

THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE  
OF THE CIVILIZATIONAL CRISIS

I. *The Sociology of Militarism, Structural Violence and Peace.*  
*The State of the Art*

There is a powerful vision by Walter Benjamin which from time to time comes back to haunt the field of social sciences. A storm drives the angel of history out of Paradise towards an undetermined future. Turning his face towards the past, the angel sees only catastrophe, which keeps on piling wreckage upon wreckage. The storm of history called 'progress' never gives him time to rebuild what has been destroyed. He must continue his flight ahead.

The ancient phantom of total destruction and universal conflagration has become an easily realisable possibility by today. We are now facing a Frankenstein-like phenomenon. Nuclear and microelectronic technologies in the past decades have entered into total conflict with traditional geographical and political units and concepts. Having produced a technology which, for the first time in history can effect the whole planet and beyond, mankind is unable to use its own creations for social needs. In his article *'Can we survive technology? John von Neumann'* (1955) called this phenomenon the maturing crisis of technology. Von Neumann predicted that by the 1980s this crisis would develop far beyond all earlier patterns of crisis. Today, in the second half of the 80s, we can argue if he was right. Instruments produced for the sake of such noble aims as 'defense' and 'national security' could destroy our entire culture, together with its acknowledged 'drown' *industrial civilization*. Therefore, from a broader historical perspective we can call this process, being determined by *instrumental rationality* (Furtado, 1978) a *civilizational crisis* instead of the crisis of technology. Hence, civilizational crisis includes the ever-growing tensions and discrepancies between material technology and, to use a metaphor, 'social technology'.

If we explain the concept of crisis as a subjectively perceived objective endangering survival (Habermas, 1973), the existence of the 'subjective side' is unquestionable. *Modern industrial civilization* — the concept of which has been synonymously used with that of 'progress' up to the present — has entered upon the phase of radical self-suspicion and insecurity (Brand, 1983).

The self-contradiction and irreversible self-destructive effects of the worldwide process of modernization have become more and more obvious from the middle of the 20th century onwards.

This self-contradictory 'progress' combined with a significantly decreased optimism about the future doesn't give rise to the same self-sacrificing attitude in societies now being at the beginning of modernization which determined the more optimistic period of Western industrial revolutions. The dubious concept of progress facing the irresistible character of the process of modernization has caused a powerful *crisis of consciousness*, the reaction patterns of which cover a whole range of attitudes from re-ideologizing traditional solutions through rigidly rejecting the existence of the problem itself, to the »refusal of the project of modernity« (Habermas, 1981). Even Dahrendorf (1980), a liberal representative of modernization acknowledges that there is more at stake than an undeniably existing left- or right wing cultural pessimism or an 'anxiety in modernity' (Berger, 1975), or some nostalgic antimodernism. Dahrendorf speaks about entirely new solutions which are regarded taboos today, »which are not invented yet«. He considers the Greens and other 'alternative' movements the harbringers of new solutions since they seem to gradually disintegrate «the social democratic consensus» characterized by economic growth, political participation, equality of citizens, belief in sciences etc. Dahrendorf argues that this consensus, accepted by 75 percent of the population of OECD countries, entered upon an »obscurisation-phase« in the '80s. On the other hand, due to the *constraint of modernization* and the deeply rooted value system of industrial civilization (excessive self-assertion manifesting itself as power, control and domination of others by force, aggressive competitiveness, the illusion of indefinite economic growth, scientism, the worship of efficiency etc.), there are many who consider the phenomena of crisis as natural concomitants of industrialization and accept them as a »price of modernization«.

Opposed to them, there is a growing circle of critics and antagonists of the modernization process. However justified it is to criticize the »no-future« spirit of the »lost generation«, the semi-mystical »escapism« or the eschatological Apokalypse-expectations, we also have to see objectively that industrial civilization with its alienating, environment-destructing, dehumanizing and bureaucratic considerations has produced its own opposing party. By the permanent violation of the conditions of reproduction of life, the endangering of present and future generations' work and life perspectives and also by presenting it as if endangering were a natural concomitant of »progress«, the most appreciated biogenetic and military-industrial products of »technical progress« raise not only the question of »how to shape development« but also if it is necessary at all.

