

The Birth of War out of the Spirit of Peace

European Irenism from Pax Dei to the Christian Humanists

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Europe is dead, and *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*. Yet should one refrain from speaking evil of the dead when the dead is still able to kill and destroy, and skilfully exercises this ability? There is more than one example of European policy of murder and destruction, not only in history but in the world in which we live today. What I particularly have in mind is the destruction of Bosnian state and the genocide of Bosnian Muslims – of those who have been styled »Muslims« in Bosnia. Here, indeed, *le mort saisit le vif*. And it is not the war which is the principal problem, but the peace: the peace which Europe has been imposing on Bosnia, the peace which has denied the Bosnian government the right of self-defence, which has sanctioned an aggressive war against an independent polity, sanctified genocide and annulled a number of basic principles of international law. My claim is that European peace, one of the most unquestionable moments in the constitution of Europe, has been problematic, both in its idea and practice, and that today's peace making descends from a long tradition. In the text that follows I will try to outline part of this European tradition of peace.¹

I.

In some histories of European peace plans, Pierre Dubois figures as the originator of the idea of a peaceful international order. At first glance, this is curious and confusing. It is curious because an advocate of war is styled a peacenik, and confusing because different issues and agendas are mingled with the pursuit of peace. However, confusion is what constitutes European peace thought, and what counts here is a declaration that peace is dear to one's heart, a declaration Dubois does not fail to make. If we realise that European irenism is, more than anything else, a kind of *Gemütergemeinschaft*, any argument as to who may rightly be judged to belong to its tradition is futile. We should rather take what irenists say on trust and try to delineate the structure of their argument. Proceeding this way, we shall see that Dubois is not alien to, but typical of, the European community which talks of peace.

1. This paper is a part of an longer essay dealing with European irenic discourse until the French Revolution. The research for this work was assisted by an award from the Social Science

Dubois is renowned as a »pacifist« for his proposal to establish an arbitration machinery for the prevention of wars between Christian powers.² This device, however, is of subordinate importance: a means for the establishment of peace which is itself an instrument for higher ends. The »perpetual« and »universal« peace between powers inhabiting the geo-political space which, in the course of human events, would begin to call itself Europe, is a necessary preliminary to a successful crusade for the recovery of the Holy Land. Dubois first points out a very pragmatic reason for this being so: »In order that a sufficient number of people may be induced to journey thither and remain there, it will be necessary for Christian princes to live in harmony and avoid war with one another.« Otherwise these armed journeyers, hearing that their country is at war, would rush home to defend their possessions. »It is therefore necessary to establish peace among all Christians – at least those obedient to the Roman Church – on such a firm basis that they will form in effect a single commonwealth so strongly united that it cannot be divided, because “every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate,” as the Saviour says.«³ Yet there is a normative dimension to his argument.

»Intercine wars among Catholics are greatly to be deplored, since in such wars many meet death under circumstances which make their status in the world to come very uncertain.«⁴ Dubois has been reproached for bad and unclear language,⁵ yet, here, at least, he is very precise. He is not deploring, or condemning, war. He would go so far as to agree with Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* X.7.1177b 8-10) that to seek war for its own sake is the extreme of wickedness, only to undermine this position by approving the righteous war, the war waged by the righteous. »[W]hen it is impossible to secure peace except by means of war, it is permissible for righteous men to seek and even to urge war in order that men may have leisure for acquiring virtue and knowledge after war is over and lasting peace has been established.«⁶

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2. *De recuperatione terre sancte. Traité de politique générale par Pierre Dubois, avocat des causes ecclésiastiques au bailliage de Coutances sous Philippe le Bel*, ed. Ch.-V. Langlois, Alphonse Picard Éditeur, Paris 1891, § 12. (I quote English transl.: Pierre Dubois, *The Recovery of the Holy Land*, ed. W. I. Brandt, Columbia University Press, New York 1956.)
3. *De recup.* § 2. Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, Leicester University Press, Leicester/London 1992, p. 12, has characterized Dubois as a »true herald of a modern style of thinking about European unity.«
4. *De recup.* § 2.
5. Ernst Zeck, *Der Publizist Pierre Dubois, seine Bedeutung im Rahmen der Politik Philipps IV. des Schönen und seine literarische Denk- und Arbeitsweise im Traktat »De recuperatione Terre Sancte«*, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin 1911, p. 190.
6. *De recup.* § 2.

The gist of Dubois' argument is that war among Catholics is inadmissible and has therefore to be diverted elsewhere. When universal peace and harmony among all Roman Catholics is established, »Catholics will be more virtuous, learned, rich and long-lived than hitherto, and more able to subjugate barbaric nations. They would no longer make war upon one another [...] [and] Catholic princes, mutually zealous, would at once join together against the infidels, or at all events send innumerable armies of warriors from all directions to remain as a permanent garrison in the lands to be acquired.« And (the argument is repetitious): »The whole commonwealth of Christian believers owing allegiance to the Roman Church must be joined together in the bonds of peace. United in this way, all Catholics will refrain from making war upon one another. [...] Let no Catholic rush to arms against Catholics; let none shed baptized blood. If anyone wishes to make war let him be zealous to make war upon the enemies of the Catholic faith, of the Holy Land, and of the places made sacred by the Lord.«⁷

This is the matrix of European peace thought.⁸ The question, therefore, is not whether Dubois belongs to European irenic tradition but whether he had an impact on the logic of irenic discourse. With regard to Dubois' general outlook and his reform proposals, Strayer has argued that he is important »because he represented the views of the hundreds of officials who worked for the king throughout France,«⁹ as an articulate representative of *milites legum*, the emerging new class running the affairs of the nascent territorial state. His peace plan cannot claim much originality either. *De recuperatione Terre Sancte*, as well as some of Dubois' shorter writings, have a proper place in the literature which emerged in Latin Christendom after the capture of 'Akka by the Egyptians in 1291, in that »new branch of literature which, in volume and importance, occupied a notable place in the literature of the age« and was introduced by Thaddeo of Naples' *Hystoria de desolacione et conculcacione civitatis Accomensis et tocius Terre Sancte*.¹⁰ More specifically, it belongs to a later stage of the new literary genre of *de recuperatione Terrae Sanctae*

7. *De recup.* §§ 70, 99.

8. »Le principe de la paix est [...] la paix entre chrétiens et la guerre contre les infidèles, considéré comme un devoir suprême. La paix n'est qu'un moyen pour faire la guerre.« Chr. Lange, *Histoire de la doctrine pacifique et de son influence sur le développement du droit international*, Académie de droit international, Recueil de cours 1926, Librairie Hachette, Paris 1927, p. 209.

9. Joseph R. Strayer, »France: The Holy Land, the Chosen People, and the Most Christian King«, in Strayer, *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1971, p. 310.

10. Aziz Suryal Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London 1938, p. 45. On Dubois see ch. III.

treatises, written under Clement V's pontificate, which are »far less original than it is commonly accepted, or than they appear when individual plans are discussed in isolation from the contemporary treatises on the same subject.« Dubois' contribution, in particular, is »hardly original«, and his practical opinions are plagiarized.¹¹ What is important, however, is that, with him, the crusade »became a part of a general reform in all branches of society as well as its vehicle«. The irenist should be seen as one among »crusade theorists«.¹²

The *de recuperatione Terrae Sanctae* literature of the turn of the century stood in the framework of the crusading policy as it was redefined at the council of Lyons (1274). A common feature of the tracts of the period, and a determinant of the crusading policy, was the love for peace. Gregory X proclaimed a six years truce in Christendom, necessary for the recovery of the Holy Land, and the council ordered spiritual punishment for those who broke the peace. For authors of the memoirs submitted to the council, peace inside the Christian world was the »*sine qua non* of a successful crusade«, and the constant concern of the immediate successors of Gregory X to the See of St Peter was the maintenance of peace in »Europe« as the necessary condition of the crusading enterprise.¹³ Nicholas IV, the pope at the time of the so-called loss of the Holy Land, »strove hard to establish peace on a firm foundation in Europe in order to unite all the forces of Latin Christianity for the crusade«,¹⁴ and the popes who followed »made repeated attempts to restore peace to Europe as a preliminary to sending an expedition to the East«. ¹⁵ In short, »peace in Europe and the unity of Christendom were always considered by the papacy to be the preliminary and essential conditions for the launching of a general crusade.«¹⁶ The crusading propaganda outside curia echoed these concerns and, mobilising for war, generated a series of calls for peace.

What the council of Lyons redefined was the military strategy of the crusade. The work for peace both in, and for, Christendom was neither questioned nor changed. This was inherited from the earlier crusading policy, as the indispensable moment of the crusade from the outset. Indeed, the crusade was a peace movement, and it was born out of a peace movement. It was a holy peace as much as a holy war.

11. Sylvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis. The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land 1274-1314*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991, p. 201, 208, 217.

12. Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274-1580. From Lyons to Alcazar*, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 54.

13. Cf. Schein, *op. cit.*, p. 41, 46, 51.

14. Atiya, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

15. Elizabeth Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading 1095-1274*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1985, p. 220. Cf. Schein, *op. cit.*, p. 75, 135, 149.

16. Schein, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

II.

At the beginning there was peace: *pax Dei*. Historians have shown how the attempts to promote the Peace of God emerged in Burgundy and Aquitaine at the end of the tenth century and how the Truce of God, *treuga Dei*, grew out of this movement in the first half of the eleventh century. The Peace of God was the response of bishops to the private warfare of barons resulting from the decomposition of public authority, and its aim was to protect the church property, the clergy and the poor from the *invasiones* and *depraedationes*. The Truce of God declared the cessation of violence and »wild justice« during days and seasons of special religious importance (initially between Saturday evening and Monday morning, »in order to enable every man to show proper respect for the Lord's Day«). »Whereas the Peace sought to protect certain classes and their goods at all times, the Truce was an attempt to stop all violence at certain times.«¹⁷

Sanctions by which the Peace of God was backed were, at first, spiritual: peace councils held by bishops anathemized the perpetrators of violence. However, the peace movement was soon to call for armed support and it eventually declared war upon war. These developments are, on the one hand, intertwined with a major social restructuring which took place at the time, and, on the other, imply a profound shift in culture. Duby has pointed out how the fusion of two of the three principal orders of the »Carolingian sociological schemes« – the clerks and the monks – rigorously segregated this unified ecclesiastical *corps* from the body of the laics; and how the lay people were divided by a new fundamental opposition between *milites* and *rustici*. Of key importance for my argument here is the formation of the military order: »C'est dans les années 980 que le mot *miles* prend une signification juridique et sociale.«¹⁸ This *ordo* was addressed by the peace movement: first, in the attempt to delimit its sphere of activity which in itself was perceived as licit; and then, to enlist them in the Peace of God efforts. Because the Peace of God emerged against the background of the dissolution of the secular authority and was promoted and led by bishops, because *pax Dei* replaced *pax regis*, the tendency at work in these developments was that of bringing *milites* under ecclesiastical authority.¹⁹ This

17. H. E. J. Cowdrey, »The Peace and the Truce of God in the Eleventh Century«, *Past & Present*, No. 46 (1970), p. 44.

18. Georges Duby, »Les laïcs et la paix de Dieu«, in *I laici nella »societas christiana« dei secoli XI e XII*, Miscellanea del Centro di studi medioevali, Società editrice Vite a pensiero, Milano 1968, p. 454.

19. It is anachronistic to talk about »the state« in this context. However, Carl Erdmann, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzungsgedankens*, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart 1955 (reprint of 1935 edn.), p. 53, points to the central issue when he writes: »Die Kirche trat also ohne die Vermittlung des Staates in ein direktes Verhältnis zu den eigentlichen Vertretern des Kriegerhandwerk.«

involved more than simply the recognition of the military profession by the Church: it gradually led to both the formation of a Christian military ethic and the Christianization of warfare; and to the militarization of the Church – the process described as the rise of Christian militarism.²⁰

It is important to understand that, in the Peace of God, »the search for peace took the form of a religious movement.« It was not just »un pact social«, it amounted to »un pact avec Dieu.«²¹ Because the lawlessness of the private warfare, along with natural disasters, famine and pestilence, was seen as God's wrath, the attainment of peace and justice required a moral reformation of the people, a religious renewal. Thus the peace movement, »at least in the minds of churchmen,« as Cowdrey argues, »came to embody something approaching their total view of Christianity. [...] Upon the basis of the need to provide for physical peace and security there was thus erected a superstructure of the preaching and liturgical commemoration of peace in an ideal sense as the planting upon earth of the order that God willed to prevail.«²² It was in this framework that the Church was increasingly willing to bless arms and sanction their use as something meritorious, thus moving away from its traditional hostility towards warfare and bridging the gap between *militia spiritualis* and *militia saecularis*.

