1. Freud’s Speculation

Any consideration of psychoanalysis as a discourse is confronted with a specific problem: It is impossible to claim a standpoint outside psychoanalysis that could not be subjected to a psychoanalytic cure. This problematic contains two separate aspects, namely not only that it is impossible to conceive of ‘the psychoanalysis’ from some external, apparently unobserved point of view: Any such point can be analysed; but also, there exists perhaps no such thing as ‘the psychoanalysis’, as it would threaten to decompose itself. Any consideration of psychoanalysis in general is bound to speculation: speculation that enables us to construct something such as ‘psychoanalysis’ in the first place.

A speculative hypothesis needs to be posited. But it will become apparent that a speculative hypothesis on psychoanalysis is already posited within psychoanalysis itself. Speculation on psychoanalysis, then, in a Hegelian sense, has to exceed the difference between a represented object and the knowing or speculating subject. But if speculation inheres in psychoanalysis, the question arises whether speculation not only exceeds the gap between object and subject, but is also itself a site at which philosophy and psychoanalysis collide, differentiate, and overlap. Speculation would be situated beyond the gap between the object and subject, and its site itself would be split.

We proceed hypothetically, and we assume that the ground and the figure of this assembly, the territory of the assembly of the moments of speculation in psychoanalysis, can be addressed in the figure of the psyche. The psyche comprehends a correlation between unconscious acts and the consciousness, a relation that not only opens the question as to the reality of the unconscious, but also renders the structure of the consciousness doubtful and turns it into an unsecure ground. From either side, the other is proven ambivalent. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which remains, on the one hand, a continuous source of
Freudian psychoanalysis, but on the other also prepared all the sites at which the moments of speculation will subsequently occur, we are warned not to misunderstand the notion of psychic reality as something that could be rendered in material terms: “If we look at unconscious wishes reduced to their most fundamental and truest shape, we shall have to conclude, no doubt, that psychical reality is a particular form of existence not to be confused with material reality.”

Nevertheless, for Freud the unconscious, as he had already stated some pages before, is the “true psychical reality.” But even if it may be the ‘true’ psychical reality, the unconscious is not the complete psychic reality. The complete psychic reality Freud sought to picture within the famous structure of the topic, which he calls the structure of the ‘mental apparatus’. Referring to Gustav Theodor Fechner, Freud writes:

What is presented to us in these words is the idea of psychical locality. I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental apparatus with which we are here concerned is also known to us in the form of an anatomical preparation, and I shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine psychical locality in any anatomical fashion.

As is widely known, in The Interpretation of Dreams Freud then developed the so-called first topic; the second model would then be used from the 1920s onwards and is mainly explained in the text The Ego and the Id. For our concerns, it is important to emphasise that both of the topics do not simply represent psychic reality as such, they are rather intended to offer a topology, which we might only take as an aid to read the structure of psychic reality. Already from this point of view it becomes very ambivalent to consider the unconscious as the ‘true psychic reality’. Whatever ‘true’ means, it does not refer to completeness; it rather intends to say something like the ‘essential’. In the second topic Freud then transfers the model of the preconscious, unconscious, and conscious into the structure of the Id, Ego, and Superego and thus severs the unconscious from the limits of an entity within the mental apparatus. The ‘true’ is now displaced.

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2 Ibid., p. 607.
3 Ibid., p. 538.
The psyche moves and develops between two different models and thus is in itself a volatile ground upon which we will attempt to reconstruct the figures of speculation. It is an experimental arrangement, which is supposed to help us to think a genuine relation between psychoanalysis and philosophy. But as there are many, we will only attempt to circumscribe the contours of one of these relations, namely a potential failure in this orientation. Philosophy may come too close to psychoanalysis and lose its proper being in this contact. The outlines of such a problematic – this is what we will propose – can be seen in Derrida’s account of philosophy, to which we will refer later.

It is for this purpose that we risk the speculation of constructing a speculative site named the psyche. And we will build this site out of three different moments of speculation: the beginning, the inmost, and the end. Speculation occurs in relation to the ground of the figure, then in relation to its finitude and figurative structure, and finally to its speculative infinity. We construct the psyche as if it were a site in which three different points of speculation are connected: the point of the beginning (its ground), of the inmost (its figure), and of its closure (its infinity).

Furthermore, we will refer to three different points in Freud’s oeuvre. As for what concerns the beginning, it seems legitimate to turn to *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which is – according to several instances in which Freud underlined this himself – the starting point of psychoanalysis. As for what concerns the inmost, it is our hypothesis that the speculation marks a transition, a relation of exchange, in which something outer necessarily appears in the inner: This is, according to Freud’s own conception, the death drive, which Freud himself called a “far-fetched speculation.” In what finally concerns the question of closure, we will then again pick up a famous posthumous note – “[p]syche is extended, knows nothing about it” – because the question of the (bodily) extension provides an effective reality to the psychic reality and relates it to the question of finitude. This construction will be our preliminary speculation, before we attempt to read Derrida’s reflection on it.

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Let’s begin with a rather rough outline of the Freudian project, which might assume at first that Freud’s construction of the unconscious is the discovery of a paradigmatic alterity in relation to consciousness. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud points to the “great Fechner,” who said that “the scene of action of dreams is different from that of waking ideational life.”6 This remark was soon turned into the emblematic phrase of the ‘other scene’ on which the unconscious takes place and which Freud localises in the innermost of the first model of the mental apparatus in *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1900. Freud begins by introducing a basic model, according to which any stimuli are transferred from the “perceptual end to the motor end.”7 This model is then refined by several psychic instances or systems in which stimuli are treated differently. First of all, arousals that are transcribed into permanent or lasting traces result in “memory-traces.”8 Then, referring to the already achieved work on the dream, Freud adds the difference between a criticising instance and a criticised instance: The criticising instance will be called the *preconscious*, a system that he will abbreviate as *Pcs*. The preconscious still has access to the conscious, but also closes off the *unconscious* behind it. “We will describe the system that lies behind it as ‘the unconscious’, because it has no access to consciousness except via the preconscious, in passing through which its excitatory process is obliged to submit to modifications.”9

