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The Final Countdown: Fascism, Jazz, and the Afterlife

Count till All

It is well known that Mussolini was not a fan of opera. Instead, he praised and advocated for the “theater of masses,” which could accommodate a large number of people.¹ Though a theater of the masses in its own right and in its own time, opera houses could no longer keep up with the political demands for mass-consumable culture.² In the early 1920s, beginning with the Milanese La Scala, the Italian regime started undermining and reorganizing the so-called ente autonomo model of the opera houses to bring all private and public opera houses under state control in an attempt to use opera as a vehicle for propaganda.

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houses under its control. In the early 1930s, all the main opera houses “transferred the property of the theater building from ente autonomo to the municipality, and dictated that the president of the institution was to be appointed by [...] Mussolini” himself. Consequently, the opera repertories, informed by nationalistic ideology and subject to censorship, drastically changed, and the selection process tended to favor (living) Italian composers. By the time anti-Semitic legislation came into force in 1938, most major compositions were already ignored or began to systematically disappear from programs. At La Scala, for instance, one could no longer listen to Rossini’s Mosè or Verdi’s Nabucco. However, works by Arnold Schoenberg, Felix Mendelssohn, Kurt Weill, Alban Berg, Anton Webern, Paul Hindemith, and other (living) Jewish composers were intentionally overlooked, too.

That is why it is all the more surprising that in an interview from 1932 Mussolini defined race as a feeling and not a reality. The political censorship of the aesthetic was itself grounded in an aesthetic dimension of the political. I quote from Mussolini’s interview with Emil Ludwig:

Of course, there are no pure races left; not even the Jews have kept their blood unmixed. Successful crossings have often promoted the energy and the beauty of a nation. Race! It is a feeling, not a reality; ninety-five per cent, at least, is a feeling. Nothing will ever make me believe that biologically pure races can be shown to exist today. [...] No such doctrine will ever find wide acceptance here in Italy.

Mussolini juxtaposes race as a feeling to race as reality, seemingly delivering it of its absolute dependence on supposed biological substance. Racism thus construed pertains to subject rather than substance. However, while Mussolini may be said here to deliver race of its absolute dependence on presupposed (biological) substantiality, he does not deliver it of absolute dependence itself. Race is

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5 Ibid., p. 18.
posited here as a matter of belief, and racists are absolutely dependent on it. We may be reminded of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s notion of religious faith as being entirely dependent on a feeling of absolute dependence.\footnote{See Richard Crouter, \textit{Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.} Furthermore, we should remind ourselves of Hegel’s reply to Schleiermacher: “[Then] a dog would be the best Christian, for it possesses this [felling of absolute dependence] in the highest degree and lives mainly in this feeling.” Dogs that are fed the bone of race so as to secure their own “salvation”\footnote{Quoted from \textit{ibid.}, p. 91.} are racist.

After the official implementation of the \textit{Manifesto of Race},\footnote{For a more detailed account, see Snowden, “Race Propaganda in Italy”, pp. 103–111.} the state apparatus stripped Italian Jews of their citizenship and prohibited them from participating not just in opera but also in jazz and swing music, which at that time started to massively increase in popularity. \textit{Manifesto of Race} was first published on 14 July 1938 in \textit{Il Giornale d’Italia} under the title “Il Fascismo e il problema della raza” and republished a month later in \textit{La Difesa della Razza} in an attempt to popularize racism. It was written by the members of the Fascist Party and several established scientists who, in the form of ten propositions, delivered biological explanations of and justifications for the notion of race. Significantly, a month before the document was made public it was circulated anonymously under the title \textit{Il Manifesto degli Scienziati Razzisti} (Manifesto of Racist Scientists).\footnote{\textit{Cf.} “The Italian Racial Laws”, Centro Primo Levi, New York, October 2011, https://primolevicenter.org/events/the-italian-racial-laws/.} But what was distinctive about the \textit{Manifesto} was not so much the ongoing hostile attitude towards Jews, but also the introduction of a hostile attitude toward people of color.\footnote{\textit{Cf.} ibid.} This turn from anti-Semitism to racism, however, did not undermine the hostility toward Jews, but rather strengthened it even further. The \textit{Manifesto} effectively reduced the “intolerance” within its own, already fascist-oriented group and increased the difference between Italians and “the rest”.\footnote{\textit{Cf.} Theodor W. Adorno, “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda”, in A. Arato and E. Gebhardt, \textit{The Essential Frankfurt School Reader}, New York, Continuum, p. 130.}