The notion of peace implied in this »total view of Christianity« was, as *treuga Dei* developed out of *pax Dei*, extended so that it comprised the totality of Christians. This new understanding of peace was articulated at the council of Narbonne, 1054, where the principle was declared that »no Christian should kill another Christian, for whoever kills a Christian undoubtedly sheds the blood of Christ.« The importance of the formulation of this view can hardly be exaggerated. »At least in theory, the Truce had brought the Peace movement to the point where it should logically require complete internal peace to be maintained in the whole Christian society.« And, after the peace movement had reached this point, it could »scarcely develop further unless a voice with sufficient authority complemented the precept of internal peace by finding an appropriate external outlet for those whose vocation was Christian warfare.«²³

This voice was to be heard very soon, and it was the voice of the highest authority in Latin Christendom, the voice of the popes of the great reform movement of the eleventh century. This did not come as a surprise, for the background of both the peace movement and the reform papacy, was monastic

20. Duby, *op. cit.*, p. 459; Colin Morris, *The Papal Monarchy. The Western Church from 1050 to 1250*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991, p. 143 sq.

21. Cowdrey, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Duby, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

22. Cowdrey, *ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*, p. 53. Cf. Duby, *op. cit.*, p. 459-60.

reform. The promotion of the peace movement by churchmen and, as an integral part of these developments, the process of bringing the military order under the authority of the Church, were moments of the new ordering of society in the new Christian spirit; and the Peace and Truce of God, in turn, fed into Gregorian reforms.

Leo IX proclaimed the *pax Dei* at the synod of Rheims, 1049, and has been, because of the way he conducted the military campaign against the Normans in Southern Italy in 1053, characterized as »der erste Papst, der grundsätzlich seine Kriege aus der Religion herleitete, sie mit den Geboten der Kirche in Einklang brachte und den kriegerischen Geist des Heeres mit kirchlichen Sinn durchdrang.«²⁴ Stephen IX followed his steps. Nicholas II »gave a general papal sanction to the peace and truce of God« in the Lateran synod of 1059, and succeeded in bringing the Norman army into a vassal relationship to the pope.²⁵ Alexander II supported the Spanish »crusade« of 1064 and granted the first papal commutation of penance to those who fought it, while Catalan bishops proclaimed the Peace of God in order that the Christians could go to war against the Muslims.²⁶ The crucial role in breaking both with the traditional Christian attitude towards war and with the existing temporal loyalties and obligations of laymen to their secular lords, was played by Gregory VII. Robinson has summarized his views as follows: »The Church is the "Christian legion", within which the laity is the "order of fighters": laymen have no function save that of fighting; they exist solely to suppress the enemies of the Church and all elements which tend to subvert right Christian order. The word of St. Paul, "No man that warreth for God entangleth himself with the affairs of this world", has been turned upside down.«²⁷ Although his plans from 1074 for a military expedition to Orient²⁸ came to nothing, as a practical theoretician of the »Christian warfare«, he opened the way to the crusade.

The crusade, preached by Urban II in the council of Clermont in 1095, »sans conteste porte l'exigence de la paix de Dieu à son accomplissement«: the

24. I. S. Robinson, *The Papacy 1073-1198. Continuity and Innovation*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 326; I. S. Robinson, »Gregory VII and the Soldiers of Christ«, *History*, 58 (1973), p. 181; Erdmann, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

25. Robinson, *The Papacy*, p. 326; Erdmann, *op. cit.*, p. 116 sq.

26. Erdmann remarks that »hier schon ebenso wie 1095 in Clermont der Gottesfriede unter den Christen mit dem Kreuzzuge gegen die Heiden im Zusammenhang stand.« *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

27. Robinson, »Gregory VII«, p. 190. Cf. Erdmann, *op. cit.*, ch. V.

28. »For the first time, the idea of carrying a holy war into the Near East at the instigation and under the command of the papacy had been broached.« James A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Milwaukee/London 1969, p. 27. Cf. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, The Athlone Press, London 1993, p. 8.

council of Clermont »fut d'abord un concile de paix.«²⁹ Urban II had already been an active promoter of the peace movement in the earlier years of his pontificate. The council of Clermont, however, »enacted peace legislation more sweeping than that of earlier councils: it was binding on the whole of western Christendom and it was to last for three years.«³⁰ It »resumed the Peace movement where it was left by the canons of Narbonne« precisely in making »universal« peace among Christians and directing their arms against the heathen.³¹ All versions of Urban's speech in Clermont mention the pope's urging of the Christians to fight righteous wars instead of being engaged in iniquitous combats among themselves.³²

Urban's exhortations were written down retrospectively by chroniclers of the First Crusade, that is, with a knowledge of the events triggered by the council of Clermont. However, if the authenticity of pope's words in these chronicles can be questioned, these documents nevertheless authentically express the »spirit of the age«. Fulcher of Chartres, clearly situating Urban's crusading speech in the context of *pax/treuga Dei*, reports him as saying (referring to the military successes of the Turks against the Greeks): »«Oh what a disgrace if a race so despicable, degenerate, and enslaved by demons should thus overcome a people endowed with faith in Almighty God and resplendent in the name of Christ! Oh what reproaches will be charged against you by the Lord Himself if you have not helped those who are counted like yourself of the Christian faith! Let those,» he said, »who are accustomed to wantonly wage private war against the faithful march upon the infidels in a war which should be begun now and be finished in victory. Let those who have long been robbers now be soldiers of Christ. Let those who have once fought against brothers and relatives now rightfully fight against barbarians.»³³

Robert the Monk's *Historia Iherosolymitana* relates Urban II linking his summons of the chosen race of Franks to free the holy sepulchre of the Saviour

29. Duby, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

30. Robinson, *The Papacy*, p. 326. The canons of Clermont »prescribe, for the first time in the history of the Peace of God, a perpetual peace within the whole of Christendom.« Cowdrey, »The Peace and the Truce of God«, p. 57.

31. Cowdrey, »The Peace and the Truce of God«, p. 57.

32. D. C. Munro, »The Speech of Pope Urban II. at Clermont, 1095«, *The American Historical Review*, IX (1905), 2, p. 239; cf. Robinson, *The Papacy*, p. 326-7; Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade*, ch. 1; Erdmann, *op. cit.*, ch. X, and H. E. J. Cowdrey's critique: »Pope Urban II's Preaching of the First Crusade«, *History*, 55 (1970); and recently, Penny J. Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusaders to the Holy Land, 1095-1270*, The Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge, Mass., 1991, ch. I.

33. Fulcher of Chartres, *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem 1095-1127*, ed. H. S. Fink, The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1969, p. 66-7.

from »unclean nations«, to the scarcity of land and wealth in their own country: »[T]his land which you inhabit [...] is too narrow for your large population; nor does it abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder and devour one another, that you wage war, and that frequently you perish by mutual wounds. Let therefore hatred depart from among you, let your quarrels end, let wars cease, and let all dissensions and controversies slumber. Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from the wicked race, and subject it to yourselves.«³⁴

Guibert of Nogent comprised these ideas into a concept. Very early in the twelfth century he wrote that, »[i]n our own time God has instituted a holy manner of warfare, so that knights and the common people who, after the ancient manner of paganism, were formerly immersed in internecine slaughter, have found a new way of winning salvation. They no longer need, as formerly they did, entirely to abandon the world by entering a monastery or by some other similar commitment. They can obtain God's grace in their accustomed manner and dress, and by their ordinary way of life.«³⁵ He defined the crusade as *prelium sanctum* (compared to contemporary descriptions, such as *peregrinatio, iter, via*, this was indeed much more of a definition) and understood holy war as a new phenomenon.

There is no consensus among medievalists about how accurate was Nogent's understanding, that is, whether holy war was indeed »instituted« with the crusade. However, there seems to be a considerable body of literature which confirms that Nogent's claim is not without substance. It has been argued that, between about 1000 and 1300, there occurred a fundamental transformation in the way in which Christian writers treated the problem of war, and that, in this period, »emerged the concept of holy war, of war that was not merely justifiable but justifying and spiritually beneficial to those who participated in it.«³⁶ The transformation was imminent in the peace movement and the papal reforms. Moreover, the change of the official attitude to warfare (as a result of which, from being inherently sinful, it became, at least as a possibility, merito-

34. *Western Awakening. Sources of Medieval History Volume II (c. 1000-1500)*, ed. C. T. Davis, Appelton-Century-Crofts, New York 1967, p. 148-9.

35. *Historia quae dicitur Gesta Dei per Francos*, I. Cited in H. E. J. Cowdrey, »Cluny and the First Crusade«, *Revue bénédictine*, 83 (1973), p. 294.

36. James A. Brundage, »Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers«, in *The Holy War*, ed. T. P. Murphy, Ohio State University Press, Columbus 1976, p. 99-100. In Brundage's view, Erdmann, *op. cit.*, is »a basic point of departure for all subsequent studies of holy war in medieval Christian thought prior to the Crusades.« (*Ibid.*, p. 126.) For an alternative view, that »le principe« of the holy war »fut admis par les théologiens et les juristes à travers tout le moyen âge«, see Michel Villey, *La croisade. Essai sur la formation d'une théorie juridique*, J. Vrin, Paris 1942, »Introduction«.

rious to engage in warfare »and so to promote “right order” in human society by force of arms«) has been seen as the most significant aspect of the Church's reform of the eleventh century, of the reform which is »the greatest – from the spiritual point of view perhaps the only - turning point in the history of Catholic Christendom.«³⁷ This change is most closely associated with Gregory VII, yet it was Urban II who completed it in launching the crusade.

The crusade was holy war *kat'exochén*, it »embodied the holy war in its most characteristic medieval form.«³⁸ From the formal point of view, holy war was a »subset of the just war«, just and justifying, »a war that confers positive spiritual merit on those who fight it«; and the crusade was »the Church's ultimate just war, sharing with other just wars the requirements of authority, necessity, just cause, right intention and defence of the *patria*.«³⁹ One of the questions in debate is whether one is to look for the background of this institution in theology or in »popular culture« (as expressed by *chansons de geste*).⁴⁰ Not less important for our understanding of the western holy war is to see it in the historical context of the beginnings of »European« expansion: »in intima correlazione con il passaggio della Cristianità dalle posizione difensiva a quella offensiva verso i popoli pagani, anche la dottrina della guerra santa aveva subito una graduale profonda trasformazione.«⁴¹ The key determining element of the crusade, however, is not simply that it was an expansionist, and therefore offensive, warfare but that it was war against Islam, and that Islam was not simply seen as a form of paganism but as *the* enemy of Christianity.⁴²

37. H. E. J. Cowdrey, »The Genesis of the Crusades: The Springs of Western Ideas of Holy War«, in *The Holy War, I.c.*, p. 19. The characterization of the Church reform, quoted by Cowdrey: Gerd Tellenbach, *Church, State and the Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1940, p. 164.

38. Brundage, »Holy War«, p. 105. Cf. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *What were the Crusades?*, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke 1977, p. 16.

39. Brundage, »Holy War«, p. 116-7; Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 38-9. For a succinct discussion on the just war theory see Jonathan Barnes, »The just war«, in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, eds. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

40. Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 36; Cowdrey, »The Genesis«, p. 29; and Brundage, »Holy War«, p. 102-3, all point out that the Augustinian just war was not the inspiration here. Cf. Franco Cardini, »La guerra santa nella cristianità«, in »*Militia Christi*« e *Crociata nei secoli XI-XIII*, Miscellanea del Centro di studi medioevali, Vita e pensiero, Milano 1992; and Paul Alphandéry, *La Chrétienté et l'idée de croisade*, ed. A. Dupront, 2 vols., Éditions Albin Michel, Paris 1954-59, who stresses the role of popular sentiments in the crusade.

41. Giulio Vismara, »“Impium foedus”. Le origini della “respublica christiana”«, in *Scritti di storia giuridica*, Milano 1989, cited in Cardini, *op. cit.*, p. 391-2.

42. The western holy war was not a response to *jihād*: Brundage, »Holy War«, p. 103. Cardini, *op. cit.*, p. 396. Erdmann, *op. cit.*, p. 295, summarized Urban II's understanding of the crusade as »ein Stoß ins Herz der muhammedanischen Welt.«

The institution of holy war is inseparable from the creation of the symbolic enemy of *respublica christiana* and, subsequently, of Europe. Moreover, the Christian commonwealth was formed through the crusade, simultaneously with the construction of the enemy who had to be destroyed by war fought in the name of God; with the construction of the common enemy of the Christian community who had to be ruined by its united effort.⁴³ What was new was not the awareness of the existence of Islam but the gradual articulation of the determination to annihilate Islam with systematic violence organized by the Vicar of Christ.⁴⁴ It was not that an enemy was perceived as the other; it was that a particular other was now being construed as the universal enemy.