Later, in the edition of 1925, Freud adds a footnote to this last sentence that reads: “If we attempted to proceed further with this schematic picture, in which the systems are set out in linear succession, we should have to reckon with the fact that the system next beyond the *Pcs.* is the one to which consciousness must be ascribed—in other words, that *Pcpt.* = *Cs.*”10 A stimulus then may stem from any of the systems, but the preconscious, the criticising instance, regulates access to reality and will also give such a form to unconscious wishes that reality can be brought into accordance with them. The entirety of these systems

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7 Ibid., p. 539.
8 Ibid., p. 544.
9 Ibid., p. 546.
has been called the first topic. It allows for three different kinds of regression, ‘regression’ not in relation to the path from the ‘perception end’ to the ‘motor end’, but a regression in terms of the apparatus itself. In the dream, a conscious remainder of the day will be connected to the unconscious, thus it enables a “topographical regression,” but then there is also a “temporal regression, in so far as what is in question is a harking back to older psychical structures,” and finally a “formal regression, where primitive methods of expression and representation take the place of the usual ones.”

The dream serves for Freud not only as a specific example, but rather it also proves the difficulties of the topical understanding of the mental apparatus. The dream in its main characteristic is an expression of a wish fulfilment, and will be adjusted to avoid censorship by using the means of “displacement, condensation and overdetermination” and also “considerations of representability.” But as the work of censorship is continued in the “secondary process,” i.e. in the reproduction after awakening, only the manifest dream content emerges, out of which the latent dream thoughts have to be gained in the analysis. Often, the distinction between the latent dream thoughts and the manifest dream content is identified with the distinction between the edited, censored, and condensed dream and its unconscious content, which is not precise enough.

The dream-thoughts and the dream-content are presented to us like two versions of the same subject-matter in two different languages. Or, more properly, the dream-content seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression, whose characters and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation.

However, it is decisive to see that the unconscious wish does not simply form the encrypted content, but is mixed with the latent thoughts of the day, so that the latent dream thoughts are composed by the dream-work out of the unconscious wish and the thoughts of the day. This clarifies, already in The Interpretation of Dreams, the dynamic aspect of the unconscious, even if the first topic

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11 Ibid., p. 549.
12 Ibid., p. 452.
13 Ibid., p. 585.
14 Ibid., p. 295.
and its ‘systems’ of the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious present a relatively rigid distinction. In the *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* from 1917 the threefold structure of the dream becomes clearer:

The only essential thing about dreams is the dream-work that has influenced the thought-material. We have no right to ignore it in our theory, even though we may disregard it in certain practical situations. Analytic observation shows further that the dream-work never restricts itself to translating these thoughts into the archaic or regressive mode of expression that is familiar to you. In addition, it regularly takes possession of something else, which is not part of the latent thoughts of the previous day, but which is the true motive force for the construction of the dream. This indispensable addition is the equally unconscious wish for the fulfilment of which the content of the dream is given its new form. A dream may thus be any sort of thing in so far as you are only taking into account the thoughts it represents—a warning, an intention, a preparation, and so on; but it is always also the fulfilment of an unconscious wish and, if you are considering it as a product of the dream-work, it is only that. 

Psychoanalysis thus does not simply focus on the latent content, but rather on the form in which this content is encrypted, and it takes this form – the work – to be the specific unconscious message. In the dream-work, the dynamic of the unconscious process is thus foreshadowed, even if this moment is not inscribed into the first topic.

How, then, can we understand the place of the unconscious as the other scene? The place of the unconscious is consequently another scene in the same apparatus, but the unconscious is not only another scene, it is also the other scene of the conscious or even the other scene of thought: The wish is unconscious, and the work on it is an “unconscious process of thought.” But taken as such a thought process, its ‘otherness’ becomes even more remarkable. For we are told


16 Here I follow an argument first put forward by Slavoj Žižek, who also refers to the given quote. See Slavoj Žižek, *Incontinence of the Void. Economico-Philosophical Spandrels*, p. 185.

17 Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, p. 298.
that in the unconscious thought process not only the order of time but also the law of contradiction are suspended.

The way in which dreams treat the category of contraries and contradictories is highly remarkable. It is simply disregarded. “No” seems not to exist so far as dreams are concerned. They show a particular preference for combining contraries into a unity or for representing them as one and the same thing. Dreams feel themselves at liberty, moreover, to represent any element by its wishful contrary; so there is no way of deciding at a first glance whether any element that admits of a contrary is present in the dream-thoughts as a positive or as a negative.18

Only a few pages later, Freud corrects this point and attributes to dreams that are oriented by anxiety the possibility to interrupt itself with a ‘no’. Then again, subsequently in 1915, Freud will describe the unconscious as definitely being bereft of any negation:

What we call our ‘unconscious’—the deepest strata of our minds, made up of instinctual impulses [Triebregungen]—knows nothing that is negative, and no negation; in it contradictories coincide. For that reason it does not know its own death, for to that we can give only a negative content.19

Furthermore, the unconscious wish is active at any moment, and it serves as a source of energy for the dream-work. To summarise: What we get is an other scene, filled with active wishes that do not know any negation, and which have been taken out of the normal line of perception-motility.