Another distinctive feature of the \textit{Manifesto} is summed up by the old accusation against Jews as being mere usurers and emotionally inert people not ca-
pable of producing the real passions necessary to produce music. Similarly, in
his controversial article “Judaism in Music” Wagner posed a question of “how it grew possible to the Jew to become a musician” and claimed that if “we hear a Jew speak, we are unconsciously offended by the entire want of purely-human expression in his discourse: the cold indifference of its peculiar ‘blubber’ (‘Gelabber’) never by any chance rises to the ardour of a higher, heartfelt passion. [...] Never does the Jew excite himself in [a] mutual interchange of feelings with us, but – so far as we are concerned – only in the altogether special egoistic interest of his vanity or profit [...]).” In making his anachronistic claim, Wagner draws on, in a sinister spin, the Kierkegaardian idea of music as a medium of sensuality – a point to which I return in the third section of this text. However, Wagner names exceptions to this rule. First, he speaks favorably of Bach, Beethoven, Mozart, Heine, Mendelssohn, etc. A few paragraphs later, he approvingly mentions – and capitalizes – only three (Jewish) names, namely Mendelssohn, Heine, and Börne, and then, in the very last paragraph, he highlights a single name, the one true exception: BÖRNE, who
came among us seeking for redemption: he found it not, and had to learn that only with our redemption, too, into genuine Manhood, would he ever find it. To become Man at once with us, however, means firstly for the Jew as much as ceasing to be Jew. And this had BÖRNE done. Yet Börne, of all others, teaches us that this redemption can not be reached in ease and cold, indifferent complacence, but costs – as cost it must for us– sweat, anguish, want, and all the dregs of suffering and sorrow. [...] But bethink ye, that one only thing can redeem you from the burden of your curse: the redemption of Ahasuerus – Going under!

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14 Ibid., p. 85.
15 For an extensive analysis of Kierkegaard’s thesis on the ultimately Christian invention of carnal sensuality, see Simon Hajdini, Na kratko o dolgčasu, lenobi in počitku, Ljubljana, Društvo za teoretsko psihooanalizo, 2012.
16 “FELIX MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY [...] has shown us that a Jew may have the ampest store of specific talents, may own the finest and most varied culture, the highest and the tenderest sense of honour.” (Wagner, “Judaism in Music”, p. 93.)
17 “He was the conscience of Judaism, just as Judaism is the evil conscience of our modern Civilization.” (Ibid., p. 100.)
18 Ibid.
Here, I propose reading the above-mentioned old accusation against Jews against the backdrop of the claim that every virulent anti-Semitism depends on making an exception (which in turn proves the rule). In order to truly hate something in its entirety, one needs to make an exception. Within the context of Wagner’s essay, this implies that to “exclude” all Jews, i.e., everybody, from the domain of music, one needs a figure of the Jew that stands for Judaism disembodied. And that is precisely what Wagner does when subtracting, counting down: first, Wagner discusses a series of artists; then, only Mendelssohn, Heine, and Börne are left; until – finally – only Börne is left standing in this final countdown.

Here, a type of exception is announced that follows the logic of count till none and to which I will return in more detail in the final section of this text. For now, I would like to claim that every addition comes at the expense of subtraction; whenever we add up, something must necessarily be subtracted so as to arrive at the desired result. Concretely, while adding seats at the opera houses, for example, Mussolini simultaneously excludes/subtracts Jewish composers. Or, to take another example, from Arthur Rosenberg, who in his 1934 analysis of the origins of fascism famously argues that the distinctive feature of fascism is not its ideology but rather its origin myth, entirely premised on the operation of addition: according to the myth in question, Hitler started with six followers, who then became a thousand, then a million, then 40 million, until finally encompassing the entire German nation. Or, in the case of Italy, how on 23 March 1919 in Milan, when the first Congress of the Italian Fascists took place, there was a gathering of 145 people, which finally grew to encompass the entire Italian nation. While counting “their own” (till all are included), the fascists at the same time exclude “the others” (Jews, people of color, homosexuals, etc.). Put differently: the fascists simultaneously count till all (are included) and count till none (are left). This double count provides the model and basic mechanism of racism.

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20 Rosenberg, “Fascism as a Mass Movement”, p. 144.

21 Ibid.
The point I am trying to make here is that counting alone, either forward, as was the case with the myths that sustained the fascist mass movements, or in reverse, as is the case with Wagner’s count, already makes the difference.

Dubbed Music

But let me return to the relationship between Judaism and music, specifically jazz in fascist Italy. In 1940, an article appeared in Minerva that claimed that “Jews have used jazz for economic reasons only: this music has become an instrument for ideological propaganda and for the corruption of our spiritual health.” However, at that time in Italy, but also in the rest of Europe, especially in France, Germany, and England, it was not only Jews and people of color who were not allowed to produce jazz, as it was banned in general. Although the reception of jazz in Europe varied, it was generally perceived as a “foreign” and “degenerate” art form, originating in African American culture. Jazz first arrived in Italy in 1924 with American soldiers. It soon became associated with the wealthy bourgeois and other nobles, who could afford to travel abroad, while signaling the barbarism and corruption synonymous with capitalism. Moreover, the corrupting nature of jazz was further accentuated by its close relationship to dance, further signaling perversion and testifying to corrupted morals.