The legal theory of holy war was formulated after the first armed pilgrimage to the Holy Land. It was in the mid-twelfth century that the general opinion crystallized, supported by the lawyers, that »Crusades were undoubtedly holy wars and as such were fully justified.«⁴⁵ But it also took some fifty years to fix the meaning of the crusading experience in general, to arrive at a definition of the project, so that »between 1145 and 1149, between the launching and the failure of the Second Crusade, a variety of motives and conceptions of “crusading”, distinguished by lay, local, papal and other interests, converged into a single concerted effort “against Islam and paganism by one Christian ‘pilgrim’ army”, with the chief formative influence to be credited to the bulls of Eugenius III and the meditation of St. Bernard. Here is the all-important act of transmission. Onward from here the continuous life of a coherently-formed “crusade idea” is clearly established: looking backwards in time is the deliberate effort to recreate the experience of the First Crusade as then understood.«⁴⁶

This final assertion may not be unproblematic. What Blake has done is a reconstruction of the »making sense« of the crusade; what he has not dealt with

43. For an early perception of »la forza di tutto il mondo cristiano«, cf. Raoul Manselli, »La respublica cristiana e l'Islam«, in *L'Occidente e l'Islam nell'alto medioevo*, Settimane di studio del centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo, Presso la sede del centro, Spoleto 1965, p. 133, 135-6.

44. As in many other respects, it was Gregory VII who made considerable progress in both the conceptualizing of military action against the Muslims, and in articulating the idea of *christianitas*. However, the historical breakthrough was the crusade: »il momento storico in cui la *respublica christiana* raggiunse la più chiara consapevolezza della sua unità e della sua distinzione netta di fronte specialmente all'Islam.« Manselli, *op. cit.*, p. 136. I do not think it is really with irony that Strayer, »The First Western Union«, in *Medieval Statecraft*, p. 333-4, calls the crusading enterprise »the first Western union«, and writes that »the creation of a crusading army marked a spectacular advance toward European peace and unity.«

45. Brundage, *ibid.*, p. 121.

46. E. O. Blake, »The Formation of the “Crusade Idea”«, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, XXI (1970), 1, p. 30, 28; the quote in quote is from Giles Constable, »The Second Crusade as seen by Contemporaries«, *Traditio*, IX (1953), p. 265.

are the ideas, or rather the imaginary world, which made this »senseless« enterprise at all possible, which framed and triggered it, which brought into being this definitionless and nameless action. (It is well known that the crusade, for a century, did not have a proper name, and that the *crusignati* for crusaders appeared in the late twelfth century, and the vernacular *croisierie* in the thirteenth century.) As important as clear definitions are for scholarship, their absence does not curtail the effectiveness of social action, as the First Crusade proves, and confused imagination does not exclude a concentrated effort. A comprehensive definition of the crusade is of secondary importance, compared to the magma of ideas, images and sentiments that erupted at Clermont and have spilled over lands and centuries, reaching the space and time in which we now live. The rationalization of the crusading experience provides us with the language of the crusade only in so far as we do not lose sight of the *pensée sauvage* which the rationalization attempted to tame. The crusading language – the political language *par excellence* of an era which was only coming to know politics⁴⁷ – as any political language, is structured, and works, as the unconscious.

What is important for my argument, is to state the deep formative impact the crusade has had on western ideas and institutions. Cowdrey has characterized the period under discussion here as »one of the most powerfully formative periods in our common culture, outlook, and institutions«, and Brundage has pointed out how »[b]y the end of the Middle Ages the holy war had become a model for expansionist campaigns by European Christians against non-Europeans and non-Christians in all parts of the world.«⁴⁸ Structurally the most consequential moment in this was, in my view, the formation of the western anti-Islamic attitude. And while forms of the collective identity of the Occidental Asiatic peninsula⁴⁹ have been changing, the Muslim Enemy has been the fixed reference point for almost a millennium. This seems to have been the only certainty in the history of Europe.

Of particular significance for the history of European political thought is the centrality of the crusade in the processes of articulation and rearticulation of pivotal »political« structures (spiritual and temporal powers; empire, papacy

47. Cf. Nicolai Rubinstein, »The history of the word *politicus* in early-modern Europe«, in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. A. Pagden, Cambridge University Press 1987; Maurizio Viroli, *From Politics to Reason of State. The acquisition and transformation of the language of politics 1250-1600*, Cambridge University Press 1992.

48. Cowdrey, »The Genesis«, p. 27, cf. p. 11; Brundage, »Holy War«, p. 124.

49. J. G. A. Pocock, »A discourse of sovereignty: observation on the work in progress«, in *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain*, eds. N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 379, contends that »the time has come to see Europe not as a continent but as a sub-continent, a peninsula of the Eurasian land-mass comparable to India.«

and *regnum*, and relations between them; finally the state and international system), as well as the language that was used in these processes. Riley-Smith has called attention to the prominence of the language of *libertas* in the crusading propaganda: »It is no exaggeration to say that “liberation” was the word most frequently used by him [Urban II] when justifying the need to crusade. [...] The eleventh-century sources are full of the words *libertas* and *liberatio*.«⁵⁰ Often, the language of *necessitas* was used. For example, Rufinus, a Decretist opposing the argument that clerics can take up arms, nevertheless admitted exceptions. He stated that a cleric might fight to defend himself when required by necessity, which knows no law.⁵¹ Finally, the crusade is embedded in the language of rights (the rights of the Church and *imperium*, and secular rulers in general; the »historical« right to *Terra Sancta*; the right to war, and in war; the natural rights of Christians in relation to the infidels), and might be seen as the institutional context in which one is to look for the »origins« of the language of rights.⁵²

These questions can only be indicated here: an indication of why the political languages that developed in the centuries following the heroic age of crusading warfare had little trouble in appropriating the crusading *Gedankengut*. This seems to have been their common heritage, a more or less submerged framework which they have promiscuously shared. Here, I can only substantiate these claims in a most rudimentary form, by sketching something which cannot aspire to be more than a provisional *florilegium*.

III.

Dupront, in a postscript to his edition of Alphandéry's lectures on Christianity and the idea of crusade,⁵³ has written that »Croisade et Chrétienté se sont fait ensemble, dans une création réciproque.« From this point of view, Dubois is

50. *The First Crusade*, p. 17. In Viroli's apotheosis of the republican politics (*op. cit.*), the crusade is not an issue (despite the all but minor role the Italian city republics played in the crusades). Neither it is in Quentin Skinner's *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, Cambridge University Press, 1978, which has provided the conceptual framework for Viroli's study. And if Black's remark that, in the *Foundations*, there is the danger of a favoured theme – a story of civic liberty – »playing too great a role in interpretation«, is accurate, the absence of a treatment of the crusade in his work is still less justifiable. Cf. Anthony Black, *Political Thought in Europe 1250-1450*, Cambridge University Press, 1992 (quote p. 12-3). *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350-c. 1450*, ed. J. H. Burns, Cambridge University Press, 1988, also lacks any substantial treatment of the crusade.

51. Cf. Brundage, »Holy War«, p. 112; Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 106-7.

52. Cf. Brian Tierney, »Tuck on Rights: Some Medieval Problems«, *History of Political Thought*, IV (1983), 3, p. 440-1; and »Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts and Contexts, 1150-1250, *History of Political Thought*, X (1989), 4, p. 625 sq.

53. »La croisade après les croisades«, Alphandéry, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 274.

again a good starting point, to look at the subsequent developments. The political context of Dubois' argument, the conflict between the French monarchy and the Holy See, has been seen as a turning point in Occidental history. It marked the decline of the two universal powers, of *monarchia ecclesiae* and *monarchia imperii*, and thus the waning of the medieval »political« order, and the taking shape of territorial powers. These *regna* were not yet modern states, and it would take centuries before Hobbes could paint the papacy as »no other, than the *Ghost* of the deceased *Romane Empire*, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof.«⁵⁴ What was disintegrating, was *respublica christiana*, and what was emerging, was Europe as the new notion of unity, as the new collective identity, of the space populated by Latin Christians.⁵⁵

Dubois' project is symptomatic of the changing constellation of (from now on increasingly »political« and »European«) powers. What has often been seen as his incoherence – in the first place his pleading for a universal Catholic enterprise while promoting French royal interests; but also his breaking of the Church's temporal power while placing the pope at the head of his pacific council as the author and promoter of world peace; his expanding upon worldly prerequisites for the crusade and not ceasing to be concerned with the status of his warriors »in the world to come«⁵⁶ – is actually his achievement. He succeeded in finding a place for the crusade in the new power configuration by linking it to the rising authority of the French king and by putting its organisation and leadership into royal hands. This was the opposite of Innocent III's commanding the kings of England and France to head the military expedition;⁵⁷ Alphandéry styled the former crusades of princes »une entreprise royale« in opposition to »la Croisade populaire«, but they were ultimately papal wars. Dubois' crusade was royal in a different sense: he redefined the crusade as a national undertaking. St. Bernard's reproachful *Vae principibus nostris!* seems to have been obliterated, and if half a century ago, at least in a

54. *Leviathan*, ed. R. Tuck, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 480.

55. Werner Fritzmeier, *Christenheit und Europa. Zur Geschichte des europäischen Gemeinschaftsgefühls von Dante bis Leibniz*, Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, München/Berlin 1931; Denys Hay, *Europe. The Emergence of an Idea*, 2nd edn., Edinburgh University Press, 1968, ch. V; Heinz Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke. Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*, 2nd edn., C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München 1964, ch. II; *Actes du colloque international sur la notion d'Europe*, Travaux du Centre de recherches sur la civilisation de l'Europe moderne, Presses universitaires de France, Paris 1963, ch. I. For medieval *Wortbedeutungen* of »Europe«, see Jürgen Fischer, *Oriens - Occidens - Europa. Begriff und Gedanke »Europa« in der späten Antike und im frühen Mittelalter*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1957.

56. *De recap.*, §§ 40, 3.

57. »La lettre *Mediator Dei* ne propose pas, mais impose aux deux rois la guerre sacrée.« Alphandéry, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 43.

historical retrospection, the crusade appeared to be one of the first victims of »l'esprit laïque de nationalité«,⁵⁸ it now found, in the nascent nationalism, its driving force.

However, this was only one option available for to the crusading warfare. As I will try to show, the crusade was, from then on, alternately associated with single territorial powers and alliances between them; with the dwindling universal powers, the papacy and the empire, and with the new aspirant to universal rule, *monarchia universalis*; as well as with the ideal of an united Europe. And the »idea« of crusade found its expression in different political languages.

Philippe de Mézières' ideas on peace are exemplarily expressed in his *Epistre au Roi Richart*, a letter commissioned by Charles VI and addressed to the English king in 1395. However, the same ideas are to be found in his other writings, especially in *Le songe du vieil pelerin* (1388), and one can see de Mézières, »une des plus belles figures de ce XIV^e siècle«, as a monomaniac. »Dès son premier départ de Mézières, son but était fixé pour toujours: il voulait recommencer les croisades et restaurer le royaume de Jérusalem.«⁵⁹

In *Songe*, de Mézières confides to the young king that his royal father, Charles V, thought out a plan to reunite and reform Christendom, and that the achievement of this ideal now falls to him, Charles VI. In the eyes of the Old Pilgrim, Charles VI was destined to make his dreams come true: to deliver the Holy Land. »Beau Filz,« so de Mézières lets *la royne Verite* speak to the young prince, »pour se que tu as plus receu des graces du doulz Jesus mon Pere que les autres roys crestiens, tu dois plus travaillier et premier commaincier la voulente de Dieu; c'est assavoir que paix et union soit entre les Crestiens. Et raisonnablement les autres roys ne refuseront pas la sainte requeste que tu leur presenteras, c'est assavoir d'amour et d'aimitie, de paix et repoz.« This peace plan envisaged the convocation of a general council, »grant conseil et parlement general«, in which the envoys of all the kingdoms and »autres seigneuries des Crestiens catholiques« would, firstly, reach the agreement on »la reformacion, amour et unites des roys, des princes et des communes«, and

58. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 206; p. 186, 196 on St. Bernard's reprobation.

59. N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières 1327-1405 et la croisade au XIV^e siècle*, Librairie Émile Bouillon, Paris 1896, p. 512. Cf. de Mézières' late self-portrait in *Épistre lamentable et consolatoire sur le fait de la desconfiture lacrimable du noble et vaillant roy de Honguerie par les Turcs devant la ville de Nicopoli* etc., in *Oeuvres de Froissart*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Imprimerie et librairie Victor Devaux, Bruxelles 1872, vol. 16, p. 507. Atiya, *op. cit.*, p. 129, sees Pierre de Thomas and Philippe de Mézières as »two men who, by their dominating personality and influence, contributed more to the promotion of crusades than probably any other of their contemporaries.«

secondly, heal the schism of the Church by electing one sole pope. After this has been achieved and the Golden Age has come, the schismatics and infidels, Tartars, Turks, Jews and Saracens will be, by hook or by crook, brought into the true faith, and the Holy Land delivered.⁶⁰

Besides this general plan, de Mézières worked out a more concrete and politically practicable peace and crusading project. He invested his hopes in Charles VI and Richard II, desiring them to conclude peace between France and England. Against the background of peace negotiations between the two countries, de Mézières exposed this project in *Songe* and elaborated it in *Epistre*. In a language reminiscent of the later Erasmian irenic rhetoric, de Mézières describes the evils of war and grieves over hostilities between Christian princes: not only because God abominates the effusion of Christian blood but also because this internecine warfare has led to the loss of the Holy Land and the subsequent failure to recover it.⁶¹ He also deplures, as an open wound in Christendom, the schism in the Holy Church.⁶² His peace formula, glossed in medical metaphors, is simple and clear: the peace of Christendom; the union of the Church; and the crusade (*le saint passage d'oultremer*).