At this point, the formation of the unconscious already exceeds by far the description of a collection of memories that are no longer beholden to the conscious. Viewed from this angle, the aspect of repression becomes decisive, for it is in the theory of repression that a fundamental paradox of the dream be-

18 Ibid., p. 334.
comes visible: Why are affirmative wishes, whose fulfilment creates pleasure, repressed?

Linguistic usage hits the mark in speaking of the ‘suppression’ [i.e. the ‘pressing down’] of these impulses [Impulse, JV]. The psychical arrangements that make it possible for such impulses [Wünsche, JV] to force their way to realization remain in being and in working order. Should it happen, however, that a suppressed wish of this kind is carried into effect, and that its inhibition by the second system (the system that is admissible to consciousness) is defeated, this defeat finds expression as unpleasure. 20

In this passage Freud suggests that the wish is seen as creating unpleasure from the point of view of the preconscious. But then, toward the end of the book, in the famous seventh chapter on the psychology of the dream-process, Freud offers the following formula:

Let us assume, then, that the suppression of the Ucs. is necessary above all because, if the course of ideas in the Ucs. were left to itself, it would generate an affect which was originally of a pleasurable nature, but became unpleasurable after the process of ‘repression’ occurred. The purpose, and the result too, of suppression is to prevent this release of unpleasure. The suppression extends over the ideational content of the Ucs., since the release of unpleasure might start from that content. 21

At this point we might formulate the open problematic of The Interpretation of Dreams: Why at all is the wish repressed in the first place? Freud assumes that the conscious processes prevent the wish from permeating into it while the body is awake. They are restrained in favour of the conscious; the reality principle interrupts the pleasure principle. But thus we are left with a contradictory account of the wish: as the intention of pleasure that is regarded as creating unpleasure. The problem is not solved by the reference to the reality principle, for it is not clear how a wish can be assumed to be pleasurable and unpleasurable within the same apparatus. Freud subsequently formulates this very clearly in his article Repression:

20 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 255.
21 Ibid., p. 580.
It is not easy in theory to deduce the possibility of such a thing as repression. Why should an impulse of a drive undergo a vicissitude like this? A necessary condition of its happening must clearly be that the drive’s attainment of its aim should produce unpleasure instead of pleasure. But we cannot well imagine such a contingency. There are no such drives: satisfaction of a drive is always pleasurable. We should have to assume certain peculiar circumstances, some sort of process by which the pleasure of satisfaction is changed into unpleasure.\(^{22}\)

Here a difference is inscribed. Instead of the repression of a wish, now the repression of the impulse of a drive is marked. If we take this back to The Interpretation of Dreams, we see that the understanding of repression as the repression of wishes is organised according to the topic: Repressed wishes are those that do not accept the reality principle. What is repressed is a content, and this content then figures as the unconscious. But as was to be seen, the unconscious already also informs the form of the dream-work, and as such the unconscious is unregistered in the first topic. The unconscious wish should not be confused with a material reality, and it combines a pleasurable with an unpleasurable side, oscillating between form and content. Three different sites of speculation in Freud’s oeuvre respond to these difficulties.

1) To begin with, two operations that belong together react to the problem of form and content. There is the speculative operation of the drive, on the one hand, and the speculative operation of the primal repression, on the other. One of the most concise definitions of the drive can be found in the text of The Unconscious, where Freud writes:

A drive can never become an object of consciousness—only the idea that represents the drive can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, a drive cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea. If the drive did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it.\(^{23}\)


And then Freud introduces in the text of *Repression* the difficult question of primal repression:

We have reason to assume that there is a *primal repression*, a first phase of repression, which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative of the drive being denied entrance into the conscious. With this a *fixation* is established; the representative in question persists unaltered from then onwards and the drive remains attached to it.24

The mystical first moment of repression here still resembles the rejection of a ‘wish’, only now the cause and its representative are distinguished. But this distinction also obscures the point of beginning: The drive and its representative unfold a play, in the course of which the objectivity of a clear source of repression is rendered ambivalent. “*Repression proper,*” Freud continues, will work upon “mental derivatives of the repressed representative” and is “actually an after-pressure.”25 Moreover, these derivatives do not continue in the form of a representative chain, they work “in a highly individual manner,”26 and thus a relation of cause and effect is turned into energetic differences, whose ground absents itself.

The consciousness now has to keep the pressure from the unconscious at bay, and therefore it needs to develop countercharges. The unconscious finds its expression in its effects, cut off from a clear, objective source. The primal repression becomes in its tendency intelligible as a moment of the structure of repression: It is actually the repression of repression as such. But what does this mean? The unity of the conscious does not entail the unconscious as one of its parts, but it rather cannot act differently than to present the forces of the unconscious in its acts. The unconscious is not another consciousness; its acts are differential acts that cannot be reduced to a singular source. Speculatively, one might conclude that it is the primal repression that marks the structure of repression which separates the consciousness in its unity from its difference. And precisely as such, as an agent of differentiation, the primal repression is an instance of speculation. It is a speculation on the question of the beginning: in

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 150.
the precise sense of giving it the form of an intertwined knot in which one part
cannot be read without the other – it is therefore groundless.

2) If we now turn to the second moment of speculation, thus to the speculation at
the inmost of psychoanalysis, then we stay within the terminology of the drive
and get to a problem that occurs again exactly at the site of the impossibility of
a unification. And here, too, we find a moment in The Interpretation of Dreams
that helps us to situate this speculative extension. Beyond the Pleasure Principle
could also be read as Beyond the Interpretation of Dreams, for The Interpretation
of Dreams starts with the authority of the pleasure principle, and the conviction
that any increase in arousal results in unpleasure, so that pleasure stems from
the reduction of arousal. While on one hand unpleasure sometimes needs to be
accepted as a detour to pleasure, pleasure is, on the other hand, reinterpreted
as unpleasure in the course of repression. The problem we find here is not the
problem of a possible origin of repression, but rather the problem that a pro-
cess like that of the pleasure principle is not pure. We could also say: As the
beginning has proven to be not-one, we see now that the process itself is also
being interrupted and continued at the same time. The Interpretation of Dreams
dealt schematically with this problem by opposing the pleasure principle to the
reality principle. But the true problem is the process by which something pleas-
urable becomes a source of unpleasure. Thus, the problem is how the one-sided
notions of the pleasure principle and the reality principle can be transformed in
such a manner that they display their own processual interweaving.

As is known, for Freud, the compulsion to repeat provides a fundamental ir-
ritation of the pleasure principle: How is it possible that the unpleasurable is
repeated over and over again?

To answer this difficulty it then follows what Freud calls the ‘far reaching spec-
ulation’ within his text Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and this speculation be-
gins with a very specific observation:

PsycHé’s speculative figure: freud—derrida
the most universal attribute of mental processes, but only a particular function of them.  