All these negative connotations leading up to the prohibition of jazz music presented the political regime with an additional problem: jazz was precisely the art form that attracted large crowds, the form of evental gathering that Mussolini was opting for. In his brilliant essay “The Saxophone and the Pastoral: Italian Jazz in the Age of Fascist Modernity,” Robert Dainotto points out that in Italy jazz was marked by a specific ambiguity: on the one hand, it was unwelcome due to its African American roots, and as such did not adhere to or glorify the Italian

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23 Most scholars agree that the birthplace of jazz is New Orleans, where it developed in the 1910s, and that it first arrived in Europe after the end of World War I. Cf. Calenza, Jazz Italian Style, p. 4.
24 Calenza, Jazz Italian Style, p. 4.
25 However, that which was seen by some as perversion, meant liberation for others, especially women. It is widely accepted today that the jazz age, which began in the 1920s, goes hand in hand with the women’s rights movement.
tradition; but on the other hand, jazz served very well to protect the “national interests in the light of mass society.”26 Along the same paradoxical lines, Ruth Ben-Ghiat has argued that although jazz was imported, the Italian regime was able to paint it as both fascist and Italian.27 Ben-Ghiat speaks of this paradoxical process in terms of a “politics of display and appropriate.” To a surprising extent, fascist Italy was able to absorb, assimilate, and recreate “that which it has received from other races, making it something entirely [Italian].”28 Jazz, so it seems, although officially banned and undesired by the State, was effectively appropriated and put to use by the State in order to lead the country into a new era. Following Adriano Mazzoletti’s Il Jazz in Italia, Roberto Dainotto further shows that no jazz concert was ever cancelled in Italy and that no other country broadcast as much jazz music on the radio as fascist Italy. The peak of this acceleration was seen especially from 1938 to 1942, when the strictest racial laws were in force. Alessandro Pavolini, the then Italian Minister of Popular Culture who ordered the writing of the Manifesto, considered listening to jazz a “fascist duty.”29 When trying to understand this strange phenomenon, one is led to consider the question and problem of exceptionality, i.e., of what type of exception had to be operative in Italy for this to have been possible.

One of the most thoughtful answers to this question was provided by Dainotto who, echoing Paul Gilroy’s Against the Race, claims that

the racial element associated with this music represented for Italian fascism, especially after the racial laws of 1938, an opportunity, rather than a problem, to “aestheticize” the entire political question of race. [...] In [1935], Louis Armstrong’s February concert in Turin was organized with the full support of the regime, especially of Vittorio Mussolini. In 1936, in a climate of full cultural autarchy, virtually everything could be broadcasted as long as Louis Armstrong would be introduced

as Luigi Braccioforte, and Benny Goodman as Benito Buonuomo – as if to signal the autarchic capability of Italian culture to absorb and appropriate any alien element.\textsuperscript{30}

Domestication of the names of foreign jazz artists\textsuperscript{31} is only one side of the coin, the other one being the introduction of the comical element. Trivially speaking, to some jazz enthusiasts, not necessarily familiar with the Italian language, Luigi Braccioforte or Benito Buonuomo already sounds comical. The names have the same effect as revoicing or dubbing, as if these artists were the very first proponents of \textit{the dub}.

According to Dainotto, Louis Armstrong’s quirky stage persona was the first instance of this merging of jazz music with the comic: “It is exactly this association of jazz with the comic, I believe, that explains the surging popularity of jazz in the years following the implementation of the racial laws. More than the mere lure of the exotic, jazz could banalize and trivialize the entire question of race, which could thus be reduced to a comical episode on the path to Italy’s historical realization of its own Aryan-ness.”\textsuperscript{32} It seems that this excessive disregard for one’s own dignity turned out to be the only way to circumvent the laws.

In retrospect, this comical aspect of jazz is perhaps best captured by a flood of sitcoms and movies attempting to embody the spirit of fascist Italy. Here, the two most notable characters come to mind: the annoying captain Alberto Bertorelli (from the British sitcom \textit{Allo Allo!}) with his catchphrase “What a mistake-a to make-a!”, and Ferdinando “Nando” Mericoni (from \textit{An American in Rome}), who one day realizes that his future is not in Rome, where he was born and raised, but in the United States. Nando Americanizes his life by mimicking the sounds of the English language and by trying to live out everyday situations as though


\textsuperscript{31} In her \textit{Everything is Rhythm. Everything is Swing}, Camilla Poesio lines up various replacements and periphrases used to replace originally Anglo-Saxon words: most notably, jazz with “giazzo” or sometimes simply “musica ritmica”, and, perhaps most unusually, “accordion” instead of “saxophone”. (Poesio, \textit{Tutto è ritmo, tutto è swing}, pp. 87–88 and 115–116, quoted from Ben Earle, “Camilla Poesio, \textit{Tutto è ritmo, tutto è swing. Il Jazz, il fascismo e la società italiana}”, \textit{Transposition}, 8 (2019), https://journals.openedition.org/transposition/2908.