Aware of the rise of national powers,⁶³ de Mézières entrusts his project to two of them. For reasons of propaganda, England is honoured by being admitted to share with France the title of the elect Christian nation, and the two greatest Kings of Christendom are beseeched to end the long war, and conclude peace, between their countries. The »confederacion et aliance en Dieu perpetuele, la vraie paix et douce amour fraternelle des ii. filz saint Loys« will bring about »la paix et unite de l'eglise et de toute la crestientie«. ⁶⁴ And so Charles VI and Richard II will kindle the light, »par laquele lumiere toutes les generacions des crestiens catholiques qui jusques a ores par les guerres et divisions se sont trouvez en tenebres, reconnoistront la droite voie qui va en Jherusalem.«⁶⁵ Jesus made them leaders of his chosen people, of Western Christendom, to

60. Philippe de Mézières, *Le songe du vieil pelerin*, ed. G. W. Coopland, 2 vols, At the University Press, Cambridge 1969, II, p. 292, 293-5, 296.

61. Philippe de Mézières, *Letter to King Richard II. A plea made in 1395 for peace between England and France*, ed. G. W. Coopland, Liverpool University Press 1975 (quoted as *Epistre*), p. 85, 117, 100. Warfare between Christians is war against God (*ibid.*, p. 119), and so de Mézières prays to the Sire Dieux to »dissipe et destruis tous ceulz qui veullent les batailles encontre leurs freres crestiens« (*ibid.*, p. 124). He implies that there is no just war between Christians. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 93 sq.

63. »Lombardie demourra as Lombars, Espagne aus Espaigneux, France aus Francois, et Engleterre aux Anglois.« *Ibid.*, p. 87.

64. *Epistre.*, p. 116.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

take them into the Promised Land,⁶⁶ and the Old Solitary has a vision of God's temple in Jerusalem once again shining with light and the holy sepulchre (presently befouled every day by the false followers of Mohammed, condemned in the sight of God) restored to the glory of the Catholic Faith.⁶⁷

For de Mézières, the Holy Land is »terre publique de la crestiente« which belongs, »quanta la foy et quant a l'onneur«, to Christian peoples and to their kings and princes. Thus the conquest of Turkey, Egypt and Syria is a work done for the Christian *res publica*, for »la chose publique de la cresteinte«. ⁶⁸ The fact that these countries »sont remplis de toutes manieres de richesses et delices«, while the »royaumes d'occident« are cold and frozen, appears to be circumstantial. What really mattered in that world in which phantasmagorias were eager to materialize, was that »la gloire de la vénérable dame Sainte Foy soit de cy en-avant mieux gardée qu'elle ne fu à nostre lacrimable journée.« ⁶⁹ It was as a Catholic republican that de Mézières preached the crusade, made itineraries for the carrying out of the project and also engaged practically for the crusading warfare. His military order, *Militia Passionis Jhesu Christi*, never grew strong enough to accomplish the historic mission for which de Mézières conceived it, yet it is of interest as a semi-embodied idea. This virtuous, well ordered and disciplined chivalry was meant to recommence the holy war. De Mézières was as resolute in condemning armed conflicts between Christians as he was in urging Christians to wage war against the infidels: »il se fault efforcier et faire violence selon la doctrine de saint Pol l'apostre.« ⁷⁰ To fight »bonne et forte guerre« against the »Turcs ennemis de la foy férues et deshonnourées«, the »conversion ou confusion et destruction de la faulse secte de Mahomet et de toute ydolatrie«, is the will of God, a »chose Dieu nous veuille ottrouer!« ⁷¹ The aim of the *Order of the Passion of Jesus Christ* – of these »vaillans combatants et esclues de Dieu«, of this »sainte congrégation«, of this »nouviau peuple d'Israël« – however, was not only to engage in »la bataille de Dieu« which would open the gates of the »royaume du ciel«. ⁷² It was also to settle in the Holy Land, and to establish the City of God in the reconquered territories. ⁷³ The military order is »la cité de Dieu«, ⁷⁴ and the new order was to

66. »O vous Richart et Charles, freres, et filz des benois sains, il vous devoit souvenir souvent comment le doulz Jhesu vous a fais chevetains ensamble de son peuple d'Israel, c'est assavoir de la crestiente d'occident, pour la mener en la terre de promission.« *Ibid.*, p. 118.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 90-1; »la faulce generacion de Mahommet, devant Dieu reprouvee«, p. 101.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 99, 103.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 145; *Épître lamentable*, p. 523.

70. *Épître lamentable*, p. 499.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 489, 467, 498.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 473, 490, 499.

73. »[...] le temps est venus de édifier la cité de Dieu, selon Saint Augustin.« *Ibid.*, p. 500; *cf.* p. 503.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 475. »Cette chevalerie sera la Cité portative de Dieu.« *Ibid.*, p. 499.

be a »monarchie militaire«, or as Jorga appropriately described it, a Christian Sparta.⁷⁵

IV.

In the aftermath of the conflict between the conciliar movement and the papal monarchy in the first half of the fifteenth century, two opposing peace/crusading plans competed for the support of Christian princes. The initiative was in the hands of Pius II, and it was in response to the popes' repeal, in 1462, of the *Compactata* agreement, concluded between the Czech Hussite leaders and the council of Basle,⁷⁶ that Jiří z Poděbrad, King George of Bohemia, conceived his *tractatus pacis*. »Not content with repudiating the authority of Rome in his own country, Poděbrad threw himself into an elaborate scheme for undermining the position of the papacy in Europe. His agent was a certain Anton Marini of Grenoble, who startled the world by his proposition that Christian princes and nations would never cease to cling to Rome as long as the Holy See alone took thought for the defence of Christendom against the Turk.«⁷⁷

King George's political calculus is easy to understand. The Utraquist prince wished to forestall Pius II's attempts to isolate him by seeking alliances with those European rulers who were themselves not well disposed towards the pope's policy. His plan to establish peace in Christendom and organize war against the Turks was meant to be the platform for diplomatic negotiations focused on France, Poland, Hungary, Burgundy and Venice; and because the

75. Jorga, *op. cit.*, p. 455, 458.

76. On Pius II's Czech policy, see Cecilia M. Ady, *Pius II (Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini). The Humanist Pope*, Methuen & Co., London 1913, p. 214; Georg Voigt, *Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini als Papst Pius der Zweite, und sein Zeitalter*, 3 vols., Georg Reimer, Berlin 1856-63, vol. 3, ch. VII; Ludwig Pastor, *The History of Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages*, vol. III, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London 1894, ch. V; for Pius' own view *The Commentaries of Pius II*, tr. and ed. L. C. Gabel and F. A. Gragg, Smith College Studies in History, vols. XXII, XXV, XXX, XXXV, XLIII, Northampton, Mass., 1936-57, especially VII, p. 512 *sq.*, X, p. 621 *sq.*

77. Ady, *op. cit.*, p. 219; cf. Pastor, *op. cit.*, p. 231; Voigt, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 487, who calls this response to the papal diplomatic offensive »drohendes Gegenpiel«. On *Tractatus pacis* see Václav Vaneček, »The Historical Significance of the Peace Project of King George of Bohemia and the Research Problems Involved«, in *The Universal Peace Organization of King George of Bohemia. A Fifteenth Century Plan for World Peace 1462/1464*, Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague 1964, who argues that the role of Antonius Marini has been overemphasised (p. 37-45, 64); Jacob ter Meulen, *Der Gedanke der internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung 1300-1800*, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1917; Václav Vaneček, »Deux projets tcheques des XVe et XVIIe siècles relatifs à l'organisation universelle de la paix: Projets du roi Georges de Podebrady et de J. A. Komensky«, in *La paix*, Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin XV, Editions de la librairie encyclopédique, Bruxelles 1961.

objectives of the plan coincided with the declared aims of papal policy he made it difficult for the pope to dispute them.⁷⁸ However, the idea of an assembly of Christian princes in which neither the pope nor the emperor played a leading role, this »initiation of a secular crusade«,⁷⁹ provoked a swift rebuttal by the Holy See, and king George's »foreign policy« was ultimately unsuccessful.

King George's abandonment of the idea of universal empire headed by emperor and/or the pope was not such a radical innovation as has been argued.⁸⁰ By the time of his rule, the conciliar controversy had given a strong impetus to the formation of the international system in the strict sense of the word, and the papacy itself had developed »dalle terre di san Pietro al principato« and contributed much to the legitimation of the modern statal *frazionamento*.⁸¹ What I also find problematic is the interpretation of his pacific union as an international organization of sovereign, equal and independent, states. The assembly, as it was conceived at the Czech court, was meant to be composed of representatives of European powers whose task would be to settle conflicts between those powers peacefully. It had jurisdictional, political and economic competencies that infringed upon »sovereignty«. ⁸² I do not dispute, however, that king George's peace plan is a significant and remarkable document of

78. Pius II, indeed, invited Podiebrad, whose professed zeal for the war against the Turks contrasted sharply with indifference of other Christian princes, to the congress of Mantua as a »dear son«. Pastor, *op. cit.*, p. 217, 219.

79. Ady, *op. cit.*, p. 219. Pastor, *op. cit.*, p. 238, 232, speaks of this »anti-Papal, cosmopolitan Union« as a »wild project which aimed at revolutionising the whole political system of Europe.« The pope was only supposed to help with organizing the building of a naval force and collecting finances: *Tractatus pacis toti cristianitati fiendae*, ed. J. Kejř, and English transl. by I. Dvořák, *Treaty on the Establishment of Peace throughout Christendom*, both in *The Universal Peace Organization of King George of Bohemia, l.c.*, § 21.

80. Vaneček, »The Hist. Significance«, p. 15 and elsewhere.

81. Anthony Black, *Monarchy and Community. Political Ideas in the Later Conciliar Controversy 1430-1450*, At The University Press, Cambridge 1970, p. 132; Paolo Prodi, *Il sovrano pontefice. Un corpo e due anime: la monarchia papale nella prima età moderna*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1982, p. 40.

82. Vaneček, »The Hist. Significance«, p. 11 sq., 45, 60. *Tractatus pacis, l.c.*, § 9 on the introduction of »new laws« in »the name of all of us«; §§ 13 and 14 that the assembly is to decide when to wage war; §§ 13-15 on the imposition of financial obligations on the members, and § 18 on the enforcement of the payment of the determined money by military force if necessary; § 14 on common currency (*communi moneta*) and determination of »decent prices« of »victuals and billets in towns, villages and other suitable places« for the Christian army, and of »who should be given what, if something should be successfully acquired from the enemy«; § 16 on the jurisdiction over »all of us and our subjects«; and § 22 with the provision that, if a prince who is a member of the union died, »no heir or successor of his may be allowed to succeed him to the kingdom, principality or dominion« without the consent of the *congregatio*.

European history. It sought to restore the unity of Christendom on the basis of plurality of territorial powers, and to create union and, consequently, establish peace, among them by organizing war against the Turks.

The preamble to the *Tractatus pacis* is a succinct declaration of the »European ideology«. It first invokes the image of the once flourishing Christianity, blessed with men and goods, that for a long time held a large part of pagandom including the Holy Sepulchre: »in those days there was no nation in the world which would have dared to challenge Christian rule.« But, writing a decade after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks, the irenic manifesto points out how lacerated, broken, impoverished and deprived of all its former brilliance and splendour Christendom has become. »When almost the whole world was strong with the holiness of the Christian religion, the astute Mohammed first led astray the exiguous Arab nation. However, when the first attempts were not opposed, he gradually acquired so many of the lost people that he subjugated very large regions of Africa and Asia and incited them to commit a most detestable treachery. And then the utterly despicable Turks, who had most recently subjugated first the famous Greek Empire and then very many Christian lands and kingdoms, abducted an almost innumerable multitude of souls from the Christian parts, took away everything as bounty, destroyed and defiled many convents and large churches, and perpetrated very many other evils.«⁸³

As is to be expected, the invocation of a historical myth and the depiction of the present decline of the past glory, caused by a perfidious enemy, called for action. »Oh, golden land! Oh, Christianity, Thou jewel of all lands, how could all Thy glory disappear in such a way, how couldst Thou lost all Thy most magnificent brilliance? Where is the vigour of all Thy people, where is the reverence shown to Thee by all nations, where is Thy royal glory, Thy fame? What good were Thy many victories when so soon Thou werest to be led in a triumphal march? What good does it serve that Thou hast resisted the power of pagan leaders when now Thou art unable to resist the attacks of Thy neighbours?« All the necessary resources are provided and what is required to mobilize them is the amendment of what may be erroneous and the mollification of God with pious acts, as His Divine Majesty apparently must be ired by some ill deed. And since God is just and merciful, and »those whom He loves he corrects, castigates and leads to virtue through many adversities, we hold, turning our hopes to our Lord whose cause is at stake, that we can do nothing more pious in our integrity [...] than to strive diligently for the establishment among Christians of true, pure and lasting peace, unity and love, and to defend the faith of Christ against the most vicious Turk.« The Christian princes have

83. *Tractatus*, p. 69.

been given their power in order to glorify peace, to uphold the position of Christendom, to bring the wars against the infidel to a successful end, and to guard and extend the frontiers of the Christian republic.⁸⁴ There is no doubt left that those who do not fight for the Lord are against Him: »if we do not want to be against Christ, we must fight for His faith and stand with Him. For the Holy Spirit damns those who do not fight on His side, who do not oppose the enemy, who do not stand like a wall to protect the House of Israel.« And in order to be able to war for God and against His enemies, Christians have to stop fighting each other and unite: »such wars, plunder, tumult, fires and murders which, alas, have engulfed Christendom almost on all sides [...] should end and be completely eradicated«, so that »such kingdoms and principalities may be brought through praiseworthy unity into a state of mutual charity and fraternity.«⁸⁵

The *Caritas* and *fraternitas* referred to are »our« charity and fraternity and the dividing line between »us«, or »all of us«, and those outside the *unitas*. The cult of peace, it is asserted, is unthinkable without justice, yet *iustitia* is a name of exclusion and *pacis* the prerequisite and instrument of war. Christians have to love each other in order to be able to effectively hate and in an organized way destroy their enemies. The Turks, and the Turkish prince as the symbol of their political existence, are construed as the »severest enemy of the Christian name«, and the European princes united in peace swear that »we shall not cease to pursue the enemy [...] until he is driven out of Christian territory.«⁸⁶ This is a theme which the heretic king shared with the head of Christian orthodoxy, his adversary Pius II. We shall see more clearly that Europe, as a self-conscious entity, was articulated through the imaginary practice of cleansing itself of the Turk. »Ethnic cleansing« was integral to the concept of Europe from the start.