Freud justifies the exception from the pleasure principle, which he will be unfolding and speculating on, with the dreams of those neurotics who bring about a repetition in their dreams, and he derives from this exception, which is an exception from the paradigm of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, a prehistoric past of the dream:

Thus it would seem that the function of dreams, which consists in setting aside any motives that might interrupt sleep, by fulfilling the wishes of the disturbing impulses, is not their original function. It would not be possible for them to perform that function until the whole of mental life had accepted the dominance of the pleasure principle. If there is a ‘beyond the pleasure principle’, it is only consistent to grant that there was also a time before the purpose of dreams was the fulfilment of wishes. This would imply no denial of their later function.

This prehistory of the dream is an inert state of things, and the speculative aspect then consists in the supplementation of occurrences of the drive, additionally understood to be of a conservative character. All of the drives, with the exception of the sexual drives, adhere to this conservative character: They aim at the restitution of a previous state of things, a previous inert state of things. The compulsion to repeat proves to be a movement of regression, against which everything new, irritating, moving, any moment of life, is a moment of interruption. The pleasure principle, as Freud can then conclude, works on behalf of the death drive, and the latter is opposed by the sexual drives or the life drives.

For us, in this context it is mainly of interest how the death drive is situated speculatively. The death drive expresses a moment of the prehistory of life within life, so that it inverts the inner of life (or of the wish) and thereby inscribes a

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29 The aspects of the death drive are complicated and an issue of broad debate, especially Lacan’s reading thereof. A detailed explanation of the differences between Freud’s and Lacan’s notions of the death drive as well as of the inexistence of these differences can be found in Alenka Zupančič, *What is Sex?*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2017, p. 94ff.
prehistory within the timeless structure of the unconscious. This prehistory is not a past history; it can only serve as a demarcation, a closure of its ground: in the middle of the timeless structure of the unconscious, the un-time of the death drive stands out, \textit{ek-sists}, an un-time that does not provide a beginning to the unconscious, but closes it off and opens it at the same time. The death drive is a proper speculation not on the beginning, but on the becoming. The second instance of speculation is thus one that marks the internal ambivalence of the psychic process as such; it inserts the difference of itself, from itself, into the process of the pleasure principle.

3) Now, let us finally turn to the third systematic space of speculation. We find an instance of it in a note that Freud wrote in 1938: “Space may be the projection of the psychical apparatus. No other derivation is probable. Instead of Kant’s \textit{a priori} determinants of our psychical apparatus. Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it.” \textsuperscript{30} What we find here differs from the other two instances of speculation. But even this note at the end of Freud’s life can be referred back to \textit{The Interpretation of Dreams}. As we have already noted, it is in \textit{The Interpretation of Dreams} that Freud conceives of the psyche as being of a different reality that should not be confused with material reality. Here, in this late note, space as a form of the material is a projection, and the extension of the psychic itself can only be understood as a form of projection itself. We could then understand that the psyche projects itself, and finds its extension precisely in this. The actual extension is a psychic extension; space in its actual reality is not simply a projection as if it were not real, but space is then the extension of this projection that the psyche is.

This note is strictly speculative for one specific reason. In a specific manner the note indicates a closure of the unconscious. It dissolves the distinction between the material reality and the psychic reality, but it inscribes this dissolution into the figure of a projection: The psyche has the form and content of its own projection. But at the same time (i.e. in no time), it also keeps the figure of the unconscious open in the sense that the inscription of the psyche in the complete ambivalence between material and psychic reality deprives us of any means to distinguish between material and psychic reality. In finding a form it announces its own infinity – any reality is psychic reality. While Kant wanted

\textsuperscript{30} See note 5.
to determine reality, reality now proves to be a difference within the psychic. Speculation entails infinity in its own figure. Psyche is a groundless infinite difference.

Before we continue with the relation of this figure of speculation to philosophy, a second moment of speculation needs to addressed, and may it be rather quick. This second moment does not concern the figure of the psyche, but its analysis, psychoanalysis, in its relation to the natural sciences. Can the analysis of a speculative figure be a science? One knows that Freud develops psychoanalysis as a series of intertwining but also independent case studies and that he always attempted to keep psychoanalysis within the field of the sciences. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* we find, for example, the following statement:

Dreams and neuroses seem to have preserved more mental antiquities than we could have imagined possible; so that psycho-analysis may claim a high place among the sciences which are concerned with the reconstruction of the earliest and most obscure periods of the beginnings of the human race.31

Freud understands psychoanalysis as a positive science of the psychic occurrences, as a science that has opened new territories for the sciences and uses the same methods as other natural sciences. All the concerns one might raise against this view seem to be inexistent for Freud himself.

But as he insists on the singularity of case studies, Freud is also aware that knowledge gained from single case studies cannot be abstracted into a sort of generalised psychology. But even if psychoanalysis cannot be a generalised empirical science of the psychic, it nevertheless needs to build a fragile frame that allows for the concatenation of the different case studies. Freud’s most decisive attempt to nevertheless generate a level of generality and comparison is to be found in a series of articles known as the metapsychological works. He abandoned this endeavour and we know of only five out of the originally envisaged 12 texts. Metapsychology is a precise attempt to reconcile the singularity of the analysis with the generality of the natural sciences, and it is here that the

decisive moments of speculation take place: at the site of the creation of psychoanalysis as another science.

In between the parameters of case and structure, psychoanalysis unfolds a difference within the self-referential world of the consciousness. Freud, as one knows, declared his enterprise to be the last narcissist slight to the human being, the last in a very famous series of slights: The Copernican turn removed the human being from the centre of the universe; Darwin’s discoveries reduced the uniqueness of the human being to a moment within a series of natural developments; and psychoanalysis finally made the human being aware of the fact that the Ego is not the “master in its own house,” because it is dependent on mostly unconscious forces.32

If we understand the humiliation inflicted by psychoanalysis not in some metaphorical sense, but rather as a real act, then it hits upon the general order of the consciousness, it cannot be reduced to one aspect, and it also cannot be invalidated as a temporary phenomenon. It is valid for all forms of human consciousness, in all variants of practice, and throughout all scientific forms of explanation. It is valid in the individual everyday, just as it is valid for discursive formations such as philosophy and literature. Afterwards, nothing that is related to forms of the consciousness could remain as it used to be.