In other words not only the decisions but also the premises of the decisions are challenged (Brand, 1983). Although social protests are usually organized around concrete abuses and are rather kaleidoscopic in their goals, these fragmented movements represent a comprehensive civilization criticism. This »protest-potential« (Habermas, 1981) has to be taken seriously.

Thus, one can speak of a spreading crisis-consciousness which fundamentally undermines the leading ideas of the growth-oriented industrial society. The »price« of modernization will not be paid anymore without further ado by the societies concerned. The contradictory process of industrial development, the ecological, social and political consequences of the application of new technologies, the relation of man to nature, and also his/her own body: the



rules of the game of political life, etc. will remain matters of conflicts mobilizing the protest potential.

What are the most important crisis-foci around which this potential is (or can be) organized?

1. The endangering of natural living conditions through the permanent disturbance, pollution and destruction of the ecosystem keeps alive and further develops the *ecological awareness*. There is a rising concern for ecology ethic, and developing »soft« technologies. In the political arena, the *antinuclear movement* is fighting the most extreme outgrowth of our self-assertive megatechnology (*Mumford, Capra, Furtado*) and in doing so, it throws light upon the widening range of militarism.

2. The possibility of total destruction through a nuclear collision calls for a new concept of security, for the renewal of the East-West dialogue (f. e. *Palme Report*, 1982). The emerging tendency of the involvement on civil society in this dialogue and its endeavour to control and influence state activity will be a focus of conflict in the future.

3. The developmental dynamics of modern industrial society not only biologically threatens humankind, but its contradictions become manifest in forms of social, cultural and psychological disturbances as well.

4. It is becoming increasingly clear that there are deep interlinkages between the drastic poverty of the *Third and Fourth Worlds* on the one hand and the worldmarket dependency, modernization strategies and global militarization on the other. More than fifteen million people — most of them children — die of starvation each year: another 500 million are seriously undernourished. Almost 40 percent of the world's population has no access to professional health services: yet, underdeveloped countries spend more than three times the amount on armaments than on health care.

The growing *worldwide instability and inequality* and the deepening gap between the »North« and the »South« as part of the civilization — and modernization criticism has become a political and moral issue, i. e. another movement forming focus of crisis and conflict.

Primarily in the industrial countries one can speak about emerging and strengthening postmaterial values (*Inglehart*, 1977) such as self-realization, participation, decentralization, autonomy, the insistence on aesthetic qualities etc. beginning to displace the dominant materialistic values of »security« and »order«. From this significant shift of the value system derives the revaluation of political priorities — hence the emergence of the claim of »new politics« (*Hildebrandt, Dalton*, 1977).

In short, the greatest achievement of the »*new social movements*« is their effect reshaping the value system. Due to their specific character, they can easily decline and even disappear. Yet, the civilizational crisis, the symptoms of which they are, will definitely reproduce them.

## II. *From the political economy of war and militarism to the sociology of dehumanization*

If we turn our attention from the consciousness symptoms to the 'real processes' of the crisis of industrial civilization, the most striking and most threatening of them are global militarization and nuclear arms race.



Apart from the one-sided economic, political or strategic analysis, the problem of war and militarism has been a fairly neglected area of social sciences.

Owing to the shock caused by WW I and to the growing discrepancies between the limitless technical progress and the obsolete political structures and institutions and also to the strengthening militarism of the inter-war peace period several writers have done substantial work. However, *Martin Shaw* (1984) correctly remarks that the impact of authors like *Pitirim Sorokin* (1937), *Quincy Wright* (1942) or *Stanislaw Andreski* (1954) on sociology as a whole was and has remained marginal.

After World War II, *C. Wright Mills* was among the first who tried to put the question into a broader social context in a convincing way. *Mills* (1958) perceived that, despite its hopelessness, preparation for World War III has been built into the economics and politics of both the East and the West. The targets of *Mill's* polemic were the power elite in general and especially the intellectual technicians and apologists of the war machine. Being very sceptical about the presumed anti-militaristic potential of modern industrial societies, he regarded the *power elite* — the representative of war ideology — homogeneous and entrenched. *Mills* explains the rising influence of the military and the subsequent escalations of arms race as fundamental long-term tendencies of modern industrial society which will ultimately result in World War III. The 'inertial thrust', of which *E. P. Thompson* warned much later, was first identified by *Mills*. For the first time in the history of social theory, the concept of 'militarism' has become an organizing principle of the processes being at work in modern industrial society.

