne za vse čase. Razumljivo je, da Heidegger zavrača vsako sklicevanje na transcendentno, pa

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²¹ [Navajamo po slov. prev.: Aristotel, Politika, prevedel Matej Hriberšek, GV založba, Ljubljana 2010, str. 638.]

²² Ta motiv razvije Derrida v svojem eseju »Edmond Jabès in vprašanje knjige«.

naj bo to v židovstvu, krščanstvu ali v liberalnem razsvetljenstvu. Toda tukaj gre za nekaj drugega, za nekaj, kar je samo na prvi pogled videti ambivalentno. Gre za Politično, za po eni strani izvajanje političnega delovanja proti drugemu, na drugi strani pa za izločitev samega Političnega kot bistvenega. Heidegger potrebuje politično akcijo nacionalsocialistične stranke, da bi tudi on bil na fronti, kjer se boj odigrava med duhovi in kjer se sprejema odločitev o predhodni, to je, izvorni utemeljitvi prihodnje metapolitične oblike nemškega naroda, tisto Prihajajoče. Heidegger ne skuša najti nobenega opravičila za svoje mišljenje, zelo dobro ve, da se ono odvija v prostoru izpraznjenim od prava, prostoru, ki je napolnjen z revolucionarnim nasiljem. Kot vsako politično nasilje, tudi to vsebuje potrebo po svoji izjemi, potrebo po izrednem stanju, da bi lahko samo sebi podelilo razumljivost v trenutku, v katerem se dogaja, in da bi obenem zahtevalo, da opravičilo za svoja dejanja dobi šele post festum.

Zbiranje v razcvetu polemosa se ne dogaja samo v pogovoru duhov; tudi taborišče se je izkazalo za mesto koncentracije in zbiranja. Danes, desetletja po zgornjih Heideggerjevih besedah, nam taborišča ponujajo pretresljivo simboliko padca v najbolj grozne, protičloveške strahote vsake politike, ki razlog svojega delovanja nahaja v tistem, kar bo šele prišlo. Nedvomno je vsaka družbena objektivnost konec koncev politična in se ne more izogniti sledovom zasnujajočega izključevanja drugega, ker je vsaka politična identiteta konstruirana kot »razlika« in »izključitev«. Rešitev ni v metapolitiki ali duhovnem boju, temveč je lahko rešitev samo prav politična odločitev, da odnos do drugega ne postane politični, da ne preide v skrajnost antagonizma in razlikovanja prijatelj/sovražnik. Kot smo videli zgoraj, pa Heidegger nenehno išče prav to razlikovanje, ter drugega ali nasprotnika noče imenovati partner. Za njegovo spreminjajoče zgodovinsko-filozofsko zbiranje odnosa logos-polemos, še vedno velja Aristotelovo stališče: nasproti Heideggerju, je treba še naprej vztrajati pri tem, da nasilje ni le nasproten modus od mira, jezika in pogovora, da tudi ono v sebi vselej nosi žig partikularnosti in zasebnosti. Mir in sporazum, ne boj, sta prostor in mesto, element in medij logosa ter filozofije (Pol. VII, 13, 1333a).

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Ponavljanje med reprodukcijo in variacijo: Deleuze, Hegel, Kierkegaard

1.

V knjigi *Razlika in ponavljanje* iz leta 1968 Deleuze koncipira fenomena razlike in ponavljanja kot »motorja« dinamičnega procesa postajanja in ju vzpostavi kot osrednja pojma svojega filozofskega programa transcendentnega empirizma.

Izhodiščna Deleuzova predpostavka je, da sta razlika in ponavljanje v temelju povezana – drug drugega pogojujeta in omogočata. Razlika je pogonsko kolo ponavljanja, ponavljanje pa je gibanje same razlike in obenem tudi pot do nje. To gibanje je onstran vsake identitete in reprezentacije, onstran enoznačnega smisla, onstran zaključkov zdravega razuma in v transgresiji glede na vsakršen red splošnosti in zakona. V tovrstnem razprtju se razlika postavi kot *unilateralna distinkcija*. Kot takšna je razlika onkraj vsakega razmerja: utemeljena je v sami sebi, kot razlika, ki se ne razlikuje *od nečesa* (kot v polju reprezentacije negativno določena razlika), niti se ne razlikuje (*se namreč že napoteva na drugost – drugost sebe*), temveč zgolj *razlikuje*. Razlika razlikuje.

Zavračamo splošno alternativo neskončne reprezentacije: bodisi nedoločeno, nerazlikovanje, nerazlikovano, bodisi razlika, ki je že določena kot negacija, ki implicira in ovija negativno (s tem zavračamo tudi posebno alternativo: negativno omejitve ali negativno nasprotja). Razlika je v svojem bistvu objekt afirmacije, afirmacija sama.¹

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Edini možni koncept razlike je razlika onkraj koncepta – tega se Deleuze ne naveliča ponavljati. Kajti vsak koncept razlike – pa naj bo to selekcija, delitev, limitacija, *differentia specifica*, *omnis determinatio negatio* –, samo razliko kot čisto afirmacijo v temelju zgreši. Filozofija po Deleuzovem mnenju v vsej svoji pestri zgodovini ni uspela koncipirati fenomenov razlike in ponavljanja kot

¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Razlika in ponavljanje*, Založba ZRC, Ljubljana 2011, str. 110.

*Filozofinja, Ljubljana

takih, saj je razliko vselej interpretirala kot negativno entiteto, ponavljanje pa kot golo (mehansko, fizično) ponavljanje primerov: ni jih bila sposobna misliti samih zase, neodvisno od štirih stebrov *cogita* – konceptov analogije, opozicije, podobnosti in identitete. Temeljna napaka filozofije razlike pri Aristotelu, Heglu in Leibnizu je za Deleuza v tem, da so se zadovoljili z vpisom razlike v koncept na splošno – razlika je tako že posredovana z reprezentacijo.

Vedno lahko posredujemo, preidemo v antitezo, kreiramo sintezo, vendar teza ne sledi, temveč vztraja v svoji neposrednosti, v svoji razliki, ki v sebi tvori resnično gibanje. Razlika je resnična vsebina teze, trmoglavost teze. Negativno, negativnost, vendarle ne zajame pojava razlike, ampak prejme le njegovo prikazen ali epifenomen. Celotna *Fenomenologija* je epifenomenologija.²

Deleuzova kritika negativne ideje razlike se, kot je znano, naslavlja zlasti na Heglovo dialektiko, vendar je mogoče pokazati – kot je prav tako znano³ – da se hegeljanske strukture, ko se enkrat priplazi v sistem, ni tako lahko znebiti, oziroma da je Deleuzov očitek Heglu, da je razlika pri njem v službi v sebi krožeče totalnosti, ki se samodoloča skozi dialektiko negacije, v končni fazi mogoče nasloviti tudi na samega Deleuza. Kajti negacija, ki je izvržena iz sistema, iz tega sistema ni dejansko izbrisana, ampak se mu postavlja nasproti kot njegova zunanja meja, ki natanko kot manjkajoči element od zunaj vzpostavlja sistem kot celoto: sistem lahko deluje kot celota le, če obstaja vsaj en element, ki temu sistemu manjka.⁴ V tej perspektivi se zastavlja vprašanje, ali ni afirmirana, v sistem vpisana razlika, zev, ki deluje kot njegov notranji stožer, kakršna je na delu pri Heglu, celo manj zavezana poenotujoči logiki Enega, kakor pa izvržena, potlačena in zanikana negativna razlika pri Deleuzu? Ali ni izgon negativne razlike ravno simptom prikrite pretenzije po totalnosti, kolikor v Deleuzovem univerzumu mnogoterost singularnosti prežema v neskončnost raztezajoče se

² *Ibid.*

³ Na tej točki trčimo ob vprašanje, s katerim so Deleuza vsak po svoje soočili Dolar, Žižek in Malabou: vprašanje Hegla kot tistega potlačenega zaznamka, travmatskega jedra, okrog katerega kroži Deleuzova filozofija natanko na način za Deleuza v temelju nekredibilne logike *Verneinung*. Ali ni v paradoksnem zanikanju zanikanja, s katerim misel sama sebe nenehno izganja v pat pozicijo, nekaj težko obremenilnega za idejo neznosne lahкости dinamičnega samopostajanja? cf. Bara Kolenc, »Surova ponovitev: Deleuze in Freud«, *Problemi*, DTP, Ljubljana, 1–2/2015, str. 181.

⁴ Cf. Slavoj Žižek, »Vase spodviti rob in njegovo izvrženje: logika 'ne-celega'«, v: *Hegel in označevalec*, Analecta, DDU Univerzum, Ljubljana 1980.

gibanje ponavljanja, katerega nujni kompendij je vseprisotna razlika, ki jo Deleuze povsem eksplicitno imenuje *enoglasna bit*?

Na tem mestu nas bo zanimala neka čisto specifična perspektiva: razgrnitev konceptov *variacije* in *reprodukcije* in njune medsebojne povezave z vidika ideje ponavljanja, ki nam lahko ponudi jasnejši uvid v razmerje med Heglovim, Kierkegaardovim in Deleuzovim (obenem pa – nekako neizbežno – tudi Lacanovim) konceptom ponavljanja. Naša analiza nam bo znotraj Deleuzove *Razlike in ponavljanja* razkrila neko – presenetljivo ali ne – lacanovsko strukturo: izkazalo se bo namreč, da ne samo, da je Hegel znotraj Deleuzove filozofije prisoten tam, kjer ga ne bi smelo biti, ampak, da po drugi strani Kierkegaard natanko tam, kjer je kot pozitivna referenca trmasto prisoten, zares pravzaprav manjka na svojem mestu. Kierkegaardov koncept ponovitve se namreč točno tam, ko naj bi se najbolj očitno skladal z Deleuzovim zastavkom, v svoji paradoksnosti nevarno (kolikor je znotraj deleuzovskega univerzuma Hegel nasploh najbolj grozeča nevarnost) približa Heglovi konceptiji ponavljanja, pri čemer se ta bližina primerno konceptualno okrepi še skozi lacanovsko logiko ponavljanja kot gibanja *automaton* in *týche*.

2.

Hegel zelo redko spregovori o ponavljanju, pa vendar moramo reči, da heglovska dialektika ni nič drugega kot ponavljanje *par excellence*.

Klasično polje razmisleka o Heglovi teoriji ponavljanja se veže na njegovo znamenito idejo zgodovinskega ponavljanja, ki ga je v zgodovino misli – v skladu z retroaktivno logiko produktivne koncepcije ponavljanja⁵ – zares vpisala šele slavna Marxova (ki je zares pravzaprav Engelsova) replika o ponavljanju v zgodovini.⁶ Namesto klasičnih mest, ki se v zvezi z vprašanjem ponavljanja opirajo na Heglovo videnje zgodovine, bomo tu izhajali in njegove *Znanosti logike*.

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⁵ V zvezi s tezo o produktivni konceptiji ponavljanja kot eno od štirih temeljnih matric ponovitve cf. Bara Kolenc, *Ponavljjanje in uprizoritev: Kierkegaard, psihoanaliza, gledališče*, Analecta, DTP, Ljubljana 2014, str. 21–28.