Psychoanalysis first develops as a series of differences exposed by the individual case studies, then it produces an indeterminable difference from other sciences, and finally psychoanalysis rests on a fundamental difference within the consciousness as such. Psychoanalysis unfolds a difference in a strict sense: In it, the singular localisation overlaps with its universal relevance.

This – concrete and universal – difficulty of psychoanalysis finds its expression in the change from the first to the second topic. While the first topic of The Interpretation of Dreams introduces the distinction between the ‘preconscious’, the ‘unconscious’, and the ‘conscious’ and attempts to classify the contents of the psychic apparatus according to these three systems, the second topic does

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justice to the dynamic and economic aspects. The Ego is no longer considered as a conscious instance opposite to the unconscious forces; rather, the three new distinctions of the ‘Id’, ‘Ego’, and ‘Superego’ are now integrated within one context of a psychic occurrence.

We can see that all the points combine a question of difference and localisation: Any form of difference is located, situated. The case studies are the localisation where everything begins. The question of the human being and its consciousness and unconscious are the inmost of the psychoanalytical process. The relation towards the other sciences is the permanent consideration of its own finitude.

We can then finally relate the three moments of speculation to this process of the localisation of differences. The drive and the primal repression provide an answer to the structure of the case studies: Repression is already there, but it will always be different. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* demonstrates the essential point in psychoanalysis: namely the problem of the inner change. And the claim of the extension of the psyche inscribes psychoanalysis not in a differential manner within the field of other sciences, but rather turns it into the prehistory of the sciences. The psyche, then, is not only a groundless infinite difference, but it is also one that has already taken place, that changes constantly, and it is to be understood as arche-scientific.

2. **Derrida’s Defence**

If this is the figure of the speculative psyche in its analysis, the proper of psychoanalysis, then in what philosophy or in what kind of philosophy could we take refuge, if we want to consider psychoanalysis from the outside? Perhaps the decisive point is not to know or to think psychoanalysis, but rather the question is whether philosophy can react to the speculative figure of the psyche, and therefore, with this aim, address psychoanalysis from the outside. It seems to be evident then that not just any philosophy will be able to do so. In a banal sense, we need to think of ‘a’ philosophy that takes issue with psychoanalysis as such, that is able to let it operate within itself. It would be a different matter to ask the – not so banal – question as to philosophies that do not take issue with psychoanalysis.
But then there is also a second option. It is one thing if a philosophy incorporates psychoanalysis, turns into an object of philosophical thought; but it is another thing if a philosophy can be understood as a consequence of psychoanalysis. This could not be a psychoanalytical philosophy, it could neither be a philosophy that grasps psychoanalysis conceptually; it would rather be a philosophy that takes the margin literally, the margin to which psychoanalysis has brought spirit, the spirit that is the philosophical form of consciousness. This philosophy would need to accept that the concept cannot be the fruit of reason alone, although, as philosophy, it would have to rely on the concept.

Any philosophy always begins, even if only implicitly, as the examination of the possibility of philosophy. And so there might be no philosophy that would understand itself to be the consequence of a given object. But a philosophy that would incorporate psychoanalysis as a form of an existing difference would have to be understood as a consequence of this difference that psychoanalysis is and makes: and the question is whether this is possible.

We will proceed by unfolding two different points: First, we will try to show that Derrida needs to (re)construct psychoanalysis as an ‘other’ to philosophy, thereby necessarily ignoring psychoanalysis as a speculative site (ungrounded, differential, and infinite). Second, we will argue that the deconstruction of this ‘otherness’ of psychoanalysis then leads to an implicit dissolution of both sides – différance abolishes both psychoanalysis and philosophy.

Derrida recognised this proximity between psychoanalysis and philosophy from the very beginning, and he rejected a possible overlapping from the start. Already in 1967 he issued a verdict, which is even stronger as it came about only in the form of a note. We are referring to the article *Freud and the Scene of Writing*, published 1967. To this article some notes are prefixed in which the first part of this talk, a part that is not reproduced in print, is summarised. At the end, we find notes referring to the third part, which is also not printed. Although the gesture of keeping only notes on the introductory part and on the conclusion somewhat mysteriously implies that a recording was perhaps lost or that there was not enough space in the later book, we should abstain from falling into the trap of these hermeneutical assumptions, and rather read it as it
is: In the book, we find a text, accompanied by notes, and this turns the notes into a form of declaration, verdict, limitation, and threshold.

It thus seems justified to take a precise look at them. The notes for the first, introductory, part are divided into two points, and the first sentence of the first part reads famously: “1. Despite appearances, the deconstruction of logocentrism is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy.”

The form of these ‘appearances’ is then indicated in the second sentence, which opens a new paragraph. “These appearances: the analysis of a historical repression and suppression of writing since Plato. This repression constitutes the origin of philosophy as epistēmē, and of truth as the unity of logos and phonē.”

The third and fourth sentences then outline the justification for this claim: For Freud, Derrida argues, repression is connected to an inner force, but it does not react or relate to an external force. “Repression, not forgetting; repression, not exclusion. Repression, as Freud says, neither repels, nor flees, nor excludes an exterior force; it contains an interior representation, laying out within itself a space of repression.”

The repression of writing is then some lines later declared to have been a necessary one; it is not a pathological error, there needs to be a repression of writing, because at first it opens the “possibility of symbolism in general.” And this structure precedes all fundamental oppositions, the one between “man and animal,” but also between “the living and the nonliving.” These are notes on the general functioning of deconstruction, as it seems. But then there is a sentence following directly after the quoted sentence on the ‘repression’ that makes things more complicated.