Enea Silvio Piccolomini, the humanist pope Pius II, was, as befits the time, an *uomo universale* in politics as well. He argued for the empire and for the pontifical *plenitudo potestatis*, he was a conciliarist and a papal monarchist. Of interest, here, is his European policy, and in this he had a clear and permanent *Leitmotiv*: a crusade against the infidels. Pius II did not only use the majestic plural but also spoke of himself in the objective third person singular. This is how he wished to be seen by his contemporaries and the generations to come:

84. *Ibid.*, p. 69, 70.

85. *Ibid.* Cf. § 21, that, in particular, those wars and discord between the princes of the Church have to end which might impede in some manner the conclusion of the wars against the Turks.

86. »pacis cultus«, *ibid.*, § 9. »[...] ad hostis insecucione non destituros, [...] quoadusque a cristianorum finibus fuerit effugatus.« *Ibid.*, § 13. It has to be added that King George allowed the conclusion of peace with the enemy, yet only if this is no longer perceived as a threat to the security of Christians.

»Among all the purposes he had at heart none was dearer than that of rousing Christians against the Turks and declaring war upon them.«⁸⁷ This was not only »the central and dominant goal of his entire pontificate«,⁸⁸ he strove for this through a great part of his life.

The fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 required a concentrated effort. From the imperial court, Piccolomini urged pope Nicholas V to rally the forces of Europe for a crusade. He helped the emperor to convene an »European congress« in Regensburg (Spring 1454), followed by diets in Frankfurt (October–November 1454) and Neustadt (February–April 1455); he spoke on all these occasions; and he corresponded diligently. All the themes of crusading policy, to which he would return time and again, were articulated already in this period, and with regard to them there was little new under the sun. What Piccolomini, with the strong humanist sense of his own personality, added to the conventional stock was his vanity. As a politician and an ecclesiastic, Piccolomini saw Christianity disgraced and Europe threatened: what had to be done was to make peace between Christians as the necessary condition of uniting forces and declaring war on the enemies of the faith.

As a humanist, Piccolomini contributed to the literary genre of *Turcica*. Nicholas of Cusa, an ecclesiastical dignitary and a fellow humanist with strong affinity to Greek culture, was a well chosen interlocutor. He could understand Piccolomini's lament that, with the fall of Constantinople to the lascivious Turks,⁸⁹ Europe was cut off from the spring of learning and arts. Aeneas Silvius doubted not that the Turks, the enemies of the Greek and Latin literature, would burn all alien books (as Westerners had often done). He saw not only muses dying but also Homer, Pindar, Menander and other illustrious poets suffering their second death, and he predicted the ultimate annihilation of Greek philosophy. However, great as this loss might be, the blows to Christian religion were much greater. It once reigned over the whole world; now it had been destroyed in Asia and Libya, and it was not to be left in peace in Europe. »We have seen the defeat of the Greeks, now we are waiting for the ruin of the Latins. [...] The Turkish sword already hangs over our necks, while

87. *Commentaries of Pius II*, II, p. 115. The epitaph in the Choir of S. Ciriaco immortalizes the pope as »moritur dum in Turcos bella parat.« Pastor, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

88. Leona C. Gabel, »Introduction« to *Commentaries, l.c.*, vol. XLIII, p. xxv. Already in the first days of his pontificate he showed himself »wholly engrossed by the one idea of war against the Turks«. Pastor, *op. cit.* p. 23.

89. Piccolomini, who as Pius II vainly attempted to suppress his own erotic writings (Pastor, *op. cit.*, p. 284), must have been qualified to write that the Turks »in libidinem provoluti sunt«. Letter to Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, July 21, 1453, in *Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Papst Pius II. Ausgewählte Texte aus seinen Schriften*, ed. B. Widmer, Benno Schwabe & Co., Basel/Stuttgart 1960, p. 446.

we are waging intestine war; we are persecuting brothers and allow the enemies of the Cross to proceed against us.«⁹⁰

The call to take measures, not only to defend the Christian possessions but also to attack and destroy the Turks in their own territory, had been heard before. So had been the claim that nothing prevented Christians from succeeding in this but their own negligence and dissensions – consequently, peace had to be made between them so that they could go to war.⁹¹ What was new was the more acute awareness of the governmental fragmentation of the West, and it was this which led Piccolomini to complain that Christendom had no head which all would obey; that the Pope and the Emperor had become fictitious entities; that every town had a king; and that it was difficult to imagine how to lead to war so many heads.⁹² More important than this was a growing »European« consciousness.

It has been observed that »the works of Pius II, both before and after his elevation to the papal throne, are full of the use of the word Europe.« This was in conformity with the general increase in the use, and the emotional content, of the term in the fourteenth and especially in the fifteenth centuries. What has been associated with Piccolomini is the loading of the notion with political significance: »der Begriff stellt sich als Träger des politischen Gesamtbewußtseins des Abendlandes ein.«⁹³ It is not difficult to perceive that this occidental political consciousness was articulated in opposition to the »Turkish peril«. For Piccolomini and his *consortes*, what was under threat was Europe. Yet in order to be able to formulate such a cognizance, clear concepts were needed (or at least clearer than those that had been inherited). Piccolomini, in his geographical work, defined the territories of Europe with an increased precision; his main achievement, however, appears to be that he both associated this definite geographical unit with Christendom and dissociated it from Christendom. In one sense, Europe was Christian Europe: *Christianitas* was identical with Europe. This identity emerged through a consciousness of territorial losses of Christendom in Asia Minor, and in this other sense

90. *Ibid.*, p. 446-8, 450.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 452. Cf. *Commentaries*, III, p. 213; XII, p. 819, and elsewhere.

92. »Christianitas nullum habet caput, cui parere omnes velint; neque summo sacerdoti neque imperatori, que sua sunt, dantur. nulla reverentia, nulla obedientia est. tanquam ficta nomina, picta capita sint, ita papam imperatoremque respicimus. suum queque civitas regem habet. tot sunt principes, quot domus. quomodo tot capitus, quot regunt Christianum orbem, arma sumere suadebis?« Letter to Leonardo dei Benvoglianti, Mai-October 1454, in Widmer, ed., p. 454-6.

93. Hay, *op. cit.*, p. 86-7; Fritzmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Both Hay and Fritzmeier credited Piccolomini with turning the word into an adjective, for inventing »Europeans«. For earlier usage of *Europenses*, cf. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 50-1.

Christianitas was not equivalent with Europe. It was a broader concept, an universality at the moment confined to culturally defined geographical space, but which *in potentia* gave the blueprint for European expansion. The actual situation, however, was one of Christian and European retreat. It was in this framework that Pius II could write: »All that we possessed in Asia, we have lost in unsightly manner; we fled and let Mahomet to gain victory.«⁹⁴ This was a distinctively new language. This was not Innocent III's understanding of Palestine as »funculus haereditatis Dominicae«; nor was it Innocent IV's claim that the pope had jurisdiction and power over all men, infidels included.⁹⁵ It was the question of Christian possessions outside Europe, and their fate had been, and was to be, decided by military strength.

In principle, or at least for propaganda purposes, Piccolomini had no doubts about the military superiority of the *Christianus populus*, so that the urgency of the defence of the faith easily turned into a vision of the spread of Christian religion and a triumphant expansion beyond Turkish lands.⁹⁶ In reality, he faced Turkish military advances. He repeatedly described them in exact geographical terms in order to make clear that European territories were occupied, or in danger of being occupied: that Europe was assailed. However, what was also assaulted, with the Turkish inroads into Europe, was Christian faith.

From the political point of view, Pius was convinced that the Turkish sultan »began to aspire to the sovereignty of all Europe«. In his view, »it was absolutely certain that the Turks were aspiring to the empire of the West«; that »Mahomet after winning the east is aiming at the empire of the west.«⁹⁷ From the ecclesiastical perspective, he was convinced that »the Turks are doing their utmost to destroy« the Catholic Faith; that they »are everywhere trying to rend in pieces« the religion; that they trample it under their foot; and that they had inflicted »great injuries [...] on the Christian religion«. ⁹⁸ He had no hindrances

94. Letter to Cusa, *l.c.*, p. 448.

95. Cf. Alphandéry, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 149; Brundage, »Holy War«, p. 121.

96. Letter to Cusa, *l.c.*, p. 452-4. »ac non solum de Turchis, si perseverantes erimus, sed de Saracenis quoque ceterisque barbaris gentibus victricis dextera sua triumphum nobis elargietur.« Cf. *Commentaries*, III, p. 226; and on the military superiority, *ibid.*, p. 215. In one aspect, at least, Pius was openminded: he could easily imagine that God's anger with the »impious Turks« be extended to »the barbarian nations who dishonour Christ the Lord«; that not only »the faithless Turk may be crushed« but »all infidels may cease from troubling us«. *Commentaries*, VIII, p. 528-9. As a practical man, he offered his good offices to organize the »plunder of the East« in a way which would not rouse jealousies among Christian powers (*Commentaries*, XII, p. 817), and in September 1463 (in order to quiet Florentine suspicions of the Venetians), he unfolded a plan for the partition of Turkey, »the first of many similar projects«. Pastor, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

97. *Commentaries*, II, p. 115; III, p. 214; XI, p. 741; cf. XII, p. 801.

98. *Ibid.*, III, p. 192, 208; VIII, p. 540; XII, p. 809.

to declare that, »[a]s a nation the Turks are foes of the Trinity«, that they profess a »monstrous doctrine« which he compared to the »plague«. He avowed that »we hate the Turks as the foes of Christianity«, and warned that under »the rule of the Turks [...] the sacraments of the Church must finally be doomed and the gate to the other life be closed«. ⁹⁹ Consequently, in a shockingly honest spelling out of the new golden rule: *Do not allow others to treat us in the way that we are treating others*, he forewarned his fellow Europeans that »[u]nless we take arms and go to meet the enemy we think all is over with religion. We shall be among the Turks in the position in which we see the despised race of Jews among Christians.« ¹⁰⁰

In his objective voice, Pius noted that »[h]e was ashamed that so vile a race should terrorize Christians, who had once inspired fear in the whole world«, and as nothing was so dear to him »as the defence of holy religion«, he »decided to take steps« to prevent the Mohammedan poison »worming its way further.« ¹⁰¹ And because he had analytically separated Europe and Christendom, he could bring them together in a powerful political synthesis: »all Europe would be subdued, a calamity that must bring with it the destruction of our Faith«. ¹⁰² To »take the offensive against the Turks« was the fulfilment of his »dearest desires«, ¹⁰³ and the crusade he planned was of a double nature: it was a war for Europe and Christianity. The war for Europe was Christian war, and the war for Christianity was European war. The double-edged holy war had a single objective: to fight and crush the Turk. ¹⁰⁴ In this framework, the European congress Pius II convened in Mantua in order to discuss and protect »the common weal«, ¹⁰⁵ although it was abortive in that it failed to launch a crusade, nevertheless did succeed in formulating a political strategy. The formula was simple and clear: »to drive the Turk out of Europe«. ¹⁰⁶ This was European strategy not in the sense that Europe would carry out a political, military and

99. *Ibid.*, II, p. 116; VIII., p. 528; XII, p. 815.