\textsuperscript{32} Dainotto, “The Saxophone and the Pastoral”, p. 290.
he was a character in some Hollywood movie. Both Nando and captain Bertorelli are irreducible to the role they imagined for themselves. Their irreducibility to an American identity (in the case of Nando) or to captainship (in the case of Bertorelli) resembles Wagner’s depiction of a Jew and his “peculiar blubber,” which is irreducible to the highest passion necessary to produce music.\textsuperscript{33}

Here, I would like to direct my focus at the question of the fascist regime itself and its leader, which had a stake in sustaining this type of excessiveness. In his analysis of Freud’s theory and the structure of fascist propaganda, Adorno argues that the key feature of a fascist leader is his “orality,” or more specifically, his “compulsion to speak incessantly and to befool the others.”\textsuperscript{34} For Adorno, the sole reason for the leader to deliver these kinds of speeches was not to persuade the masses with his arguments. Such freely “associative speech” involved occasional absence of self-control, “a temporary lack of ego control”: “[i]n order successfully to meet the unconscious dispositions of his audience, the agitator to speak simply turns his own unconscious outward.”\textsuperscript{35} One could argue that instead of entering analysis, the fascist leader exits analysis, deciding to display his unconscious in front of everybody, thus turning the multitude of his followers into his mass analysts, or into a crowd of analysts. While the “psychology of fascism,” as Adorno would have it, is manipulative through and through,\textsuperscript{36} and serves one purpose only, namely to subjugate the masses, this subjugation is not achieved through the repression of the masses as correlative to the speaker holding back and repressing his own true views, but rather through the process of externalizing or publicizing his own unconscious desire, thereby conferring it on the listeners. Thus, the crowd is not a proper Freudian analyst. On the contrary, the crowd identifies with the leader’s displayed desire, his meaningless babble, which is the minimal mark of its submission. At the same time, this is the first step toward reducing any intolerance within one’s own group, which, by extension, then entails greater hostility toward groups deemed foreign.

To return to Ben-Ghiat’s “politics of display and appropriate,” we can claim that the fascist leader \textit{displays} his unconscious in front of the masses, while

\textsuperscript{33} A Jew’s song, Wagner writes, “is just Talk aroused to highest passion,” and not a “speech of passion” that defines the properly musical. (Wagner, “Judaism in Music”, p. 8)

\textsuperscript{34} Adorno, “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda”, p. 132.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 133 (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Cf. ibid.}
the masses, the addressees of his unconscious babble, *appropriate* his unconscious by identifying with it. Moreover, this identification, as both Adorno and Dainotto claim, entails a specific comical element that often takes the form of mockery (of the object of identification). That is why captain Bertorelli, for example, is so funny to watch. Instead of being a true invader of France, he is reduced to a comical figure incapable of causing any real harm. The funniest thing about him is precisely his irreducibility to the role entrusted to him. He is not a captain; he is the guy next door, a nobody, masquerading as somebody wearing a ridiculous peacock-feathered hat. Put differently, the solemn and serious core of fascism in fact amounts to an object of ridicule – however, this ridiculous aspect of fascist domination is the lever of its authority. Recall Adorno’s warning: in Nazi Germany, “everybody used to make fun of certain propagandistic phrases such as ‘blood and soil’ (*Blut und Boden*), jokingly called *Blubo*, or the concept of the Nordic race from which the parodistic verb *aufnorden* (to ‘northernize’) was derived.”

In order to unpack this thesis, let us return to the figure of *Il Duce*. Romano Mussolini, his fourth child and an ardent jazz pianist (!) provided some valuable insight into Il Duce’s musical taste. Here is a quote from his memoirs: “Everybody knows of the Duce’s passion for the violin: my mother once told me he used to play near [my sister] Edda’s cradle, in order to calm her down when we used to live in the house of via Merenda. Some reader will be surprised, but the *Duce* was also a jazz lover.” Though not a fan of the opera, Il Duce, as well as the rest of his extended family, were fans of jazz. But what exactly does this imply? Dainotto’s claim that the regime was never serious in its intention to ban jazz music falls somewhat short and requires further unpacking and specification so as to account for this apparent contradiction.