⁶ Gre seveda za slavno Marxovo sklicevanje na Heglovo izjavo o ponavljanju, ki se je utrdila kot neuničljivi aforizem, kot večno vračajoči se stavek o heglovskem problemu ponavljanja: »Hegel pripominja nekje, da se vsa velika svetovnozgodovinska dejstva in osebe pojavljajo takorekoč dvakrat. Pozabil je pristaviti: Prvič kot tragedija, drugič kot farsa.«

Obstaja mesto, kjer Hegel na kratko, a zelo jasno, nekaj reče o ponavljanju kot čisto strukturni zadevi. To mesto se nahaja v prvem delu *Znanosti logike*, v 3. opombi k razdelku o *Postajanju*. Postajanje Hegel opredeli takole: »Enotnost, katere momenta, bit in nič, sta neločljiva, je hkrati različna od njiju samih in je nasproti njima tako nekaj *tretjega*, to tretje pa je v svoji najbolj svojski formi *postajanje*.«⁷ Heglova izpeljava znamenite izhodiščne hipoteze *Znanosti logike*, da sta čista bit in čisti nič isto, da sta kot taka v osnovi nerazločljiva, ki je obenem temeljna poanta njegove dialektike, je v tem, da ravno sama nerazločljivost biti in ničča že tvori njuno razliko. In prav ta razlika, ta nujni zamik znotraj vsakršne izjave identitete, je tisto notranje gibalno, ki dialektiko vzpostavlja kot dinamizem postajanja in prehajanja. Bit in nič, pravi Hegel, ne obstajata za sebe, temveč sta navzoča le skozi postajanje oz. prehajanje. Kjerkoli je govora o biti in ničču, mora biti kot njun pogoj možnosti navzoče to tretje, postajanje, ki je resnica čiste biti in čistega ničča.

To tretje pa ima, nadaljuje Hegel, različne empirične podobe, ki jih abstrakcija zanemarja, jih postavlja na stranski tir, in sicer natanko zato, da bi

tista svoja produkta, bit in nič, obdržala vsakega zase in ju zaščitila pred prehajanjem.⁸

Najbolj zgovorne orise o nemožnosti, da bi od abstraktnega prišli do česa nadaljnega in do združitve obeh, pravi Hegel, podaja Jacobi v svoji polemiki proti Kantovi apriorni *sintezi* samozavedanja v svoji razpravi o podjetju kriticizma (*Über das Unternehmen des Kritizismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen, Leipzig 1816, Werke, II. zv.*). Nalogo si Jacobi postavi takole:

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... prikazati nastajanje ali proizvajanje sinteze v nečem čistem, najsi bo to čista zavest, prostor ali čas.

Karl Marx, *Osemnajsti brumaire Ludvika Bonaparta*, v: *Izbrana dela*, III. zv., Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 1979, str. 452. Glede razlike med Heglovim in Marxovim pojmovanjem ponavljanja cf. Mirt Komel, *Diskurz in nasilje*, Analecta, DTP, Ljubljana 2012, str. 92–106.

⁷ G. W. F. Hegel, *Znanost logike I*, DTP, Analecta, Ljubljana 2001, str. 85.

⁸ *Ibid.*, str. 86. Kot primere takšne konceptualne — in nujno abstraktne — »zaščite pred prehajanjem« Hegel navaja Parmenidov nauk o biti, Spinozino in Fichtejevo filozofijo.

Prostor naj bo *eno*, čas naj bo *eno*, zavest naj bo *eno* ... Le povejte, kako se vam kako od teh treh enih na čist način pomnogoteri v samem sebi, ... vsako je le eno in *nobeno drugo*;

Kaj vnese ... v one tri neskončnosti ... *končnost*; kaj prostor in čas a priori oplodi s številom in mero in ga preobrazi v nekaj čisto raznoterega; kaj čisto spontanost (jaz) privede do oscilacije ...? Kako pride njegov čisti vokal do soglasnika, ali bolje, kako se njegovo *brezglasno* neprekinjeno *piskanje* samo prekine in zastane, da bi pridobilo vsaj neko vrsto samoglasnika, nek *akcent*?⁹

Hegel Jacobijevo nalogo komentira takole: »Kot vidimo, se je *Jacobi* zelo jasno zavedal nedejanskosti (*Das Unwesen*) abstrakcije, pa naj si bo to tako imenovani absolutni, tj. zgolj abstraktni prostor ali prav takšen čas ali prav takšna čista zavest, jaz; v teh abstrakcijah vztraja z namenom, da bi dokazal nemožnost napredovanja do drugega, ki je pogoj sinteze, in do sinteze same.«¹⁰ Še posebej nazorno *Jacobi* opisuje proceduro, kako se prispe do abstrakcije prostora:

Toliko časa moram ... poskusiti čisto pozabiti, da sem kdajkoli karkoli videl, slišal, se česa dotaknil in kaj premaknil, pri čemer niti jaz sam izrecno nisem izvzet. Čisto, čisto, čisto pozabiti moram vsako gibanje in se najbolj posvetiti ravno temu *pozabljanju*, ker je to tisto najtežje. Nasploh vse moram, tako kot sem odmisлил, tudi docela in popolnoma *spraviti* proč, obdržati pa ne smem čisto ničesar razen edino *na silo* zadržanega zora neskončno *nespremenljivega prostora*; (-) od mene samega ne sme preostati nič razen *tega mojega zora* samega, da bi ga tako opazoval kot resnično samostojno, neodvisno, eno in edino predstavo.¹¹

V tej praznini, pravi *Jacobi*, bi se mu pripetilo ravno nasprotno od tega, kar bi se mu moralo pripetiti v skladu s Kantovimi zagotovili; ne bi se počutil kot nekaj *mnogega* in *raznoterega*, nasprotno, počutil bi se kot eno brez vsakega mnoštva in raznoterosti, še več, sam ne bi bil nič drugega kot nemožnost sama, uničenje vsake raznoterosti. Tako, sklene *Jacobi*, »se v tej čistosti vsa raznoterost in mnoštvo razodeneta kot nekaj čisto nemožnega«¹².

⁹ *Ibid.*, str. 88.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, str. 89, navedeno po: Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Über das Unternehmen des Ktitizismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen*, Leipzig 1816, str. 147.

¹² *Ibid.*, str. 90.

Heglov odgovor pa je naslednji:

Ta nemožnost ne pomeni nič drugega kot *tavtologijo*: trdno se oprimem abstraktnosti in izključim vsakršno mnoštvo in mnogoterost, vztrajam v nerazlikovanem in nedoločenem in odmislim vse, kar je razlikovano in določeno.¹³

Kantovo apriorno sintezo samozavedanja, pravi Hegel, si Jacobi razvodeni do čiste abstrakcije. Sintezo na sebi spremeni v »čisto kopulo na sebi, v neko *je, je, je*, brez začetka in konca in brez kaj, kdo, kateri.«¹⁴ To, pravi Jacobi – in tu smo končno prispeli do ponavljanja – »to v neskončnost nadaljujoče se *ponavljanje ponovitve*, ta *je, je, je* je edina zaposlitev, funkcija in produkcija te edine sinteze; ona sama je golo, čisto, absolutno ponavljanje samo.«¹⁵

Kopula *je, je, je* izreka abstraktno bit, od katere se ni mogoče nikamor premakniti, ki je popolnoma nedoločena, ki nima nobenega predikata in ki niti ni substanca, temveč je čista praznina, nek prazen prostor, neko brezglasno piskanje, neka skrajno splošna istost. Za Jacobija je ponavljanje torej ravno neko trmasto vztrajanje v istem, neko gibanje, ki ničesar ne proizvede, reprodukcija identičnega, ki je v najbolj popolni obliki možna prav kot reprodukcija praznine, čiste brezvsebinske forme.

Toda, pravi Hegel – in tu moramo biti pozorni – »ker v njem ni nobenega presledka, tj. nobene negacije, ta sinteza dejansko ni ponavljanje, ampak je čista nerazlikovana bit.«¹⁶ To, kar Jacobi imenuje najčistejše ponavljanje same ponovitve – vračanje kopule *je, je, je* kot domnevne absolutne identitete, za Hegla torej ravno *ni* ponavljanje, ampak je, prav nasprotno, apriorna, strukturna ukinitev vsakršne možnosti ponovitve.

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Če se miselna abstrakcija, ki skuša pojmiti nekaj čistega, npr. čisto bit (ali čisto zavest, ali čisti prostor ali čisti nič) zatakne v absolutni nedoločenosti in ne more preiti k ničemur določenem, od neskončnosti ne more sestopiti v končnost, in če je vse, kar uspe ta abstrakcija ponavljati, zgolj njena identiteta s se-

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

boj, nek *je, je, je* ali *jaz, jaz, jaz*, potem tu, – pravi Hegel, *ravno ne moremo govoriti o ponavljanju*.

3.

Ponavljanje je proces identitete identitete in neidentitete, znotraj katerega je vsaka identiteta vselej že identiteta identitete in neidentitete – v dialektičnem postajanju je vselej že na delu neka razlika.

In ker ta razlika ni nič drugega kot negacija, minimalni zaznamek te razlike ni vsebinski, ampak povsem formalen – ne zadeva kakšnega posebnega označenca, temveč samo označevalno logiko. Razlika ni designirana, poimenovana, zlepljena z nekim označencem (ne poimenuje na primer praznine, odsotnosti, itd.), ampak nastopa zgolj v posredovanju, skozi formo ponavljanja dialektične strukture. Pa vendar – in v tem je temeljni spodvoj Heglovega koncepta ponavljanja – ravno razlika kot brezvsebinska, kot zgolj strukturna, kot povezovalno-ločevalna vez med bitjo in ne-bitjo, lahko na svoji hrbtni strani proizvede določen pomen, omogoči sestop nedoločenega k določenemu, neskončnega h končnemu. To, da ponavljanje ni reprodukcija, da ponavljanje kot reprodukcija ni možno, zato za Hegla pomeni tudi, da *ni čiste forme*.

Natanko s tem poudarkom se tudi nadaljuje Heglova kritika Jacobija. Najprej, pravi Hegel, se Jacobi, ki se utrdi v nekem absolutnem, abstraktnem prostoru, času in zavesti, utrdi v nečem empirično napačnem:

dan, tj. empirično navzoč ni ne prostor in ne čas, ki bi bil nekaj neomejeno prostorskega in časovnega, ki v svoji kontinuiteti ne bi bil izpolnjen z raznotero zamejenim obstojem in spremembo – te meje in spremembe neločeno in neločljivo pripadajo prostorskosti in časovnosti. Zavest je prav tako izpolnjena z določenim občutenjem, predstavljanjem, želenjem, itn.: zavest ne eksistira ločeno od vsakršne posebne vsebine. ... zavest si pač res lahko naredi za predmet in vsebino tudi prazni prostor, prazni čas, in celo prazno zavest ali čisto bit; toda zavest ne ostane pri tem, temveč ne samo da seže preko, še več, prebije se ven iz take praznosti do boljše, to je na kakršenkoli način konkretnejše vsebine, in najsi bo ta vsebina še tako slaba, je kot konkretnejša boljša in resničnejša; prav takšna vsebina je nasploh sintetična. ... Sinteza vsebuje in pokaže neresničnost onih abstrakcij; v

sintezi so abstrakcije poenotene s svojim drugim in torej niso kot nekaj, kar obstaja za sebe, niso kot absolutne, temveč kot sploh relativne.¹⁷

Pokazati je treba, pravi Hegel,

da je misel čistega prostora, itn., tj. čisti prostor itn., *sama na sebi* nična, tj. pokazati, da je ta misel kot taka že svoje nasprotje, da se je vanjo že na njej sami vrnilo njeno nasprotje, da je sama zase že izšla iz same sebe, da je določnost.¹⁸

Prav skozi sprevrnitev razmerja med abstrakcijo in določnostjo, klasičnega razlikovanja med obliko in vsebino, se pri Heglu razgrne logika označevalca, na katero opozarja tudi Žižek:

Tisto, kar naj bi bilo notranja vsebina, ki da se izraža oz. povnanja v obliki, je pravzaprav vselej že oblika, učinek nekega razsrediščenega procesa, površinski učinek; in obratno, tisto, kar naj bi bilo oblika, medij povnanjenja vsebine, je pravzaprav edina vsebina, tj. mreža posredovanj, ki proizvede kot svoj učinek notranjost pomena.¹⁹

Forma in vsebina si vselej že sopripadata, in sicer natanko tako, da se zakon njune sopripadnosti vsakokrat vzpostavi šele retroaktivno, kot proizvod označevalne verige. Jacobi, ki eno in njegovo drugo abstrahira, se izogne njunim empiričnim pojavitvam, da bi ju, kot pravi Hegel, lahko držal daleč vsaksebi, od enega ne more preiti k mnogemu, od čiste nerazlikovanosti ne more preiti v raznolikost. Predpostavlja čisto formalno nasebnost enega in drugega, subjekta in objekta, in ju nato skuša *od zunaj, naknadno* povezati. Na ta način iz razmerja med enim in drugim izloči razliko, kar ima na drugi strani za posledico to, da samo razliko – se pravi razločenost enega in drugega, biti in ne-bitu – pojmuje kot nekaj nasebnega, zunanjega.