As the tendencies analysed by *Mills* became stronger, social theory devoted more attention to the intertwining of economic, social and military processes.

The concept of *military-industrial complex*, which started its career with President Eisenhower's warning Farewell Address in 1961, was further developed by *Dieter Senghaas* (1972) who speaks of a 'political-ideological-military-scientific-industrial' complex. Although the awkwardness of this enlarged category indicates the necessity of theoretical/conceptual development, it contains the important perception that the nuclear age which required a »sustained deployment of research, military technology and industrial capabilities«... does »not only swallow up enormous sums of money and tie up resources, but... also program the development process of the countries concerned«. Thus, *Senghaas* involves the problem of ideological and psychological deformations inseparable from this 'programmed development'. The paranoid state of the managers of MIC is reflected by the propaganda machines charged with creating an awareness of the permanent external threat. He admits that the decision-makers have become the prisoners of their own self-generated worst-case assumptions. *Senghaas* took a decisive step towards the analysis of the mechanisms of mass communication transferring the values of militarism into everyday life: however, the comprehensive explication of the phenomenon of »armament culture« and »weapon-fetishism« is due to *Robin Luckham* (1983).

Although the participants of the debate on MIC have never clarified the concept theoretically, they agree that MIC is a self-reproducing structure which serves as an instrument for both internal and external violence and that militarism increasingly determines the processes of political, economic



and scientific life, while its propaganda machine makes arms race desirable for the public opinion.

An attempt to a conceptual grasp of the connections between global militarism and other crisis-symptoms was made by *Johan Galtung* (1971). In his view, the managers of the MIC are the agents of a global policy of »structural violence«, the main function of which he regards to be the maintenance of inequalities inside and among nations. The linking together of the two levels — »national« and »international« — of the analysis proved very fruitful, since it showed the irrelevant nature of the nation-state as an exclusive unit of analysis and at the same time made it impossible to solve the problem of militarism, arms race etc. in global generalities. The analysis of structural violence simultaneously manifesting itself both in national and international dimensions brought into the limelight the relation between the *state* and the *interstate systems*.

State theory can be very useful in explaining the global and local phenomena of militarism since historically there is a close connection between the emergence of the state as a separate entity from society and the concentration of legitimate violence in a specialised body, i. e. the military.

Some writers argue, however, — *Wallerstein* (1982), *McKenzie* (1983) etc. — that it is misleading to talk of *the state* in itself. Individual states exist not in isolation but in the context of other states, as parts of the *interstate system*. *Militarism* is directly tied up both by the concept of the interstate system and by that of the sovereign state.

War has been typically war between sovereign states. However, the role of violence in international relations has undergone fundamental changes. After *WW II*, total war can no longer be viewed as an instrument for achieving national goals. Apparently, and paradoxically this shift was followed by the *globalization of militarism*, and the militarization of the »South« by the »North«. This paradox is included in the concept of *deterrence*. This new fundamental category of international relations is equated with a reduction of the chances of the outbreak of a total (nuclear) war. According to the theory of deterrence, arms race, i. e. preparation for war guarantees the maintenance of peace. A critical approach to the concept of deterrence can provide a starting point for a sociological explanation of international relations.

The presence of force as a permanent threat, its simultaneously conceivable and inconceivable double character causes new kinds of social and sociopsychological impacts. Traditionally, »national security« and »defence of the motherland« are matters of a psychological security and a positive affiliation to a collectivity. The spectre of the holocaust can produce higher levels of personal insecurity, leading either to apathy or cynicism, or, — in a lesser degree — to a growing moral resistance.