In their *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer provide a key to understanding this seeming contradiction with a reference to the schema of the

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39 “Yet, the fact remains that Romano, starting his career in 1948 as the accordion player of Ugo Calise’s Star Jazz Quartet, grew up to become a leading pianist of the Italian jazz scene; that his brother Vittorio was, in fact, a renowned jazz critic in the thirties; and that, at a closer look, the regime never meant seriously to suppress jazz music at all.” (*Ibid.*)
anti-Semitic reaction. When something prohibited is identified with the prohibiting agency, the forbidden becomes allowed:

That is the schema of the anti-Semitic reaction. The anti-Semites gather to celebrate the moment when authority lifts the ban; that moment alone makes them a collective, constituting the community of kindred spirits. Their ranting is organized laughter. The more dreadful the accusations and threats, the greater the fury, the more withering is the scorn. Rage, mockery, and poisoned imitation are fundamentally the same thing. The purpose of the fascist cult of formulae, the ritualized discipline, the uniforms, and the whole allegedly irrational apparatus, is to make possible mimetic behavior. [...] The Führer, with his ham-actor’s facial expressions and the hysterical charisma turned on with a switch, leads the dance. In his performance he acts out by proxy and in effigy what is denied to everyone else in reality. Hitler can gesticulate like a clown, Mussolini risk false notes like a provincial tenor, Goebbels talk as glibly as the Jewish agent whose murder he is recommending [...] Fascism is also totalitarian in seeking to place oppressed nature’s rebellion against domination directly in the service of domination.40

Bertorelli is funny and harmless until he is not. Blubo and aufnoredn are funny until they are not. Mussolini may sound like a clownish provincial tenor, but ultimately the joke is on the listeners, with the clown grabbing hold of them (tenor comes from teneō, “I hold”). Through the act of the simultaneous suspension of the ban and appropriation of the banned, that which is considered rebellious and is thus prohibited is made to directly benefit this oppression – such was the dialectics of racism in fascist Italy.

The mechanism continues to be relevant today. Many Holocaust scholars, for example, would read it as a corollary to the logic of de-humanization that sustained the brutality of the Nazi concentration camps.41 However, Italian fascism may have gone furthest in exploiting this clownish suspension of the prohibition. Consider the following quote from Dainotto: “While Hitler sent trains to Auschwitz with Teutonic eagerness, Italy, engaged exactly in the same process,

accompanied its trains with a note of humor and *commedia*. If Primo Levi theorized de-humanization as the logic sustaining the violence of Auschwitz, I wonder if we should not theorize a different form of de-humanization – the reduction of the human to clown – as the logic sustaining the Italian concentration camps in Manfredonia and Fossoli.\footnote{Dainotto, “The Saxophone and the Pastoral”, p. 290.}

Minding the gap indicated by Dainotto, fascist de-humanization was not one of reducing the Other to bare, de-humanized life. Fascist de-humanization of the Other coincided with its *cartoonization*. But what is its function? Is the Other thereby reduced not to *bare life* (which can be legally extinguished), but rather to *bare afterlife*, i.e., to a non-human, creaturely substance situated beyond life and structurally akin to a cartoon character perpetually surviving its own death?\footnote{In his reading of Adorno and Benjamin’s interpretations of animated films, Simon Hajdini comments: “Benjamin sees cartoon characters as creatures of satanic laughter that have ‘thrown off all resemblance to a human being,’ while Adorno reduces these same characters to symptoms of traumatized bourgeois subjectivity. Their resilience and literal ‘destructive plasticity’ (to use Malabou’s term), their immeasurable capacity for enduring violence place them beyond the concept of trauma. The new subjectivity emerging from the burning ground of experience therefore disrupts ‘the entire hierarchy of creatures that is supposed to culminate in mankind,’ that is, in man as a reservoir of tradition and ‘inner life.’ The new subject is emphatically a subject without a biography: its life cannot be written because it is situated beyond life.” (Simon Hajdini, “Ste slišali tistega o Benjaminu?”, *Problemi*, 59 (9-10/2022), p. 148.)}

**Count till None**

In this section, I would like to highlight and unpack the type of exception indicated at the end of the first section and associated not with jazz but with its opposite, i.e., with so-called “serious music”. For Adorno, every representation of suffering eliminates “our shame before the victim.” While delivering us of shame in the face of the victims, such representations also nourish the “barbaric” assumption that even in the most extreme of situations “humanity flourishes.” Representations of extreme suffering are impossible in the sense that they (inadvertently or not) effect the opposite of what they intend. However, one cannot overlook the peculiar exception to this rule – an exception that is all the more peculiar because its source is Adorno himself:
Schoenberg [...] suspends the aesthetic sphere through the recollection of experiences which are inaccessible to art. Anxiety, Schoenberg’s expressive core, identifies itself with the terror of men in the agonies of death, under total domination. The sounds of *Erwartung* [...] finally meet what they had always prophesied. That which the feebleness and impotence of the individual soul seemed to express testifies to what has been inflicted on mankind in those who represent the whole as its victims. *Horror has never rung as true in music*, and by articulating it music regains its redeeming power through negation. The Jewish song with which the *A Survivor from Warsaw* concludes is music as the protest of mankind against myth.44