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Toda pri Kantovi apriorni sintezi ravno ne gre za to, da si eno in drugo, npr. jaz in svet, pojem in stvar na sebi, subjekt in objekt, a priori pripadata kot fiksni preddani entiteti – prav v tem je pomen Heglovega stavka, da *sinteze ne smemo*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, str. 91.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Slavoj Žižek, *Hegel in označevalec*, Analecta, DDU Univerzum, Ljubljana 1980, str. 170.

razumeti kot povezave zunanje že navzočih določil. Gre prav nasprotno za to, da si eno in drugo, se pravi jaz in svet, pojem in stvar na sebi, subjekt in objekt, sopripadata v vzajemnem sopostajanju: sinteza nasebstva in zasebstva, pravi Hegel, ni zunanja, naknadna, ampak je *imanentna*.

Sinteze ravno ne smemo razumeti kot povezave zunanje že navzočih določil: deloma gre prav za izdelavo drugega k prvemu, nečesa določenega k nedoločenemu začetku, deloma pa za *imanentno* sintezo, sintezo a priori – za nasebno in zasebno enotnost razlikovanega. Postajanje je ta immanentna sinteza biti in nič.²⁰

Razlika biti in nič ni zunanja, ne vzpostavlja se kot njuna nasebna razločenost, ki ju od zunaj postavlja v neko nemogoče razmerje, temveč je vpisana v samo bit kot njena notranja vrzel: bit je vselej že tudi nič, samo bit v temelju zadeva njeno lastno ničenje.²¹ Bit kot eno vselej že napotuje na njeno drugo – in prav v tem je logika Heglove negacije. Bit je svoje lastno drugo, in ravno to prehajanje enega ven iz sebe v svoje drugo, nedoločnosti v določnost, neskončnosti v končnost (in obratno) je za Hegla *resnično gibanje ponavljanja*. Heglovska formula ponavljanja kot prehajanja nasebstva v svojo drugobit in te drugobiti spet nazaj samo vase, torej ni nič drugega kot temeljna formula same dialektike.

4.

Že pri Heglu lahko zaznamo nek temeljni *kierkegaardovski paradoks*, ki zelo dobro opiše kompleksno logiko ponavljanja. Ta paradoks, ki ga sam Kierkegaard sicer ni izrecno artikuliral, a se njegova izjemna struktura tako rekoč sama ponuja v mišljenje, je sestavljen iz dveh premis. Vsaka od obeh premis tega paradoksa pa je tudi sama paradoks: *veliki Kierkegaardov paradoks ponovitve*, če mu lahko tako rečemo, je torej nek paradoks na drugo potenco, ki dve premisi – dva

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²⁰ G. W. F. Hegel, *Znanost logike I*, DTP, Analecta, Ljubljana 2001, str. 88.

²¹ V opombah k razdelkom o biti, nič in postajanju je Hegel svojo koncepcijo razmerja med bitjo in ničem pojasnil tudi s sklicevanjem na Parmenidovo identitetno filozofijo. Kot je zapisal Gregor Moder: »Hegel declares that pure being, without any further determination, is a Parmenidian concept. But at the same time, he argues, Parmenides failed to see that pure being has already become pure nothingness.« Gregor Moder, »'Held Out into the Nothingness of Being': Heidegger and the Grim Reaper«, *Filozofski vestnik*, XXIV, Ljubljana, 2/2013, str. 105.

paradoksa, o katerih Kierkegaard povsem izrecno govori – postavi v protislovno razmerje.

Pri tem je ključno, da Kierkegaardove kategorije *paradoksa* ne moremo brati v smislu pat pozicije, v smislu nemožnosti, ki vnaprej zatre vsakršen pogoj možnosti mišljenja, temveč ga moramo, prav nasprotno, videti kot register produktivnih momentov mišljenja, ki nemožnost postavi kot resnični pogoj vsake možnosti. Paradoks, znotraj katerega se znajde ponovitev, mišljenja o ponavljanju tako ne izžene v mrtvi kot, ga ne zablokira, temveč ga, nasprotno, šele požene v gibanje. Kajti paradoks kot tak za Kierkegarda ni zapreka misli, ampak je razgrnitev edinega legitimnega polja mišljenja: paradoks nič drugega kot sama živost misli – šele v paradoksu misel zares naleti na samo sebe (a naleti natanko v tem, da se je že razletela).

Vendar nikar ne mislimo slabo o paradoksu; kajti paradoks je strast misli in mislec, ki je brez paradoksa, je kot ljubimec brez strasti: povprečen patron (Platon, Simpozij, str. 69). A najvišja potencia sleherne strasti je vselej hoteti svoj lastni propad in tako je tudi najvišja strast razuma hotenje spotakniti se, ne glede na to, da ga bo spotika tako ali drugače speljala v propad. Takšen je tedaj najvišji paradoks mišljenja, hotenje odkriti nekaj, česar sam ne more misliti.²²

Prva premisa velikega Kierkegaardovega paradoksa ponovitve se vzpostavi, ko se Kierkegaard sooči z nekim *temeljnim neuspelom ponovitve* – z radikalno nemožnostjo, da bi se določen dogodek ponovil v enaki obliki. Prav v tem je razočaranje njegovega eksperimentalnega potovanja v Berlin, ki se zaključi z ugotovitvijo, da *ponovitev ni možna*.

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Ko se je tole nekaj dni zapored ponavljalo, sem postal tako zagrenjen, tako sit ponovitve, da sem se odločil vrniti domov. Moje odkritje ni imelo nobenega pomena, a vendar je bilo zaskrbljujoče; kajti odkril sem, da ponovitve sploh ni, in se o tem prepričal, saj se mi je ponavljalo na vse mogoče načine.²³

²² Sören A. Kierkegaard, *Ponovitev; Filozofske drobtinice*, Slovenska matica, Ljubljana 1987, str. 42.

²³ *Ibid.*, str. 174.

Ponovitev, pravi Kierkegaard, čista ponovitev istega, *ni možna*. Vse, kar se ves čas in trmasto vrača, je le neuspeh ponovitve. V tem je seveda nek paradoks: nič se ne more ponoviti, a ravno to, da se nič ne more ponoviti, se ves čas ponavlja.

Na tej točki Kierkegaard izpelje nepričakovan in ključen, modernost določujoč *tour de force*, ki govor o ponovitvi prestavi na povsem drugo raven: natanko sam neuspeh ponovitve, pravi Kierkegaard, je ključ njenega uspeha. Prav to, da se ves čas ponavlja zgolj nemožnost ponovitve, šele vzpostavi pravi teren ponavljanja, katerega pogoj možnosti ni nič drugega kot njegova temeljna nemožnost: *prav to trmasto vračanje neuspeha ponovitve je že ponovitev sama*.

S tem Kierkegaard začrta neko novo, moderno logiko neuspeha, ki ne prinaša resignacije in obupa, temveč je konstruktivna, kolikor neuspeh kot pogoj možnosti vsakršnega gibanja in vsakršne spremembe deluje kot konstitutivni moment samega uspeha. Spodletelost, razlika, negacija kot vrzel – ki pa, in to je ključno, *ni designirana*, ki ji ni pripet označenec odsotnosti, praznine, teme ali česa podobnega, ampak obstaja kot čisto formalni zdrs, kot nujna spodletelost vsakršne zatrditve in ustoličenja na nekem fiksnem mestu – bodisi substance bodisi subjekta bodisi označenca – je konstitutivni moment ponavljanja.

In prav ta zdrs poudari Lacan z znamenitim stavkom, da tudi odsotnost ni podlaga, da ne obstaja najprej tišina, v katero se zad(e)re nek glas, temveč da sam krik tišino šele vzpostavi – zev, ki je prvotna, je nek razcep, ki hkrati vzpostavi tako eno kot drugo, tako substanco kot subjekt, tako bit in nič, tako ponavljanje kot razliko. Neuspeh ponovitve je konstitutivni moment ponavljanja kot gibanja označevalne strukture in logike odtujitve, skozi katero v tej označevalni strukturi vznika subjekt: »Funkcija neuspeha je v samem središču ponavljanja. Zmenek vselej zamudimo – v tem je, glede na *týche*, ničevost ponavljanja, njegovo konstitutivno prikrivanje.«²⁴ Natanko skozi prizmo takšne logike neuspeha lahko beremo tudi Heglovo dialektiko: negacija je konstitutivni moment ponavljanja kot sodoločanja določenosti in nedoločenosti, biti in nič, razlikovanosti in nerazlikovanosti, končnosti in neskončnosti.

Drugo premiso velikega Kierkegaardovskega paradoksa tvori neka druga protislovna situacija, ki preči logiko ponavljanja: razlike, novega, ne bomo dosegli

²⁴ Jacques Lacan, *Štirje temeljni koncepti psihoanalize*, Analecta, DTP, Ljubljana, 1996, str. 120.

onkraj ponovitve, ne bomo je odkrili v čisti transgresiji, odklonu ali variaciji, temveč se razlika proizvaja šele tam, kjer jo je nemogoče iskati – v čisti ponovitvi istega. Paradoks je tu torej v tem, da je *odmik od ponovitve istega možen točno šele skozi ponovitev istega*.