As a counter-trend, the prolonged exposure to the international threat of mass destruction can cause a diminishing commitment to internal order. Individual terrorism, the spread of neofascist tendencies and rightwing extremism among young people, the expansion of the »no-future« atmosphere and mass violence in sport stadiums built for nobler fights, though cannot be originated exclusively from the new forms of world wide military force, they can, by no means be explained separately from them.

The enrichment and growing efficiency of the forms of organized, planned and controlled violence is reflected in its spontaneous, uncontrollable, incal-



culable manifestations. Thus, we can only agree with *Morris Janowitz's* (1974) conclusions that military institutions have a diminished ability to provide psychological security and that massive military preparations and expenditures contribute to aggressive internal disorder. This challenges the legitimacy of military force. *Janowitz* made a successful attempt to outline a complex sociological approach: which connects the analysis of the interstate system of nuclear age with the explanations of 'internal' social tensions. According to him, the crisis of legitimacy in military force is »one formulation of the sociological dimension of international relations«.

*Fusion of force and persuasion* are new features of international relations, in which the *symbolic aspects of force* become more and more central.

*Janowitz's* central idea is that the classical categories analysing international relations must be reconceptualized in the nuclear era. He refuses the concept of *deterrence* not only because it has been misused but also because »it deals mainly with military goals and does not encompass the range of processes and objectives required by an international order that seeks to avoid war«. As an alternative to the classical language — balance of power, offensive-defensive etc. — *Janowitz* introduces the more dynamic concepts of »stabilizing« and »destabilizing« military systems.

*Janowitz* made a decisive step from the biased, reductionist economic and strategic analyses towards a comprehensive theory of structural violence and dehumanization. The successful involvement of the sociological approach in the exploration of interlinkages between war, militarism, arms race and international relations proves that the concurrent analyses of »global« and »local« issues is not only possible but also necessary.

But however aptly he distinguishes the stabilizing political-military systems from the destabilizing ones, his view on »nuclear weapons managed without consuming excessively large amounts of resources« seems somewhat illusionary today. And however significant the impetus he has given to the analysis of international relations by introducing the aspects of sociology, the new epoch of the 80s — witnessing a new cold war and as a response to the unprecedented outburst of national and transnational peace movements — had to come so that the worldwide symbols of war, militarism and violence altogether may become the basis of a comprehensive critical social theory.

*E. P. Thompson's* (1900) article, — *Notes on Exterminism the Last Stage of Civilization* — symbolizes this turning point in social scientific thinking.

*Tohmpson* suggests a shift of paradigm: instead of examining the origins, we have to turn towards »the consequences of consequences«: cold war is the »central human fracature... the field of force which engenders armies, diplomacies and ideologies, which imposes client relationships upon lesser powers and exports arms and militarisms to the periphery«.

Imperialism is an inadequate category to describe this unprecedented situation characterized both by antagonism and by reciprocity. He argues that we cannot explain arms race and its possible outcomes in terms of the economic interests and political intentions of states and ruling elites. Nuclear arms race has a logic of its own, the secret of which is to be found in its products: »The category which we need is that of exterminism.«

The logic of exterminism which has been locking superpowers for decades in the postures of military confrontation is leading to the global militarization of politics, societies, economies and cultures.



*Thompson* emphasizes that the emergence and working of this logic symbolises a new historical epoch which can be understood only in a holistic approach, i. e. if we take into consideration both of the antagonists concurrently. »What may have originated in reaction becomes direction. What is justified as rational self-interest by one power or the other becomes, in the collision of the two, irrational.«

Thus this logic requires at least two agents for its realization, whose deliberate policy has to be directed to collision. *Thompson* agrees with *C. Wright Mills*: the immediate cause of World War III is a preparation for it. This inertial thrust towards war is deeply rooted in the structures of the opposed powers. Militarism and militarization, therefore, cannot be located in a limited place of society or economy.

To describe these processes, *Thompson* borrows the concept of *isomorphism*, an expression of the fundamental, continuous correspondence between the military and the civil sphere of society (*Øberg*, 1980).

But this integration between the military and the civilian sectors is increasingly asymmetric, with the military-industrial sector tending to become the 'centre', while the civilian sector becomes peripheralised.