100. *Ibid.*, XII, p. 823.

101. *Ibid.*, III, p. 214; XII, p. 811; II, p. 116.

102. *Ibid.*, II, p. 192.

103. *Ibid.*, II, p. 118; XII, p. 822.

104. »Holy Jesus will show that the vileness of Mahomet is so hateful to Him and fighting on our side will crush the enemy before our eyes.« *Ibid.*, XII, p. 811.

105. *Ibid.*, II, p. 117; VIII, p. 515. Already at the diet in Frankfurt, Piccolomini linked Europe to another cherished republican concept, that of *patria*: »Turcorum grandis victoria, Grecorum extrema ruina, Latinorum summa infamia fuit ... nunc vero in Europa, id est in patria, in domo propria, in sede nostra percursi cesique sumus.« Cited in Widmer, »Biographische Einleitung«, *l.c.*, p. 82. For a detailed report on the Mantua congress, see Pastor, *op. cit.*, ch. II; Voigt, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, ch. I; *Commentaries*, II, III.

106. »in dieta Mantuana [...] decrevimus, ut Turchum de Europa divino adiutorio fugaremus.« Cited in Hay, *op. cit.*, p. 85, who points out the difference between this program and the old crusading objective of recapturing the Holy Place. *Cf. Commentaries*, XII, p. 816: Turks were

cultural program; but in the sense that Europe would only come into being through cleansing itself of the Turk. Holy war is the dynamic constitutional principle of Europe.

Against this background, Pius II's showing of a conciliatory pacific face should be seen as insincere rather than enigmatic. In 1460 he wrote a letter to sultan Muhammad II, trying to persuade him to convert to Christianity.¹⁰⁷ The letter is most often interpreted as a measure taken in a desperate situation: because the prospects of raising a Christian army were bleak, the pope decided to take issue with the Turks by means of rational argument. As he could not overpower the Turk by the force of arms, he thought he could be victorious with »a little water«. In contrast to his own military weakness, he argued with confidence that Muhammad could never hope to overcome the powerful nations of Europe by waging war against them, but that he could easily become the greatest, most powerful and most famous man of his time if he would only let himself be baptized. If the sultan would do this, the pope would invest him with the empire of the East.¹⁰⁸

Whether the investiture with the Eastern Empire offered to the Turkish sultan should be seen as a pathetic invocation of the days of the fullness of papal power (as pathetic was Pius' promise that »all Christians« will reverence the converted sultan and make him their judge, while he, the pope himself had failed to make them respond to his summons), or as a political manoeuvring intended to alarm Christian princes, is not at issue here. It would be more instructive to look at Pius II's *Epistola* in the context of contemporary conciliatory approaches to Islam.¹⁰⁹ From the doctrinal point of view, Pius II belongs to those authors who »felt they should contribute to a subject to which they had

to be »compelled to move out of Europe«; Mahomet was to be »conquered and utterly driven out of Europe«.

107. Pio II (Enea Silvio Piccolomini), *Lettera a Maometto II (Epistola ad Mahumetem)*, ed. G. Toffanin, R. Pironti & figli, Napoli 1953; Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, *Epistola Ad Mahomatem II (Epistle To Muhammed II)*, ed. A.R. Baca, Peter Lang, New York-Bern-Frankfurt/M-Paris 1990. For Toffanin, »Introduzione«, p. x, »storicamente la lettera resta un enigma«; R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, p. 99, with all his admiration for Pius II's magnificent composition, splendid language, skilful argument and worldly wisdom, comments that the one thing the *Epistola* lacks »is any depth of sincerity. He wrote rather as a lawyer with a brief than as a man speaking from the heart.« The argument is summarized by Southern, *ibid.*, p. 99-102.

108. *Epistola*, I, II.

109. *Epistola*, II; Pastor, *op. cit.*, p. 256. Southern, *Western Views*, p. 86, speaks about the application of the »habit of conciliation«, learned in the conciliar movement, to the solution of the problem of Islam, and James E. Biechler, *The Religious Language of Nicholas of Cusa*, American Academy of Religion and Scholars Press, Missoula, Montana, 1975, p. 45, of an interfaith dialogue as »a new application for the *via concilii*«.

little to add», and who reiterated the »themes of hostile medieval misinterpretation of Islam«. ¹¹⁰ With regard to the potential political effect of the *Epistola*, it has been argued that, even if Muhammed received the letter, »it is doubtful that he would have been swayed by it, and it is certainly improbable that he would not have been offended by the invective and by the patronizing attitude Pius everywhere displays.« ¹¹¹

In order to address the question of the status of rational dialogue in the confrontation between Christianity and Islam, between *Occidens* and *Oriens*, one would have to look at works of the authors who are said to have directly influenced Pius II's *Epistola*. Prominent among them was Juan de Segovia, yet closest to Pius was Nicholas of Cusa. Pius made use of *Cribratio Alchorani*, which the cardinal dedicated to the pope; Cusa's most daring enterprise in this respect, however, was the elaboration of the universal religion theme in his *De pace fidei*. Because he saw the war between Christians and the Turks as rooted in religious differences he believed that the overcoming of those differences would create harmony and peace. ¹¹² He believed that it was possible to get all people to know how there is not but one religion within a variety of religious forms, and that all diversity of religions could, by the common consent of all men, peacefully be reduced to one single religion. ¹¹³ In the final analysis however it was the non-Christians who had to abandon those aspects of their faith that differed from Christianity in order that religious differences should be overcome. The common religion that should be established was Christian faith as the one religion, the religion common to all. Pius II's letter to Muhammad could be seen as both less naive and less sophisticated than Cusa's imagined heavenly council in *De pace fidei*, or Segovias' *contraferentia*. He was as one with Segovia and Cusa in »regarding Christian doctrine as synonymous with the one Truth and therefore both accessible to all men who were willing to open their minds as well as utterly convincing in its rational simplicity. The important point is that all three therefore held the conviction that religious peace was a matter of common acceptance of the Christian faith under a kind of rational imperative.« ¹¹⁴ Any rational dialogue which failed to result in the

110. Norman Daniels, *Islam and the West. The Making of an Image*, revised edn., One World, Oxford 1993, p. 307.

111. Albert R. Baca, »Introduction« to *Epistola*, l.c., p. 7.

112. Cusanus was not in principle opposed to military action against the Turks. On his position on the crusade, see Biechler, *op. cit.*, p. 41, 42; Erich Meuthen, *Die letzten Jahre des Nicholaus von Kues. Biographische Untersuchungen nach neuen Quellen*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln/Opladen 1958, p. 19, 47, 49, 52 sq., 97, 104, 213, 220; for his notion of Europe, Fritzmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

113. »Et cognoscent omnes quomodo non est nisi religio una in rituum varietate. [...] una sit religio et unus patriae cultus.« For an exposition of the thesis, see Biechler, *op. cit.*, p. 46-63.

114. Biechler, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

adversary's embracing of Christianity would only prove that this adversary was non-rational,¹¹⁵ and at that very moment reason became a mighty sword: a material sword, obliterating the traditional two swords theory.

V.

Pius the humanist interpellated the humanity of Christians in order to move them to war against the Turks. When he preached crusade in Ancona he wished to soften their stony hearts: »O stony-hearted and thankless Christians! who can hear all these things, and yet not wish to die for Him Who died for you. Think of your helpless brethren groaning in captivity among the Turks, or living in daily dread of it. As you are men, let humanity prompt you to help those who have to endure every sort of humiliation.«¹¹⁶ Yet half a century later European humanists would not urge that ploughshares must be beaten into swords, as Pius II's zealot assistant cardinal Bessarion had insisted.¹¹⁷ Instead, the Gospel of peace was exhorted and, blended with stoic rhetoric, it developed the peace idea so much that, as has recently been argued, this »gave birth to a new language«, to a »peace discourse«.¹¹⁸ However, the evaluation that the peace idea was »significantly transformed by humanists who considered it such a valuable concept in all of its manifestations that they fashioned it into an ethic applicable to *all Christians*«,¹¹⁹ points to the limits of what was allegedly new in the work of these humanists: Erasmus and his »coterie of pacifists«.

Erasmus' apparently fundamentalist rejection of war has met with the enthusiastic approval of pacifists who praise him as their hero. His works, especially *Querela pacis*, the adage *Dulce bellum inexpertis* and *Institutio principis Christiani*, are a gold mine for those who look for handy quotations to condemn war. More thoughtful readers of his *opus* have criticised him for making

115. Pius' argument, addressed to the sultan, provides a good example: Muhammad the Prophet forbade the discussion of »your law« because he knew that his position could not be defended by reason; because »law is reason in action« (*ratione praecipitur*), what is against reason is against law (*Quicquid igitur rationi adversum est, legis nomine caret*); and because »your legislator« forbids reasoning, what he says can either be reasonable, or law. *Epistola*, ch. XVI.

116. Cited in Pastor, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

117. *Commentaries*, VIII, p. 539.

118. Ben Lowe, »Peace discourse and mid-Tudor foreign policy«, in *Political Thought and the Tudor Commonwealth. Deep structure, discourse and disguise*, eds. P. A. Fideler and T. F. Mayer, Routledge, London/New York 1992, p. 130.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 133 (my italics). Cf. Klaus Garber, »L'humanisme européen et l'utopie pacifiste: essai de reconstitution historique«, *Érasme. Actes du colloque international (Tours 1986)*, eds. J. Chomarat, A. Godin and J.-C. Margolin, Librairie Droz, Genève 1990; Otto Herding, »Erasmus – Frieden und Krieg«, in *Erasmus und Europa*, ed. A. Buck, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1988, p. 13.

a purely moralistic denunciation of war and for his inability to come to grips with the institutional reality of his age, most of all with the emerging »modern state«. ¹²⁰ One of his biographers portrayed him as a »wholly non-political mind«. ¹²¹ Consequently, Erasmian pacifism was politically unimportant. ¹²²

There are, however, aspects of Erasmus' irenism which are neither fundamentally opposed to war nor alien to, or alienated from, the contemporary political reality. Herding has not only shown that Erasmus found aesthetic pleasure in military scenes, but also, more importantly, that the censure of the Paris Faculty of Theology, accusing Erasmus of enervating every kind of polity (*omnem politiam enervat*) and contradicting the natural and divine law, was unjustified. ¹²³ In response to this, Erasmus himself repeatedly stressed that he did not intend to generally abolish war as a right pertaining to legitimate authority. He only insisted on very strict conditions under which alone it was permissible – and just – to resort to arms. ¹²⁴ Most telling, in this context, is Erasmus' attitude towards the war against the Turks. The problem figures prominently in his writing, yet he dedicated to this subject only one treatise, published in 1530. ¹²⁵ Huizinga dealt with this work in few lines and described it as very »vague« because it left the reader with the troubling question whether the author approved of war or not. And although the treatise represented Erasmus' meddling with the affairs of the day, Huizinga did not see it in real contrast to his picture of an ageing and fatigued man who was »remote from the great happenings of his time«. ¹²⁶ It seems to me, however, that, in his thoughts on the *bello Turcis*, Erasmus was at the very heart of his time.

120. Cf. Kurt von Raumer, *Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance*, Karl Alber, Freiburg/München 1953, p. 1; Pierre Brachin, »Vox clamantis in deserto. Réflexions sur le pacifisme d'Érasme«, *Colloquia Erasmiensia Tyronensia*, vol. I, University of Toronto Press, Toronto/Buffalo 1972, p. 259; Otto Herding, »Einleitung« to his edn. of *Institutio principis christiani*, in *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, IV-1, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1974, p. 122.

121. J. Huizinga, *Erasmus of Rotterdam*, Phaidon Press, London 1952, p. 153.

122. Cf. Brachin, *op. cit.*, p. 256, 257, 264; on the influence in our century, Otto Herding, »Einleitung« to his edn. of *Querela pacis*, in *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, IV-2, North-Holland, Amsterdam-Oxford 1977; p. 30-1.

123. Herding, »Erasmus«, p. 18, 19, 25; J. A. Fernández-Santamaria, *The State, War and Peace. Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance 1516-1559*, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 143.

124. Herding, »Erasmus«, p. 19-25; on Christian humanists' »conditional bellicism«, J. A. Fernández-Santamaria, *op. cit.*, p. 150 sq.

125. *Vtilissima consvltatio de bello Tvrcis inferendo, et obiter ennaratvs Psalmvs XXVIII*, ed. A. G. Weiler, *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, V-3, North-Holland, Amsterdam-New York-Oxford-Tokyo 1986.