Upanje je brhko deklet, ki ti uide med dlanmi; spomin je lepa stara dama, s katero človek ne ve, kaj početi; ponovitev je ljubljena soproga, ki se je človek nikoli ne naveliča; kajti naveličaš se samo novega. Starega se ne naveličaš nikdar: in ko ga imaš pred sabo, si srečen; resnično srečen pa je le, kdor ne vara samega sebe z utvaro, da mora biti ponovitev nekaj novega; kajti sicer se je naveliča.²⁵

Kierkegaard na tem mestu spet izpelje podoben spekulativni zasuk kakor pri prvi premisi, ki mrtvo točko paradoksa zaobrne v matično celico mišljenja: novo, pravi Kierkegaard, ravno ni nekaj, kar moramo iskati onkraj ponovitve, onkraj struktur, v katere se vpisujemo. Največja različnost, pravi Kierkegaard, je največji dolgčas, – kaj je bolj dolgočasnega od tega, da v trgovini vsak dan kupimo drugačen jogurt, da vsak večer spimo z drugo osebo in da vsak mesec zamenjamo politično stranko? Ali ni ravno v tem čista rutina istega? Različnost je za Kierkegaarda zgolj tisto povnanjeno, designirano *zanimivo*, ki nima prevratniške moči *izjeme*: izjema, kierkegaardovsko nemožni moment ultimativne realizacije eksistence v ponovitvi, ravno ni ujemljiva v variacijah, ampak se zgodi natanko skozi radikalno ponovitev istega.

Novega ravno ne bomo dosegli z njegovo – vselej drugačno – designacijo, z variiranjem pomena, kajti čim skušamo razliko poimenovati, jo po nujnosti že izgubimo. Novo ni označeno, poimenovano *novo*, temveč vselej vznika za našim hrbtom kot neuzakonljivi in nenadzorljivi moment same ponovitve, kot njen inherentni presežek – manko.

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5.

Skozi premisi velikega Kierkegaardovega paradoksa, – se pravi na eni strani skozi paradoks, *da ponovitev kot ponovitev istega ni možna, pa vendar se ravno ta nemožnost vztrajno ponavlja*, na drugi strani pa skozi paradoks, *da je pogoj možnosti vznika razlike prav popolna ponovitev istega* –, lahko razberemo dvojno

²⁵ Kierkegaard, *Ponovitev*, str. 130.

Kierkegaardovo kritiko klasičnega razumevanja ponavljanja, ki logiko ponovitve bere bodisi skozi idejo *reprodukcije* bodisi skozi idejo *variacije*. Ponavljanje za Kierkegaarda ni niti čista ponovitev istega, niti ni variiranje, ki se hoče izogniti čisti ponovitvi istega: kolikor ponavljanje *ni čisto formalna reprodukcija*, toliko se ponavljanju (kot čisto formalni reprodukciji) tudi *ni mogoče izogniti zgolj z vsebinsko artikulacijo razlike*.

Točno ta dva poudarka lahko prepoznamo tudi v Heglovi dialektiki kot realizaciji gibanja ponavljanja. Po eni strani ponavljanja ni mogoče zvesti na reprodukcijo, na gibanje abstraktne forme, ampak je v samo formo vselej že vpisana negacija, zev, razlika, ki proizvaja nek presežek, izjemo, in s tem poganja samo gibanje ponavljanja. Po drugi strani pa ponavljanje tudi ni variacija, kajti razlika pri Heglu ni designirana, ne gre za vsebinsko razliko, temveč za razliko kot čisto formo. Toda – in prav v tem je ključ – ravno čista forma razlike, heglavska negacija, vselej že proizvede določen zamik, določen vsebinski moment, sama forma razlike ima neke – če lahko tako rečemo – realne učinke.

Dvojno kritiko reprodukcije in variacije Hegel natančno definira v nekem izjemnem stavku, ki je obenem edini stavek v *Fenomenologiji duha*, ki se eksplicitno naslavlja na problem ponavljanja. Gre za mesto v *Predgovoru*, 16. paragraf. Stavka o ponavljanju se umešča v kontekst kritike vedovne omike, ki še ni spoznala, da je čista vednost ravno pot do nje same. Tako, pravi Hegel, en del vedovne omike »trka na bogastvo materiala in razumljivost«, se pravi se izgublja v čisti empiriji in nabiranju primerov, drugi del pa nasprotno ravno »zaničuje vsaj to drugo, in trka na neposredno umnost in božanskost.«²⁶ Prvi del se torej ukvarja z variacijo, z nabiranjem različnosti, drugi del pa je absolut kot čista abstrakcija, ločena od vsakršne vsebine. Ta dva pola sta nato od zunaj spravljeni skupaj, in princip mojstrov vedovne omike je v tem, da

Na svoja tla zvlečejo množico materiala, namreč tisto že znano in urejeno, in ker si prvenstveno dajo opraviti s posebnostmi in kuriozitetami, se zdi, da še toliko bolj posedujejo ostalo, s čimer je bilo vedenje na svoj način že gotovo, hkrati pa da obvladujejo tudi še neurejeno in s tem vse podvržejo absolutni ideji, za katero se s tem zdi, da je v vsem spoznana in dozorela do razširjene vede.²⁷

²⁶ G. W. F. Hegel, *Fenomenologija duha*, DTP, Analecta, Ljubljana 1998, str. 17.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

In na tej točki pridemo do ključnega stavka:

Če pa to širino opazujemo поблиže, se ne kaže, da bi nastala tako, da bi se eno in isto sámo različno upodobilo, temveč je le brezlično ponavljanje enega in istega, ki je na različni material le vnanjsko naobrnjeno in zadobiva neki dolgočasen videz različnosti.²⁸

Vedovni omiki se torej zgodi točno to, kar vednost ločuje od postajanja kot resničnega (in nujno paradoksnega) gibanja ponavljanja: njen spoznavni postopek ji razpade na abstraktno vztrajanje v ideji, ki se lahko vzdržuje le kot brezlično ponavljanje enega in istega – se pravi kot čisto formalna reprodukcija – na eni strani, in na variranje raznolikosti, zgolj zanimivega, ki – ker se tu ne more zgoditi nič zares novega – navsezadnje ni nič drugega kot en sam pisan dolgčas, na drugi strani. Takšni vednosti nadalje ne preostane nič drugega, kot da od zunaj aplicira »teorijo na prakso«, formo na vsebino – in pri tem izgubi vse: tako moč absoluta kot možnost resnično novega, kajti oboje lahko vznikne le v imanentni povezavi in sopogojevanju določnega in nedoločnega. Prav takšna povezava pa je privilegirana naloga spoznanja kot imanentne sinteze samozavedanja: proizvesti razliko natanko na mestu ponovitve istega in to nemožnost postaviti kot pogoj možnosti napredovanja vednosti.

6.

(Veliki) kierkegaardovski paradoks dve premisi, ki smo jih razgrnili zgoraj, dve zavezi nemožnega kot pogoja možnosti ponovitve zvrne na drugo potenco: čeprav ponovitev istega ni možna, čeprav razlike ni mogoče eliminirati, da bi dosegli neko popolno ponovitev, je po drugi strani pogoj možnosti vznika razlike prav popolna ponovitev istega.

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Ta paradoks na drugo potenco, ki pravi, da ponavljanje kot ponovitev istega ni možno, pa vendarle je možno le kot ponovitev istega, in znotraj katerega se ponavljanje dvojno opredeli v ločitvi od vsakršne *reprodukcije* na eni strani in *variacije* na drugi strani, je natančna določitev mehanizma ponovitve, ki se lahko odvija le skozi neko protislovno, zatikajočo se logiko: *ponovitev kot ponovitev istega ni možna*, ker se znotraj same forme ponovitve vselej že proizvede določen

²⁸ *Ibid.*

presežek, določena formalna – in obenem tudi vsebinska razlika, – toda natančno tu je tista točka, ko nad ponovitvijo ne smemo obupati in se prepustiti užitku variacije, udobju zgolj *zanimivega* (ki se mu prepušča Kierkegaardov esteti). Zanimivost namreč ni nič drugega kot zamenljivost, ki ne vzpostavlja razlike, temveč tvori red splošnega. Če hočemo doseči gibanje resnične ponovitve, moramo vztrajati natančno v njeni paradoksalni strukturi, v *nemožni ponovitvi istega*, ki sama na sebi proizvede razliko, novo. *Možnost za ponovitev je natanko v njeni lastni nemožnosti*: to je spoznanje, ki kierkegaardovsko eksistenco povzdigne iz etične na religiozno raven. Novo se zgodi kot inherentni moment ponovitve, ki to isto samo od znotraj zaobrbe, ga spremeni v neko novo razmerje med nedoločnostjo in določnostjo, se pravi, kot se izrazi Hegel – eno in isto zadobi drugačno upodobitev.

Ob opazovanju otroške igre je Freud odkril neko nenavadno stvar – odrasli v svojih igrah in dejavnostih vselej iščejo nekaj novega, medtem ko otroci neutrudno ponavljajo vselej isto igro: »V odraslem življenju ne naletimo več na potrebo ponavljanja istega – novost je vselej predpogoj užitka.«²⁹ Odrasli vedno znova zahtevajo nekaj novega, drugačnega, in na tej zahtevi gradijo svojo »domačnost in priročnost«, raztezajo simbolno polje, v katerega se umeščajo tako, da variirajo pomene. Toda ta zahteva po novem, pravi Lacan, ravno »zastira tisto, kar je resnična skrivnost ludičnega, zastira bolj temeljno raznovrstnost, ki jo ponavljanje vzpostavlja že samo na sebi.«³⁰ Variacija, designacija novega kot *zanimivega*, ravno ne proizvede ničesar novega: »vse kar se v ponavljanju variira, modulira, je samo odtujitev njegovega smisla.«³¹ Otroška »zahteva, naj bodo podrobnosti vselej enake, pomeni, da se označevalec ne bo mogel nikoli tako skrbno vtisniti v pomnenje, da bi lahko resnično izražal prvenstvo, ki gre pomenjanju (*significance*) kot takemu. Očitno le bežimo pred prvenstvom pomenjanja, če ga razvijamo tako, da variiramo pomene. Zaradi takšnega variiranja pozabimo, kakšna je namera (*visée*) pomenjanja, saj variacija njegovo dejanje preobrazi v igro in mu s stališča načela ugodja priskrbi dobrodošle razbremenitve.«³²

²⁹ Sigmund Freud, »Onstran načela ugodja«, *Metapsihološki spisi*, Studia humanitatis, Ljubljana 1987, str. 272.

³⁰ Lacan, *Štirje temeljni koncepti psihoanalize*, str. 59.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

Lacan dvojni Kierkegaardov paradoks artikulira skozi koncepcijo ponavljanja kot enega od štirih temeljnih konceptov psihoanalize, kot dvojnega gibanja *automaton* in *týche*, ki na eni strani vzpostavlja vračanje znakov, ponavljanje na ravni *simbolnega*, na drugi strani pa neujemljivo kroženje areprezentabilnega preostanka, zevi, ponavljanje, ki obkroža polje *realnega*. Ponavljanje zarisuje vračanje strukture, vendar le na način, da samo strukturo nenehno sprevrča, jo obrača skozi njeno lastno neuspešnost, skozi zdrs reprezentacije, ki se javlja kot njen nevzdržni preostanek, kot tisto, česar srečanje je za subjekta bistveno spodletelo, pri čemer je prav ta spodletelost obenem pogoj možnosti reprezentacije in subjekta kot takega. *Automaton* in *týche* sta dva nagiba istega procesa, eden drugega pogojujeta in sta drug od drugega neoddvajljiva. Ali, kot v kratki formuli zapiše Dolar: »*týche* je vrzel v *automaton*.«³³

Ponovitev se zgodi iz težnje, da bi ukinila razliko, da bi se vzpostavila nerazlikovanost med obema objektoma ponovitve, a ravno sama težnja po ukinitvi je tista, ki proizvede nekaj, kar že vnaprej ukinja istost in kar naredi, da je ponovitev vselej premalo ali preveč. Razlika, ki nastane kot nekaj odvečnega, kar kot štrleče stran onemogoča ponovljenemu, da bi sovpadlo z lastno ponovitvijo, je obenem tudi že manko, kompleks ponovljenega, ki ga žene v ponovno ponovitev. Toda to, kar je z vidika ponovljenega njegova nezaceljiva rana, je z vidika samega ponavljanja njegov pogoj možnosti.