*Thompson's* conclusions are alerting and mobilising. He argues that a new internationalism is needed since the exterminist thrust can only be confronted by the broadest alliance of peoples *inside each bloc*. Secondary differences must be subordinated to the human ecological imperative. Only a *new international alliance* which includes the churches, Eurocommunists, trade unionists, ecological movements, autonomous East European movements, etc. would be able to break the deadly logic of exterminism.

*Thompson's* provoking article has challenged the contemporary left wing social scientific world. A significant number of historians, philosophers, sociologists and economists — Marxists and non-Marxists — have been participating in this ongoing debate (to mention only a few names: *André Gorz*, *Cornelius Castoriadis*, *Rudolf Bahro*, *Ernest Mandel*, *Ágnes Heller*, *Ferenc Fehér*, *the Medvedev-brothers*, *Andrew Arato* etc.).

From a social scientific view the vitalizing effect of the 'debate' is obvious: it brought out the study of war, peace and related social movements from the net of strategic analysis and peace research: at the same time, it has thrown new light upon many issues such as the crisis of Western democracies, the renewed conflicts of state and civil society, the shortcomings of class analysis, the specific features of Western and Eastern societies, the possibilities of combining the most acceptable characteristics of socialism and capitalism etc.

And neither has failed a critical evaluation of the new social movement, first of all that of the Western peace movements.

---

In their contribution entitled *The Peace Movement and Western European Sovereignty*, *Andrew Arato* and *Jean Cohen* consider peace movements as representatives of an important new phase of the struggle for the social and political democratization in Europe. They make three major challenges. *On the structural level* they are challenging the historically new degree of irresponsible administrative/bureaucratic intervention into social and economic processes. *On the normative level*: these movements represent the penetration



of the democratic process of will-formation into the spheres of technocratic rationality. *On the institutional level*: the new social movements represent the best current possibilities for restabilising and democratising the heritage of *Civil Society* in the West. On the other hand, they do not fail to notice their shortcomings. They agree with *André Gorz*, who claims that the majority of the participants in the existing peace movement tend to glorify *'mere life'* instead of *'good life'* (i. e. their aims are socially limited). According to *Castoriadis*: this is the zoological interest of mankind, the ethics of slavery. Therefore, like Thompson they consider it necessary that the new autonomous social movements transcend the *'zoological level of peace'*. Only under this condition could the *civil society* promote the process of redemocratization *versus the state*. These critical points of view deserve attention. Even if we consider the changing tendency of the value-system, the protest-potential and the possibilities of different movements joining each other to be significant developments, we must also see that the movements emerging around the crisis foci of the industrial society are rather fragile and their direct social impact is limited.

From a sociological point of view, we can identify two basic social groups in connection with the movements. The first one is the wide circle of the *'affected'* ones who are directly touched by the process of modernization and militarization. This group cannot be described even approximately by pure class- or stratum-categories. The second one which has been crystallized around universal values is the much narrower group of *'activists'*.

On the one hand, the extent to which the affected society is mobilized depends strongly upon local conditions, upon the traditions of solving conflicts etc. On the other hand, the globally prevailing megatechnics and nuclear armament produced general patterns of reaction. The knowledge about nuclear weapons and nuclear war is organized in a way that the great masses of people remain mute concerning them. This does not only mean that they regard nuclear war as fate — that is they don't include it among their soluble problems — but it also means that strong power interests are involved in strengthening this feeling. *Paolo Freire* (1985) argues that the conditions that have rendered illiterate Latin American peasants politically and linguistically mute in the face of oppressive social conditions are deeply embedded in their socialization. The great mass of people who are oppressed live in a *culture of silence* while those few who are dominant live in a *'culture that has a voice'*. One of the primary characteristics of these societies is their *self-depreciation*. They hear so often that *'they are good for nothing, know nothing, and are incapable to learn anything — that in the end they become convinced of their own unfitness'*. (*Freire, 1970*).

Similarly, the citizens of industrial societies have learnt that they are incompetent concerning nuclear war and nuclear weapons. Strategic experts, politicians, etc. often argue *'that the public is not competent to judge in these matters anyway'* (*Fiske, 1980*). Thus, in *Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s*, *Hermann Kahn* (1984) essentially discredits the ordinary citizen's *'common sense'* approach to these issues. According to him, the voices opposing nuclear arms race and deterrence *'are basically irrelevant, impractical . . . or foolish and should be eliminated from the debate at the outset'*.