Adorno is referring to Schoenberg’s *A Survivor from Warsaw*. A quick overview of this rather unknown piece seems in order. *A Survivor* is a six-minute cantata set for narrator, male chorus, and orchestra. The piece has a tripartite structure; in the first part the narrator depicts the story of a survivor from the Warsaw ghetto during Second World War. One day, in the ghetto, the Nazi authorities held a roll call of a group of Jews. The group tried to assemble, but there was confusion, and the guards beat the old Jews who could not line up quickly enough. The Jews left on the ground were deported to the death camps. The guards then ask for a faster and faster head count, and the work culminates as Jews begin to sing the prayer Shema Yisroel (Hear, O, Israel). The work was composed in August 1947. Considered one of the first musical depictions of the Holocaust, it is often referred to as the “Holocaust cantata”. The piece premiered in November 1948 in New Mexico by the Albuquerque Civic Symphony Orchestra under the baton of Kurt Frederick. According to Schoenberg’s biographer Stuckenschmidt, the audience was so stunned by the composition that the work had to be performed twice: “After the first time the audience of 1,500 sat in astonished silence; after the second the applause was stormy.”45 Another reaction to the performed work was provided by the conductor himself. In a letter to Schoenberg, Frederick informed the composer of the huge success the work had achieved and of the audience’s persistent requests for an encore: “The audience of over 1,000 was shaken by the composition and applauded until we repeated the performance.”46 *A Survivor*’s success continued the following year in New York, when the piece

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46 Ibid.
was performed under the direction of Dmitri Mitropoulos. According to *Musical America*, “the listeners cheered and would not let the performers leave the stage for the intermission until the conductor had broken a Philharmonic Symphonic precedent”\(^{47}\) and the performance was repeated.

*A Survivor* was indeed a huge success, and despite Adorno’s comment, we should take note of this overexcitement, bordering on obscenity. Two things need to be noted, one particular and one more general. First, Adorno later revoked his favorable mention of *A Survivor*, which is a point worth mentioning. And second: amongst all of the art forms, music is possibly best equipped to encapsulate and trigger the most extreme of emotions; as such, music has, in the history of philosophy, held a privileged position. Suffice it to recall Nietzsche’s first book, *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music*, or Kierkegaard’s analyses of Mozart’s *Don Giovanni*. In the context of this text, it is possible to claim that the Holocaust finds its only adequate representation precisely in music. Where words fail, music succeeds in representing the impossible. However, one can also claim that music is the ultimate fetishistic art form. Mladen Dolar, in his book *A Voice and Nothing More*,\(^ {48}\) has drawn attention to the fact that music is somehow immediately understandable, that it emanates sense immediately understood by any listener. However, Dolar adds, this characteristic of music as emanating an immediately comprehensible sense coincides with its opposite, i.e., with music’s ultimate meaninglessness. As listeners, we immediately, without thinking, without any apparent mediation, “get the gist of it”; we immediately know what it means, but once asked to convey this meaning we resort to empty phrases and commonsensical descriptions. Music means that it means, and that is all that it means. Its aura of deep meaningfulness is immediately confronted with its ultimate meaninglessness. Music’s meaning is the embodiment of an absence of meaning, just like a fetish is the embodiment of an absence, a stand-in, covering up the hole at the core of reality.

But if ever there was a musical piece that is the Platonic Idea of such a notion of music as conveying the highest of meanings, it is Beethoven’s *Ode to Joy*. In

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his book on Beethoven’s Ninth, Esteban Buch succinctly designates Beethoven’s symphony as the fetish of Western civilization, “an aural fetish in the Western world.” If we follow Adorno in reading Schoenberg’s A Survivor as an adequate representation of the Holocaust, it is no surprise that after the 1960s a strange ritual emerged, namely that of performing Beethoven’s Ninth immediately after Schoenberg’s A Survivor. The film documentary Following the Ninth: In the Footsteps of Beethoven’s Final Symphony mentions one performance that joined the two pieces as follows: “In a tremendous symbolic gesture, the Beethoven Orchestra of Bonn plays Schoenberg’s ‘A Survivor from Warsaw’ and without a pause goes straight into the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven. The Jewish prayer is joined by Beethoven’s.” Although the documentary does not mention the exact date of the performance, the pairing of Schoenberg’s cantata and Beethoven’s Ode to Joy in fact occurred on numerous occasions, gaining additional popularity in recent years. In 2012, The Cincinnati Symphonic Orchestra and its musical director Louis Langrée announced the initiative “One City, One Symphony”. The initiative was described as a “journey from tragedy to triumph,” i.e., as a journey from the split to the restoration of totality. I want to propose two possible interpretations of this curious match.