Tu se moramo izogniti prehitremu sklepu, da bi reprodukcijo pripisali simbolni ponovljivosti znakov, tezo, da ponavljanje ni reprodukcija, pa bi prihranili za »pravo« ponavljanje onkraj simbolnega, torej za neujemljivo, skrito, premeščajoče se srečanje z realnim. Ne gre za to, da imamo na eni strani *automaton* kot reprodukcijo in na drugi strani *týche*, ki je onkraj reprodukcije. Nasprotno. Gre za to, da sta *týche* in *automaton* dve plati enega in istega gibanja ponavljanja – ponavljanja, ki ni reprodukcija. Ponavljanje razlike je vpleteno v gibanje označevalne strukture, na drugi strani pa označevalna struktura šele skozi razliko sploh lahko vzpostavi platformo za ponovljivost. Ali, če povemo drugače: *ravno njuna prepletenost – týche kot vrzel v automaton – je to, kar ponavljanje ločuje od reprodukcije.*³⁴

³³ Mladen Dolar, »Komedijski in njen dvojni«, *Problemi DTP*, Ljubljana, 3–4/2004, str. 27.

³⁴ Cf. Bara Kolenc, »Ponavljjanje ni reprodukcija«, *Ponavljjanje in uprizoritev: Kierkegaard, psihoanaliza, gledališče*, Analecta, DTP, Ljubljana 2014.

Kolikor torej ponavljanje ni reprodukcija, toliko se tudi variacija kot možni izhod iz začaranega kroga domnevne reproduktivne ponovitve izkaže za nesmiselno nalogo – za nekakšno donkihotsko borbo z mlini na veter. Variacija se postavlja proti reprodukciji kot zlohotnemu reprezentatnu represivne instance ponovitve, ki ni nič drugega kot zgolj iluzorična predstava o ponavljanju kot čisti ponovitvi istega (znaka, primera, dogodka), in je zato v svojem postavljanju tudi sama iluzorna. Še več – kolikor variacija deluje na ravni vrnitve znakov, kjer hoče zajeti novo v polju *pomena*, ne le, da ustvarja fantomskega reprezentanta razlike, temveč s tem tudi izniči vsakršno možnost za razliko. Pomen se tu namreč ne vzpostavlja kot ena od sten subjektive nemožnosti, ki znotraj gibanja ločitve in odtujitve (gibanja, ki ni nič drugega kot temeljna lacanovska shema ponavljanja, znotraj katere vznikaja subjekt) vselej znova vzpostavlja le v formi skrepenega označevalca, temveč kot zatrdeli označevalec, kot nekakšen označevalni tampon, ki se zarine v zev označevalne strukture in ki ravno onemogoča, da bi se v gibanju vrnitve znakov, v (nujnem in obenem nujno nemožnem) vračanju istega, samo na sebi, kot nujni preostanek, proizvedlo nekaj novega. Variacija kot označevalni reprezentant razlike ni le njen podobenik, temveč dejansko deluje kot njen grozljivi dvojnik – postavi se na njeno mesto, izrine jo iz njenega polja: variacija z domnevnim odmikom od reprodukcije ne prekine le strašljive vrnitve istega, temveč ukine tudi samo možnost za razliko.

7.

Pri Deleuzu pa dvojni kierkegaardovski paradoks, skozi katerega je mogoče brati tako Heglovo kot Lacanovo koncepcijo ponavljanja³⁵, ne deluje. Zakaj? To dejstvo nas mora vsaj malo začuditi, saj je Kierkegaardova ideja paradoksa za Deleuza vendar privilegirana shema transgresije misli, ki se ne pusti ujeti v formalne zakonitosti *cogita* (identiteta, podobnost, analogija, protislovje), in ki kot *hotenje odkriti nekaj, česar misel ne more misliti*, vzpostavlja *cogitandum* kot transcendentalno polje mišljenja.

³⁵ Obstaja sicer neka temeljna strukturna razlika med heglovsko dialektiko lacanovsko označevalno logiko kot realizacijo ponovitve, a to v pričujočem članku puščamo ob strani. V zvezi s tem vprašanjem cf. Mladen Dolar, *Oficirji, služkinje in dimnikarji*, Analecta, DTP, Ljubljana 2010, str. 257, in Slavoj Žižek, »Vase spodviti rob in njegovo izvrženje: logika ‚necelega‘«, *Hegel in označevalec*, Analecta, DDU Univerzum, Ljubljana 1980.

Paradoks je za Kierkegaarda bistveno *strast mišljenja*, toda – in to je tisto, kar Deleuze pri Kierkegaardu v temelju spregleda (v dvojnem pomenu *spregleda* kot *pomotoma ne-videti* in *videti, pa se narediti, da nisi videl*, – medtem ko je ravno tretji pomen – *končno videti* – tisti, ki ga moramo na tem mestu dodati) –, najvišja potenca sleherne strasti je ravno vselej »hoteti svoj lastni propad«. Najvišja strast razuma za Kierkegaarda ni pozitivno zajetje vseh ekstremov misli kot dotika nemisljivega onkraj logike nasprotja in negacije, kakor njegovo idejo paradoksa interpretira Deleuze, temveč je ravno neko nezadržno »hotenje spotakniti se«, in sicer »ne glede na to, da ga bo spotika tako ali drugače speljala v propad«. ³⁶

Kierkegaardovski paradoks ni ideja čiste transgresije misli, ni težnja k njeni zunanji meji, kakor ga postavlja Deleuze, temveč prav nasprotno razpira dimenzijo misli, kjer je misel *sama sebi svoja lastna meja*, kjer misel znotraj sebe naleti na zev, zaradi katere se ne more nikoli zares srečati s seboj – nikoli si ne more dokončno priti na čisto s sama sabo. Paradoks ni nič drugega kot razsežnost nemožnega kot nujnega propada, izničenja, ki pa je ravno pogoj možnosti slehernega mišljenja – in je kot taka obenem tudi pozitivna. Paradoks se ne strukturira skozi eliminacijo negacije v soprisotnost in enakopravnost nekompatibilnih dimenzij mišljenja, temveč skozi logiko negativnosti kot pogoja vsakršne pozitivnosti. Kar je zares paradokсно je, da je negacija nujni pogoj kakršnekoli afirmacije. ³⁷

³⁶ Kierkegaard, *Ponovitev*, str. 42.

³⁷ Kar skoraj preveč očitno je, da Kierkegaardova logika strasti ni daleč od psihoanalitične funkcije želje. Na tem mestu lahko na kratko omenimo Deleuzovo kritiko Lacanovega koncepta želje, ki se osredinja okrog očitka, da je želja negativna funkcija, ki ne obkroža in ne proizvede ničesar drugega kot lasten manko in ki jo preči frustracija nezadovoljenosti: želja je želja želje, vedno si želi tisto, česar nima. S tem se vpisuje v tradicijo nesrečne zavesti, ki jo je od Platona dalje gojila zahodnoevropska filozofija. Namesto te nesrečne in zafrustrirane želje Deleuze promovira idejo želje brez manka, čistega veselja, izpolnjenega s samim sabo in s svojimi kontemplacijami. Vendar Deleuze pri Lacanovi funkciji želje – prav zato, ker je zanj nemisljiv – spregleda njen ključni moment: pozitivnost negativnosti. Manko ni melanholično brezno nič, temveč je ambivalentna koncepcija, ki na eni strani manjka zato, da bi na drugi strani proizvedla presežek, je tista razlika, ki iz nerazločljive celosti enega odtegne pogled in s tem šele vzpostavi simbolno polje. Prava grožnja subjektu zato za Lacana ni manko, temveč manko manka, neznosna bližina, nerazločljivost od lastnega objekta in od Drugega, ki ukine prostor za željo. Neskončnost želje ni njena frustracija – tisto, kar je zaradi nezadovoljenosti lahko nesrečno, je kvečjemu potreba – temveč je njen pogon, gorivo, s katerim poganja tako subjekta kot simbolno strukturo.

Deleuze torej pri Kierkegaardu spregleda temeljno predpostavko, ki določa funkcijo mišljenja – predpostavko negacije kot pogoja afirmacije. Negacija kot pozitivni, produktivni moment misli je torej tista radikalna Deleuzova slepa pega, tisti spregled, ki mu na nek paradoksen (sic!) način omogoči, da v eni potezi postavi Kierkegaarda za paradnega konja lastne ideje afirmativne ponovitve, in Hegla pribije na sramotilni steber kot avtorja prevarantske dialektike lažnega gibanja ponavljanja in fantomske razlike, ki deluje v službi statične totalitete Enega.

Točno ta moment spregleda pa je tudi tista nevrvalgična točka, zaradi katere sta za Deleuza napačni obe trditvi, ki smo ju skozi Kierkegaardovo idejo ponovitve, ki se v najbolj zgoščeni obliki vzpostavlja v zgoraj razvitem paradoksu na drugo potenco (ta dvojni paradoks pri Kierkegaardu sicer ni nikjer neposredno izpostavljen, a je implicitno prisoten, obstaja kot nujna nemožnost srečanja misli, ki preči tekst *Ponovitev*, s samo seboj), postavili kot ključni tako za Heglovo kot za Lacanovo koncepcijo ponovitve. Prva trditev: če ponavljanje kaj ni, potem to ni reprodukcija. Druga trditev: protipol trditve, da ponavljanje ni reprodukcija, nikakor ni ideja, da je bistvo ponavljanja v variaciji.

8.

Deleuze v *Razliki in ponavljanju* razvije teorijo o dveh vrstah ponavljanja, o *preoblečenem in golem ponavljanju*, ki sta povezani kot dve dimenziji istega procesa: »Ni golega ponavljanja, ki bi ga bilo mogoče abstrahirati ali izpeljati iz same preobleke. Ista stvar preoblači in je preoblečena.«³⁸ Dvojno gibanje ponavljanja se odvija onkraj reprezentacije, vendar pa je golo ponavljanje za razliko od zamaskiranega lahko podvrženo reprezentaciji: na ta način se vzpostavi sfera lažnega mehanskega ponavljanja, ki se loči od areprezentabilnega prepleta golega in preoblečenega ponavljanja.

Takšno reprezentirano ponavljanje istega, statično oziroma *golo ponavljanje* se nanaša na identiteto koncepta in dopušča le zunanjo (negativno določeno) razliko med običajnimi primeri, dinamično, *zamaskirano ponavljanje* pa vključuje razliko in jo inkorporira v vsakega od posameznih momentov. Pri statičnem ponavljanju, ki zadeva splošne, abstraktne posledice, je razlika zunanja konceptu,

³⁸ Deleuze, *Razlika in ponavljanje*, str. 59.

pri dinamičnem ponavljanju, ki je delujoči vzrok, pa je razlika onkraj koncepta. Statično ponavljanje ima pri Deleuzu negativen predznak, je identiteta koncepta, ki se po nujnosti pojavlja v ideji, zamaskirano ponavljanje pa se vključuje v raznolikost ideje in heterogenost a-prezentacije ter se kot eksces pojavlja v ideji. Ponavljanje asimetrije je skrito v simetričnih učinkih – povsod Drugi v ponavljanju Istega. V tem primeru – kadar golo ponavljanje zapade reprezentaciji – se maskirano ponavljanje vzpostavi kot resnica golega ponavljanja in tvori jedro tega, iz česar je sestavljeno vsako ponavljanje: *razlika brez koncepta, neposred(ova)na razlika*.