So, after the reference to the inner force of repression in Freud, Derrida continues: “Here, that which represents a force in the form of the writing interior to

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34 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 247.
37 Ibid.
speech and essential to it has been contained outside speech.”¹³⁸ Now the ‘here’ might be related to deconstruction or back to psychoanalysis. If the former, it would mean: What deconstruction does is rather to contain something outside of speech as its essential moment. If the latter, it would mean: What psychoanalysis does is to keep something outside speech that is essential to it.

But as the repression of writing is declared a necessary moment in the history of Western thought, we can infer that deconstruction attempts to think an external relation as an internal relation, to think the occurrence of repression as an external-internal necessity that infects psychoanalysis, too, while keeping up the externality of this internal moment. If deconstruction thus thinks external forces in and as an internal relation, then it is in this point opposed to psychoanalysis because somehow the latter seems to disregard the pure externality of forces. But as there is an outside necessary to the inside, and the pure inside of repression, without its externality, cannot grasp this outside, deconstruction speculates on the infinite externality of forces.

Thus, on its outside, on its surface, the first note intends to show the ‘appearances’ that rightly juxtapose deconstruction and psychoanalysis: It draws a line from the repression to the failure of repression, the symptomatic return of the repressed, and relates this line to the repression of writing, its failures, and its symptomatic return in the ambivalent form of “presence ‘pure and simple’.”¹³⁹ But this account is perhaps only the official line of the first point. What is latently inscribed is an opposition between the inside and the outside: with psychoanalysis referring to an internal force, while deconstruction relates to external forces as an internal necessity. The first difference is then the following: Deconstruction focuses on a different relation of forces; it not only opposes inner to exterior forces, but attempts to think an external relation as an inner relation (‘necessary’).

Following from this, we will have to ask how far deconstruction then thinks or opposes psychoanalysis, as psychoanalysis to a lesser extent opposes inner drives against external forms, but rather analyses the conflictuality of incorporated forms of the external. Is not this the point of psychoanalysis? That it

¹³⁸ Ibid.
¹³⁹ Ibid.
works on the threshold of the interior and exterior? That is to say, one might wonder whether psychoanalysis thinks an internal force as the conflict of the external, while deconstruction thinks the external as internal. The hidden difference is then that deconstruction insists on the pure externality as such, which is abandoned by psychoanalysis.

The next note (‘2.’) first makes reference to the deep metaphysical bias that is inscribed into the Freudian concepts, which are without exception bound to the history of the metaphysics of presence. And subsequently Derrida notes:

The necessity of an explicit question concerning the meaning of presence in general: a comparison of the undertakings of Heidegger and of Freud. The epoch of presence, in the Heideggerian sense, and its central support, from Descartes to Hegel: presence as consciousness, self-presence conceived within the opposition of consciousness to unconsciousness. The concepts of archi-trace and of différance: why they are neither Freudian nor Heideggerian.  

Finally, then, the différance is indicated as “the pre-opening of the ontic-ontological difference ... and of all the differences which furrow Freudian conceptuality.”

A moment of this appeared already implicitly in the first point, especially the assumption that in deconstruction a difference is written that is of a more fundamental nature than Freudian differences. But here the difference between psychoanalysis and deconstruction is taken to the outside: Deconstruction refers to a difference that precedes Heidegger as well as Freud. The problem is of course that this preceding ‘element’ – différance – is something that is not present. It precedes in its own non-present way. Might we say implicitly? However, therefore it cannot be understood as an opening, but rather only as a pre-opening. In a seeming parallel to the primal repression in Freud, we find something like the primal différance in Freud, but as a différance that still even precedes the primal repression. If repression, as we might assume according to the first point, presents an internal force, then the primal différance is an external and internally necessary moment in relation to repression.

40 Ibid., p. 248.
41 Ibid.
Thus, the second difference: The *différance* does not follow upon psychoanalysis, does not appear within psychoanalysis, but does precede it, in its own non-present way. Logically as well as temporally, one would need to add. Deconstruction’s bet: a necessary preceding difference, inscribed as an externality within the internality of forces. Deconstruction secures its external place in relation to psyche’s *Urverdrängung*.

From these two distinctions, given in the form of notes, which have the advantage of a certain fixation in their brevity, we can infer the frame of doubt. It is perhaps, first of all, not so much a question of whether deconstruction psychoanalyses philosophy. The question is whether the philosophy of deconstruction would not have to become a part of psychoanalysis itself if it were to be able to analyse philosophy: For how to conceive of deconstruction as the psychoanalysis of philosophy without understanding deconstruction as an analysis? Thus, the sentence from the first point actually states: ‘Despite appearances, deconstruction is not psychoanalysis.’ It is not – and this is the explanation – because deconstruction unfolds a *relation* of forces, and does not refer to the *presence* of a force.

Here, then, our doubt is intensified, if Derrida’s thought on Freud culminates in the demonstration that the complete programme that Freud unfolds aims at the dissolution of the unity of ‘a’ force, be it internal or external: “Force produces meaning (and space) through the power of ‘repetition’ alone, which inhabits it originarily as its death.”42 In Freud, too, it can only be about relations, and the interior, the inner, is a hypothesis that finds itself in permanent dissolution.

The second point then declares, localises, the difference with psychoanalysis. But at the same time, difference is being inscribed into an order of succession, allocating a place to psychoanalysis (namely after the pre-opening of *différance*), and ascribing a certain non-place to deconstruction. It becomes impossible then to ask the question of modernity, although it might be necessary to ask it with psychoanalysis, but modernity cannot be taken to be an interruption of thought in this account of deconstruction. By ascribing *différance* to a kind of prehistory, thinking, as an effect of *différance*, is referred to a history that unfolds itself in a succession of continuity. There is a ‘before’ of psychoa-

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nalysis, and even if this ‘before’ is less timely than logical, it is nevertheless not simultaneous, but rather positions psychoanalysis, thus constituting a succession. This is the problematic and the clarity of the note: The prehistory is not gained within psychoanalysis; it is opposed to it, it is posited. We are entering an onto-ontological difference that states a prehistory that dissolves history.