For instance: on April 1969 under the baton of Erich Leinsdorf, the musical director and conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra. This was Leinsdorf’s farewell concert. A recording that combined A Survivor and Ode to Joy was made on 14 March 1986. This, too, was the farewell concert of the conductor and musical director of the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra, Michael Gielen. In the CSO program book that Gielen wrote for the concerts held in March at Music Hall in Cincinnati, we read that he juxtaposed the two pieces because he wanted to combine the old and the new, to see how the old music would react to new music and vice versa, adding that at “first there seems to be no connection – but they are related. The connection is dialectical and not easy for me to describe.” (See http://www.musicincincinnati.com/site/commentary_2013/Michael_Gielen_Musical_Visionary_for_Cincinnati.html, accessed 2 September 2022.)

Ibid.

Throughout recent history, especially in the last decade, Schoenberg’s A Survivor has been performed alongside many symphonies. In 2012, for instance, Kurt Masur and the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra released an album that pairs Schoenberg’s piece with Anton Bruckner’s Seventh, while Simon Rattle paired it with Gustav Mahler’s Symphony No. 2 (known as the Resurrection Symphony). For my present purpose, I will focus only on the pairing with Ode to Joy.
The first possibility would be to interpret the pairing of the two musical pieces in terms of an ultimate obscenity. A deep wound of the Real, opened up by Schoenberg’s piece and producing traumatic effects, is sutured by the fetish of Beethoven’s *Ode to Joy*. The most radical split of the social is thus amended, and society – after performing the traumatic duty of listening to Schoenberg’s piece – is once again restored in its unproblematic, harmonious totality. In his analysis of ideology, Dolar often uses the paradigmatic Brechtian example of a capitalist who enters the stage and declares the following: “I am a capitalist, and my sole aim is to exploit the workers.” Dolar argues that such a statement can never properly function in ideological discourse, since it unveils the (hidden) background of the ideological intention itself. Ideological discourse remains ideological only insofar as it does not proclaim itself to be ideological, thus masking and obfuscating its ideological pretext. The direct assertion of the capitalist’s interest would thus mark the very impossibility of ideological discourse.

However, in *A Survivor*, this ideological appendage is fundamentally lacking, a step away from the Thing, a withdrawal from the Real, comes to the fore only via its add-on, namely by way of adding to the cantata *Ode*, which has not only the capacity to restore the harmonious totality but also the ability to insert the missing ideological framework. The main fetishizing effect of *Ode to Joy* is not only that it covers up the “horror ringing true” in Schoenberg’s cantata, but that by adding to the *Survival’s* prayer its own, joyful one, celebrating life and the flourishing of all humanity, it effectively sublates the suspended aesthetic sphere of *Survivor*, thus eliminating “its redeeming power through negation.” As indicated by Adorno, the lesson of such an endeavor is that it falls into the abyss of its opposite, into aesthetic pleasure that erases the dimension of the trauma. No wonder, then, that the audience of “One City, One Symphony”, when asked

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54 The Brechtian procedure is discernible in Schoenberg’s libretto for *A Survivor*. For instance: “Faster! Once more, start from the beginning! In one minute I want to know how many I am going to send off to the gas chamber! Count off!” The sergeant who is counting off people is indeed directly asserting the interest of the Nazis (“I am an SS officer, and my sole aim is to kill off the Jews”). However, this does not necessarily imply the above-mentioned impossibility of ideology. Here, one should take note of Adorno’s thesis regarding Italian fascism and its lack of *Verfremdungseffekt* (a distancing or alienating effect) as crucial to the very functioning of ideology: “Fascism has in some respects realized this procedure of Brechtian theater: it has directly asserted the demand for obedience [...] but in such a way that it did not produce the distancing effect. Although faked, the fascination was there.” (Mladen Dolar, *Strel sredi koncerta*, Ljubljana, Cankarjeva založba, p. 158, note.)
to share their thoughts on what they had just heard completely forgot about *A Survivor*, instead praising *Ode to Joy* and expressing their gratefulness for being able to participate in this initiative. Reportedly, some even danced while drinking their champagne in the reception hall.\(^{55}\) What is sublated here is precisely the suspended aesthetic sphere of *A Survivor*, and by way of abolishing this abyss of the Real opened up by Schoenberg’s piece, *Ode* remains the sole “survivor”. Differently put, *Ode* becomes the ultimate “truth” of *Survivor*. (One may note here that the original libretto was initially titled “A Survivor of Warsaw.”)\(^{56}\) The inner split, or inherent tension, in Schoenberg’s cantata is not abolished for the sake of some higher totality, of the unification of the human spirit. The Warsaw prayers do not praise the triumph of the human spirit. The ultimate tragedy of the Warsaw prayers is that they are praying for themselves – although they escaped the killings and the beatings in the ghetto; although they are still alive, they are already (un)dead. The name of the initiative “One City, One Symphony” should thus be read by the letter: the symphony serves not only as a fetishistic ideological appropriation of the musical piece, but also as the ultimate ideological gization of the Holocaust.