V uvodu *Razlike in ponavljanja* Deleuze zapiše: »različice ne pridejo od zunaj, ne izražajo nekega sekundarnega kompromisa med potlačujočo in potlačeno instanco³⁹, in ne smemo jih razumeti ne na podlagi še negativnih form nasprotja, obrata ali sprevrnitve. Različice prej izražajo diferencialne mehanizme, ki spadajo v bistvo in genezo tistega, kar se ponavlja.«⁴⁰ Variacije izražajo mehanizme razlike, ki pripadajo bistvu in izvoru tega, kar se ponavlja.

Če hočemo opredeliti Deleuzov koncept ponavljanja v razmerju do ideje reprodukcije na eni strani in do ideje variacije na drugi strani, nujno trčimo ob – nikakor ne preprosto – vprašanje o logiki označevalca znotraj Deleuzove teorije. Lacanovsko simbolno polje, polje vrnitve znakov, ponavljanje kot *automaton*, pri Deleuzu bolj ali manj zapade v sfero reprezentiranega golega, mehanskega ponavljanja, kjer ni mesta za razliko.⁴¹ Tu se ponavljanje odvija kot čista reprodukcija, kot horizontalno ponavljanje istega (označevalcev, primerov), kjer ne

³⁹ Deleuze idejo o dveh vrstah ponavljanja – golim in preoblečenim – med drugim veže na spreobrnitev razmerja med ponavljanjem in potlačitvijo znotraj psihoanalize: *ne ponavljam, ker potlačujem, ampak potlačujem, ker ponavljam*. To, kar se kaže kot simptom, kot posledica potlačitve – obsesionalni obred ali shizofrenični stereotip – je za Deleuza le pozunanjena posledica globljega gibanja ponavljanja, ki se odvija v jedru psihičnega aparata, in glede na katerega se sama potlačitev izkaže za sekundarni proces. In, – kar je za Deleuza ključno in okrog česar se vrti celotna Deleuzova kritika Freudove teorije -, v jedru psihičnega aparata ne deluje shema konfliktnosti, temveč struktura variacij kot izvornih diferencialnih mehanizmov ponavljanja.

⁴⁰ Deleuze, *Razlika in ponavljanje*, str. 59.

⁴¹ Za natančnejšo opredelitev razmerja med reprezentacijo in areprezentabilnim pri Deleuzu (tako golo kot zamaskirano ponavljanje sta v temelju areprezentabilni, a golo ponavljanje se lahko tudi reprezentira v aktivni sintezi časa kot mehansko ponavljanje primerov) cf. Bara Kolenc, »Surova ponovitev: Deleuze in Freud«, *Problemi*, DTP, Ljubljana, 1–2/2015, str. 192.

deluje logika prave razlike, temveč logika negacije kot lažne razlike. Kot vertikalna os tega horizontalnega reproduktivnega ponavljanja se odvija zamaskirano ponavljanje, ki vključuje razliko – je gibanje variacij, ki so osvobojene vsakršnih spon reprezentacije.

Temeljna razlika med lacanovsko in deleuzovsko logiko ponavljanja je torej v tem, da se za Lacana ponavljanje odvija skozi reprezentacijo, znotraj označevalne logike simbolnega kot vračanja znakov, medtem ko se za Deleuza resnično ponavljanje odvija onkraj reprezentacije, v okviru heterogene logike areprezentabilnega ponavljanja.⁴² Pri Deleuzu torej ponavljanje je *reprodukcija* – a le kot površina, pod katero deluje globoko areproduktibilno ponavljanje kot gibanje čiste diferencialnosti –, obenem pa je ta čista diferencialnost za Deleuza ravno gibanje *variacij*.

V nasprotju s Heglovim, Kierkegaardovim in Lacanovim prepričanjem za Deleuza variacija ni nek zunanji dodatek k ponavljanju, ki na napačnem koncu zgrabi razliko, jo designira in s tem prikriva ali blokira gibanje ponavljanja, temveč je, ravno nasprotno, njegov pogoj in konstitutivni element. Prav logika variacije, ki deluje onkraj reprezentacije, pa nas opozarja na to, da pri Deleuzu areprezentabilno polje nikakor ni tudi a-designativno – nasprotno, zamaskirano ponavljanje nam razgrne kompleksno Deleuzovo teorijo znaka, katere temeljna naloga je asimetrična sinteza čutnega. Deleuzova teorija znaka razlikuje med signali, znaki in simulakri: signal je sistem, sestavljen iz vsaj dveh heterogenih serij, ki sta sposobni vstopiti v komunikacijo, znak pa je fenomen, ki se zgodi znotraj takšnega sistema, ki pljuska čez intervale in omogoča komunikacijo med serijami. Znak je bistveno nek učinek, posledica, ki ima dva aspekta: po eni strani izraža produktivno simetrijo, po drugi strani pa teži k ukinitvi te simetrije. Teoretsko razvitje asimetrične sinteze čutnega nam razkrije enega od temeljnih zastavkov Deleuzove teorije ponavljanja – povezavo med *pojavi* in *stvarmi na sebi*, ki jo zastavi kot konceptualno povezavo med *raznolikostjo* in *razliko*: raznolikost je dana kot *phenomenon*, razlika pa je *noumenon* – je to, preko česar je dano dano kot raznoliko. Raznolikost se nanaša na razliko, ki je njen nujni pogoj in zado- stni razlog, pri čemer je njuna povezava najčistejša znotraj simulakrov kot čistih diferencialnih sistemov, kjer se različno nanaša na različno s sredstvi razlike same – v njih ni predhodne identitete ali notranje podobnosti.

⁴² Cf. Alenka Zupančič, »Ponavljanje«, *Filozofski vestnik*, Ljubljana, 1/2007, str. 57–79.

Ker torej Deleuzova dimenzija areprezentabilnega ponavljanja (kot prepleta gola in preoblečenega ponavljanja) ni a-designativna, temveč razgrinja določeno označevalno logiko, ki pa ni logika identitete koncepta, lahko rečemo, da ključna razlika med Lacanovo in Deleuzovo koncepcijo ponavljanja ni v tem, da se pri Lacanu razlika vpisuje v samo označevalno strukturo, pri Deleuzu pa deluje onkraj nje, ampak v tem, da se sam vpis razlike v označevalno strukturo dogaja na bistveno drugačen način: pri Lacanu kot zev, manko, negacija, pri Deleuzu pa kot čista afirmacija. In prav ta vpis je tisti, ki v temelju določa samo logiko designacije: medtem ko Lacanovo simbolno polje v osnovi izhaja iz strukturalistične redukcije (stvar sama je vselej že pojem), zaradi česar je areprezentabilni element v simbolnem lahko prisoten le na način odsotnosti – kot objekt *a*, ki vselej manjka na svojem mestu, pa je Deleuzova stava v apriorni areprezentabilni sintezi fenomenalnega in noumenalnega, ki mora preseči zastavek Kantove estetike:

Če se nam zdi ta estetika globlja od Kantove, je to zaradi tehle razlogov: Kant je z definicijo pasivnega jaza kot preproste receptivnosti predpostavil že izoblikovane občutke, ki jih je nato zgolj navezal na *apriorno* formo njihove reprezentacije, določeno kot prostor in čas. Na ta način je ne le poenotil pasivni jaz, s tem ko si je prepovedal postopno sestavljanje prostora, ne le prikrajšal ta pasivni jaz za sleherno moč sinteze (kolikor je sinteza prihranjena za dejavnost), temveč je poleg tega Estetiko ločil na dva dela, na objektivni element občutka, ki ga jamči forma prostora, in subjektivni element, ki ga utelešata ugodje in bolečina. V nasprotju s tem pa je bil cilj zgornjih analiz pokazati, da je treba receptivnost definirati z oblikovanjem lokalnih jazov, pasivnih sintez kontemplacije in kontrakcije, ki hkrati pojasnijo možnost doživljanja občutkov, moč njihove reprodukcije in vrednost načela, ki jo prevzame ugodje.⁴³

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Naloga, ki si jo zastavi Deleuze, je precej težavna: ponavljanje je potrebno obravnavati kot spremembo v objektu in obenem kot spremembo v duhu, ki ga kontemplira, pri čemer je tovrstna obravnava veljavna le, kolikor se dogaja z obeh strani hkrati. In prav v tem navzkrižnem pogledu, ki po eni strani misli objekt kot stvar samo in obenem kot fenomen za subjekta, po drugi strani pa subjekta postavlja kot receptivnega, čutečega, mislečega, kot fenomenološki subjekt, obenem pa ga postavi tudi kot nekakšno delno, disperzivno realiteto, ki je sama objektivirana, ki obstaja poleg stvari same kot njen komplement za nek nedo-

⁴³ Deleuze, *Razlika in ponavljanje*, str. 172.

ločen pogled od zunaj, v tem težko zapopadljivem konceptualnem škiljenju, je trans-kantovska stava Deleuzove filozofije, ki naj bi skozi logiko vzajemnega pogojevanja in proizvajanja dokončno povezala subjekt in objekt. Toda natanko takšna je v končni fazi tudi Heglova trans-kantovska stava: duh je samorazvitje sveta (perspektiva na sebi) toliko kot je svet samorazvitje duha (perspektiva za zavest), pri čemer je ključni uvid te stave prav prepoznanje te dvojnosti pogleda (perspektiva za nas), tega škiljenja, cilindričnega zamika, ki horizont z dveh strani hkrati pretaka v singularno točko pogleda, in ki zapopade vsako zunanost kot svojo lastno notranjo razpoko.⁴⁴

Vrnimo se za hip še enkrat k Jacobiju, in mu zastavimo vprašanje v zvezi z nečim, kar zaradi očitne nesmiselnosti močno spominja na namerno nastavljeno kost, ponujeno v glodanje: kakšno za vruga naj bi bilo *brezglasno piskanje*? Odgovoriti si bomo morali seveda sami, roko pa nam bo vendarle ponudil Hegel. Recimo, da ideja brezglasnega piskanja ni nič drugega kot metaforična zgostitev Jacobijeve ironije: je natanko paradoks, ki kaže na temeljno nemožnost in nedejanskost čiste miselne abstrakcije, katere se je, pravi Hegel, Jacobi dobro zavedal. Pa vendar Jacobi vztraja v tej miselni abstrakciji, da bi pokazal nemožnost prehoda v drugo: prekinitve piskanja, prestopa od čistega vokala k samoglasniku, itd.. S tem se strinja tudi Hegel – čista miselna abstrakcija na sebi je neka nemožna, nedejanska konstrukcija. Toda to ne pomeni – in natanko v to točko se zadrejo puščice Heglove kritike Jacobijeve kritike Kanta –, da je treba ovreči Kantovo apriorno sintezo samozavedanja. Prav nasprotno, treba jo je razumeti natanko v smislu krika, ki šele vzpostavi tišino, v smislu določnosti, ki je pogoj možnosti vsake nedoločnosti – in obratno. Jacobijevo kost, namenjeno glodanju, je treba (v koraku s Heglom) kar pregrizniti: postavimo, da pri ideji brezglasnega piskanja ne gre za nedejanskost miselne abstrakcije, od koder se ni mogoče nikamor premakniti, ampak gre za to, da je vsak, še tako abstrakten pojem, vselej že posredovan. Piskanje se tako postavlja kot pogoj možnosti brezglasnosti – a brezglasnosti, brez katere tudi ni glasu.