126. Huizinga, *op. cit.*, p. 180. For *Ortbestimmung* of *Consultatio*, see Weiler, »Einleitung« to his edn. in *Opera omnia* V-3, p. 3-4; and A. G. Weiler, »La *Consultatio de Bello Turcis inferendo*:

It has been pointed out that Erasmus feared the Turks, and in the face of Turkish military successes his fears were not completely unreasonable. He was conventional in reiterating the formula of strife among Christians playing into the hands of the Turks. The theme keeps reappearing in his work. He deplored warfare between Christians as »a thing most cruel of all«,¹²⁷ as a »parricidal« war.¹²⁸ He was convinced that conflicts between European princes paved the road for the Turks.¹²⁹ And he allowed a military expedition against Turkish inroads to Europe.¹³⁰ He conceded a conditional right to war outside the *orbis christianus*.¹³¹ This right was conditional because, for Erasmus, it seemed »not so allowable, that we should so oft make war upon the Turks«. War against the Turks, too, had to be undertaken only as the last resort, and it had to be fought in a »Christian way«. Erasmus' ideal was that the Turks would be subdued and brought to Christ, he preferred winning them over to the Christian faith to killing them. »For be the Turks never so wicked, yet they are men, for whose salvation Christ suffered death. And killing Turks we offer to the devil most

une oeuvre de piété politique», *Érasme. Actes du colloque, l.c.*, p. 108. Weiler, »Einleitung«, p. 24, summarizes the view of a number of authors that *Consultatio* »das gemässigste Traktat sei, das Erasmus dem Problem von Krieg und Frieden gewidmet habe.«

127. *Dulce bellum inexpertis*. I use J. W. Mackail's edn.: *Erasmus against War*, The Merrymount Press, Boston 1907, p. 24.
128. »Yet from whence commeth it into our minds, that one Christian man should draw his weapon to bathe it in another Christian man's blood? It is called parricide, if the one brother slay the other.« *Ibid.*, p. 33. In *Institutio*, Erasmus compared war between Christians to Plato's *sedition*, as if Christendom was a *respublica*. The notion of *respublica Christianiorum* informed his argument against war, so that a war, if it could not be avoided, was to be fought »at the lowest cost in Christian blood«. *l.c.*, p. 214.
129. »Turcas non sua pietate, non sua virtute, sed nostra socordia potissimum huc vsque creuisse.« *Consultatio*, p. 38. The formulation which Erasmus used in a letter to king Sigismund I of Poland (Mai 1527): »Nunc haec monarcharum inter ipsos conflictatio Turcae viam aperuit« (*Ep.* 1819, quoted in Weiler, »Einleitung«, p. 10), echoes Pius II's lament, as quoted in Toffanin, »Introduzione«, p. xii: »Siamo trafitti dalla nostra e dall'altrui spada; tutti siamo procuratori dei Turchi e spianiamo la via a Maometto.«
130. »This is not to say that I absolutely oppose war against the Turks if they attack us.« *Dulce bellum inexpertis* (omitted in *Erasmus against War*, p. 57, and quoted in Robert P. Adams, *The Better Part of Valor. More, Erasmus, Colet and Vives, on Humanism, War, and Peace, 1496-1535*, University of Washington Press, Seattle 1962, p.209). Cf. Herding, »Erasmus«, p. 25. There was, for Erasmus, also an anthropological ground for contemplating war against the Turks: »But perhaps it is the fatal malady of human nature to be quite unable to carry on without wars. If so, why is this evil passion not let loose upon the Turks? [...] But if war [...] is not wholly avoidable, that kind would be a lesser evil than the present unholy conflicts and clashes between Christians.« *Querela pacis, l.c.*, p. 90. Transl.: *A Complaint of Peace Spurned and Rejected by the Whole World. Querela pacis undique gentium ejectae profligataeque*, ed. B. Radice, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 27, University of Toronto Press, Toronto/Buffalo/London 1986, p.314.
131. Herding, »Einleitung« to *Institutio, l.c.*, p. 109.

pleasant sacrifice, and with that one deed we please our enemy, the devil, twice: first because a man is slain, and again, because a Christian man slew him.«¹³²

Yet even if the Turks were *homines* and even *semichristianos*, they were barbarians.¹³³ And what is most specific in Erasmus, is that he needed these barbarians in order to create an understanding of Europe. In our time, it is not uncommon to see Erasmus being praised as an European, as if this was the ultimate compliment one could give or get. Erasmus perceived himself as an European only in opposition to the Turks.¹³⁴ The distinguishing quality of Erasmus' thought was, however, that he constructed the gaze that saw the evil in the Christian/European world. That evil gaze, seeing the evil, was the Turkish gaze. »What do we imagine the Turks and Saracens say about us, when they see that for hundred of years the Christian princes have been utterly unable to agree among themselves?«¹³⁵ »[A]nd what can be a more pleasant sight to the Turks, than to behold us daily each slaying other?« »Oh, there has been more than enough shedding of blood – and not just human blood but Christian blood – enough frenzy ending in mutual destruction, enough sacrifices by now even to hell and the Furies – there has long been enough to gladden the eyes of the Turks.«¹³⁶

Erasmus not only invented the evil Turkish gaze which took pleasure in what was most wrong in Christian Europe, but complemented it with his own political cardioscopy. He discovered the Turk in the heart of Europeans. That Christian Europeans were, in their hearts, like Turks was obviously the hardest thing the Christian humanist could imagine to say. At their innermost, Europeans were not themselves. Because of their unchristian way of life, they carried

132. *Erasmus against War*, p. 55-6.

133. *Consultatio*, p. 52. Erasmus called the Turks monstrous beasts, enemies of the Church, a people contaminated with all kinds of crime and ignominies. *Ep.* 2285, *Opvs epistolarym Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, ed. P. S. Allen and H. M. Allen, vol. VIII, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1934, p. 384. A. Renaudet, *Études érasmienne (1521-1529)*, Librairie E. Droz, Paris 1939, put it nicely: »Érasme n'aimait point l'Islam. [...] Les musulmans ne reconnaissent dans le Christ qu'un prophète parmi les autres; ils lui égalent Mahomet, un criminel.«

134. »L'Europe? Erasme ne s'en préoccupe guère. Il parle plutôt de chrétienté. Toutefois, devant le péril turc qui se précise, il se sent européen et il le laisse clairement entendre.« L.-E. Halkin, »Erasme et l'Europe«, in *Commémoration nationale d'Erasme. Actes*, Bruxelles 1970, p. 99 (quoted in Weiler, »Einleitung«, p. 17). The reference is to *Consultatio*, *l.c.*, p. 52-8.

135. *Institutio*, p. 217. Transl.: *The Education of a Christian Prince. Institutio principis christiani*, ed. N. M. Cheshire and M. J. Heath, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 27, University of Toronto Press, Toronto/Buffalo/London 1986, p. 286.

136. *Querela pacis*, *l.c.*, p. 98. Transl.: *A Complaint of Peace*, *l.c.*, p. 320. »Then they curse the Turks for being godless and unchristian, as if they could be Christians themselves while committing these crimes or as if there could be anything more agreeable for the Turks than the sight of Christians putting each other to the sword.« *Ibid.*, p. 84/310.

the unchristian other in their breast. And where the enemy is the closest, it has to be fought against hardest. For Erasmus, war against the Turks was first and foremost the war against the Turk »in our hearts«. This »Turk« had to be driven out first.¹³⁷ If Christian Europeans were not to amend their lives, to reform their morals, to cleanse their hearts of the Turk, they stood no chances of overcoming the Turks. They would fight the Turks like Turks.¹³⁸ They would kill men, not the Turks,¹³⁹ and more likely degenerate into Turks themselves than make the Turks into Christians.¹⁴⁰

In as much as the moral reformation, which was necessarily religious renovation, was understood by Erasmus as the precondition of any successful war against the Turks, his *Consultatio de bello Turcis inferendo*, the treatise in which he summed up his views on the Turkish question, could rightly be seen as an »oeuvre de piété politique«.¹⁴¹ And in as much as war against the Turks required a struggle with the Christian European self, it could be said that Erasmus argued for the greater jihad.¹⁴² He was the most sublime thinker of the European holy war. And yet the European's struggle with his own self was bound not to be a struggle with his own evil self. His own evil was perceived as the other: it was evil because it was not really of his own making. And so the struggle with the self could easily lapse into a struggle against the other. In fact, if that self had not been construed in a way which necessitated its purging of the other, comprehended as a thorn in its cardiac flesh; if that self had not been so well suited to strangle in its symbolic net a real people; one would be tempted to think that some Oriental wisdom visited Occident.

137. »Si nobis succedere cupimus, vt Turcas a nostris ceruicibus depellamus« etc. *Consultatio*, p. 62. Cf. Erasmus letter to Peter Gilles, 28 January 1530: »imminet Turca ceruicibus nostris«. Ep. 2260, *Opvs epistolarvm*, p. 332.

138. »Turcae pugnamus cum Turcis«. *Consultatio*, p. 52. »Now oftentimes we, being ill, fight with the evil. [...] if we set aside the title and sign of the Cross, we fight Turks against the Turks.« *Erasmus against War*, p. 55-6.

139. The opposite of Erasmus' maxim: »kill the Turk, not the man.« *The Handbook of the Christian Soldier. Enhiridion militis christiani*, ed. C. Fantazzi, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 66, University of Toronto Press, Toronto/Buffalo/London 1988, p. 94.

140. »Quin vt nunc sunt fere, per quos huiusmodi bella geruntur, citius fiat, vt nos degeneremus in Turcas, quam illi per nos reddantur Christiani.« *Institutio*, p. 218. Cf. *Enhiridion*, l.c., p. 11: Without a moral/religious reform, that is, »[i]f we cannot put our hearts into something of the sort, we shall degenerate into Turks long before we convert the Turks to our way of thinking.«

141. Weiler, »La *Consultatio*«, p. 108.

142. W. Montgomery Watt, »Islamic Conceptions of the Holy War«, in Murphy, ed., p. 155, quotes sufi Sufyan ibn-'Uyayna (d. 814) who »is reported to have said that the jihad in the way of God consists of ten parts, of which only one is fighting against the enemy while other nine are fighting against the self. The same thought was expressed in another way by Sahl at-Tustari (d. 896) when he remarked, "We have returned from the lesser Jihad to the greater Jihad," and then on being questioned added, "The greater Jihad is the struggle against the self."«

Of Erasmus' fellow pacifists, members of the humanist international, I will mention only two. They both put an offensive edge on European peace thought which it lacked in Erasmus. Thomas More's *A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation*, »the final summing up«¹⁴³ which he wrote in the London Tower while he was waiting for execution, bears some resemblance with Erasmus' concerns. For More as well, the Turkish danger is a double one. The threat on the level of Realpolitik is doubled with the symbolic threat: »Turks« stand for the false Christians. On the first level, one of the personae of the dialogue which is taking place in Hungary (the bulwark of Christendom) on the eve of Turkish invasion, expresses an obsession with Turkish advances, characteristic of that time: »And now, sith the tidings have come hither so breame of the great Turk's enterprise into these parties here, we can almost neither talk nor think of any other thing else than of his might and our mischief. There falleth so continually before the eyen of our heart, a fearful imagination of this terrible thing: his mighty strength and power, his high malice and hatred, and his incomparable cruelty.«¹⁴⁴ What follows is a vivid description of this cruelty. The Turks are a »shameful, superstitious sect«, the »abominable sect of his [Christ's] mortal enemies«, »his open, professed enemies«, they represent forces of darkness and Belial.¹⁴⁵ However, the false Christians, »evil Christian people«, are no better than the Turks. What is mainly before the eyes of More's heart, are Protestants. »Throughout his polemical works, More equates Protestant and Turk, heretic and infidel.« For him, »the enemy within is identical with the enemy without.«¹⁴⁶ What they have in common is that they strike blows against »the whole corps of Christendom«, against »all the corps of Christendom«.¹⁴⁷

The difference between them is that heretics generate disunity among Christians which prevents them from defending Christendom and efficiently confronting the infidel. »Howbeit if the princes of Christendom everywhere about the world, where as need was, have set to their hands in time, the Turk had never taken any one place of all these places. But partly dissensions fallen

143. Frank Manley, »Introduction« to his edn. of St. Thomas More, *A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation*, The Yale Edition of Selected Works, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1977, p. xxviii.

144. *A Dialogue*, l.c., p. 6.

145. *Ibid.*, p. 196, 197, 198, 236.

146. Manley, »Introduction«, p. xvii, xviii. On the exchangeability of Turks and Protestant in More's historical context, see Franklin L. Baumer, »England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom«, *The American Historical Review*, L (1944), 1; and for diplomatic manoeuvring between Protestants, Catholics and Ottomans, Dorothy M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk. A Pattern of Alliances 1350-1700*, At the University Press, Liverpool 1954, ch. III.