From here, let us return to the problem of the (im)possibility of aesthetic representations to point out two irreducible attitudes towards it. The first attitude, or theoretical stance, is in line with Adorno’s claim according to which such representations sublate “our shame before the victims” and thus turn into their very opposite, obfuscating or rather erasing the difference between the victim and executioner. The second option is provided by narratives that render neither facts (documents, testimony, etc.) nor ideological truisms, but opt for the subjective truth as provided by the victims. For Adorno, such “committed literature”\(^{57}\) translates and integrates the Holocaust into “cultural heritage,” conse-

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55 “I thought it was incredible, I’ve never seen so many people this excited about a concert, it’s really kind of fulfilling for me to see that!” Another audience member commented: “Yes, I also loved it, it’s my third time seeing this symphony, and each time I like get a way bigger perspective on it.” (See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s7VK-fpeS7A, accessed 2 September 2022.)


quently allowing for its incorporation into the very culture that generated it. For Adorno, the insistence on impossibility is the only possibility. However, as emphasized by Wajcman, one has to avoid falling into the trap of praising this impossibility. In his *The Object of the Century*, Wajcman claims that the representation of the Holocaust as impossible is not enough; such a claim might as well be a call to forget, i.e., to paradoxically forget that which we cannot remember. A further impossibility needs to be added here: it is not merely impossible to represent the Real of the Holocaust; it is also impossible not to represent it, albeit in failed and ever failing attempts.

The “One City, One Symphony” initiative is nothing if not an appropriation of the Real, or of the lie about the truth. But this “lie about the truth” should not simply be read along the lines of Lacan’s famous claim according to which “the truth has the structure of a fiction.” Lacan’s point, of course, is not that no truth is possible; he is no postmodernist relativist proclaiming our structural embeddedness in the cobweb of fiction, while discarding the very notion of truth as something potentially “totalitarian”. To refer to one of Žižek’s arguments that points in the same direction: in Joshua Oppenheimer’s *The Act of Killing*, the Real or the truth of this Real is not abolished by the fiction; it is rather the fiction itself that renders it visible in the first place. One ought to distinguish between a lie and a lie, i.e. between, on the one hand, a “true lie” (as in the famous title of the film *True Lies* starring Arnold Schwarzenegger), a lie as the structural component of the very conveying of the truth, as its “medium”, and, on the other, a “false lie” (as brought about by Beethoven’s *Ode to Joy* as it sublates the horror of *A Survivor*). *Ode* is the epitome of a “false lie” which fails to encapsulate both the inherent impossibility (of aesthetization) and the (aesthetic) symbolization of the impossibility of the Real, or the formalization of this impossibility, serving as a means of its ideologization. However, if we follow the thesis about the Holocaust’s necessary elusion of representation, the failure of *Ode* could be said to be structural: there is no true lie about the Holocaust; all lies, all symbolic representations, amount to “false lies” and are thus manifested in the fetish, standing for the truth of this “false lie” itself.

Let us proceed with our second reading. What if we must abandon this simplistic opposition and block our theoretical reflexes, and instead take this idea se-

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riously? What if such a denouncement of the succession of the two pieces is a way of escaping another, more fundamental truth? What if the simplistic opposition between Schoenberg’s Truth and Beethoven’s Lie is itself false and should be rejected? What could be this bitter truth that only comes to the fore if we abandon this opposition? It is the following, deeply unsettling one: There is no Schoenberg without Beethoven; there is no Auschwitz without the cartoonishly obscene rejoicing of humanity.

Can such a paradox serve as a potentially productive principle? Fascist modernity seems to have managed to do just that: against the backdrop of a flexible national identity that followed Ben-Ghiat’s logic “of display and appropriate,” there emerged a new (monolithic) ethnic identity. And the paradoxical role of jazz within the fascist movement seems to have been the harbinger of just such a change. In short, the prohibited became a symbol of national identity.

References