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Tako Hegel kot Deleuze torej za izhodišče svoje koncepcije ponavljanja vzame ta Kantovo apriorno sintezo samozavedanja, ki jo oba postavita kot *imanentno*. Toda medtem ko Hegel kot temeljni mehanizem te sinteze vzpostavi negacijo,

⁴⁴ Cf. Kolenc, Bara, »Surova ponovitev: Deleuze in Freud«, *Problemi*, DTP, Ljubljana, 1–2/2015, str. 186

Deleuze vztraja pri diferencialnosti kot strogo afirmativni sintezi fenomenalnega in noumenalnega. Na tej točki se moramo vrniti k Deleuzovemu spregledu Kierkegaardove sheme paradoksa – sheme izhodiščne nemožnosti kot pogoja možnosti mišljenja –, ki nas privede do temeljne razlike med Kierkegaardovo, Heglovo in Lacanovo koncepcijo ponavljanja na eni strani ter Deleuzovo na drugi strani. V osnovi gre za to, da je za Kierkegaarda, Hegla in Lacana simbolno ponavljanje možno natanko kot nemožno: simbolna podvojitve kot ponovitve istega je nemožna ravno v tem, da je sama pogoj možnosti razlike – in obenem je seveda tudi razlika nemožna natanko v tem, da je sama pogoj možnosti ponavljanja istega. Toda – in v tem je ključ – ravno skozi to dvojno steno nemožnosti sta tako ponavljanje kot razlika možni, a možni sta le onkraj vsakršne reprodukcije na eni strani in variacije na drugi strani. Kajti kolikor je v ponavljanje vselej že vpisana razlika, se to ponavljanje v temelju ločuje od reprodukcije, in kolikor ponavljanje ne more biti reprodukcija, toliko je variacija neka napačna pot do razlike, saj predpostavlja reproduktivno dimenzijo ponovitve, znotraj katere je potrebno – na ravni simbolnega – zajeti razliko. Za Deleuza ta logika seveda ni legitimna, ker izhaja iz negacije. Toda – in s tem se mora soočiti vsak pozitivizem – negacije se ni tako lahko znebiti, ker se o njeni možnosti lahko izrečemo le na dva načina: bodisi jo afirmiramo, in jo privzamemo kot možno, bodisi jo zanikamo, s čimer jo spet privzamemo kot možno.

Povzetki | Abstracts

Alain Badiou

Predavanje z dne 23. novembra 2015

Ključne besede: množični umor, sodobni fašizem, vojna, simptom, vrnitev politike

V pričujočem predavanju, ki si je dalo za cilj pojasniti, kaj se je zgodilo 13. novembra v Parizu, je množični umor opredeljen kot eden od simptomov hude bolezni, za katero trpi sodobni svet kot celota, obenem pa so nakazani možni načini zdravljenja te bolezni, pri čemer je množenje podobnih dogodkov v svetu dojet kot zgolj eden od še posebej nasilnih in spektakularnih simptomov. Izhajajoč iz kratke analize sveta, kot ga vidimo danes, vključujoč množične zločine in vojno, ki jo je napovedala država, se predavanje nato ponovno vrne k sedanji situaciji, ki pa ni opisana taka, kot je, marveč kot taka, kot bi jo morali želeli, to je, kot situacijo, v kateri bi volja in delovanje naredila, da podobni simptomi izginejo. V sklepnem delu predavanje nakaže drugačno misel, tako, ki se ogne pastem tako oblikovanja javnega mnenja kot tudi reaktivni usmeritvi države. Taka misel je osredinjena na pogoje vrnitve politike, natančnejše, vrnitve emancipatorne politike, torej tiste politike, ki zavrača svojo umestitev znotraj okvirov sveta, kot je bil opisan na začetku predavanja.

Alain Badiou

Lecture of 23rd November 2015

Key words: mass murder, contemporary fascism, war, symptom, the return of politics

In this lecture, which aims at an elucidation of what happened on the 13th of November in Paris, the speaker designates the perpetrated mass murder as one of many current symptoms of a serious disease of the contemporary world as a whole, while attempting at the same time to outline the possible ways for a healing of this disease, of which the proliferation of similar events in the world is but a particularly violent and particularly spectacular symptom. Starting out from a brief analysis of the world as it is today, characterised by mass crimes and the war declared by the State, the speaker then returns to the actual situation, describing it not as it is, but rather as the situation that we should desire that it becomes, involving the will and action that will make similar symptoms disappear. In conclusion, the speaker considers the possibility of a different thought, one that would evade the traps of the shaping of public opinion and the reactive orientation of the State. Such a thought will focus on the conditions of what the speaker calls a return of politics, more precisely, a return of emancipatory politics, this being a politics that will reject all inclusion within the framework of the world, as was described at the beginning.

Alan Bass

Heideggerjevska Stvar

Ključne besede: fetiš, stvar, transcendentalna imaginacija, avtoafekcija, četverje

Pričujoči članek je del osežnejšega projekta o zgodovini fetišizma. Ker fetišizem zmerom zadeva razmerje med umom in stvarjo, nujno vključuje povezanost uma in stvari. Heidegger se je še zlasti izčrpno ukvarjal z vprašanjem možnosti povezanosti uma in stvari. Začenši z *Bitjo in časom* ter *Kantom in problemom metafizike, Kaj je stvar?* in poznim spisom »Stvar«, pričujoči članek preiskuje Heideggerja ravno v luči ključnega vprašanja o ponovnem premisleku »uma« in stvari.

Alan Bass

The Heideggerian Thing

Key words: fetish, thing, transcendental imagination, auto-affectation, fourfold

This essay is part of a larger project on the history of fetishism. Because fetishism always concerns the relation between mind and thing, it assumes the relatedness of mind and thing. The possibility of the relatedness of mind and thing has been treated in depth by Heidegger. Starting with *Being and Time*, and then *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, What Is A Thing?*, and the late essay on "The Thing" the essay examines Heidegger on the crucial question of rethinking "mind" and thing.

Rosaura Martinez Ruiz

Freud in Derrida: pisava in spekulacija (ali ko prihodnost vdre v sedanjost)

Ključne besede: Freud, Derrida, spekulacija, pisava, *hauntologie*, bit

V pričujočem prispevku analiziram tista vprašanja, s katerimi se je ukvarjala psihoanaliza, ki so bila izziv za Derridajevo filozofsko misel. Pri tem sem izpostavila tri taka temeljna vprašanja, ki sodijo na področje »spekulativnega/spekularnega«, ki je obravnavano tako s spektralnega kot z ekonomskega vidika. Gre za virtualnost psihičnega, idejo o mnemični sledi in naknadnosti (*après-coup*). V *To Speculate – on »Freud«* Derridajevo reflektivno in kritično podjetje nima ene same smeri, kajti dekonstruktivistični vidik, ki implicira kritiko metafizičnih predpostavk psihoanalize, z *Onstran načela ugodja* ponuja refleksijo o Derridajevem lastnem filozofskem razmišljanju, kjer nastopa podoba biti kot spekulativna ekonomija. Še več, Freudova psiha ni več razkrita kot a priori, temveč kot produkt odseva več kot enega »zrcala«. Interakcije med različnimi psihičnimi sistemi so po Freudu resda ekonomski, toda ta ekonomija je tudi sama spekulativna v več pomenih: prvič, različni sistemi se spreminjajo transverzalno, drugič, vključujejo modifikaci-

je v terminih utroška ter prihodnjih projekcij razmerja bolečina/ugodje. Mnemična sled je namreč pri Freudu rezultat razmerij med različnimi silami vdora in upiranja, katerih rezultat ni nikdar predvidljiv. Kajti tudi psihični čas in čas hauntološke ontologije sta oba nelinearni temporalnosti, ki odpirata možnost za prihodnje prekrivanje. Na podlagi povedanega vztrajam, da je razmerje med derridajevsko *hauntologie* in freudovsko metapsihologijo spekularno.

Rosaura Martínez Ruiz

Freud and Derrida: writing and speculation (or when the future irrupts in the present)

Key words: Freud, Derrida, speculation, writing, hauntology, Being

In this paper I analyse the questions of psychoanalysis that excited Derrida's philosophical thought, I would point out three as the most fundamental that, in addition, belong altogether to the realm of the "speculative/specular" in its spectral as well as economic senses. These are: the virtuality of the psyche, the idea of the mnemonic trace and that of "deferral" (*après-coup*). In *To Speculate — on "Freud"*, it becomes very clear that Derrida's reflexive and critical exercise does not have only one direction, i.e. at the same time that, from a deconstructive interest, he criticises the metaphysical assumptions of psychoanalysis, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* reflects on his philosophical thinking an image of Being as a speculative economy. Moreover, the Freudian psyche is no longer unveiled as an *a priori*, but as a product of the reflection of more than one "mirror". The interactions between the different psychic systems are, according to Freud, economic, but this economy is also speculative in more than one sense: first, the different systems are altered transversally and second, they negotiate in terms of expense, savings, and pain/pleasure future projections. Besides, the mnemonic trace is, in Freud, the outcome of relationships between different forces of irruption and resistance whose result is never predictable. And finally, psychic time and the time of *hauntological* ontology are both non-linear temporalities wherein the *possibility* of a future overflowing is always at play. In this sense, I will maintain that Derridian hauntology and Freudian meta-psychology have a specular relationship.

Vladimir Safatle

Časovnost, ontologija, dialektika: Hegel proti formalnemu pojmu časa

Ključne besede: čas, kontingenca, zgodovina, žalovanje, spominjanje

V tem članku avtor pokaže, da je heglovski pojem časa odločna kritika vsakega pojma čiste forme časa oziroma pojmov časa kot subjektivne kategorije zaznavanja, kot jih najdemo pri Kantu. Taka zastavitev nalaga razumevanje Heglovega pojmovanja časa kot nečesa, kar se poraja in spreminja kontingentno, razumevanje zgodovinskega časa pa kot objektivnega prostora, ki pojasni dinamiko ontoloških konceptov časa. V tem oziru je

mogoče reči, da si je pričujoči članek dal za nalogo, da kritizira vsako branje, ki ohranja nujnostno ali teleološko naravo heglavske filozofije zgodovine.

Vladimir Safatle

Temporality, ontology, dialectics: Hegel against a formal concept of time

Key words: time, contingency, history, mourning, recollection

This article aims to show how the Hegelian concept of time is a strong critique against every notion of the pure form of time or against notions of time as a subjective category of perception, as we can find in Kant. This implies understanding how, for Hegel, the form of time is engendered and modified by contingency, how historical time is the objective space to clarify the dynamic of ontological concepts of time. In this sense, the perspective that this article tries to defend could be understood as a critique of every lecture that sustains the necessarist and teleological character of the Hegelian philosophy of history.