The inner force of psychoanalysis thus is put in opposition to an external force in deconstruction: An interiority of force is inscribed in psychoanalysis that makes it necessary to confront it from the outside. This might be understood as a symptom of a defence: Deconstruction defends itself against its possible turning into psychoanalysis, against the pure interiority of any externality of forces. In this account, then, deconstruction rejects psychoanalysis quite violently as something other, and this might be the case because it came too close. It might be that psychoanalysis has to be an ‘other’ to deconstruction, even more so if deconstruction is to remain the same. Philosophy has to ascribe a ground to psychoanalysis, a sameness and a finitude: It needs to ‘de-specularise’ psychoanalysis to allow for its own site of speculation.

What it is necessary to do then – understanding necessity as the sign of the interiority – is to invert these two points, and to ask if deconstruction is not perhaps a philosophy that follows from psychoanalysis. In contradistinction from the first difference that Derrida points out, the question would be whether deconstruction is not perhaps related to psychoanalysis rather in an internal relation, and in contradistinction from the second difference one would need to ask whether deconstruction perhaps does not precede, but follow.

In an early text from 1967 on the *différance*, the structural overlapping between deconstruction and psychoanalysis can be reconstructed in a first attempt. At first it is only about the suggestion that the problematic covered by the notion of *différance* – the temporised and spatialised occurrence of the difference – was already articulated, before Heidegger, in Nietzsche and Freud. Nietzsche marks a game of self-deferring forces and thus prepares the way for Freud’s deferral of the consciousness. Derrida sees “two apparently different values of *différance* ... tied together in Freudian theory: to differ as discernibility, dis-
tinction, separation, diastem, spacing; and to defer as detour, relay, reserve, temporization."43

For the first ‘value’ Derrida invokes the trace and the ‘Bahmung’/facilitation, which connect the question of memory to the question of the differential deferral and spatialisation. For the second ‘value’, the play of differences is one in which contradictions are suspended, and are transposed into an economy of deferrings and detours.

We now get to the point of the deepest entanglement, given within a long passage, through which we will have to pass.

Here we are touching upon the point of greatest obscurity, on the very enigma of différance, on precisely that which divides its very concept by means of a strange cleavage. We must not hasten to decide. How are we to think simultaneously, on the one hand, différance as the economic detour which, in the element of the same, always aims at coming back to the pleasure or the presence that have been deferred by (conscious or unconscious) calculation, and, on the other hand, différance as the relation to an impossible presence, as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss of presence, the irreversible usage of energy, that is, as the death instinct, and as the entirely other relationship that apparently interrupts every economy? It is evident—and this is the evident itself—that the economical and the noneconomical, the same and the entirely other, etc., cannot be thought together.

If différance is unthinkable in this way, perhaps we should not hasten to make it evident, in the philosophical element of evidentiality which would make short work of dissipating the mirage and illogicalness of différance and would do so with the infallibility of calculations that we are well acquainted with, having precisely recognized their place, necessity, and function in the structure of différance.44

We find here a very complicated structural description of the difference, in which different oppositions are related and in which finally the différance finds

44 Ibid., p. 19.
itself sublated, if not even brought to an implosion. To begin with, the difference is defined as a detour in the element of the same, which is at the same time in relation to the entirely other in the form of an expenditure. *Différance*, that is to say, is an economy that acts within the deferral of pleasure, it is a form of counter-economy: While the conscious or unconscious calculation defers pleasure, *différance* refers back to it. *Différance* then again is an “expenditure without reserve,” and as such it is a non-economy. The detour within the economy then is opposed to its own interruption, to its own end. We are not dealing with the opposition between the temporal moment and the spatial moment here, but we rather have the opposition of these two moments as being combined in the figure of *différance* to the interruption, the end of this figure. *Différance* then is properly shown to be the relation to its own end.

Temporisation and spatialisation form an economy, opposed to which we find on the other side an apparent exclusion of economy. But this exclusion is in a certain sense only an apparent exclusion, for it is impossible, it is what cannot be, namely death. There is a relation at the inside of difference that relates it to its other as to one that is infected with the *Schein*, i.e. mere appearance. If the noneconomic is infected with a *Schein*, this suggests that economy continues to be, even in the form of its absence: Economy prevails.

The conclusion from this opposition can only be given schematically. The passage concludes by saying that the compatibility of both sides is impossible, and declares this impossibility to be the evident. Evidentiality is taken as a philosophical moment, so that we then can say: It is philosophy that is incapable of thinking both sides together, as unified, as philosophy produces the evident. But, here again, philosophy is only one side of what is going on. In contrast with philosophy, as the production of the evident, there is a further moment that appears and which is opposed to this impossibility in thought: *différance*, which is this unthinkability, which is as a phenomenon opposed to philosophy. And it is the unthinkability by way of preserving the fallacious and the illogical.

If we intensify the contrast even a bit more, we then can say: The same cannot be thought together with the other; together it cannot be made evident. What can be made evident is the same, and thus philosophy is what turns the same into the evident of a concept. What cannot be made evident is the other, but the other is, and it appears together with the same. It is an appearance of the
fallacious, but it is also a fallacious appearance, for it cannot be made evident. The appearance of what cannot be thought is the appearance of something that appears alongside the same, but cannot be harmonised with it.

Thus we find an opposition of thought to something that appears, and we find the incapacity of thought to combine thought and being. If we take this back to the field of psychoanalysis, then it becomes clear that Derrida needs to reject the real effectiveness of thought. The thought in psychoanalytical terms would precisely be a thought that has a form of appearance in its effects, and does not lead to something evident, insofar as it is impossible to think the same and the other in one thought: It is impossible to reconcile unconscious thought with conscious thought. Thus Freud’s figure of the unconscious presents a form of difference in which the same cannot be reconciled with the other. But as the figure of the unconscious is inscribed into the conscious, this aspect does directly touch on the question of philosophy. It aims at the inner heart of philosophy, for it would be impossible for philosophy to think what is outside of philosophy. From the point of view of psychoanalysis, it is not possible to reconcile the one with the other in the form of something evident. The psychoanalytic speculation on the inmost of the psyche – the death drive – threatens the philosophical evident as it presents thought as a difference from itself.