As we have seen, nuclear deterrence has become an element of reality, which justifies the existence of weapons and has been accepted as such by



the vast majority of our societies. As a consequence of the logic of peace forming around the concept of deterrence, the *culture of silence* has developed around the nuclear issue as well (Skelly, 1986).

Radical peace researchers have pointed out that the majority of the scholarly works on peace and war contributes to the maintenance of this culture of silence while repressing other knowledge that might contribute to the development of a more critical social consciousness. Thus, according to Philip Green (1966) »the intellectual imperialism of deterrence theory is not just an academic fact, but a political act«. Schmid (1968) criticized peace research for its becoming »a factor supporting the *status quo* of the international power structure«. Following Schmid's critique, Bereince Carrol (1972) argued that peace research has been preoccupied with »the cult of power« so it has failed to »challenge the prevailing conception of power as dominance«. Skelly (1986) strongly emphasizes that we have to pay more attention to the *culture of silence* manifested around the peace issue.

Peace today — using Michel Foucault's phrase — can be characterized as one of the »subjugated knowledges« from those sets of knowledges that »have been disqualified as inadequate to their task, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity«. As long as the magic belief in the power of those who can speak about nuclear weapons remains strong (Skelly, 1986), the dreadful culture of silence will survive.

The antinuclear, antiwar movements — as well as other alternative movements — can play a significant role in loosening this psychic numbing. They do not have an easy task, however. Deterrence pursued by the slogan of peace has led to permanent fears, intimidation and preparedness on global level, that is: to war in 'pure' form. To return to human communication from the Orwellian language, the world community has to reach the concept of peace based on mutual interests and interdependence at the field of conflicts between and inside societies. From the idea of common survival to a human life lived together.

### III. Conclusions

Authors, who speak about the complexity of crisis, the coincidence of cycles and trends of longer and shorter terms are seemingly right. This crisis — in a historical perspective and in view of the 500 years' cycle mentioned by Mumford, Capra, Sorokin etc. — is the crisis of the industrial civilization, which manifests itself in the breaking of the absolute monopoly of instrumental rationality and in the self-contradictory developments of the process of modernization appearing to be unsolvable. As if by the end of the 20th century, mankind were captive of its own instruments which originally were thought to serve its prosperity and defense.

During the process of »historical progress« war, power struggle and all that follows: paranoia and megalomania have not only remained accepted and basically unchallenged, but also as a result of the technological development, have themselves further developed by extending their range and by multiplying their power all over the world. The destructive side of the megamachine works on in technically more »efficient« circumstances today. *Military-industrial complex, civil-military isomorphism, garrison state and garrison*



*society, New Military World Order* etc. are politico-sociological concepts which, though they require further clarification and thinking can be used to properly apprehend the socially determining role of arms race and militarism. *Structural violence* is nothing but the self-assertion of the extending tendencies of militarism, and the paranoid power struggle. Considering the external and internal elements of structural violence »natural« or »the constraints of things« has a legitimizing and reaffirming force keeping the *status quo* unaltered.

The tendency of the *modern state* toward continuous mobilization is obvious since World War I, but is only fully realized by World War II and its aftermath, *Cold War*. *Deterrence* keeps societies in the permanent state of war preparation. It is thus in their requirements for mobilization rather than their destructive power that nuclear weapons have become ultimate weapons (Skelly, 1986). According to their social functions, the use-value of nuclear weapons is expressed in the substitution of total war for total mobilization. This is how nuclear weapons help the state in monopolizing the instruments of coercion to a growing extent. Thus, the accumulation of power takes place in a »stainless« pure war which theoretically can be waged without significant inner challenges since it takes not even a single soldier's life. As Virilio (1983) argues: »the total peace of deterrence is Total War pursued by other means«.