Davide Tarizzo

Vrata

Ključne besede: Foucault, Deleuze, vrata, odpiranje/zapiranje

Michel Foucault in Gilles Deleuze sta si pred leti prizadevala razviti »misel zunaja«. Avtor pričujočega prispevka pa, nasprotno, vztraja, da taka misel vključuje »misel vrat«. Edino z zaprtjem vrat se lahko pojavi nekaj takega kot zunaj. Toda, kaj so vrata? Da bi odgovorili na to vprašanje, je treba zarisati kratko zgodovino vrat, vključno z nekaj teoretskimi refleksijami o ontoloških lastnostih vrat. V sklepnem delu je zastavljeno vprašanje, ali je za človeško bitje mogoče, da živi v svetu brez vrat. Zakaj potrebujemo vrata? Zakaj danes bolj kot kdaj koli prej?

Davide Tarizzo

The Door

Key words: Foucault, Deleuze, door, opening/closing

A few years ago, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze worked out a new concept, “the thought of the outside”. In this paper, I suggest that such a thought implies “the thought of the door”. It is in fact by closing a door that an outside appears. But, then, what is a door? In order to answer this question a brief history of the door is sketched out, together with some theoretical reflections on the ontological properties of doors. In the end, the question is raised as to whether it is possible for human beings to live in a world without doors. Why do we need doors? Why today more than ever?

Diana Gasparyan

Od metafizike k filozofiji razlike: Deleuze in Derrida

Ključne besede: razlika, Deleuze, Derrida, metafizika, nemožnost

Slovita francoska filozofa Jacques Derrida in Gilles Deleuze pogosto imenujemo tudi filozofa Razlike, da bi poudarili pojmovni pomen razlike v njunih delih. Ta članek bom namenila opisu omenjenega pojma ter njegovi vlogi pri osnovanju tako imenovane Filozofije Razlike. Da bi lahko celostno razumeli logiko omenjenih dveh filozofov, bomo morali zaobiti enega najmočnejših očitkov številnim post-modernističnim filozofom. Otresti se bomo namreč morali ideje, da so nasprotniki vsakršne metafizike. Poskusila bom dokazati, da sta Derrida in Deleuze na začetku dediča metafizike, šele kasneje pa prideta do spoznanja o nemožnosti metafizike, kar pa od njiju zahteva paradoksalne formulacije – metafizika namreč kaže na svojo lastno nemožnost, istočasno pa tudi na nemožnost nemožnosti.

Diana Gasparyan

From Metaphysics toward a Philosophy of Difference: Deleuze and Derrida

Key words: difference, Deleuze, Derrida, metaphysics, impossibility

The famous French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze are often called the philosophers of Difference to emphasise the importance of the Difference concept in their works. I dedicate this article to the description of the mentioned concept as well as to its role in the conception of the so-called philosophy of Difference. But to fully understand the logics of these two philosophers, we will need to steer away from one of the strongest prejudices addressed to many post-modernist philosophers. That is, we have to give up the idea of considering them the opponents of any metaphysics. I will try to prove that Derrida and Deleuze begin as heirs of metaphysics and only then come to the impossibility of metaphysics, the statement of which, however, requires paradoxical formulations – the metaphysics points at its own impossibility and simultaneously at the impossibility of impossibility.

Livia Georgeta Suciu

Bližnji dotik med derridajevsko dekonstrukcijo in negativno teologijo: Kenozo jezika in presežek povsem Drugega

Ključne besede: Derrida, dekonstrukcija, negativna teologija, jezik, vera

Jacques Derrida nam predlaga kritiko govornice, izhajajoč iz analize eksemplaričnega primera negativnih teologij, saj so prav te najbolj primerne za razmišljanje o mejah govornice. Tako dekonstrukcija kot negativna teologija priznavata, da nam »preostanek« naših izkušenj uhaja, zaradi česar nismo sposobni, da bi ta preostanek razpoznali v okvirih našega védenja in govornice. Kako lahko torej sploh govorimo o tistem »onkraj«, pa najsi gre za transcendentnost drugega ali pa za transcendentnost Boga? Enega od odgovorov na to lahko najdemo v Derridajevem eseju *Sauf le nom*, v katerem komentira zapise Angela Silezija: S tem, ko se poskuša osvoboditi vsakršne govornice in pripovedi, začne negativna teologija vršiti *kenozo* govornice, in prav to predstavlja pogoj za dogodek, ki se ima pripetiti. Tako se znajdemo na paradoksalnem kraju, kjer se dekonstrukcija sreča z apofatičnim: pragmatična pot nedoločne vere kot take razkrije pojav absolutne singularnosti povsem Drugega.

Livia Georgeta Suciu

The Tryst Between Derridean Deconstruction and Negative Theology: the *Kenōsis* of Language and the Excess of the Entirely Other

Key words: Derrida, deconstruction, negative theology, language, faith

Jacques Derrida proposes a critique of language starting from an analysis of the exemplary case of negative theologies, since it is the latter that bears the most relevance to thinking the limits of language. Both deconstruction and negative theology admit that a "residue" of our experiences escapes, leaving us unable to identify it within the boundaries of our knowledge and language. How can we, therefore, talk about this "beyond", be this the transcendence of the other or of God? We find a way in Derrida's comment on Angelus Silesius from *Sauf le nom*: by trying to set itself free from all language and narrative, negative theology comes to practice the *kenōsis* of language, but precisely this represents the condition for an event to come about. We are led to the paradoxical place where deconstruction meets the apophatic: the pragmatic path of indeterminate faith as such reveals the event of the entirely Other's absolute singularity.

Rastko Jovanov

Heidegger na fronti: metapolitika, zbiranje, vzgoja

Ključne besede: metapolitika, zbiranje, vzgoja, Heidegger, narod, žrtev, prostor

Pričujoči tekst se ukvarja s Heideggerjevimi zasebnimi zapiski o naravi in obsegu njegovega političnega angažmaja, ki so bili objavljeni leta 2014 kot prvi del tako imenovanih »črnih zvezkov«. Ob pojmu »metapolitike«, ki v sicer obsežnem Heideggerjevem opusu nastopi samo na tem mestu, najbolj izstopijo narava, ambivalentnost in tudi osebno mesijanstvo Heideggerjevega duhovno-političnega projekta. Ta je na eni stran pogojen z delovanjem nacionalsocialističnega gibanja, na drugi strani pa negira samo Politično kot nekaj bistvenega za duhovno-politično vodenje, pri čemer istočasno vztraja na zbiranju duhovnih sil, ki bodo nemški narod popeljale k metapolitičnemu ustroju prihodnjega človeškega obstanka v svetu.

Rastko Jovanov

Heidegger on the Frontline: Metapolitics, Gathering, Education

Key words: metapolitics, gathering, education, Heidegger, nation, victim, space

The paper deals with Heidegger private notes on the nature and extent of his own political engagement, which were published in 2014 as the first part of his so-called "black notebooks". With the help of the notion of "metapolitics", which in Heidegger's otherwise vast opus appears only here, nature, ambivalence and Heidegger's personal messianism of his spiritual-political project are outlined. It is conditioned, on one hand by political action of the national-socialist project, while on the other it negates the political as something essential of spiritual-political leadership and at the same time insists on the gathering of spiritual forces that will lead the German nation to a metapolitical constitution of the future of human survival in the world.

Bara Kolenc

Ponavljanje med reprodukcijo in variacijo: Deleuze, Hegel, Kierkegaard

Ključne besede: ponavljanje, reprodukcija, Deleuze, Hegel, Kierkegaard

Izhodiščna teza članka je, da je problematično razmerje med Deleuzovim, Heglovim in Kierkegaardovim konceptom ponavljanja, ki predstavlja ontološko izhodišče njihove filozofije, mogoče natančneje osvetliti skozi razdelavo konceptov *reprodukcije* in *variacije* kot specifičnih aspektov same ideje ponavljanja. S pomočjo hipoteze, da je Kierkegaardov koncept ponovitve mogoče brati skozi nek *dvojni paradoks*, ki ponavljanje loči od vsakršne ideje reprodukcije na eni strani in variacije na drugi strani, najprej pokažemo, da ta dvojni paradoks deluje tudi v Heglovi dialektiki. Iz tega sledi, da Heglova dialektika v nekem temelju smislu ni nič drugega kot ponavljanje *par excellence* – ponavljanje, ki

se strukturira v konceptualnem odmiku tako od ideje reprodukcije kot od ideje variacije. V zadnjem delu članka ugotovimo, da pri Deleuzu dvojni Kierkegaardov paradoks ne deluje, kar podpremo z ugotovitvijo, da v *Razliki in ponavljanju* tako variacija kot reprodukcija predstavljata specifična funkcionalna aspekta ponavljanja. V zaključku pridemo do presenetljive ugotovitve – kolikor je Kierkegaard poleg Nietzscheja pač vodilni paradni konj Deleuzove teorije ponavljanja –, da je Kierkegaardova koncepcija ponavljanja precej bližje Heglovi dialektiki kot pa samemu Deleuzovemu zastavku. To, kar namreč Deleuze v izhodišču spregleda, je, da pri Kierkegaardovi koncepciji paradoksa, ki predstavlja temeljno platformo njegove teorije spoznanja, ne gre za transcendentalno polje mišljenja kot zunanjo mejo misli, temveč za notranje neskladje same možnosti mišljenja, za temeljno nemožnost misli, ki je vpisana v njen register kot manko, negacija, a je kot taka vendarle – in prav v tem je ključ – pogoj možnosti samega mišljenja kot pozitivne produkcije in afirmacije.

Bara Kolenc

Repetition between Reproduction and Variation: Deleuze, Hegel, Kierkegaard

Key words: repetition, reproduction, Deleuze, Hegel, Kierkegaard

The paper departs from the thesis that the problematic relationship between Deleuze's, Hegel's, and Kierkegaard's concept of repetition, which at the same time represents the ontological starting points of their philosophies, can be illuminated through the elaboration of the concepts of *reproduction* and *variation* as specific aspects of the very idea of repetition. With the help of the hypothesis that Kierkegaard's concept of repetition can be read through a *double paradox* that separates repetition from reproduction, on one hand, and variation on the other, we show that this double paradox is also presented in Hegel's dialectics. The consequence of that is that in the final analysis Hegel's dialectics is nothing but repetition *par excellence* – repetition that conceptually moves away from the idea of reproduction as well as from the idea of variation. In the final part of the paper we first state that in Deleuze this double paradox of Kierkegaard does not work, which is further backed up by a statement in *Difference and Repetition* that variation and reproduction represent a specific functional aspect of repetition. The conclusion brings the surprising finding – in so far as Kierkegaard, besides Nietzsche, is a parade horse of Deleuze's theory of repetition – that Kierkegaard's conception of repetition is in fact much closer to Hegel's dialectics than Deleuze's project. Deleuze namely from the very start overlooks that in Kierkegaard's conception of paradox, which represents the fundamental platform of his theory of knowledge, it is not the transcendental field of thinking as the outer limit of thought, but the very discord of the possibility of thought, the fundamental impossibility of thought, that is inscribed in its register as lack, negation, and in what is indeed crucial, the condition of the possibility of thinking as positive production and affirmation.

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1. Gilles-Gaston Granger, *Pour la connaissance philosophique*, Odile Jacob, Pariz 1988, str. 57.
2. Cf. Charles Taylor, "Rationality", v: M. Hollis, S. Lukes (ur.), *Rationality and Relativism*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1983, str. 87–105.
3. Granger, *op. cit.*, str. 31.
4. *Ibid.*, str. 49.
5. Friedrich Rapp, "Observational Data and Scientific Progress", *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, Oxford, 11 (2/1980), str. 153.

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