But isn’t this precisely Derrida’s idea? Isn’t Derrida’s point that the one and the other cannot be reconciled? And therefore the notion of différance is kept in an undecidable ambivalence between the one and the other. But deconstruction does so, from a philosophical point of view, and even if it keeps the différance in the ambivalence to be there and to be absent at the same time, it allocates a structural place to it, inscribing it into a (pre-)history. From the point of view of psychoanalysis, this would imply that philosophy – deconstruction – misunderstands psychoanalysis here, and is mistaken in its attempt to bring the différance of psychoanalysis to the evident of a structural position.

To rephrase this: Derrida situates the différance of psychoanalysis and declares the impossibility of making the existence of différance evident. But the attempt to situate it is nothing other than the attempt to ascribe evidentiality to it, for the reason that the attempt to situate it relates différance to its other. This turn then makes us suspicious of what philosophy truly is, and it seems that philos-
And it is only from here that we get to the actual point of Derrida’s attempt. For it is not to inscribe \textit{différence} into the clarity of a history of concepts, and it is not to situate the psychoanalytical \textit{différence} within the broader frame of philosophy. Rather, in presenting philosophy as a fallacious attempt to undertake such a clarification, Derrida is exposing philosophy as doing the impossible. While declaring that it is impossible to reconcile the one with the other and simultaneously inscribing the psychoanalytical \textit{différence} within the frame of the \textit{différence} of deconstruction, Derrida destabilises philosophy: Philosophy now becomes the fallacious other of \textit{différence}. We might also say: \textit{Différence} unfolds itself, its extension, in the form of a projection, with psychoanalysis and philosophy being moments thereof. Rather than declaring psychoanalysis to be the ‘other’, philosophy becomes a same.

But this reversal bears a difficulty which results from the transference: If the unconscious is a form of the appearance of the impossible, in which temporisation and spatialisation are connected, then we can also think in the next step the impossible encounter of philosophy and psychoanalysis as a form of \textit{différence}. Philosophy and its evidentiality are bereft of their security, and Derrida’s text itself can only be understood as an attempt to turn the unthinkable into something evident. Philosophy would then be situated at the place of a structural impossibility.

It is precisely this moment that occurs in Derrida’s text some lines later. What might happen at the moment the economic economy and the excessive economy would be connected?

Through such a relating of a restricted and a general economy the very project of philosophy, under the privileged heading of Hegelianism, is displaced and reinscribed. The \textit{Aufhebung – la relève} – is constrained into writing itself otherwise. Or perhaps simply into writing itself. Or, better, into taking account of its consumption of writing.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.
This does not mean that philosophy in its possibility is done away with; it means rather that a deferral of philosophy itself is indicated, a deferral of which it remains unclear if it might not nevertheless question philosophy in its totality. Hegel appears as the counterpoint who would offer a possible form of the unification with the unthinkable in thought, but who needs to be deferred in the direction of an *Aufhebung* that would write itself. Unavoidably so in the mode of writing, that is, in the form of the changing difference which appears in the replacement of the ‘e’ by an ‘a’, as a *différance* which cannot be made evident.

What we see then is that philosophy is now caught by the movement of the existing *différance*; philosophy inscribes itself into the movement of *différance*, or, better put, philosophy is inscribed into the movement of *différance*. “Contrary to the metaphysical, dialectical, ‘Hegelian’ interpretation of the economic movement of *différance*, we must conceive of a play in which whoever loses wins, and in which one loses and wins on every turn.”

Let us first consider the passivity, which is now possible, rendered possible in the writing of the *Aufhebung*. It takes place and is not banished to an order of metaphysics or dialectics. But Hegel, whom Derrida considered to be a thinker of difference, does once more defer the problem, insofar as we can see now that it is not the compatibility of the incompatible that is the main problem for Derrida, but rather the economy of loss. While Hegel, in Derrida’s understanding, is incapable of inscribing a moment of loss into the sublation, the deferral that is undertaken by deconstruction presents an opening towards the notion of loss: The sublation that writes itself enables the loss, thus it inverts itself as an economy, disavows itself, is only the apparent appearance of an economy.

Where have we left Freud in all this? The more philosophy becomes a writing of *différance* itself, the less it can uphold its distinction from psychoanalysis. The more philosophy becomes a writing of *différance*, the less it is able to set up a structure in which the difference of the *différance* of deconstruction and the *différance* of psychoanalysis can be situated. The moment of resistance in which deconstruction rejects psychoanalysis proves to be an indication of their proximity. And the proximity is the site of speculation in which neither one nor the other is, and is only ungrounded, differential, infinite.

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*Différance*, and with it the structure of temporisation and spatialisation, is sublated at the moment in which *différance* cannot be written anymore, but is only writing itself. *Différance* loses itself, it produces the loss of itself. This could, finally, be considered the most essential difference between deconstruction and psychoanalysis: that deconstruction presents an anti-economy of the loss against the economy that seems to organise the processes of the unconscious and that presents itself in the form of effects. Deconstruction then abolishes itself, and if we ask for the reason for this abolishment, and refer it back to the defence against a possible confusion of deconstruction and psychoanalysis, then we can only draw the conclusion that deconstruction abolishes itself because it fears to be abolished by psychoanalysis. The proximity is then to be found in this: Deconstruction wants to be the same as psychoanalysis, but it wants to be it in a different manner, and it fails necessarily in securing this difference, because psychoanalysis is a speculative site and resists identification. The deconstructive difference, and the difference as such cannot be secured.

It is impossible to claim that deconstruction follows upon psychoanalysis, but we see that psychoanalysis is the decisive point at which it becomes necessary for deconstruction to construct and to secure a difference. In the entanglement of difficulties, deconstruction abolishes itself and its philosophical thought of psychoanalysis.