*Exterminism*, the extreme end value of destruction, is the highest level of human alienation — evolved by the second half of the 20th century. It is a Frankenstein — phenomenon, since mankind can be not only the captive but also the victim of its own instruments. If we interpret civilizational crisis as a process and assert that it is nothing but the turning of megatechnics — which subordinates creativity and freedom by means of instrumental rationality — into preponderant and un-manageable, then *exterminism* can be defined as *the climax of civilizational crisis*.

As civilizational crisis deepens, as the role of megatechnics, militarism and the states become more and more overwhelming and their interpenetrations more and more oppressive, — the alternatives of refusal begin to take shape. If we can rely on Sorokin's theory of the 500 years' cycles, at the present we are at the beginning of a new civilizational era: heading from the materialism-hedonistic 'sensate culture' towards a spiritualist/idealistic epoch.

The new social movements refusing the majority of preeminent values of the industrial society (megatechnics, megalomania, belief in indefinite economic growth, wasteful consumption, the unrestrained exploitation of nature etc. in short) indirectly outline the main characteristics of a new value system. Alternative movements should be evaluated from this point of view and not according to their 'efficiency'.

The new common dilemma of the alternative movements is on the one hand, the danger of cooptation — i. e. becoming integrated —, on the other hand, the danger of disintegration due to the lack of institutionalization. This dilemma is properly expressed by the deliberately self-contradictory self-definition of the Greens: non-party party.

Nevertheless, the dilemma also involves the perception that in the long run only the avoidance of integration or co-optation can guarantee the control and influence of state activity for social movements.

The conscious understanding of this status of *residual power* has had both in the »East« and in the »West« a revitalizing effect on political thinking



and public life. The phrase of *functional interdependence* — based upon the recognition that a »revolutionary« violent overthrow of the power of state wouldn't have a chance and wouldn't make sense — helps to apprehend this new, shifting constellation.

For all that, it must be seen that the *cognitive revolution* or the *new intellectual renaissance* the demand for which appears on the political, scientific, economic cultural and every day-life's level as well, can develop only in the long run and that it necessarily whirls along a lot of offshoots and novelties.

To consider the new social movements only as passing fads is a grave misunderstanding or dangerous self-deception since the symptoms of civilizational crisis will disappear only after the crisis itself has come to an end. In accordance to the protest cycles, their intensity and mass base may change, their claims may alter again and again, they may get into a wave-trough or may become victims of repression. But at the same time as manifestations of consciousness and conscience of *civil society versus state* they will always find new forms for themselves.

*Immanuel Kant* described the strenghtening cosmopolitan attitude of humankind as one of the conditions of *eternal peace*. This claim today, in the century of the strenghtening nationstates and nationalisms sounds somewhat utopian. Yet, the new social movements responding to the challenge of the civilizational crisis — even involuntarily — further develop the cosmopolitan consciousness.

The conditions of a real — not just warless — peace cannot be formulated without digging out the roots of militarism and structural violence. In my opinion, war, militarism and structural violence interpreted in the global context of civilizational crisis are a group of problems the apprehension of which in their connections would throw a new light upon all the fields of sociology.

Besides militarism, aggression among and within societies can be regarded as the most recalcitrant built-in limit to the non-zoological level of peace.

The notion of peace has to be expounded. Peace doesn't exist without freedom, political and economic democracy, enforceable human rights. Peace must also mean mankind's reconciliation with itself, that it learns to operate its own technical inventions not mainly against itself but mainly in its own interest, thus overcoming the civilizational crisis. The explication of the concept has to be based on a shift of scientific paradigm. This is why — in contradiction to war and militarism — peace still does not have a »sociology«.

#### REFERENCES

- Andreski, S., 1954: *Military Organization and Society*, Berkeley.  
 Arato, A., Cohen, J., 1982: *The Peace Movement and Western European Sovereignty*, in: *Telos*, Nr. 51.  
 Brand, K.-W. et al., 1983: *Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt/New York.  
 Brandt, W., Report, 1980: *North-South: A Programme for Survival*.  
 Berger, P. et al., 1975: *Das Unbehagen in der Modernität*, Frankfurt/New York.  
 Benjamin, W., 1980: *On the Concept of History*, In: *Angelus Novus*, Magyar Helikon.  
 Capra, F., 1982: *The Turning Point*, Bantam Books.