147. *A Dialogue*, p. 8, 40.

among ourselves, partly that no man careth what harm other folk feel, but each part suffer other to shift for itself, the Turk is in few years wonderfully increased, and Christendom on the other side very sore decayed. And all this worketh our unkindness, with which God is not content.« The solution to this is peace and harmony among Christians: if »God hath caused them to agree together in the defence of his name« (which would also »graciously bring them to agree together in the truth of his faith«), this would make »a common power in defence of Christendom against our common enemy«.¹⁴⁸

What More contributed to the peace discourse, at least in comparison to Erasmus, was not his perception of the Turkish threat as something that »try men's hearts«,¹⁴⁹ but his anticipation of colonial wars. To be sure, More's Utopians »despise war as an activity fit only for beasts«, and »they go to war only for good reasons«.¹⁵⁰ The fundamental reason for going to war is to protect the »good life«.¹⁵¹ This applies to both defending the »good life« of their own citizens, and to extending the »good life« abroad. It is obvious that in the latter case, in the case of humanitarian military interventionism, of this cosmopolitan brotherly help bringing liberty with a well trained and equipped army, the military action was taking place on a foreign territory; but so too their wars of defence. »If a foreign prince takes up arms and prepares to invade their land, they immediately attack him full force outside their own borders. For they don't like to wage war on their own soil.«¹⁵² As a sympathetic commentator has formulated, »the conduct of these wars expresses consistently the cosmopolitan and humanitarian Utopian view that all men belong to one human family and that potentially all belong to one "society of nature". In these wars the Utopians sacrifice treasure and blood, not in their national interest merely, but for the welfare of all humanity.«¹⁵³

The colonial wars, interestingly enough, are not discussed under the heading of »warfare«. They belong to »social and business relations«. Needless to say, they are founded in the idea of the »good life«. The »good life« requires a right number of citizens and rational spatial distribution of population. And because peace that reigns in Utopia brings with it welfare and prosperity, it is likely that

148. *Ibid.*, p. 8, 40.

149. *Ibid.*, p. 244. On the Turks as playing a role in providential scheme, *cf. ibid.*, Bk. III, especially chs. 13, 14, 17; and for the ideological background, C. A. Patrides, »"The Bloody and Cruell Turke": the Background of a Renaissance Commonplace«, *Studies in the Renaissance*, X(1963).

150. Thomas More, *Utopia*, eds. G. M. Logan and R. M. Adams, Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 87.

151. This is repeatedly stressed in Adams, *op. cit.*, ch. 9.

152. *Utopia*, p. 95.

153. Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

the population would increase. If that happens, »if the population throughout the entire island exceeds the quota«, the Utopians enrol citizens and »plant a colony under their own laws on the mainland near them, wherever the natives have plenty of unoccupied and uncultivated land. Those natives who want to live with the Utopians are taken in. [...] But those who refuse to live under their laws the Utopians drive out of the land they claim for themselves; and on those who resist them, they declare war.« Morus let his peace-loving people declare that »it's perfectly justifiable to make war on people who leave their land idle and waste yet forbid the use and possession of it to others who, by the law of nature, ought to be supported from it.«¹⁵⁴ In the ideal commonwealth, pacifism itself is pregnant with what, in the aftermath of World War II, was called the *Dämonie der Macht*.¹⁵⁵

Vives, the youngest among these Christian humanists, has been exalted as »incontestablement l'un des plus grands doctrinaires pacifistes que compte l'humanité«, and his work described as »une véritable somme de la pensée pacifiste«. He is regarded as »a man of peace and compromise in a time of religious fanaticism and destructive nationalism. Few people have spoken more eloquently than Juan Luis Vives against the tremendous absurdity of war as a means of solving human problems.«¹⁵⁶ The problem of war and promotion of peace were, indeed, his main concern. The claim, however, that his pacifism was »integral« and that he argued for an »universal agape«,¹⁵⁷ is open to debate. The doctrinal foundations of Vives' pacifism, systematically worked out in his *De concordia et discordia in humano genere*, have been discussed elsewhere;¹⁵⁸ here, I will summarily point out some aspects of the political application of this doctrine. In principle, this application was, for Vives as for his humanist friends, »an attempt to extend into the realm of praxis the message of the *philosophia Christi*«. ¹⁵⁹ As a cosmopolitan, what his heart beat for, was the whole world. Yet he was a cosmopolitan because he was a

154. *Utopia*, p. 56.

155. Cf. Brachin, *op. cit.*, p. 261. This »demoniality of power« is not totally absent from Erasmus' thought. His idea that princes who are beasts, not men, monsters polluted with human blood, should be banished to islands at the far corners of the world, »in extremas insulas deportandas« (*Querela pacis*, l.c., p. 425; transl. l.c., p. 306), actually boils down to the same. What is worked out in both authors is the expansion of European civilisation. For both of them, the outer world is at disposal of Europe.

156. Alain Guy, *Vivès ou l'Humanisme engagé*, Éditions Seghers, Paris 1972, p. 98 (»véritable somme« is a quote from Victor Sanz's *Vigencia actual de Luis Vives*); Carlos G. Noreña, *Juan Luis Vives*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1970, p. 227.

157. Guy, *op. cit.*, p. 120-2.

158. Cf. Fernández-Santamaria, *op. cit.*; Noreña, *op. cit.*; Adams, *op. cit.*; Guy, *op. cit.*

159. Fernández-Santamaria, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

Christian, and his world was correspondingly parochial: »but Christendom«. ¹⁶⁰ For Vives, »the integrity of the *respublica Christiana* [was] not beyond hope of recovery«, ¹⁶¹ yet his awareness of Europe was much more acute than in More and Erasmus.

The opinions on whether Vives thought that Europe could be unified by imperial power or by natural tolerance, mutual respect and enlightened self-interest, differ, ¹⁶² yet his vision was »the vision of a unified Europe«. ¹⁶³ He saw Europe suffering terrible damages because of incessant wars, so that what was needed – in order to survive – was no less than an universal reconstruction. ¹⁶⁴ The essential condition for this was that European princes stopped fighting each other: concord which, for Vives, is synonymous with peace. If wars, in general, are something that only idiots, *hominis imbecillitas*, want, wars in Europe, wars between Christians, are emphatically called madness, not wars: *insania, non bella*. ¹⁶⁵ It has been noted that »Vives' moral indignation against the internal wars of European nations was inspired not only by his sincere pacifism, but also by his passionate concern with the Moslem expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean.« ¹⁶⁶ The sincerity of his irenism is not to be doubted, it should be clear, however, that peace he had in mind was not universal, but solely European peace.

The absurdity of dissensions among Europeans, most vividly presented in Vives' dialogue *De Europae dissidiis*, is exhibited with the help of recurrent reference to the Turk. The alarming question which cuts into the discussion on endless European strife, is: »What is the Turk doing in the meantime? Does he sleep, or not?« The enemy is clearly not sleeping, he is taking advantage of the

160. Fernández-Santamaria, *op. cit.*, p. 120. Cosmopolitanism, as a rule, is a superiority-ridden, parochialism.

161. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

162. Noreña, *ibid.*, p. 223, 227; Adams, *op. cit.*, ch. 17; Fernández-Santamaria, *op. cit.*, p. 52-7.

163. Noreña, *op. cit.*, p. 223. Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 264, speaks (with reference to Vives' *De Europae dissidiis*) of the underlying »commonwealth-of-Europe idea«. Vives himself used the image of fascio, »un lió inextricable« (*De la insolidaridad de Europa y de la guerra contra el Turco (De Europae dissidiis et bello turcico)*, in Juan Luis Vives, *Obras completas*, ed. L. Riber, vol. II, M. Aguilar, Madrid 1948, p. 48), the symbol under which what seems to be the first conference on Europe took place in Rome, in 1932. Two volumes of proceedings were published in Rome in 1933; interesting reports are to be read in *Nazionalsozialistische Monatshefte*, 3 (1932), 33: A[lfred] R[osenberg], »Europa in Rom«; Rudolf von Maltzahn, »Sinn und Bedeutung des Europa-Kongresses in Rom«; and »Bezeichnende Vorträge auf dem Europa-Kongreß in Rom vom 14.-20. November 1932«.

164. *Concordia y discordia en el linaje humano (De concordia et discordia in humano genere)*, in *Obras completas*, l.c., p. 75.

165. *De la insolidaridad de Europa*, p. 48; Rafael Gibert, »Lulio y Vives sobre la paz«, *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*, l.c., p. 159.

166. Noreña, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

discord among Christians, and the dialogue is a reveille for Europe to »unite against him and rush with arms at the ready to destroy him«. ¹⁶⁷ For Vives, the war he desired, was clearly not a defensive war. In *De Europae dissidiis* it was argued, that the European »solidarity«, brought about »under the imminent threat of the enemy without«, ¹⁶⁸ would make possible not only the recovery of occupied territories (the liberation of European people from the Turkish servitude) but also the occupation of Asian lands. That Europeans are a superior race, was beyond doubt, ¹⁶⁹ and instead of fighting among themselves for the handful of land which they could grab from each other in Europe, they should as one Christian army break the Turkish power, appropriate for themselves the riches of Asia and, following the shining example of the Greeks in their heroic age, plant colonies there.

Even a favourably disposed account of Vives' thought had to point out that »probably because of his strong feeling against a Moslem state, Vives could not see the necessity of a policy of accommodation and appeasement with the Ottoman Empire. Instead he became one of the idealistic crusaders and alarmist prophets who constantly demanded a European alliance against »the invading hordes from Asia.«« ¹⁷⁰ For him, the Turks were untrustworthy and he saw no legal ground on which one could make treaties with the professed enemies of Christ's religion. ¹⁷¹ His pamphlet *De conditione vitae Christianorum sub Turca* has been characterized as a »violent denunciation of any "detente"«. ¹⁷² One aspect of this was that Vives was very hard on those Christians who, despairing of the oppression that they suffered under Christian rule, hoped that they might do better under the Turks. ¹⁷³ For him, this was stupid fantasizing

167. *De la insolidaridad de Europa*, p. 46, 50. (Something that did not happen when the Turks invaded Hungary, a couple of months before Vives wrote this piece.)

168. *De la insolidaridad de Europa*, p. 51. (What is »called Europe« is pictured here as a »ciudad amenazada«.) The Turk is also presented as the »enemigo común«. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

169. The authority of wise Aristotle had to back the assertion that »la raza más fuerte y más animosa y acerada es la que puebla Europa; que los Asiaticos son medrosos y no aptos para la guerra, más parecidos a las mujeres que a los varones. Por manera que la Europa no solamente produce hombres que se aventajan a los otros en ánimo y fuerzas, sino fieras también. Los leones que nacen en Europa tienen más coraje que los púnicos; y lo mismo acontece con los perros, con los lobos y los otros animales, aun cuando los africanos aparenten fiereza mayor.« *Ibid.*, p. 58.

170. »He exaggerated the Turkish threat and failed to evaluate the accomplishment of Moslem civilization. His crusading spirit was old-fashioned and dangerous.« Noreña, *op. cit.*, p. 225, 226.

171. »Si el cristiano no observa lo que juró al cristiano, 'observá el Turco lo que al cristiano prometió?« *De la insolidaridad de Europa*, p. 52. »Cum Turca non est idem iuris.« Gibert, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

172. Noreña, *op. cit.* p. 225.

173. In this respect, »[e]l Turco, gran peligro exterior de Europa, es mirado igualmente por Vives como un peligro interior.« Gibert, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

about liberty;¹⁷⁴ it meant forfeiting the eternal happiness (to which there was only one path, that of the »true religion«) for earthly well-being;¹⁷⁵ and, as a submission to the enemy, it was not only entering the »extreme slavery« but also a treacherous desertion of »our Christian society«.¹⁷⁶

Steven Runciman, in his history of the crusades, has argued forcefully that, »[u]nlike Christianity, which preached a peace that it never achieved, Islam unashamedly came with a sword.«¹⁷⁷ This is true, yet it is a perverted truth. Europeans never achieved peace because, unlike Islam, they did not make war in order to achieve peace but made peace in order to wage war. However, all the wars they have made prove that their peace efforts have been successful. Bosnians are the latest victims of European peace.

174. *De la condicion de los cristianos bajo el Turco (De conditione vitae Christianorum sub Turca)*, in *Obras completas, l.c.*, p. 65. Clearly, the *libertas* for which Vives himself opted was the one which reached its apogee in the polities of Athens, Sparta and Rome. *Ibid.*

175. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

176. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 70, 73. Choosing to direct his criticism against the despaired subjects, Vives differed from Erasmus who censured Christian princes for aiming to impose a »Turkish tyranny« on their own people. *Consultatio, l.c.*, p. 72.

177. Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, vol. 1, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1991, p. 15. Runciman has also argued that »it was the Christians of the East who were the most unwilling and most unhappy victims« of the crusades. »Byzantium and the Crusades«, in *The Meeting of Two Worlds. Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades*, eds. V. P. Goss and Ch. Verzár Bornstein, Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo 1986, p. 22. I am sure that Sir Steven did not mean to say that the muslims were happy and willing victims of the crusade. Yet ideas have currency in the West that might lead one to assume that the muslims cannot be victims. If they nevertheless happen to be victims, this is always as a result of retaliation for some kind of intolerable crime they have committed. Gibbon's warning to Europe, considered »as one great republic«, that it can never feel secure, should be incorporated in the preamble of the new European constitution: »Yet this apparent security should not tempt us to forget that new enemies, and unknown dangers, may possibly arise from some obscure people, scarcely visible in the map of the world. The Arabs and the Saracens, who spread their conquests from India to Spain, had languished in poverty and contempt, till Mahomet breathed into those savage bodies the soul of enthusiasm.« Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. XXXVIII, »General Observations«.