- Caroll, B., 1972: Peace Research: The Cult of Power, in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. XVI.
- Castoriadis, C., 1981: Facing the War, in: *Telos*, Nr. 46.
- Dahrendorf, R., 1959: *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*.
- Dahrendorf, R., 1980: Widersprüche der Modernität und die Zukunft der Freiheit, in: Branchling, E. et al. (Hg.), *Die Zukunft der westlichen Gesellschaft*, Bern/Stuttgart.
- Deutsch, K. W., 1981: Coping with the Risks of Peace: a Look at Some Prospects, in: *Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2.
- Fiske, S., 1986: Adult Reactions to Nuclear War: Evidents from Surveys and Experiments, National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine (Manuscript).
- Foucault, M., 1980: *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, New York.
- Freire, P., 1970: *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, New York.
- Freire, P., 1985: *The Politics of Education*, South Hadley, Mass.
- Furtado, C., 1983: *Accumulation and Development*, Oxford.
- Galtung, J., 1971, in: D. Senghass (ed.), *Kritische Friedensforschung*, Frankfurt/M.
- Green, Ph., 1966: *Deadly Logic*, New York.
- Habermas, J., 1973: *Legitimationsproblem in Spätkapitalismus*, Frankfurt/M.
- Habermas, J., 1981, a.: *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankfurt/M.
- Habermas, J., 1981, b.: *New Social Movements*, in: *Telos*, Nr. 49.
- Hildebrandt-Dalton, R. J., 1978: Die Neue Politik, in: *Wahlsoziologie heute*, PVS 18. Jg., Heft 2/3.
- Inglehart, R., 1977: *The Silent Revolution. Changing values and political styles in Western Publics*, Princeton, N. J.
- Janowitz, M., 1974: *Armed Forces, Nationalism and International Relations*, in: *World Politics*, XXVI July.
- Kaase, M., 1979: Legitimationskrise in westlichen demokratischen Industriegesellschaften: Mythos oder Realität?, in: Klages, H., Kmiecik, P. (Hg.), *Wertwandel und gesellschaftlicher Wandel*, Frankfurt/New York.
- Kahn, H., 1984: *Thinking about the Unthinkable*, New York.
- Kant, I., 1985: *Eternal Peace*, Budapest.
- Kothari, R., 1984: An Interview with Mary Kaldor, in: *END Journal*.
- Luckham, R., 1983: *The Arms Race and the New International Anarchy*, IDS, University of Sussex.
- Luckham, R., 1984: *Armament Culture*, IDS, University of Sussex.
- MacKenzie, D., 1983: *Militarism and Socialist Theory*, in: *Capital and Class*.
- Mannheim, K., 1935: *Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus*, Leiden.
- Mills, C. W., 1958: *The Causes of World War III*, New York.
- Mumford, L., 1967: *The Myth of the Machine. Technics and Human Development*. London.
- Neumann, J. v., 1955: *Can We Survive Technology?*
- Miszlivetz, F., Kaldor, M., 1985: *Civilizational Crisis, Slowdown or Crisis?* IDS, Bulletin Vol. 16, No. 1.
- Øberg, J., 1980: *The New International Military Order: A Threat to Human Security*, in: Eide, A., Thee, M. (ed.), *Problems of Contemporary Militarism*, London.
- Palme Report, 1982: *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament*.
- Schmied, H., 1968: *Peace Research and Politics*, in: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. V.
- Scocpol, Th., 1979: *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, Cambridge.
- Shaw, M., 1984: *War, State and Society*, London.
- Skelly, J., 1986: *Nuclear Weapons and the Hidden Discourse of Power*. Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation University of California (Manuscript).
- Sorokin, P., 1937: *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. I. IV., London.
- Thompson, E. P., 1980: *Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization*, New Left Review.
- Virilio, P., 1983: *Pure War*, New York.
- Wallerstein, I., 1982: *Crises: the World Economy, the Movements and the Ideologies*, Paper presented at VI. Annual Political Economy of the World-System Conference, University of Arizona, April.
- Wright, Q., 1942: *A Study of War*, 2 vols., Chicago.